I think you are understanding where my problem with your methodology lies (and what it is); and I think you are conceding that it doesn’t give an actually account of which hierarchy is most cogent—which, to me, is a major problem. — Bob Ross

The theory is a foundation. Does it work consistently and logically for what it does? Yes. The fact that its a screwdriver and not a hammer isn't really a critique of the theory.

rarely does the possible inductions use the same exact relevant factors (i.e., essential properties); and, consequently, your hierarchy, and methodology in general (since it doesn’t account for a viable solution comparing them), is only applicable to one piece of sand in an entire beach. — Bob Ross

That's just an opinion and not really an argument Bob. No one has ever used the hierarchy before, so they haven't had to think in terms of it. Its not difficult to start thinking using the hierarchy to compare different inductions. Just as a start, it solves many problems in epistemology that have to do with induction.

I wouldn’t count it is valid to shift the determination of cogency to distinctive knowledge; — Bob Ross

But you should. The hierarchy is built off of the consequences of distinctive and applicable knowledge, not the other way around. If A => B => C, you shouldn't criticize that C doesn't lead to A. I'm letting you know that your critique is a misunderstanding of what relies on what. Distinctive knowledge does not rely on the hierarchy. The hierarchy relies on distinctive knowledge.

Just like how I don’t get to distinctively say “well, I just don’t find the probability of flipping the coin relevant, so I am going to say it will be heads because that is what it was last time” — Bob Ross

The reason why you don't get to do this is if you also add, "When I'm using the hierarchy of induction." If you're not using the hierarchy of induction you get to do this as there is no other objective measurement to decide what induction is more cogent than another.

I don’t get to distinctively say “well, I just don’t find the designs relevant in this case, so I am going to go with the probability of 51% that it is a BWOA”. Epistemology doesn’t leave these kinds of cogency decisions up to the user to arbitrarily decide. — Bob Ross

Why not Bob? Its been logically concluded that a person can create whatever distinctive knowledge they want. There is no rule within nature that necessitates what a person must consider distinctive. Now there are arguments and situations that we can break down to try to convince a person to take on certain properties.

In fact, I've been trying to do that during our conversation. Notice how I stated earlier that you weren't addressing the hierarchy correctly. You had a different distinctive notion than I did. If you don't want to accept the distinctive notion that I'm putting forward, what can I do about it? Nothing. I can show you why its rational and consistent to do so. I can note that if you don't accept the definition I'm putting forward, not because its a contradiction, but because you don't like what it entails, that your critiques will be straw men arguments and we'll go nowhere. But ultimately, that decision is on you right?

To clarify, this means that the crux of the cogency determination in the vast majority of cases is left up the person to arbitrarily decide for themselves; which renders the scope of your methodology to only oddly specific examples. — Bob Ross

No, I've noted that with individuals, they are free to choose whatever distinctive knowledge they like. But there are risks and consequences for doing so as I mentioned in my last post.

If a bear is rushing quickly towards you in the woods, you don't have a lot of time to test to see if the bear is rushing towards you or something behind you. Another thing is to consider failure. Perhaps there's a lot pointing towards the bear not rushing towards you. But if you're wrong, you're going to be bear food. So maybe you climb a tree despite your initial beliefs that its probably not going after you.

You aren’t giving a general account of what is most cogent: you are just saying that the person can do whatever they want, and that’s what is most cogent. — Bob Ross

No, I'm not saying that at all. I'm noting that there are reasons why we limit the distinctive considerations in our choices. This wasn't a hierarchy point about cogency, just a discussion about why we find certain things distinctive. If I was unclear about that, my apologies.

For the record, I actually do think that comparing hierarchies is within the over-arching hierarchy of the entirety of the inductions and, thusly, is a critique of your hierarchy; — Bob Ross

But you're not arguing for it. You're not showing or proving it Bob. That's just a statement. Its why I asked you

Why do you think its more reasonable to choose H2 than H1?

I get the feeling that you're more interested in simply not accepting the hierarchy then you are in demonstrating why. That's why I asked you. I'm trying to get some reasoning from you, as well as get you back into thinking about the theory instead of insisting things about the theory. As of now, I'm not seeing anything but critiques on the idea that it doesn't do more than it does, that it should do more than it does, or that it does more than it does. I'm asking you to understand the actual theory, and critique the theory from within that understanding. So try to answer the question first. I'm not trying to trap you, I'm trying to see if you understand all of the terms correctly, and also get a better insight into why you're making the claims that you are.

I definitely have an answer for you, but I feel that too much of these discussions has been going back to whether you understand the actual theory as defined instead of whether the theory is flawed or illogical. Hope the week is going well for you Bob, I'll catch your reply later!

↪Ludwig V well if we are using two definitions then we’ll be arguing past each other. I would argue it is necessary because there are slippery folks out there who don’t clarify their position to hide behind the shield of being “taken of of context” or “misinterpreted” — Darkneos

I would argue one of the fundamentals of proper philosophical discussion is clear and unambiguous definitions. Clear definitions lead to clear arguments, and clear points of contention and debate.

Why would anyone get huffy over that? Makes perfect sense.

In the scenario, there are no other inductions that use the same essential properties (i.e., relevant factors) and since there are only two given the two hierarchies only contain one induction; which entails that within each hierarchy each induction is by default the most cogent to hold. — Bob Ross

Yes, that's right.

In the scenario, which let’s say is context S, there are two hierarchies, H1 and H2. Although you can’t compare the inductions, you have to compare the hierarchies to decide which is most cogent to go with (because it is a dilemma: either use the probability or the pattern—there’s no other option). Now, if we are to claim that in S H2 is more cogent than H1 (and thusly go with the pattern), then there must be some sort of criteria we used to compare H2 to H1 in S. If not, then we cannot claim either is more or less cogent to each other and, consequently, cannot claim that using the pattern is more or less cogent than the probability and if that is the case, then it is an arbitrary decision between using H2 over H1. — Bob Ross

Ok, I think I see your issue now. Your issue is not with the hierarchy. Your issue is you are attributing what people decide as distinctive knowledge, and questioning what level of detail people should choose. The hierarchy does not make any such claims. It does not say, "Taking only A/B is more cogent then considering A/B and X/Y." As I thought, you're lumping too much together instead of seeing all the parts as separate first. The solution to understand this is to first stop looking at the hierarchy entirely and go back to our understanding of distinctive knowledge.

If you recall, there is no limit to what we can distinctively know, or how we choose to identify existences. If I want, I can say a tree is a plant made of wood and leaves. Or I could say a tree is what fits to the level of detail that a botanist would consider. Of course the question we can ask next is, "What should I use?"

The answer I gave in the paper was, "Whatever outcomes would best fit your context." The more detailed the identity, the more time and effort it takes to verify that what you are looking at is applicably known as that identity. If a bear is rushing quickly towards you in the woods, you don't have a lot of time to test to see if the bear is rushing towards you or something behind you. Another thing is to consider failure. Perhaps there's a lot pointing towards the bear not rushing towards you. But if you're wrong, you're going to be bear food. So maybe you climb a tree despite your initial beliefs that its probably not going after you.

In less risky circumstances, you may not care about there being further details to a tree then leaves and wood. Its not like a more detailed botanical explanation is going to affect your life in any way. Why waste time using such an identity when it benefits you in no way?

Notice how none of these questions have anything to do with the hierarchy. If you go back to the hierarchy now, you'll understand that your question is not about the hierarchy, its about determining what would be best, to include more or less details in your assessment of the situation. The hierarchy of inductions in and of itself does not evaluate the effort or risk to yourself in deciding how many attributes you should or should not include in your identity. What it can do however, is help you determine the most rational course of action if you limit the question appropriately.

If that is the case, then the hierarchy analysis that you keep giving, which would apply to H2 and H1, isn't doing any actual work in evaluating in S what is the most cogent decision to make. Do you see what I mean? — Bob Ross

If you mean the hierarchy isn't doing the work in telling you whether H1 or H2 is more cogent to pick, you're right. The hierarchy rules do not tell you what set of distinctive properties you should pick without context. That's an entirely separate discussion, which of course we can have.

So I'm going to put the issue back to you. Why do you think its more reasonable to choose H2 than H1? Can you do so within the understanding of distinctive and applicable knowledge? Can you use the hierarchy of inductions correctly to do so? And if not, that's ok, Its more of a check to see if you understand. I'll add my own agreements or critiques after I see yours.

Philosophim so if it just stays in this obscure realm of “what if”? — Darkneos

Yes, philosophy that stays in the realm of "What if" without any way to test it or apply it is ultimately useless beyond entertainment.

2. If we do define our terms, by making distinctions between the two, then we still end in absurdity as belief and style contradict and anything can go from that conversation.

This only occurs if we do not then try to apply those beliefs to reality. Philosophy does indeed end up pointless if we make up a bunch of definitions then logic those made up definitions into made up conclusions. The best philosophers in history understood this, as they were usually mathematicians or scientists as well. Philosophy must be married to reality if it is to be useful.

