Is “qualitative experience” (i.e., qualia) different to you than observing, identifying, and acting (or are they the same)? — Bob Ross
Is “awareness” different than “qualitative experience”? Is it the same as observing, identifying, and acting? — Bob Ross
Awareness is a combination of two main factors: Observation and identification. — Philosophim
Am I correct in saying that, under your view, “objective” and “subjective” consciousness are both referring to qualitative experience? Awareness? Both? — Bob Ross
Correct me if I am wrong, but it seems like you are saying that we can objectively know that other beings have qualitative experience and that there is something to be like that subject but we cannot know what it is like to be that subject: is that correct? — Bob Ross
They can have robotic consciousness.
Are you saying that there is something to be like a robot as a subject (but we just can’t know what that is like) and it has qualitative experience? — Bob Ross
I don’t hold that a camera + a computerized interpreter (of the images) equates to a conscious being but I do agree that the camera is aware (as an observer) to some limited degree (in order to take in a photo of the environment). I just don’t hold consciousness and observation as the same thing, so can you elaborate on what you mean? — Bob Ross
Is that not the qualitative experience?
No, I do not hold that there is something to be like a camera + computerized interpreter (of those images or what have you). I do not hold that the camera has qualitative experience: all that is occurring is quantitative measurements through-and-through. — Bob Ross
e.g., the subjectively experienced redness of the truck can’t be accurately quantified, whereas the camera is capturing quantitatively what it thinks is there and displaying it quantitatively via pixels (in hex encoded colors or what have you), of which you qualitatively experience when you look at the image via the camera screen (after taking a picture). There’s nothing qualitative happening in terms of the internal processes of the camera nor is the camera subjectively experiencing anything (I would say). — Bob Ross
Objective consciousness is the observation and confirmation that there is consciousness apart from the subjective experience itself.
I don’t see how you can come to understand a thing as conscious but yet say you haven’t thereby posited it as subjectively experiencing: could you elaborate? — Bob Ross
By my lights, the whole point of saying something is conscious is to grant that it has subjective experience, and the outer, objective analysis of that looks like the an aware, organic entity. It sounds like, under your view, there could be a being which is conscious but doesn’t have any subjective experience but, to me, that’s like saying that we can determine something thinks while holding it may not have a thinker. — Bob Ross
My entire argument is the entire argument. Please read it.
— Philosophim
I did and then you decided this all only applies to the limited context of "places divided by sex". I was trying to clarify your context. You said in public it doesn't matter at all. Seems Ad-hoc. — Cheshire
The whole discussion started with my objection to your claim that 'sex' is objective. If your claim now is that 'sex' is 'what we divide by' and we pick and choose the features for the division, then I guess it is a tacit acknowledgment that it is not. — Jabberwock
We don't divide the sexes by brains, period. If you think we should, then please give a reason why. — Philosophim
If it was subjective and arbitrary, why do transgender people want to be the other sex so much? If it was subjective and arbitrary, they wouldn't care. It is objective and not arbitrary by this alone.
— Philosophim
Because the society strongly acts and sometimes enforces that division. It does not really give you an option not to belong to any group, even though some of your features might not 'belong'. — Jabberwock
It seems that you decide that the person is 'the norm of their sex' based on several arbitrarily selected attributes. When I point out that there might be different attributes to be taken into consideration, you just dismiss them, based on 'what society thinks'. Not very objective, I would say. — Jabberwock
If 'being a woman entails' some behaviors, then they are ulitimately biologically conditioned. But your definition of 'gender' claims they are not. And as I wrote, sex of the brain does not depend on a single or some features - why would it? — Jabberwock
I have not seen a compelling reason for a transgender person who is the norm of their sex suddenly being allowed into a place divided by sex because they want to act or dress in a stererotypical belief of how a sex should behave or dress. Feel free to give one, and we can keep discussing this point. — Philosophim
1. That is exactly my point. Your claim is that transgenderism is NOT a result of biological expression of sex difference - how can you be sure? — Jabberwock
That is precisely because 'sex' is a subjective collective term for many features that typically are bundled together, but not always, so the division will always be arbitrary. — Jabberwock
That is precisely because 'sex' is a subjective collective term for many features that typically are bundled together, but not always — Jabberwock
Wanting to wear a dress doesn't make you feminine, but being feminine might make you want to wear a dress. — Jabberwock
the former seemed to be the latter with just the redaction of “what it is to be like a subjective experiencing” or, as you put it, “the viewpoint of consciousness itself”. — Bob Ross
If that is correct, then I don’t see how “They are entirely separate realms of discussion and analysis”: when one analyzes how an organism has conscious experience of something, that is still “tied” to the same “consciousness” as that organism that is subjectively experiencing. I fear that this distinction implies that there could possibly be a being which has consciousness but doesn’t subjectively experience, but the consciousness we are studying objectively (from the side of behavior) is the same thing as the qualitative experience that the subject itself is having: we just don’t have direct, private access to it like that subject does. — Bob Ross
A being can be “aware” in the sense of being capable (to some degree) of observing its environment and identifying different aspects of its observation without having qualitative experience: for example, even basic AIs today can observe their environment and identify things (such as cups, tables, chairs, etc.) and they do not have conscious, qualitative experience: — Bob Ross
are you talking about qualitative experience or just the ability to take in input and interpret the environment?--these are two very different things — Bob Ross
Is “subjective” consciousness the qualitative experience and “objective” consciousness the mere awareness of the environment (plus the interpretation of it)? — Bob Ross
And yet you just did.
