Hello again Bob, this was more delayed than I had liked due to Memorial week activities and summer starting here, thanks for waiting. This was also a doozy of a post as there are a couple of central themes. As a summary, I can state I feel I've lost you somewhere along the way on the d/a distinction, and that may be an insurmountable issue at this point. For my part, you have given me every single examination and critique of the d/a distinction I have ever wanted, and I am eternally grateful for that. At this point, I feel we are getting into your own outlook and view of knowledge, and I greatly respect that as well.

The goal of this exploration was to see if someone could poke holes in the d/a distinction within the argument itself. I feel that has been adequately explored. At this point, it seems to be the dissection of your theory, and I'm not sure I want to do that on this thread. It is unfair, as you have not had the time and space to adequately build it up from the ground floor. Further, my emphasis on this thread is my own theory, and I have a bias towards that. Perhaps it is a time for another thread where you write and construct your theory, and then I will be able to adequately address it properly, minus the d/a distinction I've written here. There are a few questions I could ask about the basis of your theory, but then the thread would get derailed, and the posts here would reach new record lengths. :smile: You'll see below a lot of my disagreements with your points are merely due to perhaps not understanding how you built the theory from the ground up. As such, I feel we might be talking past each other, and I would rather just give your theory its full focus and due. I do feel at this point though that we'll need to address either your theory, or mine, and the combination of both will just explode too much writing and exploration for one thread.

With that, I'll begin.

I think, and correct me if I am wrong, you are arguing for discrete experience in virtue that the brain (or whatever object is required, to keep it more generic) must produce this discrete experience for me to even contemplate and bring forth PoN (in other words, I must discretely experience). — Bob Ross

Yes, this is correct.

However, to claim that that is truly a fundamental in relation to the subject is to take a leap, in my opinion, to bridging the gap between mind and brain, which, as of now, I do not hold. — Bob Ross

Again, I would ask how a person could even realize they were a subject without discrete experience. What I believe I can agree with is the speculation that a self could exist that could not discretely experience. Such a thing would have no awareness of itself, much less the capability for knowledge.

Discrete experience is the fundamental simplicity of being able to notice X as different from Y. Non-discrete experience is taking all of your experience at once as some indesciphable.

This is simply outlining the fundamentals of how a brain works. I find nothing wrong with this. I do not hold the brain as the subject, which I think is clearly where we are actually disagreeing (realist, materialist vs anti-realist, idealist--generally speaking, I'm not trying to force us into boxes). — Bob Ross

I don't think we're disagreeing here. I've never claimed that "I am the brain", just "I am the discrete experiencer". Focus on your breathing for a second, and control it. There you are discretely experiencing your breathing. But a few minutes ago, you were not discretely experiencing breathing. It was part of the entirety of your existence, but you didn't parcel it out of everything. Now we know from other knowledge that the brain is still what causes you to breath, but as the discrete experiencer, you do not always discretely experience breathing. To form the initial theory, knowledge of the brain is not needed, much like the knowledge of the material a ruler is made out of is needed to use the ruler.

However, the flaw I think you are making is bridging the gap, so to speak, between mind and brain in virtue of this: there are aspects of the brain which will never be explained from it. The brain is simply a representation of the mind, which can never fully represent itself. — Bob Ross

Stating that there are aspects of the brain which will never be explained from this methodology is an induction, not a fact. Everything the mind can comprehend is a representation of the mind, including itself. That is exactly what discrete experience is. It is creating discrete experiences out of the entirety of existence. An atom is a creation of discrete experience. It is a concept. As I've noted, we never had to create that concept. Think of the Bohr model versus quantum model of atoms. https://pediaa.com/difference-between-bohr-and-quantum-model/#:~:text=Main%20Difference%20%E2%80%93%20Bohr%20vs%20Quantum%20Model&text=Quantum%20model%20is%20considered%20as,particle%20duality%20of%20an%20electron.

Are any of those models "the thing in itself"? Is even "the thing in itself" something that is existent in nature as a concept apart from the minds creation? No. They are all discrete experiences. Everything is a representation of the mind, the brain is no exception.

But we could not begin to use deduction about discrete experience, without first being able to discretely experience. We cannot prove or even discuss the PoN without being able to understand the terms, principle, negation, etc.

Apart from the fact that, again, you are fundamentally positing objects as more fundamental than subjects, I want to clarify that explicating PoN and utilizing PoN is not the same thing. — Bob Ross

I want to clarify again that I am not positing objects as more fundamental than subjects, at least in regards to knowledge. First, I never use the word "object" in the theory. Knowledge never claims "truth" or that there is a "thing in itself" that exists out there. Knowledge is a logical tool developed by a subject (the discrete experiencer) to create a model of one's discrete experience in such a way that it ensures our survival and success. PoN can be part of that model, but it is not a fundamental that is first needed to derive other things. The PoN is derived and proved. I showed you how I did it with the a/d distinction. The ability to discretely experience is required first for the PoN to be derived and proven.

As I have noted in an earlier post, one can use something without applicable knowledge of it. Many of our conclusions are filled with implicit inductions. We may use the PoN without first proving that it is applicably known. But for the PoN to be applicably known, we must then examine it. And the point that I was making is that when we finally get around to seeing if the PoN is applicably known, we must prove it. And to prove it, we need the d/a distinction. A thing's use does not make it fundamental. What makes it fundamental, is that there is nothing deeper that needs to be shown to logically explain it as a concept. We may have a fundamental disagreement here, which is fine. For my purposes, fundamental construction of logic is in both explication and utilization. And to explicate and utilize PoN as knowledge, one must distinctively and applicably know the d/a distinction. I'll keep exploring below why that is.

Yes, but you must first understand what the terms "true" and "false" are.

I don't want to be too reiterative, but this argument is sound in relation to the utilization of PoN: without PoN, the best way to describe it would be "indeterminacy". — Bob Ross

Lets list what the PoN is. In Western Philosophy it is often associated with Aristotle and comprises several principles. The law of the excluded middle and the law of contradiction for example.
'if p, then not not-p,'
'if not not-p, then p.

In India you have the principle of four cornered negation. "S is neither P, nor not p, nor both p and not p, nor neither p nor not p. And that is not necessarily agreed with by all people.

The point is that these are distinctive knowledge constructs that then must be applicably known to be useful. My theory can explain how they can be known without assumption. We may have assumed they were true, but the PoN is not proven as a fundamental truth, or thing in itself. It is a construct of the mind like everything else. The reason why it works, is that it works both applicably and distinctively.

One further, I'm going to go back to something I said very early on. Humans aren't the only discrete experiencers. Animals, and even insects discretely experience. If they did not, they could not identify what was food, and what was not food. A thing that does not discretely experience is like a coma patient on a drug trip of indeterminate sensation and thoughts. Its not an "I" at that point, but what we might call a "thing" that exists without any determinate realization of anything in the world, including its own existence.

Does an insect need the PoN? No. Its beyond its capability to realize or think such a thing (in theory). Yet it can, and must, discretely experience. This is why the ability to discretely experience is more fundamental than the PoN. You see the PoN as fundamental to human thinking and logic. I'm noting that human thinking and logic relies on the fundamental of being able to discretely experience.

So back to "truth" and "false". Yes, without the PoN, we could create another identity called "indeterminancy".

I think this derails quickly though because I can posit PoN for the terms as well: it isn't that X can't be "true" and "false", it is that it can't be true and false at the same time. — Bob Ross

We can create a distinctive logic model which notes that it is possible for a thing to exist, and not exist at the same time. "Truth" is when a thing exists in its state. "False" is when it does not. "Indeterminancy" is when it exists in both a true and false state. We'll call this the "PoI".

What we cannot do is applicably know such a thing, which is why it is not used by anyone seriously within science. But a human being can live their entire life believing in the "PoI" if they so desired, and live a life. "Somewhere out there, I believe we'll find a thing that both exists and doesn't exist at the same time." Again, this is speculative at best. But why it isn't useful is it has not been applicably known, seems inapplicably and arguably illogical, and is not useful to daily life. But the reason why we distinctively and applicably know this, is not because of the PoN. Its because of the knowledge formula formed with the d/a distinction. While I can distinctively know indeterminancy, I cannot applicably know it.

I don't think this is going to be productive, but my ask back to you would be to try and "create" PoN using the a/d distinction without utilizing PoN: you can't. — Bob Ross

A deduction assumes that the conclusion follows the premises. I will instead use the PoI. All deductions instead would be hypothetical, as the deductions state could exist, but it could also not exist at the same time. A conclusion would not necessarily follow the premises, because the premises and the conclusion could potentially be, and not be at the same time. At that point we would have to tweak it to say, "But if it were the case that the involved premises and conclusions were not indeterminate", we could get something like a determinate theory. It is not required that we have the PoN, it just makes things cleaner, and is something we have applicably known.

Thus I would conclude using the POI that what is distinctively known is what we discretely experience, and I would add the claim we could discretely experience both something, and its negation at the same time. I would say then that we could applicably know something, and we could applicably know something that exists, and does not exist at the same time. But after determining the d/a distinction, I can then go back and ask myself, "Is the PoI something I can applicably know?" No, using the theory from there, I determine I cannot applicably know the PoI. Therefore its a distinctive theory that cannot be applicably known, and is unneeded. At best, it would be included as an induction. But I did not need the PoN to create the d/a distinction as shown. What I could do is form the PoN to make the proof cleaner, but it is not required.

Without the d/a distinction, there is a problem that the PoN must answer. "Just because I have not experienced an existence and its contradiction at the same time, how do I know I won't experience such a thing in the future? Isn't claiming that the PoN will always exist just an induction without the d/a distinction? And if it is an induction, why is it any better than the induction that in the future, we may experience the PoI?" The d/a distinction can answer this clearly. With the d/a distinction, the PoN is something which is possible, the PoI is speculatory at best. As they are competing inductions, it is more cogent to use the PoN over the PoI. How do you answer such a question without the d/a distinction? Despite your disagreements with the d/a distinction, this is an essential question your theory must answer.

I have no problem if you aren't trying to convey any position on free will in your epistemology, my problem is that when you state "I've noted you can create whatever system you want distinctively", that implies free will of some sort (I am not trying to box you into a specific corner on the issue). I don't see how that could imply anything else. — Bob Ross

The I is the discrete experiencer. It is what discretely experiences. I'm using "want" broadly here, and should probably have used "will". What the discrete experiencer experiences, is what the discrete experiencer experiences. Whether it has constructed a logical idea of will that is free or deterministic are non-essential properties.

It is the transcendental aspect of the mind which determines what is a contradiction and what is not. I didn't choose that something cannot be in two different places at the same time, nor that two objects cannot be at the same place at the same time. Likewise, I didn't choose the validity of the causal relations of objects. — Bob Ross

And yet someone could choose to use the PoI distinctively. The reason why its not useful is because it cannot be known applicably. Just because you couldn't choose to create a different distinctive knowledge, doesn't mean its not possible for others to do so. You have never observed these contradictions, but as noted earlier, how do you explain that this gives you knowledge that it is not possible somewhere in reality? Without the d/a distinction, your argument is only a subjective induction and cannot necessarily explain why it is superior to the PoI.

Where does the idea of negation come from? True and false?

Metaphysically the mind. Explain to me how you can derive PoN without using PoN to derive PoN. I don't think you can. — Bob Ross

I create the idea of PoN distinctively, then applicably show it to be true. Then, I note that any competing principle when used in the future, the PoI for example, is not as cogent of an induction as the PoN.

