Its not a supreme being, but a supreme identity. We could call it the summation of all sub identities. Thus talking about a multiverse still boils down to the summation of all multiverses being the supreme universe.

Monism is essentially foundationalism. You're trying to find a foundation that has no prior identity, and it is not a sub identity of anything else. Ice = water = H20 = molecules = existence. Existence is the final identity that basically describes everything that all entities can simplify down to.

Because we are the one's who essentially create identities, creating an identity that is supreme is not only possible, but logically inevitable.

Is there any reason using that logic we cannot group all the universe's entities together and call the grouping the one supreme entity? — Art48

That is exactly what I am stating. Identities are mental constructs that we as humans can create. There is no limit to what we can identify. As such, it a logical allowance to do so.

Monism: the idea that only one supreme reality exists. Why posit monism? — Art48

Because logically identities boil down to that. Lets say there were two realities. We can now group them together into the one supreme reality that exists. Monism per your definition does not exclude breaking that monad into parts, it simply observes that everything can eventually be grouped into a fundamental identity.

The careful difference is that the statement, "A triangle is a three sided shape" does not mean such a thing actually exists apart from our own definitions or imaginations. It is a blueprint and nothing more. Many of the mistakes in epistemology come from thinking that because we can define a word, it somehow makes it real apart from the definition we created.

Another thing to consider is why would God care if you believe in him? If God is an all powerful knowing being, what does it matter to him? And if it DID matter to him, why would he not just show everyone? The idea that you have to believe in God despite there being a massive lack of evidence for God sounds like a cruel game from a divine being.

What determined the beard as masculine rather than feminine? — Benj96

Just a fun discovery they found recently. It turns out that a beard absorbs impact from blows from fists or other blunt attacks. Since men fight more, those with beards had a slight advantage in fights. You could also conjecture that since they took less damage to their faces, they remained more attractive than those without beards.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context

My answer here.

In sum, we create identities through our experiences of the world, then try to match those identities either deductively or inductively to later experiences. When you can deductively match that identity to an experience, you know it. When you inductively do so, you believe it. However, different ways of inducing can result in beliefs that are more logical to believe in than others.

Meaningless to whom" because 'whom' is the object of the preposition. 'Who' is subjective. In the vast meaningless mess of the cosmos, grammar rules abide. — BC

Grammar evolves. 'Whom' is largely outdated at this point when speaking colloquially. If you're going to be dumb and nitpick someone's grammar instead of the content of their post, at least be smart about it.

Edit: Saw you edit in a compliment to the post after I mentioned this, thanks.

Because in the grand scheme of things, nothing matters. Everything that we do, all that we do, just seems so minuscule & insignificant, when seen from the bigger picture of everything. — niki wonoto

I want to ask you a very simple question. "Meaningless to who?" You see, there's an implicit undercurrent in your statement. You're looking to some sentience that will clarify meaning for you. Lets say your mother tells you she had you so you can mow the lawn. So you get up everyday and mow the lawn, knowing that is your purpose in life. But that's your purpose in life to your mother, not to yourself.

So the question is, why do you feel you need to have a purpose for someone other than yourself? Barring that, there are people in your life who see purpose in you by associating with you. Why do you feel that that's not meaningful? When you save an insect in your house by putting it outside instead of stomping it, you've created meaning to that insect. Same as if you terrify and stomp it.

Lets say something told you your meaning was something that you hated and seemed purposeless to your personally. For example, mow your mother's lawn. Would you feel satisfied? Likely not. Perhaps because what you really aren't looking for is meaning, but a feeling that you've somehow associated with the word "meaning".

Perhaps what you're looking for is finding a feeling for yourself that gives you a feeling of satisfaction when you accomplish something. Let me tell you, its out there. Maybe its your job, your family, or even questioning the meaning of life on a philosophy board. The feeling of being satisfied for accomplishing something is rarely going to be handed out by someone else, but must be found from within. Explore your interests. Take risks. Take chances on things you've wanted to do if you can. Your every attempt won't always find it, but keep at it and you'll find success.

Its sad. I find older people who have lived their lives in luxury tend to fear things that they do not understand and react with cowardice. As a white man I lived five years in inner city minority neighborhoods. Two apartments I've lived in I was the only white person. I also taught high school math for five years where my students were almost entirely black and hispanic.

Beyond minor cultural differences, there was no difference then with living in majority white neighborhoods. And for those who I know have an internal double take, I'll re-emphasize. There was none. Certain aspects of society play up the negative components of minority culture unfortunately, and I know what its like to be a white person from a white community first going into minority neighborhoods. I wanted to learn. I get having that initial fear and bias. Its normal. Its the same as any person who decides to venture outside of their culture. The problem is when people make judgements based on that bias and fear alone instead of trying to understand first.

You may not be aware of how much information and discovery computers have opened up, but neuroscience back then really is the stone age comparatively.
— Philosophim

Find me a citation that shows that Wilder Penfield's experimental verification that subjects were aware that their own volitional actions were separate from those caused by the surgeon has been overturned. — Wayfarer

No, I agree with that fact. It was his conclusion that there must be some type of dualism that I'm contending has no basis today.

You can't have it both ways. First you acknowledge that life seeks to extend the scope of 'ordinary' chemical reactions, and then as soon as that is pointed out, you say 'well, actually it doesn't, regular chemical reactions are doing that. — Wayfarer

No, I'm not saying it doesn't. I'm saying that life = group of chemical reactions that seek to self-sustain. You seem to put some attribute beyond the physical to it. I don't. That's just one aspect of physical reality.

Can you extend your consciousness outside of your physical body? No.
— Philosophim

You don't know that, it's simply an assumption because in the normal state of being we naturally associate with the body. — Wayfarer

We both know that because we cannot do it. Its like saying I don't know that a unicorn that you cannot sense doesn't exist. No, I know such a thing does not exist. To know that we can do something is to have actually done it at least once.

Thank you for your engagement Wayfarer, its always a good discussion. However, I don't want to derail the OP's thread. Feel free to have the last word, or create a new thread and I'll join you there if you want further discussion.

Analogous to what?
— Philosophim
"Analogous" is a logical classification of meaning. It means that a term is predicated in a way that is partly the same and partly different. — Dfpolis

Again, "consciousness" is an analogous term.
— Dfpolis

Yes, we all know what analogous means. You described consciousness as analogous. That means it is partly the same and partly different to what? Its like if you said, "Consciousness is a very term". Very what?

I am noting your position was that it was logically impossible to link consciousness to a physical basis
— Philosophim
I made no such claim. You continue to waste my time. — Dfpolis

I believe the exact quote was here: "I shall argue that it is logically impossible to reduce consciousness, and the intentional realities flowing out of it, to a physical basis." Part 3 page 100. But hey, if you didn't write that, ok then.

Congrats on publishing your article! *Pats you on the back*

I really don’t accept that. You’re talking about him as if he lived in Medieval Europe. He had a career spanning 50 years, which wasn’t even 100 years ago. — Wayfarer

It was almost 70 years ago Wayfarer. You may not be aware of how much information and discovery computers have opened up, but neuroscience back then really is the stone age comparatively. You really shouldn't be looking into neuroscience beyond the last 20-30 years honestly.

