Causality is potential. To refer to it as a ‘first cause’ and state that it ‘must be’ is logically inaccurate. — Possibility

Causality is also an explanation for why there is a current state.

If you follow the logic of qualitative geometry, a two-dimensional shape can only manifest in relation to a three-dimensional aspect. Therefore, a four-dimensional existence can only manifest in relation to a five-dimensional aspect. — Possibility

And why is that? What is the cause for this?

Thanks, I hope you don't drink and smoke dope all day. All I'm really saying is that religious or mystical experiences or intuitions can be evidence for beliefs for the person who experiences them, but cannot be evidence for anyone else, because there is always the possibility of being wrong. And that possibility obtains also in the empirical sciences, which are perennially defensible. — Janus

No, I do not. Coffee is my vice, and that's it. I also want to apologize for that response yesterday, it was out of line and rude. I think the difference is between the way we use the word "evidence". Experiences and intuitions are feelings. Feelings are reasons why we do or believe things, but they wouldn't be considered evidence in my book.

Evidence would be something which proves that the conclusion we made based on our feelings was right. More importantly, evidence would demonstrate that what would contradict our conclusions, is wrong. So if it we found that when a person talks to God, there was a radio wave or something that left the brain and returned, we couldn't say, "Talking to God is only in your mind."

Human intuition and feelings are often wrong. However, there is nothing wrong with being honest that it is only human intuition and feelings. As long as you state, "Yes, there's no evidence for this, but wouldn't it be fun to explore!" there's no issue. Its when people start claiming that their intuitions and feelings are true claims about reality without any evidence, but claim there is evidence as I've defined, that the exploration has become dishonest and outside of the realm of truth.

Since there is no evidence of a universal mind, then it is false.
— Philosophim

I don't think it's that simple. Most scientific evidence is partial or inconclusive or unconvincing. For the sake of argument, let's assume a universal mind that computes the universe continuously at the quantum level, and its product is the universe as it is. What sort of evidence could one have that it is convincingly so or that it is not so? Is philosophical argument ever possible to prove or disprove the assertion? — magritte

Great post! First, lets qualify that "most" scientific evidence is a biased stretch. There is some science which is inconclusive or unconvincing, but it notes this. Very rarely does actual science declare its found truth when it clearly has not. That would be called bad science.

So what type of evidence do we need to provide for your assertion to prove or disprove your proposal? None, because you haven't set a condition for it to not possibly be disproved. Its not falsifiable. Its a story. A neat story. One that would be cool if it were true, not going to lie. I enjoy the creative exploration of the fantastic. But, one shouldn't get wrapped up in the emotions of the fantastic, and start thinking the positive emotions about it give you an excuse to believe that it must be true.

There's also nothing wrong with stating, "There is no evidence for this thought experiment, but what if..." Every played the game, "if you could pick any super power, what would you pick?" Great fun. Lots of philosophical spring boards can happen from it. But if someone starts saying, "Yeah, its possible we'll be able to alter our genetics to shoot laser beams from our eyes some day," the assertion has changed the notion of the discussion. At that point, you're not having fun about a thought experiment, you're claiming the thought experiment could be reality. And when you do that, you need evidence.

So if you are going to explore the notion that non-physicalism is real, you're going to need evidence. Even if you claim, "Well we know its not real, but what if," you should at least define what something non-physical is.

I did, and it went straight past you. — Wayfarer

You're assuming an empiricist position, and then demanding empirical evidence against it!
— Wayfarer

After that, nothing further to add. — Wayfarer

Anyone who is serious in an argument would repeat it if that was the case, concerned that the other person has missed it or misunderstood. I spent a lot of time taking your requests seriously and laying out the groundwork. I replied that I did not expect empirical evidence against it. I told you to give me some evidence that the non-physical exists. Surely if you believe the non-empirical exists, then you can present evidence of it right? You did not return this, and give me evidence. And if you don't want to, that's fine. But don't tell me you did, when you didn't.

As Wayfarer will tell you, there are philosophers and scientists who would say there is no evidence of physicalism. I suspect both world views in the end come down to a kind of faith. — Tom Storm

Except there is evidence of physicalism. If Wayfarer would provide evidence of some type of non-physicalism, or provide evidence why physicalism is false, then there would be a discussion. Vague references and a lack of evidence will convince no one.

Not really. Many forms of idealism argue for a universal mind (essentially a primitive instinctive consciousness) which holds object permanence and provides us a shared reality independent of our minds. Humans are dissociated alters of the Great Mind - that kind of thing. — Tom Storm

If it is backed by evidence, then there's something there. If there is no evidence, its just a made up wish. The falsification of the idea, is that there is no universal mind. Since there is no evidence of a universal mind, then it is false.

Fine, then don't give me the evidence. I go about my way unchanged. Enjoy the rest of your day.

It seems to me you are the one running away; deflecting because you can't come up with a counterargument to what I'm saying about the difference between public and private evidence, the subjective nature of judgements of plausibility in relation to metaphysical questions; and their consequent undecidability. — Janus

You did not address my entire post. Its been a pleasant conversation until now. I told you to give me your evidence, that I can intuit and think as well. I've been very clear what viable evidence would be. I indicated deduction vs. induction, because of this very important claim:

So though I might have an induction that my consciousness is separate from my brain, the premises of neuroscience conclude that my consciousness comes from my brain.

Do you get it? I want to know I will live forever Janus. I want to die, go to heaven, see family and friends again. I want to be able to drink and smoke dope all day and it not affect who I am. I have an intuition that this could be. But that's an induction. And there is no evidence that this will happen. You claim you have evidence. Well give it! Why are you holding out? Why can't you give me something where I can rationally pursue my induction?

If you truly believed you had evidence of what was non-physical, you would rush out to help me like the good soul you are. But you don't, do you? Because I believe you're a good soul, and if you had it, you would. So don't run away. If you're a good soul, try. And if you know you can't, then just say you don't have it. We'll both be happier that way.

I have no take on the matter, its an interesting topic I would need to think on.
— Philosophim

I suggest you do that before reflexively reeling off an answer. — Wayfarer

I did not reflexively reel off an answer. And that is not the topic. The topic is I provided what I would need as evidence of something non-physical that produced our consciousness. Now, are you able to do so, or can you not?

It's obvious; we intuit and imagine differently. I cannot feel your intuitions and vice versa. They thus cannot be evidence in the public sense you are asking for. — Janus

Janus, you just ignored the rest of my post. You are running away. Don't do that.

You would not recognize non-physical evidence. The only such evidence is that of the intuitive or imaginative faculties. But such evidence cannot be inter-subjectively corroborated. So it can never be evidence in the "public" sense, but only evidence to the individual whose imagination or intuition tells them that there is something beyond the empirical reality of the shared world. — Janus

Stop telling me what I will and will not accept, and just give me the evidence. I can intuit and imagine. Why do you think we can't corroborate that? I intuit that there is not something beyond the empirical reality of the shared world. I also intuit that invisible magical men exist that guide my every move. That's called a "belief". A belief is a very real thing. Beliefs are inductions, meaning that the premise of the belief does not necessarily lead to the conclusion someone holds.

The difference between an induction and a deduction, is that in a deduction, the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. So though I might have an induction that my consciousness is separate from my brain, the premises of neuroscience conclude that my consciousness comes from my brain. A deduction is always more rational to hold than an induction. To prove the deduction wrong, you need to introduce a premise that demonstrates we cannot conclude that consciousness is purely physical. That requires evidence of something non-physical, not an induction.

But the issue there is that the 'criterion of falsifiability' was devised by Karl Popper specifically to differentiate an empirical from a non-empirical claim (I notice Kuro has made a similar point.) — Wayfarer

I see, so your definition of what non-physical is, is that it is not empirical. Meaning that there is no evidence of its existence or evidence of experience. I'm having to glean what you mean by non-physical, as no one has provided a definition of what it means so far. Give me claims of something that exists that cannot be experienced. Its falsification is that it can be experienced. If you can provide me an example of something that cannot be experienced, and I am unable to show that it can be experienced, then you've given valid evidence of something non-physical.

You're assuming an empiricist position, and then demanding empirical evidence against it! — Wayfarer

I am not. I am asking you to provide evidence of something that is not empirical. Why is that so hard? To argue against it, I would need to demonstrate that the non-physical existence is indeed empirical. If I could not, then you have something.

But anyway, to illustrate my point, consider the argument about the reality of numbers (see What is Math?). The argument is, on the one side, that numbers are real, independently of anyone who is aware of them - which is generally known as mathematical realism or mathematical platonism. It grants mathematical objects reality, albeit of a different order to empirical objects.

A counter argument might be that numbers are the artefacts of human thought and that they're only real in that context. — Wayfarer

Again, we can falsify both of these positions. If numbers are real independent of people, then what is a number? Does it mean the symbol, "1"? Does it meant the concept of "an" identity versus "multiple identities? Can we demonstrate that numbers exist in a setting devoid of anything conscious but an observer?

