I think there's a bit of a difference between pretending that I'm a super hero saving the world, vs wondering about the meaning of life. Play is purely for entertainment, while thinking is about solving real questions about life. Can some people approach philosophy as entertainment? Certainly. But the core of philosophy is thinking.

Personally I've likened philosophy to figuring out detailed and rational definitions to what we already use daily. What is "good"? What is "meaning"? It asks us to examine the words we've been using without thinking about them, and finally thinking about them.

The process of thinking involves imagination, and thought experiments. How else would a hypothesis be formed in science? The same goes for a premise in philosophy. A fine philosophical question by the way!

Those calling for a Civil War are spoiled children. No one is enslaved, starving, or lacking of a future because of an oppressive tyrannical government. Its petty differences. None of those advocating for Civil war understand the death, the disease, the loss of electricity, water, services, comforts, and economic crash such a thing would entail. Not to mention opening us up to enemy infiltration from abroad.

No, we should not have a civil war. It is a dream of the brain-addled and foolishly ignorant.

Nowadays, the modern equality movement does not respect the freedom of speech too much… At least where I live, arguing against people being genetically equal is pretty much a taboo and you get almost immediate social repercussions for it — Qmeri

I think you might misunderstand what freedom of speech means. Freedom of speech, at least in America, is the idea that the government cannot make a law restricting what you say. Freedom of speech has nothing to do with what other groups of people do. If you walk into a crowd of people and start telling them they're a bunch of losers, they are allowed to pressure you to stop speaking, and may voice their opinion in kind.

The right to free speech does not mean you are free from social repercussions. You may be hated, scorned, lose your job, your respect, and your social dignity. The only thing you are free from, is being thrown in jail because you said something the government didn't like.

Perhaps what you are referring to is that you believe the modern equality movement is not open to debate. Perhaps it is, and perhaps it isn't. Have you asked someone in the modern equality movement to debate you? To discuss the pros and cons of positions? While many people are not open to debate in any movement, I find if you ask and search, there are usually some who will.

If you are perhaps referring to "the internet", it depends on where you go, and of course how you approach the subject. When you approach any people who hold an ideology to debate it, it must be done with respect, humbleness, careful wording, insight, and possibly one of the most important, being open to also having your mind changed as well. If not, you can come across as offensive, rude, or someone who isn't open to debate yourself. Why should anyone give their time to someone like that?

I am not a Christian myself, but I think this interpretation is from people who don't understand the faith very well, or who had it twisted to scare them into being believers. Lets also not forget that Christianity was formed 2000 years ago, and does not come from a culture with our modern sensibilities. War, disease, famine, and death were common bed fellows.

My understanding of the Christian doctrine is that everyone that is human will eventually die. The reason for this is "sin", or that humans are unable to live in accordance with God's laws. Anyone who doesn't follow God's law, dies. There is essentially very few who are worthy. There are various interpretations, but Jesus is seen as an incarnation of God as a human being. Its the idea that God wanted to live as a man to see why they couldn't uphold the laws God set.

So you have God as a man, living, and feeling like a human being. Trying to teach the mortals around him. Due to the fact that Judaism is a very law like religion, God didn't want to break his law, so he willingly suffered incredible pain and death, perhaps to see what it was like, but to also "pay for the sin of all of humanity".

The idea, is that you've been paid for. We all have. It doesn't matter whether we believe it or not. I believe St. Paul states something to the effect that the only advantage Christians have over non-Christiains, is that Christians have the joy of knowing this sacrifice, and that we all have eternal life. This joy is to make you want to spread the word, and inspire people to live more fulfilling and better lives, knowing that death is not the end.

On "the last day", the dead are supposed to rise again once more. Jesus will let them know that their life has been paid for, if they simply accept it. Some will reject it. Some may not want to live forever. But all are essentially forgiven. If you refuse, you die. That's it. No torture, no eternal fire, you burn away to the ash you began as.

Of course, over the years mankind has taken a hold of this and twisted it for its useful purposes. The church needs people to come to mass and donate, or it will cease to function. So you have to give a reason to come to the pews. While Jesus' message is mostly a one and done, that doesn't keep institutions going. So a lot is done to keep people fearful and thinking Christianity is something its not.

Do we blame the person who merely wants to do the right thing, and trusts in an institution to tell them this? Many people are not into thinking deeply about ideologies, and the church forms a social tie and connection to family and friends. The same can be said of extreme political ideologies, sports teams, and many other social groups with strong ties. I feel it is unfair to pick on religion in particular, when I see the same "evils" coming from so many other social groups. I suppose a mac person doesn't tell a pc person they'll burn in hell for all eternity, but they might wish it. :)

Likewise, though these social groups can form evil ideologies, do we neglect their good as well? I feel if we examine our own lives honestly, we might find we have our own blind spots and illogical inconsistencies we live by. The older I get, the more difficult I find it to judge others, when you realize we're all human at our core, and we all get caught up in things that aren't always ideal.

Its little more than pop psychology and modern day astrology. People are not stereotypes, and that's all MBTI tries to label you as. Be you, don't worry about the label.
— Philosophim

people criticize and deny what they are too lazy and ignorant to study — Miller

If you had asked me, you would find I am quite familiar with MBTI. There is irony in the fact that you didn't ask for "details to study", but simply criticized and denied my statement. If you want a discussion, engage those that disagree with you. Otherwise all you'll ever listen to is people who agree with you. What's the point besides ego?

Great conversation so far Bob! First, I have had time to think about it, and yes, I believe without a denominator, one cannot have probability, only possibilities that have occurred multiple times. I think this ties in with your idea of "immediateness" when considering cogency, and I think you have something that could be included in the cogency calculus.

I believe immediateness is a property of "possibility". Another is "repetition". A possibility that has been repeated many times, as well as its immediateness in memory, would intuitively seem more cogent than something that has occurred less often and farther in the past. Can we make that intuitiveness reasonable?

In terms of repetition, I suppose repetition means that you have applicably known an identity without distinctive alteration or amending multiple times. Something that has stood applicably for several repeats would seem to affirm its use in reality without contradiction.

Immediateness also ties into this logic. Over time, there is ample opportunity for our distinctive knowledge to be expanded and amended. Whenever our distinctive knowledge changes, so does our context. What we applicably knew in our old context, may not apply in our current context.

I think immediateness is a keen insight Bob, great contribution!

"Plausibility" is a spectrum of likelyhoods, in a generic sense, where something is "Plausible" if it meets certain criteria (of which do not need to be derived solely from mathematics) and is "Implausible" if it is meets certain other criteria. — Bob Ross

I'll clarify plausibility. A plausibility has no consideration of likelihood, or probability. Plausibility is simply distinctive knowledge that has not been applicably tested yet. We can create plausibilities that can be applicably tested, and plausibilities that are currently impossible to applicably test. For example, I can state, "I think its plausible that a magical horse with a horn on its head exists somewhere in the world." I can then explore the world, and discover that no, magical horses with horns on their head do not exist.

I could add things like, "Maybe we can't find them because they use their magic to become completely undetectable." Now this has become an inapplicable plausibility. We cannot apply it to reality, because we have set it up to be so. Fortunately, a person can ignore such plausibilities as cogent by saying, "Since we cannot applicably know such a creature, I believe it is not possible that they exist." That person has a higher tier of induction, and the plausibility can be dismissed as being less cogent.

With this explored, we can identify probability as an applicable deduction that concludes both a numerator and denominator, or ratio. Possibility is a record of applicable deduction at least once. It is a numerator, with an unknown denominator. Repetition and immediateness intuitively add to its cogency. Finally plausibilities are distinctive knowledge that has not had a proper attempt at applicable deduction.

Another way to think about it is: if my entire life (and everyone else testified to it in their lives as well), when presented with three cards (two of which are aces), I always randomly drew an ace--as in every time with no exceptions--then I would say the the "sureness" reverses and my math must have been wrong somehow (maybe probability doesn't work after all? — Bob Ross

I pulled this one quote out of your exceptional paragraph, because I think it allows an anchor to explore all of your propositions. Probability is based off of applicable knowledge. When I say there is a 4 out of 52 chance of drawing a jack, part of the applicable knowledge is that the deck has been shuffled in a way that cannot be determined. The reality is, we applicably know the deck is deterministic once the shuffle is finished. If we turned the deck around, we could see what the card order is. The probability forms from our known applicable limits, or when we cannot see the cards.

In the case that someone pulled an ace every time someone shuffled the cards, there is the implicit addition of these limits. For example, "The person shuffling doesn't know the order of the cards." The person shuffling will doesn't try to rig the cards a particular way." "There is no applicable knowledge that would imply an ace would be more likely to be picked than any other card."

In the instance in which we have a situation where probability has these underlying reasons, but extremely unlikely occurrences happen, like an ace is drawn every time someone picks from a shuffled deck, we have applicable knowledge challenging our probable induction. Applicable knowledge always trump's inductions, so at that point we need to re-examine our underlying reasons for our probability, and determine whether they still hold.

We could do several tests to ascertain that we have a situation in which our probability holds. Perhaps pass the deck to be shuffled to several different people who are blindfolded. Test the cards for strange substances. Essentially ensure that the deck, the shuffle, and the pick all actually have the context for the probability to be a sound induction.

It could be physics changes one day and it turns out that an ace will always end up at the top of any shuffled deck. At that point, we have to retest our underlying applicable knowledge, and discover that some of it no longer holds. We would have to make new conclusions. Fortunately, what would not break is how we applicably deduce, and the hierarchy of inductions.

However, I don't think we should have to limit our examinations to their specific contexts: I think it is a hierarchy of hierarchies. You are right about the first hierarchy: you can determine the cogency based off of possibility vs probability vs plausibility vs irrationality. However, we don't need to stop there: we can, thereafter, create a hierarchy of which contextual claims we are more "sure" of and which ones we are less "sure" of (it is like a hierarchy within a spectrum). — Bob Ross

An excellent point that I think is applied to another aspect, context. Within the context of a person, I believe we have a heirarchy of inductions. But what about when two contexts collide? Can we determine a hierarchy of contexts? I believe I've mentioned that we cannot force a person to use a different context. Essentially contexts are used for what we want out of our reality. Of course, this can apply to inductions as well. Despite a person's choice, it does not negate that certain inductions are more rational. I would argue the same applies to contexts.