However on second reading, you’re differentiating life from chemistry, by saying that ‘life seeks to sustain and extend….’ So you’ve introduced the element of intentionality which I agree is necessary and which I don’t believe has any analogy in materialism. — Wayfarer

Sure, if you want to use intentionality to describe chemical reactions that attempt to keep the chemical reactions going, that's fine by me. I just think that's an aspect of the physical world, and not anything else.

I mean, at its basic Wayfarer, why is your consciousness stuck in your head?
— Philosophim

Don’t accept that it is. Conscious thought is an activity of the brain, but consciousness does indeed extend throughout your body and permeates all living things to one degree or another. — Wayfarer

That's perfectly fair. I had wondered if that was how you view consciousness, as its a bit of a subjective term. But once again the point I made remains. Can you extend your consciousness outside of your physical body? No.

The fact that we're going back and forth on what consciousness is after I've read your paper should reveal to you that you didn't make a clear case of what it meant to you to your reader.
— Philosophim
No, it only illustrates the difficulty humans have in letting go of preconceptions. — Dfpolis

No, it really means you don't have a clear definition of consciousness that a reader can understand. Instead of simply retyping or pointing out the clear case to refute my point, you've huffed yourself up and just blamed me for not simply being open to considering how amazingly right you are. Not a good counter.

Can drugs alter our consciousness, yes, or no? If yes, then we can reduce consciousness to a physical basis.
— Philosophim
Non sequitur. It only shows that there is a dependence (which I affirm), not that the particular dependence explains all the known operations. — Dfpolis

That's not a non sequitur at all. If consciousness depends on a physical basis, then it is up to you to demonstrate aspects of consciousness that do not depend on a physical basis. I already mentioned that we do not have to know every little thing in how a physical process works to know it is still a physical process, so your point is moot here.

A very simple definition of what consciousness means to you could help here.
— Philosophim
Asked and answered. — Dfpolis

Again, "consciousness" is an analogous term. — Dfpolis

Analogous to what? That is neither a clear nor simple definition. This answers nothing.

The only organisms we know to experience awareness of intelligibility are humans. — Dfpolis

No, I just gave you an example of dog expressing intelligibility. I even gave you the opportunity to note that intelligibility only convers to spoken or written language, which you have neither confirmed nor denied. The fact you just make claims instead of explaining why your claims are correct persuades no one.

If anything, that would be odd to limit consciousness to only the human physical form while simultaneously denying it is linked to neurons, or any other physical basis.
— Philosophim
You persist in misrepresenting my position. That is not a sign of good faith. I have said repeatedly that conscious thought depends on neural representation and processing. — Dfpolis

No, your position is unclear. Your assumption that I am misrepresenting your position after a reader has told you your work seems unclear, is not a sign of good faith. Its your job when someone misunderstands your work to clearly and politely point out where they've misunderstood the position. If they've misrepresented it, explain the misrepresentation and move on. I am not intentionally trying to misrepresent your position. You have spent days of your life constructing and thinking on it. I have spent an hour. Point me to lines of your work that clarify the issue. See how I'm referencing your words in your paper, then saying why I think they're incorrect? Show me other words of your paper that clarify what you mean.

You are also misunderstanding my meaning. Reread the context of what I am saying again. I am noting your position was that it was logically impossible to link consciousness to a physical basis. By consequence, that means you are claiming it is impossible to link consciousness to neurons. The way I understand it is you view neurons as creating the sensory "picture" that our consciousness intends to.

Two quotes from you:

"Aristotle’s bridging dynamic is the agent intellect (νοῦς ποιητικóς). Sensible objects engender a
physical ‘image’ he calls a phantasm (φάντασμα). We would call it a neural representation. Since
the phantasm’s intelligibility cannot make itself known, something else, capable of intentional
effects, must do so. This is the agent intellect."

"Since neural processing cannot effect awareness, an extra element is required, as Aristotle
argued and Chalmers seconds."

So here you seem to be implying that consciousness is separate from neurons, or the physical. As if it is some other thing apart from neuronal activity that analyses and intends to what those neurons provide. And if that is the case, then I believe my point has merit. If consciousness only has intentional effects on what neurons provide, but does not come from them, why would consciousness be only tied to intention upon neurons? Why not plants or dogs?

How is my experiencing the color red a particular way not my subjective awareness?
— Philosophim
I did not say it was not an instance of subjective awareness. Still, experiencing qualia is just one kind of such awareness. Knowing that pi is an irrational number is another, and it does not have a quale. — Dfpolis

Then don't tell me I'm ignoring subjective awareness.

If you want me to address other aspects of your work, you'll need to address the points I feel unclear or problamatic first.
— Philosophim
I have. I am growing impatient with going over the same ground with you, as it wastes my time. — Dfpolis

No, you have often been unclear in your answers, or dismissive by mentioning you've published a paper and have a book. You have not clearly pointed out areas in your work which would refute or clarify the issues you are trying to make. I am your reader. I am not wasting your time. When a person has spent days writing and no one responds, be it positive or negative, that is a waste of your time. You have a reader who is willing to engage with you. Someone to sell your idea to, to show the passion and outcome of your hard work to. It is very much worth your time. Why write anything if that is your attitude?

You may have wanted to devote more time to it then. At least to the point where you would have understood my reference was not claiming to be a fact or evidence, and a perfectly reasonable thing to mention.
— Philosophim
I suggest you read the section of my paper addressing information in computers. — Dfpolis

I did. It addressed a very cursory look at primitive computation and not the modern day analysis of advanced AI.

Never imply to your reader that they should just accept that you are right because you've published an article or written a book. Don't simply be dismissive of a reader's points, counter them with clarity and citation. Maybe you will have an audience larger than a forum one day. That will be your chance to make a name for yourself, don't screw it up by behaving like you are here. Publishing does not mean you've made it or that you've changed minds. You'll need to hear from others and be able to defend your work. So far, you have not done a great job at it. Be better.

Penfield interpreted that to mean that their own awareness was separate to the reactions he was able to elicit by manipulation. That is why he tended towards a dualist view late in his career. — Wayfarer

I understood. But his beliefs as to "why" the experience happened is like a blind man feeling around in the dark compared to the lights we have today. In fact, we're still feeling around in the dark in many aspects, and we need to be careful that our opinions are not equated to anything more meaningful than our own personal satisfaction in holding them.

The 'placebo effect' and many other aspects of psychosomatic medicine show a 'downward causative' effect from states of mind and beliefs to actual physiology. According to the 'bottom-up' ontology of materialism, this ought never to happen. (Hence the hackneyed saying 'mind over matter'.) — Wayfarer

First, if you remember I don't ascribe to "materialism", or "physicalism" or really most "isms". They are often times isolated theories for a simple understanding of issues that break down when you really need to think about their subjects.

If you think about the statement, "States of mind and beliefs should never cause changes in physiology," its very quickly disproved. With concentration or distraction I can overcome hunger. Being happy and experiencing pleasant social interactions can improve your health. And if the mind is physical, then it can interact with the physical world. To say the state of one's mind couldn't impact the physical world, when it clearly is in the physical world, is the statement that is less believable.