The counter argument of course has its own falsification. That being of course that they could exist independently of human thought. I have no take on the matter, its an interesting topic I would need to think on. But first lets address this topic. The point is, I'm not a dogmatist. I'm open to other possibilities, no matter how wild and crazy. But, it needs to be logical. If you're going to claim something exists, please present evidence of its existence, and demonstrate that there is the possibility of its negation. The possibility of its negation does not mean it is negated, it means it is something we can test against to see if it exists.

Matter is not the same as energy. Equivalent yes, the same no. Pure energy particles are different from massless matter particles. — EugeneW

I've given you a link to science article which clearly mentions that energy and mass are different expressions of the same thing.

From the article:
"Mass and energy are both but different manifestations of the same thing — a somewhat unfamiliar conception for the average mind."
Albert Einstein, Atomic Physics (1948)

Feel free to explain why the quote is wrong, or the article is wrong. I'll need more than just a quick opinion on this. Again, I'm not stating you aren't correct, but you need to give some evidence if I'm to know that.

There is no evidence either way as to whether consciousness "exists on some plane beyond the physical", because all our (intersubjectively corroborable) evidence is physical evidence. You're assuming that the only possible evidence is physical evidence, and then concluding that there is nothing but the physical; in other words, you;re committing the fallacy of assuming your conclusion. — Janus

Basically you're stating there is no evidence of the non-physical. The only conclusion we can reach then, are physical ones. All I asked is to give me evidence of non-physical reality. Its like magic right? Give me evidence that magic exists. If someone said, "Well the problem is all of our evidence of things I might consider magic is in physics and chemistry," I would say, "Then there doesn't appear to be any evidence of magic."

I am not precluding that non-physical evidence cannot exist. So no, I am not committing a fallacy. I'm simply asking you to provide evidence that the non-physical exists. Its very clear. What is it? What does it do? How does it interact with the brain? How does it surpass the physical elements of the brain?

We can use alcohol as an example. We all agree that getting drunk impairs our consciousness. So you need to give non-physical evidence and explanation for this. We can likely conclude that the non-physical must interact with the physical, as a physical alteration also alters a person's consciousness. If so, we should be able to detect or find something that is interacting with the physical brain that is not physical. Can you provide such evidence?

But what is matter? What is it that propels it? — EugeneW

A small primer to read. http://ifsa.my/articles/mass-energy-one-and-the-same

What does freedom mean to you?
— Philosophim
I am in the group that believes there is free will in thought. — L'éléphant

I see. That is not my personal opinion myself, but I feel that "free will" is such an ambiguous term that it can mean different things to different people without issue. Still, a very nice post L'elephant!

Then you're a naive realist? — Harry Hindu

No.

What does it mean to be physical? — Harry Hindu

To be made up of matter and energy. And I will return the question. What does it mean to be non-physical? What evidence do you have of it existing?

How is it that when I observe your mental processes I experience a brain but when I observe my own I experience a mind? — Harry Hindu

You've made a common mistake of equating the outside observation of something, to the experience of being something. Find any other person in the world. Do you know what it is like to be them? No, but that doesn't mean they don't exist. Do you know what it feels like for them to hear the beating of their own heart? No, but that doesn't mean they don't have a heart, that it doesn't beat in their body, and that they can't feel what that's like.

If I open up a brain and look at it, I don't know what its like to BE that brain. You seem to think there should be a picture show going on in there, which is silly. What we imagine in our heads isn't light. Its the communication of hundreds and thousands of electrons at incredibly high speeds.

How the computer works is much the same. If I open up a hard drive, do I see windows running? If I open up the ethernet wires, can I see youtube and sound being streamed over? And yet if you told a programmer that this is evidence that the computer's functionality is a non-physical process, they would laugh at you.

The problem is, sometimes people believe that if they don't understand how something fully works, they can make up things about how it works. You can't. You can't introduce things that don't exist into a system. You can't say, "I don't understand how youtube can be on my screen, yet not be in my computer when I look at it," and think your made up idea that it must be a non-physical process has any merit.

Back to the brain for a second, when we physically and chemically alter the brain, people's experience of BEING a brain changes. We've confirmed that time and again. Go get drunk, then tell me that your consciousness exists on a higher level beyond what physical alcohol can touch. Go read the evidence of anti-psychotic drugs, hallucinegens, and amazing records of brain damage like loss of long term memory, the inability to mentally see colors, comprehend words, etc, then tell me their consciousness exists on some plane beyond the physical.

If you can't explain how it happens then there is a problem with the theory that says that it does happen. Until you've explained how it does happen then it's still quite possible that you have a problem of correlation and not causation. — Harry Hindu

Incorrect. Do you know how your car works? And yet, you know the car works because of the things in the car, not because of an intangible non-physical process. If we studied the brain and found things that were non-physical, then we could state, "maybe its this non-physical stuff that causes consciousness."

There is none. There is nothing non-physical interacting with the brain. If you say, "Well the physical can't detect the non-physical," then you're making up a magical fantasy unicorn, and can be dismissed.

There is no detection of anything non-physical in the brain, or dealing with consciousness. Period. Unarguable. Uncontroversial.

But Descartes actually demonstrated that there is, indeed, freedom in us. And it comes in the form of thinking, or rational thinking. How so? We can control our thinking. — L'éléphant

I'm not sure Descartes declared we had free will. He simply declared that which he was unable to doubt, in fact, that which arguably he had no control over, was that he thought, therefore he must be.

And we’ve somehow achieved freedom of thinking by arriving at the ”I” or the self. By differentiating ourself from the collective “we”. — L'éléphant

An interesting point. Our brains are actually many cells working in tandem with different parts that do different functions. I still don't see how that necessitates freedom though. I suppose its what you mean by freedom. Some people mean that freedom is absolute power, unconstrained by things such as biology. I think very few people would say that's viable.

Another term of freedom might be the freedom of external dominance of your internal conclusions. So if I decide to watch TV, no one will come and shut if off or threaten me because they don't think I should. I tend to like this definition more, as it avoids the notion of freedom from determinism, and more about the levels of influence within deterministic systems.

But that is a spring board for you to decide. What does freedom mean to you?

You seem to be using a two different definitions of 'existence', one that applies to objects (things that are contained by space and time), and the other 'everything that is real'. — noAxioms

If something applies to "everything that is real," then it also applies to any of its subsets like objects. So I don't think I'm using two definitions here.

To say that there is a first cause is probably no more than to say — noAxioms

I'm not trying to assert any one specific first cause. All I'm asserting is that if you follow the logic of causality, it necessarily results that there must be a first cause.

a. There is always a X for every Y.
True only in classical physics. An easy example is the decay of an atom, which occurs uncaused. That Y has no X, and as such there is precedent for an 'alpha' as you call it. — noAxioms

I think you misunderstand, if there is no cause for the decay of an atom, than that decay is the "alpha", or the first cause. It has no prior explanation for why it decays, it simply is. This is not a deistic argument. If that is getting in the way of you understanding the argument, please be rid of that notion. I am only using "alpha" in the sense of "first letter".

That being the case, there are explanations for why atoms decay. Not that that is particularly important either. The question is whether I've shown that it necessarily must be the case that there is at least one first cause in the chain of causality.

First integer? Sure, that would be one.
— Philosophim
That's like saying the first moment in time is now, or that space begins here on Earth. — noAxioms

No, it literally means the fact that the first integer is 1. :) Don't read too much into it.

OK, I don't buy that time isn't bounded in the past direction. — noAxioms

That's fine, but that's not what the OP is addressing. I'm not addressing what you believe is a first cause. I'm addressing that logically, there must be a first cause.

As an aside, can you answer a question: What is a distinguishing characteristic of a unicorn? I mean, one legend has it that it blows rainbows out of its butt, but I don't think that one is universally agreed upon. — noAxioms

Big question that's more about epistemology. I have an entire other thread where I cover that. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge

In short, if we're talking my personal definition of a unicorn, it can be anything. If we're talking about a societally agreed upon term for a unicorn, I would say the essential property that most people agree on is that its a horse with a horn on its head, and followed slightly less with "magical".

Good response Bob! I can see we're still on different tracks of thought, but I think we're close.

This is why I think it may be, at least in part, a semantical difference: when you refer to "application", you seem to be admitting that it is specifically "application to the external world" (and, subsequently, not the totality of reality). In that case, we in agreement here, except that I would advocate for more specific terminology (it is confusing to directly imply one is "application" in its entirety, which implies that the other is not, but yet claim they are both applications). — Bob Ross

Yes, I believe the term has brought confusion as noted before. Here's the thing, I can't say "external world" for a foundational theory of knowledge. Perhaps we can conclude there is an external world, but I never did that in the theory. All I noted in the beginning was that there was a will, and that reality sometimes went along with that will, and sometimes contradicted that will.

The only reason we have a definition of reality, is that there are some things that go against our will. Reality is the totality of existence that is in accordance with our will, and contrary to our will. I have never attempted to define an external world, though my vocabulary has not been careful enough with this in mind.

