Sometimes you get both in one person, but that's something of a rarity. — Bitter Crank

I agree.

While it is true that artists tend to be creative, and engineers tend to be methodical, the best engineers are often forced to be creative when faced with a difficult problem.

According to Newell & Simon (Human Problem Solving, 1972):
Problem difficulty depends on knowledge domain expertise, and varies along a continuum between easy and challenging.
1) An easy problem contains familiar aspects and activates relevant knowledge domains.
2) A challenging problem is complex, or new, and activates analysis or heuristics depending on whether an optimal or satisfactory solution is required.

As intuition is immediate problem-solving, decision-making, and planning using tacit knowledge; and heuristics are problem-solving and decision-making strategies which use available (i.e., incomplete) information, I wouldn't use either one for solving engineering problems (unless you want to end up in court).

However, periods of careful analysis (and other types of methodical thinking), interspersed with periods of mind wandering, can produce creative problem-solving.

But what is this thing which is called "information", which is supposed to be somehow independent from the act of informing? is it just the form itself, or is it something other than the form? — Metaphysician Undercover

Per Luciano Floridi, I don't see information as a distinction which makes a difference. That describes data. I describe data (in terms which currently make sense to me) as physical or mental variables.

Floridi calls dedomena "pure data", and describes them as that which is inferred from, and required by, experience. Depending on one's interpretation, these may correspond to the notion of Form in a Platonic and/or Aristotelian sense.

So, for me, information is relational data.

It would [prove reducibility] but the absence of such proof isn't proof that physicalism can't be true. — Benkei

It may be possible at some point in the future to establish causation between levels of abstraction, but third person observation/measurement of subjective experience is not possible (as others have already noted).

Nagel suggests two ways of modifying materialism to account for mental phenomena (i.e., deny that mental is irreducible, or deny that mental requires a scientific explanation).

He concludes: "It makes sense to seek an expanded form of understanding that includes the mental but that is still scientific — i.e. still a theory of the immanent order of nature."

Sure. It would prove that psychology is reducible to biology, wouldn't it?

Feel free to cite research which establishes a causal relationship (not just a correlation) between neurophysiology and human learning.

I'm still waiting for citations of explanations of human learning written strictly in terms of Biology, Chemistry, and Physics. The reason why this is important was explained in the OP's The Heretic link, to wit:

"If materialism is true as an explanation of everything—and they insist it is—then psychological facts, for example, must be reducible to biology, and then down to chemistry, and finally down to physics. If they weren’t reducible in this way, they would (ta-da!) be irreducible. And any fact that’s irreducible would, by definition, be uncaused and undetermined; meaning it wouldn’t be material. It might even be spooky stuff."

Or, you can provide any other explanation which you think validates materialism. Your choice.

And even if such explanations aren't possible, why can't there be other explanations as to why science cannot explain it than "obviously physicalism doesn't work"? — Benkei

Such as immaterial explanations? I would be willing to consider such an explanation if you have one to offer (or refer to).

The success of science has increased the intuition that physicalism is true and a lot of research into biochemistry and neurobiology is pursued assuming these things can be quantified. — Benkei

And the success of philosophy is found in exposing this intuition as nonsense. As for assumptions, I'm sure every scientist knows what they say about you and me.

Thanks, but let me know when you've found an explanation of human learning in strictly biological terms which starts (for example) with a desire to learn how to play a violin (including the requisite decision-making and planning processes), continues with intention and volition, and ends with either self-directed or social learning (instructional action which successfully implements learning goals). After all, an explanation is what is required (not bits and pieces of research which may be relevant, accompanied with a vague psychological explanation of long term memory somehow being involved in learning).

As far as I know, the only level of abstraction which attempts to explain human learning (e.g., how to play a violin) is cognitive psychology. If materialism is true, human learning should also be explained in the literature of Biology, Chemistry, and Physics. Please provide relevant citations, and I will admit that materialism is not absurd.

And so?

Thanks for the partial answer to one of my questions, but I received much more semantic information from the answers you didn't provide.

I gave those answers early in the thread. It boils down to a difference that makes a difference. — apokrisis

Cheers.
In other words, information is a lack of uniformity per Donald MacCrimmon MacKay and Gregory Bateson.

Is information physical (meaningless), semantic (meaningful), or both (independently or simultaneously)?

Can semantic information be received by sensory stimulation and sensation (becoming empirical, or a posteriori, knowledge), by cogitation (becoming pure, or a priori, knowledge), or both (independently)?

If Aristotelian forms exist and constrain material action, what is the source of pure knowledge (i.e., the formal sciences)?