Thank you for linking the article, but I could not read it as I do not have a subscription. I did note that article was from 2016, and found another study in 2019 that confirmed the original assessment. https://qz.com/1569158/neuroscientists-read-unconscious-brain-activity-to-predict-decisions

The problem that is always going to undermine physicalism or materialism is that being has a dimension that no physical process has. A first-person experience has a dimension of feeling that can never be replicated in a third-person or objective description. It's a very hard point to articulate, as it is more an implicit reality than an objective phenomenon. That is what the argument about 'the hard problem of consciousness' seeks to illuminate, and from your analysis of it, I'm not persuaded you see the point. — Wayfarer

I may not have been as clear as I liked then. I agree with this sentence entirely. "A first-person experience has a dimension of feeling that can never be replicated in a third-person or objective description". This is the hard problem essentially. That doesn't mean it doesn't have a physical process underlying it. It also doesn't mean that we can't affect consciousness physically, or understand that though we do not know the exact mechanism, it is fundamentally a physical process.

I mean, at its basic Wayfarer, why is your consciousness stuck in your head? Why can't it float out or even extend out to your feet? Try thinking locally within your foot. Try thinking outside of your physical self. Try getting drunk and have it not affect your consciousness. Even though we can't objectively know what its like to be someone else, that doesn't deny all the very obvious facts that demonstrate consciousness is a physical thing.

The acceptance of a paper does not mean it cannot be written better.
— Philosophim
I agree, but quick acceptance is a sign that the reviewers found merit in it. — Dfpolis

And yet you posted here for analysis and critique. The argument, "Well it was published" does not negate my point. Feel free to disagree with my analysis, but I did not hear you tie in why you needed to cover everyone you did to make your point. The fact that we're going back and forth on what consciousness is after I've read your paper should reveal to you that you didn't make a clear case of what it meant to you to your reader.

This does not militate against anything I said. Since the brain process the contents we are aware of, modifying how the brain operates by drugs, trauma or in any other way can modify the contents we are aware of. Aquinas knew this in the 13th c. — Dfpolis

Yet you stated a main goal of this paper on consciousness was: "I shall argue that it is logically impossible to reduce consciousness, and the intentional realities flowing out of it, to a physical basis."

You'll need to clarify for me. Can drugs alter our consciousness, yes, or no? If yes, then we can reduce consciousness to a physical basis. If the answer is yes, and we cannot, then please explain why. A very simple definition of what consciousness means to you could help here.

The problem again though, is that your information would not be able to be objectively compared to any other person's subjective experience because you cannot experience it.
— Philosophim
This misunderstands the nature of scientific observation. Generally, it does not matter if one person or a whole group witnesses a phenomenon. What is important is the ability of others to replicate the same type of phenomena -- and that is just as possible with 1st person observations as it is with 3rd person observations. Of course, I cannot know if my quale of red is your quale of red, but we can and do know that humans have such qualia. So that is a scientific fact. So also is our awareness of intelligibility. — Dfpolis

Then you are misunderstanding me and I will attempt to be clearer. We are agreeing here. We can know that each sees red through things like the color spectrum. But yes, we cannot know what its like for you to experience red. I know what its like for myself to experience red, but no one else can.

You are free to write an article with your preferred definition. I said what I mean by the term, which is all that clear communication requires. — Dfpolis

Hm. If you want me to pat you on your back and say, "Good job!" because you published an article, I can do that. If you want to have a discussion, then I'll stay. You should consider there are plenty of people here who have also published articles and books, but know better than to think that affords them any special consideration in a critique of their work.

Natural science has never found a soul, so it is not a problem to solve.
— Philosophim
Then, why did you raise it? — Dfpolis

I did not, you did in the original quote. I'm getting the feeling you're not really considering my points, or you are and are unable to answer them.

I am not sure what point, if any, you are making. In my paper, I am not discussing plant, but human experience. We know other humans are conscious because they are analogous to us, and they verbally confirm that they are self-aware. We do not know this about other beings, but we do know that we can explain all of our observations of them without assuming that they are aware of intelligibility. — Dfpolis

Your paper addresses consciousness. Consciousness is something attributed to beings besides human beings. Dogs for example. You can train a dog to listen to commands, and a dog can non-verbally communicate with you. Now if you mean intelligibility only terms of the written or spoken language, or intelligibility and consciousness purely in human terms, then I did not glean that from your paper. I would call this an omission in your consideration, especially if you are attempting to show that consciousness cannot be logically reduced to a physical basis. If anything, that would be odd to limit consciousness to only the the human physical form while simultaneously denying it is linked to neurons, or any other physical basis.

If you believe that consciousness is only defined as, "Having a subjective experience," you are not using a reductive definition of consciousness, which is what you are supposedly railing against.
— Philosophim
I think that "consciousness" is an analogous term that can be defined in many ways. I never claimed to be using "a reductive definition of consciousness." I am not railing against anything, but offering some arguments against the physical reduction of subjective awareness, none of which you have commented upon. — Dfpolis

And yet you said I was conflating consciousness earlier. How could I conflate if it can be defined many ways? How can you argue your points about consciousness using the word "impossibility" if it can be defined many ways? I am commenting on things you have mentioned within your paper on your way to making your goal. If you want me to address other aspects of your work, you'll need to address the points I feel unclear or problamatic first.

I have been mentioning subjective awareness repeatedly. How is my experiencing the color red a particular way not my subjective awareness? I look at red, I see red. "That's red" I think. You need to more clearly define your terms, as either I do not understand what you are trying to say, or you do not understand yourself and are answering vaguely in the hopes that I won't notice.

And I never claimed it to be a fact or evidence. I would think you would have looked into the debate of consciousness in AI and this would not be a strange thing to mention.
— Philosophim
I have concluded that it is not worth more time than I have already devoted to it in my book. — Dfpolis

You may have wanted to devote more time to it then. At least to the point where you would have understood my reference was not claiming to be a fact or evidence, and a perfectly reasonable thing to mention.

There was a Canadian neurosurgeon, Wilder Penfield, who was famous for conducting such tests, which he did over many years. He started out a convinced physicalist, but in the end he subscribed to a form of dualism. He noted that patients were always aware that the sensation, memory, etc., evoked by brain stimulation was done to them, but not by them. Penfield found that patients retained a “third person” perspective on mental events evoked by brain stimulation. This lead him to conclude that the patient's mind operated independently of cortical stimulation: — Wayfarer

Dr. Penfield was practicing until 1960. That's before we had computers. Modern neuroscience has come leaps and bounds along. I would be very careful of citing someone from so long ago. Check this for example:

"Using fMRI brain scans, these researchers were able to predict participants’ decisions as many as seven seconds before the subjects had consciously made the decisions. As the researchers concluded in Nature Neuroscience, “Many processes in the brain occur automatically and without involvement of our consciousness. This prevents our mind from being overloaded by simple routine tasks. But when it comes to decisions, we tend to assume they are made by our conscious mind. This is questioned by our current findings.” "
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/unconscious-branding/202012/our-brains-make-our-minds-we-know-it

If the unconscious has already made a decision seconds before the brain is stimulated to think something else, it is not a mystery for portions of the brain to realize it is affected. If I'm swinging my arm and unable to, I'm going to assume something else is stopping it because I'm not getting the expected feedback. So we know the brain can anticipate when its neuronal messages are interrupted or not completed correctly.

2. *One person* steals $0.50 from one million different business, totaling $500,000 profit, but no one single business receives costs anymore than $0.50, making the overall impact minimal. — jasonm

I think the problem comes from your scenarios not being comparatively equal. If we do this instead:

1. A person steals 500,000 from one business that sees the loss as a relative equivalence of 50 cents off of its entire profit.