This would be difficult to measure, but I believe one can determine if a context is "better" than another based on an evaluation of a few factors.

1. Resource expenditure
2. Risk of harm within the context
3. Degree of harm within the context

1. Resource expenditures are the cost of effort in holding a specific context. This can be time, societal, mental, physical effort, and much more. As we've discussed, the more specific and detailed one's distinctive knowledge, the more resource expenditure it will require to applicably know within that that distinctive context.

2. The risk of harm would be the likelihood that one would be incorrect, and the consequences of being incorrect. If my distinctive context is very simple, I may come to harm more often in reality. For example, lets say there are 2 types of green round fruits that grow in an area. One is nutritious, the other can be eaten, but will make you sick. If you have a distinctive context that cannot identify between the two fruits, you are more likely to come to harm. If you have a more specific distinct context that can enable you to identify which fruit is good, and which is not, you decrease the likelihood you will come to harm.

3. The degree of harm would be the cost for making an incorrect decision based on the context one holds. If for example, I have a very simple distinctive context that means I fail at making good decisions in a card game with friends, the risk of harm is very low. No money is lost, and we're there to have a good time. If however I'm playing high stakes poker for a million dollar pot, the opportunity cost of losing is staggering. A context that increases the likelihood I will lose should be thrown out in favor of a context that gives a higher chance of winning. Or back to fruit. Perhaps one of the green round fruits simply doesn't taste as good as the other. The degree of harm is lower, and may not be enough for you to expend extra resources in identifying the two fruits as having separate identities.

I believe this could all be evaluated mathematically. Perhaps it would not be so useful to most people, but could be very important in terms of AI, large businesses, or incredibly major and important decisions. As such, this begins to seep out of philosophy, and into math and science. Which if the theory is sound, would be the next step.

Really great points again Bob! Holidays are on the horizon, so there may be a lull between writings this week, but should resume after Christmas. I hope you have a nice holiday season yourself!

Its little more than pop psychology and modern day astrology. People are not stereotypes, and that's all MBTI tries to label you as. Be you, don't worry about the label.

I don't think people hate vegans per say. They hate vegan evangelists. Vegans who do it because they think its the right thing to do, and don't believe it makes them better than other people, I think are respected like anyone else. But, these vegans don't make a display of it, they're just living their life. As you get to know them, it might come up, but you might never know they were vegan at all.

People also don't like vegans that expect everyone around them to change. If you're invited to a party for example, and you insist how vegan they are, and that they won't come if there aren't vegan options, its annoying. If you quietly note you're vegan, and would they mind if you brought your own vegan dish to the party to share with everyone, people won't mind at all.

Finally, if a vegan is offended that they are served non-vegan food, or offended at people who decide not to be vegans. If you're going to dislike people who aren't vegans, they shouldn't be surprised when people dislike them back.

Its really not being vegan per say, its whether you're rude, inconsiderate, or a socially inept person about it.

If you want people in your thread discussing with you, and possibly persuading them to your view point, keep to the topic.
— Philosophim
Oh no don't mind me. I'm not the one whose belief is being challenged here. Our society backs me up on this. I don't even have to lift a finger. It's there for your pleasurable viewing. — L'éléphant

But you said,

Then, what can threaten a society's integrity? — L'éléphant

A society, does not mean our society alone. If you would like to change your viewpoint to being only our society, that's fine, but that is not what your original topic implied. If that is so, I'll drop the China and North Korean comparisons.

What holds together a society is the enforcement of morality through the use of force (the law). You get enough dissent and nonconformity to your society's morals, you kill your society. — L'éléphant

Your entire premise is that our society, (I'm assuming America now) creates laws to enforce morality. Who's morality? It can't be Christian morality, because Jesus stated you should sell everything you have and follow him. A morality based on Christianity would eliminate poverty and channel the extra wealth to keeping society free from degradation or sin. That is clearly not what American law does.

Many laws, tax laws for example, benefit the wealthy over the less wealthy. Is that moral, even apart from Christianity? Or how about a law against smoking marijuana that can get you put in jail for holding a few grams (and disproportionately puts blacks in jail), when speeding at a potentially lethal level for both you and those around you is just a fine?

The nature of Democracy is that plenty of people get a say. And it turns out that while many people have different views of morality, very few people seem to want to sacrifice their own comfort and money to help those who could really use a hand. Many laws are about preserving power over other people, and in a Democracy, that is much more difficult to do.

So you have a problem with your premise. You've stated the entire premise of now, our society, is to enforce morality. And yet, I can see several instances of laws that do not appear moral to me. It does not deny that there are certainly some laws that are in place due to some cultures or universal morality, but you cannot state it is the primary reason for laws, when the law is cluttered with so many instances in which morality does not matter.

Great comments so far Bob! I'll dive in.

Firstly, let's take probabilistic inductions. Probability is not, in itself, necessarily an induction. — Bob Ross

I understand exactly what you are saying in this paragraph. I've deductively concluded that these inductions exist. Just as it is deductively concluded that there are 4 jacks in 52 playing cards.

Now, where induction, I would say, actually comes into play, in terms of probability, is an extrapolation of that probabilistic application. — Bob Ross

For example, if I have 3 cards, two of which are aces and one is a king, I could extrapolate that it is "highly probable" that I will randomly pick an ace out of the three because of my deduced knowledge that the probability of picking an Ace is 2/3 in this case. — Bob Ross

Exactly. That is the induction I am talking about. We can know an induction discretely. But know an inductions outcome when we apply it to reality.

My point is that I view your "probabilistic inductions" as really being a point towards "mathematical inductions", which does not entirely engross probability. — Bob Ross

There are likely degrees of probability we could break down. Intuitively, pulling a jack out of deck of cards prescribes very real limits. However, if I note, "Jack has left their house for the last four days at 9am. I predict today on Friday, they will probably do the same," I think there's an intuition its less probably, and more just possible.

Perhaps the key is the fact that we don't know what the denominator limit really is. The chance of a jack would be 4/52, while the chance of Jack leaving his house at 9 am is 4 out of...5? Does that even work? I have avoided these probabilities until now, as they are definitely murky for me.

Secondly, I think that probabilistic inductions and plausible inductions are not always directly comparable. To be more specific, a probabilistic "fact" (whether deduced or induced) is comparable to plausible inductions and, in that sense, I think you are right to place the former above the latter; however, I do not think that "extended" probabilistic claims are comparable (always) to plausible inductions. — Bob Ross

Ah, I'm certain I cut this out of part four to whittle it down. A hierarchy of inductions only works when applying a particular set of distinctive knowledge to an applicable outcome. We compare the hierarchy within the deck of cards. We know the probability if pulling a jack, we know its possible we could pull a jack, but the probability is more cogent that we won't pull a jack.

The intactness of the tree would be evaluated separately, as the cards have nothing to do with the trees outcome. So for example, if the tree was of a healthy age, and in a place unlikely to be harmed or cut down, it is cogent to say that it will probably be there the next day. Is it plausible that someone chopped it down last night for a bet or because they hated it? Sure. But I don't know if that's actually possible, so I would be more cogent in predicting the tree will still be there tomorrow with the applicable knowledge that I have.

I was going to say much more, and elaborate much more, but this is becoming entirely too long. So I will leave you with my conclusion: the cogency (or "sureness", as I put it) of knowledge is not, at its most fundamental level, about which kind of induction the given claim stems from, but more about the degree of immediateness to the "I". — Bob Ross

With the clarification I've made, do you think this still holds?

Imagine that I didn't have an incredibly strong case for the tree still being there (like I walked past it three weeks ago and there was a strong storm that occurred two weeks ago), then it is entirely possible, given an incredible amount of analysis, that the "sureness" would reverse. As you have elegantly pointed out in your epistemology, this is expected as it is all within context (and context, I would argue, is incredibly complicated and enormous). — Bob Ross

This ties into my "degrees of probability" that I mentioned earlier. In these cases, we don't have the denominator like in the "draw a jack" example. In fact, we just might not have enough applicable knowledge to make a decision based on probability. The more detailed our applicable knowledge in the situation, the more likely we are to craft a probability that seems more cogent. If we don't know the destructive level of the storm, perhaps we can't really make a reasonable induction. Knowing that we can't make a very good induction, is also valuable at times too.

My apologies is this is a little terse for me tonight. I will have more time later to dive into these if we need more detail, I just wanted to give you an answer without any more delay.

Amazingly, America decided to relinquish power over gays, and let them be free to be who they are.
— Philosophim
Relinquish power over gays? Listen to yourself. Do not talk to me about ego trip while talking nonsense like this, please. Gays were not out to get power from others. They wanted to be treated as equals. — L'éléphant

Last time I ask you to just address the points and avoid the personal. If you want people in your thread discussing with you, and possibly persuading them to your view point, keep to the topic.

The word "relinquish" means "to let go". I did not say gays were out to get power from others. I stated they wanted the power that others held over them to be let go. To be able to marry, and to be able to sleep with who they want without risk of criminal prosecution.

The examples with China and North Korea still stand. If you don't address them, then I'm going to assume they adequately demonstrate the OP does not stand.

Gays for example, were able to get others to relinquish their power over them, and not be outlawed or denied state marriages.
— Philosophim
Incorrect. The gays got what they wanted because the public outrage of the majority diminished. Careful now. — L'éléphant

Careful now? Is this a discussion or an ego trip for you? Just make your points without snark. Prior to the legalization of gay marriage, homosexuality was a crime in many states. The power of the state controlled held a sword over their lives. Fortunately in America, we have an educated society, and people began to question whether it should be a crime. Amazingly, America decided to relinquish power over gays, and let them be free to be who they are.

That required changes and limitations of the law, not just moral outrage. In other countries, moral outrage does not necessarily change the law, and the majority can easily be oppressed by a minority. Do you think North Korea is a country run by morality? No. It is state power over individuals to benefit a minority.

You said:

What holds together a society is the enforcement of morality through the use of force (the law). — L'éléphant

But I've given examples of societies where this isn't the case. If you can explain to me how North Korea and China are enforcing morality, you'll have a point. Otherwise, you don't.

The question is, who has power? Is it 1% of the population, and they oppress the other 99%? Is it 50%? 80%?
— Philosophim
The majority of the members of society has the power. So long as they don't use logic, but public outcry and outrage. This so-called power has nothing to do with the 1% or the 99%. It's about what morality is being undermined. — L'éléphant

Untrue. In every government, someone has power over someone else. The state does not dictate morality, they dictate who holds power. Different states around the world allow more people to have influence than other countries. In the United States, a larger swath of people have a say then in many other places in the world. Gays for example, were able to get others to relinquish their power over them, and not be outlawed or denied state marriages.