Obviously, semiosis (in its various forms) doesn't preclude physicalism or idealism. Also, I am familiar with your version of semiosis, but what meaning(s) do you attach to the word "information"?

The theory that I'm working on is that the rational mind - the mind that recognises meaning and can therefore translate and transform ideas between media and languages - corresponds with the 'immaterial intellect' above. — Wayfarer

The human mind is immaterial and united with a material human body, comprising a psychophysical unity. So, I don't agree with Brennan that, "To understand is to free form completely from matter."

Aquinas's and Brennan's position is dualist, not dual aspect monist (which is Aristotle's and Peirce's position).

Just as the meaning of a text can be distinguished from the manner of its representation, so too the intellect which understands meaning can be distinguished from the sensory apparatus. — Wayfarer

Due to the "ship on the horizon" example provided in the OP, this has become more a discussion of semiosis than of information (although semiosis is subsumed under information). This is because semiosis (sign processing) involves representation and communication.

A sign is an object which corresponds to a representation.

And because this is really a discussion about semiosis, the definition of "representation" should conform to its usage in semiotics, to wit: a representation is a socially conditioned concept, category, or mental model.

The two aspects of a sign (the object and its corresponding representation) can be distinguished, but not separated due to the relation of signification. Therefore, signs are psychophysical objects.

Also, since meaning is an idea which can be described by attribution and/or relation, it is embedded in the representation, not the object.

The same message, transmitted in different codes (physical information), through different physical channels or mediums, conveys the same representations/meanings (semantic information) to a recipient (a psychophysical organism) who has knowledge of the codes used and their corresponding representations.

So what does semiosis say about physicalism and idealism?

According to Bennett & Hacker (Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience 12, 24):

1) "Aristotle ascribed to each living organism a psuche (soul). The psuche was conceived to be the form of a natural body that has life. It was also characterised as the first actuality of a natural body that has organs (De Anima 412 5-6)."

2) "Aquinas, capitalising on Aristotle's obscure remarks about the active intellect, argued that 'the intellectual principle which is called the mind or intellect has an operation through itself (per se) unless it subsists through itself, for activity belongs to a being in act...Consequently, the human soul, which is called the intellect or mind, is something incorporeal and subsisting' (Summa Theologiae I, 76, 1)."

So, Aquinas changed the meaning of "soul" from "form" to "mind" and separated it from "body" for theological reasons.

Great topic for another thread.

Can't live with them, can't live without them. I do despair of pointless word games.

Meaning is produced by categorisation (which presupposes conceptualisation), or it is assigned by interpretation (which presupposes a non-verbal and/or verbal modelling system).

It is thought that non-verbal modelling systems precede verbal modelling systems in evolutionary terms. Animals have non-verbal modelling systems, human beings have non-verbal and verbal modelling systems.

Verbal modelling systems (i.e., languages) are a set of signs having paradigmatic (class) and syntagmatic (construction) relations (variations in either type of relation varies meaning), hence; language presupposes vocabulary and syntax.

It would be a mistake to suppose that animals do not produce or assign meaning in terms of phenomena simply because they have a non-verbal (as opposed to verbal) modelling system.

It is species-specific categorisation and interpretation which decodes physical information (received through sensory stimulation and/or interoception), producing semantic information.

More generally, the activity of minds in the medium of culture involves attunement with the whole world as it appears to us in experience.... — Cabbage Farmer

I agree. Also, the relationship between individual, environment, and group forms the basis of a continuous, circular, process of communication which produces cultural development.

Morality is our necessary "crowd control" system. It's our built in (we have to learn it) self-control mechanism. "Built in" but not pre-programmed. It has to be taught and learned. But "taught and learned" doesn't preclude a built in, biologically based capacity for crowd-control and self-regulation. — Bitter Crank

I agree. It is through the operation of empathy that ethical knowledge is acquired, and through the operation of conscience that moral conduct is maintained (empathy and conscience being psychological functions which develop in neurotypical human beings).

Morality among peoples seems to have a fair amount of commonality. — Bitter Crank

According to Donald Brown, morality is a human universal.
Brown, Donald E. (1991). Human Universals. New York City: McGraw-Hill. ISBN 0-87722-841-8.

No, I'm not saying that, but we share much, most, of our nature with animals...Yes, we are different, but not different in kind. — T Clark

These are absurd statements for anyone who has even casually observed the behaviour of wolf packs, wildebeest herds, starling flocks, etc., or noticed that human beings are different in kind by virtue of possessing the faculty of language (and the capacity for verbal modelling that affords).