This is a major point I make here if people are interested. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context

After pulling literally two billion boxes and noticing there was a 100% match of design to air or not air, it seems silly not to consider it.

According to the entirety of your methodology (and not just the hierarchy), there is no justification for this claim you have made here. You can’t say it is less cogent, even when it seems obvious that it is, for a person to say “no it doesn’t seem silly to just go off of the probability”. Without a clear criteria in your view, the vast majority of scenarios end up bottoming out at this kind of stalemate (because the hierarchy is unapplicable to the situation). — Bob Ross

Well, no, there's a clear criteria. You go for what is most cogent in the property situation you have. Taken another way Bob, if you know the probability of the boxes for X/Y was 25/75, but you've also randomly pulled 50/50 on your boxes so far, its more cogent to go with the probability. Again, the issue is you're taking two different inductions with two different identities when the hierarchy is used for two different inductions with the same identities.

I totally am (; I mean:

The most rational is to take both into account and assume that 49% of the boxes we find will be with air, and we believe that all of these boxes will have the X pattern.

You can’t say this if you generated two separate, uncomparable hierarchies and there is nothing else in the methodology that determines cogency of inductions! Philosophim, you are admitting it is more cogent and that there’s absolutely no justification in your methodology for knowing that! — Bob Ross

I think you missed what I did then. I didn't compare the two different property setups, I simply overlapped them. I've said it several times now, but its worth repeating. The probability in the first case is regarding an identity with less essential properties than the second case. So I can very easily say, "All boxes have a 49/51% chance for air/not air". Since the probability does not consider X/Y pattern, it does not tell us the probability of air/not air for an X/Y pattern. So if we disregard the X/Y, we hold that probability. To help me to see if I'm communicating this correctly, what is the problem with this notion alone? Isolate this point from all other points and tell me where you think this is flawed.

Take the above, and just realize that when you include the X/Y properties, the highest induction you can make is a pattern. You don't have a known probability on the X/Y properties. So when you refer to the boxes as "just boxes", the most cogent thing is to take the 49/51 split. When you refer to the boxes as having a X/Y distinction, you take the pattern as you have no known probability with the X/Y distinction.

You seem very hung up on this idea that a probability is always more cogent then a lower portion of the hierarchy no matter the circumstance of context. To my mind, I've never intended to imply that. Its always been within contextual identities. I don't know how else to communicate this to you. But any claim to the contrary is again, a straw man.

I 100% agree with you that it is most rational, but the problem in your view is you cannot justify it.

Let’s make the danger in having no means of determining cogency of the inductions more clear in this scenario: imagine that if you guess incorrectly they kill you. Now, we both agree that the obviously more cogent and rational move is to bet it is a BWA; but imagine there’s a third participant, Jimmy, who isn’t too bright. He goes off of the probability. Now, he isn’t misapplying your methodology by choosing to go off of the probability: he carefully and meticulously outlines the hierarchies involved in the context just like you, and realized (just like you) that he cannot compare them and is at a stalemate. He decides that he will use the probability. — Bob Ross

First, the risk of outcome does not change what is more cogent within the hierarchy. Second, I'm going to change the odds for a bit because we need to get you off this idea that the odds being miniscule make a difference. We'll make them miniscule when its all over, but for now, we'll say a air/no air is 25/75. What is rational is always rational. We simply decide to go with the less rational alternative sometimes due to how much it might cost us to be rational such as time/effort, and risk of reward/punishment, but this does not change what is rational in the hierarchy.

If Jimmy did a meticulous comparison, he would have a choice not in going against the hierarchy, but in determining the essential properties he considers in regards to the box. Does he include the X/Y design as part of his potential identification of whether the box has air or not? Let say Jimmy's not very smart and doesn't see a correlation of the X/Y pattern with air/not air. Jimmy has two options then.

1. Don't use the hierarchy

So Jimmy just guesses. Is that more rational than using the 25/75? No, I think we both agree on this.

2. Use the hierarchy

Jimmy guesses "not air". He may be wrong, but it was the most rational choice.

Ok, now lets do the miniscule odds. Its not much more rational in this case, but its still the most rational to use the hierarchy. The difference in odds, no matter how miniscule, does not change the outcome. if X > Y, its always greater than Y and therefore the most rational choice. This is proven and really not debatable.

Now Jimmy includes the X/Y pattern. He knows both the probability without the X/Y, but also the pattern with the X/Y. He pulls an X. Since he does not have a probability which concerns am X/Y correlation, the most cogent induction he has when including the X/Y is the pattern. Therefore, according to the hierarchy, he would choose that the X had air.

We're going to change this example up a bit more however to make things more clear. Now we're going to include two new pieces of information. First, we have the total number of boxes at 100. Second, Jimmy has pulled 10 boxes. Third, Jimmy has pulled 3 X's, and 7 Y's. Fourth, the question is now, "Will Jimmy's next box he pull have air or not?"

While the pattern for X/Y's still holds, in this question, Jimmy can't see the pattern ahead of time. The X/Y consideration has been removed. So what's the most cogent thing for him to do? Take the probability without considering the X/Y pattern. So the most rational choice would be "air". And if Jimmy were then also asked, "What pattern do you think the box is going to be?" he would reply, "X", because now the X/Y pattern is pertinent and he still doesn't have the odds for what the X/Y air/no air outcome would be.

I'm not sure I can make it more clear at this point. Just to let you know, I do not need the hierarchy to be right. I've worked on this for years, and have many, many times realized I was wrong or illogical in my claims here, so being wrong again is simply an opportunity for me to refine it better, or try a new approach. What I need is something logical, of which I have failed at countless times before. :) So trust me, I'm as interested in thinking about this critically as you are.

But try as well to be as critical to your own argument too. You keep misunderstanding the hierarchy. If you need a refresher, just post what you believe the hierarchy entails and I can agree/correct points so that way we're on the same page. I want to find whether the hierarchy holds, not keep clarifying what the hierarchy is. I think a major problem is you're taking a more complex problem without understanding the fundamentals of a basic problem. The complex problem is simply the application of the basics to a reasonable conclusion. Try to take your critiques of the complex problem and apply them to a simple problem first and maybe that will bring clarity in either understanding the hierarchy, or showing me if there is a flaw.

I look forward to hearing your replies Bob.

Correct me if I am wrong, but you seem to be admitting that these two inductions (which pertain to answering the same question in the same context) cannot be evaluated with respect to each other to decipher which is more cogent because you are generating two different hierarchies for them; and you are expressing this in the form of saying that it is up to the person to define what they think is essential. — Bob Ross

Yes, this is correct.

Firstly, unless there is some sort of separate criteria in your methodology for what one should consider essential, then it seems like, according to your methodology, a truly arbitrary decision of what is essential. I am ok with the idea of letting distinctive knowledge be ultimately definitional: but now you are extending it to applicable knowledge. — Bob Ross

I'm not quite sure what you mean by extending it to applicable knowledge, but I'll state what I see. We know that definitions are fully within our own choice. Of course, once we accept those definitions, then we must apply them. But the standard for applied knowledge does not change. You are simply using a definition in one scenario, then a different definition in another. Also understand that we're talking about inductions here. You won't know the outcome until you apply the induction itself. After you establish the identities in front of you, the hierarchy helps you organize your beliefs that you could apply, and which belief out of those inductions seems most rational to take.

Secondly, because it is an arbitrary decision whether one wants to include the X and Y designs into their consideration, the crux of the cogency of their induction is not furnished nor helped by your induction hierarchy and, thusly, your methodology provides no use in this scenario. — Bob Ross

First, the arbitrary decision of how you define identities is not a rule of the hierarchy, that's simply our capability as identifying minds that can discretely experience. The hierarchy arises from this knowledge, not the other way around.

If you think about it carefully, you'll realize the hierarchy is a stable way to evaluate the immense freedom of the human minds ability to identify. Recall that one such action that shapes the identities we choose is how useful they are to us. Same with things such as avoiding death or harm. Identities that have too few properties, or evaluate something as non-essential when it is essential to a person's benefit will not be very good identities to have.

The hierarchy's rules apply no matter what identities you ultimately decide on in the end. Further, understanding that the hierarchy means you need to consider all of the properties, may allow you to catch that you haven't fully explored an induction. If I start looking for a pattern of X, Y, and Z, then realize my probability I was holding only involved X and Y, I can then consciously realize that I should be looking for a probability of X, Y, and Z if I can.

This is immensely useful. Again, to my mind there is no other method in philosophy that can measure inductions in such a way.

Thirdly, I find that it would actually be less cogent to go with the probability (in that scenario) and somehow merely saying they don’t want to include the designs as essential doesn’t seem like a rational counter. The strong pattern, in this case, clearly outweighs using the miniscule probability. So I think that, as far as I am understanding it, using this methodology in this scenario can lead people to making an irrational decision (in the case that they arbitrarily exclude their knowledge of the patterns). — Bob Ross

And yet did you not come to a rational conclusion? Using less essential properties in you inductions results in broader outcomes. If I go through a forest and say, "All wood like plants with leaves are trees," its going to be very easy to point out trees. If I introduce other properties that divide trees into types, or bushes and other plants, its going to be much more difficult for me to point out specific trees, but I will be more discerning in my findings.