We now have a more comparative outcome in the fact that the theft overall caused very little damage to the businesses they stole from. This eliminates unnecessary variables and keeps the comparison focused now on the question of whether one type of theft in isolation of all other consequences seems more or less moral than another.

Thank you. I wanted to connect all the points I made because they build one upon another. The reviewers had no problem with that, accepting the paper in 12 days. — Dfpolis

This is irrelevant. The acceptance of a paper does not mean it cannot be written better. You have proper citations, it fits the topic you are looking for, and it addresses a currently popular topic. But it is still a mess that loses its focus. I am quite certain you do not need many of these references to have gotten to your point.

There is more than enough evidence that consciousness results from a physical basis.
— Philosophim
There is no such evidence. There is lots of evidence that the contents of awareness depend on physical processing, but contents are not our awareness of contents (which is what subjective, not medical, consciousness is).

This is just wrong. https://opentextbc.ca/introductiontopsychology/chapter/5-2-altering-consciousness-with-psychoactive-drugs/ At a very basic level humanity has been using drugs for centuries to alter our state of consciousness. Drugs are a physical thing. We can measure how the physical introduction of drugs changes the brain.

Read this about open brain surgery. https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/awake-brain-surgery/about/pac-20384913#:~:text=Surgery%20while%20you're%20awake,control%20speech%20and%20other%20skills.&text=Awake%20brain%20surgery%2C%20also%20called,you%20are%20awake%20and%20alert.

Generally surgeons will keep you awake and map your experiences when they stimulate certain areas of the brain. They literally alter your conscious subjective experience.

You do not understand what the Hard Problem is. Chalmers said, "The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect." This is not a problem about the experience of others, but of subjectivity per se. To be a subject is to be one pole in the subject-object relation we call "knowing" -- the pole that is aware of the object's intelligibility. — Dfpolis

I mentioned "others" specifically to avoid the problem your claim runs into. The issue in monitoring other subjective experiences objectively is the fact that we don't know what the user is personally experiencing. If however you were to monitor your own brain state and record your subjective experience, you would be able to correlate the physical changes in your brain to your subjective experience. The problem again though, is that your information would not be able to be objectively compared to any other person's subjective experience because you cannot experience it.

This is not what emergence means.
— Philosophim
The point that contextualizes my definition is that "emergence" is ill-defined. You quote one definition, but there are others. I say what I mean by "emergence" to avoid confusion in what follows. We are all allowed to define our technical terms as we wish. — Dfpolis

Redefining words must be done with care as you then use a common word with a different meaning. No, we do not get to redefine as we wish if we want to be clear and ethical in our communication. If you do, generally it should be a tweak and not a completely new definition. Otherwise, It is a good way to hide points and sneak conflations in that would otherwise be more apparent to readers if you used a new word. I think that emergent is a common enough word that you should have attempted to cobble together a meaning that fit in with currently accepted definitions. Your definition as it is "the impossibility of deducing a phenomenon from fundamental principles, especially those of physics.", is not good. There are plenty of commonly known emergent properties that are not impossible to deduce from fundamental principles. This is too large of a divergence from the original intent of the word.

This is a different problem -- that of "immortality of the soul." It is one that natural science does not have the means to resolve — Dfpolis

Natural science has never found a soul, so it is not a problem to solve. It is like saying the "existence of unicorns" is a different problem. When you are making claims that consciousness is independent of the physical, you need to give evidence. So far all the evidence points to consciousness needing some type of physical medium to exist, and your paper has not shown otherwise.

And yet we find plants react to the world in a way that we consider to be conscious.
— Philosophim
This is equivocating on "consciousness". There is medical consciousness, which is a state of responsiveness, and this is seen, in an analogous way, in plants. That kind of consciousness need not entail subjectivity -- the awareness of the stimuli to which we are responding. You made the point earlier. We cannot know what it is like to be a bat or a plant, or even if it s "like" anything, instead of something purely mechanical -- devoid of an experiential aspect. — Dfpolis

Its not equivocation at all. You also now understand the hard problem. We can know that a being has all of the mechanical aspects of what we would identify with a conscious being. However, we can't know what that actual personal experience of being a conscious plant is. So of course the definition of a reductive consciousness cannot describe the personal subjective experience of the plant. It doesn't even try to.

If you believe that consciousness is only defined as, "Having a subjective experience," you are not using a reductive definition of consciousness, which is what you are supposedly railing against. Your denial that the plant might be "conscious", in the idea that we don't know if it has a subjective experience, is an agreement with my point. Its the hard problem. What we can do at this point is ascribe certain physical processes and responses of "beings" to what we would classify as "conscious". It does not require neurons, and it does not require that we know what the personal subjective experience of the being is.

Almost certainly AI will inevitably, if not somewhere already, be labeled as conscious.
— Philosophim
This non-fact is non-evidence. — Dfpolis

And I never claimed it to be a fact or evidence. I would think you would have looked into the debate of
consciousness in AI and this would not be a strange thing to mention.

Good question MikeB. Lets say we go with the idea that there are forces and objects beyond our control that aren't our body. Does that still prove that others exist? No. But, if you say, "I am a thinker," then if other people thought and could think that they were the thinker, then there would be other "I"s in the world.

Now would you specifically be able to know if they were thinkers? If your definition of "I" never expanded from, "the thinker that knows its thinking", then you could not. And Descartes wasn't leaving it at that either. His goal was simply to start with a foundation to build other knowledge from.

So, we could try a few ideas ourselves. We can't see in other people's heads to know if there is an I there right? Typically though we expand the definition of I to include other aspects of ourself. If a thing matches enough of those, we say, "That's a thinker too." Basing off of Descartes initial line of thinking, where would you go from there to prove that I exist for example?

I would only make one small tweak to it. I would change "rational people" into "rational beings". Other than that I think its a fantastic description.

I started reading this carefully with some quotes and counters, then got to about section 4 and started skimming.

First, this paper needs more focus. About half way through I forgot what you were even trying to show. You jump from this idea, to that idea from this philosopher, to over here, and I don't see a lot of commonality between them. You could probably cut your paper by quite a bit and still get to the point that you want.

Second, maybe you do understand what the hard problem is, but I had a hard problem in seeing that.

"I shall argue that it is logically impossible to reduce consciousness, and the intentional realities
flowing out of it, to a physical basis."

First, are you a neuroscientist? This is an incredibly bold claim. A neuroscientist will tell you, "We don't yet understand everything about the brain yet." Second, what about the easy problem of consciousness? We know if we give you some drugs, we can alter your conscious state. A man caught a disease and can no no longer see in color due to physical brain damage.

There is more than enough evidence that consciousness results from a physical basis. The hard problem really boils down to "What is it like to be another conscious being?" We can look at a brain, but we can't experience the brain from the brain's point of view. Does that mean that we don't need physical medium for consciousness to exist? No, we do. We can see the physical combination of factors that consistently result in certain conscious experiences for individuals. This is how brain surgery works. What a brain surgeon cannot do is BE you. No one can as of yet do some alteration of the mind and suddenly experience what it is like to experience exactly what you do.

"Does the Hard Problem reflect a failure of the reductive paradigm?"