All knowledge is "Deduction based on what is not contradicted". The separation of distinctive and applicable is based on its simplicity versus complexity. Also, its general relation to how people speak. It is a model intended to mirror the idea of a proven external world without actually stating "there is an external world".

So why have I not declared an "external world" as synonymous with applicable knowledge? Because there are things we can do in our own mind that go against our will. Lets say I imagine the word elephant, and say, "I'm not going to think of the word elephant." Despite what I want, it ends up happening that I cant' stop thinking of the word.

Distinctive knowledge comes about by the realization that what we discretely experience, the act itself, is known. But anytime there is a claim of knowledge that could potentially go beyond our will, that is an attempt at applicable knowledge. So, if I claim, "I will not think of the word elephant 1 second from now," I must apply that to reality. One second must pass, and I must not have thought of the word. If I did, I applicably know that your earlier statement was false.

Basically, when your distinctive knowledge creates a statement that the act of the discrete experience alone cannot confirm, you need to apply it. I can discretely experience an abstract set of rules and logical conclusions. But if I apply those abstract rules to something which cannot be confirmed by my current discrete experience, I have to apply it.

So, if I construct a system of logic, then claim, "X functions like this," to know this to be true, I must deduce it and not be contradicted by reality. Once it is formed distinctively, It must be applied, because I cannot deduce my conclusion about the world from the act of discretely experiencing alone. I can discretely experience a pink elephant, but if I claim the elephant's backside is purple, until I discretely experience the elephants backside, I cannot claim to applicably know its backside is purple. This is all in the mind, which is why I do not state applicable knowledge is "the external world".

My imagination of a unicorn is distinctive knowledge (pertaining to whatever I imagined), but so is the distinction of the cup and the table (which isn't considered solely apart of the mind--it is object). — Bob Ross

Correct. There is no question that when you discretely experience what you are calling a cup and table, you have distinctive knowledge that it is what you are experiencing. But if you claim, "That is a cup and a table", you must apply your distinctive knowledge to the cup and table to ensure reality does not contradict you. You must take the essential properties of the distinctive knowledge of a cup and a table, and test them. Only if you do without contradiction, can you applicably know that is a cup and a table.

However, if what you mean by "attempts to claim something beyond them" is simply inductions that pertain to the discrete experience of objects, then I have no quarrel. — Bob Ross

So yes, if I claim that what I am discretely experiencing does in fact fit my definition of cup and table, I am inducing that is so. I must then apply my discrete experience to applicably know whether my induction is true or false.

Addressing Kant, yes, there are aspects of apriori and aposteriori that are good, it is just as a whole, I find their logic and conclusions incorrect. Lets not get into Kant, just know that I did not find the terms logically consistent or useful enough to use, and felt they would lead people away from the concept I'm trying to convey.

Distinctive awareness - Our discrete experiences themselves are things we know.
Contextual logical awareness - The construction of our discrete experiences into a logical set of rules and regulations.

To clarify, our discrete experiences themselves are things we know by application via reason. — Bob Ross

I think its necessary at this point that we define "reason". I've never used the word reason in the paper, and with good "reason" :grin: I tried defining as few concepts as I could, and tried to avoid introducing anything that I had not fully defined first. I'm not saying I succeeded, but that was the intent.

When you say we know our discrete experiences by reason, I've already stated why we know them. We know we discretely experience because it is a deduction that is not contradicted by reality. So, if I am to define reason according to the epistemology I've proposed, reason would be utilizing the distinctive and applicable contexts of deduction, induction, and pon. But that is all I have at this moment (I think).

However, I've noted that "reason" is an option. It is not a necessary condition of being human. There is nothing that requires a person to have the contexts of deduction, induction, and pon. One may of course act with inductions, deductions, and pon, but not actively have knowledge that is what they are doing. You are a very rational person, likely educated and around like people. It may be difficult to conceive of people who do not utilize this context. I have to deal with an individual on a weekly basis who are not "rational" in the sense that I've defined.

So I have defined the utilization of reason as having a distinctive and applicable context of deduction, induction, and lets go one further, logic. I have also claimed that there are people who do not hold this context, and in my life, this is applicably known to be true. But, that does not mean that is what you intend by reason. Could you give your own definition and outlook? Until we both agree on the definition, I feel we'll run into semantical issues.

When I add these two potatoes together, what happens if one breaks in half? Do I have two potatoes at that point? No, so it turns out I wasn't able to add "these" two potatoes.

I feel like you aren't referring to mathematical addition, but combination. — Bob Ross

What is addition in application, versus abstraction? If I add two potatoes together, my first thought is, "I'll put them in proximity." If you just mean counting, then that would be different. In that case, we still have to do something more to applicably know we can add those two potatoes. Very simply put, we need to applicably know if they are actually potatoes. If so, then we can add them. If one was really not a potato, then we wouldn't have applicably added those two potatoes. At best, we can say we applicably added two identities. So lets go with that, as I think this is closer to your intention.

Lets say I have the abstraction that I can count two identities. This is distinctive knowledge. But to applicably know that I can, I have to actually count two identities. This of course is trivial, but this triviality is the fine point between distinctive and applicable knowledge. One is the formation of a set of definitions and rules. The second, is its application.

The formulation of definitions and rules in our head may be sound to our minds. We distinctively know what they are. But do we know they will work when applied to a particular situation? Not until we actually apply the rules to the situation itself. The mistake of "generic" knowledge is believing that the construction of definitions and rules means that we know the outcome of their application, even if we have not attempted it before.

Think of it this way: I can also "know" what cannot occur in the external world without ever empirically testing it based off of shapes--which encompass the external world as it is discrete experience. Can you fit a square of 5 X 5 inches in a circle of radius 0.5 inches? No. — Bob Ross

When you state "know", try to divide it into distinctive versus applicable knowledge. Do you applicably know this, or distinctively know this? Because you are not dividing the knowledge as noted in the epistemology, I think you believe that I am claiming that we don't know math. We distinctively know math. We also have applicably known and used math in the world numerous times. There's no question that in the abstract we can't fit a square of 5X5 into a circle of radius .5 inches. But that does not mean we can applicably know that "that" particular square that we discretely experience cannot fit into "that" circle of radius .5 inches until we actively try, and find we can do so without contradiction.

(In regards to space) I am referring to that which is discovered, projected, and conceivable--holistically all experience. — Bob Ross

Again, is this distinctive knowledge, or applicable knowledge? Try to fit it into one of those categories. If you are unable to, then perhaps you can demonstrate that the distinction is broken, not useful, or lacking. But if you're not making that distinction, then you're not really discussing in terms of the epistemology, but in the terms of a completely different context that we have not really agreed on. To me, "holistic" means I'm applying my distinctive knowledge, not merely armchairing in my mind. In which case, this means you agree with me that we can applicably know certain distinctive contexts of space by the application of our very existence, but have not applicably known others.

I think I following what you are saying now. We don't ever, under this epistemology, really state "historical facts" other than that which is deduced. Everything else is simply a hierarchy of inductions, which we should always simply hold the most cogent one. The problem is that there's never a suspension of judgement: we also claim a belief towards whatever is most cogent. Again, when is it cogent enough for me to take action based off of it? — Bob Ross

I'm not sure what you mean by "there's never a suspension of judgement". If I'm judging that one induction is more cogent than another, how am I suspending judgement? In regards to when is something cogent enough to take action, that is a different question from the base epistemology. I supply what is more rational, and that is it. At its most simple, one should simply act based on the best applicable knowledge and inductions you have. That being said, I do have a much broader answer. It is just that your question is not a negation of the epistemology proposed, and I want to make sure we understand that first. If you would like this explored in the next post, let me know and I'll cover it.

I don't think really addresses the issue. I used the terminology "speculates it could" because you used it previously, and I was trying to expose that it is the same thing as possibility (in a colloquial sense). It is redundant: to say "it could" is to say "it is possible" (in the old sense of the term). And, no, "it could be the case" is not equivocal to "I believe it to be the case" — Bob Ross

I think we're stuck on definitions here. Saying "it could" needs to be specified. While you might say "it could, because it is possible", you could just as easily say, "it could, because I speculate, or its probable, etc." And yes, if you intend "I believe it to be the case" as an affirmation, then it is not equivalent to "it could be the case". The problem is "it could be the case" is too ambiguous. In my mind, I added, "I believe it could be the case".

If I claim "Jones could have 5 coins in his pocket", I am not stating that I believe he does have 5 coins in his pocket. I am saying nothing contradicts the idea that he has 5 coins in his pocket (e.g. the dimensions dictate otherwise, etc). — Bob Ross

Explicitly, what you are stating is, "I believe Jones could have 5 coins in his pocket." But what is the reasoning of "could have" based on? A probability, possibility, speculation, or irrational induction? Pointing out that "could have" means I can't clearly assert if Jones could have 5 coins in his pocket, is a criticism of the old epistemology that does not have a hierarchy of inductions to clarify such situations. I have a clear breakdown of inductions. Since we are not using those here, we are not using my epistemology, but the old (which has several more problems besides this one!)