Taking the probability in the first case ignores every single other property of the box besides the fact its a box and has air or not. After pulling literally two billion boxes and noticing there was a 100% match of design to air or not air, it seems silly not to consider it. You're still hung up on comparing that pattern to the probability though. You can't because you're not considering the same properties in both instances. It doesn't work that way. Stop it Bob. :D

The two can coexist as separate sets in your mind. We do this every day. Genuinely, what is wrong with holding the probability of 49/51 for boxes with air and out air, then also considering there is a pattern where X and Y are considered? The most rational is to take both into account and assume that 49% of the boxes we find will be with air, and we believe that all of these boxes will have the X pattern.

The fact that people can misunderstand, misuse, or make mistakes in applying a methodology is not a critique on the methodology. Do we discount algebra because it takes some time to learn or master? No.

Would you at least agree that this scenario demonstrates how your methodology affords no help in some scenarios? — Bob Ross

No. The scenario was fine, you just misunderstood and misapplied the hierarchy. It had been a while for both of us, so no worry! The puzzle for me was in explaining the answer in a way that was clear. The example allowed me to show you how to apply the hierarchy, demonstrate to you the decisions you have available to you, and come to a rational outcome. That's pretty useful. Now is the hierarchy useful in places its not meant to apply to? Of course. Its a tool, and like any tool it has its places where its shines the best and places where it reaches its limitations. But I see nothing here which show a contradiction within the hierarchies claims, or has broken it in any way.

I understand what you are conveying — Bob Ross

Great! This absolutely had to be understood before I addressed your questions. Now let me get to them! If I miss any of your questions or points in this answer, please redirect me and I will address them.

1. In the scenario I gave, is the possibility or the probability what you would go with (or perhaps neither)? — Bob Ross

Lets use the hierarchy to answer the question. First, it is understood that within the hierarchy, we choose the most cogent induction within a comparable set. But what if we're missing a higher level of cogency? For example, what if I only have a pattern and no odds to consider? At that point, the pattern is the most cogent to choose from.

Hierarchy 1 Just A and B
Probability 49/51% of getting either A or B.
Pattern (Not available)

Hierarchy 2: A and B and X or Y
Probability (Not available)
Pattern I always pull an A with X, and always pull a B with Y

As you can see, in the first example, we have a probability and no pattern established yet. Even if we had a pattern, we would choose the probability.

In the second example, we do not yet have a probability involving A and B and X or Y.

So which do we rationally choose if we have two hierarchies? That depends on what you find essential in pulling the boxes. If you consider the X/Y distinction irrelevant, then you would choose the probability in example one. If you find the the X/Y distinction relevant, then you would choose the pattern in example two because you do not have a probability to compare in the hierarchy. You can compare hierarchies depending on what properties you find essential to your induction, but you cannot cross parts within hierarchy 1 and 2 together to compare.

2. Do you agree with me that if you decide one over the other that you are thereby comparing them? — Bob Ross

No. You may be comparing the properties, but you are not comparing the h1's probability with h2's pattern.

3. Do you agree that all the possible inductions for a question within a context are thereby within the same context as each other? — Bob Ross

I'll need more details in what you mean by this. If you mean considering all the relevant properties to that hierarchy, yes. If you mean comparing hierarchies with different relevant properties, no.

by my lights, it is useless (since it cannot be applied) for practical examples. — Bob Ross

I hope this shows that it is not. You still have to evaluate your inductions and make sure they are accurately evaluated and compared. If you cannot cross hierarchies, you still have a rational conclusion based on the highest tier of inductive argument you have within that hierarchy comparison. To my mind, there is also no rational argument for handling inductions in any way in philosophy. I would say what I have is a pretty good foundation to start.

Take the situation with X and Y properties, then come up with a probability, a possibility/pattern, and a plausibility. Add no other properties, and remove none. Then show if a lower hierarchy results in a more cogent decision.

Sorry, I meant air and no air situation first without the X/Y's. Missed it on the phone, but I have access to a computer again. I wanted you to walk through it yourself as I thought it would help you understand. I'll just do it here however. I will answer your questions btw, I just understand that they are directly related to mine, and we cannot discuss them until this one point is understood. Lets slowly build this up so we have solid footing each step of the way.

An example of the hierarchy
Probability 49/51% of getting either A or B.
Pattern I pull 1 billion A's and 1 billion Bs.

We can compare them because all the properties considered for the induction are the same.

Another example of the hierarchy:
Probability of getting either A or B with design X is 75% or Y at 25%
Pattern I always pull an A with X, and always pull a B with Y

Again, we can compare them because we're involving the same properties in both inductions.

An example that is NOT the hierarchy:
Probability 49/51% of getting either A or B.
Pattern I always pull an A with X, and always pull a B with Y

We cannot compare them using the hierarchy, because while some of the properties are shared, not all of them are in regards to the inductions that are made.

Its that simple Bob. Your example does not address the hierarchy. The second induction involves X and Y where the first induction does not. You are trying to compare apples to oranges when the hierarchy only allows you to compare apples with apples, and oranges with oranges. You cannot use this as an example to show that the hierarchy is wrong, because its not addressing the hierarchy. There is no debate on this. This is what the hierarchy is.

If you understand this, we can move on. Understanding this does not mean that you believe the hierarchy is adequate, useful, etc. It does not mean your example cannot be discussed as its own situation. But you must understand this definition and its application before we move onto any more questions. If you don't, we're not talking about the hierarchy. If you understand this, then I will address your previous questions.

Not a problem Bob! My smiley face did not go through on that statement. My internet is down so I'm having to type these on the phone for now. Again, I will gladly answer your questions and points, but to make sure we're on the same page, first answer with the exercise I posted earlier. Here is is again.

Take the situation with X and Y properties, then come up with a probability, a possibility/pattern, and a plausibility. Add no other properties, and remove none. Then show if a lower hierarchy results in a more cogent decision.

After, do the same as above, but this time add in the X/Y consideration for all the inductions. All the inductions must now include the X/Y. Then try to demonstrate why a lower hierarchy is more cogent than the higher one.

Once we have those examples, we can use those as a base of discussion, as that will accurately represent the hierarchy of inductions.

Suppose I sit down with a bunch of strangers at a poker game. The dealer deals himself a full house. Then he deals himself four of a kind. Then a royal flush. Then another royal flush. What does your theory say about when I should leave the table?
9h — RogueAI

A good question! Before I answer, I want to make sure you've read the theory first. To do so, use the terms for knowledge and inductions in the paper and tell me from your viewpoint what the theory would conclude. At that point I will either agree with or correct you. But if you haven't read the paper and understand the ponts first, you won't have the ability to understand the answer. Don't be lazy or insist that you have, prove that you have and we'll discuss

You can have two induction which use different relevant factors to infer a solution to the same question in the same context. The use of different relevant factors does not change the context — Bob Ross

No, you cant in the instance I noted. You usually do fair readings, but this time you're not. I've told you how the theory works, you don't get to say my own theory doesn't work the way I told you!

You know I have no problem admitting when I'm wrong or you've made a good point. In this case, you're telling me the theory I made should be something different. That's a straw man. If you don't like the theory that's fine. But insisting it is something it is not is wrong.

I've asked you to do the induction breakdown in my last post so you would understand. Until you do so, you won't have understood the hierarchy theory. Your reticence to do so indicates to me you're more in attack mode than discussion mode. It's ok, I've done that myself. On the next post do the breakdown I asked and then I know your criticisms will come from an understanding. As it is, this is all a strawman, intentional or no. List those first, then see if your criticisms still hold.

It sounds like you are in agreement with me that the best choice in the scenario is to use the pattern, but you disagree that it is an example of a possibility outweighing a probability: is that correct? — Bob Ross

Correct! This is what I've been trying to get across all along, so I'm happy to see this is cleared up.

Which indicates to me you are agreeing with me that the pattern is the most cogent choice in the scenario, but you are disagreeing whether that conflicts with the probability. Is that right? — Bob Ross

Also correct!

I honestly don’t understand how I could be misusing the hierarchy if the two options are a probability or possibility (fundamentally).

The probability and the possibility are both being used to infer the same thing — Bob Ross

quote="Bob Ross;817572"]The implication with your example is that they are completely unrelated, but the probability and possibility in my example are both related insofar as they are being used to induce a conclusion about the same question. That’s why you have to compare them.[/quote]

Because for one, it has never been that fundamentally the hierarchy is applied without context. If you introduce new properties which are of consideration within the probability, that is a new context. You are not asking the same question. You're not using the hierarchy if you introduce properties in one induction that are not considered in another.

To prove that the hierarchy breaks, you need to show me a comparison of two inductions which both consider all the same properties. Otherwise its just a strawman argument.

We don't compare the two because they don't apply to the same situation, or the same essential properties.

Just to hone in on this: they absolutely do!!! The question is “does the box have air?” — Bob Ross

No, they absolutely don't because you include an X/Y design consideration in your second induction, where this is not considered in the first induction. The first is, "Does the box have air?" While the second question is, "Does the box have air based on its design being either X or Y?"