No, not at all. The hard problem reflects the failure in our ability to experience what it is like to be another conscious being. We can reduce plenty of conscious experiences to brain states. But we can't be that brain state. We can reduce that brain state to its physical components, but its subjective experience is outside of our ability to understand. Reductionism does not fail in what it does. Reductionism does not attempt to claim what a subjective experience is like. Reductionism is a ruler that measures a mile, but it cannot tell you, nor try to tell you, what it is like to be that mile having the experience of being measured.

"I define ‘emergence’ as a logical property, viz. the impossibility of deducing a phenomenon from
fundamental principles, especially those of physics. Emergence can be physical, epistemological,
or ontological."

This is not what emergence means. "Emergent properties are the characteristics gained when an entity at any level, from molecular to global, plays a role in an organized system."
https://study.com/academy/lesson/emergent-properties-definition-examples.html

"However, absent a solution to the Hard Problem, believing consciousness to be
purely neural requires an act of faith."

I can give you one better example. Plants do not have neurons. And yet we find plants react to the world in a way that we consider to be conscious. A wiki article for you https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plant_perception_(physiology)#:~:text=Plants%20do%20not%20have%20brains,computation%20and%20basic%20problem%20solving.

It has long been concluded that neurons are not needed for consciousness. Almost certainly AI will inevitably, if not somewhere already, be labeled as conscious. We'll be able to look at the program of an AI and go, "That right there is needed for the AI to be conscious." Will we know what its like to feel like a conscious AI? No. That is the hard problem, not that its consciousness can't be reduced to the physical processes it runs.

If the point was to show that we should describe consciousness through potency and act, I confess not understanding how you got there. You kept referencing so many different philosophers and their viewpoints that I was unable to really glean your own. So many of the references just don't seem needed, and got in the way of the overall point I feel you were trying to make. I can tell you're well learned, and I know a lot of hard work went into that though. I just don't feel its very clear in making its point, seems to have some questionable assumptions and definitions, and ultimately feels like it loses its focus with a poor finish.

a journal article in biology, as it happens - that disputes this contention. It claims that there is nothing in any known chemical process which can account for the ability of organisms to store and transmit biological information, to maintain homeostasis, and so forth. — Wayfarer

Except for the fact that life exists and is made up of known chemical processes. If he's talking about any one chemical process, well of course not. Life is a complex interaction of chemical processes. I'll need to read the article, but that statement seems inadequate.

The discovery of the genetic code was a breakthrough of the first order. It showed why organisms are fundamentally different from any kind of nonliving material. There is nothing in the inanimate world that has a genetic program which stores information with a history of three thousand million years!’ — Wayfarer

This analysis seems better, but still doesn't counter my point. I didn't say that we couldn't classify life. I just noted the classification is a complex chemical interaction that is internally self-sustaining. If he wants to separate inanimate from animate as having a genetic program, that's fine by me. But that genetic program is still a complex chemical reaction that seeks to sustain itself.

We can classify things as animate or inanimate, but that doesn't mean they both aren't made out of matter, energy, and their reactions with each other. We are not apart from the physical world, we are a part of the physical world.

So what is my evidence? A common observation among all life that differs from the inorganic chemical reactions that I know of. Pour vinegar into baking soda and it runs out when the baking soda or vinegar has completely reacted. It does not seek to find more vinegar or baking soda. Take life at its most basic however and it seeks to replenish what it needs to continue its complex chemical interchange. So much so that it replicates itself in some way before it reaches its limit of self-renewal.

Can you think of any set of chemical reactions that tries to seek out sources of energy to sustain itself, even reproduces, that people would unquestioningly say isn't life?

Gee where would I look in my chemistry and physics texts for the description of that state? — Wayfarer

I thought you of all people would be interested in exploring ideas outside of established science. Do you have anything to comment about the idea of life being a self-sustaining chemical reaction? Actually contribute Wayfarer.

I wouldn't say life is an illusion, just another state of matter. One way to look at life is it is an internally self-sustaining chemical reaction. In a non-living reaction, the matter required to create the reaction eventually runs out on its own. Life seeks to sustain and extend its own balance of chemical reactions.

Advanced portion: Only read this once you understand the first section and if you have more questions on how knowledge works within social contexts.

So far, deductive beliefs have been made from the self. But what of other people? Can I deductively believe other people exist? I will define other people as other “I’s”. Recall “I” is “a discrete experiencer”. Distinctly, I know a language and have written ideas expressed in this language on this paper. To comprehend this language, a thing must be able to discretely experience and be an “I”. I have written words down, and if another being, which would be you, is reading the words right now then you too are an “I”. Therefore, if you are reading this, then you exist as an “I.” If I come across you reading these words and understanding these words,, and you are not correlative with my will, then you are an “I” separate from myself. For my current purposes in applicably knowing other people exist, this is enough.

If other people exist as other “I’s” like myself, then they too can have deductive beliefs. I will call another I a “subject” and their ability to deduce is their “subjective deduction”. How do we handle that two of us can have different distinctive knowledge? The sensible way is to realize we must come to agreement on two things. First, there needs to be agreement about our distinctive knowledge. To agree, there must be an agreement of enough essential properties that we would conclude the same deductive result when applying this new distinctive agreement.. What properties are agreed to be essential between two people is called “distinctive context”.

To demonstrate a resolution of conflicting distinctive context, imagine I walk by a field and spy what I distinctively and applicably know to be a sheep. It has curly fur, hooves, and lacks a beard. A rancher is in the field tending the sheep. I call to him saying, “Nice sheep!” The rancher turns to me puzzled and states, “Actually, that’s a goat.”

I assume it is a difference in distinctive knowledge within the definition,, so I politely ask the rancher what it is that makes that a goat.. Smiling the rancher explains not all goats have beards, but one distinction between sheep and goats is their tails. He shows me the short upright tail of the creature and explains that this property is essential to define a goat.

I reply,, “I didn’t know that, thanks!” If I do so, I am expanding my distinctive knowledge to equal the rancher’s. However, context adds another layer of choice and complication. My agreement might amend my personal definition, or, it could be my definition is only within the context of speaking with ranchers, while keeping my old sheep definition the same for non-rancher contexts.

Alternatively, I could reject the distinctive knowledge of the rancher. Instead, I could state “The tail is unimportant. Its just a sheep with a short upright tail! Its silly to call it a goat when the defining feature of a goat is its beard.” There is nothing innate to reality which requires I accept the distinctive context of the rancher, just as there is nothing innate to reality that requires the rancher to accept my personal distinctive context. Distinctive contexts are choices of “I”s, and not laws of reality.

As there are potentially as many distinctive contexts as there are combinations of people in the world, societies invented languages as distinctive contextual standards. A language is a societal construct of distinctive knowledge one may reference when communicating with another person. If someone decided to define a goat as a “sheep,” they could not do so within the established prescripts of the English language. A language gives a standard of distinctive knowledge to encourage a common ground for communication. As such, we will go forward with more confidence that we are using English in this paper’s communication, with a few of my own distinctive words that we are agreeing to for this topic.

Even within a language, people’s ways of discretely experiencing the world can change the distinctive context.. A person's genetics or past experiences may incline them to discretely experience properties different from others when experiencing the same stimulus. A colorblind person will discretely experience a green and red apple differently than a person who sees color. A weak person's experience of what is heavy will differ from a very strong person. One person may look at a sheep for the first time and marvel at its wool while another thinks nothing of the wool and marvels at its tail. As such, a language is usually only a baseline, and a contextual context of essential properties must be agreed upon within each new group of communicating people.

