Yes, some animals can think rationally. It depends on how you define 'rationally' of course. If you define it as, 'the brain processing humans do', then its not. I don't ascribe to this definition, but many do implicitly.

Here is a crow using a stick to get food. Do you think this is rational?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cjfrxkEpfX8

This is about "Things in themselves" a concept which is easy to misunderstand. Let me see if I can do it justice.

A "Thing in itself" is 'reality'. It is "What is". What we do as people is observe light, air vibrations, etc, then piece together a coherent assessment of "That thing in itself" that we can process and make sense of. But if you think about it, the "Thing in itself" is not the light bouncing off. The falling tree does not make sound, the air from the crash does. As such, it is impossible to know what "A thing in itself" is. Its that upon which we represent with our definitions, beliefs, assumptions, and knowledge.

Generally, the debate is, "Can we know what a thing in itself is?" Can we know what reality is, apart from our interpretations of that reality? And the answer is "No". What we call "space" has no directionality, as directionality is related to our interpretation. It doesn't mean that space doesn't exist or that something like "up" doesn't exist 'in itself'. It just means that our interpretation of what is, that exists without contradiction, still isn't "what is".

And this makes sense right? If you can only interpret something, you can't know what the something is without interpretation. In a more relatable sense, you can't actually 'be' another consciousness than yourself. You can interpret another human being, make beliefs about them, assessments, etc., but you can never understand what it is like to be "That person in themselves". And to really make sure this is understood, it does not mean that "That person in themselves" does not exist. It just means you're ability to understand and know about it is limited by the aspects of information and interpretation.

So ok, lets see if we can make the above conversation make more sense then a late night edible conversation.

this basic argument in the 1768 essay is that Leibniz’s view does not enable one to distinguish between a left handed glove and a right handed glove, insofar as the relations of all the parts to one another are the same in both cases. — SEP on Leibniz

Ok, so the glove can fit a right hand or left hand. That's the thing in itself (which we shouldn't be able to know). We ascribe to that glove, "Its a right handed/left handed glove", but because there is nothing innate in the glove itself that would necessitate that its right or left handed, we can make a belief, but not a solid claim of "that's what it is in itself".

Yet if God had created just one glove, it would have been one or the other. — SEP on Leibniz

What he's doing here is noting that the glove was made with intention. So the design does not convey the intent of the glove, but the designer had an intent for the glove. This is pulling the idea that 'things in themselves' are of course intelligently designed. And if you understand the what I noted above, you get into some absurd logic. Essentially even though we interpret reality, God actually understands and knows reality as it is 'itself'. How? Magic. And continuing to create a reasonable argument with magic ends in nonsense.

Another way to look at it is that God is another stand in for 'conscious intelligent being'. And its Gods interpretation that the glove be used for right hands only, so therefore its a right handed glove. But God would still need the concept of right and left handed that does not exist in 'the thing in itself'. Generally when you pull God into a conversation, it gets weird. I'll try to leave that aspect out to make it more intelligible.

Right-handedness and left-handedness are not merely anthropic concepts since nature itself insists on handedness in twining plants and the shells of snails. But which direction is right and which is left can only be established by a conscious, embodied being. As he expresses it in the Prolegomena, “The difference between similar and equal things which are not congruent…cannot be made intelligible by any concept, but only by the relation to the right and left hands, which immediately refers to intuition” — SEP on Leibniz

In other words if there were no hands, we would not be able to ascribe that a glove was for a right or left hand. But since there are hands created by nature, we know there are right and left hands in themselves. Nature doesn't ascribe to it that, "This is the right hand", but it there are hands that exist on each side of the body. Our interpretation or 'intuition' is to know them as right and left hands. Nature doesn't know them as that, as nature does not ascribe to them anything more than they are. The mistake here is to think that there is another concept 'in itself', or as God would ascribe. A thing in itself has no concept, it just 'is'.

It is not clear whether this orientational analysis implies that wherever there is space there must also be sentient beings with pairs of incongruent parts, as well as top-bottom and back-front asymmetry. — SEP on Leibniz

So again, to know something is 'right or left' is a human concept based on relation. "Right" is what we call 'that horizontal direction' in relation to left which is 'the complete opposite direction' from a particular origin viewpoint. "Right" and "left" do not exist, according to the above, as 'things in themselves'. They are pure concepts based off of relations of our interpretations of things in themselves.

So that being the case, if right and left are conceptual relations, doesn't that mean that top, back, depth, height, and space in general is just a concept based on the relations that a cognizant being creates? Yes. But does that mean the things in themselves are not related to other things in themselves, as they are? No. Does putting God or Forms into the mix make it more confusing then it needs to be? Yes. :)

Ok, so now to finally answer your question!

On what basis do you make this distinction? Is it a matter of experiencing the world through a human body? Or is there something objective about it? — frank

The objective basis is 'the thing itself'. We have 'hands' in themselves. How we interpret them is up to us. We could call them "quack and bark" hands if we wanted. We could say that hands involve the forearm. We part and parcel our interpretation of reality as we wish. As long as our interpretation is not contradicted by the thing in itself's existence (I can cut my hands off and they will still work does NOT match reality) then we're good.

I like your points except the need for religion. I believe at this point in life that religion is a mental construct we use to deal with things in life that have no alternative solution. Just like "everyone thinks they're above average". Of course not everyone is above average, that's not how math works. But thinking that you are helps you make it through the world.

I do think religion can be very helpful to people, but not for this particular solution. As you noted,

words [...] have reached such a pernicious level of influence that they have no real or useful clinical meaning. — Abdul

Exactly. I see it on social media and culture. "I have OCD". No you don't. OCD is a crippling compulsion that is in no way reasonable. Do you wash your hands 10 minutes every day on the dot to the point your hands are bleeding and raw? Then you don't have OCD. You have an attention to detail, order, and habit, which is part of the human spectrum.

The problem is medicalized terms that represent crippling deficiencies, have been relegated to personality differences that people are uncomfortable with. The psychology industry makes bank off of it, and well meaning psychologists are trying to make people's lives better. Being sad is not depression. Not moving from your bed for hours after you wake up is. Popular culture looks for what is wrong with us, when it should be celebrating our differences.

Compound this with a for-profit medicalized industry, and we're marketing pills to people who are quite healthy, have no problems working and taking care of themselves, but are sold a magic pill to "make life better". This especially hits the youth hard. You have teenagers dealing with normal stresses and fears and thinking its "anxiety". A diagnosis becomes an excuse for poor behavior that you could easily overcome. Its definitely a problem.

The psychology industry has people who understand this as well. They want psychology to emphasize less what is wrong with people, and more what is right. As long as there is money to be made however, and people are more willing to look for an excuse for what's wrong with them instead of accepting that life is going to have struggles you have to overcome yourself, I don't see it changing anytime soon.

Because capitalism adapted to serve people. 40 hour work weeks, paid time off, Osha, and fantastic government regulation make life pretty good and generally healthy for its citizens. Communism was a product of tremendous income inequality and the rise of corporate power. People wanted government to fix that, and communism seemed a good way to do so. If you have its pretty good in society, or at least aren't miserable, why bother changing the system?

Why? So you can feel particularly righteous? — wonderer1

No, because Bob is constructing something important to them, an ethical theory. They are trying to get to the underlying logic of ethics, which is in my opinion, one of the last areas where true philosophy is still desperately needed. We do things all the time in our life that we cannot explain intellectually, as Bob noted. I've spoken with Bob many times, and he is not a self-righteous individual. They are passionate, curious, polite, and in my opinion, a true philosopher that is open to critique and changing their mind.

This is what philosophers endeavor to do. It is to construct a set of definitions and principles and come to a logical set of rules that help humanity understand and explain things beyond a surface level. When you encounter a person like Bob, who is a rare jewel on these forums, understand that this is their motivation. Bob can of course defend themself, but I can vouch for their reputation and intent on this forum.

I am seriously pondering what you have written, and incorporating it, but you don't seem to do the same with what I write. — Caerulea-Lawrence

I am sorry you feel that way. I felt I understood it, but that doesn't mean I did. For what its worth, you have a good soul and I wish you the best going forward!

Your theory is nice, and thorough, but from my perspective, it can only be a piece of any moral theory. It only tells one part of a much bigger story. I am looking for a more complete version. — Caerulea-Lawrence

I agree. Its only a start. Maybe one day it will be more.

If there is something unclear so far, or there is something you want to get off your chest, let me know.

If not, thanks a lot for these sincere interactions so far, and I wish you well moving forward. It was a pleasure. — Caerulea-Lawrence

You as well Caerulea! You have been a wonderful person to chat with, and I'm glad to have met you. Please continue on your path and feel free to share it with others here. I'll see you around the forums. :)

I am grateful that you are able to work with what I wrote, as it wasn’t really easy trusting my moral intuition to speak its truthfulness. I’ll do my best to write how I see things, but be aware that from my perspective we aren’t necessarily disagreeing about ‘what is moral’, we are disagreeing on how we see reality and about humanity. — Caerulea-Lawrence

Unvarnished truth is better than couched and unclear communication. I took no offense. :) I also understand where you're coming from completely. Let me explain.

I came up with the knowledge theory and then the moral theory years ago. When I first came up with the moral theory, I was terrified and put it down. The problem was if I didn't use it correctly, or set it up in a way where someone could manipulate it as a half truth as some people in power are want to do, it could be horribly misused.

Don’t you understand the consequences of actually finding a moral theory that is true? Use it for selfish gains, and we are completely screwed. — Caerulea-Lawrence

I do. Its why I put it down so long. So what made me change my mind?

1. I wanted to know if I was wrong.
2. I have more experience in philosophy and a better sense of the big picture.
3. I've learned to trust humanity more.
4. AI is coming.
5. The standard for proof is high.

Generally humanity advances whether we want to or not. It is only by those who are careful, care about the outcomes, and have a vested interest in humanities prosperity over profit and exploitation that these advances are most beneficial. If I don't try, I'm leaving it in the hands of some who potentially does not have those considerations at heart.

I also believe in the human spirit more. There are evil people yes, but I would say the majority of us are neutral to good. Humanity always struggles with a new set of knowledge or technology, but ultimately benefits if they are willing to tackle it in the right way.

AI is also a real danger. I believe if AI advances without us having established an objective morality, we'll have the same situation that you fear. AI has no intuitions, no loyalty to humanity or life, and it may determine that if morality is subjective, it can be bent for its own benefit. If it has to reason though an objective consideration, in almost no scenario would it conclude that humanity, animals, or life on this Earth should ever be wiped out.

Finally, if I'm careful in the specifics, and continually expect a high bar to claim, "This is more moral", with it being open to being challenged with new information at any time, I believe the theory avoids easy manipulation. Once could manipulate it by 'lowering the bar', but people do that even with subjective moralities.

Based on what is known to you, does everyone you know, and have ever met, have the same moral standards for themselves that you have? I’m not talking about if they try to, or you can’t judge them because you don’t know their life etc. — Caerulea-Lawrence

Correct. The moral theory is about existence being good. Meaning a person's existence is put into the equation. You can't say, "All people must do X", because not all people are the same. Its more about, "If you're X in this situation Y, and you have a choice between A and B, do B'.

Well, reading that, how do you feel? — Caerulea-Lawrence

I have no problem with it, except that I 'mostly' commit to those ideals. We are not perfect, nor should we expect to be.

By measuring morals relatively, you are ignoring the absolute nature of our lives, our actions and our morals. — Caerulea-Lawrence

I am measuring morals to the absolute reality of the situation. And in my experience, there is no other way. An absolute 'in every instance, do this' situation exists more rarely then you would think. We are part of existence, and thus we are part of morality. Morality does not have to be separate from us, but can be with us.

But I'm speaking in abstracts and feelings now. All I ask is for you to read the second part. If you read it and you don't like it, understood. But try to see what I'm doing first instead of fearing the unknown.

I am glad to discuss things with an open-minded person like you. — MoK

Thank you, I try.

But I'm going to ask, "Is it better to have good states of reality or evil states of reality?"
— Philosophim
No. Good and evil are fundamental and they are both necessary. Think of evolution for example. The weak agents are eliminated in the process of evolution so room is left for the stronger to survive since the resources are finite. Evolution is evil since weaker agents are eliminated for the sake of stronger ones. — MoK

Taken in that limited context, is that really evil then? Preferably, we would like there to be infinite resources. Then there would be no need for evolution. But if there are finite resources, and also threats that could potentially prevent beings from getting them, isn't evolution the best to handle a situation? Because if there wasn't evolution, wouldn't it all just die out?

Evil is not, "What is inconvenient". What is preferable, having a world with evolution, or no world at all? What should be is what is good, and what should not be is what is bad. Sometimes we might want something, but its not possible to obtain. We all want a world with no sickness or death. That would be a better world if it were possible. But since its not, does that automatically make our world evil?

I have to first answer what good and evil are before discussing morality. Good and evil as I mentioned are two categories of psychological states. I cannot define good and evil but I can give examples
of psychological states in which a set of psychological states are good and others are evil. Good like love, happiness, pleasure, and the like. Evil like hate, sadness, pain, and the like. — MoK

Are those things that we do not want in excess, or are they evil innately?

If someone comes into your home to murder you and your family, hate can be the motivation that lets you fight them off. Sadness over the death of a loved one is a beautiful thing. Can you imagine someone close to you dying and not being sad? Pain lets you know when your body is injured. There are people who can't feel pain, and they often die young. Here's an article to ease into the concept. https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20170426-the-people-who-never-feel-any-pain

Can you escape the notion that good is what should be, while evil is what should not be?
— Philosophim
Apparently, we cannot. We have to accept the reality as it is. Think of mental or physical exercises for a moment. Without physical activity which is tiresome and painful, therefore evil, you cannot have a body in good shape. The same applies to mental exercise. — MoK

So you see where I'm going with this. My goal here is to get to the very foundation of the words. At its very foundation I see good as "What should be" and evil as "What should not be". It keeps it clear, distinct, and allows clear identification. Because as you've noted, things that seem 'evil' in some circumstances, aren't.

And how do we know what is a right action?
— Philosophim
This is a tricky part so I have to give examples of a few situations to make things clear. Think of a situation that you have you have a nasty kid who breaks things and messes up your house. You don't reward him for what he does instead you punish him. The first act, rewarding, is good and the second act, punishing, is evil. Therefore, evil is right depending on the situation. Think of a person who is terminally ill. The act of killing any person is evil since it causes sadness to friends or relatives. But the act of killing a person who is terminally ill is right if she or he wants it. Here, I just gave a couple of examples of the situations in which evil acts are right. I am sure you can come up with situations in which a good act is the right choice. — MoK

It is tricky. And all of your examples I would intuitively think are examples of good. Good and evil are both about intention and outcome. Punishments done to teach and discipline are good. Punishments done as revenge and to simply cause hurt are evil. But why? That's what I'm trying to do here. Set up a foundation and work to the point I can say, "This is why punishing your child as a form of teaching can be good." I believe my analysis can show depending on the situation, why that would be greater good then a child who did not learn their lesson because they were not punished.

The issue I have with this, Philosophim, is that I find the whole concept revolting. The idea that existence is good and objectively moral - is abhorrent. — Caerulea-Lawrence

Ah, I see. First, let me tell you that I understand. Morality is arguably the underpinnings of everything we do. I can tell you right now, it is scary to delve into it. If I did uncover a foundation for morality, it is both potentially wonderful, and terrifying. People may not be logical enough for morality, and at the end of the day will twist anything to suit what they want. Present company not excluded!

