It's the same argument. You can't imagine an infinite series going into the past without a God? — Gregory

Ok, if you did actually read it, you need to work on your reading comprehension. Again, as I posted last time, I am not following Aristotle's argument. If you comprehend this, and think I'm wrong, then go to the argument and point out where I do that.

Instead, what you're doing is called a "straw man" fallacy. Its where you prop something I'm not saying, then beat that while saying my argument is wrong.

It also has NOTHING to do with a God. I've also stated that once before, so it appears you can't comprehend my responses either. Go ahead, find the part of my OP where I talk about God. Or continue to construct and beat your little straw man in the corner while I look on in amusement at your lack of comprehension.

I don't know your background very well, so I'm having patience. Please read the argument, and cite parts of the argument where you believe it to be wrong.

Aristotle argues that infinities on their own are unstable and a past infinity needs a root in a first cause, just as you say a first member as a cause is needed — Gregory

But I don't say what Aristotle is saying at all. Mine deals with sets, not the instability of infinities.

Your OP, which I read months ago — Gregory

You should probably read it again before commenting on it. I believe you've misremembered what it says.

I do not know Hawking's, Krauss's or Aristotle's argument. Mind pointing out where my argument coincides with Aristotle's? Mind pointing out where Hawking's or Krauss's theory would have a problem with my model?

But that does not establish 'a' first cause. Why would you posit just one? — Bartricks

1. Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows. — Philosophim

"at least one". Where am I claiming I'm only positing one?

That's like if I said 1+1 = 2, and you came back with, "You assume 1 exists".
— Philosophim
That's funny. I had pretty much had that line thrown at me (by an actual physicist) and I was arguing the opposite, that the numbers need not exist for the sum of 1 and 1 to be 2. — noAxioms

Ha ha! Well done! I mean this genuinely and not sarcastically. Always question and poke at "generally accepted knowledge". My point was that we can't take the standpoint that they're merely assuming what is generally known. We can give credit that theirs is the societally reasonable stance, and if we are to challenge it, we must given evidence that it is wrong.

My name implies that I assume nothing. So I'd say that it depends on the definitions of those words. I often take the relational view where the phrase "X exists' is meaningless since it is not expressed as relation. — noAxioms

Also very reasonable. In my experience unclear definitions in discussions are one of the biggest problems in philosophical discussion. And I include myself in those who give unclear definitions. Feel free to always ask what I mean, or point out inconsistencies.

Of course, you can take the intuitive view and not explore the alternate ideas, but then you're just rationalizing answers that you've already decided on. In other words, feel free to bid me a good day if I'm not helping. — noAxioms

I am more than willing to explore alternative ideas. Its just that you need to demonstrate why they have merit, and why the show the OP to be wrong. If I've constructed an OP about a specific set of rules and conclusions, if you want me to consider I'm wrong, you need to demonstrate why those set of rules and conclusions fail. I'm not rationalizing my assumptions here, I'm using common vocabulary to communicate ideas that most people understand to exist.

Let me help you out. If you don't exist, you won't type a reply.
No, I don't buy that. It begs its conclusion. — noAxioms

It really doesn't. Begging the question is often misapplied. Its most associated with circular reasoning. "God states that God is good, therefore God is good" is begging the question. The statement itself has the assumption that the conclusion is right. We can trust God if God is good, therefore if God says God is good, well, God must be good right?

Let me rephrase what I noted.

Something must exist to type a reply.
If something types a reply, it exists.

Can it be falsified? Yes. If something does not exist, then it cannot type a reply. Since you typed a reply, we've concluded you exist. Now, I'm quite sure you're mind might be racing to think, "Well what if I'm a bot, etc." I don't care. Your existence is based on whether there is a reply given. Something had to type a reply. I don't care what it is. But based on the falsifiable premises, it exists.

Also, one more thing, when you accuse a person of a logical fallacy, it is best to show them why in an honest conversation. Fallacies are a placeholder to summarize an issue, but they shouldn't take the place of good arguments.

The unicorn has a horn, which by the above logic it cannot because the horn doesn't exist. I told you the unicorn would come into play. — noAxioms

It is how you define it. If you mean exist objectively as an animal independent of our creativity? No. Does a unicorn exist in our minds, and can I draw one on a piece of paper and tell a fantasy story about it? Yes.

The alternate view might say that on Feb 5, 2022 we all observe the state of the world of Feb 5, 2022 (at least the nearby stuff), and not some other state. That date is no more or less 'the past', 'the present', or 'the future' than any other date. They all have equal ontology. — noAxioms

No, that's incorrect. By using dates, you are stating that there are states that are not "current", and states that are "prior to the current state". Can I experience the date of Feb 5, 2022 currently? No, because that's not today's date. I also cannot experience the prediction of tomorrow's date. These are pretty clear and undebatable notions of time. Stating, "The past present and future all all the same" doesn't hold up in any meaningful sense. I mean, you typed your previous reply earlier right? That's not now. How do you get around that?

Also, I am not stating there is a current moment "elsewhere". I'm talking about right here. Basic stuff, don't overcomplicate it or add things in that I'm not claiming.

So you're assuming an unproven suggestion.
I assume nothing as any kind of asserted truth. — noAxioms

If you're just throwing out "Maybe its this," without any type of assertion to its validity, then its worthless. Maybe cookie monster is behind the government machinations of China. Can't assume he isn't after all. Don't make the mistake that just because you can come up with an idea it means it has any worth in application to reality. An active imagination is not what is clever, its proving what we imagine exists.

There is no working theory of the universe that assumes a current moment — noAxioms

If there was no current moment, we wouldn't be able to think of any theories. That's just silly. If everything was stuck in the past, there would be no now or progress. If there was no potential for the future, there would be no past, and no progress. The current time is the transition from the potential future to the factual past. All of this you can experience right now in your brain. If you can experience it, its real.

There is no device that measures the rate of advancement of the current time. Clocks measure proper time along a worldline through spacetime. — noAxioms

No, they just measure the rate of time from future potential to relative past. A second for example is X number of electronic cycles, quatz vibrations or what have you. Just like an inch measures the start and end of distance. If it bothers you so much that we can't get a number to represent an infintismal point called "current awareness", fine. It doesn't matter to the argument. Take a state Y, then note a prior state X. We don't even need the definition of "current" to understand this. All you need to understand is "prior state".