A^B != A^B & X^Y

That's hard proof Bob. You'll need to disprove the above, and we both know that's not possible.

The point was to demonstrate that patterns are less cogent than probabilities. We both agree on this then

We don’t agree on this. All your example demonstrated was that patterns extrapolated from random pulls from a sample are not more cogent than probabilities pertaining to that sample. That is not the same thing as proving that patterns are less cogent than probabilities. — Bob Ross

Simply prove the coin flip example wrong, and then you'll be able to back that its not proven. Until then, it holds. And again, the hierarchy is when we have competing inductions within the same context. You have not demonstrated that you understand this yet. Please work to understand that first. As a challenge to you to help you do so, take the situation with X and Y properties, then come up with a probability, a possibility/pattern, and a plausibility. Add no other properties, and remove none. Then show if a lower hierarchy results in a more cogent decision.

After, do the same as above, but this time add in the X/Y consideration for all the inductions. All the inductions must now include the X/Y. Then try to demonstrate why a lower hierarchy is more cogent than the higher one. Do this, and you'll have an argument. Don't, and you're not arguing against the hierarchy, but against something else different to the discussion entirely.

I don’t have a problem with this: you seem to just be noting that I wouldn’t have made that exact inductive inference without the pattern which, to me, is a trivial fact. — Bob Ross

but, my question for you is, why explicate this? What relevance does this have to the scenario I gave you? — Bob Ross

Your point has been that the hierarchy does not hold and that there are certain instances in which a lower level of the hierarchy is more cogent to hold than a higher one. My point is that you are incorrectly using the hierarchy.

I agree that the calculated probability (which is not an inductive inference) is not considering Y and X while the inductive inference about X and Y is; but this doesn’t make it an unfair comparison; — Bob Ross

Also, a real example, like my scenario, can’t be negated by saying it is an “unfair comparison” because, in reality, you would have to compare them and choose (as described above). In the scenario, you wouldn’t just throw your hands up and say “UNFAIR COMPARISON!” (: — Bob Ross

Ha ha! No, I'm not saying its unfair as in, "I don't like it." I'm saying its not how the hierarchy works. Its been a while since we covered it, but we covered a similar situation a while back.

Probability: A coin has a 50/50 chance of landing heads or tails.
Possibility: The sun will rise tomorrow

We don't compare the two because they don't apply to the same situation, or the same essential properties. We compare coin flip with coin flip with what we know, and sunrise to sunrise to sunrise with what we know. The hierarchy doesn't work otherwise. You're simply doing it wrong by comparing two different identities Boxes without X and Y, and boxes with X and Y, then saying you broke the hierarchy.

there is a probability you are given and there is an inductive inference you could make either (1) based off of that probability or (2) off of the experiential pattern. In this scenario, they are at odds with each other, so you can’t induce based off of both (as they have contradictory conclusions): so you have to compare them and determine which is more cogent to use. — Bob Ross

Sure, and I already pointed out the solution, but I'll be more clear.

If you do not consider the X and Y properties as relevant, you choose the probability. If you consider the X and Y properties as relevant, you do not have a probability that considers the X and Y properties. Therefore you choose the pattern. You're comparing an apple to an orange and trying to say an orange is more rational. You need to compare two apples and two oranges together.

Why would it be more cogent to predict the next coin is heads rather then saying it could be either on the next flip?

It wouldn’t. If all you know is that you are performing a 50/50 random coin flip, it doesn’t matter how many times you get heads: it’s the same probability. This is disanalogous to the scenario because your knowledge of the design correlations is not derived from the sample size. — Bob Ross

The point was to demonstrate that patterns are less cogent than probabilities. We both agree on this then. If that is the case, then if you use the hierarchy correctly by comparing the types of inductions we can make from all the essential properties considered among the inductions, you still choose a probability over a pattern.

I hope your Saturday is going well Bob! I think I've been able to pare down our discussion in a more intelligible way this time. Read everything once over and I think it will all come together.

Secondly, I am also not even claiming that the designs are essential to inducing what box it is (which would be the latter thing in your quote), because that would imply that if I didn’t know the design then I couldn’t induce at all what box it is—which is clearly wrong. I am saying that it is a relevant factor. — Bob Ross

Disregarding your first point for a minute, this is what I'm trying to inform you of. A relevant factor is an essential property. A non-relevant factor is a non-essential property in regards to the induction. Anytime you make the design relevant to an induction, a pattern in your case, it is now a relevant, or essential property of that induction. Again, can you make the pattern induction if you ignore the design? No. Therefore it is an essential property of that pattern. .

f by “essential property of the induction” you just mean that I am using designs to make my induction, then I have no problem with that; but that has nothing to do with the substance of the scenario nor does that entail that it is essential to the induction. The point is that the colossally observed pattern of design → box, in this particular context, outweighs going off of the minuscule probability. — Bob Ross

It is what I'm saying. But your claim is not proven. You can include the pattern design in your thinking, but it does not outweigh the known probability. And to this, it must be re-iterated again. This probability is applicably known without the X Y consideration. When you include a new property, then you create a new induction that takes that property into consideration.

We then evaluate that induction. In this case its a pattern. A pattern is less cogent then a probability. This pattern also includes certain properties than the original probability. It is not more cogent than the original probability. However, it is also not fully comparable either. The initial probability does not include the design of X or Y in its consideration. Meaning once we include the X/Y as an essential property in our pattern, we don't have a probability to compare to. We could take the pattern as the most cogent decision if X and Y are essential properties, because there is no probability considered for the X and Y properties. But it does not negate a probability as being more cogent.

So once again, we do not have a lower hierarchy being more rational to pick then a higher hierarchy. What you've attempted to do is make X and Y irrelevant in a probability, say they are then also irrelevant in a pattern, despite them being absolutely necessary to the pattern's conclusion. I'm going to condense the points I made above below in some simple logic.

This is a fair comparable probability and pattern in the hierarchy:

Probability 49/51% of getting either A or B.
Pattern I pull 1 billion A's and 1 billion Bs.

A pattern is not as cogent as a known probability (The probability is not wrong, this would of course be a different discussion)

The more rational belief is that I will pull a ratio of A to B at 49/51%, despite the patterned solution I've seen.

This is another fair comparable probability and pattern in the hierarchy:

Probability of getting either A or B with design X is 75% or Y at 25%
Pattern I always pull an A with X, and always pull a B with Y

In this case, the probability is still more cogent than the pattern. This is because all relevant properties to the conclusion of each induction is being considered.

An incorrect comparable probability and pattern (What your example is doing):

Probability 49/51% of getting either A or B, (X and Y not considered).
Pattern I always pull an A with X, and always pull a B with Y (X and Y considered)

Then you're claiming the pattern is somehow more cogent than the probability.

1. You have not shown that a pattern is more cogent than a probability. To do so, you must resolve a very simple problem.

The probability of a random coin flip is 50/50.
Someone flips a coin ten times randomly and it turns up heads all ten times.
"Randomly" is proven and not doubted.

Why would it be more cogent to predict the next coin is heads rather then saying it could be either on the next flip? Give a reason there, and we can start to question whether a pattern is more cogent than a probability.

2. You are not comparing inductions properly. The first induction does not consider X and Y. You cannot say a later induction that does consider X and Y is more cogent than the first, because the first is a different scenario of considerations. You need to have a probability that does consider X and Y to compare fairly.

I hope this finally clears up the issue! This has forced me to be clearer with my examples and arguments, and I think the entire paper is better for it.

I can experience design X with BWAs my whole life and never refurbish its definition to include design X as an essential property: and that is how the scenario is setup. — Bob Ross

True. But if you're going to later include, "I believe property X is a property that indicates it has air," then you've made it an essential property to identifying whether it has air. Basically you're saying its not an essential property, but then in your application, it is. You can claim its a non-essential property within the induction, but then in your application you must show it is. If it was non-essential, then it would have nothing to do with your induction of whether the box has air or not. Once you believe the design pattern does, its now essential to the predictive outcome of the identity despite any belief otherwise.

I can say the designs are not essential properties of the identity of a BWA and BWOA while holding that the designs, given the inductive evidence and super low probability given of pulling BWOA, are relevant to inferring (guessing) what it is (even though it isn’t an essential property of it). — Bob Ross

Introducing different words does not change the outcome. "infer" is "a guess" which is "an induction". So we're right back to the hierarchy again. If you include the "non-essential" property as essential for your induction to the outcome of the box, then it is no longer non-essential to your belief in the outcome of the box's air or not air identity. Again, it does not matter if its non-essential in your original probability identification. You've made it essential in your new one.

Let me clarify something though: what is essential to the inductive inference is not the same thing as what is essential to the identity of a thing. I think you may be conflating those two here. — Bob Ross

It is correct that the essential properties of a known identity, and the essential property of an induction about that identity are not the same. I've said that already by noting that we can hold the original probability while considering this new pattern. Regardless of the pattern of design, we still know that any box has a 51/49 probability in regards to its air. But if we later consider the design in believing whether the box will have air or not, its now essential in that belief. You don't get to decide what's essential or non-essential in application. In application, the design is now essential in your belief on whether it holds air or not. You can deny it, but you haven't proven it yet.