I take your criticisms well, and am not offended. Thank you for being honest instead of trying to hide it under a poor argument. If it bothers you, I take no offense in the discussion ending, and you do not lose any respect from my end. If you disagree with what I write, you are not looked down on in any way. But for me, I have to look. I have to think about it. That's the nature of myself.

If you make 'moral statements' like this, apply your moral sense to them.
This isn't a logical claim. When you are making ANY kind of claim that has ANY kind of moral implications, it is a personal expression of your moral truths. — Caerulea-Lawrence

Its just a summary of the conclusion from the OP. The OP is the logical claim. If you are vehemently against it, and you can stomach it, examine it, and see if you can prove it wrong. I might be wrong after all, and this is an honest statement, not some lie of false humbleness. I take the idea of constructing a moral theory seriously, and I would not want to put anything out there that had a flaw at its core that I had not considered. I am interested in what works Caerulea, not that "I'm right". So trust me when I've come up with this as a genuine look at finding an objective foundation for morality, and would love feedback on the logic and premises.

And if what 'Should be' to you is an objective morality, which legitimized all the horrors of our existence, and dissolves all the complexities of our existence into being 'objectively good', then I am rejecting it with my whole moral self. — Caerulea-Lawrence

What may set your mind more at ease, is that this has nothing to do with quantified good. Let me see if I can explain. There's existence, and there are existences. Existence is a quality. Existences are quantities. Quantities can be compared and measured. Some can be larger or smaller than another. Intuitively, not logically, do you feel a slum of poor people who are sick and hungry is better than a town full of happy and well off people? I'm going to assume no. And as I continue my moral theory, I'll be able to show why that is.

You are thinking that my notion is quantity on my initial argument, when it is an argument of quality. I have not yet pointed out how to quantize good. But I have to build that from a logical start. Maybe reading my second post may give you more insight into what I'm doing if you're concerned, as that's where I begin to discuss quantity. My conclusions from the entirety of the theory is that our general sense of morality that holds across cultures makes sense because it creates more existences then not. Only instead of this being an opinion, I can arguably give a reason why backed by logic from the ground up. And it may not be right, my logic might be flawed here and there. But I feel its a start.

Take your moral theory and see if it alleviates any suffering, any grief or helps make sense of our helplessness and lack of understanding of the world. — Caerulea-Lawrence

Yes. That's the point. If the theory as built up works, at least to its underlying core, I could communicate across cultures what good and evil is. I can show generally how we should use knowledge and push as a species. I can explain the value and good of the various plants and animals we live with. How mutual cooperative existence is almost always better on the calculus then the elimination of competition, and the elimination of difference. And most importantly of all, this would not be an opinion. Culture would be considered, but the moral theory itself would not be a culture, but a physics. Requiring careful proof, open to be challenged at any time, and steps from A to Z.

What your concern is, is where you think I'm going to go with it. You've prejudged, and this is normal when confronted with opening the machine of morality. I think its a good thing that people defend morals so closely, and are careful to have them questioned. As you said, an irresponsible person or bad actor could cause a lot of damage. I don't want to be that person.

Logic isn't morality, morality is the faculty of you that make moral Choices. It isn't theory, it is your values.
Any moral statements have moral implications, and potentially intense emotional, physical and relational consequences - whereas logic does not. — Caerulea-Lawrence

Logic that does not consider this, is incomplete logic. All of that is part of existence, and any moral theory that did not consider it would be bereft in my opinion. Which is why I need discussion from other people. Its too big for one person to take on themself. Its not owned by anyone. Its an uniting force of the human race.

It has nothing to do with jumping ahead or reading anything into this; moral statements and logical arguments are simply incompatible, like the sun and an ice-cream. — Caerulea-Lawrence

I would consider myself a fairly moral person. I donate to charity. I moved to a different city to help my sister when she was diagnosed as bipolar. I believe in the goodness of the human race. I believe intelligence, thought, and progress can be made to benefit us all, and not a means of exploitation of the few on the many. So i do not believe that logic and morality are incompatible. I believe that if humanity could understand what morality truly is, that it could be a push forward that would make the previous years look like the dark ages.

So if you are willing, I would like you to stick with it a bit more. I only ask you because I think you have fantastic insight, and a great mind. Maybe it is trash, but I don't see that yet. Only in conversing with good people can I figure out if his is right or wrong. I leave it in your court and will respect whatever decision you make.

Yes, but this is exactly the problem. If God were to exist, you'd have to agree that God Willed our existence, and that since God is Absolute, whatever it wants, is by definition, the absolute 'Good' — Caerulea-Lawrence

As of now, I'm not claiming that. All I've claimed at this point is that there is a fundamental logical truth to any objective morality. When presented with the idea of existence vs total non-existence, "existence being good" is necessary if an objective morality exists. In no way am I measuring good relatively among existence itself. I start building that in the next post.

If you start to believe in an unprovable and unsensible Objective morality, you start off with an indirect contradiction of your own belief by reality. What is then the applicable use of the rest of the 'Knowledge' you create, when it is indirectly contradicted to begin with? — Caerulea-Lawrence

I'm not saying, "I have found and proven an objective morality". What I am noting is if (means its not necessarily true) that an objective morality exists, logically, the answer to "some existence vs non-existence" must result that "existence should be". So at a very basic level, existence is good, complete non-existence is not. There is nothing else more being stated than this at this time.

The argument being presented above is a logical argument. It demonstrates that any claim of objective morality which claims non-existence is what should be, indicates that the objective morality itself should not be. And if that objective morality should not be, then we should not follow it. In other words, it contradicts itself. Therefore the only objective morality that does not contradict itself, is one that concludes existence is preferable to non-existence.

In no way does this claim that God or anything dictated that existence is good. It is simply a logical consequence if an objective morality exists. It is not even a claim that an objective morality actually exists. It states, "If it exists, this logically must be."

We can take this with a more common knowledge setup to compare. "The definition of a bowling ball is that it is spherical, and matches what we would call a ball. Because a cube is not spherical, it cannot be a bowling ball" If an object is a cube, it cannot be a sphere, is a logical conclusion. Claiming a cube is a sphere is a contradiction in properties, therefore we know its wrong to do so."

Thus the argument above is a reducto ad absurdum argument based on the definitions we have. There are a few ways to counter it. We could change the definitions. We could demonstrate that an objective morality does not exist. But because we can neither confirm or deny an objective morality exists, we can
at least start with what is necessary for an objective morality to exist. And this basic foundation is essential to any objective morality.

Yes, but 'logical conclusions' aren't fundamental to reality. — Caerulea-Lawrence

Correct. But when we do not have proof of the fundamentals, we can take what we do know and conclude logical limits. Logical limits are starting points to build working theories of reality. That is all I'm doing here. The starting limit does not prove an objective morality. The starting limit does not prove that what I build further is true. But it does allow us to explore plausibilities. At one time, we could not travel deep under the sea. But logical allowed us to determine things on land such as "pressurized hulls". So in theory we could send something under the sea. We based it off of the things we logically knew, and adjusted as we went along.

The foundation here is that starting base. Its to say, "Hey, we can go under the ocean. I don't have all the details, and we might need to adjust as we descend, but logically, we can start with this as to why we should be able to."

Without the human element, any practical and useful understanding of 'what is good' breaks down completely, as you simultaneously argue that we don't need humans to evaluate morals, and that we as humans can understand fundamental morals. This is contradictory. — Caerulea-Lawrence

What breaks down is the language and process to prove X exists. If X is real, it exists whether we are here to understand it or not. We need humans to understand the process to prove an objective morality, but it would exist (if it does) whether we did or not. Our language construction and applied knowledge to the world would not exist, but the world still exists.

We don't know if we can mold the universe or not, and believing we can, just because we believe in Objective Morality, seems no different from any other fundamental beliefs that start off indirectly contradicted by reality. — Caerulea-Lawrence

We mold the universe today. Our understanding of physics has allowed us to create the combustion engine for example. So let us imagine that we have a moral situation. "If a river if not diverted, will destroy a village. But if it is diverted, it will tear up a nearby road." The idea isn't meant to be complex or tricky, but note that we already do moral evaluations, and shape the world based on those moral evaluations. A road is nothing compared to an entire town, so we divert the river. The question then is can we build an objective morality from the foundation that I've laid out that gives us a clear answer as to why we should divert the river besides, "Its obvious, people are more valuable for subjective reasons, and so on"

If we could construct a morality that would objectively lay out why saving the village was more valuable, then we could indicate this across cultures and even species. That's invaluable. Does it exist? Maybe. But if it does, it should follow this foundation, so from this foundation we can see if other logical conclusions necessarily occur. Thus beginning to build a morality that we can debate, and of course test.

If you can remedy this, and apply your own theory of Knowledge to your beliefs about morals, maybe we can continue this conversation, but I am very put off by the dismissal of my objections — Caerulea-Lawrence

I surely didn't mean to dismiss your objections! If you think I haven't addressed or dismissed an objection, please point it out. Having read your response, I believe you think I'm stating much more than I am here. I am not saying an objective morality exists. Maybe I'm wrong, I'm very open to that. I am only saying, if I'm correct, and an objective morality does, this logically follows. Don't jump too far ahead to where you think I'm going, just re-read the argument very carefully and see if what I'm noting leads to the conclusion I've made. I look forward to hearing any critiques or questions.

Good - what should be
— Philosophim
I'm afraid I have to disagree. Good and evil are psychological states of affairs and are features of reality. — MoK

It is fine to disagree. But I'm going to ask, "Is it better to have good states of reality or evil states of reality?" Can you escape the notion that good is what should be, while evil is what should not be?

Morality - a method of evaluating what is good
— Philosophim
Morality is about releasing what is a right action, good or evil, in a situation. — MoK

And how do we know what is a right action? Doesn't that require us to evaluate the situation? I do agree that we can also use morality in a sense that we have already determined what is good or evil. But this is the conclusion after evaluation. I do not mind either use.

What do you think about the logic of the rest of the post?

I’ll start with the connection between objective morality, and existence being good. Wouldn’t your argument work even if you changed ‘objective morality’ with ‘objective amorality/immorality/‘? Adding to this, there might be inherent conflict between the various objective moralities pertaining to the necessity for existence. — Caerulea-Lawrence

Morality is simply about evaluating what 'ought to be', so immorality would be its opposite or, evaluating "What not ought to be". Considering that we proved that the removal of all existence would be the removal of morality, we can know that if there was no existence, that would be immoral.

Adding to the inherent conflicts of other objective moralities...there are no other objective moralities. None. Its an area of philosophy, like knowledge, that still has a lot to explore and contribute. The problem until now is there has been nothing but a subjective foundation to all moral theories (that I know of).

Secondly, ‘objective’ and ‘Fundamental’. These words can mean very different things in this context. — Caerulea-Lawrence

Yes, a good question for clarification. Objective in this case is 'What can logically be deduced apart from a singular viewpoint." And deduced is "A set of premises that lead to a logically necessary conclusion". So what I'm noting is that the premises do not require any one particular viewpoint. It is not an argument of opinion that requires any particular lived experience. There is no murky foundation such as, "We've always done it this way, common sense, or edict from God". It is a clear laying out of defined concepts, and a logical conclusion from those concepts.

To contrast, most moral theories' foundations are subjective inductions. They rely on rationalized feelings, cultural pressures, or myth and edicts. There comes a point in drilling into their foundation in which it begins to break down. "Why are our feelings an indicator of what is moral? Does that mean our feelings are moral themselves? So if I feel a particular way that is immoral, but act in a way that is moral, how did I know how to do that?" Just a loose example, nothing we need to drill into. :)

Secondly, the connection between objective morality and existence. This simplifies what I see as a rather complicated line of connected assumptions. — Caerulea-Lawrence

To clarify, this is not a complete moral system, this is an objective foundation. While I later build upon it as a proposal, here I am just laying groundwork. I have no illusions that what I've built upon this groundwork is anymore than a well reasoned rough draft, but I feel the groundwork here is solid. My hope is for people to understand the foundation, look at what I've built upon it, and add their own viewpoints, critiques, and possibly their own theories.

The question you are asking; «Should there be existence at all?» doesn’t seem to be the one you are answering. The question seems to be «Does ‘conscious and moral’ existences contribute to the «moral» impetus of the Universe? — Caerulea-Lawrence

The answer is, "Yes, consciousness and moral existences contribute", but I build to the reason why that is yes in the later posts. What I'm trying to do here at this point is ask the question, "Is there a possible objective foundation to build a moral theory off of? If so, what is it?" I can't prove that "Existence is good" based on pointing to a God or some law of nature that we've discovered. I only note that if an objective morality exists, any objective morality must logically include 'existence vs nothing' as 'good'. I also note that if an objective morality does not exist, then the argument would fail as well. But if an objective morality exists, this foundation I've pointed out is one logical conclusion that must be true.

The possibility that this universe, and life, operate on different morals altogether. — Caerulea-Lawrence

Yes, we can always consider that possibility. Again, I am not claiming the entirety of the moral theory is sound, but I am claiming that logically, the foundation that "existence vs nothing" is good, is logically necessary, even if how we think the universe morally behaves as a total is different then we might think it is today.

However, arguing that since ‘conscious and moral’ entities contribute, it must be moral, is definitely a possibility, but not the most prudent one. — Caerulea-Lawrence

To be clear, I am not stating this. The moral foundation I've established does not require people. It would be a logical conclusion whether we exist or not. Just like the laws of physics would still exist without us.

Firstly, I don’t find it objectionable to say that ‘within’ the confines of this Universe that there are certain possibilities that are infinitely more ‘moral’ to life than others. However, I find it very hard to argue that the Universe is moral. My hard stance on this is that the rules of the Universe are Amoral — Caerulea-Lawrence

Without an objective foundation, we cannot claim that the rules of the universe are moral or immoral, so the assertion that they are amoral is correct in this case. But if we have an objective foundation, "Existence is good", then we can look at the universe and see if certain rules and setups are more moral than others. But I'm not going that far in the foundation at this point. Building from that into a new theory is where I try that, which you'll see in the other posts. What we can conclude here is that compared to nothing, the universe is moral.

And is our moral relationship with the Universe any different from the one children have with abusive parents? 

If anything, Existence the way it is structured, is inherently immoral to us. — Caerulea-Lawrence

True, without a moral foundation, we cannot judge. But with a moral foundation, we can. And if that moral foundation is sound, we can shape the universe around us to be better than it is as a non-conscious force. Just like we take rocks and turn them into statues, we can take the universe as it is and mold it into something greater than its mere existence.

I hope this helps to limit the scope of thinking at this moment to only the foundation. Once we come to a consensus on whether the foundation works, then we can build upon it to hit more of the issues you're thinking of.

I am unsure how to progress the conversation: I keep trying to get you to define what a choice and an action simpliciter are; and you seemed to just accept that you don’t have any—or don’t need to provide them. — Bob Ross

I had to think for a while whether I would continue this conversation or not. I think its been clear that I've been engaging with you fairly and trying to define and redefine on every post so far. I don't mind if you don't want to use my definitions, but I think at this point if you still believe I'm not engaging with you in good faith, its best to stop. I think this has morphed from a fun conversation, and that's all this was meant to be. I have a lot of respect for you Bob, so I'll leave you to it. Good luck with the other discussions here, I'll see around in another thread.