— Philosophim
You can't observe that you're not thinking a particular thought.
Not sure I understand the op either. It doesn't seem like you're discussing two kinds of consciousness. It seems like you're looking for a way to objectively identify another consciousness. — Patterner
You can't observe that you're not thinking a particular thought. — Patterner
If I am making a reductio absurdum argument against materialism, it does not mean I believe in materialism. — RogueAI
We are talking about places that are divided by sex. My claim is that gender does not override sex division, because gender and sex are different.
— Philosophim
So, your entire argument is regarding the caveat moments such as dressing rooms and bathrooms? — Cheshire
Not if attraction to women is just one biological feature that aligns with features typically attributed to men and her other psychological features align with those of women. Again, psychology is also part of genetic expression and it might also be sexual, as there are biologically caused psychological differences typically attributed to sex. Thus it should be considered by you as 'secondary sex expression'. — Jabberwock
I'm an idealist. I've identified as such here for quite awhile. I was meeting you halfway for sake of argument earlier. Don't accuse me of trolling, please.
We're at first principles now. I want to know why, at the starting gate, I should adopt your materialistic view of reality because in actuality, I don't. — RogueAI
Then you are inconsistent in your definitions – you treat physical sex expression in genitals differently than physical sex expression in a brain. — Jabberwock
And you cannot be aware that you are not thinking a particular thought. That would be thinking, "I'm not thinking about crayons right now." — Patterner
And how are you aware of yourself? Don't you need to observe something, then say, "I identify this as myself?"
— Philosophim
Do you have to observe anything to know that you exist, that you are awake? — Alkis Piskas
Do you have to feel or think anything to know that you exist? That you are a person? That you are reading this message? — Alkis Piskas
Knowing that "something". What is this something?
— Philosophim
Anything. Whatever. No some thing in particular. It could be e.g. just sitting on a chair. — Alkis Piskas
The feeling of the chair on your bottom does not determine the fact that you are sitting. — Alkis Piskas
You do not watch your legs and whole body move fast to be aware that you are running. You just know that you are running. — Alkis Piskas
But you can also be aware of the absence of thoughts! — Alkis Piskas
That's a contradiction to what I've defined. I need to observe something and then identify that as a "thought". I need to observe something and identify it as a "body". The combination of the two is awareness.
— Philosophim
Yes I know that. Repeating it does not prove that I'm wrong! — Alkis Piskas
Also, I wonder why do you chose to ignore all that I have said and shown in multiple ways about observation not being necessary for awareness to exist ... — Alkis Piskas
Suppose that a person has a male body with male genitals, but due to some developmental occurrence this person's brain acquires features typically associated with women, therefore causing that person's strong identification with women. Would that person be transsexual or not? — Jabberwock
Do you run around tearing wigs off of bald people? Do you refuse to acknowledge that they appear to have hair? — Cheshire
Insisting someone is literally a different sex when it's intuitively a contradiction to a lot of the public has just made things worse. I more or less adopted the opinion of a surgeon that performs the procedures. In his words, the result is a feminized man or the inverse. — Cheshire
The alteration seems to help but no one thinks they have become a different sex. — Cheshire
Implicit in what you said is an assumption that there exist physical objects like brains. Why should I agree with your materialist/physicalist assumption? — RogueAI
What you think is neural causation is neural correlation. It's the old, correlation is not causation. — Philosophim
X amount of indefinite harm will occur for a future person who is not born yet. Some have argued that one is not "preventing harm" for anyone, as they don't exist yet. Is this just rhetorical hedging in order to hold a certain ethical belief, or do they have some ontological validity in the idea that the potential person is not actual and therefore nothing is being prevented to any actual thing. — schopenhauer1
At what point does a future person come into ethical consideration? Some have argued that because a person does not exist yet, that "that person" is an invalid category because it is en potential and not actual. — schopenhauer1
Just looking at their body is not enough, if the person's brain or even some of its areas might express as woman's. I am not saying that it is always the case for transgender people, but there is some research that indicates that in some cases their brains might indeed be different. — Jabberwock
In such cases maybe it would be more productive to limit the divisions not to sex (as we agree that the expression might not be clear cut in some persons), but to particular features. — Jabberwock
If something does not exist in the future, but could exist in the future on certain known conditions, does that future state of affairs have any ethical worth to consider? Let us say a human exists in future point Y, but does not exist now in actual point X. Does future point Y have any ethical consideration since they don't exist yet in future point Y? — schopenhauer1