Non essential properties never weigh in or outweigh the probability of something occurring. If they do, they are now essential to that probability

Correct. You keep focusing too much on the probability. The idea is that there is a probability which is calculated independently of the designs, but it is a miniscule difference. — Bob Ross

And the miniscule difference is irrelevant. Its still 1% more rational. Or .0005% more rational. If X > Y, and no other considerations are made, its always more rational to choose X. It does not matter how small the difference is. Your original claim is that the hierarchy breaks. I'm not seeing how there being a miniscule differences breaks the logic of the hierarchy. That's a personal reason to not want to choose the more rational induction. That's not an argument for saying the probability is less rational.

I feel we're just repeating ourselves on this point. You know I'm very open to conceding whenever I see the logic, but in this case, I do not see a logical point that breaks the hierarchy. If you're going to use a property as a basis for an induction, its essential to the reasoning behind the belief. If you removed the design of X and Y from your second inference, do you have a second inference anymore? No, that inference is based on there being a X and Y design. If you can't remove the property and still hold the induction Bob, its essential to the induction. Unless a new point is made, I don't really see anything to add to this at this point.

I want to get to another point which you made which I think is valid and worth discussing over instead.

There’s no probability afforded to you of whether has a design X or Y. So correct. But that was never the claim I was making. The billion experiences of X → BWA and Y → BWOA is inductive evidence: it doesn’t give you a probability and that is the whole point. — Bob Ross

So here, you are correct. A probability is based off of our knowledge of limits. I've been using it in the generic sense, but depending on the context, the repeated occurrence of X and Y is not one. Here, we do not know the actual limit. You may not remember from the original paper, but I noted that the hierarchy is a basic identifier of inductions that almost certainly could be broken down further.

What we're faced with here is something that is a repeated possibility pattern. Lets say there's a mole in a hole. It comes out of the hole every other day for four days. Does that mean it will do so for the next four? The next forty? We don't know, its only an induction. But the longer the pattern repeats, the more cogent it seems to believe the pattern will continue.

We hold patterns as more persuasive than mere possibilities. If I only observed the mole for two days, I would see it is possible that the mole comes out of the hole, and also possible that it does not for the day. But that's not a probability. Its not a 50% chance that the mole emerges. Its a pattern. Its an observed repetition of possibilities. In other words, its something we applicably know of again and again. Applicably knowing a thing 20 times seems more solid to cogent to believe in it happening again opposed to only seeing its possible one time.

Patterns are a more detailed identity of a cogent argument than possibility alone, yet still less cogent than probabilities. Lets view our cards as an example. We know a jack has a 4/52 chance of randomly being drawn if there is no pattern in how the cards are shuffled. This is the only logical solution. Even if we observe a pattern within the draws, for example, over 10 decks our chance of pulling a jack is 10/52, we still haven't broken the odds if we still applicably know the card shuffling is random. Its like flipping a coin and getting heads 10 times in a row. Its a pattern of success, but not more cogent than the known probability.

The sun rising in the East and setting in the West is not a probability, its a pattern. An extremely long pattern that has remained unbroken. If we consider the box design in relation to whether its an indicator to its identity being an air box or not, this is also a pattern. But a pattern is not more rational than a probability due to the fact that a probability has more applicably known quantities like limitations. That being said, in absence of their being a probability, a pattern is the most cogent inference.

To clarify, I am saying that the odds of any box being without are is 51% and the only thing that matters to the identity of the box is that it (1) is a box and (2) has or does not have air in it. — Bob Ross

Here is where you also have to clarify. Does the design of X or Y have anything to do with the probability? For example, if the ration of X airs to Y airs was 3/4, then X and Y are essential properties to the probability. Both of these can co-exist.

So on one hand we could say overall, there's a 51% chance of no airs vs airs, not considering X or Y. Then we can drill down further, make X and Y a part of our observations, and note that X has a 75% chance of being no air, while Y has a 25% chance of being air. These are two different probabilities, and we could even math them together for an overall probability if we wanted to.

Once you start including an attribute in your probability, it is now essential to that probability. While you are considering X and Y, you're not considering the how heavy they are right? Anything you don't include in the probability is non-essential. Since you don't care about the weight of each box, it doesn't matter. Once you notice X and Y designs, and start actively noting, "Hey, X's so far have all been with air," then you've created a new probability, and X is essential to that probability.

No they don’t. The probability of one having design X or Y is completely unknown to you. The probability of picking a BWOA or BWA is irrelevant to the probability of it having a particular design. — Bob Ross

If it is known information that the X or Y is irrelevant to the design, then you cannot make a probability based off of it when referring to the boxes in general. If it is unknown whether the X or Y is relevant to the air inside of the box, then you could start to note a probability that is again, separate from the box disregarding the design.

I think the part of confusion Bob is you keep making non-essential properties essential to an induction, but think because its non-essential in another induction, its non-essential in your new induction. That's simply not the case. Once you start including the X or Y as a consideration, it is now an essential consideration for your new induction. That's your contradiction.

If you flip a coin ten times and it comes up heads ten times, does the non-essential property of you being in your living room change the odds of the coin's outcome? Of course not

That’s disanalogous: I am not saying that non-essential properties always weigh in or outweigh the probability of something occuring. — Bob Ross

Its completely analogous. Non essential properties never weigh in or outweigh the probability of something occurring. If they do, they are now essential to that probability. That's why the living room is non-essential to the probability.

Also, you being in your living room wouldn’t be a non-essential property because it isn’t a property of the probability. Is an unessential reason or factor: not a property. — Bob Ross

A reason or a factor is a property of something. If you wish to interchange it, its fine. The point still stands.

I am saying it is less rational to go with the 1% chance or 0.00000001% chance that it is a BWOA as opposed to a BWA in this specific scenario. — Bob Ross

Only if you consider the X, Y design of the box. In which case, it is now an essential property of your induction, and you've made the separate probability as I noted earlier.

Now lets include some non-essential properties. What they are is irrelevant. Lets call them properties X and Y.

They are not irrelevant: they are irrelevant to the identity of the thing. That is not the same thing as them being irrelevant flat out. — Bob Ross

It is not provably possible under your terms that a BWA could have a design of Y because you haven’t experienced it before. Just to clarify. — Bob Ross

Ok, I think we've narrowed down the point of contention. I think we're seeing two different contexts here. When you say, "The odds of any box being without air are 51%, and the only thing that matters to the identify of the box, is that its a box," then the non-essential properties of the box do not matter to the probability. If X and Y are non-essential, they don't matter to the probability then. I think that's a straight forward conclusion right?

Your context doesn't quite seem to fit this though, and that's what I'm trying to piece together here. Are you saying that the probability of 51% is only a guess? Or that we only think that the design of the box is irrelevant? In other words, is our 51% open to change, and do we not know if it depends on X or Y?

This is where I'm having trouble seeing your argument. You may have a good argument, but I'm just not understanding it yet. From my point, if X and Y are unessential to the probability, then they are unessential to the probability. Any results from experience, if we know the probability is correct, would not change the probability. Therefore no matter if we simply pulled 99/1 airs to no airs, that doesn't change the probability. The outcome of the probability does not change the probability.

I don't consider confirmation bias irrational by the way, I think that's a bit harsh. Its simply less rational then relying on knowledge we know. If we know the odds, its more rational to play the odds over the long term then not right? Even if we're currently beating the odds, it won't last over long term if the odds are correct.

Back to your point where I feel you changed the context a bit. You noted that it wasn't possible for you to have experienced a Box with Y that did not have air. I had assumed you had. That's true, you don't know if its possible for you to pull that box. Despite the odds, you never have. And yet you know its probable that you will, and its only incredible luck that you haven't so far. If the odds for the air or not air do not depend on X or Y, then each X and Y has a respective 49/51 split as well. This is just a logical fact. Results defying the odds do not negate the odds if the odds are known.

Now you have really good reasons to believe that when you see a box presented to you with design X, although designs aren’t essential properties, that it is a BWA. — Bob Ross

No, you don't. Because it is more rational to stick with the odds that you do then the possibilities that you don't. If you flip a coin ten times and it comes up heads ten times, does the non-essential property of you being in your living room change the odds of the coin's outcome? Of course not. If you start saying, "Every time I flip a coin in the living room, it changes the odds to where I always flip heads," then the living room is no longer a non-essential property to the coin flip, but has now become, in your head, an essential property of the coin flip.

Same as if after you count all the X and Y boxes that have ever been made, and sure enough, it turns out that all X's are airs, while all Y's are not airs. The odds didn't change, that's just one extremely unlikely outcome out of many possible outcomes. At that point since you know all of the boxes, and you've noted something special with the property of X and Y with the box, you could say that all boxes with X have air, while all boxes with Y's don't, and applicably know this. It just so happens that there are 49 billion X's, and 51 billion Y's.