Your usage of the concept of a choice and the act of choosing are incoherent with the definition you have provided; as you defined a choice as necessarily about an intent to act, while also claiming that it is not necessarily about an intent to act. — Bob Ross

Sure, I've been mentioning in the discussion that yes, choice cannot involve action in particular circumstances like an opinion. But in your case of moral discussion, we are talking about actions, not opinions. You're not saying, "I choose that its better not to pull the lever." I would have no debate over you making a choice such as that. But when you say, "I choose not to pull the lever" you are bringing this into the context of action, or what you 'do' vs 'not do'. And as I've mentioned several times, if the choice is an actionable one, some type of action happens at X time. It is unavoidable.

Basically, actionable choices vs inactionable choices. I can say, "My favorite color is blue", but in an actionable choice choose a shirt that is purple instead of blue. The action doesn't change my opinion. For my view, what you need to do is demonstrate how when faced with actionable choices, you can take no action at all.

You’ve agreed with me that an action is a volition of will; but then incoherently claim that not all actions are volitions of will. — Bob Ross

I will spell out clearly so there's no confusion. I agreed with you that one type of action is an act of volition. I already defined action, then the verb of 'to act', and noted there were two types of actions. An action of volition, and an autonomous action. I even linked a science article noting there are involuntary actions. When I say "autonomous", I mean involuntary if there was any confusion.

Surely Bob if there are voluntary actions, there are involuntary actions right? Otherwise the term 'voluntary' loses its meaning entirely.

For me, willing is ‘the exercised power of determining according to one’s will’; ‘a will’ is ‘the dispositions of an agent taken as a whole’; ‘an intention’ is ‘an end an agent has for something’; ‘intending’ is ‘acting’: ‘a volition of will [with an intention—which is implied given my definitions]’; and by ‘volition’ I mean ‘willing’ (viz., ‘a volition of will’ is the same as saying ‘an instance of willing’). — Bob Ross

Ok, so "will" is a noun. And the noun is, the disposition of a person. By disposition do you mean:

a: prevailing tendency, mood, or inclination
b: temperamental makeup
c: the tendency of something to act in a certain manner under given circumstances

If so, you're just using the term disposition instead of will. And if that is the case, you and I agree. Both actions of agency and autonomy are part of a person's disposition. But a person's disposition is not will. They are not synonyms.

1: the desire, inclination, or choice of a person or group
2: the faculty of wishing, choosing, desiring, or intending

As you can see a will is a type of disposition. Just like being pliant, sad, unconscious, conscious, etc. I see no justification for changing the term 'will' to include all dispositions, when the term disposition will suffice.

For me, willing is ‘the exercised power of determining according to one’s will’ — Bob Ross

What does the "exercised power of determining" mean? Isn't that an action? Isn't the verb basically "Acting on one's will?" Considering that volition is "the faculty or power of using one's will" "Willing" would be 'an act of volition'' right?

‘an intention’ is ‘an end an agent has for something’; ‘intending’ is ‘acting’: — Bob Ross

I agree with the first part, but intending can also mean something like, "I intend to mow the lawn today". Its usually a less forceful promise of future action, opposed to, "I will mow the lawn today". The former has the possibility that something might get in the way, while the second indicates that you forsee nothing getting in the way.

and by ‘volition’ I mean ‘willing’ (viz., ‘a volition of will’ is the same as saying ‘an instance of willing’). — Bob Ross

Ok, we just need to clarify 'exercised power of determining' then. What does this mean to you?

I completely agree that, in colloquial speech and legal speech, we would not say “I willed to sleep walk”; but this is because the terms are not robust, nor do they need to be, for their application. The average person has absolutely no robust account of what they mean by “I” nor what it means ‘to will’. — Bob Ross

This is not an argument. We are not separate from people who do not study philosophy. Our language is not our own. Our job is to take the language that is commonly used, process it to be more accurate, clear up issues, etc. and put it back into the language of everyone else. What good are we otherwise if we construct our own language in an ivory tower? Anybody can do that and be 'right'. We have the challenge of working within a system to refine. Not that we can't create a new system or subsystem, but we need a good reason to.

Specifically, what is the problem with will as commonly defined? Is there some implicit use of will that its current definition ignores or is unaware of? You know I have no problem with amending words, but there must be a good reason to do so beyond the convenience of our own arguments. Pointing out where you feel the general use of will is lacking, and what your redefinition solves will help the discussion greatly.

In this sense, it is very clear that “I willed to sleep walk”—in the event that one did sleep walk—is (1) true (because the agent as a whole, comprised of the judging faculties of the brain, did will it), (2) an action (because it is an instance of willing), and (3) is not an instance of willing with the full capacities of that agent (taken as whole). — Bob Ross

If the person is unconscious and sleeping, how is that at their full capacities? What example can you give of a person not at their full capacities, and why? If they aren't at their full capacities, but interacting with the world somehow, is that will or not will? Again, the word 'disposition' agrees with what you are noting, but will is a very particular type of disposition that entails awareness, consciousness, and agency.

Again, this distinction between voluntariness and choosing does not exist in colloquial speech: people say “I chose to do X” and “I did X voluntarily” interchangeably (because they have no robust analysis of these concepts). — Bob Ross

This is an excellent example of where we can come in as philosophers. Why do people use it interchangeably? In what sense is it logical to do so, and in what sense is it logically not to? Notice how I defined 'choice' in this case as "a choice of action". In which case we can see where the interchange makes sense. When people refer to choice as 'an action I took', they're referring to an actionable choice that took place in the past tense. The idea in philosophy is to define words that clarify reasons of use in a logical manner, not to outright contradict or redefine the word against the use that people use.

The problem is that we cannot make headway on this if you cannot provide a clear and robust alternative schema to what I have put forth here; and so far I have demonstrated (above) that your definitions are still internally incoherent. — Bob Ross

I would like to think we're having a discussion here and trying to refine both of our terms. I agree, the point is to get to a set of terms that make sense and are logically consistent and useful. But Bob, you have to do that with your own terms as well. Your set has problems with ignoring involuntary actions, just as I was ignoring choices that do not require actions. You have a problem in using definitions that seem very at odds with common use, and have not given a good logical reason why. It doesn't mean you're wrong, but these things should be addressed better before they can be accepted as right.

NO. That’s what I am trying to get you to see: if you are using a ‘consciousness’ vs. ‘unconsciousness’ schema (and omitting ‘subconsciousness’), then sleep walking is a conscious act. Normally sleep walking is a subconscious act—if it were an unconscious act, then there would be no walking whatsoever (as someone would is unconscious — Bob Ross

This seems irrelevant to the point about voluntary vs involuntary actions. I don't care what you want to label sleep walking as, except for the fact that no one would say a person sleep walking has the mental faculties to make choices of agency, rationality, or will. You need to give a good reason why we should change this outlook, and not simply because it fits your argument.

It may be the case that I am forcing my body to stay how it is, contrary to what it would be doing otherwise, through willing. — Bob Ross

If your body does something against your will then, isn't that an involuntary action? But according to your earlier definition of will as being synonymous with disposition, wouldn't this be a disposition and an act of will? What do you call your body doing an action without your will?

Continuing to pull the lever is a part of the action which you are still performing; and one can make decisions while still acting; so, yes, me choosing to continue to perform action X does not create a new action Y. — Bob Ross

You just noted exactly what I pointed out. "Choosing to continue to perform action x", or "Continuing to act" is a choice. Actions are performed over time. How I act at time X vs how I act at time Y. As you noted, "You can continue to make decisions while acting," Meaning as time ticks on, you can continue to do action X, or do another action. I'm not seeing in your point how I'm 'not acting' at all.

Again, the reason you are failing to understand this is because you have no robust nor internally coherent account of what an action vs. a choice is; nor how acting simpliciter relates to acting qua choosing. — Bob Ross

Or perhaps your own set of definitions isn't internally consistent or robust? If it was Bob, why would I feel the need to introduce a counter? :) I'm not being contrary, just pointing out I see some problems and trying to point out what I see with possible fixes. That's why we chat right? Your criticisms have helped refine my words, but look to your own as well.

Finally, what is 'acting simpliciter'? Is that acting without thinking? Is that acting with will, or without will? Alright, this one has gone on far enough, let me know what you think Bob.

While I hear this argument as strong, it is actually not all that clear and decisive imo. Your analogy between radiowaves and consciousness(waves?) doesn't hold very well at all. — AmadeusD

I did not mean to state it as a fact, just a separate consideration before we jump onto the idea that we're only correlating.

It's also quite fun, so I really appreciate you making a thorough response in good faith there. Unsure why Sam got upset tbh. — AmadeusD

I appreciate it, I was unsure myself.

This is a circular definition: you defined an action as an act of volition.

Action - Noun. A bodily state at any tick of time. — Bob Ross

Oh, I need to amend that. It would be better as "A bodily state of a living being..." I described an action as above, then defined what an act was. An act is the verbal enactment of an action. An act can be of two types, one of volition, and an involuntary act. If you intend your bodily state to be A at time X, that's an act of volition. If you don't, like an autonomous reflex, then its not an act of volition. So if I act on the lever to pull it, I'm using my hands to exert force on the lever with the intent to move it.

Like I stated before, this would include what is clearly not an action—e.g., lying perfectly still in a coma. As bodily states are not always volitions of will. — Bob Ross

Hopefully my adendum of "a living being' helps clarify this. Being in a coma is an autonomous action, not an act of will. You are still alive. I (don't think) I'm denying your note that we have acts of volition, I'm just noting that some of our acts are against what we will. I'm not understanding why this is controversial, as it is a common understanding in science that the body will act in ways apart from our conscious will.

What I don't understand how is how purposefully lying down is not an action of volition under both yours and my definition. If lying down is not an act of volition, then are you saying you were forced to lie down? That you had no decision or choice to lie down at X seconds? That your will was not involved?

I am trying to understand your viewpoint, so let me ask a few questions to help me. Do you believe that an action is only made if you alter the state you are in from a previous moment of time? You keep implying that lying down is not an action, because you already chose to lie down previously, but prior to the new considerations in front of you. So five seconds later, if I have a choice to get up instead of lying down, by default lying down isn't an action because I've already been doing it?

The problem is we can reverse this. So I could be pulling the lever and it isn't budging. Two seconds later I get a choice that I can release the lever. But if we are to extend logically your implications on an action, because I've been pulling the lever, continuing to pull the lever isn't an action, while releasing it would be. So in your case if I continued to pull the lever, it wouldn't be an act of volition because I had been, and when faced with the new choice I would continue to 'do nothing instead'.

The division between conscious and unconscious actions is a fairly common understanding in science, and if you are going to deny that it exists that demands high justification. So far I have not seen any justification we cannot have actions that do not involve our volition besides an insistence we cannot.

Is it because we have a different understanding of volition?

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/volition

1. the power of choosing or determining : will
2 an act of making a choice or decision
also : a choice or decision made

What do you mean by volition when you use it?

(Me) Act of volition - Noun. An act based on will/consciousness/intention/agency.

You are lumping a lot of distinct concepts together there: when people use the term “conscious”, they are usually referring to the ‘ego’ or, in other words, self-consciousness. That’s why most people still associate the ‘id’ with ‘subconsciousness’. — Bob Ross

In the context of what I've written you would need to be conscious to have volition right? To be clear, I'm only referring to 'conscious' in reference to unconscious. We do not need to go into Freud. :) We're talking about choice as a rational process right? You need to be conscious, aware, and will to go through with them. In other words, a sleep walking person who pulled the lever would in no way be choosing to pull the lever. That action is outside of their conscious control.

Autonomous act - Noun. An unconscious act

I see what you are going for; but, again, unconscious acts are obviously willed. E.g., sleep walking. You are going to have a hard time explaining why sleep walking isn’t an action willed by the brain but yet is an unconscious act. — Bob Ross

I have never heard the phrase, "I willed to sleepwalk". Bob, can you clarify your definition of will please? This is a contradiction to the general notion of will. Surely there is another word that captures what you want here without outright destroying the general notion of will as people understand it? I mean, there is no court of law that would say that an unconscious action was an act of will or consent. If I went up to a sleep walker and asked them, "Would you sign this form that gives all of your property and wealth away to me," and they did, this would not represent the will of the person.

To act - Verb. The act of undertaking an action at any tick of time.

This is circular: ‘to act’ cannot be defined in terms of ‘the act of <…>’. This definition needs to be thrown out. — Bob Ross

Ah, I should have proof read more carefully! :) Change it to "Undertaking an action at any tick of time". Its just the verb form of 'action'.

Why are you separating their definitions based off of time? A choice is a choice. Once you define what a choice is, then you can easily determine its past, present, and future tense. — Bob Ross

Ah, I neglected to note that these are in reference to choice as a verb. We can use choice as a noun and choice as a verb. A choice, in a moral decision, is a promise of action. Undertaking a choice, or 'choosing' is the verbal description. Therefore with choice as a verb, we can consider it as prior to an action, a choice being fulfilled as an action, and a choice that was fulfilled as an action. After all, I can choose 10 seconds prior to when pulling the lever would make a difference that, I won't pull it. Then choose two seconds before that I will. Then at the moment of time to pull the lever, choose again not to.

All of these are circular! A decision is a choice! — Bob Ross

Ok, if you view a decision as synonymous with a choice, then lets use another word. First, I'm just showing I'm not crazy Choice - "an act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more possibilities" Oxford Language But lets change it.

Intent - resolved or determined to do

A choice - Noun. An intent of action that when given a set of options to act on, one or more are chosen

Past choice: Verb. A moment in time prior to now in which an intent was made to take an action at x time

Present choice: Verb. The attempt to to fulfill one's intention by action.

Future choice: Verb. A declaration of intention of how one will act at X seconds. A promise does not need to be fulfilled, and a choice can change up until the point of X seconds.

Again, we have agreed now that it would be patently false to define a choice as about actions; so this definition of future choices and the extrapolated definition of a choice are both patently false. — Bob Ross

No we have not agreed to this at all. I have noted that there is the possibility of making a choice without regards to actions, proposing an opinion, but you have not followed up with me on that. One example I can see as a choice without an action is, "Out of the moral choices, which one do you like the most?" Again, an opinion, and not a declaration of action. But the focus of our discussion are about moral choices as actions. You are "Pulling, or not pulling the lever". Its not, "What do you think is better, "Pulling or not pulling the lever?" The prior is about the intent to act, the second is a conveyance of opinion.

So really what we're talking about are actionable choices, and unactionable choices in regards to moral decisions. You are claiming that 'Not pulling the lever' is an unactionable choice, but I have seen no good argument given for why this is. If you had said, "I think its better not to pull the lever", then yes, that's an unactionable choice. But if the moral decision is about how we will act at time X. It is an actionable choice, and we cannot 'not act' in the literal sense.

Do you see how all over the place your definitions are? How they inchohere with all the progress we’ve made at getting you to see that choices aren’t just about actions? — Bob Ross

I don't see how they're all over the place. Amendments on some word use sure, but the intent of what I'm trying to convey I believe has been fairly consistent.

What’s agency? We need to try to stick to the same terms so we can find common ground. This definition seems oddly close to mine (of an action in correspondence with one’s will) but there’s slight differences that I don’t know how to parse—e.g., splitting up a choice and an action in this definition implies that some choices are not actions (which you denied above in your definition of a choice) and that some of those can be made without agency (which makes no sense: how does one make a choice without thinking about it?--or do you just mean thinking about it but with external coercion involved?). — Bob Ross

Yes, that's fair. You can replace 'act of agency' with 'act of volition'. We just need to make sure we're on the same page of what you mean by 'volition'. Do my definitions above work, or did you have something else in mind? My intent is to hew as close to as possible to 'act of volition', but also noting that there can be acts that do not have volition, or autonomous actions.

