I hope your Saturday is going well Bob! I think I've been able to pare down our discussion in a more intelligible way this time. Read everything once over and I think it will all come together.

Secondly, I am also not even claiming that the designs are essential to inducing what box it is (which would be the latter thing in your quote), because that would imply that if I didn’t know the design then I couldn’t induce at all what box it is—which is clearly wrong. I am saying that it is a relevant factor. — Bob Ross

Disregarding your first point for a minute, this is what I'm trying to inform you of. A relevant factor is an essential property. A non-relevant factor is a non-essential property in regards to the induction. Anytime you make the design relevant to an induction, a pattern in your case, it is now a relevant, or essential property of that induction. Again, can you make the pattern induction if you ignore the design? No. Therefore it is an essential property of that pattern. .

f by “essential property of the induction” you just mean that I am using designs to make my induction, then I have no problem with that; but that has nothing to do with the substance of the scenario nor does that entail that it is essential to the induction. The point is that the colossally observed pattern of design → box, in this particular context, outweighs going off of the minuscule probability. — Bob Ross

It is what I'm saying. But your claim is not proven. You can include the pattern design in your thinking, but it does not outweigh the known probability. And to this, it must be re-iterated again. This probability is applicably known without the X Y consideration. When you include a new property, then you create a new induction that takes that property into consideration.

We then evaluate that induction. In this case its a pattern. A pattern is less cogent then a probability. This pattern also includes certain properties than the original probability. It is not more cogent than the original probability. However, it is also not fully comparable either. The initial probability does not include the design of X or Y in its consideration. Meaning once we include the X/Y as an essential property in our pattern, we don't have a probability to compare to. We could take the pattern as the most cogent decision if X and Y are essential properties, because there is no probability considered for the X and Y properties. But it does not negate a probability as being more cogent.

So once again, we do not have a lower hierarchy being more rational to pick then a higher hierarchy. What you've attempted to do is make X and Y irrelevant in a probability, say they are then also irrelevant in a pattern, despite them being absolutely necessary to the pattern's conclusion. I'm going to condense the points I made above below in some simple logic.

This is a fair comparable probability and pattern in the hierarchy:

Probability 49/51% of getting either A or B.
Pattern I pull 1 billion A's and 1 billion Bs.

A pattern is not as cogent as a known probability (The probability is not wrong, this would of course be a different discussion)

The more rational belief is that I will pull a ratio of A to B at 49/51%, despite the patterned solution I've seen.

This is another fair comparable probability and pattern in the hierarchy:

Probability of getting either A or B with design X is 75% or Y at 25%
Pattern I always pull an A with X, and always pull a B with Y

In this case, the probability is still more cogent than the pattern. This is because all relevant properties to the conclusion of each induction is being considered.

An incorrect comparable probability and pattern (What your example is doing):

Probability 49/51% of getting either A or B, (X and Y not considered).
Pattern I always pull an A with X, and always pull a B with Y (X and Y considered)

Then you're claiming the pattern is somehow more cogent than the probability.

1. You have not shown that a pattern is more cogent than a probability. To do so, you must resolve a very simple problem.

The probability of a random coin flip is 50/50.
Someone flips a coin ten times randomly and it turns up heads all ten times.
"Randomly" is proven and not doubted.

Why would it be more cogent to predict the next coin is heads rather then saying it could be either on the next flip? Give a reason there, and we can start to question whether a pattern is more cogent than a probability.

2. You are not comparing inductions properly. The first induction does not consider X and Y. You cannot say a later induction that does consider X and Y is more cogent than the first, because the first is a different scenario of considerations. You need to have a probability that does consider X and Y to compare fairly.

I hope this finally clears up the issue! This has forced me to be clearer with my examples and arguments, and I think the entire paper is better for it.

I can experience design X with BWAs my whole life and never refurbish its definition to include design X as an essential property: and that is how the scenario is setup. — Bob Ross

True. But if you're going to later include, "I believe property X is a property that indicates it has air," then you've made it an essential property to identifying whether it has air. Basically you're saying its not an essential property, but then in your application, it is. You can claim its a non-essential property within the induction, but then in your application you must show it is. If it was non-essential, then it would have nothing to do with your induction of whether the box has air or not. Once you believe the design pattern does, its now essential to the predictive outcome of the identity despite any belief otherwise.

I can say the designs are not essential properties of the identity of a BWA and BWOA while holding that the designs, given the inductive evidence and super low probability given of pulling BWOA, are relevant to inferring (guessing) what it is (even though it isn’t an essential property of it). — Bob Ross

Introducing different words does not change the outcome. "infer" is "a guess" which is "an induction". So we're right back to the hierarchy again. If you include the "non-essential" property as essential for your induction to the outcome of the box, then it is no longer non-essential to your belief in the outcome of the box's air or not air identity. Again, it does not matter if its non-essential in your original probability identification. You've made it essential in your new one.

Let me clarify something though: what is essential to the inductive inference is not the same thing as what is essential to the identity of a thing. I think you may be conflating those two here. — Bob Ross

It is correct that the essential properties of a known identity, and the essential property of an induction about that identity are not the same. I've said that already by noting that we can hold the original probability while considering this new pattern. Regardless of the pattern of design, we still know that any box has a 51/49 probability in regards to its air. But if we later consider the design in believing whether the box will have air or not, its now essential in that belief. You don't get to decide what's essential or non-essential in application. In application, the design is now essential in your belief on whether it holds air or not. You can deny it, but you haven't proven it yet.

Non essential properties never weigh in or outweigh the probability of something occurring. If they do, they are now essential to that probability

Correct. You keep focusing too much on the probability. The idea is that there is a probability which is calculated independently of the designs, but it is a miniscule difference. — Bob Ross

And the miniscule difference is irrelevant. Its still 1% more rational. Or .0005% more rational. If X > Y, and no other considerations are made, its always more rational to choose X. It does not matter how small the difference is. Your original claim is that the hierarchy breaks. I'm not seeing how there being a miniscule differences breaks the logic of the hierarchy. That's a personal reason to not want to choose the more rational induction. That's not an argument for saying the probability is less rational.

I feel we're just repeating ourselves on this point. You know I'm very open to conceding whenever I see the logic, but in this case, I do not see a logical point that breaks the hierarchy. If you're going to use a property as a basis for an induction, its essential to the reasoning behind the belief. If you removed the design of X and Y from your second inference, do you have a second inference anymore? No, that inference is based on there being a X and Y design. If you can't remove the property and still hold the induction Bob, its essential to the induction. Unless a new point is made, I don't really see anything to add to this at this point.

I want to get to another point which you made which I think is valid and worth discussing over instead.

There’s no probability afforded to you of whether has a design X or Y. So correct. But that was never the claim I was making. The billion experiences of X → BWA and Y → BWOA is inductive evidence: it doesn’t give you a probability and that is the whole point. — Bob Ross

So here, you are correct. A probability is based off of our knowledge of limits. I've been using it in the generic sense, but depending on the context, the repeated occurrence of X and Y is not one. Here, we do not know the actual limit. You may not remember from the original paper, but I noted that the hierarchy is a basic identifier of inductions that almost certainly could be broken down further.

What we're faced with here is something that is a repeated possibility pattern. Lets say there's a mole in a hole. It comes out of the hole every other day for four days. Does that mean it will do so for the next four? The next forty? We don't know, its only an induction. But the longer the pattern repeats, the more cogent it seems to believe the pattern will continue.

We hold patterns as more persuasive than mere possibilities. If I only observed the mole for two days, I would see it is possible that the mole comes out of the hole, and also possible that it does not for the day. But that's not a probability. Its not a 50% chance that the mole emerges. Its a pattern. Its an observed repetition of possibilities. In other words, its something we applicably know of again and again. Applicably knowing a thing 20 times seems more solid to cogent to believe in it happening again opposed to only seeing its possible one time.

Patterns are a more detailed identity of a cogent argument than possibility alone, yet still less cogent than probabilities. Lets view our cards as an example. We know a jack has a 4/52 chance of randomly being drawn if there is no pattern in how the cards are shuffled. This is the only logical solution. Even if we observe a pattern within the draws, for example, over 10 decks our chance of pulling a jack is 10/52, we still haven't broken the odds if we still applicably know the card shuffling is random. Its like flipping a coin and getting heads 10 times in a row. Its a pattern of success, but not more cogent than the known probability.

The sun rising in the East and setting in the West is not a probability, its a pattern. An extremely long pattern that has remained unbroken. If we consider the box design in relation to whether its an indicator to its identity being an air box or not, this is also a pattern. But a pattern is not more rational than a probability due to the fact that a probability has more applicably known quantities like limitations. That being said, in absence of their being a probability, a pattern is the most cogent inference.

To clarify, I am saying that the odds of any box being without are is 51% and the only thing that matters to the identity of the box is that it (1) is a box and (2) has or does not have air in it. — Bob Ross

Here is where you also have to clarify. Does the design of X or Y have anything to do with the probability? For example, if the ration of X airs to Y airs was 3/4, then X and Y are essential properties to the probability. Both of these can co-exist.

So on one hand we could say overall, there's a 51% chance of no airs vs airs, not considering X or Y. Then we can drill down further, make X and Y a part of our observations, and note that X has a 75% chance of being no air, while Y has a 25% chance of being air. These are two different probabilities, and we could even math them together for an overall probability if we wanted to.