In all of this, you have not shown a case in which it is more rational to not go with the odds beyond confirmation bias. But feel free to try again, as perhaps I'm missing something that you're seeing.

Secondly, if you would like to call what I just clarified as irrational, then you would have to say all inductions and abductions are irrational because that is how they work. Take Hume’s problem of induction, which you mentioned in your OP: you would have to say it is equally irrational to hold that the future will resemble the past. But this is nonsense: it isn’t irrational to induce or abduce: it can be quite rational. — Bob Ross

No, I don't. I simply rely again on the hierarchy of inductions, which rests on applicable knowledge as noted. All inductions ARE inductions, but it simply notes which inductions are more rational to believe in when compared to each other. It is more rational to believe that known rules and laws will remain as they are until we first experience them breaking. Then we will know its possible for a rule or law to break. The sun has always risen in the East and set in the West. It is in induction to believe it will do so tomorrow, but it is the only possible outcome which has ever happened. As such, it is more rational that we believe the possibility over the plausibility that it will rise in the West and set in the East.
My counter to you is to note that the hierarchy holds, so it does not destroy it.

You are basically hedging your bets on a minuscule 1% difference and expecting, given the contextual background knowledge you would have, that this next one will be the only one out of a billion and out of every single one that you have seen that will break the correlation. — Bob Ross

This is isn't hedging a bet. This is simply taking the most rational induction I know of, a probability, and holding it over my confirmation bias of the results I've obtained. My desire has nothing to do with what is more rational. However, being less rational could be less stressful for me right? Perhaps the issue you're really holding here is that you want to make decisions that are less rational sometimes. That's fine. There can be a host of reasons to be less rational in one's inductions. Perhaps you're just tired of examining the boxes and want to get through them faster. Perhaps the penalty for guessing wrong is irrelevant. What you really seem to be saying is that the 1% doesn't matter to you. Which is fine. But it is still 1% more likely, and therefore the more rational choice.

Hi Bob, I think a little too much is being thrown around by both of us, so I'm going to narrow the scope to your exact example.

1. Probability is 51% that the box does not have air.

To be clear, this means that any box given has a 51% change that it does not have air in it. So regardless of box design, its a 51% chance that it does not have air.

I'm going to simplify the others.

The only essential property for a box is that it is a six sided box. If it has air, its a box with air. If it doesn't, its a box without air. Anything else is non-essential.

We'll call call a box with air a BWA, and a box without air a BWOA because I'm tired of typing those phrases. :)

Any box you pick has a 49% chance of being a BWA, while it has a 51% chance of being a BWOA.

Now lets include some non-essential properties. What they are is irrelevant. Lets call them properties X and Y.

So I can have a BWA with a X, and a BWA with a Y. Does this change the probability of the BWA being picked? No. Its still a 49% chance. What about a BWOA with a X and a BWOA with a Y? No, still a 51% chance of being picked. This is because we know that X and Y are non-essential the the probability.

Lets say that I pull any number of boxes. It turns out that I only pull BWAs with X's and WBOAs with Y's. I've never pulled a BWA with a Y or a BWOA with a X, but its still within the odds that I can.

Is is possible that I could? Of course. But does that change the probability? No, non-essential properties don't affect the probability. If they did, they would be essential properties of the probability. Therefore it is still more rational to assume over the course of picking more boxes that I should always guess that I'll pull a BWOA, whether that's a X or a Y.

If you believe that because every BWA you've pulled so far is a X, therefore its more reasonable that a box with a X is going to be a BWA, that's not rational, its just confirmation bias. Your biased results don't make something more or less cogent. It is always more rational to believe that the box will be a BWOA whether its an X or a Y.

Confirmation bias isn't new either. https://www.verywellmind.com/what-is-a-confirmation-bias-2795024#:~:text=For%20example%2C%20imagine%20that%20a,supports%20what%20they%20already%20believe . Its an easy trap for all of us to fall into.

With that simplified, does that answer your question?

But maybe you're right and there will be a breakthrough soon. Then you can resurrect this and laugh at me, but I don't think that's going to happen. — RogueAI

No, I wouldn't laugh at you RogueAI. Just want to clarify this isn't a ego thing or jeering in any way. Please continue to have a fascination for alternatives than the status quo!

That's not the only viable problem. How does consciousness arise from matter? Why is consciousness present at all? Why are only certain arrangements of matter conscious?

If these questions are still unanswered after 1,000 years, no will believe in materialism. Why would they? It will have failed to answer some of the most basic questions. — RogueAI

Those are easy problems, not hard problems. Easy and hard do not denote their difficulty in finding a solution, but their difficulty in finding a path to a solution at all. The hard problem I noted has no pathway to a solution. Your questions have clear pathways of investigation and testability. Considering the amount of progress we've made in just the last 30 years, there seems to be no reason to alter course for the next 30, let alone 1000.

Something else to think about, but your questions can equally be applied to almost any other state of matter. How does water arise from H20? Why is water a possible existence at all? Why are only certain arrangements of atoms water while others are not? We know that water is made out of molecules, and consciousness comes from the brain, but there are still deeper questions that we continue to look into.

Still a lot to discover!

If the Hard Problem is still around 1,000 years from now, it will be devastating for materialism/physicalism. — RogueAI

Not at all. The only viable version of the hard problem is it stands today is that we cannot know what another subject is experiencing from that subjects viewpoint. We could take two subjects and stimulate identical brain states to where they both said, "I see a green tree." We could never independently verify what that green tree looked like specifically to subject 1 or 2. No one can. To my mind, there's no theory that ever could either. This in no way invalidates the fact that brain causes the mind.

If these are truly accidental properties, then they are not in consideration

Why would resemblance and inductive association to the accidental properties in relation to the essential thing not be a consideration? — Bob Ross

Because they are accidental. You're just not properly identifying the situation.

Lets simplify this. Why are the boxes accidental? Lets not just say they are. Lets prove they are. You know that the manufacturer does not care about whether X or Y design has air or not. It is known that they randomly switch between box designs for air and not air, and it turns out the box design X and Y have exactly 50% change of having air or not air.

Thus whether the box is design X or Y is accidental to whether it has air inside. This is a proven accidental property.

Now, lets say that I receive a billion boxes of X, and a billion boxes of Y. low and behold, it turns out all the X's have air, while all the Y's don't. Its an incredibly improbable scenario, but it can be independently verified that yes, its completely a 50/50 chance that either box has air or not.

It doesn't matter the result of the odds, they don't change the odds. Remember that a probability is based off of knowledge, not other inductions.

Here is another way the properties can be accidental. Lets say that X always has air, and Y does not. X is red, and Y is green. You are color blind and can't tell the difference. Within your context, whether its box Y or X is irrelevant to you. It is outside of your distinctive knowledge to know there is a color difference, and outside of your applicable context to tell the colors apart.

Lets take your accidental property that no longer remains accidental.

I am saying that, in this hypothetical consideration, the designs are accidental: it isn’t a question of whether people are implicitly claiming them as essential properties (in this scenario). — Bob Ross

The designs are accidental, not an accidental property then. If you have no foreknowledge of whether box X or Y should or should not have air, then you have not yet decided whether X or Y design are essential or accidental to the identity.

Also, we have to clarify what we're referring to here. If we're referring to the core identity of the box itself as a particular type of measuring tool where air doesn't matter, X and Y are accidental. If we're referring to the probability of whether a X or Y box has air or not, then the box design is no longer accidental to our point!

Taken another way, a type of dog can be green or blue. Whether its blue or green is irrelevant to knowing the identification of the dog. However, you later discover that 74% of these dogs are green, while 25% are blue, and 1% could be any other color. When you are asking, "Is this dog that I cannot see behind a screen green or blue," at that point the probability of the color becomes an essential set or properties in knowing the outcome. At that point, because the point is directly about the color, it is pertinent to the guess at hand. These odds also do not retroactively make the color a primary attribute in identifying this type of dog? No.

To sum up an accidental property - A property which is completely irrelevant to one's assertation or denial of the identity. Meaning that you cannot make an accidental identity suddenly be relevant to the assertation or denial of the identity. As soon as it is relevant, it is no longer accidental.

In the scenario, as I hold the possibility is more cogent than the probability, — Bob Ross

You can decide that you would rather explore the possibility than the probability, but you did not prove that a possibility is more cogent than a probability. Again, all the examples are going to boil down to needing to prove that what one is examining is a known probability, possibility, or plausibility. All that's been done so far is a misunderstanding of the terms.

To see if you understand, take your example again and try breaking it down into clear and provable accidental or primary properties for the context. Second, clearly demonstrate what is a possibility, probability, and plausibility. Only after that careful dismantling, try to prove that you can make a plausibility more cogent than a possibility.

OK, so all the neuroscience that's been done is consistent with an idealistic reality. Why should I then believe that the prima facie neural causation model that you champion is actual causation? — RogueAI

Some of neuroscience is almost certainly idealistic, in which case idealistic philosophy has free reign. But the fact that the mind comes from the brain is not idealistic, it is decades of research and experiments that continue to confirm this as a fact. From brain surgery, anesthesia, brain damage research, psychadelics, and psychiatric medicine there are a host of things to choose from. If the brain did not cause the mind, then all of these fields which rely on this fact, would have catastrophic failure rates and be no more than charlatans.