I think part of the problem is you may not have fully understood or embraced the idea of "discretely experiencing". If you don't understand or accept that fully, then the a/d distinction won't make sense

I most certainly have not fully embraced it. I am not sure how that would make the a/d distinction make sense, but you definitely know better than me. — Bob Ross

Then this is absolutely key. If there is any doubt or misunderstanding of the idea that we discretely experience, that has to be handled before anything else. Please express your doubt or misunderstanding here, as everything relies on this concept. You keep not quite grasping the a/d distinction, and I feel this is the underlying root cause.

The entire point was not to conflate or omit your terminology, when I used "application" I was referring to "applicable". I should have been more clear though: the point is that one does not know distinctively anything without performing application to know it. — Bob Ross

No, this is fundamentally false. Applicable knowledge absolutely requires distinctive knowledge first. If there is no distinctive knowledge, there is nothing to match to. When you first encounter a new sensation, you can try to match it to something you have already distinctively known. But if you have no distinctive knowledge, or do not try to match it to something distinctively known, your knowledge of the sensation will be distinctive, not applicable.

If I see a swamp thing for the first time, and name it a "swamper", that is how I distinctively know it. If I encounter it again and deductively match it to a "swamper", then I applicably know it as a swamper. But I can't applicably know it as a swamper, until I've first distinctively known it as a swamper.

Forget for a second that you have obviously imagined a "pink elephant" before (or at least odds are you just did). Now image you "discretely experience" "pink", in isolation. Now, imagine you "discretely experience" "an elephant". Now, without imagining a combination of the two, you assert "I have imagined a pink elephant". That is a conceptual conflation. You did not, in fact, imagine a pink elephant. — Bob Ross

That's not a conceptual conflation, that's a lie. If I say I've imagined something, but I have not, then obviously I have not. Words without any essential properties to them are just words without any essential properties to them. I'm not seeing the problem.

I wasn't referring to consistency, I was referring to completeness. Consistency is when the logical theory proves for all provable sentences, S, either not S or S. Completeness is when the logical theory proves all sentences in its language as either S or not S. — Bob Ross

I think completeness is more than clearly showing distinct identities. It also must be able to adequately answer questions and critiques of it. Anytime a theory must reference an infinite regress is when it is inapplicable, and incomplete in my eyes. As I've stated many times, you can form many distinctive logical arguments in your head that fail in application. My theory notes that ability to create a distinctive logical concept is only one half of the equation. I'm quite certain someone could construct a distinctive logical concept that is in exact contradiction to your own. The proof is whether the logical construct can be applicably known. Without applicable knowledge, how can your theory compete with someone who uses a completely different theory using different definitions for words and concepts?

I was never attempting to argue you were using "truth". You are arguing for what is "true", which is "truth", but you are refurbishing its underlying meaning (to not be absolute). That is what I meant by "truth outruns proof". — Bob Ross

Yes, absolute truth outruns proof. Which means any theory which relies on absolute truth can never be proven. But I am not arguing absolute truth. Anything which relies on absolute truth is inapplicable, and therefore not useful. My theory is applicable, and therefore useful and logically consistent.

What I am noting is that an infinite regress is something that cannot be applied, and therefore an inapplicable speculation.

It is applied. I think I noticed clearly in my previous post how one could negate it. Also, I want to clarify I am referring to a potential infinite regress, not actual. — Bob Ross

No, its not applied, and by this, I mean applicably known. Any distinctive reference to the infinite can never be applicably known. Long ago when we first met on the "A First Cause is Logically necessary" thread, you were the only one to point this out, and I conceded you were correct. If there is potential infinite regress, then you don't have a deduction. That's an induction.

My system can be constructed distinctively, and applicably used, while not using infinite regress

You just previously conceded "despite using some assumptions...like PoN". You can't finitely prove PoN. It is not possible. — Bob Ross

I think I've done that. Using the d/a distinction, I constructed the idea that I cannot distinctively experience both a thing and its negation at the same time. Then, I've applicably known this. As such, I hold the induction that it is not possible for me to experience both a thing and its negation at the same time. This is the principle of negation, and requires nothing else then the steps shown.

Mine does not rely on such an induction, and is therefore more sound.

If I were arguing for an actual infinite regress, then it would be an induction. A potential infinite regress is deductively ascertainable. — Bob Ross

A potential infinite regress is an induction. You can deductively ascertain this induction, but it is an induction. Potential means, "It could, or could not be." If your theory has a potential infinite regress, you have an unresolved induction as the base of your argument. This leads anyone to ask, "What separates your theory which has an induction as its base, from any other theory that has an induction as its base?" Mine contains no potential infinite regress. It is all a finite logical system, and needs nothing more than what I've given.

The justification for this seems to be "Anytime I discretely experience, I know that I discretely experience". The question is why would this be valid? I would argue it is valid in virtue of PoN, spatiotemporal contemplation, etc. — Bob Ross

As I've demonstrated, PoN can be replaced with the PoI, and I can still conclude this. In other words, I'm not claiming that I cannot discretely experience indeterminancy. Discretely experiencing indeterminency would still be discretely experiencing. The PoN is a logically concluded limit to discrete experience, because if we explore our discrete experiences, we find it impossible to applicably know that we can discretely experience both an identity and its negation at the same time. Space and time are later identities we can both distinctively and applicably know within our discrete expereinces as well. But they are not required to know I discretely experience.

Causality are simply the connections of your mind. There's nowhere to point to in objective "reality" that validates the causal connection of two objects in space and temporally in relation to time: it is a potential infinite regress of validating connectives in virtue of assuming the validity of others and so on and so forth. — Bob Ross

I've never spoken about causality or objective reality so this does not apply to my theory. We can discuss how causality would apply with the a/d distinction, but that shouldn't be in the conversation at this point. I would address it here, but this post has already been long enough!

3. This involves, sensation, memory, and language.

I think all of these are aspects of the brain in a derivation of objects and their relations. But the relations themselves are of the mind. This is why I am careful to relate my position to reason as opposed to consciousness. — Bob Ross

I do not claim the mind or brain on first construction of this theory. Yes, these are all distinctively constructed identities that we can then applicably know. I don't disagree with your notion, but they don't disagree with the knowledge theory either.

I see and understand your theory, but it is separate and apart form the a/d distinction. Your criticisms seem to miss the mark on the a/d distinction, and at this point I'm not sure what else I can do except ask you to review either parts of the original paper again, or go back and see previous replies. Again, I do not want to imply that the PoN is wrong, or that spatiotemporal identities are wrong either. I'm also not denying that you couldn't conclude the a/d distinction with those identities. What I'm trying to point out is they are not necessary, and thus not fundamental to the idea of discrete experience. They are also not necessary, and thus not fundamental to the a/d distinction either.

The key between us at this point is to avoid repetition. I fully understand that two arguments can be made, and eventually it may be that each side is unpersuaded by the other. It may be time where if you feel you are repeating yourself, feel free to state, "I disagree because of this previous point." and that is acceptable.

I feel I understand your positions at this point, and they are well thought out. But there are a couple of fundamental questions I've noted about your claim that the PoN is fundamental that I think need answering. Neither are a slight against you, you are a very intelligent, philosophically brilliant individual; the best I have encountered on these boards. So, if you would like, either we can start a new thread addressing your knowledge theory specifically, or we can simply spend the next post only going over your theory from the ground up, without the d/a distinction. I leave it up to you!

I don't think I have quite made my decision - though I do appreciate your post, and the supportive tone in which it is written. I suppose I am afriad because I cannot logically rule out the possibility that hell exists. And if it exists, I'm going there. I can't morally justify not going there, as I can't morally endorse God's decision that hell should exist. — RolandTyme

Well, perhaps I can help out a bit with that. When I was young, I was raised in a Christian household, and I genuinely wanted to believe a God existed. In my mind, who wouldn't want a great and good being helping us do better in the world for ourselves and those around us? I was very fortunate as an Episcopalian that I did not have to attend a church where hell was every really spoken about.

I also read the bible myself from beginning to end. I used a fantastic bible that would break down the historical significance of passages, and explain meanings better. What I found was that what was often taught in churches didn't necessarily work with the entire message of the bible.

For starters, "Hell" as a fire and brimstone place of eternal torture is more an invention of society, and not in the original New Testament works. Jesus notes the only way to eternal life is through him. That was because in Judaism, when you're dead, you're gone unless God himself allows you not to. Without Jesus, you didn't live forever to be tortured, you simply died.

The penalty for sin is death, and all people sin. Jesus died as a payment for that sin, so that all would be forgiven and rise on the last day. All a person had to do was to accept this sacrifice, and they too would live eternally.

Whether you believe all of that isn't the point. The point I wanted to note is that Christianity in the bible itself, does not threaten eternal life and torture. There is death, or eternal life. Anything that seems to reference a hell is more metaphor than actual prophesy.

The people who threaten you with hell fire want your money for the church, and they want control over you. But lets not even dwell on that. I want to reference the overall acts of the New Testament to demonstrate an eternal hell fire torture just doesn't seem inline with the overall message.

Jesus:

Takes care of kids and insists they are precious and never to be harmed
Forgives all manner of sinners. Whore's, corrupt politicians, and tax collectors.
He heals people who have horrid diseases and afflictions.
He turned water into wine so people could get drunk at a wedding
Spoke to all people, not just the wealthy, the political, or the religious. In fact, he had fairly harsh words against the Pharisees and Saducees who often emphasized the "Letter of the law over the spirit of the law"

He states the only way to come to the father (God) is to come through him. But he doesn't seem like some mafioso, or punished people who refused him. In fact, as he dies on the cross he asks God to forgive them for they no not what they do. Jesus doesn't sit around and talk about how everyone is going to burn if they don't accept him. He speaks wisdom and lets people make their own choices.

The fire and brimstone thing was made by a priest somewhere for their congregation. Its fear and intimidation from people who don't seem to understand the message themselves. If I recall, on the last day all are to be risen, and those who accept the gift are allowed, those who willingly reject it die. That means you don't have to decide now right? That's really the way Christianity is written. I believe there's even a passage from St. Paul where he notes that Christians will receive no greater reward than non-believers. The point of being a Christian is that you know what's coming, and it gives you so much joy that you can't help but spread it to other people so they'll have the advantage of knowing now!

You seem like a very good person, and I don't want to see you suffer over some "bullys" who want to threaten you with horrible things if you don't believe. However long left you have to live, please enjoy it without fear. Live life, and love it while you can.

Your answer to my last question was no so I assume you are confirming that in your opinion, if there ever was a first cause, it may well have no significance at all, to our current Universe and therefore the theists are wasting their energy when the show deference to the god posit? Do you agree? — universeness

In a way, yes. It isn't that one couldn't prove that a God existed through evidence, but that the existence of the universe does not necessitate that the origin be a God.

I would aslo like to ask, after your 19 page thread and the comments the contributors made,
did you have any doubts about the 'causality' route as being absolutely fundamental to the question of origin of the Universe? — universeness

No, none. Causality is a very useful and easy to prove concept. People may have problems with the generality of the word and desire more specifics, but that doesn't negate its effectiveness.

I tend to concur with the viewpoint that 'existence' does not require a cause. — universeness

This would be the definition of a first cause. An existence that has post existent causality, but does not have any prior causality for its existence.

How do posits like the multiverse or the Penrose bounce affect your view on the infinite regression and a necessary first cause? Does it not matter how many times, time is reset back to 0? — universeness

No, not at all.

Is it only the 'first time' that time progressed from t=0 that a first cause is needed? and if so, does it matter how far back that was? — universeness

No.

Would this first cause still need to have a significance to our Universe other than as some original mindless spark that occurred at the start of an unknown number of t=o resets ago? — universeness

No.

