No, and that is my point. We do not first become aware (or ever become aware) of our neural state and then interpret what that state means. For an (instrumental) sign to work we need to be aware of what the sign is, and then decide what it means. There is no such process here. So calling neural pulses "signs" only increases confusion. — Dfpolis

Nevertheless, functional neuroimaging links the spatiotemporal properties of neural response and the cognitive state of a subject. So, neural signals signify conscious and/or semi-conscious content.

"In each of these techniques, images generated while the subject is in one cognitive state may be directly compared, on a location-by-location basis, with images generated while the subject is in a second, different state."
Talavage, T. M., Gonzalez-Castillo, J., & Scott, S. K. (2014). Auditory neuroimaging with fMRI and PET. Hearing research, 307, 4–15. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heares.2013.09.009.

This establishes correlation, but not causation.
Does neural response cause perception, or does perception cause neural response?

So, in your view, no dynamics links neural signals and visual perception?? — Dfpolis

I don't know what the link is between neural signals and various types of perception. And I don't think current neuroscience has explained it.

Currently, I am inclined to think that it may be emergent (i.e., a property and/or effect not attributable to organism components in isolation or in sum).

What do you think it is?

The same signals indicating I am seeing an apple also indicate that my retinal state has change. — Dfpolis

Two different signals are involved in the process of sensation.
Light (one type of signal) changes retinal states. Photoreceptors (rods and cones) in the retina transform light into neural signals.

Neural signals and visual perception are related by correlation, not causation.
So, do neural codes signify conscious content?
They may signify conscious content, or semi-conscious content (e.g., sleep, automaticity, or the reception of subliminal and/or supraliminal stimuli), or both (in the case of dual processing).

Do you mean rather, how does this allow us to distinguish body states from the states of other objects?

It's a useful analogy in some contexts, but it may not be the best analogy for analyzing the ontology of mind. — Relativist

I think that mind is an integrated set of organism events which produce an individual's automatic and controlled acts, so; an open sub-system of (at least certain) organisms (e.g., those having a central nervous system). But, the ontology of mind is off-topic.

...if consciousness of objects is solely due to awareness of neurally encoded content, we can have no basis for thinking objects are distinct from ourselves. To do so we must grasp an intelligible difference between our self and the object, and there is none in the neural signal. — Dfpolis

Signals are not only transmitted from environment to body to mind, but also from mind to body, causing change in the environment. The capacity for motor coordination differentiates object (other) and self in the mind of a sentient being.

E.g. reference to "information" seems problematic, because information connotes meaning, and meaning entails (conscious) understanding - which seems circular, and it doesn' seem possible to ground these concepts in something physical. — Relativist

Communication (including: data, encoding, code, message, transmission, conveyance, reception, decoding, information) is a good analogy for the sensation process if a physical (as opposed to only semantic) type is acknowledged.

First...There is no difference, even in principle, between a neural message saying we are seeing a red apple and one saying we are seeing (having our bodily state modified by) a red apple.
It seems to me that grasping this difference requires a direct intuition of the object as an object, as other -- and this, or something functionally equivalent, is missing from our model. — Dfpolis

Object and subject are an ontological unity, having epistemological distinctions.

From a Cognitive viewpoint:
A neural message is a function of sensation (stimulation-response).
1) Stimulation is exogenous and/or endogenous stimulus (sensory signal) transduction by receptors, causing a response.
2) Response is the propagation of action potentials in excitable cells.

Seeing a red apple is a function of perception (sensory interpretation), specifically: vision.

The brain processes sensation data, and the mind processes perception data (these are incommensurable levels of abstraction).

From an Ecological viewpoint:
Gibson, James Jerome. 1977. The Theory of Affordances. In R. Shaw & J. Bransford (eds.). Perceiving, Acting, and Knowing: Toward an Ecological Psychology. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Second...What a neural signal encodes is immaterial as long as the response to it is biological effective (evolutionarily fit). However, if consciousness of objects is solely due to awareness of neurally encoded content, we can have no basis for thinking objects are distinct from ourselves. To do so we must grasp an intelligible difference between our self and the object, and there is none in the neural signal. — Dfpolis

This is a function of self-awareness development, levels 2 & 3.
Rochat, Philippe. 2003. "Five Levels of Self-Awareness as They Unfold in Early Life". Consciousness and Cognition 12 (2003): 717–731.