You can even test it on yourself. Go get drunk tonight and see how it affects your mind. That is due to the alcohol impacting your brain. Its an extremely simple test to confirm for yourself while having a little fun.

I would if the model you describe could actually explain how things are conscious and why consciousness is present at all, but materialism/physicalism/naturalism has utterly failed to solve the mind-body problem. — RogueAI

If you are talking about certain details of consciousness, of course we don't understand everything yet. For example, we'll never know what its like to exist as a brain from the subjective viewpoint of the brain. That's outside of our measurement. But we can most certainly impact consciousness by manipulating the brain. Anesthesia knocks you unconscious for surgerys. You think that's all just a happy accident? That's all based on the fact that brain affects the mind, and anesthesia affects the brain in a particular manner.

Don't confuse not fully mapping out the brain with being unable to make certain conclusions about the brain. We're trying to reverse engineer the brain's specifics, but we have overall conclusions about how it works that have continually held up to tests and critiques. If you reversed engineered a car, you might not understand how magnetism works, but you could understand the parts of the car and how they interact. The car does not run if the engine is not active, despite not knowing all the details on how gas combustion causes the engine to run.

How long are going to put up with that failure before we start to explore new theories? What if the mind-body problem is still around 1,000 years from now? At what point do you start to question your metaphysical assumptions? — RogueAI

You misunderstand. You can always question and wonder at alternatives. I can sit and ponder that all of physics is somehow a big misunderstanding. I can have a lot of fun coming up with other theories. But those are all suppositions, untested, and non-factual. None of those override facts themselves. If I said my crazy physics alternative fixed everything with physics, but I could not adequately demonstrate this, I would be a fraud.

So have fun with idealism. Say, "What if...?" Explore and think on alternatives. But until there is something factually substantial behind those musings, it is entirely inappropriate to say they counter known facts.

I can't prove it's all a dream. I'm simply asking you if all the science that's been done would necessarily be any different if all this was a dream. Would it? — RogueAI

I don't know. You're asking about a fictional reality. We can't make judgements about fictional realities, because they're fictional. Can we create a fictional reality where we decide science is different? Sure. Can we create a fictional reality where we decide science is the same? Sure. Its fiction, so there are no limits on what we can do.

That's an appeal to authority, not an argument.
— Philosophim

That's a copout. We cite books and philosophers in discussions here constantly. It's not a fallacy in informal discussions if the authority is a valid one. — RogueAI

No, citing a book without any specific arguments from the book is an appeal to authority. If an argument from the book had been presented to counter my point, that would have been fine.

Of course they entail what they entail. All you have to do is show that brain death and a lack of mind are not a correlate. All you have to do is demonstrate how when neuroscientists analyze the brain, they can predict accurately what a person will think or say next up to 10 seconds before they say it. If my points are so easy to counter, then you should be able to easily give a counter to them.
— Philosophim

Would any of that be different if this were all a dream? — RogueAI

Can you prove that this is all a dream? That's like saying "Would it all be different if we were all made out of cotton candy?" Its a fun thing to explore, but without providing an argument that we are in fact, made out of cotton candy, its not an argument worth considering in a discussion of facts. It is not a correlation or supposition that the mind comes from the brain. It is a scientific fact. Not that a fact cannot be overturned, or we can't suppose there's more out there than we currently know. If you're going to say a fact is wrong, you need to prove it.

Every part of the design is an accidental property except for it being a box and having air (as defined above). You have never experienced a design X which was not a box-with-air. — Bob Ross

If these are truly accidental properties, then they are not in consideration. As a reminder of an accidental property, these are properties that are variable to the essential. So a "tree without branches" would have no bearing on its identity as a tree. So we can eliminate the variables X and Y from our consideration.

As it is irrelevant whether the design matches X or Y, if I am given a box and I know that probability is 51/49%, then the more reasonable guess is to guess that the box I am given is the 51% chance that it does not have air.

The problem is that in your example, it is unlikely someone would consider box X to be an accidental property. We can't just say its accidental, it has to match accurately to the definition of an accidental property. Implicitly, what most people would think in this context is, "Box X is designed to have air, Box Y is designed not to have air." These would become essential properties for most people in their context of encountering billions of each kind and having the same outcome in regards to air. If its truly accidental, then the person would not even consider Box X or Box Y as being associated with having air, because it doesn't matter.

You don't have to have an example at all to question my conclusions Bob, its like an equation. The examples so far are doing nothing to counter the underlying claims about essential and non-essential properties, they're really examples in which you need to correctly identify if a property is essential or non-essential based on the person's context. Once that identity is complete, everything falls into place.

Are the countless neuroscience discoveries, medicine, psychiatrics, etc. all just correlations? Of course not.
— Philosophim

But they don't entail what you say they entail. Have you ever encountered the book The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, by Hacker and Bennett? — Wayfarer

Of course they entail what they entail. All you have to do is show that brain death and a lack of mind are not a correlate. All you have to do is demonstrate how when neuroscientists analyze the brain, they can predict accurately what a person will think or say next up to 10 seconds before they say it. If my points are so easy to counter, then you should be able to easily give a counter to them. Citing a book vaguely does nothing. That's an appeal to authority, not an argument.

From my perspective, everything you write on the forum comprises wholly and solely what Philosophim thinks is obvious, accompanied by a strong sense of indignation that someone else can question what, to you, are obvious facts. This is your response to everything I address to you. — Wayfarer

And yet if they were not obvious facts, you would be able to counter them easily wouldn't you? Instead you retreat and answer with things like:

Have you ever written a term paper in philosophy? Ever actually studied it? Because I can see no indication of that. — Wayfarer

This is someone who is insecure about their own intelligence. Don't be Wayfarer. You're a smart person. But a smart person should not be so easily caught up in their own ego. Its a poison trap of smart people to think that "If I just read a bunch of papers and cite them, people will think I'm smart." You have knowledge, but you seem unable to critically think about that knowledge when its challenged from a new perspective. Thus you retreat. I call this out so that you'll attempt to improve Wayfarer instead of getting haughty and making poor appeals to authority.

Here's the truth. It doesn't matter what the background of someone is in philosophy. It matters if you can think logically, critically, and honestly. You attempting to put up barriers when you're countered is unbecoming. If you must know, am I formally educated? Yes. Am I intelligent? Objectively yes. I do not post my background as a "flex" because I don't want people to just agree with me for the wrong reason. The arguments I give should stand on their own, as should yours. Eliminating such inconsequential considerations such as "status" lets us get right to the arguments instead of our egos.

But while there may be correlations between mental states and brain states, this doesn't necessarily imply a strict identity between them. — Wayfarer

You know this is a completely false statement. You can't just claim they are correlations, you have to prove it. To prove a correlation, you need to remove the brain and still have a mind. Does anyone with brain death have a mind? Are the countless neuroscience discoveries, medicine, psychiatrics, etc. all just correlations? Of course not. You're too well versed to make a claim like that.

This is a rationalization. Despite knowing this isn't true, you believe this regardless. Why? What do you gain out of it Wayfarer? That's the only reason why people hold things they know are false to be true. Do you do it because you fear you'll lose something? Maybe I can help you hold onto what you want without you having to hold to this false notion. We're in philosophy. The point is to be razor sharp with are arguments and suppositions as we cut down our rationalizations and false beliefs.

Logical propositions and their truth values are abstract entities that exist independently of any specific physical realization, such as brain states. — Wayfarer

No, they aren't. There always has to be something to process those logical proposition and truth values. It doesn't exist in a vacuum. If there is nothing, there is no logic Wayfarer. We are the brains abstracting these identities. No brains, no abstract identity of logic. Apart from brains, does such logic just float out there? Where is it if it is not in the brains of logically capable thinking beings?

I could choose to represent it and any number of different propositions in different symbolic systems and different media, whilst still preserving the logic. — Wayfarer

And what is doing this thinking? Your brain.

You seem to take the argument like this: "My brain's physical capabilities let me think of abstracts and logic and rationality. Therefore such things exist apart from the physical capabilities that my brain produces. Its a contradiction Wayfarer. Go get drunk and watch logic disappear. Look at a brain damaged individual and see how they process.

I think consideration of the role of networks of neurons, and disregarding the molecular details on which the neurons supervene, is an appropriate level of looking at things for the purpose of this discussion
— wonderer1

It might be, were this a computer science or neuroscience forum. — Wayfarer

Here you are also mistaken. The best philosophers of history were often times mathematicians and scientists as well. Philosophy has to discuss the material that we know of today, or it is an exercise in futility. You cannot discuss the philosophy of mind without neuroscience. That is a person who is in the dark ages and will be left behind. Why isn't neuroscience looking to arguments such as your Wayfarer? Because they offer nothing. They're wrong. Its not that neuroscience is full of itself and can't comprehend what you're saying. They do. And its so off base as to be brushed aside without a second thought.