And even beyond that, I just have one question. Why is reality 4D spacetime?
We don't know that it is for one. Physics doesn't answer 'why' questions too well. Philosophy does sometimes.
If you're asking the purpose of the universe being the way it is, it doesn't seem to have a purpose. — noAxioms

Well my point is, there either is a reason for why it exists, or not a reason. What state caused the universe to be 4D instead of just 3D? There is either a reason for this, or there is not. Time or purpose really has nothing to do with it.

Why do people try to prove there is a God unless they are trying to convince themselves or can't handle people having different beliefs? — Gregory

Why do people not read an OP, and assume the writer is trying to argue for something they are clearly not? Please actually read the OP before commenting on it, as you are out in space while I am planet Earth.

m saying that our understanding of cause is not as clear as we assume. When we talk about events that cause events, we’re referring to agents. When we talk about the cause for an event, we’re referring to a principle, on whose behalf an agent acts. The primary principle is potential, which is not a ‘first cause’ in a temporal sense, but in a value sense. The qualitative and structural distinction is important. — Possibility

I think you do not understand what I mean by cause, and that is fair. It is very simple. A state exists in moment B. Now it exists in moment C. Now, if the forces etc. of B lead to the moment of C, then B caused C. If C does not have any prior cause, or reason for its being, then it is a first cause.

I simply take it to the extreme and get a result. Even in the case of an infinitely regressive system, versus a system that could have starts and stops along the way, there is always the question, "What caused the system?" There eventually comes the answer, "It just is, it has no prior explanation".

Your post misses the understanding of the OP, which is fine. The definition of causality I put forth should be easy to understand. If not, please ask me where there is confusion.

I see, the way it was presented, I thought it was an aside puzzle. That being said, an unsolved thought puzzle that might be true or false is not evidence. If I said, "It might be true that lava core is black at the center of the Earth," unless I show that is true, my supposition in no way challenges or presents evidence that the lava core at the center of the Earth is not black (currently we know it as yellow).

It is true that this indirectly equates 'the empirical' with 'the physical', but I think that is a fair assumption. What is generally accepted as empirical evidence, is something that can be detected physically. Is that not so? — Wayfarer

No, I don't think that. I've noted that physical reality is matter and energy. If you can show something beyond matter and energy as existent, than that would be evidence of of something non-physical. I suppose what is laced into the assumption, is that what is non-physical must interact with the physical. And this is not a dogmatic assertion, but a logical consequence. Regardless of your opinion on consciousness, I think we can all agree that every sense that we have is physical, and that we are made up of physical bodies. And since consciousness is contained in our bodies, and not outside of our bodies, if consciousness is non-physical, it interacts with us in particular, and not in some random location apart from our bodies.

So an example in terms of consciousness, lets say a person was thinking, and we found something that was obviously interacting with the matter/energy in the brain, but could not be classified as matter and energy. At that point, I believe it would be safe to call that non-physical. But if we cannot detect anything that can interact with the brain, when obviously our consciousness must be interacting with the brain, we're inventing something that isn't there.

I don't think that's an unfair requirement for the concept of something that is non-physical. I'm not going for a "got ya" or rigging the game to where you can't win. But if the non-physical is impossible for the physical to detect, then its an imaginary idea because then it couldn't interact with the brain. That's a lack of evidence. Its fine if you want to play a game with it, and imagine if it was true, what it would entail. But if you're going to claim it exists, you need evidence. Again, this is not unfair or overly demanding.

Please clarify. Are you implying there is no "now"?
— Philosophim
No, I said that you're making the assumption that there is one. — noAxioms

No, I am not making an assumption, I am noting a basic given definition. That's like if I said 1+1 = 2, and you came back with, "You assume 1 exists". If you want to counter what is assumed, that's fine. But that's on you, not me. Anyone with basic education knows what "current" and "1" mean. Its up to you to demonstrate why the regular and assumed use is broken.

We clearly exist currently don't we?
I can think of no empirical test that falsifies the alternative, so no, it isn't clear. — noAxioms

Let me help you out. If you don't exist, you won't type a reply. Let see if you type a reply. If you don't, I'll assume you don't exist, and this was all a fever dream. :)

If we observe something currently, then that state is current as well correct?
That statement also assumes (begs) it. — noAxioms

No, that's just basic consequential logic.

Physics suggests (doesn't prove) that the universe is 4D spacetime, and is not something contained in time, but rather something that contains it. — noAxioms

So you're assuming an unproven suggestion. I thought you didn't want to use assumptions? Also, if 4D spacetime contains time, then we as as 3D objects would be able to measure it. And if we're able to measure it, we can say, "This moment now is current". Imagine an X Y graph. I can measure the X, the Y, etc. Just because that 2D plane is on my 3D desk, doesn't mean I can't use the X Y graph. Same with time.

So your assumption, which isn't a given, doesn't really refute the idea of "currently existing", causality, or time. And even beyond that, I just have one question. What caused 4D spacetime to exist?

Vague references and a lack of evidence will convince no one.
— Philosophim

Well, clearly that's inaccurate. The world is made up of beliefs without evidence. — Tom Storm

Ha! And I almost edited that out when I initially typed. I should know better on the philosophy boards. What I should have said was vague references and lack of evidence are not convincing arguments to a rational person.

Did you see how your language shifted? Now you’re referring to cause as a principle, which is structurally different to an agent. — Possibility

My language didn't shift. Are you saying there is no cause for why it is, thus an alpha, or are you stating there is a cause for why this is?

Causality is also an explanation for why there is a current state.
— Philosophim
This makes the presumption that there is a current state. — noAxioms

Please clarify. Are you implying there is no "now"? Do you not exist at this time? We clearly exist currently don't we? If we observe something currently, then that state is current as well correct?

Causality is potential. To refer to it as a ‘first cause’ and state that it ‘must be’ is logically inaccurate. — Possibility

Causality is also an explanation for why there is a current state.