Once you start including an attribute in your probability, it is now essential to that probability. While you are considering X and Y, you're not considering the how heavy they are right? Anything you don't include in the probability is non-essential. Since you don't care about the weight of each box, it doesn't matter. Once you notice X and Y designs, and start actively noting, "Hey, X's so far have all been with air," then you've created a new probability, and X is essential to that probability.

No they don’t. The probability of one having design X or Y is completely unknown to you. The probability of picking a BWOA or BWA is irrelevant to the probability of it having a particular design. — Bob Ross

If it is known information that the X or Y is irrelevant to the design, then you cannot make a probability based off of it when referring to the boxes in general. If it is unknown whether the X or Y is relevant to the air inside of the box, then you could start to note a probability that is again, separate from the box disregarding the design.

I think the part of confusion Bob is you keep making non-essential properties essential to an induction, but think because its non-essential in another induction, its non-essential in your new induction. That's simply not the case. Once you start including the X or Y as a consideration, it is now an essential consideration for your new induction. That's your contradiction.

If you flip a coin ten times and it comes up heads ten times, does the non-essential property of you being in your living room change the odds of the coin's outcome? Of course not

That’s disanalogous: I am not saying that non-essential properties always weigh in or outweigh the probability of something occuring. — Bob Ross

Its completely analogous. Non essential properties never weigh in or outweigh the probability of something occurring. If they do, they are now essential to that probability. That's why the living room is non-essential to the probability.

Also, you being in your living room wouldn’t be a non-essential property because it isn’t a property of the probability. Is an unessential reason or factor: not a property. — Bob Ross

A reason or a factor is a property of something. If you wish to interchange it, its fine. The point still stands.

I am saying it is less rational to go with the 1% chance or 0.00000001% chance that it is a BWOA as opposed to a BWA in this specific scenario. — Bob Ross

Only if you consider the X, Y design of the box. In which case, it is now an essential property of your induction, and you've made the separate probability as I noted earlier.

Now lets include some non-essential properties. What they are is irrelevant. Lets call them properties X and Y.

They are not irrelevant: they are irrelevant to the identity of the thing. That is not the same thing as them being irrelevant flat out. — Bob Ross

It is not provably possible under your terms that a BWA could have a design of Y because you haven’t experienced it before. Just to clarify. — Bob Ross

Ok, I think we've narrowed down the point of contention. I think we're seeing two different contexts here. When you say, "The odds of any box being without air are 51%, and the only thing that matters to the identify of the box, is that its a box," then the non-essential properties of the box do not matter to the probability. If X and Y are non-essential, they don't matter to the probability then. I think that's a straight forward conclusion right?

Your context doesn't quite seem to fit this though, and that's what I'm trying to piece together here. Are you saying that the probability of 51% is only a guess? Or that we only think that the design of the box is irrelevant? In other words, is our 51% open to change, and do we not know if it depends on X or Y?

This is where I'm having trouble seeing your argument. You may have a good argument, but I'm just not understanding it yet. From my point, if X and Y are unessential to the probability, then they are unessential to the probability. Any results from experience, if we know the probability is correct, would not change the probability. Therefore no matter if we simply pulled 99/1 airs to no airs, that doesn't change the probability. The outcome of the probability does not change the probability.

I don't consider confirmation bias irrational by the way, I think that's a bit harsh. Its simply less rational then relying on knowledge we know. If we know the odds, its more rational to play the odds over the long term then not right? Even if we're currently beating the odds, it won't last over long term if the odds are correct.

Back to your point where I feel you changed the context a bit. You noted that it wasn't possible for you to have experienced a Box with Y that did not have air. I had assumed you had. That's true, you don't know if its possible for you to pull that box. Despite the odds, you never have. And yet you know its probable that you will, and its only incredible luck that you haven't so far. If the odds for the air or not air do not depend on X or Y, then each X and Y has a respective 49/51 split as well. This is just a logical fact. Results defying the odds do not negate the odds if the odds are known.

Now you have really good reasons to believe that when you see a box presented to you with design X, although designs aren’t essential properties, that it is a BWA. — Bob Ross

No, you don't. Because it is more rational to stick with the odds that you do then the possibilities that you don't. If you flip a coin ten times and it comes up heads ten times, does the non-essential property of you being in your living room change the odds of the coin's outcome? Of course not. If you start saying, "Every time I flip a coin in the living room, it changes the odds to where I always flip heads," then the living room is no longer a non-essential property to the coin flip, but has now become, in your head, an essential property of the coin flip.

Same as if after you count all the X and Y boxes that have ever been made, and sure enough, it turns out that all X's are airs, while all Y's are not airs. The odds didn't change, that's just one extremely unlikely outcome out of many possible outcomes. At that point since you know all of the boxes, and you've noted something special with the property of X and Y with the box, you could say that all boxes with X have air, while all boxes with Y's don't, and applicably know this. It just so happens that there are 49 billion X's, and 51 billion Y's.

In all of this, you have not shown a case in which it is more rational to not go with the odds beyond confirmation bias. But feel free to try again, as perhaps I'm missing something that you're seeing.

Secondly, if you would like to call what I just clarified as irrational, then you would have to say all inductions and abductions are irrational because that is how they work. Take Hume’s problem of induction, which you mentioned in your OP: you would have to say it is equally irrational to hold that the future will resemble the past. But this is nonsense: it isn’t irrational to induce or abduce: it can be quite rational. — Bob Ross

No, I don't. I simply rely again on the hierarchy of inductions, which rests on applicable knowledge as noted. All inductions ARE inductions, but it simply notes which inductions are more rational to believe in when compared to each other. It is more rational to believe that known rules and laws will remain as they are until we first experience them breaking. Then we will know its possible for a rule or law to break. The sun has always risen in the East and set in the West. It is in induction to believe it will do so tomorrow, but it is the only possible outcome which has ever happened. As such, it is more rational that we believe the possibility over the plausibility that it will rise in the West and set in the East.
My counter to you is to note that the hierarchy holds, so it does not destroy it.

You are basically hedging your bets on a minuscule 1% difference and expecting, given the contextual background knowledge you would have, that this next one will be the only one out of a billion and out of every single one that you have seen that will break the correlation. — Bob Ross

This is isn't hedging a bet. This is simply taking the most rational induction I know of, a probability, and holding it over my confirmation bias of the results I've obtained. My desire has nothing to do with what is more rational. However, being less rational could be less stressful for me right? Perhaps the issue you're really holding here is that you want to make decisions that are less rational sometimes. That's fine. There can be a host of reasons to be less rational in one's inductions. Perhaps you're just tired of examining the boxes and want to get through them faster. Perhaps the penalty for guessing wrong is irrelevant. What you really seem to be saying is that the 1% doesn't matter to you. Which is fine. But it is still 1% more likely, and therefore the more rational choice.

Hi Bob, I think a little too much is being thrown around by both of us, so I'm going to narrow the scope to your exact example.

1. Probability is 51% that the box does not have air.

To be clear, this means that any box given has a 51% change that it does not have air in it. So regardless of box design, its a 51% chance that it does not have air.

I'm going to simplify the others.

The only essential property for a box is that it is a six sided box. If it has air, its a box with air. If it doesn't, its a box without air. Anything else is non-essential.

We'll call call a box with air a BWA, and a box without air a BWOA because I'm tired of typing those phrases. :)

Any box you pick has a 49% chance of being a BWA, while it has a 51% chance of being a BWOA.

Now lets include some non-essential properties. What they are is irrelevant. Lets call them properties X and Y.

So I can have a BWA with a X, and a BWA with a Y. Does this change the probability of the BWA being picked? No. Its still a 49% chance. What about a BWOA with a X and a BWOA with a Y? No, still a 51% chance of being picked. This is because we know that X and Y are non-essential the the probability.

Lets say that I pull any number of boxes. It turns out that I only pull BWAs with X's and WBOAs with Y's. I've never pulled a BWA with a Y or a BWOA with a X, but its still within the odds that I can.

Is is possible that I could? Of course. But does that change the probability? No, non-essential properties don't affect the probability. If they did, they would be essential properties of the probability. Therefore it is still more rational to assume over the course of picking more boxes that I should always guess that I'll pull a BWOA, whether that's a X or a Y.

If you believe that because every BWA you've pulled so far is a X, therefore its more reasonable that a box with a X is going to be a BWA, that's not rational, its just confirmation bias. Your biased results don't make something more or less cogent. It is always more rational to believe that the box will be a BWOA whether its an X or a Y.

Confirmation bias isn't new either. https://www.verywellmind.com/what-is-a-confirmation-bias-2795024#:~:text=For%20example%2C%20imagine%20that%20a,supports%20what%20they%20already%20believe . Its an easy trap for all of us to fall into.

With that simplified, does that answer your question?

But maybe you're right and there will be a breakthrough soon. Then you can resurrect this and laugh at me, but I don't think that's going to happen. — RogueAI

No, I wouldn't laugh at you RogueAI. Just want to clarify this isn't a ego thing or jeering in any way. Please continue to have a fascination for alternatives than the status quo!

That's not the only viable problem. How does consciousness arise from matter? Why is consciousness present at all? Why are only certain arrangements of matter conscious?

If these questions are still unanswered after 1,000 years, no will believe in materialism. Why would they? It will have failed to answer some of the most basic questions. — RogueAI

Those are easy problems, not hard problems. Easy and hard do not denote their difficulty in finding a solution, but their difficulty in finding a path to a solution at all. The hard problem I noted has no pathway to a solution. Your questions have clear pathways of investigation and testability. Considering the amount of progress we've made in just the last 30 years, there seems to be no reason to alter course for the next 30, let alone 1000.