It is not necessary something is self explained. The universe can't explain it's own existence. Gods, being eternally intelligent, don't need an explanation. Gods are the only reasonable reason for the universe's existence. — Hillary

Your first premise is false because it should start with "IF" rather than "IT", that is, under assumption that something is self-explained rather than claim that something is self-explained.

We know nothing in the nature is self-explained, do you have anything that is self-explanatory? — SpaceDweller

I proved it was logically necessary here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary

Of course, logically, a God is also not necessary
— Philosophim

A god, better, lots of them, are logical necessary to provide final closure. If the final gap is closed, only gods offer reason. A logical conclusion. You can't argue gods away by logic. — Hillary

Hello Hillary. According to the logic I've presented, I haven't argued away the possibility of a God, but I have argued away their necessity. Take the premises below:

1. It is necessary that something is self-explained.
2. If something is self-explained, there are no prior rules that explain why it existed.
3. Because there are no rules that limit why or how a self-explained existence can be, one cannot put a limit on what could possibly be self-explained when one does not know the origin(s) of the universe.

A god would be one type of possible self-explained entity. But so is anything else. A spec of dust. An atom. A bang. All of these are possible. As such, a God is not necessary. I wrote a separate OP going into more detail here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12847/if-a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary-what-does-that-entail-for-the-universes-origins/p1

Very nice start. I explore a somewhat Cartesian based approach to knowledge here, and eventually show how inductions can be ranked by cogency. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge/p1 Don't be intimidated by the parts, each part is only a couple of pages at most.

I suspected this would be the case, and I agree to a certain level: in my previous post I purposely refrained from going into a meticulous derivation of the fundamentals so as to prevent derailing into my epistemology as opposed to yours. I can most certainly dive in deeper. — Bob Ross

Please do Bob! You have been more than polite and considerate enough to listen to and critique my epistemology. At this point, your system is running up against mine, and I feel the only real issue is that it isn't at the lower level that I'm trying to address. Perhaps it will show a fundamental that challenges, or even adds to the initial fundamentals I've proposed here. You are a thoughtful and insightful person, I am more than happy to listen to and evaluate what you have to say.

"discrete experience" and any argument you provide (regardless of how sound) is utilizing PoN at its focal point. Nothing is "beyond" PoN. Therefore, I view "discrete experience" as a more ambiguous clumping of my outlined fundamentals. There's nothing wrong, at prima facea, of thinking of them in terms of one lumped "discrete experience", but this cannot be conflated with "differentiation" nor "spatiotemporality". — Bob Ross

As a reminder, one cannot think about the PoN without first being able to discretely experience. Its been a while since we last discussed this, but if you recall, the same with differentiation and spatiotemporality. Discrete experience is the fundamental simplicity of being able to notice X as different from Y. Non-discrete experience is taking all of your experience at once as some indesciphable.

As a reminder of discrete experience, a camera lens that takes a picture is a non-discrete experience. Everything that comes into the camera lens is spit out on the picture without the lens being able to differentiate anything within the light it receives. All it does is receive light. A being that can discretely experience can parcel that experience into things that it might later identity and differentiate into colors, shapes, etc.

Therefore a fundamental which a being must have before it can identify, is it must be able to discretely experience.

It is not what one can derive via PoN as the grounds which is the fundamental, it is what was used in the first place to derive it (e.g. PoN). — Bob Ross

We used the PoN to deductively assert that we discretely experience. But we could not begin to use deduction about discrete experience, without first being able to discretely experience. We cannot prove or even discuss the PoN without being able to understand the terms, principle, negation, etc.

I claim PoN is false, it is thereby true. I claim X, it used PoN, I verified that because PoN is true. — Bob Ross

Yes, but you must first understand what the terms "true" and "false" are. I believe truth and falsity are more fundamental than the PoN. While I do believe that fundamentals can be applied to themselves, an argument's ability to apply to itself does not necessitate that it is a fundamental.

I will create the PoN using the a/d distinction now. Instead of truth, its "What can be discretely experienced", and instead of false its, "What cannot be discretely experienced. What is impossible is to discretely experience a thing, and not the very thing we are discretely experiencing at the same time. Such a claim would be "false", or what cannot be discretely experienced. As you see, I've built the PoN up from other fundamentals, demonstrating it is not a fundamental itself.

I believe you have mentioned prior the idea of temporal fundamentalism. In other words, the order of discovery determines what is "fundamental". If for example, molecular theory was used to discover atomic theory, you would say molecular theory was more temporally fundamental.

Fundamental to me means the parts that make up the whole. While we may have discovered molecular theory first (hypothetically) molecules are fundamentally made up of atoms and rules that we might not have been aware of. But the use of a tool which discovers another fundamental does not mean that the underlying make up of the tool is not fundamental, nor that we necessarily needed that particular tool to discover the underlying fundamental. As we could use molecular theory as a starting point to discover atomic theory, we can also use atomic theory to discover molecular theory once we discover atomic theory. A fundamental when discovered, either confirms the higher order we used to discover the lower order, or adds clarity to that higher order concept.

I've used the a/d distinction to demonstrate an explanation for why the PoN is not a fundamental as it is made out of component parts. Barring your agreement with my proposal, you would need to identify what "true" and "false" are. As such, I think its been clearly shown that the PoN has parts and logic prior to its logical construction, and is not a fundamental.

At this point, I still don't think a/d distinction is very clear. Some times you seem to use it as if it is "abstract" vs "non-abstract", other times it is "creation" vs "matching": these are not synonymous distinctions. Sometimes it is: — Bob Ross

I think the problem is you are trying to use terms for synonyms to the a/d distinction. It is not as simple as "abstraction vs non-abstraction" or "creation" vs "matching". I can use these terms to assist in understanding the concept, but there is no synonym, as it is a brand new concept. Imagine when the terms analytic and synthetic were introduced. There were no synonyms for that at the time, and people had to study it to understand it.

I think part of the problem is you may not have fully understood or embraced the idea of "discretely experiencing". If you don't understand or accept that fully, then the a/d distinction won't make sense. But you cannot use derived systems to explain the fundamental system that allows those derived systems to exist. I think this is ultimately the source of your misunderstanding and confusion. You are still at a higher level of system, and assume that higher level is fundamental. What I've tried to demonstrate is your system is derived, and rests on the assumptions you are trying to negate. Can you use your derived system without my system underlying it? No. Until that changes, it cannot be used as a negation of the very thing it uses to exist.

I've noted you can create whatever system you want distinctively.

Other times it is:

Free will is not necessary to my epistemology. Free will is a distinctive and applicable concept that is contextually formed. — Bob Ross

"I" is the discrete experiencer. You've been attributing the "I" as having free will. I have not meant to imply that or used those terms.

Quite frankly, your descriptions are "free will" heavy (in terms of implications): — Bob Ross

But I'm not implying free will. I think you're mapping your own outlook on this when it has never been my intention.

The way I understand it is:

- If distinctive knowledge is "creation", then by virtue of the term it implies some form of "free will" to "create" whatever one wants. Unless you are positing a "creation" derived from an external entity or process that is not the subject. — Bob Ross

No. Distinctive knowledge is the creation of the discrete experiencer. If I see the color red within the sea of existence, that is my creation. If I am color blind, then what I discretely experience might be different. A person might see a tree while another sees two plants, "green leaves" attached to "brown trunks". A camera lens cannot see the color red within the light that it absorbs. It is unaware of any difference. There is no "I" within the lens. There is no distinction.

- If distinctive knowledge is "abstract", then it renders "free will" irrelevant, but necessarily meshes "creation" and "matching" into valid processes within "distinctive knowledge" due to the fact that "abstraction" can have both. — Bob Ross

As I've noted, its about deduction vs induction within your chain of reasoning. It depends on your context of what you mean by "abstraction". In one context, everything is abstraction. Our sensations are abstractions, as well as thoughts. Arguably a person could state we never experience "the thing in itself".

Distinctive knowledge is the knowledge of the experience itself, knowledge of the abstraction one creates. The key is that there is no deduced uncertainty of one's will. If I see red while you see blue, we both distinctively know our own experiences. But the moment I introduce deduced uncertainty, "You see the color blue, while I see the color red," that is a belief that my will alone cannot assert. Have I experienced how you see the world? No. That is an application I must experience before I can determine if my belief is true. Do I have the distinctive knowledge of this belief? Yes. Is that belief applicable knowledge? No. At best, such a belief is an inapplicable speculation.

I am arguing the exact same thing conversely. I don't think your "discrete experience" is the fundamental: it is an ambiguous lumping of the fundamentals into one term. — Bob Ross

This is why it is a fundamental. A fundamental is part of everything that derives from it. Atoms are the fundamentals of molecules. We don't have to create the concept of molecules, and the fundamentals of atoms will still exist. Discrete experiences are the necessary atoms that make up your higher level concepts. That's not an ambiguous lumping. All I'm noting is your molecules are made up of atoms, and atoms can be used to make more than the molecules you are noting.

Neither of us can derive a/d, or any distinction, without first using PoN, connectivity, negations, equatability, spatiotemporality, and a will. These are not after nor do they arise out of discrete experience. — Bob Ross

I think I've shown the thinking that they do not arise out of discrete experience to be incorrect. Where does the idea of negation come from? True and false? Each of your terms rest on concepts that you have not proven yet, or shown where they come from. Mine does. Negation is the discrete experience of one thing, and then that thing not being experienced anymore. True is what is and can be discretely experienced, while false is what cannot. From this, I can derive the PoN. Can you derive the PoN differently, or demonstrate how my derivation is incorrect?

Likewise, depending on what distinction you mean by "distinctive" and "applicable" it may or may not be the case that one can derive PoN in those two contexts separately. — Bob Ross

As with everything, you must clarify whether your knowledge is distinctive or applicable. The problem with epistemology has been it has lacked this distinction, and has conflated very two different identities. I can distinctively know of a pink elephant, and I can applicably know if I've encountered one. What one distinctively knows does not necessitate it can be applied.

One cannot know of their own definition before they perform application to obtain that. Once they know, then they can distinguish that from whether the definition's contents hold. It would be a conflation to claim that the definition proves it owns validity beyond it: which doesn't have any bearing on a/d. I claim "I cannot hold A and not A". I didn't know I made that claim until I applicably determine via PoN that I did claim it. Thereafter, it is a conceptual conflation to claim that in virtue of the claim it is true: this is the distinction I think should be made. — Bob Ross

Notice how you used "know" without clarifying whether this knowledge was distinctive or applicable. If you don't clarify what type of knowledge, then you aren't using the epistemology. At that point you aren't disproving the epistemology through a contradiction of use, you are simply showing how not using the epistemology causes confusion.

Let me reconstruct your sentence. "One cannot applicable know their own definition before they perform application to obtain that." While that sentence still doesn't make much sense, it is not addressing distinctive knowledge. Did you mean to say, "One cannot distinctively know their own definition before they perform application to obtain that?" That doesn't work, because distinctive knowledge does not require applicable knowledge.

Perhaps what you meant was that you cannot distinctively know something prior to experiencing it. Which is true. But you also cannot applicably know something before you experience it. If the a/d distinction cannot be used to divide a generic use of knowledge or runs into a contradiction, then I think we can safely say there is a flaw. But using a generic definition of knowledge alone is a straw man.

That is my point: there is only one form of knowledge. — Bob Ross

Knowledge is a chain of deductions. The difference between distinctive and applicable knowledge has been clearly made. Do they both use deductions as an underlying fundamental? Yes. But it is clear that we run into situations in which we have beliefs that must be resolved, and cannot be resolved by our will alone. When a chain of inductions contains a resolved induction, it is an important enough difference to note a new identity. The separation of the knowledges notes this important event, and avoids the problems other epistemologies run into.