If you follow the logic of qualitative geometry, a two-dimensional shape can only manifest in relation to a three-dimensional aspect. Therefore, a four-dimensional existence can only manifest in relation to a five-dimensional aspect. — Possibility

And why is that? What is the cause for this?

Thanks, I hope you don't drink and smoke dope all day. All I'm really saying is that religious or mystical experiences or intuitions can be evidence for beliefs for the person who experiences them, but cannot be evidence for anyone else, because there is always the possibility of being wrong. And that possibility obtains also in the empirical sciences, which are perennially defensible. — Janus

No, I do not. Coffee is my vice, and that's it. I also want to apologize for that response yesterday, it was out of line and rude. I think the difference is between the way we use the word "evidence". Experiences and intuitions are feelings. Feelings are reasons why we do or believe things, but they wouldn't be considered evidence in my book.

Evidence would be something which proves that the conclusion we made based on our feelings was right. More importantly, evidence would demonstrate that what would contradict our conclusions, is wrong. So if it we found that when a person talks to God, there was a radio wave or something that left the brain and returned, we couldn't say, "Talking to God is only in your mind."

Human intuition and feelings are often wrong. However, there is nothing wrong with being honest that it is only human intuition and feelings. As long as you state, "Yes, there's no evidence for this, but wouldn't it be fun to explore!" there's no issue. Its when people start claiming that their intuitions and feelings are true claims about reality without any evidence, but claim there is evidence as I've defined, that the exploration has become dishonest and outside of the realm of truth.

Since there is no evidence of a universal mind, then it is false.
— Philosophim

I don't think it's that simple. Most scientific evidence is partial or inconclusive or unconvincing. For the sake of argument, let's assume a universal mind that computes the universe continuously at the quantum level, and its product is the universe as it is. What sort of evidence could one have that it is convincingly so or that it is not so? Is philosophical argument ever possible to prove or disprove the assertion? — magritte

Great post! First, lets qualify that "most" scientific evidence is a biased stretch. There is some science which is inconclusive or unconvincing, but it notes this. Very rarely does actual science declare its found truth when it clearly has not. That would be called bad science.

So what type of evidence do we need to provide for your assertion to prove or disprove your proposal? None, because you haven't set a condition for it to not possibly be disproved. Its not falsifiable. Its a story. A neat story. One that would be cool if it were true, not going to lie. I enjoy the creative exploration of the fantastic. But, one shouldn't get wrapped up in the emotions of the fantastic, and start thinking the positive emotions about it give you an excuse to believe that it must be true.

There's also nothing wrong with stating, "There is no evidence for this thought experiment, but what if..." Every played the game, "if you could pick any super power, what would you pick?" Great fun. Lots of philosophical spring boards can happen from it. But if someone starts saying, "Yeah, its possible we'll be able to alter our genetics to shoot laser beams from our eyes some day," the assertion has changed the notion of the discussion. At that point, you're not having fun about a thought experiment, you're claiming the thought experiment could be reality. And when you do that, you need evidence.

So if you are going to explore the notion that non-physicalism is real, you're going to need evidence. Even if you claim, "Well we know its not real, but what if," you should at least define what something non-physical is.

I did, and it went straight past you. — Wayfarer

You're assuming an empiricist position, and then demanding empirical evidence against it!
— Wayfarer

After that, nothing further to add. — Wayfarer

Anyone who is serious in an argument would repeat it if that was the case, concerned that the other person has missed it or misunderstood. I spent a lot of time taking your requests seriously and laying out the groundwork. I replied that I did not expect empirical evidence against it. I told you to give me some evidence that the non-physical exists. Surely if you believe the non-empirical exists, then you can present evidence of it right? You did not return this, and give me evidence. And if you don't want to, that's fine. But don't tell me you did, when you didn't.

As Wayfarer will tell you, there are philosophers and scientists who would say there is no evidence of physicalism. I suspect both world views in the end come down to a kind of faith. — Tom Storm

Except there is evidence of physicalism. If Wayfarer would provide evidence of some type of non-physicalism, or provide evidence why physicalism is false, then there would be a discussion. Vague references and a lack of evidence will convince no one.

Not really. Many forms of idealism argue for a universal mind (essentially a primitive instinctive consciousness) which holds object permanence and provides us a shared reality independent of our minds. Humans are dissociated alters of the Great Mind - that kind of thing. — Tom Storm

If it is backed by evidence, then there's something there. If there is no evidence, its just a made up wish. The falsification of the idea, is that there is no universal mind. Since there is no evidence of a universal mind, then it is false.

Fine, then don't give me the evidence. I go about my way unchanged. Enjoy the rest of your day.

It seems to me you are the one running away; deflecting because you can't come up with a counterargument to what I'm saying about the difference between public and private evidence, the subjective nature of judgements of plausibility in relation to metaphysical questions; and their consequent undecidability. — Janus

You did not address my entire post. Its been a pleasant conversation until now. I told you to give me your evidence, that I can intuit and think as well. I've been very clear what viable evidence would be. I indicated deduction vs. induction, because of this very important claim:

So though I might have an induction that my consciousness is separate from my brain, the premises of neuroscience conclude that my consciousness comes from my brain.

Do you get it? I want to know I will live forever Janus. I want to die, go to heaven, see family and friends again. I want to be able to drink and smoke dope all day and it not affect who I am. I have an intuition that this could be. But that's an induction. And there is no evidence that this will happen. You claim you have evidence. Well give it! Why are you holding out? Why can't you give me something where I can rationally pursue my induction?

If you truly believed you had evidence of what was non-physical, you would rush out to help me like the good soul you are. But you don't, do you? Because I believe you're a good soul, and if you had it, you would. So don't run away. If you're a good soul, try. And if you know you can't, then just say you don't have it. We'll both be happier that way.

I have no take on the matter, its an interesting topic I would need to think on.
— Philosophim

I suggest you do that before reflexively reeling off an answer. — Wayfarer

I did not reflexively reel off an answer. And that is not the topic. The topic is I provided what I would need as evidence of something non-physical that produced our consciousness. Now, are you able to do so, or can you not?

It's obvious; we intuit and imagine differently. I cannot feel your intuitions and vice versa. They thus cannot be evidence in the public sense you are asking for. — Janus

Janus, you just ignored the rest of my post. You are running away. Don't do that.