Something else to think about, but your questions can equally be applied to almost any other state of matter. How does water arise from H20? Why is water a possible existence at all? Why are only certain arrangements of atoms water while others are not? We know that water is made out of molecules, and consciousness comes from the brain, but there are still deeper questions that we continue to look into.

Still a lot to discover!

If the Hard Problem is still around 1,000 years from now, it will be devastating for materialism/physicalism. — RogueAI

Not at all. The only viable version of the hard problem is it stands today is that we cannot know what another subject is experiencing from that subjects viewpoint. We could take two subjects and stimulate identical brain states to where they both said, "I see a green tree." We could never independently verify what that green tree looked like specifically to subject 1 or 2. No one can. To my mind, there's no theory that ever could either. This in no way invalidates the fact that brain causes the mind.

If these are truly accidental properties, then they are not in consideration

Why would resemblance and inductive association to the accidental properties in relation to the essential thing not be a consideration? — Bob Ross

Because they are accidental. You're just not properly identifying the situation.

Lets simplify this. Why are the boxes accidental? Lets not just say they are. Lets prove they are. You know that the manufacturer does not care about whether X or Y design has air or not. It is known that they randomly switch between box designs for air and not air, and it turns out the box design X and Y have exactly 50% change of having air or not air.

Thus whether the box is design X or Y is accidental to whether it has air inside. This is a proven accidental property.

Now, lets say that I receive a billion boxes of X, and a billion boxes of Y. low and behold, it turns out all the X's have air, while all the Y's don't. Its an incredibly improbable scenario, but it can be independently verified that yes, its completely a 50/50 chance that either box has air or not.

It doesn't matter the result of the odds, they don't change the odds. Remember that a probability is based off of knowledge, not other inductions.

Here is another way the properties can be accidental. Lets say that X always has air, and Y does not. X is red, and Y is green. You are color blind and can't tell the difference. Within your context, whether its box Y or X is irrelevant to you. It is outside of your distinctive knowledge to know there is a color difference, and outside of your applicable context to tell the colors apart.

Lets take your accidental property that no longer remains accidental.

I am saying that, in this hypothetical consideration, the designs are accidental: it isn’t a question of whether people are implicitly claiming them as essential properties (in this scenario). — Bob Ross

The designs are accidental, not an accidental property then. If you have no foreknowledge of whether box X or Y should or should not have air, then you have not yet decided whether X or Y design are essential or accidental to the identity.

Also, we have to clarify what we're referring to here. If we're referring to the core identity of the box itself as a particular type of measuring tool where air doesn't matter, X and Y are accidental. If we're referring to the probability of whether a X or Y box has air or not, then the box design is no longer accidental to our point!

Taken another way, a type of dog can be green or blue. Whether its blue or green is irrelevant to knowing the identification of the dog. However, you later discover that 74% of these dogs are green, while 25% are blue, and 1% could be any other color. When you are asking, "Is this dog that I cannot see behind a screen green or blue," at that point the probability of the color becomes an essential set or properties in knowing the outcome. At that point, because the point is directly about the color, it is pertinent to the guess at hand. These odds also do not retroactively make the color a primary attribute in identifying this type of dog? No.

To sum up an accidental property - A property which is completely irrelevant to one's assertation or denial of the identity. Meaning that you cannot make an accidental identity suddenly be relevant to the assertation or denial of the identity. As soon as it is relevant, it is no longer accidental.

In the scenario, as I hold the possibility is more cogent than the probability, — Bob Ross

You can decide that you would rather explore the possibility than the probability, but you did not prove that a possibility is more cogent than a probability. Again, all the examples are going to boil down to needing to prove that what one is examining is a known probability, possibility, or plausibility. All that's been done so far is a misunderstanding of the terms.

To see if you understand, take your example again and try breaking it down into clear and provable accidental or primary properties for the context. Second, clearly demonstrate what is a possibility, probability, and plausibility. Only after that careful dismantling, try to prove that you can make a plausibility more cogent than a possibility.

OK, so all the neuroscience that's been done is consistent with an idealistic reality. Why should I then believe that the prima facie neural causation model that you champion is actual causation? — RogueAI

Some of neuroscience is almost certainly idealistic, in which case idealistic philosophy has free reign. But the fact that the mind comes from the brain is not idealistic, it is decades of research and experiments that continue to confirm this as a fact. From brain surgery, anesthesia, brain damage research, psychadelics, and psychiatric medicine there are a host of things to choose from. If the brain did not cause the mind, then all of these fields which rely on this fact, would have catastrophic failure rates and be no more than charlatans.

You can even test it on yourself. Go get drunk tonight and see how it affects your mind. That is due to the alcohol impacting your brain. Its an extremely simple test to confirm for yourself while having a little fun.

I would if the model you describe could actually explain how things are conscious and why consciousness is present at all, but materialism/physicalism/naturalism has utterly failed to solve the mind-body problem. — RogueAI

If you are talking about certain details of consciousness, of course we don't understand everything yet. For example, we'll never know what its like to exist as a brain from the subjective viewpoint of the brain. That's outside of our measurement. But we can most certainly impact consciousness by manipulating the brain. Anesthesia knocks you unconscious for surgerys. You think that's all just a happy accident? That's all based on the fact that brain affects the mind, and anesthesia affects the brain in a particular manner.

Don't confuse not fully mapping out the brain with being unable to make certain conclusions about the brain. We're trying to reverse engineer the brain's specifics, but we have overall conclusions about how it works that have continually held up to tests and critiques. If you reversed engineered a car, you might not understand how magnetism works, but you could understand the parts of the car and how they interact. The car does not run if the engine is not active, despite not knowing all the details on how gas combustion causes the engine to run.

How long are going to put up with that failure before we start to explore new theories? What if the mind-body problem is still around 1,000 years from now? At what point do you start to question your metaphysical assumptions? — RogueAI

You misunderstand. You can always question and wonder at alternatives. I can sit and ponder that all of physics is somehow a big misunderstanding. I can have a lot of fun coming up with other theories. But those are all suppositions, untested, and non-factual. None of those override facts themselves. If I said my crazy physics alternative fixed everything with physics, but I could not adequately demonstrate this, I would be a fraud.

So have fun with idealism. Say, "What if...?" Explore and think on alternatives. But until there is something factually substantial behind those musings, it is entirely inappropriate to say they counter known facts.

I can't prove it's all a dream. I'm simply asking you if all the science that's been done would necessarily be any different if all this was a dream. Would it? — RogueAI

I don't know. You're asking about a fictional reality. We can't make judgements about fictional realities, because they're fictional. Can we create a fictional reality where we decide science is different? Sure. Can we create a fictional reality where we decide science is the same? Sure. Its fiction, so there are no limits on what we can do.

That's an appeal to authority, not an argument.
— Philosophim

That's a copout. We cite books and philosophers in discussions here constantly. It's not a fallacy in informal discussions if the authority is a valid one. — RogueAI

No, citing a book without any specific arguments from the book is an appeal to authority. If an argument from the book had been presented to counter my point, that would have been fine.

Of course they entail what they entail. All you have to do is show that brain death and a lack of mind are not a correlate. All you have to do is demonstrate how when neuroscientists analyze the brain, they can predict accurately what a person will think or say next up to 10 seconds before they say it. If my points are so easy to counter, then you should be able to easily give a counter to them.
— Philosophim

Would any of that be different if this were all a dream? — RogueAI

Can you prove that this is all a dream? That's like saying "Would it all be different if we were all made out of cotton candy?" Its a fun thing to explore, but without providing an argument that we are in fact, made out of cotton candy, its not an argument worth considering in a discussion of facts. It is not a correlation or supposition that the mind comes from the brain. It is a scientific fact. Not that a fact cannot be overturned, or we can't suppose there's more out there than we currently know. If you're going to say a fact is wrong, you need to prove it.

Every part of the design is an accidental property except for it being a box and having air (as defined above). You have never experienced a design X which was not a box-with-air. — Bob Ross

If these are truly accidental properties, then they are not in consideration. As a reminder of an accidental property, these are properties that are variable to the essential. So a "tree without branches" would have no bearing on its identity as a tree. So we can eliminate the variables X and Y from our consideration.

As it is irrelevant whether the design matches X or Y, if I am given a box and I know that probability is 51/49%, then the more reasonable guess is to guess that the box I am given is the 51% chance that it does not have air.

The problem is that in your example, it is unlikely someone would consider box X to be an accidental property. We can't just say its accidental, it has to match accurately to the definition of an accidental property. Implicitly, what most people would think in this context is, "Box X is designed to have air, Box Y is designed not to have air." These would become essential properties for most people in their context of encountering billions of each kind and having the same outcome in regards to air. If its truly accidental, then the person would not even consider Box X or Box Y as being associated with having air, because it doesn't matter.

You don't have to have an example at all to question my conclusions Bob, its like an equation. The examples so far are doing nothing to counter the underlying claims about essential and non-essential properties, they're really examples in which you need to correctly identify if a property is essential or non-essential based on the person's context. Once that identity is complete, everything falls into place.