If you want to persuade me that animals have a language faculty, please produce examples of animal technology similar in kind to human technology. Sure, chimpanzees and dogs have been in space, but they haven't been issuing instructions at mission control. So get serious, and don't waste anymore of my time with this bullshit.

I edited my comment after your reply.

After reading Edward O. Wilson's, On Human Nature, I adopted this definition of human nature: human genetic predispositions. These predispositions produce the psychological characteristics and behaviour common to all humans, being innate.

Also, Paul Bloom (Yale University), a moral psychologist, has specialised in research on morality in babies.

We can identify, as Plato does, sensible objects and intelligible objects. We can also note that there is interaction between the two, and you might call this psychophysical processes. But this doesn't justify "psychophysical objects". — Metaphysician Undercover

Moods and emotions are mental conditions produced by affect (a mind-body response to sensory stimulation and/or interoception). So, I don't have a problem referring to moods, emotions, and affect as psychophysical objects.

You might call it "information", that which is transmitted, but this creates an unnecessary divide between information and meaning, when "information" is generally used to refer to a type of meaning, objective, or correct meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

Herein lies the essential difference in our positions on "meaning". I do not conceive of information as semantic only, but also physical. Thanks very much for your comments, but we will have to agree to disagree on this matter.

I do not think that any object can be both physical and psychophysical (though I don't know exactly what you mean by this), because this would be a category error. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's a fair point (as stated).

The operation of the human mind consists of psychophysical (simultaneously mental and physical) processes. Whether I choose to focus on the mental or physical aspect (or both) depends entirely on the conceptual task at hand.

In fact, mental conditions and functions, and their anatomical and physiological correlates, are one of the best (or most complex) examples of the interaction of physical and semantic information.

Thanks for the explanation. I am in general agreement.

Cheers!

A definition of information would be useful.

I don't see why you can't agree that information resides in all causal relationships, including the ones out there that we never notice, or bother looking at. — Harry Hindu

It makes sense to me that causality should be linked to notions of data and/or information origin and/or history. How would you include it in a definition?

Certainly meaning can only be discerned by a mind, but I think there are elements of thought and language that are common to all who think. So I wouldn't like to say that they are peculiar to a specific subject. — Wayfarer

Can you elaborate? Thanks.

The author of a piece of information puts meaning into that piece. And this act of creating is completely different from the act of interpreting. So it is not true that "meaningful" implies that the thing has been interpreted. — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree.
An author encodes the semantic information in their mind into a physical form (e.g., a book) suitable for transmission to others. When that transmission (physical information) is received (read) and decoded (interpreted) it becomes semantic (meaningful) information in another person's mind.

In other words, physical information becomes semantic information through interpretation (semiotic cogitation).

This is the same problem I have with Floridi's GeN (i.e., data can have a semantics independently of any informee). He asserts that Egyptian hieroglyphics had meaning prior to the discovery of the Rosetta Stone (and its subsequent translation) in spite of the fact that nobody on Earth at that time knew what the hieroglyphs meant.

Whereas, I contend that: because nobody knew what they meant, they had no meaning for anyone alive at that time.

If we conflate these two distinct senses of "meaningful", one might insist that naturally occurring structures, must have been created by an author to be meaningful, or, that something created by an author must be interpreted to be meaningful. — Metaphysician Undercover

Meaning is located in a person's mind, nowhere else.

I would define "information" in such a way as to separate these two distinct senses. — Metaphysician Undercover

That would be a useful exercise (i.e., defining information) in that it might help further this discussion.

But this is where the difficulty arises. Like any other property, we can abstract the property from the object, and start talking directly about the property without necessarily attributing it to any object, as if the property is an object. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that your concept of "meaning" presents this difficulty. However, information is not a property, it is an object which can be physical and/or psychophysical.

This is the problem, with associating information with data. If we take a look at some collection of data, we have no way of knowing whether it's information, or misinformation. — Metaphysician Undercover

In addition to providing a definition of "information", it would be helpful if you could provide a definition of "data", otherwise I have no idea what you mean when using these terms (though I suspect it is substantially different from what I mean).

Floridi defines information as well-formed data which is meaningful. — Galuchat

No, I don't think that I agree with this, because "data" implies that the information has already been interpreted, and this would mean that it cannot be information unless it has been interpreted. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think that "meaningful" implies that the information has already been interpreted.

In my current working definition of information, I removed any reference to "meaning" from Floridi's General Definition of Information (GDI) because I don't agree that "data can have a semantics independently of any informee." (GeN)

My current working definitions include:
1) Data: physical or psychophysical variables.
2) Information: relational data.
3) Physical (Meaningless) Information: relational physical variables.
4) Semantic (Meaningful) Information: relational psychophysical variables and queries.