You would not recognize non-physical evidence. The only such evidence is that of the intuitive or imaginative faculties. But such evidence cannot be inter-subjectively corroborated. So it can never be evidence in the "public" sense, but only evidence to the individual whose imagination or intuition tells them that there is something beyond the empirical reality of the shared world. — Janus

Stop telling me what I will and will not accept, and just give me the evidence. I can intuit and imagine. Why do you think we can't corroborate that? I intuit that there is not something beyond the empirical reality of the shared world. I also intuit that invisible magical men exist that guide my every move. That's called a "belief". A belief is a very real thing. Beliefs are inductions, meaning that the premise of the belief does not necessarily lead to the conclusion someone holds.

The difference between an induction and a deduction, is that in a deduction, the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. So though I might have an induction that my consciousness is separate from my brain, the premises of neuroscience conclude that my consciousness comes from my brain. A deduction is always more rational to hold than an induction. To prove the deduction wrong, you need to introduce a premise that demonstrates we cannot conclude that consciousness is purely physical. That requires evidence of something non-physical, not an induction.

But the issue there is that the 'criterion of falsifiability' was devised by Karl Popper specifically to differentiate an empirical from a non-empirical claim (I notice Kuro has made a similar point.) — Wayfarer

I see, so your definition of what non-physical is, is that it is not empirical. Meaning that there is no evidence of its existence or evidence of experience. I'm having to glean what you mean by non-physical, as no one has provided a definition of what it means so far. Give me claims of something that exists that cannot be experienced. Its falsification is that it can be experienced. If you can provide me an example of something that cannot be experienced, and I am unable to show that it can be experienced, then you've given valid evidence of something non-physical.

You're assuming an empiricist position, and then demanding empirical evidence against it! — Wayfarer

I am not. I am asking you to provide evidence of something that is not empirical. Why is that so hard? To argue against it, I would need to demonstrate that the non-physical existence is indeed empirical. If I could not, then you have something.

But anyway, to illustrate my point, consider the argument about the reality of numbers (see What is Math?). The argument is, on the one side, that numbers are real, independently of anyone who is aware of them - which is generally known as mathematical realism or mathematical platonism. It grants mathematical objects reality, albeit of a different order to empirical objects.

A counter argument might be that numbers are the artefacts of human thought and that they're only real in that context. — Wayfarer

Again, we can falsify both of these positions. If numbers are real independent of people, then what is a number? Does it mean the symbol, "1"? Does it meant the concept of "an" identity versus "multiple identities? Can we demonstrate that numbers exist in a setting devoid of anything conscious but an observer?

The counter argument of course has its own falsification. That being of course that they could exist independently of human thought. I have no take on the matter, its an interesting topic I would need to think on. But first lets address this topic. The point is, I'm not a dogmatist. I'm open to other possibilities, no matter how wild and crazy. But, it needs to be logical. If you're going to claim something exists, please present evidence of its existence, and demonstrate that there is the possibility of its negation. The possibility of its negation does not mean it is negated, it means it is something we can test against to see if it exists.

Matter is not the same as energy. Equivalent yes, the same no. Pure energy particles are different from massless matter particles. — EugeneW

I've given you a link to science article which clearly mentions that energy and mass are different expressions of the same thing.

From the article:
"Mass and energy are both but different manifestations of the same thing — a somewhat unfamiliar conception for the average mind."
Albert Einstein, Atomic Physics (1948)

Feel free to explain why the quote is wrong, or the article is wrong. I'll need more than just a quick opinion on this. Again, I'm not stating you aren't correct, but you need to give some evidence if I'm to know that.

There is no evidence either way as to whether consciousness "exists on some plane beyond the physical", because all our (intersubjectively corroborable) evidence is physical evidence. You're assuming that the only possible evidence is physical evidence, and then concluding that there is nothing but the physical; in other words, you;re committing the fallacy of assuming your conclusion. — Janus

Basically you're stating there is no evidence of the non-physical. The only conclusion we can reach then, are physical ones. All I asked is to give me evidence of non-physical reality. Its like magic right? Give me evidence that magic exists. If someone said, "Well the problem is all of our evidence of things I might consider magic is in physics and chemistry," I would say, "Then there doesn't appear to be any evidence of magic."

I am not precluding that non-physical evidence cannot exist. So no, I am not committing a fallacy. I'm simply asking you to provide evidence that the non-physical exists. Its very clear. What is it? What does it do? How does it interact with the brain? How does it surpass the physical elements of the brain?

We can use alcohol as an example. We all agree that getting drunk impairs our consciousness. So you need to give non-physical evidence and explanation for this. We can likely conclude that the non-physical must interact with the physical, as a physical alteration also alters a person's consciousness. If so, we should be able to detect or find something that is interacting with the physical brain that is not physical. Can you provide such evidence?

But what is matter? What is it that propels it? — EugeneW

A small primer to read. http://ifsa.my/articles/mass-energy-one-and-the-same

What does freedom mean to you?
— Philosophim
I am in the group that believes there is free will in thought. — L'éléphant

I see. That is not my personal opinion myself, but I feel that "free will" is such an ambiguous term that it can mean different things to different people without issue. Still, a very nice post L'elephant!

Then you're a naive realist? — Harry Hindu

No.

What does it mean to be physical? — Harry Hindu

To be made up of matter and energy. And I will return the question. What does it mean to be non-physical? What evidence do you have of it existing?

How is it that when I observe your mental processes I experience a brain but when I observe my own I experience a mind? — Harry Hindu

You've made a common mistake of equating the outside observation of something, to the experience of being something. Find any other person in the world. Do you know what it is like to be them? No, but that doesn't mean they don't exist. Do you know what it feels like for them to hear the beating of their own heart? No, but that doesn't mean they don't have a heart, that it doesn't beat in their body, and that they can't feel what that's like.

If I open up a brain and look at it, I don't know what its like to BE that brain. You seem to think there should be a picture show going on in there, which is silly. What we imagine in our heads isn't light. Its the communication of hundreds and thousands of electrons at incredibly high speeds.