Are the countless neuroscience discoveries, medicine, psychiatrics, etc. all just correlations? Of course not.
— Philosophim

But they don't entail what you say they entail. Have you ever encountered the book The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, by Hacker and Bennett? — Wayfarer

Of course they entail what they entail. All you have to do is show that brain death and a lack of mind are not a correlate. All you have to do is demonstrate how when neuroscientists analyze the brain, they can predict accurately what a person will think or say next up to 10 seconds before they say it. If my points are so easy to counter, then you should be able to easily give a counter to them. Citing a book vaguely does nothing. That's an appeal to authority, not an argument.

From my perspective, everything you write on the forum comprises wholly and solely what Philosophim thinks is obvious, accompanied by a strong sense of indignation that someone else can question what, to you, are obvious facts. This is your response to everything I address to you. — Wayfarer

And yet if they were not obvious facts, you would be able to counter them easily wouldn't you? Instead you retreat and answer with things like:

Have you ever written a term paper in philosophy? Ever actually studied it? Because I can see no indication of that. — Wayfarer

This is someone who is insecure about their own intelligence. Don't be Wayfarer. You're a smart person. But a smart person should not be so easily caught up in their own ego. Its a poison trap of smart people to think that "If I just read a bunch of papers and cite them, people will think I'm smart." You have knowledge, but you seem unable to critically think about that knowledge when its challenged from a new perspective. Thus you retreat. I call this out so that you'll attempt to improve Wayfarer instead of getting haughty and making poor appeals to authority.

Here's the truth. It doesn't matter what the background of someone is in philosophy. It matters if you can think logically, critically, and honestly. You attempting to put up barriers when you're countered is unbecoming. If you must know, am I formally educated? Yes. Am I intelligent? Objectively yes. I do not post my background as a "flex" because I don't want people to just agree with me for the wrong reason. The arguments I give should stand on their own, as should yours. Eliminating such inconsequential considerations such as "status" lets us get right to the arguments instead of our egos.

But while there may be correlations between mental states and brain states, this doesn't necessarily imply a strict identity between them. — Wayfarer

You know this is a completely false statement. You can't just claim they are correlations, you have to prove it. To prove a correlation, you need to remove the brain and still have a mind. Does anyone with brain death have a mind? Are the countless neuroscience discoveries, medicine, psychiatrics, etc. all just correlations? Of course not. You're too well versed to make a claim like that.

This is a rationalization. Despite knowing this isn't true, you believe this regardless. Why? What do you gain out of it Wayfarer? That's the only reason why people hold things they know are false to be true. Do you do it because you fear you'll lose something? Maybe I can help you hold onto what you want without you having to hold to this false notion. We're in philosophy. The point is to be razor sharp with are arguments and suppositions as we cut down our rationalizations and false beliefs.

Logical propositions and their truth values are abstract entities that exist independently of any specific physical realization, such as brain states. — Wayfarer

No, they aren't. There always has to be something to process those logical proposition and truth values. It doesn't exist in a vacuum. If there is nothing, there is no logic Wayfarer. We are the brains abstracting these identities. No brains, no abstract identity of logic. Apart from brains, does such logic just float out there? Where is it if it is not in the brains of logically capable thinking beings?

I could choose to represent it and any number of different propositions in different symbolic systems and different media, whilst still preserving the logic. — Wayfarer

And what is doing this thinking? Your brain.

You seem to take the argument like this: "My brain's physical capabilities let me think of abstracts and logic and rationality. Therefore such things exist apart from the physical capabilities that my brain produces. Its a contradiction Wayfarer. Go get drunk and watch logic disappear. Look at a brain damaged individual and see how they process.

I think consideration of the role of networks of neurons, and disregarding the molecular details on which the neurons supervene, is an appropriate level of looking at things for the purpose of this discussion
— wonderer1

It might be, were this a computer science or neuroscience forum. — Wayfarer

Here you are also mistaken. The best philosophers of history were often times mathematicians and scientists as well. Philosophy has to discuss the material that we know of today, or it is an exercise in futility. You cannot discuss the philosophy of mind without neuroscience. That is a person who is in the dark ages and will be left behind. Why isn't neuroscience looking to arguments such as your Wayfarer? Because they offer nothing. They're wrong. Its not that neuroscience is full of itself and can't comprehend what you're saying. They do. And its so off base as to be brushed aside without a second thought.

I've said this before, and I'll say it again. Poor philosophy wonders at what could be. Great philosophy wonders at what is, and attempts to solve it. But we have to address what we know, not ignore it for our ideology.

Good post Wayfarer, the time and detail that went into this is appreciated.

I'm ok with point 1 at the moment, so lets go into the proposed contradiction.

As a matter of definition physicalists claim that all events must have physical causes, and that therefore human thoughts can ultimately be explained in terms of material causes or physical events (such as neurochemical events in the brain) that are nonrational. In Lewis' terms, this would entail that our beliefs are a result of a physical chain of causes, not held as a result of insight into a ground-consequence relationship. — Wayfarer

A process of reasoning (P therefore Q) is rational only if the reasoner sees that Q follows from P, and accepts Q on that basis. Thus, reasoning is veridical only if it involves a specific kind of causality, namely, rational insight. — Wayfarer

If this is the case, how is it not rational to conclude that the physical brain causes the mind? Its not an irrational argument. In simple terms, if brain state = X, then mind state = Y is the claim right? If this can be confirmed through testing, then I would say this is a completely rational argument. If you lacked rational insight, then yes, you would not see it as rational. But you have rational insight. How is this not rational then?

Are you saying that underlying physical process don't process the term rationality like we do in our mind? Because that's not what naturalism is stating. Its perfectly rational to observe that gravity pulls something down at a steady acceleration. Are we to say that gravity is irrational because it doesn't realize or think that it should accelerate at a steady pace? Of course not. That's not a counter of naturalism, that's just a misapplication of the term "rational".

I wanted to get your take on this: am I misunderstanding or misremembering the view here? By point here is that, upon further reflection, it is insufficient to use the inductive hierarchy you have proposed because they do not supersede each other absolutely in the manner you have proposed. The context and circumstances matter — Bob Ross

Yes, you are misremembering, but I believe its because I don't go into significant detail about context here. Upon re-evaluating the original paper, I found I could pare down explorations into context to lessen the size of the paper which seemed to be intimidating to people.

Context and circumstances matter greatly. These determine both what distinctive and applicable knowledge you have available to you. So lets break down your examples one by one.

First case: Air box, no air box. No probability, both are possible. No other context.

Hierarchy results: Both are possible. Therefore one is as likely as the other.

Second case: Air box most probable on earth, no air box most probable on moon.

Hierarchy results: While both are possible, its more probable for an air box to be on Earth and a no air box to be on the moon.

Third case: Air box, no air box. It is known that air boxes look like X, it is known that non-air boxes look like Y. You are provided a box that looks like Y. Is it an air or non-air box?

Hierarchy results: Depends on how you've personally defined non-air boxes. If the look and feel is an essential property for you, then you know its a non-air box. In fact if you later found out it had air, you could easily say "Its a defective non-air box". If of course the look and feel are irrelevant, and the only thing that matters is that it does, or does not have air in it, then you could say its probably an air box. Remember, your distinctive knowledge is created at your particular context. So based on how you structure that context, it would be probability or possibility comparison.

Fourth case: Chains of sub-knowledge and beliefs about whether its an air box or not.

Hierarchy results: Find the chains of reasoning, and compare them through the children up to the parent.

The flaw is here:

let’s prove a plausibility is more cogent than a possibility and probability under certain conditions. — Bob Ross

A plausibility is never more cogent then a possibility due to the logic and reasoning involved. You have to break the actual logic and reasoning behind each induction. Making a complex example without carefully and correctly identifying the chain of reasoning, and when it relies on sub-inductions, is not a counter.

First, if you've never experienced a "Box without air", then its not a probability. You simply know that people make boxes with air, and you don't yet know that people make boxes without air. The number of times this has been experienced is irrelevant.

Now lets shorten your example down to a context in which you think of a plausibility that a box could be made without air. You're comparing applicable knowledge to a plausibility. Remove the wording that notes it is a box without air. Its more reasonable to assume its a box with air.

Now lets add in the writing. Depending on context, this is a plausible truth, or a possible truth. Is it possible that when someone labels a box that it does not contain air, that it might not contain air? Or is it only plausible in your world? This is also inconsequential to your point. The real question is, once you've correctly established whether its knowledge or a type of induction, then you compare.

Perhaps an underlying point to your critique is, "Do I always have to choose the most cogent answer and not attempt to explore lesser cogent inductions?" No. The cogency is about making the most efficient and rational choice when presented with two alternatives. But, one may wish to be inefficient because they believe there is a greater payoff in the long run.

For example, its highly unlikely you will ever win the lottery. But its possible. You may be willing to forgo your time and money to buy a lottery ticket, even if you never win. In general its not the most rational or efficient use of your money, but if you DO win, it will be. Same with plausibilities. Perhaps there is a plausible challenge to something you know. It might take a week to fully explore that plausiblity to see if it is correct or not. Is that worth your time and energy? If not, it is perfectly rational and efficient to choose not to explore it. But of course, if the plausibility were correct, it very well might lead to knew knowledge which saves you two weeks of time and energy down the road. Is it worth it? That's for you to decide.

Thank you Bob, your input and insight is always welcome! My availability to respond is more limited this week, but as long as you don't mind a possible delay between responses, I would very much enjoy your questions and concerns!