Good discussion Bob! I look forward to your thoughts.

Can you be any more condescending? I'll refrain from saying what I want and leave it at that. — Sam26

I genuinely don't understand how I was condescending. I think you read an intention into that I did not mean to convey. I'm going to assume you're not just putting an accusation out there to avoid the argument I made, as you've addressed my points before. So my apologies if this came across as insulting, but that does not negate the argument put forth. If you believe my points are wrong, why?

Under my definitions, sneezing upon entering a cave might constitute a voluntary act (although it would perhaps be a stretch); because it is a volition of will insofar as my body will’s to sneeze as a reaction. — Bob Ross

So is your heart beating an act of will then? Surely you see the clear difference that I'm noting between acts of will and autonomous acts correct? My definition of autonomous acts doesn't contrast with your idea of acts of volition, I'm just noticing that some actions can be outside of our volition through reflex or automatic responses that we don't really choose.

In my view, the knee-jerk reaction to the doctor hitting your knee (to test its reflexes) is a voluntary act; but not an act of choice. — Bob Ross

If it was voluntary, it wouldn't be an unconscious reflex. Its very strange that you think an unconscious reflex is an action of will. Most would say will is a conscious effort. And I agree, an involuntary reflex is not a choice.

Remember, voluntariness is about what is in accordance with one’s will; and choosing is about what is in accordance with the conclusions of rational deliberation. — Bob Ross

Right, I don't think my definitions contradict your points. I'm only adding extra points to them to handle exceptions like involuntary reflexes. If you're saying they're an act of will...I don't know what to tell you. The medical community notes that reflex reactions are things that are unconscious actions.

https://byjus.com/biology/nervous-system-coordination/#:~:text=Reflex%20action%20or%20reflex%20is,when%20exposed%20to%20bright%20light.
"Reflex action or reflex is an involuntary action in response to a stimulus. This is a spontaneous action without thinking. For example, we adjust our eyes when exposed to bright light."

Irregardless, an involuntary act would be like sneezing because one’s brain has a huge tumor in it that is causing the sneeze. — Bob Ross

Its just a nervous system response built up over centuries of evolution. No tumor. :)

What you are calling an ‘autonomous action’ is for me an action which is not a choice. There’s not second concept at play here for me: that’s the issue with your concepts. You agreed with my definition and then turned around and implicitly denied it. — Bob Ross

No, I don't think you understood my points at all if you think that. I've clearly stated a few times now I'm just adding onto what you've put forward. I agree that an autonomous action is not a choice. Its outside of one's will. A choice which is acted on is a volition of will. I've never contradicted that.

That is because you still haven’t defined the concepts! What is ‘voluntariness’ under your view? What is an ‘action’? — Bob Ross

An act of volition. An involuntary action like a reflex is not an act of volition.

For me, I have been very clear; and it follows from my definitions that an action can be voluntary without being a choice (since an action can be in correspondence with one’s will without being a product of rational deliberation [i.e., thinking]). — Bob Ross

How? A reflex? Science has already noted reflexes are involuntary. Give me another example.

Common language is full of vague, notional, incoherent, and irreconcilable uses of terms: I am not particularly interested in trying to fit my schema to match 1:1 the common usages; however, I am interested in giving a refined schema which can provide clarity with respect to their common usages. — Bob Ross

Right, but this didn't answer my question. How does your refined schema provide clarity with respect to their common usages when what your saying contrasts common usages?

I feel I've analyzed it pretty in depth at this point.

Send me the links to where you defined the following clearly: ‘an action’, ‘to act’, ‘a choice’, ‘to choose’, and ‘voluntariness’. You haven’t. — Bob Ross

If I have not been clear, I'll put them in definition format:

Action - Noun. A bodily state at any tick of time. This can be an act of volition, or an autonomous act.
Act of volition - Noun. An act based on will/consciousness/intention/agency.
Autonomous act - Noun. An unconscious act. One's will is not behind this. An autonomous reflex is an example.

To act - Verb. The act of undertaking an action at any tick of time.
A choice - Noun. A decision that when given a set of options to act on, one or more are chosen. Choices have a reason. They can be emotional, rational, but are made with agency. Reasons can be as simple as, "I didn't like the other choices", to complex as a highly refined argument. "Choice" can be defined in terms of the past, present, and future.

Past choice: A moment in time prior to now in which a decision was made to take an action at x time. X time may, or may not have passed. If X time has passed, and the action was completed at X, then the choice was fulfilled. If X time has passed, and the action was not completed at X, then that past choice was unfulfilled. A past choice is a promise of intent, but it is a promise that does not have to be kept.

Present choice: The option one has decided to act at the moment. An autonomous action is not a choice.

Future choice: A declaration of intention of how one will act at X seconds. A promise does not need to be fulfilled, and a choice can change up until the point of X seconds.

Voluntary - The choice and/or action are made with agency.

Except what do the terms of permissibility mean? "They mean what you should, and should not act on".

Permissibility is the mode of moral thought whereof one can do an act but doesn’t have to. What you just described is impermissibility or obligatoriness. — Bob Ross

By 'terms of permissibility' that was meant to include all variations such as impermissibility. What is deemed as permissible can be due to logic, limitations, or societal allowances. You are either logically, by limitation, or socially obligated to not do what is impermissible, and only do what is permissible. You should only act in ways that are permissible, you should not act in ways that are not permissible.

The problem is that you are not understanding that a choice can be made about something without it also itself being made about something else. I have pointed out that one can choose to do nothing, and you keep pointing out that after making that choice they then separately choose to do something else. Plainly and simply put: one can reach a conclusion with rational thought which has absolutely no reference to performing an action and complete reference to not performing an action. — Bob Ross

I did say earlier that one could possibly make a choice in reference to an opinion. "I choose that my favorite color is blue." for example. But we're not talking about opinions in the case of moral decisions. Because moral decisions are about actions. You even note in your example, "Choose to do nothing". "Doing" is the an act. As I've noted many times, this is not clear language, but slang. What are you doing today. "Just hanging". You're not actually hanging from something like a tree. Slang is always an indirect implication, and the words should not be taken literally.

You cannot 'choose to do nothing' in an exact sense, as whatever action you are doing at time X, is if you did no action of any kind. You would be dead. Just like I wasn't literally hanging at time X, I'm not literally 'doing nothing' at time X. As I've noted before, the slang is shorthand for, "Out of a selection of choices, A, B, and C, I chose to an option that did not fit any of those options at X time. This can be as simple as standing there, looking to the left, or pondering what you'll have for dinner when the given options were, Did you choose to "Walk, jog, or run?" "I chose to do nothing." Does that mean you ceased to exist at time X? No, it just means you didn't act from that selection of choices, but you did act in some other way.

1. It is solely about inaction on that one particular option. It does not entail that you did not act on another option.
…
Of course they are separate decisions.

The full context of the above to be clear:

E.g., if I choose to not eat ice cream and go for a walk instead, I have chosen (1) to not eat ice cream and chosen (2) to go for a walk. The reasons for each decision may be interrelated, but they are separate decisions.
— Bob Ross

Of course they are separate decisions. But at the end of the day the choice is only realized by action. There is always a relation between what you acted on, and what you did not. Thus your actionable choice has something that you acted on, and something that you didn't. It is impossible to have what you didn't do, without what you did instead. I can claim I'm going to go eat ice cream, but if I go for a walk, I did not commit to my former choice, but instead chose to go for a walk. — Philosophim

Please address the full context. As I've mentioned several times, you may logically list what you didn't act on as part of a choice at X time, but that doesn't mean you didn't act at X time.

The most obvious example I have is choosing to not get up from one’s chair and continue doing whatever they were already doing. What you are going note is that whatever I am continuing to do is itself an action; and you would be right. — Bob Ross

That's all I'm saying. If you understand this, you understand my position.

Which doesn’t demonstrate your original point, which was that choosing cannot be about inactions. — Bob Ross

At what point in that decision was no action made? Laying down in the chair at X seconds is what you chose to do. Is lying there not an action? Is that not a choice?

Remember, my original point was that, all else being equal, one should let themselves continue to starve because the only action they can take is to steal. You cannot appreciate this if you keep denying that one can let something bad happen (which implies it was a result of inaction that is to blame for the bad thing happening). — Bob Ross

I have never stated that you cannot choose to let something bad happen. I have only been stating, "You always take an action, you cannot avoid it." Meaning you choose to starve or steal. What you seem to be implying is like if I said, "I'm currently stealing, but my only choice is to starve. So I don't make a choice and continue stealing." So again, as you noted there are relative evils. Which is more evil, to starve or to steal?

My counterargument is that they’re confusing correlation with causation. I would say that it’s settled science that there’s a correlation between the brain and consciousness, but not causation just as there’s a correlation between what we hear from a radio and the radio itself. We know that the sound isn’t generated by the radio even though we can make many correlations between the sound and the radio. — Sam26

I am glad to see an argument like this Sam. Keep approaching it from different angles. While of course the people responding to you think we're right in some aspects, looking at it from different angles is always valuable to make sure we're not missing anything.

We have to be careful not to go the other way around as well, or "Confuse causation with correlation". The sound from a radio IS generated from a radio. There is a clear mechanical process. What you mean is that the radio signal is not produced from the radio. And you would be right there.

This is a point I made earlier that may have been forgotten. If there is evidence of consciousness existing outside of the body, then there should be evidence of consciousness existing outside of the body. The reason why a person could eventually deduce that the radio receives a signal is because of how the radio works. You could experiment on it for hours trying different things and you would eventually see that when you interrupt the antenai with something, the radio keeps making a sound, but its not a clear message anymore.

Further, you could take the radio to different locations and find the same would happen. So you would start to make hypotheses. One such hypothesis would be, "Is the location or objects I put on the antenae interfering with something? And of course, research would eventually reveal, "Yes".

But what evidence do we have that our consciousness comes from somewhere else? None so far. Our consciousness works no matter what we put over our brains, and no matter where we go. If we do interrupt consciousness through drugs for example, we see its a clear impact on brain function. Its not that the brain continues to function at a same or similar rate when the drugs are applied like an inhibitor, but it seems to affect the brain process itself.

Meaning that the evidence which we do have points not to some type of thing outside of the body, but a mechanical process of the brain. Go watch an example of brain surgery. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tAFbM6Zhz7k All of this surgery was possible with the assumption that the brain is the locus of consciousness. Generally in history, when we don't completely understand a process, we run into problems of application. Read this theory on phlogiston theory on fire that was eventually replaced with oxygen theory https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phlogiston_theory

Of course, on my side of the argument, I can’t point to anything like an electromagnetic wave that would cause consciousness, so I look at other kinds of evidence, viz., testimonial evidence. — Sam26

If a radio told you, "No, I don't receive a signal from elsewhere, I generate all my messages within me," does that mean its right? It sure feels that way, but we know that's not true. Testimonial evidence only explains a subjective interpretation of a situation. And people subjective interpretation of things is no indication of its truth as an objective reality, only the truth in that is what people feel. There are plenty of people who feel there is a God, but is that objectively true? No. There are plenty of people who believe 9-11 was an inside job, that they saw the building was hit in such a way as there had to be some internal explosive beyond the plane. They are objectively wrong.

They’re self-sealing in that all testimonial evidence is rejected out of hand. No amount of counterevidence (testimonial evidence) can be enough to counter their definition of consciousness, viz., that consciousness is a brain function. — Sam26

That is not because they don't like the testimony or don't want to accept it. They accept that that is how people feel. Just like a radio may feel with all of its heart that its thinking and generating the messages it spits out, even though we know its comes from a radio tower. Its because the question of objective consciousness has been found despite what one thinks about it. Despite the fact you may believe you live forever, the evidence clearly shows you don't. You might believe your experience of floating above the bed means you actually did, but objective tests show you didn't. That's why the testimony is no good. Its a starter to explore and test for its objectivity, but has failed every time.

They can keep repeating the mantra that the brain causes consciousness but that doesn’t make it so. Correlation doesn’t mean causation. — Sam26

Its not a mantra, its scientific fact tested over countless decades that continue to point to the conclusion that your brain generates consciousness. You are doing the opposite believing that causation is correlation, when you have no evidence that it is correlation.

Keep thinking about it.

Since you continue to fail to give an internally coherent definition of the vital concepts at play (e.g., ‘to act’, ‘to choose’, ‘a choice’, etc.) — Bob Ross

It would be helpful if you pointed out how its incoherent as I'm not seeing it. But its ok to move on.

You cannot accept that an action is a volition of will and then say not all actions involve willing—that’s patently incoherent; so, no, you technically are not accepting my definition. This is why I wanted to you to define an ‘action’, because you are importing a definition which as of now remains utterly concealed and notional. For now, I am assuming that an ‘action’ is a ‘volition of will’ and, thusly, that an ‘autonomous action’, by virtue of being an action, does involve willing. — Bob Ross

I honestly have no issue in separating the two concepts if you have a term that properly covers 'autonomous' actions. "When I entered the cave, I sneezed," describes to me what people would call an action. Its one they couldn't help, a reflex that was outside of their autonomy, or choice. What are you calling an involuntary sneeze then?

If a ‘choice’ is ‘the result of the act of rational deliberation [i.e., thinking]’ and you agree with me (by saying ‘this is my thinking as well’), then you would have to agree that:

1. Not all actions involve choices.
2. Not all voluntary actions involve choices. — Bob Ross

If an action is a volition of will, then how can it not be a choice? What you will to happen is what you choose to happen no?

I don't see how its possible to make an action and say, "I didn't choose to do it", if you voluntarily did it. If we don't voluntarily do something we say, "We had no choice". If we voluntarily commit to something we say, "This is what I chose to do." How do you reconcile this with the way the words are most commonly used in language?

Now, to avoid begging the question, I would like to point out that what makes the choice morally relevant is that it is about what is permissible, impermissible, omissible, or obligatory as those concepts relate to goodness and badness—irregardless if you would leave out inaction from consideration with respect to choices. — Bob Ross

Except what do the terms of permissibility mean? "They mean what you should, and should not act on". If something is obligatory, it means I should act in accordance to that obligation. If its "You are obliged to save that man," and you do nothing but say, "I choose to say the man", you did not fulfill your obligation. As the old saying goes, "Talk is cheap." :)

Now, if we give an example of any of those moral modes of thought, then we can evidently see that it can pertain to inaction. E.g., it is permissible, sometimes, to not do something. — Bob Ross

That would literally mean its permissible to cease to exist, and nothing more. Again, you're taking a figure of speech, "I did nothing", and thinking that means you actually did nothing. No, you did something. Give me an example in which you did absolutely no actions.

You are failing to analyze the given choice per se: we are currently asking if a given choice can be about, and only about, not doing something. — Bob Ross

I feel I've analyzed it pretty in depth at this point. You say its incoherent, but you haven't really pointed out why based on what I've stated so far. It would help if you went back through and showed why its incoherent instead of just claiming it is. I feel the point is straight forward. If you choose not to do one thing, you are choosing to do something else. How is that wrong? Show me an instance in which a person chooses not to do X, and at the moment in which they don't do X, they are not doing anything else.