If you imagine a pink elephant combining your memory of pink and elephant, that is distinctive knowledge. There is nothing wrong with that.

Depends on what you mean. If you are conflating concepts, then there is something wrong. A "pink elephant" in combination is not the same as "pink" + "elephant" in isolation, it would be wrong to abstractly conflate the two. — Bob Ross

Please clarify what you mean by this in distinctive and applicable terms. I didn't understand that point.

If we distinctively identify a square and a circle to have different essential properties, than they cannot be the same thing distinctively.

This is necessarily the case because we fundamental utilize PoN as the focal point. This is not a choice, it is always abided by. — Bob Ross

No disagreement, as this is a logical consequence of using a logic derived from the context of distinctive knowledge.

I may try to apply whatever my contextual use of square is, and find that I run into a contradiction

The real underlying process here I think is trying to relate, whether abstractly or non-abstractly, concepts to one another and whether it results in an invalid conflation. You tend to be using "applicable" as if it is "non-abstract". — Bob Ross

I will note, I did not introduce the term "abstract" into the conversation. It depends on your context of "abstract". Applicable knowledge comes about from the deduced realization of an uncertain belief. The "uncertainty" is a deduction that our will alone is not enough to ascertain it cannot be contradicted. I may believe this apple is healthy, but upon eating it I discover it was rotten on the inside. Can the terms "eating, rotten, apple, action, etc" be all termed as abstractions? Sure. Can everything in the mind be termed an abstraction? Yes. This is probably where the confusion comes from. You are using a general word that can have its essential properties switched with its accidental properties depending on the context you are using.

As such, if I have used the terms "abstract" it has been to meet what I evaluated your context to be at the time. In the largest abstract of the word, discrete experience can be called an abstraction, and everything is made up of discrete experiences, including applicable knowledge. If we are to use the term abstraction going forward, could you define it clearly in your own terms so I can understand your meaning?

This would be a flaw in your proposal then...An infinite regress cannot prove itself, because it rests on the belief in its own assumptions.

Firstly, a finite regress of reason should never prove itself: that is circular logic. Secondly, a system cannot prove all of its true formulas. Goedel's incompleteness theorems thoroughly proved that truth outruns proof: it is an infinite regress wherein a system has at least one unprovable, but yet true, formula which is only proven by using another system (aka it is non-computational). — Bob Ross

What I meant by "proving itself" is it is consistent with its own rules, despite using some assumptions or higher level systems like the PoN. I assumed several higher order logics to be true, and I can use the epistemology to demonstrate why logic works. I may ask the question, "Why do I discretely experience?" but that answer is not necessary to know that I discretely experience, and can use it to form knowledge. Just like I don't need to know molecular theory to use a ruler for measurement. There is (to my mind) nothing underlying or apart from the theory itself that needs to be given to explain the theory itself.

Also, I am not using truth. If you wish to use Goedel's incompleteness theorem in relation to this theory, feel free. Goedel's is also not a free pass to set up an infinite regress. What I am noting is that an infinite regress is something that cannot be applied, and therefore an inapplicable speculation. Such an argument is flawed, and as my system is more fundamental than yours, can conclude Setting up an explanation for knowledge as infinitely regressive is therefore a flaw. I can construct your system distinctively, but it is inapplicable. My system can be constructed distinctively, and applicably used, while not using infinite regress. Because an infinite regress is inapplicable, it is an inapplicable speculation, or induction. Mine does not rely on such an induction, and is therefore more sound.

All concepts, even in your derivation, are referencing other concepts in a potential infinite fashion. — Bob Ross

No. I avoid that flaw that most other epistemologies fall into. Everything starts with the foundation that I discretely experience. All distinctive knowledge boils down to that. I need no other outside reference. If I do, please show how I do.

If you are the creator of the definitions of A and B, then there is no uncertainty.

There's always uncertainty. When someone claims they are certain of what they defined as A, they really mean that they very quickly ascertained what they defined, but necessarily had to perform application to discover what it was. — Bob Ross

Correct. My note was there is no uncertainty in distinctive knowledge. When there is uncertainty, or when it is deduced that one's will, will not necessarily result in the will's outcome, we have a situation in which we must experience the deduced outcome of that induction. That is acting upon a belief until that beliefs outcome is found.

There is no application within distinctive knowledge, because it is our experience itself. You don't match the experience itself to the experience itself. It is simply the experience itself. The act of being. What you are, is what you are. What you remember is what you remember. What you define something as, is what you define something as. There is no regress. There is no induction in this. This has been deductively shown by noting that you discretely experience, and all of these things logically flow from this fundamental.

Let me be clear by what I mean by distinctive. Distinctive is like binary. Its either on, or off. Either you have defined A to have x property, or you have defined A to have y property.

This is not " A deduced concept which is the creation and memorization of essential and accidental properties of a discrete experience", you have defined PoN here, which is true of both of your distinctions. — Bob Ross

Poor wording with lots of implicitness on my part. Let me rephrase it.

Distinctive knowledge is a deduced concept. This deduced concept is that I discretely experience. Anytime I discretely experience, I know that I discretely experience. This is distinctive knowledge. This involves, sensation, memory, and language. This is not the definition of the Principle of Negation, though we can discover the principle of negation as I noted earlier.

And no worry Bob if we retread old ground a bit! Many of those subjects were disparate, but now we have a nice consolidation.

Well done Bob, a great analysis! No need to apologize for long pauses between replies, I believe we are both out of our comfort level of easy response at this point in time. I find it exciting and refreshing, but it takes time to think.

The problem I have with your fundamental concepts, is I do not consider them the most fundamental concepts, nor do I think you have shown them to be. The most fundamental concept I introduced was discrete experience. Prior to discretely experiencing, one cannot comprehend even the PoN. Arguably, the PoN works because we cannot discretely experience a real contradiction ourselves. I have never experienced a situation in which I have existed in two different spots at the same time for example.

That being said, I don't necessarily disagree with your fundamentals as system that can be derived from the fundamental that you discretely experience. But I don't think you've shown that it isn't derived from the more fundamental a/d distinction.

Having discussed this with you for some time now, I believe this has been a re-occurring difference between us. You've typically been thinking at a step one higher, or one beyond what I've been pointing out. Your ideas are not bad or necessarily wrong. I am talking about a system from which all systems are made, while you're talking about a system that can be made from this prime system.

The d/a distinction applies as a fundamental formation of knowledge from discrete experience. As you've noted, you had to use the d/a distinction to use the concepts that you created. I'm noting how knowledge is formed to create systems, while you are creating a system. Your creation of a system does not negate the d/a distinction, but only confirms it can be used to create a system.

For myself, you have to demonstrate that you can form a system without using the d/a distinction, and that system must invalidate or demonstrate why the d/a distinction is invalid. To do so, I believe you have to show there is something more fundamental than the ability to discretely experience. Or if not more fundamental, something along the lines of that fundamental ability that can lead to knowledge without needing discrete experience.

But, let me address of a few of your derived concepts that cross into my derived concepts so I can clarify this position.

Free will is irrelevant. The determination of "knowledge" is not related directly to control, which dissolves any issues or paradoxes related thereto. — Bob Ross

Free will is not necessary to my epistemology. Free will is a distinctive and applicable concept that is contextually formed. Whether a person defines free will, or does not, is irrelevant. What I have attempted to note are situations that separate distinctive knowledge from applicable knowledge. One could use a concept of free will to describe a difference, but its not necessary.

What is necessary is the concept of a will. A will is an intention of the self, and an outcome is the result of that will. At its most basic, a will is the intention to eat to live. I believe this is very similar, if not identical to our previously agreed upon definition of "reason". It is very clear to any willing/reasoning being that one's intention does not always result in the outcome they wished. Situations in which one's will is provably certain is essentially distinctive knowledge. This is the act of discretely experiencing expressed as memory, identity, and sensations. Some in philosophy might call this, "being".

But, when your reason is placed in a situation in which it is provably uncertain, the deduced results of the experience are applicable knowledge.

Creation & Application are irrelevant. The distinction being made has no direct relevancy to whether a given concept was "created" or "applied", just that the conceptions appropriately align with the fundamentals. — Bob Ross

As I mentioned earlier, your fundamentals are not fundamentals. I can both distinctively and applicably know what you claim to be fundamentals. I distinctively know the PoN, and I applicably know the PoN. If I did not applicably know the PoN, you would have to prove it existed correct? Which means you would have to show some application of it that would demonstrate to me it wasn't something you just distinctively identified, but something that can also be utilized apart from our direct distinctions.

The problem is that I can conflate distinctively concepts. If I, in isolation, imagine the color pink and, in isolation, imagine an elephant, it would be a conflation to claim the concatenation of the two produced a literal "pink elephant". Given the nature of imagination, it isn't so obvious that there's a conflation occurring, but a more radical example explicates it more clearly: I imagine a circle and then imagine a square, I then declare that I distinctively know of a "a circle that is a square". What I really distinctively know is a square, a circle, and a contradiction (impossibility in this case). — Bob Ross

Conflation is not a function of my epistemology, but a way to demonstrate separations of knowledge and context. If you imagine a pink elephant combining your memory of pink and elephant, that is distinctive knowledge. There is nothing wrong with that. The conflation occurs if you think that you have applicable knowledge that a pink elephant exists apart from your imagination. If conflation is allowed to occur in this epistemology without explanation, I would consider that a contradiction and flaw that should be pointed out. I just don't see where this is happening at this time.

The concept of "square", and its properties (essential properties in your terms), as a predicate (such as "this circle is square") contradicts the subject concept "circle" and is therefore "impossible". It contradicts it because the properties are related to the concept as necessitous by nature and therefore a contradiction in the predicate to the properties of "circle" (the subject concept) results in rejection (due to PoN): this is what it means to be "impossible". — Bob Ross

If we distinctively identify a square and a circle to have different essential properties, than they cannot be the same thing distinctively. But our definition of square and circles are not applicably necessitous by nature. I may try to apply whatever my contextual use of square is, and find that I run into a contradiction. In your case, you are using a societally agreed upon contextual definition of square and circle that is both distinctively, and applicably known and proven. Using those current societal definitions and applicable knowledge of square and circle, there are certain things you cannot distinctively conclude. That is a distinctive impossibility. But will the rules and applicable knowledge of a square and circle remain the same tomorrow? That is an applicable unknown. That is where induction comes in.

Potential vs Possibility is now resolved. There's no more confusion about possibility because what you are defining as "possibility" is not fundamentally what it should be, however the distinction you made is still relevant. "Possibility" is truly when a predicate does not contradict its subject concept. — Bob Ross

If you want to create a system in which you define possibility as when a predicate does not contradict its subject concept, that's fine. I've noted you can create whatever system you want distinctively. But, when you make the claim that your derived system invalidates the underlying system, you are applicably wrong. The fact that I use the word possibility to describe the concept of making a belief that because X is applicably known 1 time, it could be applicably known again, is irrelevant. You and I may be using the same sign/word, but the essential properties are widely different. We can discuss why you may be more interested in a different word than possibility to describe the essential properties of this particular kind of induction, but you have not shown that these particular properties of the induction are flawed in and of themselves.

As you probably noticed, there is a recursive nature to my definitions: they are all concepts. This is purposely so because, quite frankly, it is an inescapable potential infinite regress of reason. — Bob Ross

This would be a flaw in your proposal then. The d/a distinction has a finite regress of reason. That is to what is discretely experienced. An infinite regress cannot prove itself, because it rests on the belief in its own assumptions. In other words, an infinite regress cannot be applicably known. You may have created a distinctive set of logic that fit in your mind, but it has no capability of application. The a/d distinction is complete. It start with finite experiences, and ends with them. You can use the a/d distinction in the formulation of the a/d distinction itself. That is a major strength of the theory compared to all others which I know of that are not able to use the very theory they propose to prove the theory itself.