↪Philosophim
What does your proposal have to say about the probability of Last Thursdayism? — RogueAI

Good question!

For those who don't know what that is, last Thursdayism is the idea that the universe was created last Thursday, but with the physical appearance of being billions of years old.

This proposal wouldn't be a probability, it would be an inapplicable plausibility. The outcome is designed in such a way that no one could ever find out if it were applicable, so fits the definition. That's lower down in the hierarchy of induction, so any probability or possibility would be a more cogent belief.

I would love to see more of these types of questions.

Heh, ok Wayfarer. I know when I have or haven't countered something and I admit I'm wrong or mistaken rather often. Truth is more important to me then "winning". Believe it wasn't countered if you want, but it most certainly was.

If you want to go into detail explaining why my point didn't counter yours, feel free, I'll re-engage. Until then, no worry, I'll catch you in another thread.

It seems that if sensory input isn't coming in to the brain, the brain will create it's own hallucinatory input to compensate. People in sensory deprivation tanks hallucinate fairly quickly when deprived of external stimuli. What is the evolutionary benefit of this? — RogueAI

I'm not an evolutionary cognitive scientist, so what I say is as worthwhile as any other person's opinion here. If I had to guess from my limited knowledge, the human brain requires constant work to not be bored. Those cells in your brain need something to do, and like a muscle that hasn't moved in a while, it will atrophy otherwise. Further it could also be a stepping stone to imagining how to get out of your situation, like if you were buried somewhere for example.

What sort of embodied cognition would you say you're defending? — frank

Nerve communication to the brain.

People who have dead nerves in certain places of their body cannot feel anything there.
— Philosophim

What about phantom limb pain? — RogueAI

Good point. Even 20% of people born without limbs have phantom limb syndrome. What this tells us is the brain actively fires looking for limbs to use. Makes sense since even babies use their limbs all the time. The locus of thought is from the mind to the limb, not from the limb to the mind.

If consciousness is strictly a bodily function, we'd have to explain how it is that the body doesn't adapt, but the mind does. — frank

So the reason why your brain understands what is going on in your body is because of nerves which send communications to the brain. it is these nerves which allow your extended consciousness. People who have dead nerves in certain places of their body cannot feel anything there.

As for the body not adapting, how do you conclude that? Increased Melanin in Africa. Extra eye folds for glary environments in Asia. Less melanin for people in cloudy sun limited climates. Even more basic, you can tan your skin, scar, and get calluses. All of these are adaptations.

I stand by the basic claim that numbers, logical principles, and the like, cannot be explained in terms of the interactions of matter. That reason comprises the relationship of ideas, not the relations between material entities. — Wayfarer

Its fine if you wish to stand by that, but it did not counter my point which refutes that. I can respect this however. You've demonstrated your reasons, which has at least helped me to see why you have the view you do. I approach discussions not with the goal of convincing someone else to take another view point because people will believe what they want to believe. I view a discussion as challenging my own logic, and once I believe its been adequately addressed by the other person, I am satisfied.

You can say that the weight of two 500 gram apples equals the weight of one 1Kg melon, but that's because you're mathematically literate and can grasp the meaning of 'the same as' or 'equal to'. — Wayfarer

Right, but this equally applies to discussion of water as I noted earlier. My point is that the ability to identify is the same in both instances. The ability to identify in no way proves that we cannot misidentify. If the mind was independent of objects, then we would not fear misidentifying as a threat to our existence. If I misidentify water versus oxygen when I breath, I'm going to die. My mind cannot prevent that. Therefore it is a logical conclusion that there are objects independent of the mind.

It's those intellectual operations, which we rely on for all manner of reasoned inference, which I say can't be explained in terms of matter and energy. — Wayfarer

You may say this, but I've shown it is. Your brain is made up of matter and energy. Incredulity, disbelief, or the inability to comprehend something does not negate its reality. Until you can show that intellectual operations can exist apart from matter and energy, its not a valid claim.

Great post Bob! I agree with you that at this time there are a few differences of definitions, and we both have to clarify what we mean to a point where we can say we completely understand each other's viewpoints first.

However, I was using it in the sense that you were before: mere awareness (i.e., observation, identification, and action). ...In this case, there is no contradiction in terms because you can have a being which observes and has no qualitative experience. — Bob Ross

I think this was a misunderstanding of an implicit part of the definition of observation. As I defined it was always intended to be qualitative experience.

Observation is the receipt of some type of information. This could be a sense, sensation, or even a thought. Another way to look at is is "undefined experience". — Philosophim

This misunderstanding is on trying to blend our different terms together. I had used the example of a camera and an AI as an observer and identifier. The AI is the observer and identifier, the camera merely provides the information for the AI. Of course, its easy to then say the "camera" is observing. I tried to pivot to your notion of quantitative for the camera, or that we simply observe the camera follows basic set processes of filtering light. I agreed with you that a camera does not have qualitative experience, therefore it is not an observer. At that point I should have switched from "being that observes" to "an observer" to fit better within your terms. A camera quantitatively processes data, but it is not an observer. I can agree with this understanding while also using your terminology.

The point is that your objective consciousness is only this sort of quantitative experience, where “experience” is mere awareness/observation. — Bob Ross

Regardless of our opinions on what definitions to use, we cannot use the term 'quantitative experience'. This simply does not work. Objective consciousness is a quantitative analysis of consciousness. Not an experience, ie subjective viewpoint. If you note that a being can have a quantitative experience, then you are conceding that we can know what a beings subjective experience is like through objective means.

The word quantitative can only be used as an objective outside observation, not an internal one.

I think I agree: an AI is said to have no internal ‘experience’ (in the sense you are now using it) but is understood as still able to observe, and its ability to observe is explained via quantitative measurements. Is that what you are saying? — Bob Ross

No, I noted that an AI is an observer and identifies. Therefore it is subjectively conscious under my initial definition. However, we must more clearly define that this AI must have an "I" which can evaluate as well. I'll go into more detail that later. We objectively know it is conscious because we quantitatively, or by math, understand how it observes and identifies information through functions and algorithms. But do we know what its like to experience being an ai as it observes and identifies? No.

So, although I understand what you are saying, I think you are conflating consciousness proper with meta-consciousness; to keep it brief, there is a difference between having introspective access to one’s qualitative experiences and simply having them. Think of a beetle, they are such a low form of life that they have 0 introspective access to their experience, but they are nevertheless experiencing (qualitatively). — Bob Ross

I think one mistake we've talked past a bit on is what I mean by consciousness. My points are not concerned with higher levels of consciousness or meta consciousness. They really are just about whether there is an experiencing being or a mechanical process which has no experience. To ease confusion and simplify our points, meta-consciousness should not be brought up as I don't see the need for it. When considering consciousness then, we are discussing the minimally viable level to be conscious. That would be experiencing qualia, which requires an "I".

If a beetle can experience and identify, then it is conscious according to my definition. But you make a fantastic point with your example of your unfortunate experience. I have had to step back and wonder if my definition of consciousness was not detailed enough and too implicit. First, there is the question as to whether you were conscious, but you didn't remember that you were conscious. From my point of view, consciousness does not require a memory of being conscious. But does it require memory? For our discussion, I suppose it doesn't. Memory would perhaps involve higher level consciousness, but for base consciousness, no.

Of course, we then come to the other question of your experience. Is it that you didn't remember being conscious, or were you actually unconsciously doing things and no one around you knew? We can site sleep walkers who do things unconsciously and note that in every case, another person can tell they lack some type of consciousness. Still, there has to be some experience and identifying going on with sleep walking. So the question remains. Are they conscious and do not remember being conscious, or can the unconscious mind also observe and identify?

Ironically, my citation of brain scans can give us that answer. if it is the case that brain scans can detect that the unconscious mind is shaping what your conscious mind is about to do, then the answer is obvious. The unconscious mind can observe and identify. But is it itself an observer? I'll get to that soon as well.

From your perspective, I think you are inclined to say that the qualitative experience was gone during those blackouts, and that I was essentially a PZ during those moments. But, to me, we are thereby conflating the ego with the true ‘I’: I was still experiencing (e.g., folding my clothes, conversing with people, watching TV, etc.) but my ‘ego’ had left the chat, so to speak. — Bob Ross

I think this nails the issue down. In the common use of unconscious and conscious, there needs to be the "I", or ego. As I noted, when I said "observe" there's really the implicit I in that statement. So to be explicit, a conscious being is an "I" which observes and identifies. The question still remains as to whether you simply forgot your conscious experience, or if even an unconscious experience has a subjective viewpoint that we are unaware of.

So what does this change? Not much, but it does clarify. The unconscious portion of yourself would be "you", or what you are potentially able to access consciously, while the conscious part would be the ego "I" part of yourself. This would be your subjective consciousness. Where does that leave objective consciousness then? We would just expand our objective test to see by actions things that only a person with an I could do.

Now that I understand you don't divide the "I" between conscious and unconscious, I find your ideas more intriguing and understand some of the earlier points you were making. Also explicitly noting that subjective consciousness requires an I from me does make some of my earlier statements incomplete. I stated that a camera and an AI would be conscious, but no. At minimum it could be unconscious! We would need to have an AI that also would meet the standard for what an "I" is. Consciousness is a next step evaluation of unconscious processing (observing and identifying) that forms an "I".