There is a dual problem here, two extremes. One is the question of whether relationships between things, which have not yet been interpreted by a mind, can be called information. — Metaphysician Undercover

That would depend on how information is defined. How would you define information in a general sense (i.e., one which takes into account its physical and mental manifestations)?

The other extreme, which I already outlined, is the question of whether described relationships, which cannot be demonstrated to be actual relationships between real things, can be called information. — Metaphysician Undercover

While I have completed university coursework in Physics, my knowledge of Quantum Mechanics is inadequate. However, I am persuaded that Shannon's Mathematical Theory of (Data) Communication (MTC) quantifies information, hence; provides evidence that information can be physical.

Beyond having a point in common with thermodynamic entropy through probability theory, I currently view the association of MTC with thermodynamic entropy as little more than equivocation. And this may have been the reason for Wieners' comment: "Information is information, not matter or energy."

But the mathematical aspect of data doesn't end with MTC. I find Floridi's comment, "The universe is fundamentally composed of data, understood as dedomena..," intriguing. Is he referring to geometry as a transcendental or abstract universal which constrains that which is physical and that which is psychophysical? Do Aristotelian forms figure into this equation?

Suppose that I don't know about the earth's spin, but I observe the sun setting every evening and rising every morning. So I plot a trajectory, which has the sun moving around the back side of the stars which are behind the earth, every night. Then I hand you this "data". Is this so-called data information or imagination? — Metaphysician Undercover

That would be misinformation.

Floridi defines information as well-formed data which is meaningful. Are your viewpoints amenable to this definition?

You posted a quote from Archibald without context... — Noble Dust

To be clearer: I posted quotes in response to unenlightened's statement regarding the claim of "physicist's these days." Re-read it if you must.

For the record, you have no information regarding my worldview. It's a shame that you feel compelled to denigrate the reputation of the eminent scientists quoted (your reputation is undoubtedly greater than theirs). Are you really that insecure in your beliefs?

I am still awaiting your explanation of information (if you have one), and genuinely hoping that it forms the basis of a worldview which is far superior to the one you suppose folks like me and my boys hold.

But if all you have is ad hominem, you can go sit in the corner.

Wait. There's more:
In both cases [Wheeler & Wiener], physics ends up endorsing an information-based description of nature. The universe is fundamentally composed of data, understood as dedomena, patterns or fields of differences, instead of matter or energy, with material objects as a complex secondary manifestation.

Floridi, L. (2010). Information: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

So, now let's have a serious explanation of information from yourself.

Here's a quote from another religious fanatic you may find amusing:
Information is information, not matter or energy. No materialism which does not admit this can survive at the present day.

Wiener, N.: Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine, 2nd edn. MIT Press, Cambridge (1961)

The religious ecstasy is more than palpable. — Noble Dust

John Archibald Wheeler was a theoretical physicist. What does religious ecstasy have to do with his quote?

Ok. I guess we can wait for the oncoming barrage. — Noble Dust

More like: sharks smelling blood in the water, circling their prey, anticipating a feeding frenzy.

The really hot physicists these days dispense with the stuff, and manage with just structure. So worse than information is physical, they claim that physicality is informational. — unenlightened

Correct.
John Archibald Wheeler writes:
“It from bit”. Otherwise put, every “it” every particle, every field of force, even the space-time continuum itself derives its function, its meaning, its very existence (even if in some contexts indirectly) from the apparatus-elicited answers to yes-or-no questions, binary choices, bits. “It from bit” symbolizes the idea that every item of the physical world has at bottom a very deep bottom, in most instances an immaterial source and explanation; that which we call reality arises in the last analysis from the posing of yes-no questions and the registering of equipment-evoked responses; in short, that all things physical are information-theoretic in origin and that this is a participatory universe.

Wheeler, J.A.: Information, Physics, Quantum: The Search for Links, Complexity, Entropy, and the Physics of Information. In: Zureck, W.H. (ed.). Addison Wesley, Redwood City (1990).

But instead of worse, even better: information can be physical and/or psychophysical.

All manner of equivocation is serving to confuse this thread; probably because the OP was confused to begin with.

Information not defined in terms of meaning is physical. Information defined in terms of meaning (i.e., semantic information) is psychophysical.

Everything is semiotic (adjectival form of semiosis) only for psychophysical organisms in that semiosis is how they model their world (at every level of investigation).

Everything is information (in a nominal sense) in that everything is composed of relational data (i.e., physical or psychophysical variables).

Information must be interpreted to have meaning. Because interpretation is a psychological process, information only has meaning for psychophysical organisms.