E.g., if I choose to not eat ice cream and go for a walk instead, I have chosen (1) to not eat ice cream and chosen (2) to go for a walk. The reasons for each decision may be interrelated, but they are separate decisions. — Bob Ross

Of course they are separate decisions. But at the end of the day the choice is only realized by action. There is always a relation between what you acted on, and what you did not. Thus your actionable choice has something that you acted on, and something that you didn't. It is impossible to have what you didn't do, without what you did instead. I can claim I'm going to go eat ice cream, but if I go for a walk, I did not commit to my former choice, but instead chose to go for a walk.

This is why I think you are wanting an example of a morally relevant choice that results in inaction and are failing to find one, because in all my examples you are conflating the analysis of the given choice qua itself with qua all choices related to it. — Bob Ross

I don't understand what this means, can you elaborate more?

The most obvious example I have is choosing to not get up from one’s chair and continue doing whatever they were already doing. What you are going note is that whatever I am continuing to do is itself an action; and you would be right. — Bob Ross

That's all I'm saying. If you understand this, you understand my position.

However, (1) my choice to not get up is a choice solely about inaction, (2) my choice to keep doing what I am doing is a separate choice (albeit related), and (3) the choice to continue doing something is about continuing to act and does not introduce a new action into the mix. — Bob Ross

1. It is solely about inaction on that one particular option. It does not entail that you did not act on another option.

2. No argument. But my point if you say, "I did not get up", when I ask what you chose to do instead you say, "Lay in the chair".

3. Whether the action is new or not doesn't seem to have relevance. We're just taking your choices: Stand up, lay in the chair. You choose to lay in the chair. It doesn't matter what your choice was one second ago, an hour ago, or a year ago. We're just talking about you having a choice to make within a time frame, then acting on that choice. If you say you were going to do something, then act on it, that's the choice you made upon the actions completion. If you say were going to do something, then did something else at the moment of action, if voluntary, that action is what you ultimately chose to do.
And again, your reason for laying down could have been, "Because I didn't want to get up." That's fine. Your action was still to lay in the chair.

"Choice" as in 'intent to act' and "choice" as in 'how I acted'.

This is the closest you got to a definition, but instead of giving one noted two mutually exclusive definitions of the word; and I am not sure which one you mean to use for this discussion. Are you taking a pluralistic account of the concept? — Bob Ross

There is a past, present, and future tense to choice. I'm making a choice, I've made my choice, I've completed my choice. A choice can only be made when there are options of action in a moral set of options. So when discussing choice, we have to think about whether we are using the past, present, or future tense. In all cases, a choice is only realized through action when faced with a series of actionable options, at least in the moral sense.

I have been wondering if there are choices that do not require actions. and perhaps there are in the non-moral sense. For example, "What's your favorite color?" But when discussing moral choices, we are discussing actions as a moral choice is about what you will do in a particular set of possible outcomes.

For me, ‘a choice’ is ‘the result of the act of rational deliberation [i.e., thinking]’ and ‘the act of choosing’ is ‘the act of rationally deliberating [i.e., thinking]’. — Bob Ross

This is my thinking as well. What you are describing is the present and future. "Choosing" is the present, and "choice" is either future or past. Future if you have yet to act on it, and past if you have.

I am assuming you don’t mean to say that ‘the act of choosing’ nor ‘a choice’ each have two equally cogent and incompatible definitions; so this actualized vs. unactualized distinction is just noting that when we choose to do something sometimes it doesn’t actually happen. I don’t have any problems with this; however, I must note that this in no way entails that all choices made are about actions. — Bob Ross

This last part of the sentence did get me thinking if there were choices that didn't require actions. And perhaps there are, but I did not see this in a moral sense. Trying to go along your line of thinking, there is the idea of the armchair philosopher who creates a scenario in their head and says, "This is what I would choose if the scenario presented itself." But again, this requires an action. Sometimes when the reality of the situation is present, what a person thinks they will choose is not the same as what they actually choose. And what they actually choose is how they act in the situation.

In a moral situation, it seems to always come down to actions as we talk about the results. And results are dependent on how the person acted in the situation. I can say, I chose not to pull the lever, but I did anyway," as a form of speech. But if you had free agency, you may have wanted to choose to not pull the lever, but when the time came, you did choose to pull the lever. Can you think of any moral examples of choice that don't inevitably come down to action?

Are you agreeing that an ‘action’ is a ‘volition of will’? It seems like you are accepting my definition now, because this is the closest you got to defining an ‘action’ in your response. — Bob Ross

Sure, I never rejected your definition of action, I did add a little to it though. An action of will would be an action of agency. An autonomous action would not involve one's will, like a reflex or natural breathing.

The point is, that choices are all about intent of action, or actual action.

Why? That just begs the question. — Bob Ross

Because a choice that isn't acted on in a moral sense isn't really what you chose. If I say, "I'm going to walk to the park today," then walk to the store, what did I really choose? Choosing doesn't require an action yet. A choice that has not had an action expect that choice to be actualized eventually. And a choice that has been actualized is one that has been acted on.

No, it is equivalent to, "I decided to perform an action that was not X". It in no way means, "I took no action at all".

This is so patently false though! E.g., I can legitimately decide not to pick up my phone, and that is not itself the decision to respond to your response instead. — Bob Ross

I didn't quite get this example.

I have a choice, I can either pick up the phone, or not pick up the phone. But if I don't pick up the phone, what am I doing instead? Whatever I am doing is what I chose to do instead of pick up the phone. This is if the choice is in the past tense, or actualized by action.

Viz., one can decide to not perform an action, and this does not imply a decision to do something else—even if one has to perform actions for the rest of their life continuously. — Bob Ross

How? If you're not doing X, and you're doing something else instead, aren't you doing an action? And isn't a fully realized choice how you act?

Alright Bob! I hope that made things more clear. What might help me to see what your seeing as well, is if you can come up with examples of choices that don't require actions, and then see if we can apply them in moral situations. As I noted, I tried to think of something, but the most I could come up with was an opinion, or maybe a statement of intent that a person ended up not going through with at the moment of action. The problem with the latter is of course, the real choice is what a person did, despite what they thought they would do. Anyway, let me know what you think as usual.

The main issue is that your use of the concepts of ‘to choose’ and ‘to act’ are littered with incoherencies — Bob Ross

No worry! This has been fun to sort through and try to give exact definitions. Its made me realize we use 'choice' very loosely in common language, and the word itself needs some addendums if we wish to narrow it to specific situations.

If to choose is to decide to make an action (notwithstanding the circularity in the definition), then you cannot claim that one “actively chose not to do” something. There is not such thing as “choosing not to do X” in your view by definition. — Bob Ross

I think the problem is that 'choice' can have two meanings. "Choice" as in 'intent to act' and "choice" as in 'how I acted'. My hunch is this is where the confusion is coming from. So let me break out the difference in choice by separating the two into 'unactualized choice' and 'actualized choice'.

This also requires us to dive into the definition of 'action' a bit. An action can be measured by time. Every second of existence, you are making an action. You might be thinking, sitting, walking, laughing, etc. We can have different types of actions, such as autonomous like reflexes, and actions of agency which can be described as you noted, "a volition of will', or 'embodiment of being by intention'.

An unactualized choice is that which has not been met with an action yet. Lets say that I have five seconds to pull the lever to alter the outcome, and anytime after that pulling the lever will be too late. If I choose to pull the lever, yet I have not yet pulled it, that's an unactualized choice. Once I pull the lever, its an actualized choice. If my choice was to pull the lever in 5 seconds, but I pull it in six, my choice to pull it within 5 seconds was unactualized as well.

An actualized choice is one in which the action of the choice has been fulfilled. So if I pull the lever within five seconds, my choice was actualized. If I decide to not pull the lever in five seconds, and 6 seconds pass, my choice is also actualized.

The point is, that choices are all about intent of action, or actual action. If I chose not to pull the lever, my actual action at 6 seconds was something else. What my actualized choice is, is always in reference to my actualized action. Your actualized choice of "Choosing not to do X" in no way means, "You made no action at all". Your actionable choice was the action you took. "Not doing the action X" is only part of the story. What did you do instead?

Given your terms (and notwithstanding the circularity), when you say "I chose not to do X" that is equivalent to "I decided to perform the action of not doing X". — Bob Ross

No, it is equivalent to, "I decided to perform an action that was not X". It in no way means, "I took no action at all".

I hope that clarifies it Bob. Let me know!

With respect to #1, the problem is that you keep using examples where one coincidentally chooses a different act instead of doing the act in question (e.g., walking away instead of pulling the lever); but this is not always the case. For example, imagine you decide to just stand there and keep watching instead of pulling the lever: continuing to watch is not itself an action—instead, you would be deciding to not do anything and since you are already watching you continue to watch. — Bob Ross

Right, continuing to watch is the action that you decide to do. Actions are from moment to moment. You pull the lever, or you continue to watch. Either way, you're taking an action.

What you are doing is failing to analyze the inaction in-itself—e.g., choosing to not get up is itself (A) a conclusion reached through thinking and (B) not a choice to do something. — Bob Ross

I don't think I'm trying to avoid what inaction is, I'm just noting that we have to be careful what we mean by inaction. If I have a group of 3 choices, A, B, and C, I can refuse to take action on A, B, and C. Colloquially we might say, "They did not take any actions.", but that' in reference to THOSE actions. Its not a statement "They chose to drop dead instead". In the logical sense, you still took an action, just not A, B, or C.

With respect to #2, even if I grant your point it does not follow that one cannot choose to do nothing: even in the case that it is true that “one must perform action X to avoid action Y”, it also true that the choice to not do Y precedes the choice to do X—all you are noting is that not doing Y requires a subsequent action which is not Y for Y to not be done. If this is true, then even under your view it must be conceded that choices can be about inactions—which violates your definition of ‘choice’. — Bob Ross

I've tried to explain that a choice is what you are going to do, and by consequence, what you actively chose not to do. To have 'no choice' is to have no options. I am simply noting that choice is given its main meaning in the affirmative. What one did is the choice that lead to action, and what one did not do is by consequence. While one can say, "I chose not to go swimming yesterday," this still begs the question, "What did you choose then?" "Whereas if I say, "I chose to go walking yesterday", it would be strange if I asked, "Well what did you not choose then?" Its not that you can't ask this, its that the past tense of 'choice' entails an action. Inaction is in relation to this, and the context of the different actionable options you could have picked instead. What you cannot say is, "I chose to do literally nothing' yesterday and have that literally mean 'I made no actions of any kind'. That's just a phrase like "tow the line", not a literal meaning of the words.

If one is talking about the context of "A, B, and C" and they chose not to do any of them, they could answer "Nothing" referring to that context and we know what they mean. But because they can say "Nothing" within that context, that does not mean they didn't choose something outside of that context. They had to have. They chose whatever action they did instead. You can say I chose ~A, but its incomplete information until you give what you actually chose to do instead.

In your view, we end up with a peculiar conclusion that it is false that ‘one can choose to not do Y’ — Bob Ross

One cannot choose to not do Y, then say they did not do anything 'at all' in the literal sense. One cannot stop actions unless one is dead if one is acting with agency. That is all I'm claiming.

You are forgetting that deliberation is an act, but that it can be about inaction; and this means that one is technically acting when they are concluding to not do something (in virtue of performing the act of thinking), but that they are performing the act of choosing to not do anything. — Bob Ross

Deliberation is an act. Meaning what they chose to do is, "Deliberate some more". And in the context of other actions, A, B, and C, they chose not to do those, but "D" for deliberate instead. They are not 'doing nothing' in the logical sense. They are actively deliberating.

An emotion is not a result of a choice: you don’t choose what you feel. Choices are cognitive, not conative. — Bob Ross

Correct, you choose how you act. And sometimes people act on their feelings and nothing more. "I feel hungry, I eat". I would call that an act of agency, and not autonomous. We may not be disagreeing here but just have a different way of looking at "emotional decision".

"The action they took did not involve pulling the lever, because they thought it more moral to do that action then pull the lever."

This is wrong, because you have conflated a reason one may possibly have for not doing X with it being necessary that they have such a reason for not doing X: do you find it impossible for a person to choose to not pull the lever “because they simply wanted to watch them die”? — Bob Ross

Let me break this down.

There is a reason for not doing X.
It is necessary that they have a reason for not doing X.

I don't believe I ever implied the latter without the context of choice. I even mentioned earlier that if one had not considered B an option, its not that one 'didn't choose B', its that B wasn't even a choice. So if someone asked, "Why didn't you choose B," the reply would be, "I didn't even know B was an option."

In the case of having choices, and not picking them, yes you must have a 'reason' but it does not need to be a high bar of reason. If I have A, B, or C, and I choose D, choosing D is what the primary locus of choice is about. I could ask, "Why did you not pick A?" and the answer could be as simple as, "I forgot A was a choice", or "I liked D the most" and D is "I wanted to watch him die". If someone deliberates on an option, however briefly, then there is a reason they did not pick that option over the action they finally chose when the time came. But it doesn't have to be 'reasonable' or ethical, and it could be as simple as, "I liked D more, so by consequence, I didn't pick A".

What did you think of my example with the dog in the currents? I feel that gave the best practical example of what I've been trying to communicate. I also don't mean to go around and around on this, I feel I may have distracted from the original point of your OP.

1. It is morally impermissible to perform an action that is in-itself bad;
2. It is morally impermissible to directly intend something bad—even for the sake of something good;
3. Harming someone is, in-itself, bad. — Bob Ross

So in the case of the person in the crane, sipping water and staring at the sky is not in itself bad, but in itself normally good. You need water and moments of relaxation to be healthy. However, it is bad if that is the action they chose to do instead of easily saving the dog. The action in itself is not innately good or bad, it is good or bad based on the context of what one could choose.

The same goes for the reverse. It is innately bad according to company policy, to dip the crane in the river. In fact, the brief dip in the crane will require the crane to be inspected and re-oiled, costing the business profit that day. It would generally be considered negligence on the part of the operator. But in the instance of "A few dollars spent to save a dogs life," using the crane is the right choice. Again, it is not innately good or bad, it is good or bad based on the context of the choice.

Now back to your example. Lets work backwards. Harming someone is generally, in itself, bad. A person is going to blow themselves up, killing them and everyone around them in ten seconds. You have the skill and capability to stop them, but you'll have to harm them. There is not a soul in the world who would say it is impermissible for you to save those lives by harming that individual. Because it is not innately good or bad to harm a person, but based on the context of the choice.

Now lets twist the scenario. You have the skill and capability to stop them, but you decide instead to donate ten dollars to a charity box next to you. Donating to charity is not in itself bad, and many might say its in itself good. Yet in the context of the moment, it was very bad to donate to charity instead of stopping the suicide bomber. Once again, the context of the choice.

As we spoke earlier, bad is relative to the situation, as logically good is. If the person 'just stood there' that's not innately bad or good, but bad or good dependent to the situation on hand. Since the person had the capability to stop the suicide bomber but 'stood there' (Did something else/nothing to stop the bomber) they chose the wrong action. It is not literally 'doing nothing', it is choosing to stand there. And in the context of the moral dillema, the wrong action, "Or finalized choice by action".

I don’t know what “action of agency” is vs. “action” simpliciter. — Bob Ross

Autonomous breathing is an action simpliciter. An action of agency is done with conscious intent.

A decision to make an action

I see the problem now: as a matter of definition, you must reject the idea of choosing to do nothing. — Bob Ross

My point is that you cannot 'not make an action'. To not act is to be dead. The whole point of this conversation is to demonstrate that you cannot avoid a moral situation by 'not acting'. You are deciding not to act on a set of moral choices, but your action is to walk away from the situation, think of sharks, or anything else. Its not that you are 'not acting' period. Your action is simply not aligned with 'pulling the lever' in this case.