There is a deeper question here as well. Just because "I" am not experiencing, does that mean that the subconscious has a subjective experience that we are simply unable to know? Schizophrenia is a condition in which a person can express multiple personalities. I've seen it first hand. What if Schizophrenia is a condition where certain unconscious portions of the mind which would normally stay unconscious suddenly enter into the realm of consciousness? Same with "voices" in one's head that don't seem to be one's own.

This is the natural consequence of not being able to determine what it is like for something to experience from its viewpoint. But if an unconscious mind does have a view point that our "I" is unaware of, does that change the notion of consciousness and unconsciousness? I'll need time to think on that personally. At least we both agree on something. It is impossible to know what another things subjective experience is like.

I think that you see the objective and subjective as two sides of the same coin, but you equally hold that the objective doesn’t prove the subjective—and these two claims are incoherent with each other. — Bob Ross

Let me clarify. It is not that the objective does not prove that other beings have subjective experiences. It is only that the objective cannot prove what it is like to BE that subjective experiencer. I've noted brain scans and surgery, which I understand you do not want to accept. If you cannot accept that your mind is caused by your brain, then of course we will have to agree to disagree here.

So I think we can conclude a few things from our excellent discussion.

1. You and I disagree on the definition of consciousness. I require a subjective "I". If I understand correctly, in your view the unconscious still has qualia, which I consider needing a subjective "I" to experience. In your view however the unconscious subject is still an "I" in the sense that this unconsciousness is potentially accessible to the conscious (speaking generally, I understand there are exceptions).

2. You and I disagree on whether or not the brain causes consciousness. A large part of this may be due to your definitions of qualia and consciousness. While you state you believe I have not given enough evidence to prove that the brain causes consciousness, under my terms I have. I have not seen the citations I've given be refuted in any way. Even if you note that the unconscious experiences qualia, the brain scans detecting what the unconscious is thinking about proves it still comes from the brain.
Perhaps it is true that the unconscious has a personal "I", just one that we are not privy too. I would need to look more into the study of the unconscious to make a decision here.

Since I'm not sure there's much more that can be said with these differences, I would like to explore another question. What is your reason for believing that consciousness is not caused by the brain? How will this line of thinking help society? Or is it merely that you just don't see the logical connections, and believe such conclusions are premature and prevent us from discovering the real alternative? My approach to philosophy has always been to make greater sense of the general understanding of the world. To take our common language, clarify it, and get rid of the skepticism or ambiguity that causes confusion at a deeper level. Paradigm shifts like yours seem like radical departures from the norm, and I've always wondered at the motivation for such. Obviously I am not in agreement with it, but it doesn't mean that I can't try to understand it.

This disagreement is also done in full respect Bob! Fantastic thinking was had by all sides, and I have a much better respect for your position now that I understand better the nature of your definitions and outlook. I look forward to your reply.

What you have done looks pointless. — I like sushi

And what you've done IS pointless.

I answered your initial question by informing you that Husserl does not have inductive hierarchies. That's a key point of the OP, and anyone who read it and Husserl would, looking at them in parallel, know what I said was true. Or at least try to show why I was wrong.

That was your test. You clearly didn't read the OP. Hierarchy of inductions is in the summary of the paper, as well as has its own underlined section. You were lazy sushi, and you got caught. Instead of owning up to it and actually trying, you dug in. A first time forum poster nailed the OP flawlessly, while you, a long time poster, mucked about wasting my time. You bet I'm disappointed in you.

I did not say that. — I like sushi

You didn't say the thing you said that I quoted? You're saying my answer that the hierarchy of inductions does not exist in Husserlian philosophy didn't answer your question? I spend my free time here with serious people. Attempt to make an actual point of discussion and I will engage. Otherwise I will be ignoring your posts going forward.

How is it different? — I like sushi

No, that's not the right way to approach this. Spend some time going over the argument, then explain why you believe the entirety of it and its conclusions is simply identical to eidetic reduction and nothing new.

This proves two things to me:

1. I know you've read the OP and actively tried to understand it.
2. You've read and understand what you've linked.

Do that, and I'll know you're serious about discussing. If you can't be bothered, neither will I.

Regardless, I have the view that the law of the excluded middle and other such basic elements of reason, are not dependent on human faculties, but because we have the faculty of reason we are able to discern them. It's precisely the ability of humans to grasp such facts which constitutes reason. — Wayfarer

Indeed, nothing can be said about what exists independently of human faculties (including reason) as whatever that might be, is beyond the scope of knowledge. — Wayfarer

Do you see how your own criticisms contradict your own statements? You claimed that "laws" exist apart from human reason, then in another reply you note that nothing can be said about what exists independent of our reason. Wayferer, how is that any different from humanities conclusion that physical objects exist apart from us, and we have the reason to discern them? Isn't precisely the human ability to grasp such facts which constitute reason? According to your own answer to Janus, your point is invalid.

As for your example, it doesn't stand, as the various forms of water are known a posteriori, whereas the law of identity is known a priori i.e. independently of experience. — Wayfarer

You're not comparing equivalent examples. "Can seven not exist in terms of bananas, dollars, and cars? " would be an equivalent comparison of a posteriori.

In the case of 7=7 could I not also say H20=H20, or "real physical properties" = "real physical properties"? Since real physical properties are equal to real physical properties, this is known apriori, or independently of experience right?

Personally, I do not believe in a posteriori or a priori as a good and clear separation of knowledge claims, but I will go with your separation for now. All I ask is for you to apply your criticisms against an outside physical world to your own ideas of the mental world equivalently.

I was referring to the instinctive belief in the 'mind-independent nature' of objects, which is just what has been called into question by quantum physics, where the act of measurement determines the outcome of the observation. — Wayfarer

That doesn't argue for the mind-independent nature of objects at all though. It notes that our ability to measure, which is applying X to Y and reading the bounce back, affects the outcome. It also notes that because we cannot track the exact location of an object due to very small objects vibrations and fluctuations, we use probability with limits to guess what the particles' location and velocity is to begin with. These are all physical realities, not mind-independent realities.

↪Philosophim So I just wasted my time reading your post? Thanks. Bye. — I like sushi

No, you wasted my time with that question. Obviously phenomenology does not have a hierarchy of inductions. I'm looking for serious discussion and contribution from your end, not troll posts.

The representation, the symbolic form, exists as matter, but the idea is real independently of it’s symbolic form. This is shown by the fact that the same idea can be represented by different forms, but 7=7 is true in all possible worlds. And that is so whether you think of it, or not, or whether it’s written down, or not. — Wayfarer

Referring back to your own words:

But this begs the question - it assumes what needs to be proven. — Wayfarer

Again your presumption of the reality of the object (the idea of 7) conditions your analysis - you presume that the object exists independently of any act of measurement, when that is precisely the point at issue! — Wayfarer

Aren't you just assuming there are other possible worlds? Aren't you assuming that 7=7 is independent of any brain that can think or process that symbology? As for the same idea being represented in different forms, can water not exist as both vapor, liquid, and ice? If H20 does not come together, water does not exist. It has the potential to exist, just as 7=7 has the potential to exist within a thinking mind as an idea. But if there is no thinking mind, there is no 7=7. If there is no combination of H20, there is no water.

Show me knowledge today of something that exists that is not matter and energy. If you do that, then I will concede. If you cannot, then my point stands.
— Philosophim

The number 7 is not matter or energy, yet it exists. — Wayfarer

I admit to some disappointment that my last reply was not addressed here, but I'll address this. What is the number 7 Wayfarer? It is an identity of the mind. Your ability to part and parcel reality into different identities, or "one" identity multiple times, is something most humans are capable of. The brain is as I noted previously, made of matter and energy. Your mind is your living brain. So is the identity of the number 7.

If you mark it down on a piece of paper, it exists in the form of ink and a dead tree. If you say it, it exists as a soundwave before dissipating. And if you think it in your mind, it exists as the energy and matter of your brain processing what we call a thought.

So how could it not exist as matter and energy?

The sense of sight (as a qualitative experience) has something it is like in and of itself. In other words, even if I don’t understand that I am qualitatively seeing, there is still something it is like for me to be qualitatively seeing. — Bob Ross

I think after hearing your explanation again, qualia boils down to subjective experience for me. But, we may dive a little deeper into what subjective experience means because I can see you don't quite mean that either.

In other words, your qualitative experience is really a steady flow of experiences with no distinct boundaries between them; and you single out, or carve out, experiences to compare to others nominally. — Bob Ross

This matches my definition of consciousness. Observation and identification. However, we still have slightly different viewpoints here.

Do we give attention to certain experience over others?
…
Or is this about definitions/identities we create out of the stream of experience we have?

I would say both. — Bob Ross

Just a call back here Bob, but this is what a discrete experiencer does.

So I want to bring back the discussion to quantitative for a second. If a quantitative experience is an experience, is there something that has that experience? For lack of a better term, this would be an "unconscious experience"?

There is nothing it is like to have unconscious experience because it isn’t qualitative; and I think this is where we begin to disagree. — Bob Ross

Ok, I think I've finally narrowed down the problem. We have two different uses of quantitative. We have a quantitative observation and a quantitative experience.

I think we both agree on quantitative observations. If I observe a thing calculating, then the measurement of that would be quantitative.

However, a quantitative experience is a contradiction. You've designed the word quantitative to be something that has no internal experience. If it has no internal experience, it is not an experience. The word quantitative can only be used as an objective outside observation, not an internal one. Therefore it simply can never be an experience without a contradiction of its base term. While it would be easy to dismiss it there, I think you're still trying to nail down something in particular, and I want to invite you to think with me on this.