Third, the idea that neural impulses act as a signs glosses over and obscures the dynamics of sensory awareness. — Dfpolis

Biosemioticians would classify a "neural impulse" as a signal type of sign.

The boundary between "learned" and "innate" is not so clear, so I do not think reference to such a boundary could make a useful moral principle. — Metaphysician Undercover

The boundary between "learned" and "innate" is the boundary between "culture" and "nature". Cross-Cultural research attempts to differentiate the two.
I recommend starting with "social awareness" (specifically, ethical facts), not character, before moving on to moral principles.

Furthermore, if "virtue" could only refer to learned characteristics, then if we were to judge innate characteristics they could only be judged as vices or indifferent. If all innate characteristics are indifferent, then we cannot learn to overcome any innate tendencies to become virtuous. — Metaphysician Undercover

"learned characteristics", "innate characteristics", "innate tendencies"?
So begins the confusion of terms. I'm not interested in going there.

I agree.
Based on what I currently know of Virtue Ethics, I would use "virtuous" to describe a type of character (those aspects of personality considered to be learned, as opposed to innate), the result of lifespan experience.

But meanwhile - is it not clear that there are several concepts that need investigating simply as part of the philosophy of psychology and, as I should recommend - banishing ethics totally from our minds? Namely - to begin with: "action," "intention," "pleasure," "wanting." More will probably turn up if we start with these. Eventually it might be possible to advance to considering the concept "virtue"; with which, I suppose, we should be beginning some sort of a study of ethics. — Anscombe

This implies that a coherent Moral Psychology entails a virtue (as opposed to deontological or consequentialist) approach to Ethics.

I would replace her list of concepts requiring investigation with (in order): "social awareness", "intersubjectivity", "empathy", "evaluation", "knowledge", "decision-making", "conscience", "introspection", "judgment", "motivation", "intention", "volition", "act", "habit", and "character".

From a psychological standpoint, starting with "character" puts the cart before the horse.

Use of the terms "moral obligation", "moral duty", "morally right or wrong", and "morally ought", need not be related to concepts of authority and/or legality (as in Divine Rules) in order to make sense.

They may be related to psychological concepts (as in Universal Rules) having human nature as its basis, inasmuch as:

1) Moral sentiments are a human universal (Brown, Donald E. 1991. Human Universals. New York City: McGraw-Hill. ISBN 0-87722-841-8).

2) Similarities between the moral codes and value systems of the World's major Book Religions and systems of Moral Philosophy indicate that morality is likely to have a basis in human nature rather than human culture. (cf., Kung, Hans; Kuschel, Karl-Josef, Eds. 1993. Declaration Toward a Global Ethic. The Declaration of the Parliament of the World’s Religions. SCM Press, London / Continuum, New York.)

Given an ethical model, or morality (classification of human events as moral or immoral), the realisation of right (moral) action involves applying one of the following:
1) General approach (e.g., Master Rule, or Method)
2) Particular approach (e.g., Virtue) — Galuchat

Galuchat, I am impressed how methodically you have thought this through. — god must be atheist

Thanks, but I didn't come up with these particular ideas, they are part of Natural Law Ethics.

My only objection to your presentation is the notion of "given ethical model". It is given either in a general approach, or in a particular approach, and both approaches involve a basic sense of morality, but neither approaches spell out what that basic sense of morality is. — god must be atheist

Correct.
The application of an approach to realise (actualise) right action is a function of Normative Ethics (the topic of this thread), whereas; "what morality is" is a function of Descriptive Ethics, which is off-topic.

I agree.

Even if we never had to act while tired or in pain and always had hours to flowchart outcomes, there would be unknowns. — frank

This is a common, and valid, criticism of Consequentialism. However:
1) Children make decisions based on considerations of consequence (reward versus punishment) (Kohlberg, 1983).
2) Having knowledge of possible consequences entails responsibility.
3) Ignorance of possible consequences constitutes negligence.

I think that:
1) An individual's conscience operates on a Deontological basis.
2) With regard to Political Ethics, public policy formulation would best operate on a Consequentialist basis, because:
a) The ethical quantity of action affecting a social group is relatively great, warranting careful consideration of particular circumstances.
b) The problem-solving, decision-making, and planning capacity/resources of a social group are fit for purpose (appropriate to the task).