My epistemology simply asks you to clarify what type of induction you are making by saying "could". I provided examples with this epistemology that could give you the answers. While using the epistemological breakdown of the induction of "could", is there some type of scenario you feel the breakdown is missing? The epistemology notes that "could" is simply ambiguous, and a more rational assessment can be obtained by breaking the induction down into the hierarchy. Is this wrong?

My reasoning for why "it could be the case" is abstract, but has nothing to do with reasons why he does have 5 coins in his pocket (or that I believe he does). — Bob Ross

What do you mean by "abstract"? It seems to me this is just ignoring the hierarchy. Which again, is not a slight on the hierarchy, its just a rejection of its use. If we reject its use, we cannot criticize it for not being used. The hierarchy notes you need to specify which type of induction you are using. If you don't, then you're not using the epistemology, but some other type of system.

There's a difference between claiming there is colloquially a possibility that something can occur and that you actually believe that it occurred. Does that make sense? The dilemma is the latter is non-existent in your epistemology. Smith, in the sense that he isn't claiming to believe there are 5 coins in Jones' pocket, is forced to say nothing at all. — Bob Ross

Just to ensure the point is clear, both situations exist in the epistemology. I can induce that it is possible that Jones has 5 coins in his pocket based on reasons. Every induction could turn out correct, or incorrect. So I can state, "Its possible that Jones has 5 coins in his pocket, but I'm going to believe he does/does not". My belief that Jones does not have 5 coins in his pocket does not negate the fact that I still think it is possible that he could. I hope in this way, I've used "could" unambiguously. If you are asserting an affirmative, that is not considering whether they "could". Considering a could, and asserting an affirmative are two separate conclusions.

If your follow up question is, "Which affirmative should we choose when faced with the induction we've concluded is most cogent", I can address that next response for that will be a large topic.

Potentiality is very clear (actually more clear, I would say, than possibility): that which is not contradicted in the abstract which allows that it could occur. — Bob Ross

Perhaps it is clear to you, but for my purposes, it was not yet. That is not a your fault, but mine. I think the problem here again is the ambiguity of "could occur". I can create abstract knowledge distinctively. And I can attempt to apply it to reality. Essentially, I'm making an induction that my abstract can be applied in X situation without contradiction.

An induction by definition, is uncertain. For potentially to be meaningful, we also have to consider its negation. If something did not have potential, this translates to, "Distinctive knowledge that cannot be attempted to be applied to reality." This seems to me to be an inapplicable speculation. Which means that any induction that could attempt to be applied would be considered a "potential', even irrational inductions.

Basically, its a short hand identity that wraps up probability, possibility, speculation, and irrational inductions. It ignores the hierarchy besides inapplicable speculations. And of course, this leads to problems, because its essentially ignoring the valuable differences between the different types of inductions. This is of course the problem with the old knowledge. Without a hierarchy of inductions, you run into massive problems in epistemology when trying to analyze inductions. Again, any criticism against the epistemology you come up with while using the word "potential" is because you're effectively ignoring the epistemological hierarchy, and really criticizing what happens when you don't use that hierarchy.

He is not claiming speculation that Jones has five coins in his pocket: he is claiming that Jones' could potentially have five coins in his pocket. — Bob Ross

Exactly. So Jones is claiming, "I have an induction but I'm not going to use the hierarchy to break down what type of induction I'm using". Again, not a criticism of the epistemology, it is simply not using the epistemology, then trying to point out that the epistemology cannot handle a case in which it is not used.

Really fantastic and deep points Bob!

While falsifiability can definitely be proper of scientific discourse, for good reason even, I think it is seldom at all a good condition of philosophical or mathematical discourse which includes philosophical evidence that is sometimes given in the form of proofs. This is because some of the truths that philosophers and mathematicians deal with genuinely have no falsity conditions, i.e. all tautologies, like a=a or (p∨(q∧r))→((p∨q)∧(p∨r)), simply cannot be falsified but are undoubtedly true. — Kuro

Incorrect.

If A=B, then a=a is false.
If P and it turns out that there is no p, q, or r, then the second statement is false. Logic is clearly falsifiable. Falsifiability does not mean, "It is necessary that it is false." It just means there can exist a condition in which it could potentially be false. An assertion must always allow the potential of its negation.

In a similar manner, contradictions are falsums, and in classical logic or other logics that uphold noncontradiction, if we have a contradictory formula like p∧¬p, then this always returns false whereas its negation ¬(p∧¬p) will be a tautology: i.e. will always return true and cannot be false, thus is unfalsifiable. — Kuro

Similarly, if something IS false, then it of course isn't true. That does not mean they are not falsifiable. For ¬(p∧¬p), the falsifiable condition is if (p∧¬p) existed. Again, the possibility of the condition for it being false, does not mean it IS false. Back to the original example, if there does not exist a single apple in the world that is not sweet, even though I can propose a condition where it could be false (an apple could be bitter), we cannot find that false condition. Therefore it is true that all apples are sweet, its just that it is falsifiable in the fact that there is a potential negation state to consider (an apple could not be sweet).

Well, a common objection in philosophical argumentation is a self defeat objection. If an opponent of a position finds a contradiction in its doctrine, then if that contradiction is genuine, the doctrine will be always false. And so the negation of the doctrine will be always true with no falsity conditions. — Kuro

So to be clear, if someone demonstrates that the negation of an assertion cannot be true, that makes the assertion true, but falsifiable. IE, there is a potential condition in which it could be false, but it if found that condition simply cannot exist.

In the context of the materialism/physicalism, the thesis that there exists only the physical, then if an opponent of the doctrine found it to be contradictory and was hypothetically successful, his proof of the negation of physicalism will be unfalsifiable by definition due to the logic outlined earlier. And this trivially entails the existence of at least one non-physical entity granting physicalism as false. — Kuro

So I think you understand now. Physicalism is falsifiable by stating it could be the case that physicalism is false. For example, I could state, "Everything is all in the mind, there is no physical world." Of course, just because I can propose something that would potentially show it to be false, it does not mean it IS false. As it is clear that everything is not in the mind, and there is a world outside of our thoughts, this claim against physicalism which could show it to be false, is false itself.

For these purposes, I think falsifiability is a terrible criterion in the context of philosophy, but may be more fit for other uses like science or other empirical inquiry, and therefore also urge that you reconsider it. — Kuro

Now that you understand what falsifiability is, do you still have an objection to it?

What would you consider evidence for the reality of the non-physical? — Wayfarer

A very good question. First, it needs to be something falsifiable. By that, I mean that there needs to be some way of clearly defining what the non-physical is, and testing it. A common example is if I say, "All apples are sweet" if I find a sour apple, then the claim could be wrong. If I found a sour apple and the evidence tried to say, "Well sour is a kind of sweet," Or that really all variations of flavor, including bitter and salty were some kind of sweet, then there's an issue.

Second, it must have greater evidence and logic than alternative ideas. If we have two ideas for why rain happens, one being Zeus, the other being the 5 stages of the rain cycle, the second, even if there are still unanswered questions in the 5 stages of the rain cycle, it is a more viable claim than the first.

Finally, not understanding something does not mean we can propose an explanation for it as evidence. If we don't understand something, than the reality is, we don't understand something. History is filled with people doing this, and its always wrong.

I can't be bothered arguing against that kind of complacency. — Wayfarer

Complacency? If I accepted something without evidence for my emotional gratification, that would be complacent.

Don't you think I would love it if we had immortality, or there was some viable evidence of our consciousness continuing to exist? Wouldn't it just be easy for me to pretend with a smile that I'm going to live forever? Of course it would. But there's no viable evidence Wayfarer, there's none.

I'm not disputing the facts of evolution, but h. sapiens realises horizons of meaning which are completely unavailable to other creatures. In fact I don't really understand why this is something that has to be argued for, when the differences between h. sapiens and other species seems to blindingly obvious. — Wayfarer

I'm not arguing that we aren't the best brained animal out there. I'm not arguing that we cannot do amazing things. But we're still animals, and brains and bodys at the end of the day. Its not beyond reality, its part of reality. And yet there is a desire in us that insists that we are somehow separate from our brain and body, with no evidence but a wish.

While the counter point to Darwin is fine, its old. Darwin's theory has come a long way since then, and we've discovered DNA. Want a human? Make the proper DNA sequence. Want a sheep? Proper DNA sequence. Our DNA is 99% similar to chimps. There is no evidence of anything "beyond" what we know of reality.

Its not a debate either. We are clearly physical beings with physical brains. Ever been drunk or buzzed? That was the physical alcohol affecting your body and brain to change your consciousness. There's nothing beyond or separate from that. Brain damage changes people's personalities. Drugs can help people become normal who have psychosis and see voices. Sleep is found to be restorative to the mind and aid in memory formation.