Because people with hope change the world. If we all accepted, "It is what it is", people wouldn't work to change things. Changing thing is difficult, and the ground is littered with the corpses of failed attempts. But even a 1% chance of change has a chance.

My guess is that you were likely an optimistic person at one time in your life, and you failed. So from personal experience, you know that it is likely that other optimistic people will fail, and that idea depresses and saddens you.

But don't forget the big picture! Throw enough bodies at something over time, and it WILL change.

Great thread.

I would specify a bit further.

What holds together a society is the enforcement of morality through the use of force (the law). You get enough dissent and nonconformity to your society's morals, you kill your society. — L'éléphant

You do not kill your society if the laws of society are not followed. You disrupt those who are in POWER in society if the laws are disrupted.

The question is, who has power? Is it 1% of the population, and they oppress the other 99%? Is it 50%? 80%? In your case, we could break this down law by law. Perhaps a law protects the 80% of society, like the seat belt law. Perhaps a law protect 5% of society like the abortion law. And so and so forth.

In the end, it is about who holds power in a society. A better question is, who should hold the power in society? Intuitively, I believe those who allow the greatest protection and power to the safe people of society are those we should allow to have power. Giving anarchists power would hurt most of society for example. But enslaving a portion of society, who would do no harm on their own, for the benefit of another portion would be a poor society.

How about denying gay people weddings? Seems like that's a society that is oppressive. While power can be protective to those in charge, it can also enable those in charge to do evil as well. There is a joy in the black area of the human heart in holding power over another, just for the satisfaction of it after all.

Wonderful! We are about to get into part 4, induction hierarchies. I have never been able to discuss this aspect with someone seriously before, as no one has gotten to the point of mostly understanding the first three parts. While we discuss, recall our methodology of distinctive knowledge, and deductively applying them as applicable knowledge still stands. Within part 4, I subdivided inductions into four parts, but I can absolutely see the need for additional sub-divisions, so feel free to point out any you see.

For example, I could claim that I "know" that my cat is in the kitchen with no further evidence than simply stating that the claim doesn't contradict my or anyone else who is in the room's "reality". — Bob Ross

Applicably knowing something depends on our context, and while context can also be chosen, the choice of context is limited by our distinctive knowledge. If, for example I did not have the distinctive knowledge that my friend could lie to me, then I would know the cat was in the room. But, if I had the distinctive knowledge that my friend could lie to me, I could make an induction that it is possible that my friend could be lying to me. Because that is an option I have no tested in application and due to my circumstance, cannot test even if I wanted to, I must make an induction.

I think that your hierarchy of inductions is a step in the right direction, but what is a justified claim of knowledge? — Bob Ross

When you can deduce nothing else within your context of distinctive knowledge. If you recall the sheep and goat issue, prior to separating the identities of a sheep and a goat, both could be called a "sheep". But once the two identities are formed, there is a greater burden on the person who is trying to applicably know whether that animal is either a sheep, or a goat.

Arguably, I think we applicably know few things. The greater your distinctive knowledge and more specific the context, the more difficult it becomes to applicably know something. Arguably though, the greater specificity also gives you a greater assurance that what you do applicably know, will allow greater precision in handling reality. It is easier for a person with a smaller imagination and vocabulary to know something. This reminds me of the concept of newspeak in 1984.

"In "The Principles of Newspeak", the appendix to the novel, Orwell explains that Newspeak follows most of the rules of English grammar, yet is a language characterised by a continually diminishing vocabulary; complete thoughts are reduced to simple terms of simplistic meaning.
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newspeak

Orwell understood implicitly that the simpler and more general the language, the more you could get your populace to "applicably know" without question. If this state is "good" no matter what the state does, then questioning anything the state does is "evil". Simple terms make simple men. But, simple terms also make efficient men. It is not that induction is wrong, it is that incorrectly understood, it can be misused. I think a useful term for when we are discussing a situation in which a person has extremely limited distinctive knowledge is the "simpleton context". We can use this when there is a question of fundamentals.

I would argue the bulk of our decisions are through intuitive inductions, and being able to categorize which one's are the most useful to us, is one of the strengths of the theory. Now that we have have a way to manage the cogency of inductions lets go back to your cat in the kitchen example.

As a reminder, hierarchy of inductions is as follows: Probability, possibility, plausibility, and irrational. Each are formed based on how much of their underlying logic is based upon deductions versus other inductions. First, lets examine the most basic of inductions.

Likewise, we could take this a step further: let's say that I, and everyone else in the room, get on a phone call with someone who is allegedly in that very kitchen that we don't have access to (in which I am claiming the cat to reside) and that person states (through the phone call) that the cat is not in the kitchen. — Bob Ross

I'll just cover the first three questions. We will not use the simpleton context here. It is a useful context for addressing fundamentals, so if there are any questions, we can return to it at anytime to find the underlying basis. We will be people who are normal seekers of knowledge.

Do I now "know" (applicably) that the cat is not in the kitchen?
No, because I know it is possible that my friend might lie, and I don't know if the person is telling the truth.

Do I "know" that that person actually checked the kitchen and didn't just make it up?
If it is possible that my friend could call me outside of the kitchen, and I have no way of verifying where he called from, then no.

Do I "know" that was even was a person I was talking to?
If I know it is possible that something else could mimic my friends voice to the point I would be fooled, then no.

From this discussion, I think I've actually gleaned something new from my theory I didn't explicitly realize before! If we have the distinctive knowledge of something that is possible or probable, these act as potential issues we have to applicably test and eliminate before we can say we applicably know something. This is because possibilities and probabilities are based on prior applicable knowledge.

Lets change the cat situation to different hierarchies so you can see different outcomes. The person who you're talking to is a trusted friend who rarely lies to you. Its possible they could, but its improbable. There doesn't appear to be a tell in their voice that they are lying, so it would be more cogent to look at the probability they are lying. They rarely lie to you, and they wouldn't have an incentive to lie (that you know of), so you assume they probably aren't lying.

They tell you the cat is in the kitchen as you hear them pouring the food into their bowl. You even hear a "meow" over the phone. You still don't know it, because you have distinctive knowledge of the fact that your friend could be lying this one, or playing a clever prank. You know that it is possible to get an electronic device that would mimic the sound of a cat. You know that it is possible for someone to pour something into a bowl that sounds like cat food, but that doesn't mean the cat is in the kitchen. But, again, its improbable that your friend is lying to you. Probability is more cogent to make decisions off of then possibilities. Therefore, you are more reasonable in assuming your friend is not lying to you, and making the induction that the cat is in the kitchen.

Of course, you could be wrong. All inductions could be wrong. But it would still be less reasonable for you to believe the cat was not in the kitchen based on possibility, when you have probability that indicates the cat likely is.

Another great example I have been pondering is this: do I "know" that a whale is the largest mammal on earth? — Bob Ross

It depends on your context. If you are implicitly including, "out of all the mammals we have discovered so far," then yes. Or you could explicitly give that greater specific context and add that phrase into the sentence. Often times, we may say things with implied contexts behind them, due to efficiency. The danger of efficiency is of course people can skip steps, overlook implicit claims, and take things literally when it was never intended to.

When we also state, "out of all the mammals we have discovered so far," we are also implicitly noting it is "out of all the possible mammals we've discovered so far". We do not consider plausibilities. For example, I can imagine an animal bigger than a whale that stands on four feet and reaches its neck into the clouds. But we have never applicably known such a creature, so it is not an induction that can challenge the deduction we have made.

I feel there is a lot to cover and refine with inductions, so I look forward to your questions and critiques!

quote="Joshua Jones;630465"]This is why for a conversation, acceptance of my premise is so necessary - that the end of the world is here.[/quote]

That is not an invitation to discuss philosophy. You are looking for people to agree with you on something you have already decided is right. Don't you think that's intellectually dishonest?

To everyone else that's like saying, "Its important that you accept the notion that unicorns exist before we talk about the magical powers they use."

Here's Pliny the Younger, witnessing the sudden, violent destruction of Pompeii: — Joshua Jones

Now this is a good example. But where do you see this happening today?

You started with,

Now that we seem to have quite definitely arrived at “the end of the world as we know it”, engines stopped, steam wafting through the air, conductors absent, and doors open, I’m not feeling fine. — Joshua Jones

Where do you see violent destruction happening? Where is the end of the world like Pompei? If you want people on a philosophy board to discuss with you seriously, back up your premises when people ask you to provide evidence for them.

How do you treat and care for your most poor and vulnerable?

I ask this question, because it is natural that a government treats its wealthy and powerful well, while using, exploiting, demeaning, and griping against its lowest social standings.

The greatest countries treat their poor well. The worst follow the primitive inclination of humanity.

I think you understand the theory Bob. Everything you said seemed to line up! Yes, I would be interested in your own explorations into epistemology. Feel free to direct where you would like to go next.

Fantastic points! It is a joy for me to see someone else understand the paper so well. I'm not sure anyone ever has. Lets go over the points you made.

Point 1: Differentiation is a product of error.

When I see a cup, it is the error of my perception. If I could see more accurately, I would see atoms, or protons/neutrons/electrons or what have you, and, thereby, the distinction of cup from the air surrounding it becomes less and less clear. Perfectly accurate eyes are just as blind as perfectly inaccurate eyes: differentiation only occurs somewhere in between those two possibilities. — Bob Ross

Instead of the word "error" I would like to use "difference/limitiations". But you are right about perfectly inaccurate eyes being as blind as eyes which are able to see in the quantum realm, if they are trying to observe with the context of normal healthy eyes. Another contextual viewpoint is "zoom". Zoom out and you can see the cup. Zoom in on one specific portion and you no longer see the cup, but a portion of the cup where the elements are made from.

Fortunately, we are no only bound to sight with our senses. Not only do we have our natural senses, we can invent measurements to "sense" for us as well. Sight is when light is captured in your eyes, and your brain interprets it into something meaningful. Same with measurements at the nano, or macro level, are the same.

