So let me try to use a more technical definition of ‘qualia’: ‘a mental event whereof there is something it is like to have such in and of itself’. — Bob Ross
I think this is a good approach and agree on this.
In these cases, there is still something it is like in and of itself to qualitatively experience (e.g., to see in the case of a blindsight person or to dream in the other case) and, thusly, they still have qualia. — Bob Ross
I like your separation of qualitative and qualia at first, but then you erase the distinction making qualitative experience just a subordinate of qualia. You didn't answer my question about the difference between conscious and unconscious either. In every normal case of those words, we would say that what is qualitative can be received unconsciously, but what is qualia is what is received consciously. Are we saying then an unconscious being has qualia? A P zombie would be completely qualitative right? It would have to see and act upon different stimuli. If you start to say that qualitative processing is also qualia, then is a P zombie a conscious being? Because we would be saying there is something it is like to have such in and of itself.
If qualitative experience is qualia, then it is a part of qualia. If I agreed with you, in our conversation then its pointless to note what is qualitative and what is not. My reasoning about qualia would still be "the experience from the subject", and you already said that we can match the brain to qualitative experience. Which means we've now associated brain states directly with subjective experience. If it can observe, identify, and this is confirmed in its actions, we just say its a qualitative analysis or objective consciousness that doesn't concern itself with any other type of qualia.
This is a very real problem you'll need to address Bob. If there's no difference between qualitative and qualia beyond qualitative being a specific type of qualia, then it doesn't disprove my argument. The "subjective consciousness" of higher qualia that you note would still just be qualia. If the qualitative is just a form of qualia, brain scans can explain qualitative actions, therefore qualia.
You switched the terminology mid-argument here: the first sentence is about “consciousness” in the sense of qualitative experience—i.e., qualia—and the second was about mere observance/awareness. — Bob Ross
I don't think I switched terminology here. I divided consciousness between the subjective and objective, but they are descriptor of the totality of consciousness as it is generally used today. "Consciousness" as a whole contains both the subjective and objective aspects. Objective consciousness is the expression of the actions that something subjectively experiences. The objective is simply what we can scientifically observe and conclude, while the subjective is impossible to know.
If you are going to say we can evaluate “objective consciousness”, in the manner you have described, then you can’t equally claim that that gives us insight into “subjective consciousness” which is what you would need to prove “subjective consciousness” is caused by brain states. — Bob Ross
Objectively, subjective consciousness is explained by brain states. That we are certain of. Just go back to my brain surgery example. What we cannot know, is what that subjective experience is like from my viewpoint. Objectively, it doesn't matter exactly what the subject is experiencing from its perspective. If the person states they see a tree, we don't need to know exactly how they subjectively experience a tree to believe they see a tree right?
I'll give you another example, a car. We see that a car runs. When we look under the hood we see an engine. How does it move? Gas burns and some weird thing happens that turns the engine. Later we find out its the combustion of gas that leads to magnetism. How does magnetism work? Well... we don't fully know. Its kind of a mystery really. Does that negate that the truck is ultimately run by magnetism, even though we don't understand why exactly magnetism actually works? No.
What I mean by “cause” is the actual reductive explanation of phenomena and not necessarily a physical chain of impact. So, for me, “impact” and “cause” are two different things. — Bob Ross
Sure, lets for now say they don't need a physical impact. But in the case of the brain, it is physical, and it impacts consciousness. Therefore consciousness is caused by the physical brain. The clarification does not negate that. Now if you want to speculate that something else besides the brain causes the mind, we can look at that. I'm not saying the brain is necessarily the only cause.
My problem is that you seem to be claiming that “objective consciousness” and “subjective consciousness” are two sides of the same coin, and the side we see is just relative to our epistemic access — Bob Ross
Yes.
but by this “objective” observation of “consciousness” we gain absolutely no insight into the being also qualitatively experiencing — Bob Ross
Correct.
there is a disconnect there in your argument. When I refer to “consciousness”, I am talking about that private qualia that we definitely cannot empirically observe (which I think you are agreeing with me here) and this has no connection to an empirical merely observation of a being observing, identifying, and acting upon its environmen — Bob Ross
Incorrect, but by just a tweak of wording. Yes, the act of knowing what it is like for another being to be subjectively conscious is unknowable. We can know what its like for ourselves of course. As I've noted, we are incredibly close on our analysis. I think its just a few syntax and definition differences.
We know that as subjectively conscious beings, there are certain actions which we can only do while conscious. So first we define consciousness. I noted it was the ability to observe/experience and identify. I cannot know what exactly another being subjectively experiences while its observing and identifying, so it cannot be part of my definition of consciousness in regards to other beings. But I can know that only a being which can experience and identify can make certain actions. If a being makes those particular actions that require it to observe and identify, then objectively, I can note they are conscious.