But there is no uncertainty involved. How I define A, B, and synonyms are all in my solo context.

There's a difference between saying A and B are synonyms, and trying to discover if they currently are synonymous. Maybe the latter is applicable knowledge? However, that would be solely abstract consideration, which I think you were stating was only possibly distinctive. — Bob Ross

If you are the creator of the definitions of A and B, then there is no uncertainty. You aren't trying to discover anything. Synonyms are identical distinctive knowledge. When we are trying to match an unknown identity with a distinctive identity, that deduced result is applicable knowledge.

applicable knowledge always involves the resolution of a distinctive uncertainty

Would you agree with me then that there is such a thing as uncertainty distinctively? Because prior it felt like you were stating there's never uncertainty because I am "creating" the definitions: — Bob Ross

Let me be clear by what I mean by distinctive. Distinctive is like binary. Its either on, or off. Either you have defined A to have x property, or you have defined A to have y property. You can define A as having X property for 1 second, then define A to have Y property the next second. You can even alternate every second for eternity. But there is no uncertainty that at any point in time, what you have defined or not defined as an essential property of A is the distinctive knowledge of A then.

In the way you have defined it from the dictionary, I am no longer certain "hypothetical" is the correct term. — Bob Ross

That may be the case. I do agree there is a difference between "I believe" versus, "I don't know". But the IFF is an affirmative of a possible outcome, which is an assertion that there are other possible outcomes. But we may be splitting hairs at this point.

I really think going through the terms has helped me to see where you are coming from, and I hope I've demonstrated the consistency in my use and argumentation for the a/d system. Everything we've mentioned here so far, has been mentioned in prior topics, but here we have it summed up together nicely. I look forward to hearing from you again Bob.

One could use rationality to address faith as gods offer a reason for bringing the universe into existence. — Hillary

That's a rationalization, not rationality. A rationalization is a plausible reason we invent to support a belief or desire, but is not necessarily rational. Rationality is not used with the intention to prove or disprove a belief, but see if it holds when placed against critical critique.

Why did Jews NOT lose their faith in a (benevolent) God? — Agent Smith

You are using rationality to address faith. Faith is belief despite rationality showing you otherwise. There are plenty of rational reasons not to believe in God prior to the Holocaust.

The real question then is, "What causes people to have faith?" Since its not about rationality, its about other things. I think if you ask a lot of people you'll find its community, purpose, morality, and believing in something bigger than yourself.

Well I have clearly missed the mark yet again ): It seems as though we are not semantically disagreeing but, rather, fundamentally disagreeing. — Bob Ross

Not a worry at all! Please continue to shoot arrows. I think comparing this epistemology to the a/s distinction is inevitable and necessary to fully understand it. I am glad we are exploring this route, as I think it can help clarify what my proposed epistemology means. Further, there needs to be a reason why we should use this epistemology over the a/s distinction if it is to have any worth. Lets dive in.

I have to perform this (comparison) for everything, which is the problem with your distinction. For example, if I distinctively define A and distinctively define B, but they are by happenstance defined the exact same, my conclusion that they are defined the same is a comparison of the two distinctively defined concepts, A and B, to derive that they are indeed a match: this didn't involve anything "outside of my control", so to speak. I think you would regardless consider it holistically in the realm of "distinctive knowledge", which I would disagree with. — Bob Ross

Again, this depends on how the comparison is made. Lets say I hold A and B in my head as merely definitions. Further, I define a synonym as "Two identities which have the same essential and non-essential properties. Then I say, "A and B are synonyms". At that point, I have to compare the essential and non-essential properties. But there is no uncertainty involved. How I define A, B, and synonyms are all in my solo context. I could change the identities of A, B, and synonym anytime I desired. But I don't. Perhaps this process should receive a new identity such as "logical distinction".

If a situation arises in which we are wondering if a distinctively unknown specific experience matches the definition of B, we are applying the identity to something else which is outside of our creative identification. We are still distinctively committing to what the identity of B is, but we are purposefully not creating a new identity for this currently undefined experience. At this point it requires an investigation of what this new identity is, and if it can deductively match to our B identity.

As such, applicable knowledge always involves the resolution of a distinctive uncertainty. There is no certainty that the match of this new uncertainty will match with something I distinctively know. I cannot change what B means, and I am choosing not to create a new identity for the undefined experience. The premise that the undefined experience matches B is not a necessary conclusion. But the attempt to match is the belief, or induction that it could. This is what I've been trying to narrow in on their difference. Distinctive knowledge has no uncertainty. Applicable knowledge only happens in the resolution of an uncertainty.

Distinctive knowledge - A deduced concept which is the creation and memorization of essential and accidental properties of a discrete experience.

Applicable knowledge - A deduced concept which is not contained within its contextual distinctive knowledge set. This concept does not involve the creation of new distinctive knowledge, but a deduced match of a discrete experience to the contextual distinctive knowledge set.

These are both very well written general definitions. For applicable knowledge, perhaps we need to tweak it a little with my above analysis. "A deduced resolution in the uncertainty of matching a distinctively undefined experience to a contextual distinctive knowledge set."

Applicable knowledge does involve the creation of a new concept: the synthetic joining of "A = B", which is a separate concept from A and B. There was a concept A and a concept B, now there's a new concept that "A = B". This is not necessitated in the concepts A nor B, but yet true of them (i.e. it is synthetic). But there was an analysis that was required to determine "A = B" which was the analysis of what is contained in the concept A and, likewise, what is in the concept B, which is analytical. So both were used to obtain "applicable knowledge". I think this, as of now, is the true pinpoint of the distinction we are both really trying to portray (but I may be wrong, as always). — Bob Ross

This also sounds good. If one uses the a/s distinction, they will have to use both within distinctive and applicable knowledge. Distinctive and applicable knowledge do not divide into a/s distinctions themselves however. I'll clarify further with the pink elephant example early.

Imagine I never imagined a "pink elephant" but, rather, I envisioned "pink", in isolation, and "an elephant" in isolation. If I then claimed "pink elephant", it would make just as little sense as envisioning a "pink elephant" and claiming "there's a pink elephant in my backyard". — Bob Ross

Distinctively, there is nothing strange about taking the terms pink and applying it to an elephant. We create whatever definitions we wish. The part that doesn't make sense is stating there is some unknown distinctive identity apart from our imagination or fiction that matches to the identity of a pink elephant. The creation of distinctive knowledge does not necessitate such knowledge can be applicably known. The a/s distinction is what causes the confusion, not the d/a epistemology.

Alright, back to the original flow!

It is more about creation of identities versus deduced matching of experiences to already established identities.

I don't think this directly explicates the recognition of indexical conflations. It is more of a byproduct. — Bob Ross

No, taken alone, the process of distinctive and applicable knowledge do not explicitly involve context.

Language A: A bachelor is an unmarried man. (Distinctive)
This person is found to be unmarried. (Applicable)
Therefore this man is a bachelor (Logical distinction)

Language B: A bachelor is a married man. (Distinctive)
This person is found to be married. (Applicable)
Therefore this man is married (Logical distinction)

By this I mean the context does not affect the logical process itself. The context only determines the defined starting point. The process itself is not contextual, only the identifications and capabilities of the observer/thinker.

To translate into this epistemology, we always start with distinctive knowledge.

I think that we start with analysis (which is empirical observation) and therefrom derive synthesis. I haven't found a way to neatly map this onto your d/a distinction. I don't think we always start with distinctive knowledge as you've defined it. — Bob Ross

You are correct! The analysis is the introduction to discovering we discretely experience. That is how we analyzed and discovered the term "distinctive knowledge". Nothing I've proposed is done without analysis, and all is attempted to be shown using distinctive and applicable knowledge where possible (barring inductions).

Likewise, I could then counter myself with "well, bob, you just performed synthesis in determining that you analytically discover synthesis". And I would be correct, however I didn't realize that necessarily until after I analytically observed the claim (i.e. that I analyze to discover what is synthesized). I am always one step behind the synthesis, so to speak. Hopefully that made a bit of sense. — Bob Ross

I believe so. It is one reason why I found the a/s distinction to not tell the whole story. It is a useful distinction, but one that diminishes in usefulness the more granular you get with them.

The act of experiencing imagery in ones mind is part of discrete experience: the conclusion that it is a remembrance of the past is not. — Bob Ross

I want to tweak this sentence a little to ensure we are on the same page.

The act of experiencing imagery in ones mind is part of discrete experience.
The act of experiencing that is a remembrance of the past is part of discrete experience.

The deduced conclusion that it is an accurate remembrance of the past is the discrete experience of applicable knowledge.
The deduced realization that I believe my memory to be an accurate remembrance is the discrete experience of distinctive knowledge.

Unfortunately, I don't think we are merely semantically disagreeing on this either. I think you are conflating "uncertainty" with "induction". You can have deduced uncertainty. — Bob Ross

I don't believe there is conflation, but perhaps I am wrong. An induction is a claim of uncertainty. Certainly we can deduce that an induction is all we can make.

Therefore, a premise that is hypothetical is not necessarily, when stripped of its if conditional, an induction. It could be a deduction or an induction. If I say Premise 1 = IF X, I am not thereby implying necessarily that X is an induction. — Bob Ross

No, X alone is not an induction. "IF X" is an induction. It is the same as my saying, "I believe it will rain tomorrow." If I remove "I believe", then we are left with "It will rain tomorrow" as a fact. I can create deductions based on the premise "It will rain tomorrow". The addition of the IF lets the reader know that this is not a fact, or a conclusion that followed from the premises we had. It may, or may not rain tomorrow.

Adding the IF makes it hypothetical.
Hypothetical - involving or being based on a suggested idea or theory : being or involving a hypothesis : CONJECTURAL https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hypothetical

A hypothesis is an induction. A conjecture is an induction. A claim that asserts a conclusion that is not certain, is an induction. The IF is the assertion of a conclusion that is not certain, therefore an induction. IF the induction turns out to be correct, then we can deduce what will follow.

Hypothetical: IF the penny lands on heads (Implicit uncertainty of the initial premise happening)
Non-hypothetical: The penny lands on heads (A solid and certain premise)

Again, I agree with this analogy, yet it doesn't prove that the hypothetical is an induction when the if conditional is removed: I might deductively not know whether or not the penny will land heads. — Bob Ross

If the IF condition is removed, it is no longer a hypothetical deduction. At that point, it is simply a deduction. The penny lands on heads is not an uncertainty, but a certainty at that point. The identities of our chain of reasoning are based on the zero point we pick. Its all about the starting point in our analysis.

Pure Deduction chain: Deduction -> Deduction all the way down.
Hypothetical: induction -> Deduction with the induction stating an outcome that will happen (But has not yet).
Deduced induction: Deduction -> Induction due to limited information
A Deduced Inductions Hypothetical Deduction -> Induction -> Deduction.

So if I take a hypothetical induction, and remove the induction as a premise within my chain of reason (removing the IF) it is now just a deduction.

Again, this is implying to me the indexical conflation consideration: it seems to me you are implying, rightly so, that "a guess" entails uncertainty which entails that some sort of empirical observation (analysis) is required. I am simply noting that this is true of both "applicable" and "distinctive" knowledge. — Bob Ross

I hope I have explained why this is not true of both applicable and distinctive knowledge at this point. Distinctive knowledge does not require empirical observation. An induction itself is distinctively known. But the resolution to that induction is applicably known.