Therefore, a lot of beliefs are both applicable knowledge and not applicable knowledge: it is relative to the scope. — Bob Ross

You've nailed it, as long as its realized what is applicable is within the contextual scope being considered. I can have applicable knowledge in one scope, but not another. This applies not only to my personal context, but to group contexts as well. In America at one time, swans were defined as being white, and applicably known as such. In Western Australia, "swans" can be black. Each had applicable knowledge of what a swan was in their own context, but once the contexts clashed, both had new challenges to their previous applied knowledge. The result of that, is within the context of world wide zoology, swans can be both black or white.

For example, the "cup" is a meaningful distinction, but is contradicted by reality: the more accurately we see, or sense in general, the more the concept of a "cup" contradicts it. Therefore, since it technically contradicts reality, it is not applicable knowledge. However, within the relative scope of, let's say, a cup on a table, it is meaningful to distinguish the two even though, in "reality", they are really only distinguishable within the context of an erroneous eye ball. — Bob Ross

If you remove the word error, and replace it with "difference" I think you've nailed this. Within the context of having human eyes, we see the world, and know it visually a particular way. We do not see the ultra violet wavelength for example. In ultra violet light, blue changes to white. So is it applicably known as blue, or white? Within the context of a human eyeball, it is blue. In the context of a measurement that can see ultraviolet light, it is white. Within the context of scientific reflective wavelengths, it is another color. None are in error. They are merely the definitions, and applicable knowledge within those contextual definitions.

Point 2: Contradictions can be cogent. — Bob Ross

I would like to alter this just slightly. Contradictions of applicable knowledge can never be cogent within a particular context. If there is a contradiction within that context, then it is not deduced, and therefore not knowledge. If two people hold two different sets of distinctive knowledge, but both can apply them within that particular context and gain applicable knowledge within that set of distinctive knowledge, then they are not holding a contradiction for themselves. But if two people are using the same distinctive context, then they cannot hold a contradiction in its application to reality.

The real conflict is the conflict of which distinctive knowledge to when there is a conflict. I'll try not to repeat myself on how distinctive contexts are resolved within expanded context, but the examples I gave in part 3 show that. If you would like me to go over that again in this example, and also go point by point on your example, I will. I'm just trying to cover all of your points at a first pass, and I feel getting into the point by point specifics could be too long when trying to cover all of your initial points. Feel free to drill into, or ask me to drill further into any of these points more specifically on your follow up post.

Building off of point 1 and 2, the distinction between an accidental and essential property seem to be only different in the sense of scope. I think this is the right time to invoke Ship of Theseus (which you briefly mention in the original post in this forum). — Bob Ross

Nailed it. And with this, we have an answer to the quandary that Theseus' ship posed. When is a ship not a ship anymore? Whenever we decide its not a ship anymore within the scale of context. The answer to the question, is that there is no one answer.

For example, one society could state that both the original parts, and replaced parts, are Theseus' ship. However, the ship that is constructed with the newest parts is the original ship. So if two ships were built, Theseus ship would be the newest part ship, while the oldest part ship would be another ship made out of the originals old parts.

Another society could reverse this. They could say that once a ship has replaced all of its old parts, it is no longer the original ship anymore, and needs to be re-registered with the government. This could be due to the fact that the government assures that all vessels are sea worthy and meet regulation, and it figures if all of the original parts are replaced, it needs to be re-inspected again to ensure it still meets the regulatory standards.

It is a puzzle that has no specific answer, does have specific answers that fulfil the question, but has puzzled people because they believed there was only one answer.

What is essential and accidental in each is within the context of each society. For accidental properties, perhaps society B wasn't detailed enough, and it turns out you can replace "most" of a part of a ship, like an engine besides one cog, and that's still "The original engine with a lot of pieces replaced on it." In society A, they might say "Its a new engine with one old piece left on it". In the first case it is essential that every piece be replaced for something to be considered a "new" part, while in the later, a few old parts put on a new part still means its a "new part with some old pieces".

There is another type of induction: "ingrained induction". You have a great example of this that you briefly discuss in the fourth essay: Hume's problem of induction. Another example is that the subject has to induce that "this" is separate from "that", but it is an ingrained, fundamental induction. — Bob Ross

Recall that the separation of "this" and "that" is not an induction in itself, just a discrete experience. It is only an induction when it makes claims about reality. I can imagine a magical unicorn in my head. That is not an induction. If I believe a magical unicorn exists in reality, that is a belief, and now an induction.

Now you could argue that in certain cases of discrete experience, we also load them with what you call "ingrained inductions". Implicitly we might quickly add, "that exists in reality" and "this exists in reality". You are correct. Most of our day to day experiences are not knowledge, but inductions based off of past things we've known, or cogently induced. Its much more efficient that way. Gaining knowledge takes time experimentation, and consideration. The more detailed the knowledge you want, the more detailed the context, and the more time and effort it takes to obtain it.

And that is ok. I do not carry a ruler around with me to measure distance. Many times I estimate if that is a few feet with my eyeball. And for most day to day contexts, that is fine. Put me in a science lab, and I am an incompetent who should be banned. Put me in a situation in which I need to know that the stream is a little under a foot wide, and I can easily cross, and I am an efficient and capable person.

For example, the fact of gravity (not considering the theory or law), which is an induction anchored solely to the "ingrained induction" — Bob Ross

Hm, I would ask you to specify where the induction is. Gravity is not a monolith, but built upon several conclusions of application. Is there a place in gravity that has been applied, and found to be inconclusive? The induction is not what gravity claims to describe itself as, the induction would be in its application. Off the top of my head I could state the idea that "Gravity is always applying a pull from anything that has mass to every other mass in the universe" an induction for sure. That does not negate its application between particular bodies we can observe.

But more to your point, I believe the theory allows us to more clearly identify what we can conclude as knowledge, and what we can include as cogent, and less cogent inductions. It may require us to refine certain previous assumptions, or things that we have unintentionally let slide in past conclusions. As science is constantly evolving, I don't see a problem with this if it helps it evolve into a better state. If you would like me to go into how I see this theory in assisting science, I can go into it at a separate post if desired.

The properties and characteristics that are apart of discrete experience do not in themselves prove in any way that they are truly differentiating factors: the table and the chair could, in reality, be two representations of the same thing, analogous to two very different looking representations of the same table directly produced by different angles of perspective. — Bob Ross

By discrete experience and context, they can, or cannot be. Recall the situation between a goat and a sheep. If I include what a goat is under the definition of a sheep, I can hold that both a goat and sheep, are a "sheep" The reason why we divide up identities into smaller groups of description is that they have some use to us. It turns out that while a goat and sheep share many properties, they are consistently different enough in behavior that it is easier and more productive to label them as two separate class of animals.

The idea that the table and chair are two separate things is not a truth in reality apart from our contexts. So there could be a context where chair and tables are separate, or they are together as a "set". We can identify them as we like, as long as we are clear with our identities, and are able to apply them to reality without contradiction.

Point 6: Induction of possibility is not always cogent

You argue in the fourth essay that possibility inductions are cogent: this is not always the case. — Bob Ross

Cogency is a way to define a hierarchy of inductions. But an induction is still always an induction. Its conclusion is not necessarily true from the premises. Just because something existed once, does not mean it will ever exist again. We know its possible, because it has at least existed one time. So in the case where you have a memory of iron floating on water, as long as you believe in the accuracy of your memories, you will reasonably believe it is possible for iron to float on water.

Of course, when you extended that context to another person, you would be challenged. Person after person would state, "No, I've never seen or heard of any test that showed iron floated on water." What you do is your choice. You could start doubting your memory. You could start testing and see that it fails time and time again. You are the only one in the world who thinks its possible, while the rest of society does not.

And finally, inductions are not more reasonable than deductions. If you believe it is possible for iron to float on water, but you continually deduce it is not, you would be holding an induction over a current deduction. You might try to explain it away by stating that it was possible that iron floated on water. Maybe physics changed. Maybe your memories are false or inaccurate. And as we can see, holding a deduction as the greater value than the induction, gives us a reason to question our other inductions instead of holding them as true.

And for our purposes, we might indeed be able to prove that their memories are false. Surely they had memories of parents. We could ask the parents if they knew of his birth. They would quickly realize they did not have an id, or a record of it anywhere in society. Once the memories were seen as doubtful, then they could not be sure they had actually seen iron float. At that point, its plausible that the person's memories of iron floating on water were applicably known, but it has been reduced from a possibility, and is even less cogent now then affirming the deduction of today, that iron does not float on water.

Point 7: the "I" and the other "I"s are not used equivocally

Here's where the ternary distinction comes into play: you cannot prove other "I"s to be a discrete experiencer in a holistic sense, synonymous with the subject as a discrete experiencer, but only a particular subrange of it. You can't prove someone else to be "primitively aware", and consequently "experience", but only that they have the necessary processes that differentiate. In other words, you can prove that they differentiate, not that they are primitively aware of the separation of "this" from "that". — Bob Ross

You may be correct. We would need to clarify the terms and attempt to apply them to reality. And that's fine. As for this line, " In other words, you can prove that they differentiate, not that they are primitively aware of the separation of "this" from "that", yes I can. Differentiation within existence is "primitive awareness". Lets not use that phrase anymore if it causes confusion. If we don't have solid definitions between us, we won't match up in the context of discussion.

Another thing to consider, is I don't need to prove anything deeper in the "I" then I did in that context. If you read the paper and understand the concepts, are you a discrete experiencer? Can you deduce? Can you take the methodology, apply it, and it comes away with consistent results that give you a useful tool to interact with reality in a rational manner? It is there to prove yourself. If you can understand the paper and follow its conclusions, then you have actively participated in the act of distinctive and applicable knowledge. If you want to produce another "I" for your own personal context, there is nothing stopping you, or contradicting the "primitive I" in the paper.

What I want to take away from this instead of debating over an "I" is a broader concept that there will be some things that we cannot applicably know based on the context we set up. Will I ever applicably know what it is to discretely experience as you do? No, nor you for I. But can I applicably know that this is impossible? Yes. Applicably knowing our limits is just as important. Calculus was invented to measure limits of calculation, where the calculation eventually forms an asymptote of results. While I may not be able to know what its like to discretely experience as yourself, I can know you discretely experience, and use that knowledge to formulate a tool that can evaluate up to our limits.

There is my massive reply! Out of all that, pick 2 that you would like me to drill into for the next response. When you are satisfied with those, we can go back and drill into two more, so I don't approach the questionable limits of how much I can type in one post! Wonderful contributions as always.