For example, one way to establish a discrete context is to agree to forgo discussing any discrete experiences two people are unable to share. For example, when speaking with a blind person, both people may decide to forgo any communication regarding sight. Such an applicable context does not negate the distinctive knowledge of a sheep having visual properties, those properties are simply not important or useful in this particular contextual communication. Thus I could file away in my head, “Sheep that is in the English language for people with sight, sheep for people without sight, and sheep between me and a group of friends,” and these would all be valid distinctive contexts.

Imagine two friends are lifting weights in the gym. One lifts 100 pounds with every ounce of their strength while the other lifts 100 pounds with ease. When communicating, the stronger weight lifter praises their friend for lifting such a “heavy weight.” The intention of this context is to enter into the weaker weight lifters distinctive experience, and is not addressing the stronger weight lifters personal context of “heavy” that he uses for only his self-context.

In some cases, there may be a distinctive disagreement two people can never agree on. One person might like the color blue more than any other, while another person likes the color green more than any other. In this case, we cannot enter into the same distinctive context regarding the appeal of colors. Our understanding of this and acceptance of another’s self-subjective distinction is called an opinion.

Just like a language is a standard baseline to share a contextual discrete set of beliefs, there are often standards set to deal with the differences within perceptions and measurements. One such standard in society is math. Math does not consider the specifics of what a person is discretely experiencing. Instead, math considers the logic of discrete experiencing itself. A discrete experience is “one”. The act of discretely experiencing two discrete experiences as a group is “two”, therefore, 1+1=2. These standards are translated into tools of application. As the distinctive knowledge of math is consistently applied and deductively confirmed as a representative of the logic of discrete experiences itself, it is one of the standardized languages of discrete experience.

Yet even with math as a baseline, its application is still within a context as well. For example, we can measure a large group of people together and say, “X height is higher than average, so we’ll call that ‘tall’”. Tall of course can change, even with math, based on the group of people one is measuring. If I’m only measuring Americans, what is tall might differ greatly when comparing to Chinese people. And of course, the context of tall may change once again when I apply it to both countries.

Once contextual agreements are established, the deductive steps needed for an applicable conclusion are the same as within a self-context.. If those contextual beliefs are applied to reality without contradiction, they are applicably known within that context.

While optimally, we should use distinctive contexts that lead to clear deductive beliefs, deduction takes time and energy, and is not always practical. When a well-designed context runs into limits, there is no recourse but induction. Fortunately, we have the hierarchy of induction once again. As long as we agree on the definitions involved, we can practice contextual applicable knowledge.

Induction

While a method of evaluating beliefs through a deductive methodology has been proposed, there are times when a belief cannot be deduced. In these cases the only type of belief available is an inductive belief. So far, an inductive belief has been classified as merely a belief. Intuitively however, people have regarded certain inductions as more cogent than others. Understanding how beliefs can be deduced into knowledge also allows insight that not all inductive beliefs are the same.

In evaluating inductions I looked at them from the standpoint of their relations to distinctive and applicable knowledge. In looking at the interplay between distinctive and applicable knowledge, I noticed that certain inductions strayed more or less further from the knowledge process. This allowed me to definitely demonstrate why one induction is more reasonable than another. From this, I propose 4 baseline inductions: probability, possibility, plausibility, and irrational induction.

Probability

The induction considered mathematically the most cogent is probability. An example of probability is the statement, “The random chance of pulling a jack out of a normal deck of 52 playing cards is 4/52. If it is applicably known there are four jacks in a deck of 52 playing cards, the cards have been randomly shuffled, and the person who draws the card is unable to discern which card is which, deductively a 4/52 chance is the only possibility. Any prediction about the future is innately inductive, but a probability is the most rational type of prediction about the future because its justification the applicably known limits of what can occur given the situation.

Probability will also reveal how I can evaluate other inductions cogency. If applicable knowledge is a deduction that cannot be contradicted by reality, then the possible outcome when considering all of the evidence leading to that knowledge is 100%. There is only one conclusion that can be reached, no other possibilities. If I then make another claim of applicable knowledge using a prior claim of knowledge as justification, as justification, the second justification is a 1*1=100% probability of being applicable knowledge.

If I make a pure induction, its probability is less than 100% of being logically sound. The definition of an induction is that the premises do not necessarily lead to the conclusion. This means that the probability of an induction’s result being a belief that does not contradict reality is 1 out of an unknown other possibilities. To simplify this concept, imagine an induction’s probability of not being contradicted by reality is 50%, as in the shep/goat example when I could not see its face. I arrive at 50% because there are only two distinctively known possible outcomes. (Note: I am ignoring the possibility of a person forming new distinctive knowledge to simplify the example).

If more than one probable induction is combined, the likelihood of its occurrence can be reasoned out. For example, I guess that it’s a shep instead of a goat, then I guess that the shep is male. Since I distinctly only know of two possible sexes, the probability of both of them being sounds is .5*.5 or a 25% chance. Any probability of less than one multiplied by any probability of less than one will always result in an overall lower chance of being correct. The more inductions one uses as justification for new inductions, the less likely their conclusion will be a rationally concluded belief.

Possibility

From this understanding, the next cogent induction down from probability that can be defined is possibility. A possibility is a belief that something applicably known at least once, can be applicably known again without consideration of its likelihood. For example, I applicably know people can put a jack in a deck of cards, shuffle it randomly, and draw a jack on the first draw. Therefore, it is possible that when a deck of shuffled cards has a jack in it, it can be randomly drawn on the first draw again. However, I am not evaluating the probability that it will happen, only that it is possible.

A possibility is cogent because it relies on previous applicable knowledge. It is not inventing a belief about reality which has never been applicably known. Like probability, a possibility is an applicably known outcome. We applicably known there is a Jack in the deck of cards, and thus if someone randomly pulls a card, it is a possible outcome that it is a jack. A possibility is less cogent than a probability because while both rely on applicable knowledge as a justification for their inductions, a possibility does not examine all of the facts to conclude a deduced chance of its likelihood. For example, it is possible that I could win the lottery, but highly improbable. I would be more rational in my belief that I will likely not win if I buy a ticket based on probability, then ignoring probability and simply believing it is possible that I will win if I buy a ticket today.

What I cannot do while comparing inductions is state the specific likelihood that one is more possible than another. I can claim that it is unlikely that I will win the lottery, and also believe it is possible. But what I can do is base my decisions on what is most applicably known. If I examine the possibility of winning the lottery, I can realize it is incredibly unlikely that I will win in a particular place, lets say 1 out of 1 million. If however I examine another lottery elsewhere, I find the chances of winning are 1 out of 100,000. If both pay out equally, I can take the more rational probability and bet on the one that has the greater chance of winning.

Without probability, if I know it is possible to win the lottery in both states, but do not know the odds, there is no way to determine which possibility is more likely to occur. Thus if there are two possibilities, I cannot deductively conclude which one has the greater chance of occurring. If I only examine the possibility that I can win without analyzing the probability, my belief has less applicable knowledge involved, and thus I cannot know the likelihood of winning.