Lets not use blindsight yet, but something more basic that we can all relate to. There is a nerve that by passes a cell in your lower leg. Its constantly there sending signals, but you're not conscious of it. We can describe this quantitatively of course. But its still a part of you isn't it? Unlike a row of dominos falling (I thought the analogy was quite fine Bob :) ) I can become conscious of that nerve at that cell if I receive a cut. I can have a subjective experience of that nerve cell eventually. I can never have the subjective experience of a set of falling dominos.

So when you mean quantitative experience, I think you're referring to a set of mechanics in our body that we could potentially be conscious of. Or at the least, somehow impacts our consciousness. I'm not quite sure what to call it. But I can see where the word "experience" would tend to come in, because there's the desire for us to say that the nerve cell is us, even though we aren't currently having qualia of it at any particular time.

Initially I want to call it 'unconscious embodiment', or something like that. Some things we are unconscious of can potentially be made conscious of, but then some things within our body we'll never be able to be conscious of, only quantitatively. For example, I'll never be able to conscious of the cells that produce my nails to the point that I can grow my nails faster or slower. I can only quantitatively observe how fast or slow my nails grow.

Also, something that we have an unconscious embodiment of can only be known quantitatively until we can know it qualitatively. This would match with the finding here. https://qz.com/1569158/neuroscientists-read-unconscious-brain-activity-to-predict-decisions

In that article there is a link to the original research paper. As noted:
"Neuroscientists have long known that the brain prepares to act before you’re consciously aware, and there are just a few milliseconds between when a thought is conscious and when you enact it."

And here perhaps we have the missing link. We cannot qualitatively experience the unconscious portions of ourselves. If we do, it then becomes a conscious portion of ourself. That is what I identify as subjective experience. The difference between the quantitative and the qualitative is the objective and the subjective. And our unconscious mind is the qualitative part of us that eventually we become subject to.

The unconscious portion of ourself is not qualia. It is outside of our conscious experience, and this fits with your definition of qualia. Unconsciousness is not a stream of experience that I am deciding what to focus or not to focus on, it is the unbidden processing that eventually becomes a qualia that we can focus on, blur, or dismiss.

Since the unconscious mind is measured quantitatively, and we see that it has a repeatable and known cause of what we qualitatively experience, we have more proof that the brain causes our qualitative experience, or subjective consciousness. We can quantitatively measure the brain and predict qualitative, or conscious outcomes.

Back to blindsight. We cannot say the person experiences seeing an object that they have no subjective conscious experience of. This is part of their unconscious embodiment. Their unconscious embodiment influences their consciousness to say, "I guess it is this," and be correct. This can be quantitatively measured but the subject has no qualia of that experience.

With quantitative experience being a contradiction, I'm not sure where you can go from here Bob. I've shown how we can scan the brain during brain surgery and map the brains signals to a person's subjective experience. I've demonstrated that the unconscious brain can be evaluated to accurately predict what a person will consciously say or experience. I've demonstrated that drugs can affect the consciousness of a person. The only thing left to you, which we both agree on, is that we cannot objectively know what its like to have the subjective experience of a being subjectively experiencing. But this alone is not enough to override the other facts presented at this moment.

Qualia/qualitative experience is simply subjective consciousness while quantitative analysis is simply objective consciousness. There's really no difference between them

This was an ambiguous sentence on my part that you interpreted against what I meant. I meant there was no difference between qualia and subjective consciousness, and a quantitative analysis and an objective measure of consciousness.

I'll leave that here and see what you say Bob.

How anything you are saying is different from what he was outlining with phenomenology. — I like sushi

How to approach reading this paper: This may seem odd, but it is important to come to this paper with the correct mindset to keep discussion where it needs to be.

The discussion on this paper is intended to be an analysis of the terms and logic within it. Your primary approach should not be introducing your own idea of knowledge. Please make your own topic if that is what you desire. — Philosophim

Read the entire argument before posting please. If you have not read the full argument and have only read part of it, like just the summary for example, do not post here. I have encountered this multiple times in the past. It is extremely rude and a waste of my limited time to pursue a question or counter and find the person hasn’t read the entire argument where this would be answered. I welcome all background levels and will not find any discussion poor as long as you have read the paper. — Philosophim

I am not sure it can be made more accessible, though, without losing its inherent strength. At least that is something I am pondering whilst reading my earlier comment. It made an impact on me, but I imagine that was also due to it being outside my regular way of thinking, but also because of the specific instructions about how to go about reading it. Without both, it might just end up being mislabeled and added to other categories, without the growth in mindset it can have (More at the end). — Caerulea-Lawrence

Thank you for the valuable feedback. I have written and rewritten this over a long period of time. The first iteration was 200+ pages, more like a rough draft of ideas. Slowly I pared it down to what I felt was absolutely essential due to feedback from other people. It is nice to hear from someone else that it seems like there's not much else that could be cut without losing something.

To your point about the instructions, those came about because of responses in previous attempts to post this. You are correct. Without those, many people do not understand how to approach a discussion like this. To your point, tackling something outside of your normal line of thinking is difficult. It can be fun with the right mindset, but without that, its easy to let our emotions get the better of us and we look for surface level reasons to escape having to read it.

If there is a small nit-pick I can mention, I do not like the word Irrational... It has some bad connotations, and made it harder to focus on the content and remember it. — Caerulea-Lawrence

I appreciate this feedback as well. My intent was to use inductive terminology that was positive at best, neutral at worst. All four of the induction types have value in certain situations in life. Originally I used the word 'faith', but later stepped back from it because I was worried it would evoke an undue response from some people. I wanted people to focus on the logic first, so eventually I settled on a logic word. However, I agree with you that "irrational" still has more of a negative connotation. Any suggestions on what word you would rather it be named?

God-damn, I am so pleased about understanding the "secret" to the Evil Demon example. Well played by you, too, on that one. There were some hints there that made me question it a bit more, not sure how you did it. Like you subtly 'forced' the meaning or something, not sure. — Caerulea-Lawrence

It wasn't a secret or a trick, you simply used the internal logic of the argument and came to the correct conclusion! It makes me happy to hear that you concluded this yourself, as it lends credence to the internal consistency of the system.

The growth from reading this — Caerulea-Lawrence

That's the greatest compliment I could receive. Good philosophy should enable a person to enhance their life. If you feel you are better able to comprehend the world of ideas, then I am very glad. I use this theory myself in my daily life, so it is gratifying to see it help another.

And in that sense, maybe it is true to say that science is underestimating consciousness a bit too much, and talking about NDE's this way is a kind of backlash to a certain unwillingness, on the flip side, to bother with acknowledging Distinctive Knowledge at all. — Caerulea-Lawrence

Consciousness is sort of the hot topic of the boards recently. I highly encourage people to look to neuroscience over philosophy first, as I believe it is more up to date and necessary to know modern facts about the brain to have a discussion of any validity.

Thank you again for reading and contributing!

Read Husserl. — I like sushi

I have. Anything in particular you wanted me to consider?

Hello Caerulea! I'm so sorry that I never saw your notification that you had replied. I'm pretty upset about it as you spent such a nice amount of time in your reply. Hopefully you're still around to see my response.

First of all, this is a fantastic summary. You nailed the message all the way through. I may use your summary at a future date, so your reply is most welcome. I wrote this so that it would be able to be understood by even someone without a background in philosophy. The fact you nailed it so well, makes me extremely happy. :D

Onto your questions now!

Your summary of the Evil Demon, your point, and your conclusion, are all correct. It is the evil demon itself which is plausible, as no one has ever applicably known an evil demon before. But if we do remove the Evil Demon and use Descartes applicable knowledge of being flawed and misunderstanding reality, your statement:

He believes it is possible that he could view his current worldview as flawed and based on a false (view of) reality. — Caerulea-Lawrence

you are correct.

Maybe I am missing some obvious point, but I was wondering if it is also possible to include the subconscious with regard to the discrete experiencer, or see it as a parallel axis or something? As I am very much more fluent in intuition, emotions and feelings, I am trying hard to focus on the task at hand and not dive into that. Still, I thought this feedback could fit the bill without digressing. — Caerulea-Lawrence

Great question, and I'll need to think about it. You've waited long enough for a reply for now however, so I'll come back when I've had time to think about it and answer.

I think the approach of Bohr's was that it was pointless or impossible to say what the 'object' 'really is', apart from the act of measurement. — Wayfarer

I agree completely with you.

Again your presumption of the reality of the object conditions your analysis - you presume that the object exists independently of any act of measurement, when that is precisely the point at issue! — Wayfarer

I would say this another way. Obviously there's something there to measure. If not, we wouldn't get a measurement. What we do with measurements is create identities. Identities are fully shaped by us. There is nothing within reality that insists that anything must be identified in any particular way. However, in relation to ourselves, certain identities end up being more useful than others. In general, the most useful identities are those which have a clear difference in behavior than the existence around it.

A sheep eats grass for example. There is nothing in reality apart from our observation that necessitates that we identify the sheep and the grass as separate. We could just as easily group the sheep and the grass together. If then we can identify anything in whatever way we want, why do so? Because it turns out reality exists independently of our identities. If I think that rotten looking apple is healthy to eat, it makes me sick. If I identity a 40 foot drop as save to jump down to, I die. So how do we decide what identities work? We decide based on whether reality contradicts them or not.