Yes, I am enjoying the discussion of getting to the essence of the work. I much appreciate your desire to understand what the argument is trying to say, and I hope I am coming across as trying to understand the argument you are making as well.

It is irrelevant if a being that discretely experience realizes they are doing this, or not. They will do so regardless of what anyone says or believes.

You are 100% correct. I do not need to recognize that I am differentiating the letters on my keyboard from the keyboard itself: the mere differentiation is what counts . But this, I would argue, is a recognition of your "awareness" (aka awareness of one's awareness), not awareness itself. So instead, I would say that I don't need to be aware (or recognize) that I am aware of the differentiation of the letters on my keyboard from the keyboard itself: all that must occur is the fundamental recognition (awareness) that there even is differentiation in the first place. — Bob Ross

Good, I think we're thinking along the same lines now. That fundamental recognition matches the definition of discrete experiencing. Such discrete experiencing does not require words. We could say that words are a "higher" level of discrete experiencing. But I don't do that in the paper, because that differentiation is not important as a fundamental.

Now can the theory be refined with this differentiation? It could. Someone could call that consciousness. Someone could say, "I" isn't the primitive part of me, "I" only requires that I have consciousness or higher level defining. The theory allows this without issue. But that refinement of I would be a different context of the "I" in the argument. The "conscious I" versus the "unconscious I" are one possible example.

I think you are wrong: "I" am not differentiating (separating "this" from "that"), something is differentiating from an undefined flood and "I" recognize the already differentiated objects (this is "awareness" as I mean it). — Bob Ross

This is a perfect example of your discrete experience, versus mine. I am not wrong. My definition of "I" applies to reality without contradiction. Your definition of I is also100% correct. Can it apply to reality without contradiction? Perhaps. But we are not having a disagreement about the application of the word, we are having a disagreement about the construction of the definition.

My "I" contains both the fundamental, and the "higher" level discrete experiences we make that I believe you are pointing out. Whether its the fundamental awareness, or meta awareness (making a fundamental awareness into a word for example), they are both discrete experiences. A house cat and a tiger are both cats. For certain arguments, it is important to differentiate between the two. And it may be necessary as the theory grows, or someone creates a new theory based on these fundamentals. But for now, for the fundamentals, I see no reason by application, why there needs to be a greater distinction or redefinition of "the primitive I". The only reason I have the primitive "I", is to quickly get into the idea of context without contradiction, or needing to dive into some form of consciousness, which would likely be another paper.

You are putting your own desired definition of "I" into the argument. Which is fine and perfectly normal. You might be thinking I am stating that my definition of "I" is the definition that is 100% correct, and we should all use it forevermore. I am not. I am saying "I" in this context of understanding knowledge as a process is all that we need. I am not saying we couldn't have "I" mean something different in a different context. In psychology, "I" will be different. For a five year old, "I" will be different. Each person can define "I" as they wish. If they can apply it to reality without contradiction, then they have a definition that is useful to them in their context.

"I" here is simply a definition useful within the context of showing the fundamental process of knowledge as a tool between more than one "I", or discrete experiencer.

I'm fine with saying that "experience" initially precedes definition (or potentially that it even always precedes definition), but I think the fundamental aspect of existence is "primitive awareness". If the beating of something in your neck, which is initially just as foreign to you as your internal organs, wasn't something that you were "primitively aware" of, then it would slip your grasp (metaphorically speaking). — Bob Ross

Agreed. If you don't discretely experience something, then it is part of the undefined existence. To reiterate, this applies to primitive awareness. I'm not sure we both have the same intention when using this new phrase, so but for my part, its merely the barest of discrete experiences. Think of it this way. My primitive discrete experience is seeing a picture and the feelings associated with it. Then I look closer, and see a sheep in the field. Then I look again and see there is another sheep crouching in the grass in the field that I missed the first two times. While the crouching sheep was always in my vision, I did not discretely experience it. Or, as I think you are implying, have primitive awareness of it.

For example, if something (the processes) wasn't differentiating the keys on my keyboard, then I would not, within my most fundamental existence, "experience" the keys on a keyboard. — Bob Ross

If you define "I", as consciousness, then you are correct within this context, and could applicably know that. But if I define "I" as a discrete experiencer, you are incorrect in your application. If I am able to pick out and type a "k" on the keyboard, that cannot be done without a discrete experience. Just because you haven't registered it beyond haptics, or have to put a lot of mental effort into it, doesn't mean it isn't a discrete experience.

Do you see the importance of definitions within contexts? We have two different contexts of "I", and they are both correct within their contexts. The question is, which one do we use then? But if we are at this point, then we are at the level of understanding the fundamentals of the argument to address that point.

First, I asked you to understand the context of "I" that I've introduced here, which I believe you have done more than admirably. I hopefully have returned the idea that I understand your context of "I" as well. At this point, we attempt to apply both to reality without contradiction. We both succeed. Why I'm asking you to use my "I", is because it helps us get to the part of the argument where we introduce context. Perhaps I could introduce "consciousness" and get to the same point. But that would likely extend the argument by pages, and would only be explaining a sub-division of discrete experience. Why introduce a sub-division when it doesn't seem necessary to talk about context? If you can explain why my definition of an "I" does not allow me to identify other discrete experiencers, then you will have a point. But so far, I do not see that. Therefore, I do not think we need that context of your "I".

What I'm trying to indicate is that your context of "I" for the argument isn't the "I" of the context of this argument. Within my contextual use of "I", can I apply that to reality without contradiction? You might say yes, but feel that it is inadequate and does not address so many other thing you want to discuss. That is fine. My "I" does not negate your "I", nor its importance in application. If it makes you more comfortable, we could make a different word or phrase for it like, "Primitive I". It is not the word that matters. It is the underlying meaning and context. For the context of ultimately arriving at applicable knowledge, and then the idea that there are other discrete experiencers besides myself, is this enough?

I would not constitute this as a real proof: that discretely experiencing doesn't contradict reality and, therefore, it is "correct". — Bob Ross

I do not believe it is an axiom. Someone can question if what they discretely experience is "real". The axiom I think is, "That which does not contradict reality is knowledge". I don't have any proof of this statement when it is introduced. I state it, then try to show it can be true. If the axiom is upheld, then I can conclude that what I discretely experience is known to me. But without the axiom of what knowledge is, I don't believe I claim that. Even then, I don't like the idea of "something that is true by default". I believe we can start with assumptions, but when we conclude there should be some proof that our assumptions are also correct in some way. But like you said, this is an aside to the conversation. I will not say you are wrong, and I am just giving an opinion that may also be wrong. The discussion of proofs and axioms could be a great topic for another time though!

Perhaps you misunderstand what "evil" is in entertainment. Evil serves the purpose of representing a challenge to overcome for growth. Evil is seen as a thing to be conquered for success. It is a lens to learn a lesson, so you do not commit evil in your own life.

Real world evil is not interesting. If someone kidnapped you and sawed your arms off without any sedatives, would that be entertaining? How about a bomb in real life that blows a child's head off, and permanently twists and disfigures the remaining people around it?

You are confusing the world of fiction, and its purpose, with the real world. Evil is never entertaining, except perhaps to the one committing it. Terrorists mangle and ruin lives for some ideology that obviously most people don't want to live by.

We must learn to admire fundamentalist, terrorists, extremists AS FAR AS their determination and solidarity is concerned. — Wittgenstein

If they are evil fundamentalis, terrorists, and extremists, never. That is determination and ideology that has become twisted for nefarious purposes. It is shameful and tragic; not a thing to be admired.

This has got me thinking: Does my individual psychology (which has accrued various arbitrary biases based on my genes, upbringing, books I've read, etc.) limit what philosophical theories I can consider to be good/true? — clemogo

If those philosophies do not have undeniably solid backing, then I would say yes. Without near solid logic, we are left with our whims. I think philosophy tries to create situations that have solid logic. Philosophy also constantly challenges us out of our comfort zone. Perhaps a person may choose philosophy A on a whim, but a good argument from philosophy B might inspire a person to think deeper about A. They still may stick with A, but might be compelled to give a greater reason then their whims. Sometimes this is enough for someone to break from their whim, and choose something that has a more logical foundation.

Certainly Bob!

Experience is your sum total of existence. At first, this is undefined. It precedes definition. It is that which definitions are made for and from. A discrete experiencer has the ability to create some type of identity, to formulate a notion that "this" is separate from "that" over there within this undefined flood.

It is irrelevant if a being that discretely experience realizes they are doing this, or not. They will do so regardless of what anyone says or believes. In questioning the idea of being able to discretely experience I wondered, are the discrete experiences we make "correct"? And by "correct" it seems, "Is an ability to discretely experience contradicted by reality?" No, because the discrete experience, is the close examination of "experience". At a primitive level it is pain or pleasure. The beating of something in your neck. Hunger, satiation. It is not contradicted by existence, because it is the existence of the being itself. As such, what we discretely experience is not a belief. It is, "correct".

If I discretely experience that I feel pain, I feel pain. Its undeniable by anything in existence, because it is existence itself. If I remember something from years past, that memory exists. If I choose to define an existence as something, I choose to do that. It is undeniable that I have chosen that. Therefore discrete experience is "known", by a discrete experiencer by the fact is it not contradicted by reality.

Again, a discrete experiencer does not have to realize that their act of discretely experiencing, is discrete experiencing. Discrete experience is not really a belief, or really knowledge in the classical sense. When I say distinctive knowledge, it is the set of discrete experiences a thing has. A discrete experiencer, has discrete experiences. But, if a bit of distinctive knowledge is used in one extra step, to assume that what one discretely experiences can be used to accurately represent something more than the discrete experience itself, then we have a situation where it is a belief, or knowledge. When one has applied their distinctive knowledge, such as adjusting it to logically apply to reality without contradiction, I call applicable knowledge.

That's basically the start, and I hope explains experience and discrete experience with greater clarity!

I will label the awareness of discrete experiences as “distinctive knowledge”. To clarify, distinctive knowledge is simply the awareness of one’s discrete experiences.

This explicitly defines distinctive knowledge as the awareness of discrete experiences. But now you seem to be in agreement with me that it can't have anything to do (within the context of your essays) with awareness. — Bob Ross

No, you are quite right Bob. I wrote this decades ago when I was much younger and not as clear with my words. I believe you are one of the few who has read this seriously. Back then, I had a greater tendency to use words more from my own context and personal meaning, then what would be proper and precise English. This is a mistake in my writing.