How the computer works is much the same. If I open up a hard drive, do I see windows running? If I open up the ethernet wires, can I see youtube and sound being streamed over? And yet if you told a programmer that this is evidence that the computer's functionality is a non-physical process, they would laugh at you.

The problem is, sometimes people believe that if they don't understand how something fully works, they can make up things about how it works. You can't. You can't introduce things that don't exist into a system. You can't say, "I don't understand how youtube can be on my screen, yet not be in my computer when I look at it," and think your made up idea that it must be a non-physical process has any merit.

Back to the brain for a second, when we physically and chemically alter the brain, people's experience of BEING a brain changes. We've confirmed that time and again. Go get drunk, then tell me that your consciousness exists on a higher level beyond what physical alcohol can touch. Go read the evidence of anti-psychotic drugs, hallucinegens, and amazing records of brain damage like loss of long term memory, the inability to mentally see colors, comprehend words, etc, then tell me their consciousness exists on some plane beyond the physical.

If you can't explain how it happens then there is a problem with the theory that says that it does happen. Until you've explained how it does happen then it's still quite possible that you have a problem of correlation and not causation. — Harry Hindu

Incorrect. Do you know how your car works? And yet, you know the car works because of the things in the car, not because of an intangible non-physical process. If we studied the brain and found things that were non-physical, then we could state, "maybe its this non-physical stuff that causes consciousness."

There is none. There is nothing non-physical interacting with the brain. If you say, "Well the physical can't detect the non-physical," then you're making up a magical fantasy unicorn, and can be dismissed.

There is no detection of anything non-physical in the brain, or dealing with consciousness. Period. Unarguable. Uncontroversial.

But Descartes actually demonstrated that there is, indeed, freedom in us. And it comes in the form of thinking, or rational thinking. How so? We can control our thinking. — L'éléphant

I'm not sure Descartes declared we had free will. He simply declared that which he was unable to doubt, in fact, that which arguably he had no control over, was that he thought, therefore he must be.

And we’ve somehow achieved freedom of thinking by arriving at the ”I” or the self. By differentiating ourself from the collective “we”. — L'éléphant

An interesting point. Our brains are actually many cells working in tandem with different parts that do different functions. I still don't see how that necessitates freedom though. I suppose its what you mean by freedom. Some people mean that freedom is absolute power, unconstrained by things such as biology. I think very few people would say that's viable.

Another term of freedom might be the freedom of external dominance of your internal conclusions. So if I decide to watch TV, no one will come and shut if off or threaten me because they don't think I should. I tend to like this definition more, as it avoids the notion of freedom from determinism, and more about the levels of influence within deterministic systems.

But that is a spring board for you to decide. What does freedom mean to you?

You seem to be using a two different definitions of 'existence', one that applies to objects (things that are contained by space and time), and the other 'everything that is real'. — noAxioms

If something applies to "everything that is real," then it also applies to any of its subsets like objects. So I don't think I'm using two definitions here.

To say that there is a first cause is probably no more than to say — noAxioms

I'm not trying to assert any one specific first cause. All I'm asserting is that if you follow the logic of causality, it necessarily results that there must be a first cause.

a. There is always a X for every Y.
True only in classical physics. An easy example is the decay of an atom, which occurs uncaused. That Y has no X, and as such there is precedent for an 'alpha' as you call it. — noAxioms

I think you misunderstand, if there is no cause for the decay of an atom, than that decay is the "alpha", or the first cause. It has no prior explanation for why it decays, it simply is. This is not a deistic argument. If that is getting in the way of you understanding the argument, please be rid of that notion. I am only using "alpha" in the sense of "first letter".

That being the case, there are explanations for why atoms decay. Not that that is particularly important either. The question is whether I've shown that it necessarily must be the case that there is at least one first cause in the chain of causality.

First integer? Sure, that would be one.
— Philosophim
That's like saying the first moment in time is now, or that space begins here on Earth. — noAxioms

No, it literally means the fact that the first integer is 1. :) Don't read too much into it.

OK, I don't buy that time isn't bounded in the past direction. — noAxioms

That's fine, but that's not what the OP is addressing. I'm not addressing what you believe is a first cause. I'm addressing that logically, there must be a first cause.

As an aside, can you answer a question: What is a distinguishing characteristic of a unicorn? I mean, one legend has it that it blows rainbows out of its butt, but I don't think that one is universally agreed upon. — noAxioms

Big question that's more about epistemology. I have an entire other thread where I cover that. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge

In short, if we're talking my personal definition of a unicorn, it can be anything. If we're talking about a societally agreed upon term for a unicorn, I would say the essential property that most people agree on is that its a horse with a horn on its head, and followed slightly less with "magical".

Good response Bob! I can see we're still on different tracks of thought, but I think we're close.

This is why I think it may be, at least in part, a semantical difference: when you refer to "application", you seem to be admitting that it is specifically "application to the external world" (and, subsequently, not the totality of reality). In that case, we in agreement here, except that I would advocate for more specific terminology (it is confusing to directly imply one is "application" in its entirety, which implies that the other is not, but yet claim they are both applications). — Bob Ross

Yes, I believe the term has brought confusion as noted before. Here's the thing, I can't say "external world" for a foundational theory of knowledge. Perhaps we can conclude there is an external world, but I never did that in the theory. All I noted in the beginning was that there was a will, and that reality sometimes went along with that will, and sometimes contradicted that will.

The only reason we have a definition of reality, is that there are some things that go against our will. Reality is the totality of existence that is in accordance with our will, and contrary to our will. I have never attempted to define an external world, though my vocabulary has not been careful enough with this in mind.

All knowledge is "Deduction based on what is not contradicted". The separation of distinctive and applicable is based on its simplicity versus complexity. Also, its general relation to how people speak. It is a model intended to mirror the idea of a proven external world without actually stating "there is an external world".

So why have I not declared an "external world" as synonymous with applicable knowledge? Because there are things we can do in our own mind that go against our will. Lets say I imagine the word elephant, and say, "I'm not going to think of the word elephant." Despite what I want, it ends up happening that I cant' stop thinking of the word.