Given an ethical model, or morality (classification of human events as moral or immoral), the realisation of right (moral) action involves applying one of the following:
1) General approach (e.g., Master Rule, or Method)
2) Particular approach (e.g., Virtue)

The amount of time available for decision-making depends on the exigencies of a situation. Required response time varies along a continuum between immediate and eventual.
1) Immediate decision-making requires automatic processing.
2) Eventual decision-making permits controlled processing.

So, the exigencies of a situation determine the type of mental processing required (automatic and/or controlled), and which right action approach is most suitable. For example, the application of a:
1) Master Rule Approach is suitable for automatic processing.
2) Method Approach is suitable for a combination of automatic and controlled processing.
3) Virtue Approach is suitable for controlled processing.

I agree.

Regarding ethical maturation, Jean Piaget's work was continued by Lawrence Kohlberg's work, which was continued by James Rest's work...

Piaget, Jean. 1954. The Construction of Reality in the Child (M. Cook, Trans.). New York, NY, US: Basic Books.

Kohlberg, Lawrence; Levine, Charles G.; Hewer, Alexandra. 1983. Moral Stages: A Current Formulation and a Response to Critics. Basel, NY: Karger. ISBN 3-8055-3716-6.

Rest, James R. 1979. Development in Judging Moral Issues. University of Minnesota Press.

I think you have passed too quickly on to virtue, and neglected what I think is fundamental to the psychology - conflict, between ought and want, or good and evil, or personal and social, or... — unenlightened

And as soon as one sees that one is motivated always by images of consequences and never by consequences themselves, one starts to see things somewhat differently in ethics too. — unenlightened

Agreed.
1) Conscience may be overruled by competing incentives (e.g., desires, passions, etc.) resulting in a decision to select an immoral course of action.
2) Want = unnecessary desire, a propositional attitude having World-to-Mind Direction of Fit (World-to-Fit-Mind), or world actualisation intent.

There are no gaps.
Object (perceived particular)-Subject (cognised particular), Is (fact)-Ought (value), and Being (character)-Doing (act) are convenient epistemological distinctions which are ontological unities.

What if it were the case that it is not psychologically possible to dispense with those linguistic devices; the accepted uses of those terms? — creativesoul

Is Anscombe in search of a theory of mind which results in just that? — creativesoul

Of course she is; she's a Thomist (Natural Law).

I agree with Anscombe's first thesis, because:

1) Much empirical investigation (Science) has been conducted in the various fields of Psychology (especially since 1958), but logical investigation (Philosophy) has not kept pace (probably due to the complexity of the task). There are dozens of fields of academic study and/or professional practice which are relevant to developing a Scientifically-informed Philosophy of Mind, Social Philosophy, and Moral Philosophy.

2) The human mind is foundational to human social dynamics, including the development of ethical models and ethical behaviour.

The linguistic turn in Moral Philosophy is a crutch.
Moral Philosophy needs to be informed by a coherent Moral Psychology.

Yeah, one might suppose that you just made up this intuition to fill the space left by the removal of a commanding divinity. — Banno

Is conscience an inherent human faculty?

We ought not tackle ethics by looking for other universal rules - deontic or utilitarian - to replace divine rules, but by looking more directly at what we do, at what is virtuous. — Banno

If there are no universal or divine rules pertaining to human actions, then: Moral Relativism (which is untenable, because it provides no common basis for discussing ethics).

Notions of virtue and vice are subsumed in Deontology. The operation of conscience (self-judgment) develops:
1) Virtues through self-commendation, or
2) Vices through self-condemnation.

The first is that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking. — Anscombe

Agreed. So, end the article here.

The second is that the concepts of obligation, and duty - moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say - and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of 'ought,' ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible... — Anscombe

It isn't psychologically possible.

A deontological approach is required for normative ethics because conscience (an intuitive faculty) appraises circumstances, and judges personal motive, intent, and action, according to (subjective, then intersubjective) ethical knowledge.

And:
1) Moral obligations are required by conscience, imposing natural duties of performance and forbearance on the obligor(s), and creating corresponding rights to demand performance or forbearance by the obligee(s).
2) Right action is the faultless performance of moral action.

Randomness is on a different level, not chemistry or biology. — Zelebg

Which level? Physics?