Yes, distinctive knowledge is the discrete experiences you have. Memory as well, is a discrete experience. If this is understood, then I think we can continue.

By your essays' definition, distinctive knowledge is the awareness of discrete experiences — Bob Ross

Ah, I see now. This is incorrect. A person's awareness of the vocabulary has nothing to do with it. Their awareness that they discretely experience, has nothing to do with it. Your discrete experiences ARE your distinctive knowledge. If you have a discrete experience meta-analyzing a discrete experience, or you don't, it isn't important.

The point was I wondered whether I could prove myself wrong that I discretely experienced. I could not. Then I asked if I could prove that the discrete experiences I had did not exist. I find that I could not. Of course they exist. I'm having them. Therefore discrete experiences are knowledge of the individual. But a particular type of knowledge. It is when one tries to apply that discrete experience as representing external reality that one needs to evaluate whether that is an applicable belief, or an applicable piece of knowledge.

That is why if you can read, I know you can discretely experience that language. Then I introduce the terms to you. Then I show you a process by which you can attempt to apply it to reality using deduction, apart from a belief. Perhaps the label of distinctive knowledge is confusing and unnecessary. All I wanted to show is that any discrete experience is something you know, whether you realize it or not. That is a type of knowledge within your personal context. This was to contrast with the application of that personal knowledge as a belief in its application to reality.

If I removed distinctive knowledge from the terminology, and just used "discrete experiences when not applying to reality" would that make more sense? Do you think there is a better word or terminology? And does that clear up what is going on now? I agree with you by the way, if I tried to assert that distinctive knowledge required a person to be aware of their discrete experiences, I would be introducing a meta analysis on discrete experiences that could never be proven. I am not doing that.

I don't think so, no. Absolute power reveals your character apart from the inhibitions and threats of society. It reveals "the real you". I believe there are plenty of people who are moral and good because they have decided to be, and not because of the threats from others if they are not.

I don't think absolute power requires knowledge at all. But absolute power without knowledge won't be wielded very well. In life, I don't think absolute power or knowledge exist. We work with the power and knowledge we have, and what we do when we find our selves free from the limits of other people, is when we truly discover who we are.

Great, I believe we've iterated through this and are closer to understanding each other.

I think what you meant (and correct me if I am wrong here) is the five senses, not all senses. If you had no senses, you wouldn't have thoughts because you would not be aware of them. — Bob Ross

I had to laugh at this one, as I've never had senses defined in such a way as sensing thoughts. We have two definitions here, so let me point out the definition the paper was trying to convey. The intention of the senses in this case is any outside input into the body. Some call them the five senses, but I wasn't necessarily stating it had to be five. Anything outside of the body is something we sense. The thing which takes the senses and interprets it into concepts, or discrete experiences, is the discrete experiencer. For the purposes here, I have noted the ability to discretely experience is one thing you can know about your "self".

Is it incorrect for me to say I have discrete experiences? I believe it is impossible to not. If I claim, "No." I must have been able to discretely experience the concept of words. As a fundamental, I believe that's as solid as can be.

But thoughts are not absent of all senses. — Bob Ross

Could you go into detail as to what you mean? I'm not stating you are wrong. Depending on how you define senses, you could be right. But I can't see how that counters the subdivision I've made either. If I ignore my senses, meaning outputs entering into the body, then what is left is "thoughts". Now again, we can subdivide it. Detail it if you want. Say, "These types of thoughts are more like senses". I'm fine with that. It does not counter the fundamental knowledge that I am a discrete experiencer. If I know that I discretely experience, then what I discretely experience, is what I know.

You are directly implying that even if you can determine another animal to be a discrete experiencer, you still have no reason to think that they have any distinctive knowledge because that doesn’t directly prove that they are aware of their discrete experiences. Am I correct in this? — Bob Ross

No. I hesitate to go into animals, because its just a side issue I threw in for an example, with the assumption that the core premises were understood. Arguing over animal knowledge is missing the point. If you accept the premises of the argument, then we can ask how we could apply these definitions to animal knowledge. If you don't accept the premises of the argument, then applying it to animals is a step too far. This is not intended to dodge a point you've made. This is intended to point out we can't go out this far without understanding the fundamanets. My apologies for jumping out here too soon! Instead, I'm going to jump to other people, which is in the paper.

As of now, the “I” defined for you has another property that you haven’t proven to exist in the other “I”s: awareness of discrete experiences—distinctive knowledge as you defined it. Just like how I can park my car with a complete lack of awareness of how I got there, I could also be reading your papers without any awareness of it. — Bob Ross

You would not be able to read without the ability to discretely experience. This was implicit but perhaps should be made explicit. If you can read the letters on the page, you can discretely experience. If you can then communicate me with those letters back in kind, then you understand that they are a form of language. If you can do this, you can read my paper, and you can enter the same context as myself if you so choose. You can realize you are a discrete experiencer, and apply the test to reality.

You cannot do that without being a discrete experiencer like me. I would have to come up with a new method of knowing if someone who could not read or communicate was an "I" as defined. But again, I am not concerned with branching out into detailing how this fundamanal process of knowledge could be used to show a person who cannot communicate is an I, but establishing the fundamental process of knowledge first, with which we can use to have that discussion.

To that end, it doesn't matter if you're "conscious". It doesn't matter if you're spaced out, in a weird mental state, etc. You're a discrete experiencer like me. You run into the very problem of denying that you are a discrete experiencer, just like myself. So the rest follows that what you discretely experience, is what you distinctely know. And for you to conclude that, you must understand deductive beliefs, and be capable of doing them.

Do you deny that you deductively think? That you can discretely experience? Of course not. So that is good enough for the purposes that I need to continue the paper into resolving how two discrete experiencers can come to discrete and applicable knowledge between them. All I need is one other discrete experiencer, and the theory can continue.

A person's genetics or past experiences may incline them to discretely experience properties different from others when experiencing the same stimulus.
This is why, I would argue, not everyone who reads your paper is going to fundamentally agree with you with respect to your sheep example. — Bob Ross

They can fundamentally disagree with me by distinctive knowledge. They cannot fundamentally disagree with me by application, unless they've shown my application was not deduced. But in doing so, they agree with the process to obtain knowledge that I've set up. The sheep examples are all intended to show we can invent whatever distinctive knowledge we want, but the only way it has use in the world, is to attempt to apply it without contradiction.

I understand you're still concerned with the specifics of distinctive knowledge claims I've made such as, "What is an "I", when the real part to question is the process itself. What I'm trying to communicate, is that there is no third party arbiter out there deciding what "I" should mean, or what any word should mean. We invent the terms and words that we use. The question is whether we can create a process out of this that is a useful tool to help us understand and make reasonable decisions about the world.

Is it incorrect that an individual can invent any words or internal knowledge that they use to apply to the world? Is it incorrect, that if I apply my distinctive knowledge to the world and the world does not contradict my application, that I can call that another form of knowledge, applicable knowledge? If you enter into the context of the words I have used, does the logic follow?

If it is initialized with a ternary distinction, then, as you hinted earlier, solipsism becomes a problem much quicker and, therefore, your ease of derivation (in terms of a binary distinction) will not be obtained by them. For example, for a person that starts their subjective endeavor with a ternary distinction, it is entirely possible that they must address the issue of “where are these processes coming from?” — Bob Ross

It is not a problem for me at all if someone introduces a ternerary distinction. The same process applies. They will create their distinctive knowledge. Then, they must apply that to reality without contradiction. If they cannot apply it to reality without contradiction, then they have invented terms that are not able to be applicably known. Distinctive knowledge that implies solipsism tends to fail when applied to the world. In my case, I have terms that can be applicably known. Therefore I have a tool of reasoning that allows me to use my distinctive knowledge to step out in the world and handle it.

My problem is that you skip ahead straight to the sheep example, which is an analysis of the products of the processes, when you haven’t addressed the more fundamental problem of whether those very processes are accurate or not — Bob Ross

I don't doubt this is a problem for a reader, so thank you for pointing this out. Your feedback tells me I need to explicitly point out how if you are reading this, you are by the definitions I stated, an "I" as well. The sheep part itself I use to give examples to how distinct knowledge can change, and that's ok. The only thing that matters is if that knowledge can be applied to reality without contradiction. So I think I can retain that, I just need to add the detail I mentioned before.

Now you could say, and I think this may be what your essays imply, that, look, we have these processes that are throwing stuff at the "I", of which it is aware of, such as perception and thought, and here's what we can do with it. If that's what your essays are trying to get at, then that is fine. — Bob Ross

Yes, this is a more accurate assessment of what I am doing. I am inventing knowledge as a tool that can be used. With this, I can say I distinctly know something, and I can applicably know something. I have a process that is proven, and the process itself can be applied to its own formulation. You can go back with the conclusions the paper makes, and apply it from the beginning. I use the process to create the process, and it does not require anything outside of the process as a basic foundation.

Thank you again for your thoughts and critiques! I hope this cleared up what the paper is trying to convey in the first two papers. If these fundamentals are understood, and can withstand your critique, then we can address context, which I feel might need some tightening up. I look forward to your next thoughts!

Hi Joshua, and welcome to the forums. You might be getting some resistance from people and scratching your head a bit. What you've brought to your post is lamentations in a poetic format. But that is not philosophy. Philosophy is when we have a problem that perplexes us that cannot currently be answered by science, or its answer seems inadequate. What is death? What is life? What are the end times?

To assist, don't assume anyone knows what you are talking about. Tell us in a straight forward manner your experiences you are having. In your case, it seems to be despair, a belief that the world is coming to an end. What does it mean to you if the world is coming to an end? Do you have specific instances you would like to discuss?

We do not discuss philosophy to nod at each other's assumptions or feelings. We come to discuss a topic, and have its assumptions challenged and questioned. I'll give you an example.

I'm middle aged, and I know, for a fact, that I'm going to die one day. I know I will age, decay, and might even meet a terrible end. I am not married, I almost certainly never will, and I have no kids. Yet I am happy. I do not feel the world is going to end, or society is collapsing. I have my own purpose in life, and I live that fulfilled.

Tell me why I'm wrong. Show me your viewpoint why I should feel like society is collapsing, or that winter is coming. Challenge me, and we shall discuss your assumptions and see if they hold up when detailed.