Distinctive knowledge comes about by the realization that what we discretely experience, the act itself, is known. But anytime there is a claim of knowledge that could potentially go beyond our will, that is an attempt at applicable knowledge. So, if I claim, "I will not think of the word elephant 1 second from now," I must apply that to reality. One second must pass, and I must not have thought of the word. If I did, I applicably know that your earlier statement was false.

Basically, when your distinctive knowledge creates a statement that the act of the discrete experience alone cannot confirm, you need to apply it. I can discretely experience an abstract set of rules and logical conclusions. But if I apply those abstract rules to something which cannot be confirmed by my current discrete experience, I have to apply it.

So, if I construct a system of logic, then claim, "X functions like this," to know this to be true, I must deduce it and not be contradicted by reality. Once it is formed distinctively, It must be applied, because I cannot deduce my conclusion about the world from the act of discretely experiencing alone. I can discretely experience a pink elephant, but if I claim the elephant's backside is purple, until I discretely experience the elephants backside, I cannot claim to applicably know its backside is purple. This is all in the mind, which is why I do not state applicable knowledge is "the external world".

My imagination of a unicorn is distinctive knowledge (pertaining to whatever I imagined), but so is the distinction of the cup and the table (which isn't considered solely apart of the mind--it is object). — Bob Ross

Correct. There is no question that when you discretely experience what you are calling a cup and table, you have distinctive knowledge that it is what you are experiencing. But if you claim, "That is a cup and a table", you must apply your distinctive knowledge to the cup and table to ensure reality does not contradict you. You must take the essential properties of the distinctive knowledge of a cup and a table, and test them. Only if you do without contradiction, can you applicably know that is a cup and a table.

However, if what you mean by "attempts to claim something beyond them" is simply inductions that pertain to the discrete experience of objects, then I have no quarrel. — Bob Ross

So yes, if I claim that what I am discretely experiencing does in fact fit my definition of cup and table, I am inducing that is so. I must then apply my discrete experience to applicably know whether my induction is true or false.

Addressing Kant, yes, there are aspects of apriori and aposteriori that are good, it is just as a whole, I find their logic and conclusions incorrect. Lets not get into Kant, just know that I did not find the terms logically consistent or useful enough to use, and felt they would lead people away from the concept I'm trying to convey.

Distinctive awareness - Our discrete experiences themselves are things we know.
Contextual logical awareness - The construction of our discrete experiences into a logical set of rules and regulations.

To clarify, our discrete experiences themselves are things we know by application via reason. — Bob Ross

I think its necessary at this point that we define "reason". I've never used the word reason in the paper, and with good "reason" :grin: I tried defining as few concepts as I could, and tried to avoid introducing anything that I had not fully defined first. I'm not saying I succeeded, but that was the intent.

When you say we know our discrete experiences by reason, I've already stated why we know them. We know we discretely experience because it is a deduction that is not contradicted by reality. So, if I am to define reason according to the epistemology I've proposed, reason would be utilizing the distinctive and applicable contexts of deduction, induction, and pon. But that is all I have at this moment (I think).

However, I've noted that "reason" is an option. It is not a necessary condition of being human. There is nothing that requires a person to have the contexts of deduction, induction, and pon. One may of course act with inductions, deductions, and pon, but not actively have knowledge that is what they are doing. You are a very rational person, likely educated and around like people. It may be difficult to conceive of people who do not utilize this context. I have to deal with an individual on a weekly basis who are not "rational" in the sense that I've defined.

So I have defined the utilization of reason as having a distinctive and applicable context of deduction, induction, and lets go one further, logic. I have also claimed that there are people who do not hold this context, and in my life, this is applicably known to be true. But, that does not mean that is what you intend by reason. Could you give your own definition and outlook? Until we both agree on the definition, I feel we'll run into semantical issues.

When I add these two potatoes together, what happens if one breaks in half? Do I have two potatoes at that point? No, so it turns out I wasn't able to add "these" two potatoes.

I feel like you aren't referring to mathematical addition, but combination. — Bob Ross

What is addition in application, versus abstraction? If I add two potatoes together, my first thought is, "I'll put them in proximity." If you just mean counting, then that would be different. In that case, we still have to do something more to applicably know we can add those two potatoes. Very simply put, we need to applicably know if they are actually potatoes. If so, then we can add them. If one was really not a potato, then we wouldn't have applicably added those two potatoes. At best, we can say we applicably added two identities. So lets go with that, as I think this is closer to your intention.

Lets say I have the abstraction that I can count two identities. This is distinctive knowledge. But to applicably know that I can, I have to actually count two identities. This of course is trivial, but this triviality is the fine point between distinctive and applicable knowledge. One is the formation of a set of definitions and rules. The second, is its application.

The formulation of definitions and rules in our head may be sound to our minds. We distinctively know what they are. But do we know they will work when applied to a particular situation? Not until we actually apply the rules to the situation itself. The mistake of "generic" knowledge is believing that the construction of definitions and rules means that we know the outcome of their application, even if we have not attempted it before.

Think of it this way: I can also "know" what cannot occur in the external world without ever empirically testing it based off of shapes--which encompass the external world as it is discrete experience. Can you fit a square of 5 X 5 inches in a circle of radius 0.5 inches? No. — Bob Ross

When you state "know", try to divide it into distinctive versus applicable knowledge. Do you applicably know this, or distinctively know this? Because you are not dividing the knowledge as noted in the epistemology, I think you believe that I am claiming that we don't know math. We distinctively know math. We also have applicably known and used math in the world numerous times. There's no question that in the abstract we can't fit a square of 5X5 into a circle of radius .5 inches. But that does not mean we can applicably know that "that" particular square that we discretely experience cannot fit into "that" circle of radius .5 inches until we actively try, and find we can do so without contradiction.

(In regards to space) I am referring to that which is discovered, projected, and conceivable--holistically all experience. — Bob Ross

Again, is this distinctive knowledge, or applicable knowledge? Try to fit it into one of those categories. If you are unable to, then perhaps you can demonstrate that the distinction is broken, not useful, or lacking. But if you're not making that distinction, then you're not really discussing in terms of the epistemology, but in the terms of a completely different context that we have not really agreed on. To me, "holistic" means I'm applying my distinctive knowledge, not merely armchairing in my mind. In which case, this means you agree with me that we can applicably know certain distinctive contexts of space by the application of our very existence, but have not applicably known others.