Atoms and molecules are bound to strict rules with limited possibilities, and they actively seek to form those possibilities, which is rather opposite of 'random'. — Zelebg

Are:
1) Atoms not considered in Quantum Mechanics (e.g., random decay)?
2) Molecules not considered in Thermodynamics (e.g., random motion)?
3) Random mutations not considered in Evolutionary Theory (Biology)?

In general I agree you are correct, but just by good fortune there is very specific biological information that can set limits on metaphysical issues relating to origin of life. — Barry Z

Cool. Such as?

More information is gained with organism as a beginning than trying to explain how lifeless matter develops consciousness and will. — Barry Z

More semantic information is gained from understanding biological information than is gained from understanding physical information, because an understanding of biological information presupposes an understanding of physical information.

But with reference to Metaphysics, a general (multi-discipline) concept of information would be more useful than an understanding of biological (or any other type of) information.

I am researching different philosophies but it is tiresome and time consuming to try learn the ins and outs of each of them through online web pages, published papers and books, and countless forums. On top of this I could easily have scanned past something important. Any help would be appreciated. — Otto Ogliaro

Writing what you know is easier than knowing what you write.

Expert
Etymology
From Latin exspurtus.
ex: a has-been.
spurtus: big drip under pressure.

My point remains unaddressed. — Galuchat

Perhaps you can formulate more clearly what your objection is, in relation to the arguments I have presented. — Virgo Avalytikh

Feigning ignorance doesn't become you.

As I mentioned, I am re-constructing Hobbes's own position. — Virgo Avalytikh

And using the (agreed, but for different reasons) falsity of Hobbes' (supposed) two theses to justify anarchism or limited government as alternatives to totalitarianism.

Then dispensing with the limited government ("non-totalitarian Statist") alternative, because its proponents' reasons for rejecting Hobbes' second thesis are inadequate.

My point remains unaddressed.

Granting authority doesn't necessarily entail the exercise of "absolute power" (authoritarianism).

For everyone to hand over to a government absolute power and authority... — Virgo Avalytikh

The OP seems to conflate authority and authoritarianism.

The basis of political power may be either coercion or authority (the right which arises from a moral claim of legitimacy to control, command, or otherwise influence, the behaviour of others), regardless of political structure (egalitarian or stratified). The possibility that any human institution can become corrupt is not disputed.

With regard to current Neurological and Psychological evidence:
1) Body and mind are open sub-systems of (at least certain) organisms (e.g., those having a central nervous system).
2) Body is open to mind and environment.
3) Mind is open to body.

So:
1) Mind-body dualism is a non sequitur.
2) Human substance (being) is a unity having two properties (i.e., body and mind).

How does that account for mental arithmetic? — Wayfarer

Numeracy: ability to understand number arrangements, and perform numerical operations.
Minds aren't numerate, brains aren't numerate, human beings are numerate.
And so it goes with every other human "mental" condition, function, and process.

Apparently.

On the ordinary use, it is the human being that thinks (and is the referent of "I"), not their mind. — Andrew M

Correct.
Minds cannot think because they do not exist per se.
Use of the word "mind" is a convenient façon de parler (Bennett & Hacker, 2003). What it refers to is an integrated set of organism events which produce automatic and controlled acts (corporeal actions).

Cheers.

Can you, or anyone else, explain why Kant should be considered important for understanding QM or science generally? — Andrew M

I asked a similar question here.

This is the closest anyone has come to providing an answer:

It is quite clear Kant thought science to be the direction metaphysics should follow, which is pure reason applied to something, not that pure reason should be the direction science should follow. — Mww

I've not read anything in this thread since that comment which convinces me that Kant has anything to do with Science generally. But there has been alot of entertaining chest thumping and ass covering.

Taking Kant's advice (per @Mww, above), let Metaphysics be informed by modern Psychology regarding the subject/object distinction/complementarity.

Thanks for answering this question.

Kant was what was being discussed. — Xtrix

In terms of "the philosophical basis for modern science" (which was also being discussed) what has Kant contributed?

Forget Kant and get back to me.

Physical reality can be grasped not by pure reason (as Kant has asserted), but by pure thought. — Einstein, A. (7 May 1952). Letter to Maurice Solovine

From the Kantian epistemological thesis, yes, it is a mistake: we as subjects have representations of the outside world, but they are not phenomena. — Mww

Of course they are. — Xtrix

Physicalist pap.