Likewise, thank you for your response again Bob! And no, I do not find you condescending. I would much rather the point was over explained then not enough. Feel free to always point out where I'm wrong, its the only way to put the theory through its paces.

If there is a disagreement with the foundation, lets focus on that first. The rest is irrelevant if that is wrong.

First, lets focus on definitions. To clarify, a discrete experience is the ability to part and parcel what we "experience". A lens focusses light into a camera, but the lens does not discriminate or filter the light into parts. We do. Discrete experiences include observations, and our consciousness. Discrete experience is the "now", our memory, and anytime you think. As you note, we could split up discrete experience into different categories. I could include consciousness, but consciousness is still a discrete experience.

So what is distinctive knowledge? The awareness of any discrete experience. I discretely know when I sense. When I have a memory. What I define my own consciousness to be. Since I can know that I discretely experience, I know whatever it is that I discretely experience. That is discrete knowledge.

I read your essays as directly implying (by examples such as the sheep) that a specific instance of "I am a discrete experiencer" was "I am a discrete perceiver and thinker"--and I believe this to be false — Bob Ross

No, the only thing I am claiming is, "I am a discrete experiencer". Perception is a discrete experience, as well as thinking, consciousness, and whatever other definitions and words you want to divide up the notion of what we can discretely experience. Being a discrete experiencer does not requires consciousness, or even any notion of an "I". For beings like us, we can divide what we discretely experience into several definitions. I can create sub-conscious, meta-conscious, meta-meta-conscious, and conscious-unconscious. I can write books, and essays, and have debates about metaphysical meta-conscious-unconsciousness.

Yes, these words are not real words within the context of society, but there is nothing to prevent a person from making up these words, and attributing it to some part of their "self" or a portion that they discretely experience. The subdivisions are unimportant at a base claim of knowledge, as they are all discrete experiences, and all of them if created by an individual, are distinctly known to that individual.

In other words, one who does begin with a binary distinction can by use of those very discrete experiences determine that there original assertion was wrong and, in fact, it is ternary. — Bob Ross

What I am saying is, someone can subdivide the notion of an "I" even further if they like. They can even change the entire definition of "I", and state it requires consciousness, thus excluding certain creatures. There's nothing against that. The definition of "I" am using is based upon the fact I can discretely experience. Me changing the definition of an "I" does not negate that underlying fact. What is ultimately important when one decides on a bit of distinctive knowledge, is to see if they can apply it to reality without contradiction.

So, if I define "I" as simply a discrete experiencer, then I could apply this to reality and state that things which are deemed to discretely experience are "I"'s.

If you define "I" as needing consciousness, then when you applied to reality, any thing that discretely experienced that did not have consciousness would not be an "I". Yours would add in the complication of needing to clearly define consciousness, then show that application in reality.

Both of us are correct in our definitions, and both of us are correct in our application. I would discretely and applicably know an "I" in my context, while you would have both knowledges in your context. It is just like the sheep and goat example in part 3. Someone could define a "goat" to encompass both a sheep and a goat. Or they could create "sheep" and "goat" as being separate. Or they could go even further, and state that a goat of 20 years of age is now, "The goat". It doesn't matter what we create for our definitions for individual use. We distinctly know them all. The question is whether we can apply them to reality without contradiction, so then we can claim we can applicably know them as well.

The only way to prove that someone's definitions are not going to be useful on the applicable level, is to demonstrate two definitions that they hold contradict each other. For example, using the context of regular English, if I said, "Up is down" in a literal sense, we could know that describes an application of reality that is a contradiction. But I could be an illogical being that uses two contradictory definitions in my head. That is what I distinctively know.

The question of "correctness" comes in when two contexts encounter one another.
The keys when discussing the two parts of knowledge come down to whether the distinctive knowledge proposed can be applied to reality without contradiction, and whether the distinctive knowledge that can be applied, is specific and useful enough for our own desired purposes.

In your case, you are dissatisfied with my definition of an "I", because you want some extra sub distinctions for your own personal view of what "I" is. But "I" is merely a placeholder for me at this time for the most basic description of, "that which discretely experiences". Why am I so basic here? Because it avoids leading the discussion where it does not need to go at this time. Further, it serves to avoid the issue of solipsism. Finally, it avoids the discussion of knowledge from focusing squarely on human beings, or particular types of human beings. Notice that your addition of consciousness adds a whole extra addition to the discussion. A new word that needs to be defined, and applied to reality without contradiction. But I am not trying to get the specifics of what we can derive from the our ability to discretely experience as human beings. I am just trying to get the most fundamental aspects of knowledge as a tool.

We could of course conflict further on the notion of what we discretely experience, going round and round as to what consciousness entails, what what all sorts of sub-assessments entail. But it is a fruitless discussion for the purposes of what I'm using the definitions for. I am not wrong, and you are not wrong in our own contexts. We must come to an agreed upon context of distinctive knowledge, and the way to do that for the most number of people, is to get the concepts as basic as possible. The symbol of "I" is unimportant, as long as you understand the concept underneath the "I" that I made from my own personal context. You are entering into "I" as the context developed by myself, while you can hold the "I" as the context on your end. The final "I" is the agreement of compromise between the context of you and I together. We can hold all three in our head without contradiction. It is not the word or symbol that matters. It is again, the underlying concept.

So with this, before you build upon it, before you subdivide it, I ask you to think about the exact definitions of discrete experience, distinctive knowledge, and applicable knowledge. Have I contradicted myself? Have I applied these basic definitions to reality without contradiction? If I have done so, then I have shown a system of knowledge that I can use in my personal context. After that, we can address the notion of cross context further. Thanks again!

Thank you for the wait Bob. I wanted to make sure I answered you fully and fairly.

you stated (in, I believe, your first essay): “In recognizing a self,, I am able to create two “experiences”.  That is the self-recognized thinker, and everything else.” I think that this is the intuitive thing to do, but it is only an incredibly general description and, therefore, doesn’t go deep enough for me. — Bob Ross

It is fine if you believe this is too basic, but that is because I must start basic to build fundamentals. At this point in the argument, I am a person who knows of no other yet.

There are three distinctions to be made, not simply “I” and “everything else”: the interpreter, the interpretations (representations), and self-consciousness. — Bob Ross

I have no objection with discussing this sub divisions of the "I" later. At the beginning though, it is important to examine this from the perspective of a person who is coming into knowledge of themselves for the first time. A "rough draft" if you will. Can we say this person has knowledge in accordance to the definitions and the logic shown here, not the defintions another human being could create. I needed to show you the discrete knowledge of what an "I" was, which is essentialy a discrete experiencer. Then I needed to show you how I could applicably know what an "I" was, which I was able to do.

To this end, we can say that a discrete experiencer does not need the addition of other definitions like consciousness for the theory to prove itself through its own proposals.

it would translate (I think) into a discrete experiencer (self-consciousness and the interpreter joined into to one concept) — Bob Ross

I think this is a fine assessment. We can make whatever definitions and concepts we want. That is our own personal knowledge. I am looking at a blade of grass, while you are creating two other identities within the blade of grass. There is nothing wrong with either of us creating these identities. The question is, can we apply them to reality without contradiction? What can be discretely known is not up for debate. What can be applicably known is.

That is why I define an “experience” as a witnessing of immediate knowledge (the process of thinking, perception, and emotion) by means of rudimentary reason, and a “remembrance” (or memory as you put it in subsequent essays) as seemingly stored experiences. — Bob Ross

This is a great example of when two people with different contexts share their discrete knowledge. I go over that in part 3 if you want a quick review. We have several options. We could accept, amend, reinterpret, or reject each other's definitions. I point this out for the purposes of understanding the theory, because I will be using the theory, to prove the theory.

What I will propose at this point is your definition additions are a fine discussion to have after the theory is understood. The question is, within the definitions I have laid out, can I show that I can discretely know? Can I show that I can applicably know this? You want to discuss the concept of the square root of four, while I want to first focus on the number 2. You are correct in wanting to discuss the square root of four, but we really can't fully understand that until we understand the number 2.

Back to context. If you reject, amend, or disagree with my definitions, we cannot come to an agreement of definitive knowledge within our contexts. This would not deny the theory, but show credence to at least is proposals about distinctive knowledge conflicts within context. But, because I know you're a great philosopher, for now, please accept the definitions I'm using, and the way I apply it. Please feel free to point out contradictions in my discrete knowledge, or misapplications of it. I promise this is not some lame attempt to avoid the discussion or your points. This is to make sure we are at the core of the theory.

To recap: An "I" is defined as a discrete experiencer. That is it. You can add more, that's fine. But the definition I'm using, the distinctive knowledge I'm using, is merely that. Can I apply that discrete knowledge to reality without contradiction? Yes. In fact, it would be a contradiction for me to say I am not a discrete experiencer. As such I applicably know "I" am a discrete experiencer. Feel free to try to take the set up above, and using the definitions provided, point out where I am wrong. And at risk of over repeating myself, the forbiddance of introducing new discrete knowlege at this point is not meant to avoid conversation, it is meant to discover fundamentals.

It’s kind of like how some animals can’t even recognize themselves in a mirror: I would argue that they do not have any knowledge if (and its a big if in this case) they are not self-conscious. Yes they have knowledge in the sense that their body will react to external stimuli, but that isn’t really knowledge (in my opinion) as removing self-consciousness directly removes “me” (or “I”) from the equation and that is all that is relevant to "me" — Bob Ross

Would an animal be an "I" under the primitive fundamental I've proposed and applicably know? If an "I" is a discrete experiencer, then I have to show an animal is a discrete experiencer without contradiction in reality. If an animal can discern between two separate things, then it is an "I" as well. Now I understand that doesn't match your definition for your "I". Which is fine. We could add in the defintion of "consciousness" as a later debate. The point is, I've created a defintion, and I've applied it to reality to applicably know it.

Thus as a fundamental, this stands within my personal context. I note in part 3 how limitations on discrete knowledge can result in broad applications for certain contexts that ignore detail in other contexts. It is not the application of this distinctive context to reality that is wrong, it is a debate as to whether the discrete knowledge is detailed enough, or defined the way we wish. But for the single person without context, if they have defined "I" in this way, this is the only thing they could deduce in their application of that definition to reality.