I think I following what you are saying now. We don't ever, under this epistemology, really state "historical facts" other than that which is deduced. Everything else is simply a hierarchy of inductions, which we should always simply hold the most cogent one. The problem is that there's never a suspension of judgement: we also claim a belief towards whatever is most cogent. Again, when is it cogent enough for me to take action based off of it? — Bob Ross

I'm not sure what you mean by "there's never a suspension of judgement". If I'm judging that one induction is more cogent than another, how am I suspending judgement? In regards to when is something cogent enough to take action, that is a different question from the base epistemology. I supply what is more rational, and that is it. At its most simple, one should simply act based on the best applicable knowledge and inductions you have. That being said, I do have a much broader answer. It is just that your question is not a negation of the epistemology proposed, and I want to make sure we understand that first. If you would like this explored in the next post, let me know and I'll cover it.

I don't think really addresses the issue. I used the terminology "speculates it could" because you used it previously, and I was trying to expose that it is the same thing as possibility (in a colloquial sense). It is redundant: to say "it could" is to say "it is possible" (in the old sense of the term). And, no, "it could be the case" is not equivocal to "I believe it to be the case" — Bob Ross

I think we're stuck on definitions here. Saying "it could" needs to be specified. While you might say "it could, because it is possible", you could just as easily say, "it could, because I speculate, or its probable, etc." And yes, if you intend "I believe it to be the case" as an affirmation, then it is not equivalent to "it could be the case". The problem is "it could be the case" is too ambiguous. In my mind, I added, "I believe it could be the case".

If I claim "Jones could have 5 coins in his pocket", I am not stating that I believe he does have 5 coins in his pocket. I am saying nothing contradicts the idea that he has 5 coins in his pocket (e.g. the dimensions dictate otherwise, etc). — Bob Ross

Explicitly, what you are stating is, "I believe Jones could have 5 coins in his pocket." But what is the reasoning of "could have" based on? A probability, possibility, speculation, or irrational induction? Pointing out that "could have" means I can't clearly assert if Jones could have 5 coins in his pocket, is a criticism of the old epistemology that does not have a hierarchy of inductions to clarify such situations. I have a clear breakdown of inductions. Since we are not using those here, we are not using my epistemology, but the old (which has several more problems besides this one!)

My epistemology simply asks you to clarify what type of induction you are making by saying "could". I provided examples with this epistemology that could give you the answers. While using the epistemological breakdown of the induction of "could", is there some type of scenario you feel the breakdown is missing? The epistemology notes that "could" is simply ambiguous, and a more rational assessment can be obtained by breaking the induction down into the hierarchy. Is this wrong?

My reasoning for why "it could be the case" is abstract, but has nothing to do with reasons why he does have 5 coins in his pocket (or that I believe he does). — Bob Ross

What do you mean by "abstract"? It seems to me this is just ignoring the hierarchy. Which again, is not a slight on the hierarchy, its just a rejection of its use. If we reject its use, we cannot criticize it for not being used. The hierarchy notes you need to specify which type of induction you are using. If you don't, then you're not using the epistemology, but some other type of system.

There's a difference between claiming there is colloquially a possibility that something can occur and that you actually believe that it occurred. Does that make sense? The dilemma is the latter is non-existent in your epistemology. Smith, in the sense that he isn't claiming to believe there are 5 coins in Jones' pocket, is forced to say nothing at all. — Bob Ross

Just to ensure the point is clear, both situations exist in the epistemology. I can induce that it is possible that Jones has 5 coins in his pocket based on reasons. Every induction could turn out correct, or incorrect. So I can state, "Its possible that Jones has 5 coins in his pocket, but I'm going to believe he does/does not". My belief that Jones does not have 5 coins in his pocket does not negate the fact that I still think it is possible that he could. I hope in this way, I've used "could" unambiguously. If you are asserting an affirmative, that is not considering whether they "could". Considering a could, and asserting an affirmative are two separate conclusions.

If your follow up question is, "Which affirmative should we choose when faced with the induction we've concluded is most cogent", I can address that next response for that will be a large topic.

Potentiality is very clear (actually more clear, I would say, than possibility): that which is not contradicted in the abstract which allows that it could occur. — Bob Ross

Perhaps it is clear to you, but for my purposes, it was not yet. That is not a your fault, but mine. I think the problem here again is the ambiguity of "could occur". I can create abstract knowledge distinctively. And I can attempt to apply it to reality. Essentially, I'm making an induction that my abstract can be applied in X situation without contradiction.

An induction by definition, is uncertain. For potentially to be meaningful, we also have to consider its negation. If something did not have potential, this translates to, "Distinctive knowledge that cannot be attempted to be applied to reality." This seems to me to be an inapplicable speculation. Which means that any induction that could attempt to be applied would be considered a "potential', even irrational inductions.

Basically, its a short hand identity that wraps up probability, possibility, speculation, and irrational inductions. It ignores the hierarchy besides inapplicable speculations. And of course, this leads to problems, because its essentially ignoring the valuable differences between the different types of inductions. This is of course the problem with the old knowledge. Without a hierarchy of inductions, you run into massive problems in epistemology when trying to analyze inductions. Again, any criticism against the epistemology you come up with while using the word "potential" is because you're effectively ignoring the epistemological hierarchy, and really criticizing what happens when you don't use that hierarchy.

He is not claiming speculation that Jones has five coins in his pocket: he is claiming that Jones' could potentially have five coins in his pocket. — Bob Ross

Exactly. So Jones is claiming, "I have an induction but I'm not going to use the hierarchy to break down what type of induction I'm using". Again, not a criticism of the epistemology, it is simply not using the epistemology, then trying to point out that the epistemology cannot handle a case in which it is not used.

Really fantastic and deep points Bob!

While falsifiability can definitely be proper of scientific discourse, for good reason even, I think it is seldom at all a good condition of philosophical or mathematical discourse which includes philosophical evidence that is sometimes given in the form of proofs. This is because some of the truths that philosophers and mathematicians deal with genuinely have no falsity conditions, i.e. all tautologies, like a=a or (p∨(q∧r))→((p∨q)∧(p∨r)), simply cannot be falsified but are undoubtedly true. — Kuro

Incorrect.