You can decide, right now, to never respond to this message without choosing to go do something else instead: if that is true, then you made a choice to not make an action—which violates your definition of ‘choice’. — Bob Ross

I can choose to not respond to the post, but I choose to make some other type of action in my life. Again, I would have to be dead. My not posting does not absolve me for choosing to do something else.

You know me: I hate semantics as much as the next person; but if you define ‘choice’ in this way, then I would note that you must still agree that one can ‘reach a conclusion through the process of thinking’ which results in that ‘conclusion’ being that one should not act; and this then would not, by definition, be a ‘choice’ in your schema—but that’s what I am getting at. — Bob Ross

A choice is simply an assertion that you are going to commit an action based on your perceived options. So if I have a mutually exclusive choice between A and B, if I choose to do A, I am also choosing to not do B. My action will include A, and exclude B. Now if I didn't know that B was an option, I would not be able to choose B, or not choose B. My action would exclude B, but I would think I could only choose A.

All this notes, is that ones actions are necessarily chosen; but not that ones choices are all about actions — Bob Ross

Agreed. A realized choice is a choice that you act on. An unrealized choice is one that you are unable to. For example, if I choose to move my hand, try to, and find my hand is stuck on some glue, my choice was not fully realized.

Choosing is the act of deciding: you circularly defined a ‘choice’ here with ‘decision’. I would submit to you that ‘making a decision’, ‘making a choice’, etc. are all the results of the process of thinking; and ‘thinking’ is an act of rational deliberation (even if it is irrational in the sense that one doesn’t have sound argumentation or hasn’t thought it through very robustly). If this is true, then you must accept that one can act without choosing; because one can act without thinking—and surely you agree, semantics aside, with that. — Bob Ross

I would say agency more than thinking, as one can act emotionally, then rationally think about it later. The only way you can act without choosing is if its an autonomous action like a reflex, heart beating, etc.

I've already pointed this out once, but I am talking about mutually exclusive scenarios.

Got it: that wasn’t clear to me. You said it was a matter of a logical formula, which was confusing me. — Bob Ross

Not a worry, I should have been more explicit.

They chose to not pull the lever, and acted on it, because they thought it more moral to do something else

How did they act on it? What you are missing, is that the choosing to not pull the lever is a choice to refrain from acting; and if that is the case then they didn’t act on it. — Bob Ross

That's a poor sentence from me. My intent was to say, "The action they took did not involve pulling the lever, because they thought it more moral to do that action then pull the lever." Choosing to 'walk away' is the same as 'choosing not to pull the lever' as it was an option they had deliberated on.

The point I was making is that an omission is sometimes permissible. — Bob Ross

Agreed 100%

Again, allowing something bad to happen is not as bad as doing something bad. — Bob Ross

This sentence is circumstantially true or false. It is only true if you allowed something bad to happen because any other action or prevention would have only made it worse. For example, if I see a dog caught in a flood current in a river, I can choose not to save the dog because I'm a poor swimmer and the current would almost certainly kill me too. I wouldn't call this 'allowing' something bad to happen, just noting that there is nothing you can do to mitigate it. But that's semantics and probably not important. :)

On the other hand, lets say I'm a crane operator on a crane by the river and I realize I can easily scoop the dog out of the water without issue. If I choose to sip on some water and stare at the sky instead, I have done something bad. Staring up into the sky and sipping water are not innately bad, but they are considering everything the crane operator knows they can do given their options. By choosing to take the action of staring at the sky, I have chosen not to help the dog, and I have done wrong.

Fantastic points Cerulea! Let me start towards the end of your points first.

if you argue that Knowledge is for the sake of survival and desired goals, and therefore it is justified having a hierarchy based on who has the best knowledge? 

In other words, I question where the justification built into your model is based on.

Of course, you shortened the model, and maybe some of these axiomatic arguments were left out, and so now their absence means these questions prop up. — Caerulea-Lawrence

Correct, what I am discussing is not an assertion of strongly backed or proven reason, but discussion. Everything I am saying at this point is open for debate, change, and amending. You are the first person I've conversed with so far that has ever gotten to this point of consideration within the theory, so this aspect has always been put on hold until someone got to this point. So definitely, lets think carefully about these points now. First, lets start from the idea of "What knowledge context is best?"

Is 'survival and desired goals' a neutral, all encompassing, by-all-agreed-upon purpose? From my perspective, and I hope this comes across in the right way, your values, your truths, are some I view as far from universally held — Caerulea-Lawrence

Feel free to attack anything you see, do not hold back. No offense is taken from my view. The important thing isn't whether I'm right or not, its whether the theory holds or needs to be amended.

I believe what you are talking about is the moral use of the theory. Let me define morality so we're on the same page. Morality - "What ought to be." The theory in its basic formulation and understanding does not convey the 'moral use'. I think we can use the theory of knowledge to find out what morality is, and then use that morality as a guide to determine the best way to use knowledge. I have written another set of papers, less developed and definitely more open to potential flaws then this one here https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15203/in-any-objective-morality-existence-is-inherently-good/p1 where I propose the basis and possible reasoning for an objective morality.

I warn you, the first part is pretty clear, but people tend to get very lost on the second part, likely due to the math and its originalist view on demonstrating that morality applies even to objects. I don't mean to shy away from the topic here, but you may see more justification for my answer if you understand how I view morality.

If anything, humans and animals alike follow a rather peculiar impulse to diversify for the sake of 'something', but not for the inherent sake of Knowledge or complementary desired goals. At least this is how it looks to me. — Caerulea-Lawrence

I agree. But because we are thinking animals, we can also assess if we should be doing something even if there is a cultural or emotional pressure. This is again, a moral issue.

My thoughts on the matter are that many of our human 'ways' are incompatible with each other. 
An example would be how people generate applicable knowledge, not for survival and "desired goals", but for destruction and obliteration.


Knowledge is therefore power, a good and a tool, and never neutral. — Caerulea-Lawrence

Again, I agree with you. However, knowing the foundation gives a reasonable leg to stand on if you wish to challenge these power structures.

Let me give you an example. Lets say in a country, a religion is state enforced. If we apply our knowledge theory to the religion, it will certainly be found that the statements about its God are at best, plausible. Which leads to the question, "Should a nation base its rules off of what is plausible, or what is at the minimum, possible?" Because possibility is the minimum inductive belief that still contains some applicable knowledge at its core.

So we have a reasonable basis to question the government beyond an emotional one. It is not that reason will always be agreed with, but reason is a basis that holds despite our opinion of it. Having a solid basis of reasoning in any challenge may not overcome resistance, but definitely makes resistance more difficult to do.

Even if a culture or group claims they have knowledge, with a clear indication of what applicable knowledge is, one can more easily see through lies, deceptions, and faulty reasoning then if one is still uncertain themself as to what knowledge is.

And, You might want a bendable building in an Earthquake, but what if the builder was cutting corners to save costs, and so your house falls down? — Caerulea-Lawrence

This again, is the morals of deciding to follow best practices, or cut corners for efficiency and short term gain. In this case, we fortunately have an answer. The house falling down due to shoddy practices causes real harm in the society. The builder may be sued, and society will pressure such people to follow best practices or suffer themselves through the law or cultural backlash. Properly built up knowledge should in theory, be as logically coexistent with reality as possible. When one lives in accordance with reality, they can see what is coming, and make decisions that have real predicted outcomes instead of chance. Such lives are usually more stable and productive over the long term.

Whether you agree with my determination of morality, to me this question begs us to have one. And an objective one, not subjective. It needs to have a set of premises that can be applicably known, and that will take more than an initial theory to work out. The only justification I'm making for the theory at the moment is that, "Its logically consistent, does not make exceptions for itself, and solves many pressing questions of knowledge as a tool." I am not purporting to say with anything more than "What I think" the best use of the knowledge theory is in any particular culture. For that, we need morality.

I don’t know what “action of agency” is vs. “action” simpliciter. — Bob Ross

An action 'simpliciter' is simply what your being is at any moment in time. As I noted, you can have autonomous reactions. For example, breathing. An action of agency is when we commit an action through choice, ie, intent.

I understand that you use “choice” in a looser sense, but what exactly is it under your view? — Bob Ross

A decision to make an action. Once you have made that action, you have fulfilled your choice. Assuming agency, if you choose to do A, but at the last second, pick B, you changed your choice to B.

I don’t understand what you mean by “if one acts on A, then one is not acting on B”. Again, A could entail B: there’s nothing logically impossible about that. — Bob Ross

I've already pointed this out once, but I am talking about mutually exclusive scenarios. Of course you can choose A and B if they aren't mutually exclusive. You can't walk and run at the same time. If you run, you chose not to walk. If you walk, you chose not to run. And vice versa.

With respect to the situation of the 1 vs. 5 trolley problem, you didn’t do anything else—that’s the point! You did something insofar as you rationally deliberated (viz., made a decision) to not pull the lever; but not pulling the lever is not itself an action—and this is what I want to see if we agree on or not. — Bob Ross

Perhaps what you want is to argue that a person who doesn't pull the lever didn't take a moral action? Because they clearly did. In a simple scenario you can pull the lever, or not pull the lever. They chose to not pull the lever, and acted on it, because they thought it more moral to do something else. You either decide and act by pulling the lever, or by not pulling the lever in the moral situation. You don't get out of it. Of course, pulling or not pulling the lever alone does not entail moral judgement. This can only be determined after moral evaluation.

Moral omissibility is not the same as moral permissibility; and the former is not standardly the same as “doing something impermissible”: it is separate moral category of thought. — Bob Ross

Something that is morally permissible is something which is not bad; whereas something that is morally omissible is bad but is exempt from moral responsibility — Bob Ross

I see. Omissibility in itself neither necessarily exempts or makes the person responsible; that's more of a case by case basis. Omission is simply that a person did something incorrect without understanding that they shouldn't have done that. Whether this deserves judgement or not is separate. So I'm still not sure that the term fits the situation you're trying to describe. If I understand it right, what you're saying is that if a person does something wrong, but only because doing something would cause further harm, its ok. I think that's pretty uncontroversial as long as the harm was seen either equal or greater than not pulling the lever. No need to call it an omission, that's just traditional moral justification.

because failing to reasonably prevent a bad effect or act is in-itself bad, but in some cases it is exempt from moral scrutiny; and one such example is when one cannot act in any morally permissible way to prevent the bad act or effect from happening. — Bob Ross

I don't think its exempt from moral scrutiny, but exempt from moral judgement. As we spoke about earlier, if we had a 50/50 situation, in which you only had two choices and both were equally bad, no one could judge you for your choice. If however your choice to not pull the lever results in more wrong than if you had, and you knew that, you would be morally negligent. The way people are morally exempt traditionally is if they lack active agency, or had ignorance that wasn't do to negligence. IE, "The power plant failed because I was never told to push a certain button" vs "The power plant failed because I didn't bother to read the new manual that came out last week".

The absurdity in your view, so far, is that there is no such thing as allowing or letting something bad happen; as opposed to doing something bad; because you completely lack the vocabulary to notate a choice to not act, since you think inaction is action. — Bob Ross

No, I'm not saying that at all. My point is that "letting something happen" when you could choose to stop it, does not absolve you of moral consideration. And in the situation of moral choice, 'not acting' is the action you take. I can see in some situations, it would be better to 'do nothing' or 'do any other action' then interfere in the situation. And in some situations, its not. But no one gets a free pass from moral scrutiny if you are aware of the situation and you could have made a choice to alter its outcome.

I apologize Philosophim: I ran out of time to respond earlier. — Bob Ross

Not a worry! As always this is a hobby where we squeeze in time, and I know we have a habit of making longer posts to one another. :)

This is true. And if

The biggest problem with your analysis is that you see no difference between making a choice and acting — Bob Ross

Its not that I don't see a difference, its that an action of agency is a choice. You can't act, and then as a person with agency say, "I chose not to act, but acted anyway." Basically not all choices are actions, but all agency actions are choices.

An action is a volition of will with an intention — Bob Ross

If we call it an action of agency, yes. An autonomous reflex for example could be called an action, but not an action of agency.

a choice is the decision reached through a process of rational deliberation — Bob Ross

It doesn't have to be through a process of rational deliberation, but could be instinctual or emotional. It is the determination of what you are going to 'do', or act.

an inaction is a lack of action — Bob Ross

Yes, on a set of choices. But just because one does not act on certain choices does not mean they don't act on others. To truly be inactive is to be in a deep coma or dead. Inaction is generally meant as "That which a person does not act on." It does not mean that an awake and aware person literally makes no actions. I feel this is a language issue here, and probably our source of disagreement.

1. Not all actions are choices: some are merely voluntary. One may very well do something that is in correspondence with their will (i.e., do something voluntarily) without rationally deliberating about it (i.e., choose it) (e.g., punching a wall in pure rage). — Bob Ross

Because you note that a choice is made though rational deliberation only, I understand where you're coming from. I don't believe choices need to be rational deliberations, and would simply call this an emotional choice. Again, this seems to just be a definition disagreement.

A choice is an action: one is deliberating (viz., thinking), and this is a volition of the will with the intention of contemplation (about something). — Bob Ross

I would say more that a choice is the intention to commit an action. I could choose to go out and eat, but my car won't start. However, I also understand that it could be argued that a choice is an action as well, in the fact that it is a process of a person with agency. But where I feel the words really do separate is that a choice is the intention, the action is the end result. A choice is what we are going to do, while an action is what we do. Thus I can say, "I chose to walk over there, and I acted on it."

An inaction is not an action: this is obvious, so I will leave it there. — Bob Ross

No, I don't think so. If you would, I would like you to explain why the following is wrong. An inaction is a choice to not act on one or more possible actions. And in this, I am using using the logic that if one acts on A, one is not acting on B. Total inaction, is for all possible letters, you did not act on them. That means the removal of actionable agency. This is if we are using the terms consistently and logically.

Yes, in the context of what other people might find meaningful in our lives we can say, "I didn't do anything today." But the person did not take any actions in the logical sense, they just didn't act on b-e, which are boring to talk about. What one 'does' is an action. If I 'do nothing', that is a slang term for 'not acting on anything we would consider important'. It does not mean, "I entered into a comatose state this weekend and emerged back into consciousness Monday at 7."

4. One can choose something (viz., reach a conclusion) without further acting on it. — Bob Ross

Agreed. There can be things that get in the way of our choices, or while we may intend to act on something, the opportunity never comes around. An action is ultimately what we do though. While we may have intentions to do something different, when we act with agency, that is ultimately what we have chosen to do. So I might intend to walk over there and sit in a chair, but my ultimate choice was to not walk over there instead. I might not like my choice (what I ultimately decided to act on) but all actions of agency are choices.

Not all actions are voluntary. E.g., If you hold a gun up to my head and tell me to eat a bowl of ice cream or die and I do it; then I am not doing this because it corresponds to my will in any meaningful sense (if I am doing it to avoid dying). — Bob Ross

What you're describing is duress, or the limitation of actionable choices to those that you would normally not want to do. So lets say I would normally choose not to break my diet, but the alternative is to die. I don't want that either. But I can't choose the act of 'lying on the ground,' without getting killed. Without the duress, that I can only eat ice cream or die, I would choose the actions of "Not eating ice cream and taking a walk." And again this is equivalent to, "The inaction of A, the action of B".