At the basis of all of them, is being aware of yourself. — Alkis Piskas
Neither does being aware of your emotions, thinkng, etc. — Alkis Piskas
Awareness actually means knowing that something exists or is happening. — Alkis Piskas
Leaving concepts, descriptions, etc. aside, just sit back and experience that you are aware of your thoughts, your body, your movements. Do not observe anything. — Alkis Piskas
I have intervened at this point of your discussion because I think it has taken a wrong path — Alkis Piskas
Even if they don't ontologically exist, are they in some sense real in a different way, or simply how we use language? — schopenhauer1
The tree is in X position now, but could be in X1 position or X2 position in the future, depending on conditions (conditional state of affairs I guess). What is X1 or X2 without defining it tautologically (that they are conditionals, or just explaining that in a longer definition). — schopenhauer1
Nice definitions. But are these possible worlds in some way real? X is X. X could be X1 or X2. Is X1 or X2 a thing? What are these possibilities? Also, X could be X1 or X2, or even X3, but then they have likelihoods of being one or the other. But also there is a sense of necessity involved here. It is necessarily true perhaps, that X could not be Y in any possibility. — schopenhauer1
Exceptions are important in demarcating the differences, if sex is supposed to be objective. — Jabberwock
1. Sex is only determined genetically. That means that on the first day after the conception it can be identified and whatever happens phenotypically is irrelevant. By that account, people with androgen insensitivity syndrome are males, even though they have vaginas, everyone treats them as females and they themselves identify as females. — Jabberwock
I must disagree. While indeed most androgen insensitivy syndromes are genetically based, it does not mean that their genotype itself is not male or female: they have 46, XY karyotype, so geneticists would identify their genomes as male. — Jabberwock
I would disagree with the OP claim that sex is objective. What is objective are biological features or properties. 'Sex' is a subjective term that is used to categorize beings based on those features, but it depends on the accepted definition, i.e. which features do we consider as essential for that category. — Jabberwock
Are you talking about an origin of causality, all of the unknown steps that would lead to what we know today,
— Philosophim
Yes, my idea of an hypothesis that could be plausible is that we would be able to relate it to the current laws of nature and everything would fall in place like the pieces of a puzzle. — Skalidris
Those subjective outlooks however question to what extent this biological fact is supposed to rule divide them in the first place. Notice how you haven't actually explained why sex (as chromosomes alone) is the only criterion used to make these distinctions. You've said it is, not why it is. — substantivalism
Notice how you haven't actually explained why sex (as chromosomes alone) is the only criterion used to make these distinctions. You've said it is, not why it is. — substantivalism
Dressing or acting in a particular way does not change that. Its not a party place. Its not a place to express fashion. Its to go to the bathroom. And since you have to undress or put yourself in a vulnerable position to expel certain bodily fluids, we keep the sexes separate. — Philosophim
Except when it comes to biologically transitioned individuals and intersex people who still, besides their possibly 'discordant' sex organs, can use either bathroom just as easily. — substantivalism
So a person is a trans-female who passes. . . are they seen as a sexual predator or not? — substantivalism
If you're saying that acting like something you are not, or identifying as something you are not, makes you that something, that's false.
— Philosophim
Unless what that thing is, is nothing above the act itself. Being feminine/masculine (NOT TALKING ABOUT SEX) is heavily enforced by and cemented socially in a variety of acts that do not have to involve you taking your clothes off or revealing your chromosomes. — substantivalism
Society then has what right to tell us who we are internally? None. — substantivalism
The sex differences between men and women are chromosomes or what primary/secondary sexual organs you possess. Sex is not the 'potential to rape' or 'probably going to rape'. That is something that ISN'T SEX. — substantivalism
. . and it's there because. . . why? Why should it be there? — substantivalism
. . and these divisions by chromosomal status are there because. . .? Why should it be there? — substantivalism
Philosophim I'll pass. — RogueAI
↪Philosophim Would a functional mechanical equivalent of a working brain be conscious? Would a simulation of a working brain be conscious? If yes to either of those, how would you verify the consciousness of the simulation and/or the mechanical brain? — RogueAI
I'm using the word women/men to regard the social/cultural categories and all assumed stereotypes or behaviors coincident with those terms colloquially. — substantivalism
No, that's incomplete. Do men dressed in clown suits get rejected from the men's restroom? No. Its not appearance, its based on sex.