I could go much more in depth with this in my theory of knowledge paper, you might actually like the ideas contained within. Long story short, we believe our identities represent something in reality as reality will prove us wrong otherwise. In the case of the quantum realm, we're in a serious case of not being able to accurately measure reality. We're working with what we have, which is a lot of probabilities.

As for decoherence, the Wiki article you point to says 'Quantum decoherence does not describe the actual collapse of the wave function, but it explains the conversion of the quantum probabilities (that exhibit interference effects) to the ordinary classical probabilities.' The 'collapse of the wave function' is not at all a resolved issue. — Wayfarer

If you read my conclusions again you'll see I concluded this as well.

As far as readings are concerned, try A Private Vew of Quantum Reality, Chris Fuchs, co-founder of Quantum Baynesianism (QBism). Salient quotes:

Those interpretations (i.e. Copenhagen, Many Worlds) all have something in common: They treat the wave function as a description of an objective reality shared by multiple observers. QBism, on the other hand, treats the wave function as a description of a single observer’s subjective knowledge. — Wayfarer

Yes, but we must be very careful not to translate this into the common meanings of the terms. Notice he's looking at the function, or the identity. Unlike bouncing light off of a sheep, bouncing particles off of quantum particles is going to affect the outcome. If the observation impacts the object, then of course the observation and the object are intertwined. If I push a sheep over for fun, then say, "The sheep will objectively fall over at this spot when someone touches it," that doesn't work objectively. If you touch the sheep with X force at Y velocity at Z location, then the outcome will happen.

A problem with quantum measurement is the sheep is constantly moving, writhing like a mass of worms, and we're trying to aim and hit the same spot every time without anyway to confirm exactly where we hit it. We can't. Don't take the analogy too literally, its just an easy thought comparison. It doesn't meant the sheep wouldn't fall over if the same exact force were applied in the same exact location and all of its internal forces were known. Quantum mechanics doesn't half of that to make a repeatable objective outcome. At best, it has to analyze the limits of possibilities, very much like chaos theory.

The entire point behind all of this conjecture really, is that identities don't create reality, reality impacting other reality is the reality. And sometimes the only identity which can be made is the identity of a reality impacting another reality. It doesn't mean that we cannot identify much of reality without changing it. Eyes are passive receptors of light bouncing off an object. Whether we are here or not, that light is affecting the object in the same way.

I believe his [i.e. Norbert Wiener's] assertion that information is more than matter and energy is wrong. DNA is made up of matter and energy. All life is made up of matter and energy and stores information.
— Philosophim

Again, your dismissal is simplistic. How DNA came into existence is still not something known to science. — Wayfarer

Simple does not mean wrong Wayfarer. In fact, it is my experience the best way to explain complex things is to put many simple things together. Don't mistake my notion that everything being matter and energy explains how something came to be. I don't know if you are a religious person, but none of my arguments refute the notion of a God or some creator. If your hope is that somehow getting away from physicalism saves God, I wouldn't. You can very much argue for a creator or God through the idea that there is a reality independent from us. In fact, I think its far easier. And if you're not a theist, no matter. It just seemed an odd thing to point out when I had never implied that we actually knew how DNA came into being.

The fact that living things are able to maintain homeostasis, heal from injury, grow, develop, mutate and evolve into new species, all involve processes and principles that may not be explicable in terms of physics and chemistry, as there's nothing in the inorganic domain. — Wayfarer

To your earlier point Wayfarer, the "organic domain" is just an identity. While you may find some use in creating such a domain, there is nothing in reality that necessitates such an identity be apart from your world view. A more objective measure is to realize that the "organic domain" is simply when matter and energy behave in a different way. As I noted earlier, matter and energy create water. Think of lava, or complex crystal caverns. Why should any of that exist? Its magic. Same with life. Life is just yet another expression of matter and energy in particular combinations. You see some special difference, but I don't. Its all part of the wonderful reality of existence, something that has no right or reason to exist in the first place.

I much appreciate the link, its a good refresher on Husserlian phenomenology. I have my own theory of identity and knowledge I wrote here some time again. Here's a rewrite in which I greatly simplify the original that Bob and I poured over for almost a year. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context

Good thing I looked to, I had a reply and never saw it until now. :(

This is the original with Bob and I. It might be worth while if you have questions, you can read our back and forth. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge

Let me clarify my terminology with more technical verbiage as, although I do think we are progressing, I think we are (1) using the terms differently and (2) our usages thereof still contain nuggets of vagueness. — Bob Ross

Yes, a good idea. I think I'm going to spend the time really getting into qualia vs quantitative experience as I think that's the crux of where a lot of arguments go.

Also, you brought up some good points, and I just wanted to recognize that: you are genuinely the only other person on this forum that I have discussed with that forces me to produce razor thin precision with my terminology—and that is a good thing! The more rigorous the discussion, the better the views become. — Bob Ross

You as well Bob! It forces me to be clearer, and I think despite whether we agree at the end or not, it forces both of us to be better philosophers. I always enjoy your points, it is fun to be made to think. :)

I am going to revert back to ‘qualia’ being best defined as ‘instances of qualitative experience’; but by ‘qualitative experience’ I would like to include in the definition the property of there being ‘something it is like to have it in and of itself’. — Bob Ross

I feel your definition is not concise enough to give a clear and unambiguous identity. "something it is like to have it in and of itself" is too many words. I can't make sense of it. I'm trying though. In trying to pare the words down I start with "something it is like to have it", and I'm still not quite sure here. If I look at "In and of itself", that seems similar to "experience unidentified". So if I'm seeing, I'm not trying to describe or identify what I'm seeing, I'm just in the moment per say.

If that's the case, then I can combine this into "Something it is like to have experience". Something can be separated into some thing, which I think can be translated to, "What it is like to have experience". Now, I'm not saying that was your intention, but it was the closest I could get to with the definition.

I think this fits more what I am trying to convey, as I think you are thinking that ‘qualitative experience’ and ‘qualia’ are two separate things: the former being non-quantitative experience and the latter being a ‘mental event whereof there is something it is like to have such in and of itself’. — Bob Ross

What I was noting is that there didn't seem to be a discernible difference between qualitative experience and qualia. If my pared down definition of "What it is like to experience" works, then this fits. The hard problem would apply to both in my view. If my pared down definition is also correct, I see no reason for the terms qualitative and qualia. They're the same thing in regards to the assessment. Or so I thought until I read this:

So, to clarify, ‘qualia’ is just an instance of a stream of qualities that we experience which we nominally single out to meaningfully navigate our lives; and the experience of the stream of qualities has of its own accord the property of something it is like to have such. — Bob Ross

I tried to pare this down again. "Qualia is just a stream of qualities that we experience. This is not just any experience though, but experience that we nominally single out to meaningfully navigate our lives".

First, what does "nominally single out" mean? Do we give attention to certain experience over others? So if I'm not paying attention to something in the corner of my eye, is this not qualia? If so, what is it? Or is this about definitions/identities we create out of the stream of experience we have? So for example I say, "That's a TV", because that's meaningful to me in my life.

I then tried to pare down the second sentence. "The experience of qualia has of its own accord, what its like to experience." or "Qualia is what its like to experience". Is this right?

This leaves me now with a question of what quantitative experience is. I'm going to confess something. Words which have the first few letters the same as another are something my brain easily mixes up. I looked back briefly and am not sure that I did not accidently do that between the words quantitative and qualitative. It is something I've worked on a long time, but I still slip up occasionally.

So I want to bring back the discussion to quantitative for a second. If a quantitative experience is an experience, is there something that has that experience? For lack of a better term, this would be an "unconscious experience"? In the case of blindsight, the person would unconsciously see the object, but has no actual qualia, or conscious experience of doing so. I believe this is what you confirmed, but I'm making sure. If so I am fairly certain I had the two terms crossed in my head unknowingly as I was writing them, and most definitely recant that you had a problem in your qualitative/qualia comparison.

When you say we can tell objectively that a being observes, identifies, and acts upon its environment, you are describing a quantitative being through-and-through (or at least that is the conceptual limit of your argument: it stops at identifying Pzs)--not any sort of qualitative experience. — Bob Ross

Yes, I agree with this fully.

If I understand your definitions correctly, then you and I don't disagree. Qualia/qualitative experience is simply subjective consciousness while quantitative analysis is simply objective consciousness. There's really no difference between them. "Quantitative experience" is essentially unconscious experience. If so, then you agree with my division between objective and subjective consciousness as a viable means to assess consciousness. Let me translate my argument to yours so you can see.

Qualia (Subjective consciousness) can be neatly described as, "The viewpoint of consciousness itself".

Quantitative analysis (Objective consciousness) occurs when we can know that something that is not our qualia is also experiencing qualia with identification. The problem in knowing whether something is qualitatively conscious is that we cannot experience their qualia. So the only logical thing to do is to observe what a quantitative consciousness does that only an observing and identifying thing could do.

Quantitative consciousness then requires the addition of one other term, "Action". Only through a thing's actions can we ascertain that it can observe and identify. Combine baking soda and vinegar together and it merely "reacts". Its a simple chemical process with no means of control, identification, or observation. Chemicals collide and results happen.

So there we go, in the end we went about defining a few terms which are semantically no different from one another. :)

I'll stop it here and confirm with you if this is a good breakdown of your definitions. If so, then I'll address the second half.