From your statement that “your action is to stay in the chair” in the case of choosing to not get up from the chair, I find if self-evident that you are lacking a robust analysis of what “action” is. — Bob Ross

That was a fair point, and I hope my above points gave a better analysis of what an action is from my viewpoint.

If I do not get up, then I performed the act of not getting up; which is just to say that I didn’t perform an act at all. — Bob Ross

A = "Getting up"
~A is "Not getting up"
But ~A does not entail ~everything

The action that was committed was B, or what you did. Did you contemplate? Simply lie there and zone out? If one has agency from second to second, 'doing' or 'acting' is the expression of that agency. To do 'nothing' or ~anything is to have no agency at all.

I mean it in the more prominent sense of omitting something or someone. E.g., I consider it morally omissible to not do something and let something bad happen if the only way to prevent that bad thing from happening is to do something bad. — Bob Ross

Wouldn't it be better to say "Morally permissible to not do something?" And remember, the something that we are not doing is, "The action that would stop X from happening." It doesn't mean that we aren't doing anything else. So I can see, "It is morally permissible not to throw a fat person on the train tracks to stop the train from running over five other people". That makes sense. Using the word omissible would imply that you made the wrong choice, but didn't realize that you made the wrong choice. Omissible just doesn't seem to work here with what I think you want.

I would find this morally omissible, in the sense that they are not going to be held morally responsible for not taking the measures to save the five. — Bob Ross

Again, I think 'morally permissible' conveys your intention clearly, whereas morally omissible implies you made a mistake though ignorance, and aren't going to be held accountable for it. Your action was ~A, which could have saved those people. You acted in another way, such as watching, leaving, or humming a tune in your head as the chaos errupted. :)

Some voluntary acts which are not chosen, may be chosen indirectly by means of choosing to instill a habit which tends to produce that act—e.g., one may install the habit of eating healthy by way of choice (i.e., by rationally deliberating about it), and once that habit has a strong hold one may find themselves wanting and eating a healthy meal without thinking about it all. — Bob Ross

Habits are ways we can act with less deliberation and effort. But one can have a habit and act with, or against that habit. Choices and actions can be influenced, pressured, or coerced, I'm not arguing against that. But ultimately what a person does, is an act of agency if it is not something like an autonomous reflex.

If I choose to go on a hunger strike, I am acting purposefully not to eat.

It is purposeful, but not an action. — Bob Ross

If an action is what one does, is this not a purposeful action?

You are not doing anything; just like if you decide to not pull the lever and let the five get run over by the train: did you do anything by not pulling the lever? No. — Bob Ross

Of course you did something. You chose not to pull the lever, and did something else. I think what you're trying to say is that "Its ok if I take another action besides not pulling the lever." That you made the choice not to intervene. Which that's a fine conversation to have. But what you seem to be saying is, "Because I didn't pull the lever, I am absolved of moral judgement." That doesn't work. If you're in a moral situation, understand you have actionable options, how you acted is always open open for moral judgement. "Do nothing (to stop the situation from happening) was the the choice you made by acting in some other manner than pulling the lever.

Whereas, truly not doing something doesn't actualize anything; e.g., if I make the decision that my phone should continue to lie on the table exactly where it is, then me not picking it up is not an action. — Bob Ross

Correct. But you acted in some other manner. And in a moral scenario, 'not acting on the choices which would stop X from happening," means you acted in some other way. One cannot escape moral judgement through such actions.

Its an interesting break down. Having gone over this again, I have a feeling the real goal here is that you want a person to have a 'get out of jail free card' on moral situations by claiming 'not acting' means they weren't involved. If someone is aware of a moral situation, and has a choice to alter that moral outcome, choosing not to alter the moral outcome is the action they take. I'm not here to judge whether that person was right in doing so or not, but that is the action they took in that moral situation. Once a person knows and understands their options in a moral situation, they cannot stop being a part of the equation by simply 'doing nothing'. In the end, their 'inaction' to alter a situation is fully within the choices that are being judged.

Sounds pretty good. I've always taken that numbers are the logical expression of a living beings ability to discretely experience. Experience is the totality of your senses, thoughts, feelings, etc. A discrete experience is your ability to focus on an aspect of it. A sense. A thought. A feeling.

So you can say, that is a (one) blade of grass. Two blades are the concept of 1 and 1 together. And of course you can say, "That is a field of grass." "That is one piece of grass". And so on.

Information is the compact storage of a discrete experience that may be a combination of many aspects, properties, feelings etc. "My dog" evokes a lot of combined information into a neat and reasonable package to think and communicate about. So yes, I like your thinking on this!

In logic, to choose A, is to choose not B.

This is not a logical truth whatsoever. Choosing A may entail simultaneously choosing B — Bob Ross

I'm talking about the context of steal or starve, or mutually exclusive choices.

The act of rational deliberation is the act of making a choice, and one can certainly rationally deliberate such that they decide not to do anything. E.g., I can choose to not get up from my chair, and not getting up from my chair is NOT an action. — Bob Ross

It is though. Your action is to stay in the chair. An action is simply a decision of what to do as a living being from moment to moment. You cannot choose not to take an action as long as you live. The moment you cannot take any action, is death.

This is important in order to understand my theory, because omissions and commissions evaluated differently. — Bob Ross

Ok, I see where you're going with this then. An omission is generally understood as "Not doing the right thing". And generally, this is a descriptor of ignorance. At a very basic level, I had a choice to go right or left, I chose left on a whim, but the correct choice was to go right. Omissions generally means a choice that didn't turn out to be the right one, but the person involved didn't know that when they made the choice.

A commission on the other hand is when you know you should go right, but you go left instead. You have knowledge of the correct outcome, but do not choose it. This mirrors my explanation of agency earlier. No one is faulted for starving if there is no option that can alleviate starving. Or if someone offered you a poison apple, but you didn't know it was poison. You chose not to starve, but you didn't know the apple would kill you instead.

In the case of starve vs steal, we have full information. You can either choose to steal and not starve, or not steal and starve. The question is whether it is worse to starve or steal. And if you willingly choose the worse choice, its a commission. If you don't know what the worse choice is, and accidently choose it, its an omission. Actively deciding to starve is neither an omission or commission in this scenario as we don't know what is worse.

So if I choose not to steal, but then take the action of stealing, what does that mean?

It would mean you are acting irrationally; and that you chose to not act, but acted anyways. — Bob Ross

If I didn't choose to act, how did I act? Was it unconscious or did some other force move my hand? We can have all sorts of wishes or opinions on how we act, but at the end of the day, our actions are our choices if it was in our power to have acted in a different way.

If you make the decision that you are want to change the fact that you are starving such that you aren’t anymore but don’t actually do anything to change it, then you haven’t acted to change the fact that you are starving. — Bob Ross

I'm going to respectfully disagree with you here, and I think you'll find most will as well. If I choose to go on a hunger strike, I am acting purposefully not to eat. What you seem to be implying is that if I purposefully lie on my back for three days, I took no actions for three days. An action is 'a lived choice'. This is not the same thing as the colloquial term, "I did nothing today." No, you did something today, just not anything that's worthy of sharing in a conversation with another person. The action was, "I didn't get out of bed today."

What I was noting is that not doing something and doing something are nor morally calculated equally; and your response here is full of equivocating the two. — Bob Ross

Its not an equivocation. I'm not noting the morality of doing something vs not doing something. I'm just pointing out that if you make a choice, and go through with it in your lived experience, that's an action. It can be boring like sitting on the ground, but its still an action.

If you are currently in the state of starvation, then choosing to remain in that state produces no action pertaining to it—no different than me choosing to not move doesn’t cause movement. — Bob Ross

No, your action is to not move. But not moving doesn't mean you haven't taken an action.

By choosing one, you will commit an evil act.

Again, you don’t commit an evil act by allowing something bad to continue to happen; exactly no different than how I don’t do anything to not get up from the chair that I am in—there’s a choice being made, but some choices require inaction. — Bob Ross

This is again, an inaccurate use of the term for what we're discussing. If I am told to pick a card out of deck, I have 52 possibilities to pick a card. If I decided to take the action of simply leaving the table, I would be inactive in making a choice to pick a card, but I would actively be walking away from the table to do something else. Just like, "Currently I'm an inactive soldier". Its not that "I'm not taking actions", its simply a term that states, "I'm not taking any actions as a soldier anymore." In the case of steal vs starve, there are only two choices to act on. Steal or starve. Starving is not an inaction, it is a conscious choice made by not stealing.

"I would rather starve then steal".

By allowing yourself to continue to starve, you have committed an omission (an inaction); whereas if you steal you have committed a commission (an action). — Bob Ross

Again, this is not the correct use of the term 'omission'. An omission is when an action you have taken results in something bad happening, and you didn't know that was going to be the outcome. This term is used outside of morality as well. "I omitted my signature from the form because I didn't see the line. My form was rejected". Vs "I saw the line for the signature on the form, but decided not to sign it. My form was rejected". Here I have committed an improper act vs having an improper act happen because I omitted something. You cannot avoid making an action as long as you have agency.

It is a choice, but not an action. There’s no 50/50 decision being made, because it is morally impermissible to do something bad for the sake of something good; and so it is better to choose to not do anything than do something bad. — Bob Ross

This is a hard sell. In logic, to choose A, is to choose not B. If I were to grab A, it means I'm grabbing not B. To say that choice isn't an action seems odd to me. If you choose something but don't act on it, did you really choose? So if I choose not to steal, but then take the action of stealing, what does that mean? If I choose not to starve, but don't take an action to prevent starvation when that option is presented, didn't I act by not stealing, thus actionably starving?

The times that I see where we have no choice or ability to act, is when there is no agency. Agency can be defined as knowledge plus the ability to act. So if I have knowledge of a way to avoid starving, and the choice to act on it, then I have agency. If you choose not to steal to prevent starvation, you are actionably starving by agency. Just as if you chose to steal to avoid starving, you would act by agency.

If of course you were simply starving, and there was no way to stop it, you had no choice, and did not actionably starve. But if a person has knowledge, and the ability to act, acting on A means not acting on B, your other choice.

If you disagree that this specific scenario does not seem to fit the 50/50 scenario, its fine, but a 50/50 is going to happen. By choosing one, you will commit an evil act. By choosing the other, you will also commit an evil act. However, you do have relative evil, which I think resolves this major problem. In the face of a 50/50, you would choose the less evil act, and I think that's a good enough solution for the framework. Still, this does lead into two other considerations.

1. If there is relative evil, how do we determine the level of evil.
2. Logically, if there is relative evil, there is relative good.

In the second case, you may have your solution to the OP. Lets say intrinsically it is good to not be harmed. Then in the case of self-defence, it is less good to hurt another person, but not if they are being even less good by trying to harm you. The question of how you evaluate the relative good is the next question you have to tackle, but if there is relative evil, then logically there must be relative good. The same language can be used if you just change everything to being relative degrees of evil. Harming others is evil, but it is less evil if you are defending yourself from them trying to hurt you.

This does not counter your idea of intrinsic good/evil. We can still say that harming a person is a rating of 6 evil, or -6 good, while defending yourself is a 3 evil, or -3 good. You can still say that rape is intrinsically evil at a level of 10, while torture is intrinsically evil at a level of 9. How you determine the intrinsic level is the next step, but I don't think you run into an contradictions in your current framework as long as you allow relative comparisons and note that intrinsic good/bad has levels to compare.

As you see, relative ratings of good and evil are necessary to tackle complex moral issues, and this does not counter intrinsic values. Whether your values or intrinsic or not, relative measurements are going to be need to accurately make the most moral decision. What really comes next is how do we determine if something is intrinsically good/evil, and to what degree? I think in general the idea of, "Do the least harm/greatest good" is uncontroversial enough. How we determine what that is, is the next challenge.

The question in the OP is operating under the assumption that one accepts that a thing can be bad or good in-itself and simply that the action of harming someone is in-itself bad. — Bob Ross

Moreover, if they starve to death because their only option to avoid it was steal, then they did not do anything bad—just because it is bad to starve it does not follow that one is acting by allowing something to happen. — Bob Ross

I see. Isn't refusing to make an action that would prevent starvation a choice however? If I was starving and a pie was in front of me, the act of not eating the pie does seem to be choosing starvation. People go on hunger strikes all the time because they believe its essential to draw attention to the prisoner's inhumane treatment. Choosing not to eat, is a choice when you have the means in front of you to eat. So if this is the case, we still have the 50/50 scenario. The person can choose to steal the food in front of them the avoid starvation, or choose not to steal the food, and thus also choose to starve.

In its most generic sense, I mean “bad” and “good” in the common man’s usage of the terms as it relates to morality. In a more technical sense, I would say “badness” is “negative intrinsic valuableness” and “goodness” is “positive intrinsic valuableness”; however, these technical definitions are not required to understand, more generally, what is meant by “bad” and “good” in the OP. — Bob Ross

That is fine by me. For now we can assume that there is no reason behind what is good or bad intrinsically, only that they are. I am also assuming, and correct me if I'm wrong, that inherent goodness and badness don't have a 'rating'. For example, stealing isn't 2 badness, while murdering isn't 4 badness, they're just both intrinsically bad. Same for goodness. Helping a little old lady across the street is just as good as saving 1 million lives. While I see problems with this, I can accept this for now and discuss what it would be like to have such a system.

This also leads to the point that the 50/50 scenario doesn't need to be explicit. Maybe you don't like the steal/starve scenario, but that doesn't mean that there won't be a good/bad conflict of some kind. We can assume through the varieties of life experience, its going to happen. You can use a starve/steal example to make it less abstract, but any scenario will do. How does your moral framework handle such a scenario? A 60/40? Does a scenario have to be 100% good for a person to act, that even a 99% good choice should not be done if there is 1% evil involved?

We could say, equally, that it might be good per accidens to rape someone if they have to choose between raping them for 10 seconds or torturing them in a basement for 10 years (and assuming those are the only two options); but this would have no effect on the fact that rape itself is bad, when taken in isolation. — Bob Ross

There seems to be a bit of an answer to my above question in here. Again though, what about degrees of badness? If its rape, but the rape is your husband. Lets not make torture 10 years, but ten seconds to be more comparative. What if that torture is water boarding vs toe nail removal? The problem I'm getting at is that intrinsically good or bad without degrees of value overly simplifies morality. Morality is complex and can lead to some controversial and odd situations. A framework that cannot handle that is not strong.

And to not stray too far from your topic, this leads us back to:

1. It is morally impermissible to perform an action that is in-itself bad;
2. It is morally impermissible to directly intend something bad—even for the sake of something good;
3. Harming someone is, in-itself, bad.

It seems to me, under these stipulations, that one could never justify self-defense—e.g., harming someone that is about to kill you—because it will always be the case in such examples that one directly intends to harm that person for the sake of saving themselves. — Bob Ross

Which if a moral framework claims you can never defend yourself, this seems like the moral framework is unable to handle a fairly common moral scenario that is generally agreed upon by people across the world. Most of the world has determined that defending yourself is a moral right. Not that this means they're correct, but there's a high burden of reason for any framework to state that it is immoral to do so.

So in sum:

1. Does this framework have degrees of moral good and evil? If not, you run into a problem of oversimplicity, and an inability to handle moral complexities.
2. I don't think one can easily discount that 'not doing something' is 'not a choice', and a 50/50 scenario of some kind is unavoidable. How does this framework handle these scenarios?