While I cannot compare possibilities alone and determine which one is more cogent, I can compare probabilities to possibilities and determine that probabilities are more cogent to make decisions on. Thus, a hierarchy of inductions seems to be a better way to evaluate inductions than evaluating what is more cogent within the particular hierarchy set. Still, both probability and possibility rely on the belief, “What has been applicably known once could be applicably experienced again.” This brings up the problem of induction by Hume. What reason compels us to believe that what has happened once can happen again? If one has applicable knowledge of moments in which one applicably experienced something, and moments in which one did not applicably experience that same thing, one cannot applicably know that the applicable knowledge will, or will not be experienced again. The only way to applicably know one will or will not experience what one applicably knew again, is if one either does experience, or does not experience what one applicably knows again. Thus the decision to make an induction is something outside of applicable knowledge.

Relying on Hume’s base criticism of induction is not a rational decision,, but an ingrained thing that I simply do. I in fact, must do it, just like I create discrete experiences. Making inductions is something that is necessitated by our very existence. Forming applicable knowledge takes time and careful reason, something the world does not always afford an individual before a decision must be made. With the understanding of distinctive and applicable knowledge, just like I can shape our discrete experiences into better expressions and tools for greater success, I can manage and shape my inductions as well.

Plausibility

Continuing on, this leaves the remaining two classifications of induction: plausibility, and irrational. While probability and possibilities rely on applicable knowledge, these two new inductions rely only on distinctions. A plausibility is the belief that an applicable belief will be applicably known before an application has been made. This breaks down even further into two subgroups. There are applicable and inapplicable plausibilities. An applicable plausibility is a plausibility which has not been applicably tested, but can be. An inapplicable plausibility is a belief which is unable to be applicably tested.

Imagine I open a brand new deck of 52 cards and have looked at them. I know that its a 4/52 probability that the first card I draw will be a jack. I know that its possible for the first card drawn to be a jack. However, my mind whirls and I think to myself, “What if its possible that all the cards are actually magical cards that grant me a wish when I pull one?” I've never experienced this before in opening a new deck of cards, so using the word “possible” is incorrect. I don’t applicably know if its actually possible that all the cards could grant wishes. The correct term is “plausible" when I have formed a new distinctive idea that has not yet been tested in application.

Without the understanding that knowledge has the two subdivisions of distinctive and applicable, the distinction of plausible can be difficult to identify. However, there is a clear difference between the possible, and the plausible. What is possible must have been applicably known at least one time. What is plausible is a distinctively known concept that has yet to be applicably tested.

An applicable plausibility is previously unapplied distinctive knowledge that can be applied. In this case, an easy way to test the idea that all cards are magical wish granting cards, is to pull the cards and see if my wish is granted. If at least one of the cards does not, then my plausible belief is now applicably known as incorrect. An inapplicable plausibility would be when I had no means of applicably testing My claim. For example, I are unable to, or refuse to open up the deck of cards and pull one.

Another example of an inapplicable plausibility is Descartes’ “Evil Demon,” argument. In his meditations, Descartes stated that perhaps his entire view of reality was flawed because an Evil Demon tricked him into believing a false reality. There must be essential properties of this Evil Demon that I could apply. As the Evil Demon cannot be sensed in any way, there is no criteria of application. The plausibility is inapplicable.

What is common to both plausibilities is that they are distinctive ideas without application. In the hierarchy, plausibilities are less cogent than possibilities. The simple reason is that possibilities and possibilities are based on something which has been applicably known. A plausibility has not yet reached this level. It is more cogent to base my reason on what has been confirmed to exist in reality, then what has not. Myths and conspiracy theories are good examples.

Irrational

Finally, an irrational belief is a belief that distinctive knowledge which is applicably known to be contradictory to reality, still may somehow be real. An example would be a person watches a deck of 52 cards being shuffled, a jack is randomly pulled, and it actually grants a wish. There are no tricks, and this is applicably confirmed. Despite the applicable knowledge that a jack was randomly pulled, the person irrationally insists on believing it is impossible for card to grant wishes.

Justification for irrational beliefs cannot rely on applicable knowledge, irrational beliefs are a contradiction to applicable knowledge. Irrational beliefs are either justified by reliance on other inductions, or simply have no justification at all beyond one’s personal desire. This does not mean irrational inductions cannot be eventually found to be an applicable outcome. Perhaps in the future new experiences demonstrate that the card wasn’t actually magical, despite the idea that it granted wishes being the only deduced outcome that could be ascertained at the time. Irrational inductions are at the bottom of the hierarchy of inductions, as they go against rationality itself.

Hierarchy of Inductions Summary
Induction examined from the applicable knowledge of deductive justification provides a rational way to evaluate competing inductive beliefs. This is important, for while one cannot rationally argue which possibility is more rational to believe in, one can argue a probability makes the claim of a possibility irrelevant. Thus I can now take different inductions and determine which is most rational to make decisions on.

To summarize:


In an applicably known deck of 52 playing cards with four jacks,
It is a 4/52 probability that a jack will be drawn the first pull.
It is possible that a jack will be drawn.
It is plausible that drawn card will grant me a wish.
It is irrational that if I draw an applicably known Jack, I believe it is not a Jack.

Here I can see how each progressive induction is lower in the hierarchy. To be clear, when comparing inductions within the same hierarchy (besides probability), there isn’t an easy way to determine which induction is more cogent. It is possible that a jack could be drawn, but also possible that a jack could not be drawn. Looking at possibilities alone cannot tell us which is more rational to believe in for the first card draw. It is equally plausible that the drawn card could grant myself a wish, but also plausible that it sings a tune for me. It is equally irrational to believe the Jack I draw is not a Jack, and that despite my drawing the card, I did not actually draw it.

At this point, this theory of knowledge has been distinctively known and applied within a single individual’s context. This does not yet address knowledge between more than one individual, but I will definitely post the continuation if this gets enough traction and discussion. Thank you for reading all the way! Feel free to post questions and criticisms at this point. I honestly have so much more to say, but I understand the length is already quite long for these forums. I will be reserving the next post for optional reading focused on questions and comments that are repeated below.

Reductionism can be simplified even further. Science never asserts that its underlying premises are true, only that they have not been able to be disproven at this time. While scientists must rely on what has been scientifically ascertained up to that point, nothing is sacred.

Thus, in the first case, someone may discover some new information that finally negates an earlier accepted conclusion in science. The only reasonable thing to do at that point is re-evaluate the now questionable underlying theory until that can once again pass scientific rigor. This may then extend out to other theories that rely on this building block. Only then can science continue upward.

With this, we see the second case cannot be a viable reductionism argument for science. To conclude that everything must end in physics is the negation of the scientific ideal that nothing which has been learned can be questioned. Physics has no special place in scientific theories in this regard.

I actually didn't now that Wayfarer, so thank you! I've been using it for years assuming tact was short for "tactic".

Quite right. I’m not sure whether you think that induction can never result in knowledge because it is always uncertain or not. — Ludwig V

No, induction can never result in knowledge. However, certain inductions could be considered more reasonable or cogent than others. That is the problem of induction. What standard can we used to determine which types of inductions are more reasonable to hold than others? You mentioned you might take a look at my paper; I cover that there.

Lets try another tact. Do the people deductively know where their car is at that moment, or are they making an induction?

The only thing they could know is, "I left my car at X spot." Do they deductively know their car is there still when they walk away? Of course not. Its an induction. An induction based on logic, reason, and memory, but an induction none-the less.

I think what is often missed in evaluating theism is the cultural and emotional aspects of it. First, there is the cultural. Oftentimes theists are raised in culturally theistic societies. It is seen as the cultural norm, and a positive glue that keeps society together.