I've said this before, and I'll say it again. Poor philosophy wonders at what could be. Great philosophy wonders at what is, and attempts to solve it. But we have to address what we know, not ignore it for our ideology.

Good post Wayfarer, the time and detail that went into this is appreciated.

I'm ok with point 1 at the moment, so lets go into the proposed contradiction.

As a matter of definition physicalists claim that all events must have physical causes, and that therefore human thoughts can ultimately be explained in terms of material causes or physical events (such as neurochemical events in the brain) that are nonrational. In Lewis' terms, this would entail that our beliefs are a result of a physical chain of causes, not held as a result of insight into a ground-consequence relationship. — Wayfarer

A process of reasoning (P therefore Q) is rational only if the reasoner sees that Q follows from P, and accepts Q on that basis. Thus, reasoning is veridical only if it involves a specific kind of causality, namely, rational insight. — Wayfarer

If this is the case, how is it not rational to conclude that the physical brain causes the mind? Its not an irrational argument. In simple terms, if brain state = X, then mind state = Y is the claim right? If this can be confirmed through testing, then I would say this is a completely rational argument. If you lacked rational insight, then yes, you would not see it as rational. But you have rational insight. How is this not rational then?

Are you saying that underlying physical process don't process the term rationality like we do in our mind? Because that's not what naturalism is stating. Its perfectly rational to observe that gravity pulls something down at a steady acceleration. Are we to say that gravity is irrational because it doesn't realize or think that it should accelerate at a steady pace? Of course not. That's not a counter of naturalism, that's just a misapplication of the term "rational".

I wanted to get your take on this: am I misunderstanding or misremembering the view here? By point here is that, upon further reflection, it is insufficient to use the inductive hierarchy you have proposed because they do not supersede each other absolutely in the manner you have proposed. The context and circumstances matter — Bob Ross

Yes, you are misremembering, but I believe its because I don't go into significant detail about context here. Upon re-evaluating the original paper, I found I could pare down explorations into context to lessen the size of the paper which seemed to be intimidating to people.

Context and circumstances matter greatly. These determine both what distinctive and applicable knowledge you have available to you. So lets break down your examples one by one.

First case: Air box, no air box. No probability, both are possible. No other context.

Hierarchy results: Both are possible. Therefore one is as likely as the other.

Second case: Air box most probable on earth, no air box most probable on moon.

Hierarchy results: While both are possible, its more probable for an air box to be on Earth and a no air box to be on the moon.

Third case: Air box, no air box. It is known that air boxes look like X, it is known that non-air boxes look like Y. You are provided a box that looks like Y. Is it an air or non-air box?

Hierarchy results: Depends on how you've personally defined non-air boxes. If the look and feel is an essential property for you, then you know its a non-air box. In fact if you later found out it had air, you could easily say "Its a defective non-air box". If of course the look and feel are irrelevant, and the only thing that matters is that it does, or does not have air in it, then you could say its probably an air box. Remember, your distinctive knowledge is created at your particular context. So based on how you structure that context, it would be probability or possibility comparison.

Fourth case: Chains of sub-knowledge and beliefs about whether its an air box or not.

Hierarchy results: Find the chains of reasoning, and compare them through the children up to the parent.

The flaw is here:

let’s prove a plausibility is more cogent than a possibility and probability under certain conditions. — Bob Ross

A plausibility is never more cogent then a possibility due to the logic and reasoning involved. You have to break the actual logic and reasoning behind each induction. Making a complex example without carefully and correctly identifying the chain of reasoning, and when it relies on sub-inductions, is not a counter.

First, if you've never experienced a "Box without air", then its not a probability. You simply know that people make boxes with air, and you don't yet know that people make boxes without air. The number of times this has been experienced is irrelevant.

Now lets shorten your example down to a context in which you think of a plausibility that a box could be made without air. You're comparing applicable knowledge to a plausibility. Remove the wording that notes it is a box without air. Its more reasonable to assume its a box with air.

Now lets add in the writing. Depending on context, this is a plausible truth, or a possible truth. Is it possible that when someone labels a box that it does not contain air, that it might not contain air? Or is it only plausible in your world? This is also inconsequential to your point. The real question is, once you've correctly established whether its knowledge or a type of induction, then you compare.

Perhaps an underlying point to your critique is, "Do I always have to choose the most cogent answer and not attempt to explore lesser cogent inductions?" No. The cogency is about making the most efficient and rational choice when presented with two alternatives. But, one may wish to be inefficient because they believe there is a greater payoff in the long run.

For example, its highly unlikely you will ever win the lottery. But its possible. You may be willing to forgo your time and money to buy a lottery ticket, even if you never win. In general its not the most rational or efficient use of your money, but if you DO win, it will be. Same with plausibilities. Perhaps there is a plausible challenge to something you know. It might take a week to fully explore that plausiblity to see if it is correct or not. Is that worth your time and energy? If not, it is perfectly rational and efficient to choose not to explore it. But of course, if the plausibility were correct, it very well might lead to knew knowledge which saves you two weeks of time and energy down the road. Is it worth it? That's for you to decide.

Thank you Bob, your input and insight is always welcome! My availability to respond is more limited this week, but as long as you don't mind a possible delay between responses, I would very much enjoy your questions and concerns!

↪Philosophim
What does your proposal have to say about the probability of Last Thursdayism? — RogueAI

Good question!

For those who don't know what that is, last Thursdayism is the idea that the universe was created last Thursday, but with the physical appearance of being billions of years old.

This proposal wouldn't be a probability, it would be an inapplicable plausibility. The outcome is designed in such a way that no one could ever find out if it were applicable, so fits the definition. That's lower down in the hierarchy of induction, so any probability or possibility would be a more cogent belief.

I would love to see more of these types of questions.

Heh, ok Wayfarer. I know when I have or haven't countered something and I admit I'm wrong or mistaken rather often. Truth is more important to me then "winning". Believe it wasn't countered if you want, but it most certainly was.

If you want to go into detail explaining why my point didn't counter yours, feel free, I'll re-engage. Until then, no worry, I'll catch you in another thread.

It seems that if sensory input isn't coming in to the brain, the brain will create it's own hallucinatory input to compensate. People in sensory deprivation tanks hallucinate fairly quickly when deprived of external stimuli. What is the evolutionary benefit of this? — RogueAI

I'm not an evolutionary cognitive scientist, so what I say is as worthwhile as any other person's opinion here. If I had to guess from my limited knowledge, the human brain requires constant work to not be bored. Those cells in your brain need something to do, and like a muscle that hasn't moved in a while, it will atrophy otherwise. Further it could also be a stepping stone to imagining how to get out of your situation, like if you were buried somewhere for example.

What sort of embodied cognition would you say you're defending? — frank

Nerve communication to the brain.

People who have dead nerves in certain places of their body cannot feel anything there.
— Philosophim

What about phantom limb pain? — RogueAI

Good point. Even 20% of people born without limbs have phantom limb syndrome. What this tells us is the brain actively fires looking for limbs to use. Makes sense since even babies use their limbs all the time. The locus of thought is from the mind to the limb, not from the limb to the mind.

If consciousness is strictly a bodily function, we'd have to explain how it is that the body doesn't adapt, but the mind does. — frank

So the reason why your brain understands what is going on in your body is because of nerves which send communications to the brain. it is these nerves which allow your extended consciousness. People who have dead nerves in certain places of their body cannot feel anything there.

As for the body not adapting, how do you conclude that? Increased Melanin in Africa. Extra eye folds for glary environments in Asia. Less melanin for people in cloudy sun limited climates. Even more basic, you can tan your skin, scar, and get calluses. All of these are adaptations.

I stand by the basic claim that numbers, logical principles, and the like, cannot be explained in terms of the interactions of matter. That reason comprises the relationship of ideas, not the relations between material entities. — Wayfarer

Its fine if you wish to stand by that, but it did not counter my point which refutes that. I can respect this however. You've demonstrated your reasons, which has at least helped me to see why you have the view you do. I approach discussions not with the goal of convincing someone else to take another view point because people will believe what they want to believe. I view a discussion as challenging my own logic, and once I believe its been adequately addressed by the other person, I am satisfied.

You can say that the weight of two 500 gram apples equals the weight of one 1Kg melon, but that's because you're mathematically literate and can grasp the meaning of 'the same as' or 'equal to'. — Wayfarer

Right, but this equally applies to discussion of water as I noted earlier. My point is that the ability to identify is the same in both instances. The ability to identify in no way proves that we cannot misidentify. If the mind was independent of objects, then we would not fear misidentifying as a threat to our existence. If I misidentify water versus oxygen when I breath, I'm going to die. My mind cannot prevent that. Therefore it is a logical conclusion that there are objects independent of the mind.

It's those intellectual operations, which we rely on for all manner of reasoned inference, which I say can't be explained in terms of matter and energy. — Wayfarer

You may say this, but I've shown it is. Your brain is made up of matter and energy. Incredulity, disbelief, or the inability to comprehend something does not negate its reality. Until you can show that intellectual operations can exist apart from matter and energy, its not a valid claim.