Subjective consciousness is for ourselves. It is our personal understanding that it is possible to have a state of experience subjectively. But objectively, no one can ever know that experience, and we cannot know theirs. Can we know they are conscious by their actions? Yes. That is objective consciousness. The analysis of subjective consciousness is a belief system. It is not objective.
Did you know some people cannot visualize in their mind Bob? Its just dark when they close their eyes. Unless they told you, you might never figure it out. Even then, I can't actually know what not being able to visualize is like. I can make conjectures and beliefs, but it is outside of my personal knowledge. Does that mean that I can know people claim they cannot visualize? Yes. Can we make objective tests that a person who can visualize would pass while a person who cannot visualize can fail? Yes.
Its like truth Bob. We can never know the truth. The truth is what is. But can we set up a logical system of deduction called knowledge that works for us in objective society? Of course. Does that fact that we cannot directly know the truth invalidate knowledge as a useful tool? No. Does the fact that we can never know what is true negate the knowledge of the identity of truth as a concept? No. Same with an objective consciousness and its relation to the subjective mind.
Can we doubt that when we know something, it isn't true? Of course. Does doubt alone negate knowledge? The idea that we are being manipulated by an evil demon or are brains in a vat? No, you know this. An objective consciousness is what is within our capability of knowledge. Same with the concept of a subjective consciousness. Does pointing out that because we cannot know what it is like for another being to be subjectively conscious change anything about our objective conclusions? No.
To negate the knowledge that the brain causes subjective consciousness Bob, you have to have more than a doubt. More than a, "But it doesn't quite answer everything." Doesn't matter. All of our knowledge that we hold can be criticized in this way. We may wonder at the mystery of magnetism on the quantum level, but we still use it objectively to power our cars. As well, your own assessment is not free of this criticism either. If you claim brain states do not cause subjective consciousness, you have to combat modern neuroscience and medicine, which holds this to be known. This requires a replacement.
What does your replacement offer? If brain states do not cause consciousness, then what have we been doing wrong all these years in medicine? It is not your notion that we cannot know exactly what it is like to be a subjective being that I disagree with. It is the idea that because we do not, we have to throw away all the other objective knowledge we've accumulated. This knowledge does not make claims about the exact subjective experience of an individual, so where is the logic in throwing it away?
There must be more than doubt, or skepticism, or the idea that our current knowledge cannot identify or understand certain aspects of reality. We must offer an alternative that gives us something better than the current system. I asked this a while back and I'll ask again. What do you hope to get out of your system? I can invent the idea that an evil demon controls all of our actions, but it cannot be proved, so what does it do for us in reality?
What you are referring to, I think, is our ability to affect consciousness with what looks like from our perceptions as physical objects (e.g., popping a pill to get rid of my headache, cutting part of a brain off and observing the person’s personality change, etc.). This doesn’t mean that we have a reductive, conceptual account of brain states producing mental states. Within my perspective, popping a pill is just an extrinsic representation of mentality: the pill doesn’t fundamentally exist as something physical. — Bob Ross
No, the pill is physical because it fits the terms of what physical means. The pill is an identity with a particular set of essential properties. It matches those properties in reality, therefore we know it as a pill. We use the identity of "physical" to represent reality, and our analysis of reality works. Everything is matter and energy, so far that's held. If someone pops a rock instead of a pill, it doesn't matter that they identified and believed the rock to be a pill, its not going to have the same effect. Again, this is general knowledge Bob. You can't come to it and start saying things like "it looks like from our perceptions". If we go that route, we don't have knowledge. And if we don't have knowledge, any system goes. And if any system goes, people are going to choose the system that works in reality, not yours.
"All of existence consists,it is claimed,solely of ideas—,emotions,perceptions,intuitions,imagination,etc.—even though not one’s personal ideas alone."
I did look up the paper, and wanted to point this summary out. Bob, we've already discussed knowledge before. This author is a person who clearly does not understand knowledge. Knowledge and personal experience consists of all of these things. Yet reality is ultimately what all of these are tested against. I can have a dream that I can fly, but when I awake and imagine myself flying, I can't do it in reality. We've discussed this at length in the past, so I do not feel the need to revisit it. His theory is a theory we can invent, but a theory that fails when tested against reality. I will not debate this point as a courtesy since we already have before. This may be a point in which we agree to disagree here. If this is a key point of difference between what is stated here, then we will not be able to continue the conversation. I still have full respect for your thought process, passion, and intelligence, it is just something we have already explored at length.
I'm not sure what you mean by "mind-independent". The brain and the mind are one.