Second, people can believe in a deity because it represents a great ideal. The ideal of an ordered universe, morality, and the idea that you as an individual are special somehow and should live your life as if you are. These are powerful motivators to many people.

Third, people can believe in a deity through fear. I view this as the more negative aspect of theism. A cultural bonding can just as easily be a means to exclude a person from a group. Pushing to an ideal that cannot be lived up to can lead to frustration, self-loathing, and needless self-sacrifice.

Its not about evidence. If it was, theism would have died a long time ago. Its about servicing those needs that a lot of humanity has. Until something else can come along and replace that, theism will remain strong.

So what is your solution? — Ludwig V

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge I have written a knowledge paper divided into four parts. It answers the Gettier question, explains what knowledge is, and provides a hierarchy of induction that we can use when the limitations of knowledge are reached.

Do you think there's a meaningful distinction between soul as spirit and soul as concept, even with both posited as immaterial? — ucarr

I don't see why not. I believe emotional and general language is extremely useful and enriching as long as it does not supersede the physical reality underneath it all. At the end of the day talking about ourselves as brains may not be nearly as exciting or motivating as talking about "the human spirit" or "the soul of humanity". Essences capture feelings that objects do not.

The Gettier problem is a very technical critique of a very specific declaration of what knowledge is. If you state, "Knowledge is a justified true belief," you must answer Gettier's problem.

Justified - Adequate evidence

In the case of the farmer why would he think there was a cloth that was cow shaped? He has cows in his field all the time.

True belief - The end stated belief must be true

In this case the technical true belief is, "There is a cow in my field".

So the farmer is justified and has a true belief. So the farmer then knows there is a cow in his field.

According to the strict interpretation of justified true belief, something is wrong here. Here we have a situation in which the farmer has a justified true belief, so thus should know there is a cow in his field, and yet he doesn't really know there is a cow in his field.

The Gettier problem points out the JTB is missing something. Must someone believe in something that is true to have knowledge? Do we need greater specification of what justification entails? Despite the farmer not knowing the full picture, can we still say, "That is what the farmer knows?" However you want to tackle it, Gettier in his criticism of a base JTB theory of knowledge is unquestionably correct.

Soul is the part of you that truly believes
Soul-belief comes to children naturally
After childhood it threatens to slip our grasp
Soul is the heart of vulnerability — ucarr

Sorry for the late response. I'm not sure what you're asking me here. All of those things are reactions of your brain. Neuroscience doesn't deny the powerful feelings we have about the world such as purpose and love. Its just that's the source of where it all comes from, and is not an ethereal ghost.

I've always viewed romantic relationships as containing 3 parts.

1. Attraction - The physical arousal aspect. Your physical desire and fulfillment with another person.
2. Friendship - Actually having things in common. Enjoying activities and conversations together.
3. Love - A full understanding of a person's good and bad. Despite knowing both, you desire to stay with them and assist them in becoming the best they can be.

Shallow relationships have 1 out of the 3 with your romantically preferred sex. These are generally not going to last long, and if they do, they will be seen as unhealthy by others around them.

Having 2 out of the three is a decent start. As the relationship develops, the two stronger one's will develop and the third will likely blossom. However, there are levels and limits to most relationships. Someone may deeply love and be friends with someone but strongly dislike the sex. Some people, which may be your friends, have great sex and friendship, but find they can't tolerate the negatives about each other that they discovered about each other as the relationship deepened.

And then of course, there's the absolute ideal which are written and sung by poets, a relationship that is strong in all three aspects. This is exceedingly rare. Even if one person had all three at a strong level, that doesn't mean the other person returns those three at the same overall level of intensity either.

The practical is to find someone that has 2 out of the three aspects you most desire given to you, and someone who you can give 2 out of the three aspects they desire the most. Thinking in this way, its no surprise people go through so may relationships looking for the right fit.

Therefore, infinity may be an actual thing, but we can never know. All we can ever know is the concept of infinity. — RussellA

Great post, I agree RussellA. Perhaps infinity is the abstract concept of understanding there are always things to be known beyond our limitations.

I mean an objective morality that would apply regardless of being human or having a culture.
— Philosophim

I'm curious what you mean by a morality regardless of being a human. Can you clarify? — Tom Storm

Morality should transcend humanity. It should apply to other plants, animals, and even the physical interactions of the universe. The moral question boils down to, "What ought to be." When people focus on human morality that will always be a subset of morality in regards to the entirety of existence. And since human morality is a subset of what would be an objective morality, focusing only on humanity will not answer the greater picture.

because people are still looking for a soul. Its not really a philosophical discussion, but a faith based and emotional discussion. Once neuroscience ends that avenue, I'm sure people will look elsewhere.
— Philosophim

Are you a physicalist? — Tom Storm

I don't know what you mean when you say physicalist. I tend to avoid labels because they mean too many different things to different people. If you want to know what I believe, what I stated is my viewpoint. If that viewpoint leaves you with questions, feel free to ask and I will answer to the best of my ability.

I have some sympathy for this as a potential resolution for some of our seemingly intractable questions. Any ideas for some directions? Do humans in your view have access to facts/truth beyond the quotidian (and even then...)?

Personally, I don't see any real breakthroughs happening in my lifetime and even then I wonder how much we'd understand when most of us still can't understand Kant? Possibly at some level it doesn't much matter. :wink: — Tom Storm

I wrote a pretty lengthy forum post and set of small papers on here exploring knowledge. It took many years of study and development, but I am extremely happy with it in my personal life. I use it to solve issues in my own life, and its a strong base to study and build from. Most people don't bother to read it to understand it, they just read it to try to shut it down in the first section. Only one forum goer actually bothered to read the whole thing and discuss it with me in depth, Bob Ross. He largely agreed with me on the broad strokes, but we had some issues on the language and some of the details I will forever respect him for it! If you want to take a stab at it, its here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge/p1

In sum what is boils down to is noting that knowledge is a tool. It is based on the most rational conclusions we can make from our inner personal experience, as well as our inductive interactions with society. I am most proud of it not only because it presents a successful deductive approach to knowledge, but a rational approach to inductive knowledge which allows a hierarchy of cogency. Its ok if you don't read it though, its the norm.

Good question. I would say that there are a few big puzzles in philosophy that still need to be figured out.

1. Knowledge

And by knowledge I mean being able to properly measure deductive and inductive knowledge. We may naturally solve this as we further evolve AI, or it will figure it out for us.

2. Morality

I mean an objective morality that would apply regardless of being human or having a culture.

3. Art

Again, an objective understanding of art. What defines it?

To your points, I think consciousness and its related ideas are for neuroscience to solve. What consciousness is fairly clear at this point. We're simply the part of our brain that regulates certain other larger areas of our brain. We're the brain's CEO if you will. Of course, how do we know this? Once again, the problem of knowledge needs to be answered.

I believe the primary reason consciousness is debated in philosophy is because people are still looking for a soul. Its not really a philosophical discussion, but a faith based and emotional discussion. Once neuroscience ends that avenue, I'm sure people will look elsewhere.

Infinity is solved by solving knowledge. How do you know what infinity is? Is infinity an actual thing, or is it a conceptual framework of an algorithm?

Finally, rationality is once again, knowledge. As we can see, there is no greater need in philosophy then solving epistemology.