As always, feel free to correct me if I've misunderstood anything. :)

1. It is morally impermissible to perform an action that is in-itself bad;
2. It is morally impermissible to directly intend something bad—even for the sake of something good;
3. Harming someone is, in-itself, bad. — Bob Ross

Hey Bob! Its been a while, glad to see you again. There are a few clarifications I feel you need to give to address this.

1. What is bad? What is bad 'in-itself? Can you give an example of something that is is bad in itself, and why it is bad?

2. This is going to be important, because a person who doesn't have your set definitions can set up this scenario.

a. It is good to not starve.
b. It is bad to starve.
c. It is bad to steal.
d. It is good to not steal.
e. If you do not steal, you are going to starve.

Therefore if you do not steal and starve, you are doing both a bad and a good thing. But if you steal and don't starve, then you are doing both a good and a bad thing. If things are good or bad 'in themselves' then we reach a situation in which either choice is equally as good and bad as the other. But our intuitions, (and I'm sure deeper argumentation) justify stealing to not starve. So we have a situation by which things in themselves result in a coin flip outcome that I think many of us would not call a coin flip.

Yes, shameless plug, but a relevant one! https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

If you haven't read my work on knowledge within self-context, you may get your answer. There's a summary in the next post down that breaks it down very well.

I'm not quite saying that the "world is simply too complex to simply have formed," i.e., it's logically possible for the world to have simply come about by chance or some first cause (naturalistic first cause). — Sam26

Then I misunderstood your argument, my apologies.

I don't have to apply your criticism to an intelligence behind the universe (not necessarily God, any intelligence). It's perfectly reasonable to pick what you think the first cause might be based on the evidence and use that as your starting point. — Sam26

True. My point is that there doesn't seem to be anything that necessarily points to a creator as a starting point. The same arguments that would point to a creator, would point to the creator of a creator, and so on. What I'm not saying, to be clear, is that its impossible that there is a creator. Only that the argument does not give a compelling logical reason to believe that a creator is an origin vs not.

Also, why would you think that consciousness (I prefer to use consciousness or mind) is complex, it might be simple, we don't have enough information to say one way or another, — Sam26

To be clearer, I'm not talking about consciousness, I'm talking about an 'intelligent designer'. I actually believe there is varying level of consciousness, and that consciousness is really just another part of the brain that has been granted the ability to monitor and adjust certain portions of the body beyond autonomous reaction. I think dogs are conscious for example, just not intelligent enough to have a consciousness that can build a cities and shuttles to the stars.

And that's my point about an intelligent designer. Humans are the only one's that have been able to build something more complex and complicated then simple tools with sticks. So while there can be simple consciousness and simple intelligence, there is a level of conscious intelligence both needed to create a certain level of complexity, and to be aware of it. So if a God is an intelligent designer, and assuming it must be as intelligent of a designer as our greatest engineer, if our complexity is evidence we were designed, then logically so too must God have been designed. So we don't get anywhere, and we're back with a question.

That question of course is what I answer in the paper I linked. The answer is that inevitably, the 'first cause' or 'where there is no prior explanation for a things existence,' must inevitably be uncaused, or not caused by something else. Which means the reason for its existence is, "It simply is." While this leaves God as a plausible explanation for what caused the universe, it does not mean that God is necessary. That also pulls the idea of a God out of faith, and into one that now requires evidence. That evidence must be enough to show that a God necessarily occurred, while the universe simply being did not. And in regards to any particular claim of what God is like, that also would require evidence.

And so far, there is no such evidence for the necessity of our universe being created by God, nor any evidence of the existence that such a being is still around, would be good, all powerful, evil, etc. The most likely scenario is that such a creator is not all powerful, all knowing, and not around anymore. Further, that creator may have been made by another. There is certainly no viable evidence of eternal life, heaven, miracles, or any supernatural claims.

I'm trying to point out that a mind behind the universe is the best explanation based on all the data, especially specified information, which I haven't got to yet. — Sam26

I didn't quite see that. Would you like to elaborate more and present what else you have? I'm listening.

None of which has any bearing on what ‘divine intelligence’ means. I’m not sticking up for the idea, but at least it should be framed in the terms of classical theism. — Wayfarer

What? No, I frame it in MY argument. If my argument is illogical, point it out. But you don't get to insist I use words, phrases, or OTHER people's arguments in my argument.

You may think that the doctrine of divine simplicity is ‘nonsense’ but it is the orthodox view of the nature of God. So rather than dispute intelligent design on spurious philosophical grounds you’d be better off saying you just don’t believe in it. — Wayfarer

Wayfarer, what do you think philosophy is? Every idea that has ever been thought of or put down in a book was thought about by 'just a another person'. There is no weight to the argument because of its history, who wrote it, or what book its in. Those things are starters, places to begin in discussion with the hopes that such writings and arguments have some worth. But past that, the only thing which matters in the argument is the logic of the idea. As someone who harshly questions physicalism, I would think you would understand that well.

I laid out a clear idea of intelligence, and why the teleological argument fails. If you wish to introduce some catholic ancient idea of divine intelligence, and how its different, feel free. But if its nonsense, its nonsense. It deserves no more consideration or respect, and I surely am not going to use such outdated and nonsensical framing in my arguments.

Fast-forward to the 20-21'st century, and we seem more concerned with probabilities and statistical likelihoods, as per the field of quantum mechanics. — Shawn

Statistics are based on causality. Without causality, there is no reason and no limitations. What you might be confusing with anti-causality is 'limits on knowledge', specifically in regards to measurment. Statistics and probabilities are all based on limited knowledge. Take a classic coin flip for example. When the coin is flipped, the outcome is determined by the sum of the forces on it. However, we can't know all of those forces due to a lack of measurement. But what we've found is that a small variability in force can greatly affect the outcome. What we know is that few people have the capability to flip a coin with the exact precision and force to have it land on the same side every time. So we assume an average of variability from what we do know, and determine that its a 50% chance for the coin to land on either side.

To the broader question of modality or 'the nature of necessity', it is still held that forces always work in the same way. So if an electron is traveling with a particular set of forces that we could measure, the outcome would always be the same. People confuse quantum mechanics math with the idea that an electron is magically indeterminate. No, our lack of measurement and knowledge mean we have to use probability and indeterminate math to have any chance of approximating the electrons outcome. But underlying it all, the assumption that the forces of the world work deterministically is still held by modern science.

But is He? Richard Dawkins also says that, but it founders on the rock of divine simplicity. — Wayfarer

If you're going on the fact of an intelligent designer, we need a base line of what 'intelligent' means. Can a dog create anything more complex then a hole? No. A beaver can create dams. Monkeys can create primitive tools. So if we're going to state that there is an intelligent designer, at minimum, it would need to be at the level of a human. If it did not have intelligence, then it would be a mechanical process, but then it wouldn't really be a designer anymore either.

And if a human being, the height of known intelligence, is considered so complicated that it needs a designer, then God as an intelligent being which can design and create far more than a human can, would also need a designer. I think its a straight forward line of reasoning.

According to the doctrine of divine simplicity, God is simple, not complex, and not composed of parts.

God is necessary because he is simple and not because he exists in all metaphysically possible worlds. And while one may say that the simple God is or exists, God is not an existent among existents or a being among beings, but Being (esse) itself in its prime instance and in this respect is different from every other being (ens). — Wayfarer

This is nonsense. Being which is not being. Existence which is not existence. This is poetry masking as meaningfulness.

I looked at your thread on 'first cause', but I don't think you're at all familiar with the classical description of 'first cause'. A forum thread is not the place to try and fill that void, and anyway, I lack the expertise to do it. — Wayfarer

Feel free to post what you think it lacks on that thread so we don't detract here. You'll notice I give a definition of first cause, and build from there. If you disagree with the definition or find a problem with it, please give your opinion there, I'll address it.

↪Philosophim ↪Sam26 Also contra "intelligent design" (i.e. creationism), consider the dysteleological argument:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_poor_design

In sum: both the universe in general and organic life in particular appear defective, or suboptimal, just as it's most reasonable to expect it be according evident and explicablee, nonintelligent processes of (e.g.) nucleogenesis and biological evolution (especially given that 99.99% of baryonic matter – the observable universe that has been expanding for at least 13.8 billion years from a planck radius of random (i.e. non-causal, ergo not "created / designed") fluctuations – is vacuum radiation inimical to organic/human life (in a universe evidently "fine-tuned" for lifelessness). — 180 Proof

This is another good point.

The teleological argument for God is by far the best of the core 3, but it suffers from a crippling counter point.

Essentially, you are saying people and the world are too complex to simply have formed. But have you applied that same criticism to a God? Once you do, the argument falls apart. God is at least as complex as a human being, so therefore the same argument would apply to a God. Something would have to create a God. But then, something would have to create that as well! The only logical conclusion is that the origin point of causality must have existed without prior cause. That origin could be a God, but it could also be a universe without a God. I have post on it here if you want to look into it.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary/p1

I don’t believe I did that, nor did I wish to imply it. — Wayfarer

If I note you made a clear appeal to authority, ask you to give some actual examples because its an innocent enough mistake to make, then you double down and tell me you won't because you think I already know how I'll respond, then you're implying it. Even one example could have been enough to demonstrate you were taking the conversation seriously. Wayfarer, I keep telling you I'm a lot more open to your ideas then you'll allow in your own head. Give people a chance, especially if they're willing to engage with you.

Currently the hypothesis, "Our consciousness does not survive death," has been confirmed in applicable tests. You'll need to show me actual tests that passed peer review, and can be repeated that show our consciousness exists beyond death. To my mind, there are none, but I am open to read if you cite one.
— Philosophim

Where the obvious difficulty is that of obtaining an objective validation of a subjective state of being and which only occurs in extreme conditions. — Wayfarer

True, and I don't discount this. Again, I've gone over this in my conversation with Sam. I've mentioned how NDEs can be seemingly reproduced at a less intense level through drug stimulation and situations of oxygen deprivation. I do not have an issue with pointing out weaknesses in things I've addressed with Sam, but you aren't referencing those and just assuming things. Again, a simple enough mistake to make, but when I've tried to correct you to go read, you keep making false assumptions about where the conversation has gone, indicating you still haven't done that. If you don't want to, that's fine, but stop making accusations or criticisms from ignorance.

Myself, I don't really see how the claim that there can be a state beyond physical death is ever going to be scientifically validated, although I believe there are research programs underway to do that. — Wayfarer

There are. Here's a modern article which mentions a few groups that are attempting to study NDE's as the least.

https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/lifting-the-veil-on-near-death-experiences/

One example of a test that has not borne fruit yet is putting distinct objects out of sight of the patient and if they have a OBE, seeing if they can say they saw it while floating above their body.

It's easy to dismiss Stevenson as a crank or charlatan but he did amass a considerable amount of data which I happen to think is a more empirically reliable source of data than NDE testimonies. — Wayfarer

Again, I would have taken this more seriously if you had given some examples and not a simple book reference.

I also laid out a sketch of an alternative metaphysic, within which the idea of continuity from life-to-life might be considered plausible, to which you didn't respond. — Wayfarer

This was not addressed to me, but AmadeusD. But if you think it relevant, I'll give my thoughts.

But I think the soul could be better conceived in terms of a field that acts as an organising principle - analogous to the physical and magnetic fields that were discovered during the 19th century, that were found to be fundamental in the behaviour of particles. — Wayfarer

This isn't a bad idea, but we have to be careful in understanding what a field is. The best analogy I can give is calculating the waves of the ocean vs measuring the particles of water involved. A wave is a mathematical way of looking at particle behavior in large groups. You've probably heard that light can be both a wave and a particle. Light doesn't change, its our mathematical calculations of viewing light as waves vs particles that hold sound in testing.

Meaning that if the soul were a wave, or some type of large conscious energy force, there would be something measurable. Considering that logically the soul would have to interact with the brain, this also means that the soul must be able to impact physical reality, and vice versa. Thus in repeated viewings of death, we should be able to detect something.

You'll note in the article I link this is a common thing they find.

"In 2023 Borjigin and her colleagues published what they suspect could be a signature of NDEs in the dying brain. The researchers analyzed EEG data from four comatose patients before and after their ventilators were removed. As their brains became deprived of oxygen, two of the dying patients exhibited a paradoxical surge of gamma activity, a type of high-frequency brain wave linked to the formation of memory and the integration of information.

Borjigin had seen the same upwelling of activity in previous studies of the brains of healthy rats during induced cardiac arrest. In the rodents, the surge occurred across the entire brain. In humans, though, it was confined primarily to the junction of the brain’s temporal, parietal and occipital lobes, a region involved in multiple features of consciousness, including visual, auditory and motion processing. Past research has also associated the region with out-of-body sensations, as well as with altruism and empathy. Although these are all regular components of NDEs, Borjigin says, it’s impossible to know whether the two patients actually experienced an NDE because they did not live to tell about it. But “I could almost guess what they might have experienced,” she says."

Things like these are exciting because they're repeatable finds. It still doesn't explain why some have it and others don't, but at least there's something measurable. Whether it will be something that the brain simply does on its own, or whether there is some energy or force we can trace leaving the brain remains to be seen.

As the morphic field is capable of storing and transmitting remembered information, then 'the soul' could be conceived in such terms. The morphic field does, at the very least, provide an explanatory metaphor for such persistence. — Wayfarer

I have often thought the memories and their preservation could be captured somehow. Generally though memory is stored as a medium, and it needs a translator to process it into an experience. Even a simple computer is a good example of the broad concept. To make this idea actionable, we would need to find this medium, find evidence of it interacting with the brain, and then attempt to repeat it and see what happens. So this is still in the speculative fiction category, but possibly the Jules Verne kind.

Then he identified from journals, birth-and-death records, and witness accounts, the deceased person the child supposedly remembered, and attempted to validate the facts from those sources that matched the child’s memory. — Wayfarer

Ah, I see, this is what you were talking about. I took some time to review a bit of Stevens. Its interesting material. Stevens himself never attempted to use his claims to prove that reincarnation was real, but that was what he leaned on the most. Honestly, a guy like him is a pioneer who I have a lot of respect for. The question is whether his methodology was sound, and whether a repeat in the study would result in similar conclusions. Science is not one study, but repeated attempts to poke, prod, and explore. Its a bit telling there doesn't seem to be much follow up research or attempts to build upon his work from the 1970s. There are several interested parties in wanting reincarnation to be real, and I'm sure enough money could be found to explore that interest. So a neat start, but can't be considered more seriously without further research.

Carroll goes on in his essay to say that 'Everything we know about quantum field theory (QFT) says that there aren’t any sensible answers to these questions (about the persistence of consciousness)'. However, that springs from his starting assumption that 'the soul' must be something physical, which, again, arises from the presumption that everything is physical, or reducible to physics. — Wayfarer

From my point we can replace the word physics with, "Measureable". And as I noted earlier, logically, if there is some other type of substance that interacts with the human body, it must be detectable in some way. It would be part of reality, and measurable. So its a neat idea to keep exploring, but until such a measurable thing is discovered, we can't conclude its more than a hypothesis.

My argument against Sam26 is that he believes the strongest inductive idea we can present is that consciousness survives death. That's plainly false. Its fun to think about, explore, and experiment with. But as of today, it is an incredibly weak argument in the face of the conclusions which have lead to us understanding that consciousness does not survive death. Its a difference between theory and fact. Theory is a lot of fun. Exploring possibilities is necessary for the human race to further itself. But expressing theories as facts, or more viability then they currently do, is wrong. Just as outright dismissing theories that contradict the norm as possible things we should explore. Both are instances of a misapplication of the human spirit and mind for discovery about the world.