Not quite. Either the brain produces the mind, and thusly the mind is an emergent property thereof (and so they are not one and the same) or vice-versa. — Bob Ross
Let me clarify then, a "living brain" and the mind are one. A dead brain of course produces nothing. But a living brain which fires synapses and has a subjective experience is the mind. Beyond the science of "death", You can do an experiment to confirm this. Note where your consciousness is in your body. Now move to a new location. Does your consciousness move with you? Can you by concentration extend your consciousness out past your body to where you were? I know I'm unable to. Therefore the only reasonable conclusion is that consciousness follows physical movement, and is therefore subject to physical reality. It is located at a particular physical location. With our scientific understanding of the brain, the only reasonable conclusion is that physical location is the brain. I am open to hearing reasonable alternatives.
The point is it is logically consistent to hold that matter and energy can create consciousness internally.
Something being logically consistent doesn’t make it true in metaphysics nor science: idealism and physicalism are both logically consistent. — Bob Ross
That's an avoidant answer Bob. I don't hold to idealism and physicalism because I often find they are summary identities that are not logically consistent when examined in detail. Unless you can show me why its not logical to hold that matter and energy can create consciousness internally, you do not have a logical argument yourself. You either need to present a logical alternative, which I have not seen so far, or demonstrate where my logical claim fails explicitly.
Being able to associate people’s mental activity with brain states doesn’t prove in itself that the latter causes (i.e., reductively explains) the former: you keep bringing up examples of this as if it does prove it. Why do you think it proves it? — Bob Ross
Its not "associate", its real claims of knowledge and science. If you deny this, then once again we're going to have to agree to disagree here. I've given plenty of examples in neuroscience and medicine. I have yet to hear any counters to them besides an insistence its just a correlation. You need to prove they are correlations, not causations, and you have not done so. Expressions of doubt just aren't enough.
Think of lower-life forms, like squirrels: they don’t self-reflectively know (cognitively) that there is something it is like to see from there eyes nor that they qualitatively experience in general. According to your definition, then, one would likewise have to have the over-and-above cognitive abilities to gain self-knowledge of one’s qualia, which is different than the qualia itself. — Bob Ross
According to our discussion of qualia, it is not simply self-reflectiveness. It is the experience of the subject itself. Self-knowledge of qualia is a higher consciousness, but unnecessary to be conscious. If a thing experiences and identifies, it has consciousness. You seem to be implying that only meta-consciousness is consciousness. But its not, its why we note "meta". A squirrel likely may not be able to evaluate its own qualia. That has nothing to do with being conscious at the most basic level.
But the cogitated “2+2=4” or “I am seeing the color red” are self-reflective notions of the qualia--they are not the qualia themselves. — Bob Ross
Self-reflection is also qualia. I don't understand how its not. You even noted that qualitative processing is qualia, so why is this all of the sudden not qualia? On your next pass, lets see if we can really clearly identify what qualia is as a unique identity that does not have these inconsistencies or questions.
I view the term "metaphysical" as its most base definition. "Analysis of the physical"
This isn’t what metaphysics means: it is the “study of that which is beyond the possibility of all experience”. — Bob Ross
The word includes "meta", which essentially means, "about the subject", and the subject is physics, or the physical. Physical in later years has been replaced with "experience", but metaphysics always refers to what is real. It is about taking the real and identifying it in a way that we can logically process. For example, "Gravity pulls everything together", is a metaphysical description of the math and science of gravity. But it relies on there actually being the math and science of gravity. Metaphysics that does not rely on existence or reality isn't metaphysics. Studying what is beyond the possibility of reality is not metaphysics, but speculation and imagination.
Regardless of your definition, the underlying meaning is all that matters. I am discussing matters of experience. Anything that cannot be experienced, is outside of what can be known. Anything outside of what can be known is speculation, and while fun, is pointless to debate the veracity of any one speculation over another.
Finally,
No, objectivity is something that can be logically concluded to the point that any challenge against it fails. A falsifiable claim that cannot be shown to be false essentially.
What do you mean by “logically concluded to the point that any challenge against it fails”? Do you mean logical necessity?
I would say that objectivity is that which its truthity is will-independent.
Also, “a falsifiable claim that cannot be shown to be false” is a contradiction in terms. If it is falsifiable, then it is possible to shown to be false, whereas an unfalsifiable claim is something which cannot be shown to be false. — Bob Ross
Objectivity is deduction that is not contradicted by reality. Going back to a long ago conversation, applicable knowledge. if we don't want to go down that road again, the closest view would be scientific laws and tested theories.
As for falsifiable, all falsifiable means is that we can imagine a situation in which a claim could be false. For example, "I will be at a dinner at 2pm". Its falsifiable in the fact that there is a state in which I am not at the dinner at 2pm." But if I am indeed at a dinner at 2pm, my statement cannot be shown to be false. Apologies for the unclear sentences there.
A good deep dive again Bob! I now these replies are getting long again. I'll try to pare down the next reply.