The evidence is high enough to bury a mountain. What does anyone have who believes we are somehow more than our brain and body? What? The silence of nothing is deafening. It is just our desire that we are more, nothing more; nothing less.

The Wikipedia link I provided is a list of paradoxes (which logical people hold as true). — Agent Smith

I'll try one more time in case you aren't understanding my request. I know those are paradoxes that people have come up with. What logical thinker holds onto something that leads into a paradox, agrees that the paradox is sound, but still insists on holding onto logic that leads to that specific paradox?

You're noting that people sweep paradoxes under the bridge to hold certain logical arguments. Which arguments? Which logical argument are people holding onto despite it leading directly into a paradox?

If I had to guess, its a need for people to think they're better than the physical animals they are.
— Philosophim

That humans are different to animals is not a matter of opinion. We show capabilities and attributes that no animal can come close to, I don't see how this can be glossed over or ignored. — Wayfarer

Certainly, we are the smartest animals we know of. But we share many traits with animals as well, and I don't see how this can be glossed over or ignored. There is nothing beyond your brain and body. It is a wish and desire that we are more than that, nothing more.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge/p1 if you are interested in a serious but not technically difficult approach.

I might have a unique take on the subject if you're interested. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary/p1

If I had to guess, its a need for people to think they're better than the physical animals they are. People want to feel special, immortal, and see their dead friends and loved ones again. If we're all physical, all that goes away. We're just here, then we're not. A lot of people don't want to believe that, so they seek for outlooks on humanity that allow us to surpass the material world.

The reason why people hate one another are myriad. One I've witnessed first hand is envy. To some men, women coast through life. They don't appear to have to handle real hardship. Courtship seems easy when men approach them all the time. Women are allowed to act a certain way that men cannot.

Of course, this is usually a narrow view based more on the man themselves than the women. This hate and anger can also easily manifest itself with other men. If I had to guess why women are abused more, it is because they are physically weaker, and hormonally less prone to direct confrontation. Women are unable to win, or let men win more in direct conflicts. I don't think its necessarily that men don't get into as many direct conflicts, its that most men are unwilling to let the other side win. Because victories are not easy, and defeat stings much more in a hard fought loss, men are less willing to directly confront other men who show they would not be easy.

Lets use your own conclusions.

My attitude is this - God can stuff it if he thinks that I am going to worship him simply on the basis that if I don't, I will go to hell. — RolandTyme

There you go, you've made your decision. Perhaps you just haven't accepted it yet. If the only reason you are contemplating religion is because you think you are going to die, and are concerned about the consequences, then you've just told yourself you shouldn't do that.

Ignore religion and do good not because of an uncertain reward you will receive one day by an uncertain being, but for the reward of bettering humanity and the world.

I don't think I was clear. It wasn't a list of paradoxes I was looking for. I was looking for paradoxes that logical people hold as true, or thoughts that logical people still hold despite it falling into a paradox. Most paradoxes are fun accidents that I know of, and no serious logical thinker that I am aware of, entertains a thread of logic that necessarily leads into a paradox.

Isn't this just a way to justify snobbery and reinforcing intellectual separation?

The goal must be far above all of this. — Rafaella Leon

You use the word "must" when you should replace it with, "in my opinion". Status is a survival need as well in a species with a strong society. The need for status at the cost of disparaging your fellow man, is a misuse of a basic survival need.

Healthy status is supposed to be a way to determine who should be in charge of particular jobs for the benefit of society, not to be consumed and spat out on others for our own gratification and sense of superiority.

Anyone who uses status as their single drive and motivator for life, would be a primitive failure under your essay, and should be shunned from society. And yet, I didn't do that did I? I spoke with you. I gave you another perspective. I did not consider you an inferior, just your argument and view point in how to live life. And if you rejected my argument? I still would associate with you. Maybe you would be inspired by future conversations. Maybe I would learn something else from you, instead of judging you based on one interaction.

Between that attitude and yours, what do you think is better for the rise of humanity? Shouldn't our different skills and attributes mix together to create something more than our isolated selves? Or should we separate from the rest, self-confident and smug in our ability to go forth alone in the world, and do nothing but gratify our own selves?

Mind giving an example of a paradox that exists, and logical people still hold as true?

I'm not sure if we'd not notice it. Forces stay the same if all particles and processes reverse direction. — EugeneW

Correct. If we are part of time that is being changed to a prior state, it is impossible to notice. The only way we would notice is if we continued forward, while everything else continued backwards.

A good question. First, we have to understand what time is. Time is a concept. Imagine yourself at this moment. You are a combination of matter and energy at that snapshot with particular forces applying on them. One second later, you are the result of those forces. That is all time is. You have memory of the previous second, but the previous "second" isn't a real tangible time force unit, but simply an realization that the matter and force combination of now, is not what it was a second ago.

There is nothing mechanistically from us recreating the first snapshot after one second. If something had the power to reorganize the matter and forces of the universe to what it was one second prior, then we would be "back in time". But really, we wouldn't. Because the reorganization happened at the second second if we're an outside observer.

A -> B -> A. From the inside observer, time travelled backwards, and none were aware of it. Did A still come before B, which then came before A again? Yes, but that is only because we are recording state changes. We cannot erase the state change. We can't reverse everything so that the state change was never made. Time is just that, states of change compared to a memory of a prior state.

But think about internally once again. If it is the case that time is merely the state of change from one moment to the next, then if reality reorganized itself to A -> B -> A, the second A would never be aware that B ever happened. They would be sitting there asking themselves, "Why does time always move forward?" or, "Why do the states of change never go back to the way they were prior?"

Basically, if time did move backwards, you would never know it, because backwards time is merely a change to a previous state. And in a change to a previous state, you saw time as moving forward. It is absolutely impossible to be aware of the state of the universe being reorganized to a previous state, unless you are an outside observer. As we are not outside observers of time, we have our answer. Time always moves forward, because it is impossible for us to be aware if a state returned to a previous set up.

First of all, an apology is due: I misunderstood (slash completely forgot) that you are claiming that abstract reasoning is knowledge (as you define it, “distinctive knowledge”). — Bob Ross

No apology needed! We've been discussing this some time, and have not addressed the beginning in a while. I'll re-explain if something is forgotten without any issue or negative viewpoint on my part.

Our dispute actually lies, contrary to what I previously claimed, in whether both types of knowledge are applied. — Bob Ross

They are both obtained in the same way. Knowledge in both cases boils down to "Deductions that are not contradicted by reality." Distinctive knowledge is just an incredibly quick test, because we can instantly know that we discretely experience, so what we discretely experience is known. Applicable knowledge is distinctive knowledge that claims knowledge of something that is apart from immediate discrete experience. Perhaps the word choice of "Application" is poor or confusing, because we are applying to reality in either case. Your discrete experience is just as much a reality as its attempts to claim something beyond them.

It is why I avoided the inevitable comparison to apriori and aposteriori. Apriori claims there are innate things we know that are formed without analysis. This is incorrect. All knowledge requires analysis. You can have beliefs that are concurrent with what could be known, but it doesn't mean you actually know them until you reason through them. Perhaps there is a better word phrase then "applicable knowledge" that describes the concept. Feel free to suggest one!

As I've noted many times, there is nothing wrong with digging in and refining the words or definitions. Its not the words that matter, its the ideas behind those words. I feel that it might be helpful to break down distinctive knowledge further so I can effectively communicate what concepts are, abstractions, and how knowing them distinctively does not mean you know them applicably.

Distinctive awareness - Our discrete experiences themselves are things we know.

Contextual logical awareness - The construction of our discrete experiences into a logical set of rules and regulations.

A contextual logical viewpoint holds onto discrete experiences that are non-contradictory with each other. When thinking in a logical context, to hold things which would contradictory, we invent different contexts. For example, "Gandolf is a good person, therefore he would fight to save a hobbit's life if it were easy for him to win." Perfectly logical within his character, because we've made a fictional character. But we could create another context. "Gandolf is sometimes not a good person, therefore we can't know if he would fight to save a hobbit's life if it would be easy for him to win."

We distinctively know both of these contexts. Within our specially made contexts, if Gandolf is a good person, he WILL do X. The only reason Gandolf would not save the hobbit if it was an easy victory for him, is if he wasn't a good person. Here I have a perfectly logical and irrefutable context in my head. And yet, I can change the definitions, and a different logic will form. I can hold two different contexts of Gandolf, two sets of contextual logic, and distinctively know them both with contextual awareness.

Of course, I could create something illogical as well. "Gandolf is a good person, therefore he would kill all good hobbits in the world." Do I distinctively know this? Yes. But I really don't have contextual logical awareness. I am not using the "context of logic". I could think this way if I really wanted to. Perhaps we would say such a person is insane, especially if such contextual thinking was applied to reality, and not a fantasy of the mind.

The rational behind thinking logically, is when you apply logical thinking to reality, it has a better chance of your surviving. Of course, this does mean in situations in which harm to ourselves is not an immediately known outcome, we can entertain illogical contexts instead. Philosophy is arguably an exercise of trying to see if the logical contexts we've created in our head actually hold up when discussing with another person.