If A=B, then a=a is false.
If P and it turns out that there is no p, q, or r, then the second statement is false. Logic is clearly falsifiable. Falsifiability does not mean, "It is necessary that it is false." It just means there can exist a condition in which it could potentially be false. An assertion must always allow the potential of its negation.

In a similar manner, contradictions are falsums, and in classical logic or other logics that uphold noncontradiction, if we have a contradictory formula like p∧¬p, then this always returns false whereas its negation ¬(p∧¬p) will be a tautology: i.e. will always return true and cannot be false, thus is unfalsifiable. — Kuro

Similarly, if something IS false, then it of course isn't true. That does not mean they are not falsifiable. For ¬(p∧¬p), the falsifiable condition is if (p∧¬p) existed. Again, the possibility of the condition for it being false, does not mean it IS false. Back to the original example, if there does not exist a single apple in the world that is not sweet, even though I can propose a condition where it could be false (an apple could be bitter), we cannot find that false condition. Therefore it is true that all apples are sweet, its just that it is falsifiable in the fact that there is a potential negation state to consider (an apple could not be sweet).

Well, a common objection in philosophical argumentation is a self defeat objection. If an opponent of a position finds a contradiction in its doctrine, then if that contradiction is genuine, the doctrine will be always false. And so the negation of the doctrine will be always true with no falsity conditions. — Kuro

So to be clear, if someone demonstrates that the negation of an assertion cannot be true, that makes the assertion true, but falsifiable. IE, there is a potential condition in which it could be false, but it if found that condition simply cannot exist.

In the context of the materialism/physicalism, the thesis that there exists only the physical, then if an opponent of the doctrine found it to be contradictory and was hypothetically successful, his proof of the negation of physicalism will be unfalsifiable by definition due to the logic outlined earlier. And this trivially entails the existence of at least one non-physical entity granting physicalism as false. — Kuro

So I think you understand now. Physicalism is falsifiable by stating it could be the case that physicalism is false. For example, I could state, "Everything is all in the mind, there is no physical world." Of course, just because I can propose something that would potentially show it to be false, it does not mean it IS false. As it is clear that everything is not in the mind, and there is a world outside of our thoughts, this claim against physicalism which could show it to be false, is false itself.

For these purposes, I think falsifiability is a terrible criterion in the context of philosophy, but may be more fit for other uses like science or other empirical inquiry, and therefore also urge that you reconsider it. — Kuro

Now that you understand what falsifiability is, do you still have an objection to it?

What would you consider evidence for the reality of the non-physical? — Wayfarer

A very good question. First, it needs to be something falsifiable. By that, I mean that there needs to be some way of clearly defining what the non-physical is, and testing it. A common example is if I say, "All apples are sweet" if I find a sour apple, then the claim could be wrong. If I found a sour apple and the evidence tried to say, "Well sour is a kind of sweet," Or that really all variations of flavor, including bitter and salty were some kind of sweet, then there's an issue.

Second, it must have greater evidence and logic than alternative ideas. If we have two ideas for why rain happens, one being Zeus, the other being the 5 stages of the rain cycle, the second, even if there are still unanswered questions in the 5 stages of the rain cycle, it is a more viable claim than the first.

Finally, not understanding something does not mean we can propose an explanation for it as evidence. If we don't understand something, than the reality is, we don't understand something. History is filled with people doing this, and its always wrong.

I can't be bothered arguing against that kind of complacency. — Wayfarer

Complacency? If I accepted something without evidence for my emotional gratification, that would be complacent.

Don't you think I would love it if we had immortality, or there was some viable evidence of our consciousness continuing to exist? Wouldn't it just be easy for me to pretend with a smile that I'm going to live forever? Of course it would. But there's no viable evidence Wayfarer, there's none.

I'm not disputing the facts of evolution, but h. sapiens realises horizons of meaning which are completely unavailable to other creatures. In fact I don't really understand why this is something that has to be argued for, when the differences between h. sapiens and other species seems to blindingly obvious. — Wayfarer

I'm not arguing that we aren't the best brained animal out there. I'm not arguing that we cannot do amazing things. But we're still animals, and brains and bodys at the end of the day. Its not beyond reality, its part of reality. And yet there is a desire in us that insists that we are somehow separate from our brain and body, with no evidence but a wish.

While the counter point to Darwin is fine, its old. Darwin's theory has come a long way since then, and we've discovered DNA. Want a human? Make the proper DNA sequence. Want a sheep? Proper DNA sequence. Our DNA is 99% similar to chimps. There is no evidence of anything "beyond" what we know of reality.

Its not a debate either. We are clearly physical beings with physical brains. Ever been drunk or buzzed? That was the physical alcohol affecting your body and brain to change your consciousness. There's nothing beyond or separate from that. Brain damage changes people's personalities. Drugs can help people become normal who have psychosis and see voices. Sleep is found to be restorative to the mind and aid in memory formation.

The evidence is high enough to bury a mountain. What does anyone have who believes we are somehow more than our brain and body? What? The silence of nothing is deafening. It is just our desire that we are more, nothing more; nothing less.

The Wikipedia link I provided is a list of paradoxes (which logical people hold as true). — Agent Smith

I'll try one more time in case you aren't understanding my request. I know those are paradoxes that people have come up with. What logical thinker holds onto something that leads into a paradox, agrees that the paradox is sound, but still insists on holding onto logic that leads to that specific paradox?

You're noting that people sweep paradoxes under the bridge to hold certain logical arguments. Which arguments? Which logical argument are people holding onto despite it leading directly into a paradox?

If I had to guess, its a need for people to think they're better than the physical animals they are.
— Philosophim

That humans are different to animals is not a matter of opinion. We show capabilities and attributes that no animal can come close to, I don't see how this can be glossed over or ignored. — Wayfarer

Certainly, we are the smartest animals we know of. But we share many traits with animals as well, and I don't see how this can be glossed over or ignored. There is nothing beyond your brain and body. It is a wish and desire that we are more than that, nothing more.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge/p1 if you are interested in a serious but not technically difficult approach.