— Philosophim
Except that isn't what you implied before. . . — substantivalism
Can you attempt to disguise your sex? Yes. Does that change your sex? No. Does that mean that because we can disguise our sex that suddenly it makes it ok? No. Appearance is not your sex. Being able to "pass" does not change your sex.
— Philosophim
It does change the point or significance of using it or its utility in a true general sense. — substantivalism
Being seen as a likely perpetrator or as a statistical risk based off of your 'grouping' is also not based directly on your sex. — substantivalism
You know, you are right. So let us agree for the moment with Butler that gender is to be seen as a performance. You aren't pretending to be a man dressed as women. You are you. Identity isn't XX chromosomes or XY chromosomes. . . it's who you 'are' or what you consider your 'self'. — substantivalism
The question is why it should be a dividing line at all WITH a lawful set of consequences that negate some moral intuitions we have on it. — substantivalism
Turns out, such stereotyping is seemingly motivating the decision to punish someone who's only action was using the restroom. The motivation being one's 'uncomfortability' which is garnered by societal expectations of how one who is MALE is to be judged on sight or even under a 'disguise'. — substantivalism
Again, you seem to want to agree with me on gender and yet if a person doesn't conform to gendered expectations of their sex then they are still said to be 'doing it wrong'. — substantivalism
Female people don't own facial expressions and externalized forms of certain behavior nor do males as if some one doing something similar is 'stealing' it or some 'cheap copy'. As that assumes, contrary to our assumptions, that gender is in fact strapped to your chromosomal status. — substantivalism
Why is the solution to pretend a stereotype means you now belong in a place of another sex, despite you not being that other sex?
— Philosophim
First, sex is not the reason they feel the need to be with the same sex. . . its SIMILARITY. Do I need to quote you again. . . — substantivalism
Nothing. That's the entire point. Gender is a subjective stereotype of a group or individuals. If it doesn't have to do with physical characteristics, its not sex.
— Philosophim
However, the motivation and reason why this choice is made can be heavily influenced by gender. — substantivalism
First of all, gender is not necessarily about ought - As a woman, I have learned not to make decisions based on societal expectations of how I ought to behave. — Possibility
I feel I should point out that, as women, there are many occasions in our lives where we have our pants around our ankles in the presence of strange men — Possibility
So, let me be clear - the mere physical ability for a man to penetrate a woman is NOT the source of fear or discomfort felt by women. — Possibility
We don't generally let men or women in the other bathrooms.
— Philosophim
Based on appearance, yes. — substantivalism
Your dress and behavior do not negate your sex or make you special.
— Philosophim
Yes to the former. The latter however ignores societal classes, social roles, and stereotypes themselves. — substantivalism
cting like what some people think the opposite sex should act like does not make you the opposite sex.
— Philosophim
It could make you similar in every manner that is relevant to most people as to what it means to be culturally/socially a man/woman while not having the right chromosomes still. — substantivalism
The point I want to emphasize at this stage is how we've treated the bathroom situation. As a couple of the feminist articles i've seen on the issue have showcased and you admitted its about perceived safety among those of similar supposed standing. Its thinking, because we have the same external biology/behavior/chromosomes that we then feel comfortable around you in that vulnerable state. The question then is how much of the first two are needed until suddenly they, as you said before, 'don't feel uncomfortable'? Is there a 'male/female brain' or sense of biological essentialism that dooms any person who tries to avoid those masculine/feminine stereotypes? — substantivalism
You can never be the opposite sex. Its impossible.
— Philosophim
If you are talking about chromosomes. . . then yes. If you are talking about societal classes to identify under or be a part of. . . well. . . we are on a philosophy forum. — substantivalism
Why can't a trans person use the bathroom of their own sex?
— Philosophim
Uhhh. . . reasons. — substantivalism
Gender isn't sex. It's fluid and people who have a particular set of chromosomes might just behave contrary to expectations of this biological fact. So, they may desire to be accepted into that grouping irrespective of being held down by their mere chromosome status...This new desire being so great that it motivates them to completely change many aspects of themselves to achieve this goal. — substantivalism
I have no problem with a man dressing as a woman, or a woman dressing up like a man.
— Philosophim
If gender is separate from or to be mostly dissolved away from sex then it's just dress, stereotype, and. . . lots of varied behaviors. — substantivalism
The question here is. . . what makes a woman/man that isn't their chromosomes? What behaviors/mannerisms/mental states are 'owned' by women/men? — substantivalism
My argument is very simple: brain consciousness leads to machine consciousness and machine consciousness is an absurdity — RogueAI
What you think is neural causation is neural correlation. It's the old, correlation is not causation. — RogueAI