You can see plenty of people who hold contexts that do not follow logic, and when they are shown it is not illogical, they insist on believing that context regardless. This is the context they distinctively know. It doesn't work in application to reality, but that is not as important to them as holding the context for their own personal emotional gratification. I do not mean to imply it is "others" that do this. I am willing to bet almost every human in the world does this, and it is only with vigilance, training, and practice that people can minimize holding the emotional value of a context over its rational value.

So to clarify again, one can hold a distinctive logical or illogical context in their head. They distinctively know whatever those contexts are. It does not mean that those contexts can be applied beyond what is in their mind to reality without contradiction. We can strongly convince ourselves that it "must" be so, but we will never applicably know, until we apply it.

With that, let me address your points.

In simpler terms, math applies before any application to the empirical world because it is what the external world is contingent on: differentiation. — Bob Ross

No, that is what our context of the world depends on. The world does not differentiate like we do. The world does not discretely experience. Matter and energy are all composed of electrons, which are composed of things we can break down further. Reality is not aware of this. This is a context of distinctive knowledge that we have applied to reality without contradiction. It is not the reverse.

I've noted before that math is the logical consequence of being able to discretely experience. 1, is the concept of "a discrete experience." That is entirely of our own making. It is not that the external world is contingent on math, it is that our ability to understand the world, is contingent on our ability to discretely experience, and logically think about what that entails.

Does this mean that reality is contingent on our observation? Not at all. It means our understanding of the world, our application of our distinctive knowledge to reality, is contingent on our distinctive knowledge.

Therefore, if I distinctively define a potato in a particular way where it implies “multiplicity” and “quantity”, then the operation of addition must follow. The only way I can fathom that this could be negated is if the universality of mathematics is denied: which would entail the rejection of differentiation (“discrete experience” itself). — Bob Ross

Exactly. If you use a logical context that you distinctively know, there are certain results that must follow from it. But just because it fits in your head, does not mean you can applicably know that your logical context can be known in application to reality, until you apply it to reality by adding two potatoes together. To clarify, I mean the totality of the act, not an abstract.

When I add these two potatoes together, what happens if one breaks in half? Do I have two potatoes at that point? No, so it turns out I wasn't able to add "these" two potatoes. Since I have added two potatoes in reality before, I know it is possible that two identities I know as potatoes, can be added again. But do I applicably know I can add those other two potatoes before I add them together? No.
Can I add two potatoes abstractly in my head, and the result will always logically equal two? Yes. Can I imagine that adding "those" two potatoes in my head, and they will not break and everything will perfectly equal two? Yes. Does that mean I applicably know this? No. I hope this clarifies what I'm trying to say.

I can know, in the abstract, that a circle can fit in a square. I do not need to physically see (empirically observe) a circle inscribed in a square to know this. — Bob Ross

Yes, you can distinctively know this, which is what abstract logical contexts are. But do you applicably know that you can fit this square and circle I give you in that way before you attempt it? No. You measure the square, you measure the circle. Everything points that it should fit perfectly. But applicably unknown to you, I made them magnetized to where they will always repel. As such, they will never actually fit due to the repulsion that you would not applicably know about, until you tried to put them together.

I am not referring to what we induce is under our inevitable spatial references (such as the makeup of “outer space” or the mereological composition of the space), but, rather, the holistic, unescapable, spatial captivity we are both subjected to: we cannot conceive of anything else. — Bob Ross

I understand. But your inability to conceive of anything else is because that is the distinctive context you have chosen. There are people who conceive of different things. I can make a context of space where gravity does not apply. I can conceive of space as something that can allow warp travel or teleportation. What I cannot do, is applicably know a conception of space that I have never applied without contradiction. That part which is inescapable, is the application of our concepts to reality. Reality does not care about our logical constructs and rational thinking, aka, our distinctive knowledge. If we are unable to create a distinctive context of logical thinking that fits in reality without contradiction, then we lack any applicable knowledge of that reality.

Although this is slightly off topic, this is why I reject the notion of non-spatial claims: it is merely the fusion of absence (as noted under the spatial reference), linguistic capability (we can combine the words together to make the claim), and the holistic spatial reference (i.e. “non-” + “spatial”). This is, in my eyes, no different than saying “square circle”. — Bob Ross

To hammer home, that is because of our application. When you define a logical context of space that cannot be applied and contradicts the very moment of your occupation of space, it is immediately contradicted by reality. A distinctively known logical context that is rationally perfect in our heads cannot be claimed to be an accurate representation of reality, until it is applied to reality.

Whether either of us like it, we do not claim “theory”, scientifically, to the most cogent induction out of what we know: that is a hypothesis at best. — Bob Ross

I think you misunderstood what I was trying to state. I was not stating a scientific theory. I was stating a theory. A scientific theory is combination of applicable knowledge for the parts of the theory that have been tested. Any "theories" on scientific theories are speculations based on a hierarchy of logic and inductions.

As another example, historians do not deem what is historically known based off of what is the most cogent induction (currently), it has to pass a threshold. — Bob Ross

If they are using knowledge correctly, then yes. But with this epistemology, we can re-examine certain knowledge claims about history and determine if they are applicably known, or if they are simply the most cogent inductions we can conclude. Sometimes there are things outside of what can be applicably known. In that case, we only have the best cogent inductions to go on. We may not like that there are things outside of applicable knowledge, or like the idea that many of our constructions of the past are cogent inductions, but our like or dislike of that has nothing to do with the soundness of this epistemological theory.

In other words, my epistemology is not "not taking into account" these situations. It does. The question is, does the application of the epistemology continue to be the best tool currently available to assess reality rationally?

Completely understandable. I would also like to add that even “truth” in terms of distinctively known is merely in relation to the subject: it is still not absolute “truth”--only absolute, paradoxically, relative to the subject. — Bob Ross

No, that is not "truth" as I defined it. That is simply applicable knowledge. And applicable knowledge, is not truth. Truth is an inapplicable plausibility. It is the combination of all possible contexts applied to all of reality without a contradiction. It is an impossibility to obtain. It is an extremely common mistake to equate knowledge with truth; as I've noted, I've done it myself.

To explain, I am limited by my distinctive context. I can take all the possible distinctive contexts I have, and apply them to reality. Whatever is left without contradiction is what I applicably know. But because my distinctive contexts are limited, it cannot encompass all possible distinctive contexts that could be. Not to mention I'm limited in my applicable context as well. I will never applicably know the world as a massive Tyrannosaurus Rex. I will never applicably know the world as someone who is incapable of visualizing in their mind. As such, truth is an applicably unobtainable definition.

In my scenario with Smith, he isn’t speculating that Jones has 5 coins in his pocket: he is claiming it has the potential to occur. — Bob Ross

If he claims that he speculates it could be the case that Jones has 5 coins in his pocket, then he is literally claiming the colloquial use of the term possibility. I am salvaging this with “could” referring to potentiality. — Bob Ross

The problem here is in your sentence, "he speculates it could be the case". This is just redundancy. "Speculation" means "I believe X to be the case despite not having any experience of applicable knowledge prior". "It could be the case" means, "I believe it to be the case", but you haven't added any reasoning why it could be the case. Is it the case because of applicable knowledge, probability, possiblity, etc? I could just as easily state, "He speculates that its probable", or "He speculates that its possible".

And this is what I mean by asking for a clear definition of "potential" that serves an indicator of something that cannot be described by the hierarchy. If potential simply means, "it could be the case", its just a generic and unspecified induction. It is a claim of belief, without the clarification of what leads to holding that belief. I don't think this is what you want. I felt I did use your example and successfully point out times we can claim probability and speculation, but that's because I fleshed out the scenario to clarify the specifics. If you do not give the specifics of what the underlying induction is based on, then it is simply an unexamined induction, and at best, a guess.

This is feels like “context” is truly ambiguous. The term context needs to have some sort of reasoning behind it that people abide by: otherwise it is pure chaos. I think the main focus of epistemology is to provide a clear derivation of what “knowledge” is and how to obtain it (in our case, including inductive beliefs). Therefore, I don’t think we can, without contradiction, define things purposely ambiguously. — Bob Ross

I'm hoping that at this point I've laid out what context is. The term distinctive context is clearly defined as a set of distinctive identities that are held together in the mind. Distinctive contexts can include other contexts, like logic, and we generally consider those more valuable. Rational people ensure that their contexts include the "logical context" which allows us to make rational abstractions.
Applicable context is the ability of a person to apply their distinctive context to reality. If I have a context of metric measurement, but I do not have a ruler with centimeters, it is outside of my applicable context. If I later go blind in life, I may have visions of what the world looks like in my head, but I can no longer applicably know the world with sight.

What can be ambiguous, is the context another person holds. Our own conversation is a fine example! We are discussing not only to see if the application of this epistemology context can be applied to reality without contradiction, but to also to convey and see if the distinctive context of our words is understood by each other as we intended, and to see if it fits within a rational and logical context as well.