Then I think you may be agreeing with me that we do not know that a possibility is more cogent than a speculation in the relation to the future, we only know that it is true of the past. The grounds of the induction hierarchy in relation to the future (which is the whole purpose of it is for the future) is an induction. — Bob Ross

I want to make sure its understood that cogency does not mean "truth" or "deduced certainty" Cogency originally is defined as "a strong inductive argument with true premises." Here it is amended to be "A strong inductive argument based on how many steps it is removed from deductions in its chain of rationality."

That has been shown distinctively, and I believe can be shown applicably. But I don't claim that taking a cogent induction determines that the induction will come to pass. Its simply shown to be more likely to pass when taken over a large sample space. And if a person is to be rational, they will take the induction type that gives them the greatest odds of being correct.

Also I never claim that we can applicably know that any form of induction will necessarily lead to its outcome. It is reasonable to guess that an outcome that will occur 99% of the time will happen, but you will be wrong 1% of the time.

Any claim about the future is always an induction. The question is, do we have a rational way of sorting out which inductions are more reasonable based on logic and past experience? Yes. While it is an induction that logic and our past experiences will be the same tomorrow, we must also not forget that it is also an induction that our logic and past experiences will NOT be the same tomorrow. As no one has experienced logic suddenly altering, or the past suddenly shifting reality, it is a speculation that this may change, while it is a possibility it remains stable. Therefore it is more cogent to act as if the known certainties of today such as logic and needing to breath and eat to survive, will be the known certainties of tomorrow. My inductive hierarchy can justify itself. Can any other rationalization of inductions do so? I leave that to you.

Fantastic post Bob, and I hoped I adequately addressed your thoughtful points!

If I want to know the reason of existence, I wanna know why there is a universe with life in it. I think I have a reasonable(!) cosmological model, but that still offers no reason. It just can't have come into existence out of the blue. — Hillary

That's a fair and great point. I first want to say, because it is not said enough on these boards, that is a fine thing to want. It is not stupid or deserves derision that you have a desire for such answers. I might be derailing the thread here, but I find this important.

The conclusion I make is that it did all come out of the blue. That is necessarily came out of the blue. But that's not important here. What's important here is to ask yourself why the circumstances of your existence necessitate how you must exist? Lets say a person is raised in a drug dealing household. Does that necessitate they must become drug dealers? No. What if an evil God created humanity? Must you necessarily be evil if you have a rational mind? No.

The power that you hold may be shaped by the circumstances that caused your existence to be, but they do not necessitate what you do today, or in your future. The power of philosophy and reason is to examine the things we take for granted in a new light, and find freedom in breaking free of unreasonable circumstances or societal pressures. It is not to destroy wonder, it is to restore wonder, curiosity, and an understanding of our freedom.

The purpose you serve today, is to be what you are today. To discover, solve problems, experience joy, sadness, comfort, hardship etc. It is to live. And if you are one of the lucky few who thinks about it, you can work to live how you want to live in the now of today and tomorrow. Find your passions, your drives, and what makes you feel alive and pursue that. Be the person that on their death bed does not look at regret with what they did not do in their short time here on Earth.

And if you don't mind, consider that there are a lot of us also trying to do this. So don't hurt us unnecessarily in your pursuit. Maybe offer a little consideration when we fail or stumble, and some short praise and admiration when we reach it. We will offer it back in kind, and hopefully make the world a better place for us all.

In this case, the idea of “reason” I had in mind were things like modus ponens, avoiding what are defined as local fallacies, drawing conclusions from new or existing information, etc. But it is a sort of fuzzy concept IMO. — Paulm12

Yeah, it can be difficult to define. In your case, I think you're viewing reason as logic. While I think logic is used with reason, it is not necessarily equivalent. I want to say logic is the result of reason, whereas reason is the process by which logic is understood and acquired. One can have reason, but never have learned formal logic. Still, you may want to edit the OP and add in specifically that you mean logic while the topic is still new. Its a good topic!

Science can't offer a reason for existence. The magical appearance of something out of complete nothing is reason-devoid and as such an irrational explanation. — Hillary

True. But science is just one expression of reason. I wrote an explanation about the origin of existence using reason here https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary/p1 But to the point of the OP, what do you think reason is, and should we trust it?

What do you consider reason? Its a broad word that is often interpreted differently by different people.

My summation of reason is the following.

1. Concluding and acting upon which is logically undeniable. In other words, using deductions where possible.

2. Understanding one's limitations, and the fact that one's deductive construct could be wrong. Thus being open to new information, and acceptance of one's own possible failings.

3. Using cogent inductions where it is impossible to deduce.

I believe reason is a tool to help us understand and be able to handle reality at a more capable level than without reason. Its not that being reasonable will guaranty a successful outcome, its that in general, it will much more than if you are not being reasonable.

It’s a faith of mine, but one founded on experience, that in the absence of state power a majority of free people will not resort tyranny, theft, murder, and they should have the means and ability to defend themselves against those who would. — NOS4A2

No one disagrees with this NOS4A2. Its the word "most" that everyone is pointing out. That does not negate the existence of "the rest". The "most" have to come up with some system to handle "the rest", or "the rest" will ruin what "the most" have.

No one is also saying you can't have a group of people where all cooperate nicely for some time. This is usually if resources are plentiful and times are good. But when famine, disease, or intertribal conflicts come into play, you're more likely to have a few bad apples that will cause massive destruction for everyone else.

The problem everyone is repeatedly trying to point out to you, is that you present only the situation in which everyone is good in your laissaz faire world, and those who aren't good, are outside of it. Laissaz faire lets in "the rest" as well. You've been shown facts and history that prove this to be true.
Ignoring or dismissing this comes across to others that you are being dishonest. And if you are dishonest in your dealings here, how can anyone believe your world where everyone is honest and good?

Eucalypts simply do not choose to fall into neat categories for the benefit of botanists and foresters.

The various trees do not have essential characteristics that mark them as members of this species or of that. — Banno

This. The world does not determine the essential characteristics that mark them as members of a species. We do.

No real disagreements here. "sort of like a proto-science" was not intended to diminish its usefulness. I view philosophy as the laboratory where ideas are cooked up that can eventually be tested. Philosophy creates, science tests and confirms.

Whenever a question can be answered factually it's no longer philosophical and is translatable into a scientific hypothesis, or problem, to be 'solved' experimentally (which may be interpreted philosophically in terms of "what it means ..." ethically / aesthetically / ontologically, etc). — 180 Proof

That sums up my point nicely. I consider such philosophy a success. Philosophy is also littered with failures that have not gone anywhere beyond the lab itself. In my opinion, if a philosophy cannot eventually be turned into something testable, or put into practice in life with measurable outcomes, its just fiction. It can be comforting, exciting, and imaginative; but still fiction.

Of course, my view of science is that its "testable philosophy". But once such philosophy has been tested, a small part of it has been destroyed. Philosophy can only exist as a logical exercise. Once the real world puts it to the test, it is no longer philosophy. So this is why I noted philosophy's goal is to destroy itself. All of its successes are no longer philosophy, and all of its failures are the leftover dregs of petri dishes.

reply="unenlightened;693306"]
You neglected to note the point I made about context.

3. Context - A societal or intentional situation that changes the essential and accidental properties of the definition. "That plaster statue is a tree." (It is not essential that a tree be a plant, as we are within the context of artistic representations, and thus plaster). — Philosophim

The context within "botany", (textbook definition) botany determines what are the essential and accidental properties. If of course different areas of botany have different contexts, they'll define the essential and accidental properties as different. It may very well be that several groups have great difficulty agreeing on the "correct" context the entire group should take. But, there has to be some meaning to the word that is essential to that word. If there was nothing essential to the word within the context, then a tree could be equivalent to a bus.

An expression of disapproval is not a point.
— Philosophim
Neither is this:

False character only holds when there is threat of punishment, loss, or promise of reward. True character holds when no one will punish, harm, or reward you for what you do.
— Philosophim — L'éléphant

If you wanted me to dig deeper or explain more, just ask. Nothing wrong with that. But we should be better than rolling eyes at one another or just saying, "You're wrong and I can't believe you don't realize how wrong you are."

To myself and likely those that agree with me, character is the core person you are when no one is looking. When I mean core, I don't mean general societal adaptation to different groups of people. I mean values. A way of life you've determined is right and appropriate for yourself, and living by it. You can of course change what you consider right over the course of your life, but what you hold at that time is what you live by.

People who alter their core of who they are in society, or only do particular actions while other people are looking, are weak of character. The point of the action is not because there is belief in any underlying value, but social acceptance and validation, or the avoidance of societal punishment or harm.

People who take actions only for the rewards and punishments society will grant them have weak characters. This is because they compromise the core of who they are for other people. When you gain power, committing a crime can be done easier and with less consequence. As such, if you were only not doing a crime because of the punishment, there is no character to prevent you from doing so. Further, when you obtain power and no longer care about the praise of those underneath you, you no longer treat them in the way you did for your previous reward.

If you find issue with this, can you explain why?

Ugh. Where to begin.

If you think the way you do here on this thread, then you have no understanding of human nature yet. — L'éléphant

Care to explain that human nature then? An expression of disapproval is not a point.

Attaining a position of power shows what a person is really like. Power doesn't corrupt, it reveals. — baker

This. False character only holds when there is threat of punishment, loss, or promise of reward. True character holds when no one will punish, harm, or reward you for what you do.

In case you guys didn't realize, NOS just keeps repeating the same thing again and again. He's not interested in a real discussion or a conversation. You will not change his mind, because that's not what he's here for. And that's perfectly fine. Just don't waste your time sticking around after you say your piece.

I think he was ultimately just whining about American education. I love patterns, though, and the one he provided was intriguing. — frank

Sure, its an interesting thought to bring up! Appreciate the contribution.

The only issue I have with this is the regression of definitions. Ie. A tree is a plant, a plant is a living thing a living thing is ... at so forth all of which by your reasoning has some previous essential property contained within the next. So what is “thee” essential property in the first place? — Benj96

In terms of biology, likely your first experiences with the plant based on your cultural upbringing. This would be different than for a biologist who has plants categorized down to very exacting definitions and standards.

Are there trees without branches? — Benj96

Yes. If I trim all the branches off of a tree, its a "tree without branches".

Sure. He would say the ever-waning commitment of Americans to foreign wars is a side effect of diminished national cohesion. — frank

Wouldn't that be due to an increased national cohesion? If a broken up cohesion, there would be too many counter parties that would disagree with foreign interventions. Its expensive and costly to the citizens. We were in Afghanistan for 20 years. I'm not sure a nation with low cohesion could continue to support such a foreign war with the changes in elected officials.

You're basically agreeing with Kurth that the US is an example of federalism. It's not much of a nation-state. — frank

But you stated earlier:

The USA was a functioning nation-state from the end of the Civil War until sometime after WW2, when it began to evolve into a post-modern state — frank

I'm noting that the USA was not a functioning nation state during this time. Arguably federalism took a nose dive during WW2 and that is when we became more nation-like. I suppose my point truly though, is that I don't understand how he determines his post-modern definition, and that America fits that definition.

But, I am also going purely by your summary and not his article directly. I'm quite sure I'm missing something or not understanding the full context.

Definitions are a combination of three factors.

1. Essential properties - These are properties which are absolutely necessary to the word. A tree is a plant.
2. Accidental properties - Properties that the definition can contain, but are not essential to its identity. "A tree can have branches".
3. Context - A societal or intentional situation that changes the essential and accidental properties of the definition. "That plaster statue is a tree." (It is not essential that a tree be a plant, as we are within the context of artistic representations, and thus plaster).

The difficulty is nailing down the context of the situation. If you note that "Trees are made of plaster" when talking about biological trees, you are wrong. If you note that "Trees are made of plaster" when talking about art, you are correct. Oftentimes people aren't debating the essential or accidental properties of a definition, but the context of it.