As an example, let's take your sheep example: what if that entire concept that you derived a deductive principle from (namely tenants that constitute a sheep) were all apart of a hallucination. — Bob Ross

I'll repost a section in part 2 where I cover this:

"What if the 'shep' is a perfectly convincing hologram? My distinction of a sheep up to this point has been purely visual. The only thing which would separate a perfectly convincing hologram from a physical sheep would be other sensory interactions. If I have no distinctive knowledge of alternative sensory attributes of a sheep, such as touch, I cannot use those in my application. As my distinctive knowledge is purely visual, I would still applicably know the “hologram” as a sheep. There is no other deductive belief I could make."

So for your example, the first thing we must establish is, "How does the hallucinator distinctly know a sheep?" The second is, "Can they apply that distinctive knowledge to reality without contradiction?" When you say a deductive principle, we must be careful. I can form deductions about distinctive knowledge. That does not mean those deductions will be applicably known once applied to reality. Distinctive knowledge can use deduction to predict what can be applicably known. Applicable knowledge itself, cannot be predicted. We can deduce that our distinctive knowledge can be applied to reality without contradiction, when we apply it to reality. But those deductions are based on the distinctive knowledge we personally have, and the deductions we conclude when we apply them to reality.

To simplify once again, distinctive knowledge are the conceptualizations we make without applying them to reality. This involves predictions about reality and imagination. Applicable knowldge is when we attempt to use our conceptualizations in reality without reality contradicting them. With that in mind, come back to the hallucination problem and identify the distinctive knowledge the person has, and then applicably what they are trying to prove.

Once this fundamental is understood and explored, then I believe you'll see the heirarchy of inductions makes more sense. First we must understand what a deduction is within the system. Within distinctive knowledge, I can deduce that 1+1 = 2. When I apply that to reality, by taking one thing, and combining it with another thing, I can deduce that it is indeed 2 things.

The most fundamental aspect of our lives (I would argue) is rudimentary reason, which is the most basic (rudimentary) method by which we can derive all other things. — Bob Ross

True. But I have attempted to define and apply rudimentary reason as a fundamental, and the above paper is what I have concluded. Again, I am not trying to be dismissive of your creativity or your world view in any way! I would love to circle back to those points later. I am purely trying to guide you to the notion that we do not need these extra additions of definitions to learn these fundamentals, nor could we discuss them without first understanding the fundamentals proposed here.
I also wanted to leave you with one of your points on the table.

What if you really snorted a highly potent hallucinogen in the real world and it is so potent that you will never wake up in the real world but, rather, you will die in your hallucinated world once your body dies in the real one. Do you truly have knowledge of the sheep (in the hallucinated world) now, given that the world isn't real? — Bob Ross

This is one of the best critiques I've seen about the theory. Yes, I have an answer for this, but until the fundamentals are truly understood, I fear this would be confusing. if you understand what I've been trying to say in this response, feel free to go over this proposal again. We are at the point where we are going over addition and subtraction, and here you went into calculus with binary! I will definitely respond to this point once I feel the basics are understood.

Thank you again Bob, I will be able to answer much quicker now that it is the weekend!

Thank you for reading this Bob! This might be a long reply, and I will likely need time to go over it adequately, so sorry in advance if this takes some time for a reply. I've already spent an hour tonight going over it, and my time tonight is spent. I just wanted to acknowledge and express gratitude for taking the time to read it. I will have your answers in the coming days!

I see...And you suggest that hidden placeholders and variable realties in our formulas result in leaky abstractions, because they fail to assess the reality beneath? — john27

Yes, I believe that's what I was trying to put into words. I appreciate everyone's contribution. I feel like leaky abstraction should be a logical fallacy as I see it so often in philosophy. Thanks again!

What exactly do you see as the problem? Abstract thought? — SophistiCat

I was looking for a term, or others experience and view point of what I'm trying to put into words. If you don't get it, that's fine. Its a discussion to explore these types of encounters other people have had to see if it can be put into better words. I think I may have found what I'm looking for with the phrase "leaky abstraction" I noted in my reply to John.

use knowledge in a negative or positive extremity (i.e all the time or none of the time) and it's distasteful, but apply a nugget of wisdom moderately, and it can help clarify a lot of things. — john27

I think the term I've been looking for is "leaky abstraction". Its a term in computer science. In a language, often times extremely detailed sets of functions will be cobbled together into a higher abstraction like, "RunPrintProgram()". You run the print program thinking that it will do so, and 99% of the time, it does. But 1% of the time when interacting with another program, something unexpected ands strange happens. This is because the underlying code doesn't fully function like you think the abstraction would. Thus the underlying reality 'leaks' out into the application, and you get unexpected things happening.

It's a pretty common misconception that the fourth dimension is time. — john27

Yes! What I did is exactly what I'm talking about.

So the fact that string theory uses placeholders for spatially relevant dimensions isn't wrong at all I dont think, its kind of like saying "we know it's out there, we just dont know what it looks like." — john27

But do we know its out there? All that a dimension is, is a variable. We don't really know what the variable represents in reality, because we can't observe it in reality. The fact that we abstract it out to spatial dimensions is the problem.

↪Philosophim First, I am a bit puzzled by your choice of words "identity" and "placeholder": I don't think I've seen them used like this before. From the context, you seem to be referring to models, concepts, representations, abstractions, maps (as in "the map is not the territory"). Is that what you mean? — SophistiCat

Yes, this post isn't intended to be a solution, but a puzzle for us to discuss. Its a situation I've seen before that I'm not accurately able to describe, and was wondering what others thought. I believe you have the gist of what I'm going for.

Second, I am struggling to discern your point here. The most specific example that you give concerning the use of extra dimensions in string theories is poorly chosen, since neither you nor most of the readers understand the background enough to have a reasonable discussion about it. That these dimensions are "not representations of reality or dimensions as we believe them to be" is obviously true in one sense: we the common people are used to thinking about space as three-dimensional (and that only because Descartes' invention has been drilled into us from an early age). But what of it? — SophistiCat

I think that is the point. String theory is a detailed idea that is abstracted away into the general populace, and we make improper conclusions based on that abstraction. So here I am doing the same thing. Is there a term for it? Is there a way to spot it easier? What do you do when you find it in an argument? These are the questions I'm looking to see people answer.

Could you give one or two examples from a philosophical perspective. Something mundane and fairly easy to understand. — T Clark

Certainly. In philosophy I've seen people take certain identities and believe because such an identity can be claimed, it must be "real" in some way. The most famous I can think of is probably "This sentence is false". There is an initial assumption that a sentence can be true or false, and people spend hours thinking about it.

The reality is, the sentence is rubbish. It doesn't actually claim anything. A better sentence would be, "This is a false sentence". I believe this issue is we abstract away certain details for general communication and believe that the abstraction holds true when we return to detailed communication.

For me, eternity is more of an experience, hence why I “know” it to be true (by “know I simply mean for me, obviously not everyone else will have that experience). It’s almost like I can see it and feel it in every passing moment. At least, that’s the best I can try to explain it. If I were to humbly suggest a lowly excuse for a logical argument for it (which some of you may rip to shreds for all I know), I’d probably say that the fact that the present moment was able to manifest (self evident present experience), no matter what form that present moment may be, is an indication that it must therefore manifest infinitely. — Mp202020

What you are describing is a very confident belief. But there are lots of things that we confidently believe that aren't true. And that's fine! It should not be embarrassing that you feel that way, we all have confident beliefs in our way.

One point of philosophy is to examine those confident beliefs and ask, "Am I interpreting this feeling logically? Is my belief real or knowable?" My question to you is, "Are you interpreting your feeling correctly?"

When I think eternity, I think forever. Never ending. Never beginning either. When you examine and think of the present moment, you are feeling what is now. There was a man who lost the ability to make long term memories after a viral infection. One thing I remember from the documentary on him was that he was told to write in a book a diary entry and mark that he consciously had written it. It was filled with pages of him Xing out the previous entry, then one with a check that noted "This is the first entry I've consciously made".

I mention this, because what you are experiencing isn't eternity, it is "the now". "The now" is our current awareness at any moment. It contains our memories of the past, but it does not need them. It can predict the future, but it cannot know it until the next second comes. The past and the future are constantly outside of "The now".

Is this eternity? I suppose it can feel like it is. That man with memory loss felt the now, but his past was gone from his understanding. To me, this indicates feeling the now, is not feeling eternity. It is feeling the moment as we pass through seconds of our life. By fact, we also know we're all going to die one day. We might feel like we aren't, like that man felt he had never made a previous conscious entry in the diary. But he did. And we all will.

So thinking about it, your feeling cannot describe eternity. Perhaps the wonderment of existence. A question of what it would be like to not exist, when you cannot remember what life was like before you were born. Regardless of the conclusion, the feeling you have is not any self-evidence for eternity, just self-evidence that you exist in that moment.

This is something I feel strongly about. Women who say they want to be respected but then blame the problems of our society on men rather than taking their share of the responsibility are hard to take seriously. — T Clark

Whenever I see a broad sentence that signifies a specific group, I get rid of the specific group.

"This is something I feel strongly about. People who say they want to be respected but then blame the problems of our society on other people, rather than taking their share of the responsibility are hard to take seriously.

Removing the specific allows us to also remove bias. Removing bias is key to thinking more rationally about something.

First, its still a broad sentence that can be taken different ways depending on how you read it. If I read it as:

People who are an equal part of society, and say they want to be respected but then blame the problems of our society on other people, rather than taking their share of the responsibility are hard to take seriously.

I can agree here. If you are a wealthy land owner who has the power to not do something wrong, but you do something wrong and blame it on society, its hard to respect that person.

But lets change it up.

People who are oppressed, threatened, and marginalized by society, and say they want to be respected but then blame the problems of our society on other people, rather than taking their share of the responsibility are hard to take seriously.

Now I would agree with this sentence too. If society will not respect you, threatens you, and basically ostracizes you from society, I think the blame lays with those who have power in society, not yourself.

Divisive sentences like T-Clark's are divisive because they let you two diametrically opposed contexts into it. One person could be angry at T-Clark, while a defender of T-Clark would roll their eyes at the person in anger. Both have merit in their context of the sentence, but are actually concluding entirely different meanings from that sentence.

True woman's liberation is about equality of opportunity, and respect in the law. We can eliminate the word woman as well, and realize that true liberation in society is about equality of opportunity, and respect in the law. Beware those who would taint liberation with bias, for their intent is often not about liberation, but an agenda.