Whew! This has already gone on long enough, so let me shorten the rest. I believe I've added enough to address the points on calculating the Earth distinctively versus applicably knowing what the Earth's circumference is, as well as noting what cannot be applicably known. If you still feel my points have not adequately addressed those, let me know.

A very quick article on science. https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulmsutter/2019/10/27/science-does-not-reveal-truth/?sh=431c861c38c3

If you still want me to address my claims of science, I will as well next post.

So I think I have identified our fundamental difference: you seem to be only allowing what is empirically known to be what can be "known", whereas I am allowing for knowledge that can, along with what is empirical, arise from the mind. — Bob Ross

No, not at all! There are two types of knowledge. Applicable knowledge, and distinctive knowledge. What you have been trying to do, is state that distinctive knowledge can be applicable knowledge without the act of application. This is understandable, as "knowledge" in general use does not have this distinction. But here, it does. And in the study of epistemology, I have found it to be absolutely necessary.

For example, try applying without contradiction (in the sense that you seem to be using it--empirically) the principle of noncontradiction. I don't think you can: it is apodictically true by means of reason alone. — Bob Ross

As an abstract, you can distinctively know the principle of non-contradiction. To apply it, you must create a specific example. For example, if I stated, this color red, is both the color red, and blue at the same time, I can test it. I look at the color, find it is red, and that it is not blue. Therefore that color right there, cannot be both red and blue at the same time.

Distinctively, I can imagine the color red, then the color blue, and determine that the color I am envisioning in my head cannot both be the color red I am envisioning, and the color blue I am envisioning. This is known to me, as I am contradicted by my inability to do it.

But, what if I smell a color? For example, I smell a flower whenever I envision purple in my head. I distinctively know this. However, if I point out a purple object and I don't smell flowers, then I cannot say I applicably know that the color purple in reality smells like flowers. Does this make sense? I can distinctively know that when I envision a color, I also imagine a smell. But that doesn't mean that happens if I apply that to reality.

Furthermore, try proving space empirically: I don't think you can. Space, in one unison, is proven apodictically (by means of the principle of noncontradiction) with reason alone. — Bob Ross

No, space in application, is not proven by distinctive knowledge alone. I can imagine a whole set of rules and regulations about something called space in my head, that within this abstract context, are perfectly rational and valid. But, when I take my theory and apply it to a square inch cube of reality, I find a contradiction. I can distinctively have a theory in my head that I know, but one that I cannot apply to reality.

The notions of space that we use in application today, such as the idea of an "inch", have all been applied to reality without contradiction. There are many distinctively known ideas of space that have not been applied. String theory, field theory, and multiverse theory are all theories of space you can distinctively know in the abstract. But they cannot be currently known in application.

Recall that I can distinctively know 1 and 1 are two. But what is that in application? 1 what? 1 potato and 1 potato can be applicably known as two potatoes. That is the key I think you are missing.

If we have a mathematical formula, we can "know" it will work in relation to the "external" world regardless of whether it actually is instantiated in it. — Bob Ross

What I am saying is you can distinctively know that if you have an identity of 1, and an identity of 1, that it will make an identity of two. But if you've never added two potatos before, you don't applicably know if you can. While this may seem silly, lets take it to something less silly now. I have two Hydrogen atoms and 1 Oxygen atom together. What do I mean by this in application? Are they in orbit to make a molecule of water? Are the electrons orbiting slowly to be ice? Are they simply in a certain proximity? It it just Hydrogen and Oxygen in the air together? We can imagine all of these abstractly and know in our context of logic and the rules of chemistry the answers. But when we test actual Hydrogen and oxygen, our abstract rules must be applied to applicably know the answers for those specific atoms in reality.

I was inclined to adamantly claim it(inductions are knowledge) is, but upon further contemplation I actually really enjoy the idea of degrading inductions to beliefs with different credence levels (and not knowledge). — Bob Ross

Understandable! Yes, inductions are essentially beliefs of different credence levels.

However, I think there may be dangers in this kind of approach, without some means of determining something "known" — Bob Ross

And that is why there must be a declaration of what can be known first. I establish distinctive and applicable knowledge, and only after those are concluded, can we use the rules learned to establish the cogency of inductions. Without distinctive and applicable knowledge first, the hierarchy of inductions has no legs to stand on.

I am not sure how practical this will be for the laymen--I can envision everyone shouting "everything is just a belief!". — Bob Ross

The layman already misuses the idea of knowledge, and there is no rational or objective measure to counter them. But I can. I can teach a layperson. I can have a consistent and logical foundation that can be shown to be useful. People's decision to misuse or reject something simply because they can, is not an argument against the functionality and usefulness of the tool. A person can use a hammer for a screw, and that's their choice, not an argument for the ineffectiveness of a hammer as a tool for a nail!

Likewise, it isn't just about what is more cogent, it is about what we claim to have passed a threshold to be considered "true". — Bob Ross

I want to emphasize again, the epistemology I am proposing is not saying knowledge is truth. That is very important. A common mistake people make in approaching epistemology (I have done the same) is conflating truth with knowledge. I have defined earlier what "truth" would be in this epistemology, and it is outside of being able to be applicably known. I can distinctively know it, but I cannot applicably know it.

To note it again, distinctive and applicable truth would be the application of all possible contexts to a situation, and what would remain without contradiction after it was over. Considering one human being, or even all human beings could experience all possible contexts and apply them, it is outside of our capability. But what we can do is take as many contexts as we can, apply them to reality, and run with what hasn't been contradicted yet. While what is conclude may not be true, it is the closest we can rationally get.

I find myself in the same dilemma where the theory of evolution and there being a teapot floating around Jupiter are both speculations. What bothers me about this is not that they both are speculations, but, rather, that there is no distinction made between them: this is what I mean by the epistemology isn't quite addressing the most pressing matters (most people will agree that which they immediately see--even in the case that they don't even know what a deduction is--but the real disputes arise around inductions). This isn't meant as a devastating blow to your epistemology, it is just an observation that much needs to be addressed before I can confidently state that it is a functional theory (no offense meant). I think we agree on this, in terms of the underlying meaning we are both trying to convey. — Bob Ross

I fully understand and respect this! I believe this is because you may not have understood or forgotten a couple of tenants.

1. Inductions are evaluated by hierarchies.
2. Inductions also have a chain of reasoning, and that chain also follows the hierarchy.
3. Hierarchies can only be related to by the conclusions they reach about a subject. Comparing the inductions about two completely different subjects is useless.

To simplify, if I have a possibility vs a plausibility when I am rationally considering what to pursue, I can conclude it is more rational to pursue what I already know is possible. That doesn't mean being rational results in asserting what is true. Inductions are, by definition, uncertainties. The conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises. Sometimes people defy what is possible, pursue what is plausible, and result in a new discovery which erases what was previously applicably known.

Of course, when the person decided to pursue what was only seen as plausible, and against what was possible, society would quite rightly claim that the pursuit of what is plausible is not rational. Rationality is incredibly powerful. But depending on a person's context, and the limits of what they already known, it is not the only tool a person needs. Sometimes, it is important to defy and test what is rational. Sometimes, in fact, many times, we are simply in a position where we are certain that the outcome is uncertain, and must sometimes make that leap into the next second of life.

But, making that leap without some type of guideline, would be chaos and randomness. So we can use the hierarchy and the chain of reasoning to give us some type of guide that more often than not, might result in less chaos and more order.

So, I can first know that the hierarchy is used in one subject. For example, we take the subject of evolution. We do not compare inductions about evolution, to the inductions about Saturn. That would be like comparing our knowledge of an apple to the knowledge of a horse, and saying that the knowledge of a horse should have any impact on the knowledge of this apple we are currently eating.

So we pick evolution. I speculate that because certain dinosaurs had a particular bone structure, had feathers, and DNA structure, that birds evolved from those dinosaurs. This is based on our previously known possibilities in how DNA evolves, and how bone structure relates to other creatures. To make this simple, this plausibility is based on other possibilities.

I have another theory. Space aliens zapped a plants with a ray gun that evolved certain plants into birds. The problem is, this is not based on any applicable knowledge, much less possibilities. It is also a speculation, but its chain of reasoning is far less cogent than the first theory, so it is more rational to pursue the first.

When plausibilities are extremely close in hierarchy through their chain of reasoning, it is more palatable to take the less rational gamble. So for example, lets say we take the first theory, and change it to, "Perhaps our current understanding of how bones evolve among species is false." And the reason we say this, is because we found a new mammal, and it might contradict our previous findings.

This plausibility is essentially only one step away from the the first theory, and most would say it is viable to pursue. However, if a person did not have the time or interest to pursue this speculation, it would still be rational to hold onto the possibilities that our current understanding of bone structure until the speculation is fully explored.

Your coins problem is extremely good!