1. Doesn't need a large conventional army, but rather defends through deterrence, and attacks via high tech stealth weapons. — frank

But we have one of the largest and possibly the most powerful militaries in the world. This only happened after WW2, where prior we only had a minor maintaining force. When we fought Britain for independence, we used ambushes and gurilla tactics instead of meeting them open on the field. As of the modern day, the United States aggressively uses its military for regime change as well as deterrence. Iraq and Afghanistan were not acts of deterrence.

Does not engage in mass production for a national market. It's economy is characterized by an economic divide. There's a "high economy" which is comprised of financial institutions and managers of multi-nationals which are focused on a global market, and a "low economy" made up of low-skilled service workers. — frank

I don't see how this is different from economies once money and trade were invented. The high economy has always sought to obtain more capital at any means. They do not produce for the nation, they produce for themselves. The great pyramids were not for the benefit of the nation, but for the benefit of the "God emperor" who sat on the wealth built by the underclasses.

Does not contain a cohesive political class, but has a somewhat stalemated government running a multicultural regime. — frank

I would re-read the history of the founding of America. America was so divided and multi-cultural that we initially had the articles of confederation which granted extreme power to the states with an incredibly weak federal government. The reason for this was the identities between the states, (And the political elections within the states) were so different from one another. America has always been a multi-cultural and non-cohesive political entity. If you read history, there are constant struggles and debates on how the country should be run over time.

Can you give an example demonstrating where woman have more rights than men? I think that would help your OP. Currently you're stating an opinion, which may or may not be accurate.

But to broadly answer your question in the abstract, it depends on what you mean by "More rights". Since men and women have biological differences, there may be rights specific to anatomy that could be more numerous than men, and vice versa. So in the sense of pure quantity, there would not be a problem. If you mean women should have rights that explicitly deny men their rights, then no, that should not happen.

Ah, the analytic/synthetic distinction. Long ago when I first wrote this philosophy, I used the analytic and synthetic distinction instead of distinctive and applicable knowledge. The problem was, as you likely know by now, I had very different definitions from the a/s distinction. When I shared the paper or ideas with other individuals I ran into major problems.

First, people wouldn't listen. They wouldn't try to amend the definitions, and insist that I was just "wrong". Not wrong in my underlying amendments of the definitions, but wrong in trying to change them to begin with. Understandable.

Second, people took their vast knowledge of analytic/synthetic knowledge and would cite philosophers or other criticisms of the a/s distinction without understanding or addressing the points I made. It was straw man after straw man, and few people I found are willing to hear, "No, that's not what this version of the a/s distinction means, this is why that doesn't apply."

So I created new terms. This forces people to understand the terminology if I want a conversation. Of course there are still people who don't want to explore something new, but they never wanted to listen when I was redefining the a/s distinction anyway. What I didn't lose were the people who wanted to discuss concepts, but were turned off by word redefinitions. Yes, I redefine some words slightly, but I think by that point people are in the conversation enough that it naturally leads to that.

Are the names I made very good. Probably not. I'm not great with coming up with names! I like distinctive, as it flowed nicely from discrete experience. "Applicable" is probably not very good, but I'm not sure what else to call it. I view words as place holders for concepts, and I view placeholders as contextual. As long as the word works in some sense within this context, that's fine by me. I see it as "Applying distinctive knowledge" to something other than itself.

But I am very open to new naming! Perhaps creative and comparative knowledge? Identity knowledge and confirmable? Dynamic and static? The problem of course with all of these comparisons is if you interpret the word meaning a particular contextual way, they don't quite work either. The contextual implication of the words in their general use gets in the way when trying to apply them in context to the argument. The reality is, the knowledge I'm proposing has never existed before. Its a concept no one (I have read) has proposed. So perhaps I need new words entirely and should research some latin.

At this point though, feel free to use the a/s distinction to help you understand the concept. I'll correct where the a/s distinction doesn't apply. Let me get to your points now.

...analytic expresses the contrary: "a proposition whose predicate concept is contained in its subject concept" — Bob Ross

To compare to distinctive knowledge, we need to remove proposition, predicate, and subject.

Distinctive knowledge - A deduced concept which is the creation and memorization of essential and accidental properties of a discrete experience.

This then leads into applicable knowledge, which is loosely based off of synthetic knowledge.

synthetic generally means (philosophically) "a proposition whose predicate concept is not contained in its subject concept but related" — Bob Ross

Applicable knowledge - A deduced concept which is not contained within its contextual distinctive knowledge set. This concept does not involve the creation of new distinctive knowledge, but a deduced match of a discrete experience to the contextual distinctive knowledge set.

Context- when the symbol/identity of one or more sets of distinctive knowledge are identical, while the essential and accidental properties of the symbol/identity are different. "A rock" in the context of geology has different essential and accidental properties than the context of a 5 year old child for example. This can further be compounded when a person is able to comprehend the essential and accidental properties of a distinctive context, but unable to actively apply those properties due to inability. For example, being a blind geologist has a different applicable context than those with sight.

As you can see, while there are some similarities, they are very different.

(Noting synthetic) which clearly describes (in my opinion) the extension of one's own "creations" (projections) onto the "world", so to speak. For example, the concept of a rock (or just a rock, so to speak) on the floor doesn't have any inherent properties that necessitate it be called a "rock": I synthetically projected that property onto it. — Bob Ross

Both distinctive and applicable knowledge can be seen as the extension of one's creation on the world. A discrete experience (the rock) has no inherent properties that necessitate it be called anything. Distinctive knowledge is when we create those essential and accidental properties that allow it to be called a "rock". This is our creation upon the world. Upon finding finding a new discrete experience (potential rock) we attempt to match our definition of a "a rock" to "the discrete experience". If we deduce that the essential properties match, we have applicable knowledge that "the discrete experience" is a match to "A rock". This is another extension of our creation upon the world.

this directly entails that a lot of topics traditionally viewed as "controlled" by the mind can also be applicable knowledge (analytical knowledge)(e.g. imagination, thoughts, etc). I'm not sure if you would agree with me on that. For example, thoughts are analyzed (~discovered), not synthesized (~projected). — Bob Ross

This doesn't quite fit. Projection can happen in both instances of knowledge. It is more about creation of identities versus deduced matching of experiences to already established identities. But both can involve the projected world.

In other words, and this goes back to my subtle disclaimer that "synthetic knowledge" is a child of "analytic knowledge", we analytically discover that we synthetically project. — Bob Ross

To translate into this epistemology, we always start with distinctive knowledge. So I distinctively create the identity of applicable knowledge. But then, I am also able to applicably know the distinctive knowledge of "applicable knowledge" successfully. So I both distinctively, and applicably know the concept of applicable knowledge.

Once I applicably know applicable knowledge, I can also applicably know that I distinctively know. We can then apply this knowledge back to the initial claim in the beginning that, "I discretely experience." I established a definition of discrete experience, then apply the concept successfully.

Moreover, going back to our discussion of whether "distinctive knowledge" can be induced, this also implies that the deduced validity of a subset of memories (in relation to another subset) is applicable knowledge (discovered: analytic), as opposed to being distinctive knowledge (projected: synthetic): which would be where, if I am currently understanding your view, we went sideways (our argument was presupposing the analysis of memories as "distinctive", which is incorrect). — Bob Ross

The act of experiencing a memory is part of the act of discrete experience itself. For example, "I remember seeing a pink elephant." Whether the memory is accurate when applied is irrelevant. It is the memory itself that is distinctive. The act of attempting to match your memory to a different discrete experience is application of that memory. The deduced outcome of that match is the applicable knowledge. But if I attempted to show there was a pink elephant that existed, the deduced outcome of that would be applicable knowledge.

For example, my assertion that memory A is valid in relation to the set of memories S would have to be analytical (because I am discovering the "truth" of the matter), whereas labeling it as "memory" + "A" and "memories" + "S" would be synthetic. — Bob Ross

Memories in relation to other memories are distinctive. "Pink elephant" combines our distinctive understanding of "pink" and "elephant". The application of that memory for its accuracy is applicable. "I remember seeing a pink elephant in my room last night," is distinctive. "My memory is an accurate representation of what happened in reality" is applicable. Was there really an elephant? Was it pink? The outcome is irrelevant to the knowledge of the memory itself.

If I am understanding your distinction correctly, then I agree here except that applicable knowledge is not relatable to an induction directly. — Bob Ross

There may be a misunderstanding of what is meant by "directly". If I make an induction that the next coin flip will be heads, the result that is experienced and deduced will be the outcome of the flip. If I deduce that the coin lands on heads, (instead of just guessing it did) then I have a "resolution" to my induction. This is the relation that I'm talking about. I guessed heads, and it ended up heads. My guess was correct. I guessed heads, and it ended up tails. My guess was incorrect. This resolution is applicable knowledge.

A hypothetical deduction is when we take an induction, and take the logical deductive conclusion if it resolves a particular way.

I don't think this is true. A hypothetical deduction is a deduction wherein each premise is hypothetically granted as true: it is a valid deduction due to it conforming to the necessary form of a deduction. — Bob Ross

The hypothetical is a possible resolution to an induction. If there was no induction, there would be no hypothetical. The coin can land either heads or tails. We can hypothetically deduce that if it lands heads, X occurs, and if it lands tails, y occurs. But the hypothetical cannot exist without the induction as a source of alternative outcomes. A deduction leads to a necessary conclusion, not a hypothetical conclusion. Only inductions can lead to hypothetical conclusions. That's the whole point of the IF. If there was no uncertainty in the outcome, we would not need the IF. I don't think we're in disagreement here beyond semantics.

the former implies inductions are valid premises of a hypothetical deduction (which is wrong), whereas the latter implies we can dispense of that induction. — Bob Ross

To correct this, I am saying inductions are necessary premises to create a hypothetical deduction. The IF implies uncertainty. If you remove the IF, it is no longer a hypothetical, it is not a deduction.

Hypothetical: IF the penny lands on heads (Implicit uncertainty of the initial premise happening)
Non-hypothetical: The penny lands on heads (A solid and certain premise)

I'm not certain I agree with this. The induction does not resolve a particular way: — Bob Ross

Can an induction ever resolve then? If I say, "I believe the next penny flip will land on heads" will I ever find out if I was correct in my guess? All I'm noting is how we figure out the outcome of the guess. That must be done applicably.

but, rather, a deduction can resolve an induction by either dispensing of it (as now it is known that the induction happened to be accurate or it wasn't) or retaining it as not directly pertinent to what is newly known. — Bob Ross

I'm simply noting the accuracy of the induction. I think you're taking two steps here, noting the accuracy of the induction, and then deciding to dispense or retain it. For example, I could deduce the penny lands on tails, but still insist it landed on heads by inventing some other induction like "an evil demon changed it", or simply not caring and insisting it landed on heads regardless of what I deduced. The second step of deciding to stick with or reject the induction is a step too far from what I'm saying. All I'm noting is the deduced outcome after the induction's prediction comes to pass.

However, now we must deal with a second order proof pertaining to why we ought to believe that because they related in a particular way in the past that it will hold in the future (aka hume's problem of induction). — Bob Ross

I have already concluded that you cannot make any knowledge claim about the future. You can only make inductions about the future. The smartest way to make inductions is to use the most cogent inductions we already know of. So we would make our decisions based on the hierarchy of the inductions we have at our disposal. Just because we can speculate that the rules of reality may change in the future, doesn't mean its possible they will. Since we know what is possible and probable, it is possible and probable they will continue to happen in the future.

Great points again Bob! I hope I adequately showed why the distinctive and applicable distinction of knowledge might be inspired by the a/s distinction, but is not the a/s distinction itself.