He could abstractly reason that if he experienced 5 coins in a pocket of some size, that, considering mathematics in the abstract, it is possible for 5 coins to fit in a pocket that is greater than that size (assuming the pocket is empty): but he didn't experience it for the greater sized pocket. — Bob Ross

You have it correct. He can distinctively know that five coins should be able to fit into a pocket of LWD. He can measure the pocket from the outside and see that it is greater than LWD. But until he applies and attempts to put the five coins into that specific pocket, Smith doesn't applicably know if they can fit. Why? What if there is something in the pocket Smith wasn't aware of? What if part of it is sewn shut, or caught?

To sum it up, application is when we apply to a specific situation that is outside of our distinctive knowledge. We can make a thought experiment, but that is not an application experiment. Smith can have abstract distinctive knowledge about coins, pocket, dimenstions, and even Jones. Smith could conclude its probable, possible, speculate, or even irrationally believe that Jones has five coins in that specific pocket. But none of those are applicable knowledge. He can only applicably know, if he's confirmed that there are five coins in Jones pocket without contradiction from reality.

But notice that, within your terminology, Smith cannot claim it is "possible", "probable", or "irrational". Therefore, by process of elimination he is forced to use "speculation" — Bob Ross

Within the context you set up, you may be correct. But in another context, he can claim it is possible or probable. For example, Smith sees Jones slip five coins into his pocket. Smith leaves the room for five minutes and comes back. Is it possible Jones could fit five coins in his pocket? Yes. Is it possible that Jones did not remove those five coins in the five minutes he was gone? Yes. We know Jones left those coins in his pocket for a while, therefore it is possible that Jones could continue to leave those coins in his pocket.

The epistemology is not telling Smith to do what he wants. The epistemology recognizes the reality that Smith can do whatever he wants.

He can only do whatever he wants in so far as he doesn't contradict himself. If I can provide an argument that leads Smith realize he is holding a contradiction, then he will not be able to do it unless he uncontradicts it with some other reasoning. — Bob Ross

I really wish this was the case. People do things while contradicting their own rationality all the time. People do not have to be rational, or respect rationality in any way. You can conclude he Smith would be irrational using rationality. You could even explain it to Smith. Smith could decide not to care at all. There is absolutely nothing anyone can do about it.

We can somewhat resolve this if we consider "possibility", in the sense of "experiencing it once before", as "a deductively defined concept, with consideration to solely its essential properties, that has been experienced at least once before". That way, it is logically pinned to the essential properties of that concept. I may have the choice of deductively deciding concepts (terms), but I will not have as much free reign to choose what I've experienced before. To counter this would require the subject to come up with an alternative method that identifies equivalent objects in time (which cannot be logically done unless they consider the essential properties). — Bob Ross

Correct. But this is only if a person chooses to think and act logically. So to clarify, I can convince someone to do something rational, if they are using rationality (and of course, I'm actually being rational as well). But my being rational does not preclude they must be rational. And if they decide to not be rational, no amount of rationality will persuade them.

In summary, I can claim that contradictions do not arise in terms of time as well as structural levels. These are the only two aspects of contexts and, therefore, as of now, this is what I consider "context" to be. It is important to emphasize that I am not just merely trying to advocate for my own interpretation of "context": I am trying to derive that which can not be contradicted in terms of "context"--that which all subjects would be obliged to (in terms of underlying meaning, of course they could semantically refurbish it). — Bob Ross

I think you're getting the idea of contexts now. The next step is to realize that your contexts that you defined are abstractions, or distinctive knowledge rules in your own head. If we can apply those contexts to reality without contradiction, then they can be applicably known, and useful to us. But there is no one "Temporal context". There is your personal context of "Temporal". I could make my own. We could agree on a context together. In another society, perhaps they have no idea of time, just change.

To answer your next question, "What is useful", is when we create a context that can be applied to reality, and it helps us live, be healthy, or live an optimal life. Of course, that's what I consider useful. Perhaps someone considers what is useful is, "What makes me feel like I'm correct in what I believe." Religions for example. There are people who will sacrifice their life, health, etc for a particular context.

Convincing others to change their contexts was not part of the original paper. That is a daunting enough challenge as its own topic. In passing, as a very loose starting point, I believe we must appeal to what a person feels adds value to their lives, and demonstrate how an alternative context serves that better than their current context. This of course changes for every individual. A context of extreme rationality may appeal to certain people, but if it does not serve other people's values, they will reject it for others.

I think they can do whatever they want as long as they are not aware of a contradiction. Therefore, if I propose "context" as relating to temporal and mereological contexts, then they either are obliged to it or must be able to contradict my notion. My goal is to make it incredibly hard, assuming they grasp the argument, to deny it (if not impossible). Obviously they could simply not grasp it properly, but that doesn't negate the strength of the argument itself. — Bob Ross

I think you're getting it. Others decision to accept or reject your context has no bearing on whether that context serves yourself optimally for your own life. (Unless of course that rejection results in potential harm to yourself!) Further, a person's rejection of your context, is not a rejection of the rationality of the context. That stands on its own regardless of others input. Others input can introduce you to distinctive and applicable knowledge you may not have known prior, which can cause you to question and expand what you know. But there may be people who do not care, who are happy with their own little world as it gets them through their day. Perhaps they would be happier or more successful if they embraced a more rational or worldly context, but plenty of people are willing to embrace the devil they know instead of the angels they don't.

But with this, I also defend my epistemology. People's decisions not to use it, does not make it irrational or useless to other people who would like a rational approach to knowledge. For the epistemology to not be rational, it must contradict itself in application. So far, I don't think it has. But that doesn't mean we shouldn't keep trying to!

When you think of something in your head that you distinctively know is not able to be applied. For example, if I invent a unicorn that is not a material being. The definition has been formulated in such a manner that it can never be applied, because we can never interact with it.

But you can apply the fact that you distinctively know that it cannot be applied without ever empirically applying it (nor could you). So you aren't wrong here, but that's not holistically what I mean by "apply to reality". — Bob Ross

My inability to apply something, is the application to reality. When I try to apply what I distinctively know cannot be applied to reality, reality contradicts my attempt at application. If I were to apply what I distinctively know cannot be applied to reality, and yet reality showed I could apply it to reality, then my distinctive knowledge would be wrong in application. But when you lack any distinctive knowledge of how to apply it to reality, there is nothing you can, or cannot apply to reality. So by default, it is inapplicable, and therefore cannot be applicably known.

I think you are conflated two completely separate claims: the spherical nature of the earth and the size of the earth. The stick and shadow experiment does not prove the size of the earth, it proves the spherical shape of the earth. — Bob Ross

No, it at best proves the possibility that the Earth is round. If you take small spherical objects and show that shadows will function a particular way, then demonstrate the Earth's shadows also function that way, then it is possible the Earth is spherical. But until you actually measure the Earth, you cannot applicably know if it is spherical. Again, perhaps there was some other shape in reality that had its shadows function like a sphere? For example, a sphere cut in half. Wouldn't the shadows on a very small portion of the rounded sphere act the same as a full sphere? If you are to state reality is a particular way, it must be applied without contradiction to applicably know it.

It only undermines them if there are other alternatives in the hierarchy. If for example a scientific experiment speculates something that is not possible, it is more rational to continue to hold what is possible. That doesn't mean you can't explore the speculation to see if it does revoke what is currently known to be possible. It just means until you've seen the speculation through to its end, holding to the inductions of what is possible is more rational.

I sort of agree, but am hesitant to say the least. Scientific theories are not simply that which is the most cogent, it is that which has been vigorously tested and thereby passed a certain threshold to be considered "true". I think there is a difference (a vital one). — Bob Ross

Science does not deal in truth. Science deals in falsification. When a theory is proposed, its affirmation is not what is tested. It is the attempt at its negation that is tested. Once it withstands all attempts at its negation, then it is considered viable to use for now. But nothing is science is ever considered as certain and is always open to be challenged.

I think the rest of your post has been covered, and I would be repeating what has already been stated. Fantastic post again! Keen questions and great insights. I hope I'm adequately answering your points, and what I'm trying to point out is starting to come into view.

I’ve seen people knocked out, but never a brain knocked out. People are far more than brains. — NOS4A2

When a person is knocked out, its due to brain trauma. No, you are not more than your brain.

When speaking of qualities or states of a human being, such as consciousness, happiness, sleepiness, etc. we are discussing qualities and states of the organism in its entirety, such as it exists. Since disembodied brains can neither function nor exist on their own—without blood, oxygen, the skeleton, flesh—it’s silly to say a brain can produce a quality that only an entire organism can display. — NOS4A2

I mean this with all seriousness, you need to look up some biology. Nerves are extensions of the brain through which information of the body travels. If you chop a finger off, you lose the ability to sense a finger, but you don't lose your brain or consciousness. Needing nutrients to function does not deny the brain is your source of consciousness.

You also have not provided me an alternative to your brain being your source of consciousness, backed by facts that could negate the numerous facts that point to the brain being the source of consciousness. If you can't then you stand in the position of fantasy, while I stand on solid facts.