I believe Kant has it correct. Time is a descriptor, not an actual river. Essentially time is the relation of objects and forces in a causality state. So lets say we have states 1,2, and 3, all moving forward in causality by their numbers. If we somehow re-aranged the state of the universe back to 1, we did not travel through 2 and 3. We caused state 1 to be again, we did not travel backwards though causality.

Multiple worlds explain potentials. But like potential and kinetic energy, kinetic is what actually happens. This doesn't mean there must be a world in which one person dropped a ball, and in another world another person did not.

What has happened has happened. What has not happened, has not happened. There is no reversing it or going back.

A Philosoophy of Science course by Paul Hoyningen can provide great info on a systematic methodology of knowledge evaluation. — Nickolasgaspar

Hello Nickolasgaspar and thanks for your contribution. I'm sure you had good intentions, but its not very helpful to me. Is there something in particular in the argument or conversation that you noticed such a course could help? Could you perhaps summarize the points he makes to show me its relevance to the OP or the following discussion?

We can look to the law for an example. The court is presented with these types of issues all the time.

"I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." If a person is caught lying on the witness stand, they can be punished by law for perjury. That is clearly the government restricting a person's "free speech".

Lies seem to be extremism, at least in court. If a business lies to customer's about its product, they can also be legally liable. But white lies to your wife or husband? They seem fine. If you yell "Fire!" in a theater and people rush out and get hurt, that also doesn't seem protected. I suppose its about the risk and cost to people that certain lies cause which would break the idea of "free speech".

I don’t care for your points or your hypotheticals. — NOS4A2

Then I suppose you don't want to have any further discussion.

Nonetheless, despite our disagreement, your examples of why you fear of laissez-faire is all I really wanted to know. So thank you. — NOS4A2

As long as you have received other view points and considered them, that's really what's important. At the end of the day, people are going to believe what they want to believe. Here in these forums, we hopefully push ourselves to consider that the world is bigger than those beliefs. I appreciate the engagement up to this point.

My reasons for preferring it are moral. I think it is wrong and unjust to control people, to confiscate the fruits of their labor, or to impose someone’s will upon another’s if they do not deserve it. — NOS4A2

Who's going to enforce that though? If there's not a government what is the replacement? That's the question I keep asking. The world is not shaped through good intentions and an emotional desire that we all get along. If there is no government, I posit, as has happened throughout history, that a bunch of gangs and warlords are going to rape and pillage your property for themselves. They will not be swayed by your moral objections. You alone will not be able to stop them.

The same applies to matters of trade and enterprise. If anyone rigged the game in their favor as much as states have done—skimming, stealing, exploiting, extorting, racketeering, money laundering—he’d be thrown in jail. — NOS4A2

But the state is the one who throws people in jail. Absent the state, no one gets thrown in jail. People who do these things to others just don't disappear if the state is gone. What do we have to stop them if the state is gone?

No laissez faire regime has failed because no such regime has existed. — NOS4A2

And yet this is despite the theory being around for over 100 years. Why is this? If its such a successful theory that is obviously to the benefit of mankind, why hasn't this happened anywhere in the entire world?

So I’ve read your objections and still prefer the idea of separating the state and economy. — NOS4A2

I would have preferred you explain why you think its better for a company to inject lead into gasoline knowing full well the dangers to health and society, and lying about it for profit. Maybe explain why its more beneficial to have meat packing plants with unsanitary conditions and horrid working conditions. Do you think zoning should be done by businesses? That they should be able to dump chemicals in rivers or land fills that cause harm to people who live in nearby homes?

Finally, you didn't address the point I made that often times business steps on the rights and liberties of other people in pursuit of profit. Government regulation can help minimize this. Without government, what is going to help this?

It would really help if you address the potentially negative sides of laissez-faire. If you only insist on seeing the positive, can you really say you've thought about it? No. Here on the philosophy boards we cannot love our own ideas. We put them to the test, try to prove them wrong, and see what comes out at the end of it all.

The problem I have is I haven't heard your well thought reasons for Laissez-faire, but talking points that are generally spouted in pop-culture. I'm unaware of your education background, so I think before we continue, we need some outside references. Laisezz-faire is not an untested ideology, and throughout history, it has often failed.

Preserving human liberty is not a 1-to-1 ratio with regulating the economy, and it is neither rationally nor emotionally satisfying for me to accept such non-sequiturs. — NOS4A2

In Laisezz-faire capitalism, the state gets out of the way of corporations as much as possible. No monopoly regulations. No laws mandating that the vats the company pass scientific sanitary standards. No laws mandating zoning, buy outs, minimum wages, health and safety standards, etc. This is tied directly with what many consider the rights of individuals. Plenty of people don't like their water and air polluted. Here are a few examples to check.

Forbes evaluation of the 2008 crash. https://www.forbes.com/2009/02/18/depression-financial-crisis-capitalism-opinions-columnists_recession_stimulus.html?sh=45acd8d22ef2

When you introduce government regulation, Laissez-faire is over. And you agree that government regulation is needed to preserve the rights and liberties of individuals. Maybe you don't really believe in Laissez-faire, but perhaps a minimal level of regulation? If you believe at times that the government has overregulated, I don't think anyone would disagree with you there. But the moment you allow laws and regulations that business have to follow to preserve the rights and liberties of individuals, the only question is, "How much?"

Here's an article in Forbes 2008 about how Laissez-faire, allowing markets to regulate themselves failed.

https://www.forbes.com/2009/02/18/depression-financial-crisis-capitalism-opinions-columnists_recession_stimulus.html?sh=45acd8d22ef2

"To paraphrase Churchill, capitalist market economies open to trade and financial flows may be the worst economic regime--apart from the alternatives. However, while this crisis does not imply the end of market-economy capitalism, it has shown the failure of a particular model of capitalism. Namely, the laissez-faire, unregulated (or aggressively deregulated), Wild West model of free market capitalism with lack of prudential regulation, supervision of financial markets and proper provision of public goods by governments."

If you're more interested in a video, this one should explain why regulation is needed to defend human rights and liberties. Of particular note, check the section where leaded gasoline was invented and see what the "free market" did with it.



Finally, there's Upton Sinclair's famous exposure of the meat packing industry. https://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-24-1-b-upton-sinclairs-the-jungle-muckraking-the-meat-packing-industry.html#:~:text=Upton%20Sinclair%20wrote%20The%20Jungle,emerged%20in%20the%20United%20States.

Fairly famous, but you might not be aware of it. Essentially food factories were unsanitary, dangerous, and risky for both employees and consumers who had little alternative.

One can and should do that without a state because, if history is any indication, the state is often incompetent in that regard and violates those same rights. According to author RJ Rummel, the body count for which the state is to blame in the 20th century is 262,000,000, and this is only acts of genocide. — NOS4A2

Have you compared to the body count of entities that are not the state? The number is irrelevant if you don't. Ever studied the death count in collapsed states where its warlords run around? Have you also compared the good that state has done? Developed infrastructure, roads, sewage handling?

Barring that, have you ever studied any society that did not have a tribe, chieftan, or some type of laws and rules? The idea that you can ever live a purely free person from "state" influence only happens if you find a cabin in the woods somewhere and go off the grid.

I would just read for now. To make a fully educated judgement, you must engage in all sides of thought. I think you've seen the pro Laissez-faire side, but its imperative that you see its anti. Now after reading and thinking on these, if you still think Laissez-faire is good, come back and talk. You can use some of the examples I gave, or more of your own. But I feel until you are aware of these other facts about free market and its politics, its more a discussion of faith then one of thought.

As for taxes...we can come back to it after this.

For every man who would exploit his neighbor is another who would not. This is why I have faith in the absence of state fetters. What prohibits a man from exploiting his neighbor is not the state, but a conscience and a reasonable set of moral principles. — NOS4A2

Correct. But what punishes a man and makes them pay for exploiting their neighbors is the state. I don't think you are so naive that you believe everyone is intelligent and of high moral character? Tell me, how does Laissez-faire handle criminals, brutes, thugs, and slavers?

Would you seek to dominate others should there be no state? — NOS4A2

The wrong question. "Would there be people who would seek to dominate others should there be no state?"

Absolutely. There are very real evil people in this world who will lie to your face, pay you pennies, and throw your body quietly in a ditch if it were convenient to them. If people were always perfect NOS4A2, then all forms of economics would work. Socialism and communism in their ideals would end up just as we envisioned. The problem with ideals is they do not factor in evil. I'm sure you would agree that pure socialism or communism does not result in the ideal utopia envisioned. This is because the reality of man is it must always plan with the idea that evil will exploit others if given the chance. Free market capitalism is no exception to this.

The moral and just way to fund any institution is voluntarily, whether through subscription, donation, etc. — NOS4A2

I don't want to pay my taxes this year, is that ok? Can the government properly budget and afford the judges and law enforcement needed to ensure people don't abuse and take advantage of the system?

I don’t want to abolish democracy, nor do I want to completely abolish the government. I just don’t think the task of government is to meddle in our livelihoods. — NOS4A2

You need to clarify by what you mean by "meddle". You seem to contradict yourself here when you also include

No. One is not at liberty to interfere with another’s liberty. — NOS4A2

That's not laisezz-faire. That's regulated capitalism, which is what we have today in America. That takes an enforcer, or in our instance, the state, to ensure this happens.

NOS4A2, instead of defending your argument, for fun and exploration, attack it. Find the holes in it from your perspective. Every idea has pros and cons. If you cannot see the cons in an idea, then you have not thoroughly thought of the consequences of it, and are grasping at something that is emotionally satisfying, and not rationally satisfying.

Well, that's probably my deeply hidden fruitfly brain part talking then. The part beneath the olfactory lizzard part. I smell powerful tendencies here... :smile: — Hillary

And its ok. We all have do or have done it at one point in our life. Its a shared human struggle. The thing is, all of us lose time to time, and some of us just give in. In a situation of competition in which there is no outside enforcer, one person is going to slip up (or intentionally) not be fair. And that's all it takes. A game cannot be played correctly unless everyone involved follows the rules.

NOS4A2 believes that the state as a function itself is oppressive. Its a common political refrain, mostly because he seeks dominance himself. He sees the state as dominating people, and his lizard brain doesn't like that. He's likely not thinking about all the circumstances or situations that would arrive if the state was eliminated. People will always have to fight others seeking dominance, whether or not they personally seek it themselves. Without some type of societal rules, and an enforcer of those rules (government) someone else will come in, dominate, then set the rules and enforcement up to ensure they retain their dominance. Its an unavoidable part of humanity.

My dear gracious good god... Where did you grow up? Ah, of course...you're a philosopher! — Hillary

Ha ha! I suppose I am. But I'm also a person who likes history. History has shown us that what I claimed was true. Wars, monopolies, slavery, etc. I would say about 80% of people are fine just living their lives without bothering others. But 20% of people want dominance, and don't care who they hurt to get it. Did you know that fruit flies like to dominate one another? They only live 8-15 days, but if you put a bunch of fruit flies together, they'll do a dominance fight where they flip each other over to show who gets that space.

The brain of a fruit fly is insignificant, and yet this primitive need for dominance still exists. It is a powerful drive in almost every living creature. In fact, I want to ask what was your motivation when you wrote your reply? Read it again. Was it done to educate me? Reach out and connect with me? Start a deep conversation? No. You did it to for status. To ridicule me and put yourself on top.

Now if you did that on a philosophy forum where there are no stakes, what do you think happens when there are resources involved? Millions of dollars at stake? Tons of land and power? You think everyone is going to resolve their differences for these resources with kind words, reaching out to one another and sharing? You already know the answer yourself.