Hello Bob! I'm back from vacation. I hope the holidays found you well.

Your immediateness section is spot on! Our chain of "trusting" memories is the evaluation of possibilities and plausible beliefs. Having a memory of something doesn't necessarily mean that memory is of something we applicably knew. Many times, its plausible beliefs that have not been applicably tested. While I agree that immediateness is an evaluative tool of possibilities (that which has been applicably known at least once), an old possibility is still more cogent than a newer plausibility.

Plausibility does not use immediateness for evaluation, because immediateness is based on the time from which the applicable knowledge was first gained. Something plausible has never been applicably known, so there is no time from from which we can state it is relevent.

Moreover, I would say that immediateness, in a general sense, is "reasonableness". — Bob Ross

The reasonableness is because it is something we have applicably known, and recently applicably known. I say this, because it is easy to confuse plausibilities and possibilities together. Especially when examining the string of chained memories, it is important to realize which are plausibilities, and which are possibilities. If you have a base possibility that chains into a plausibility, you might believe the end result is something possible, when it is merely plausible.

So taking your example of a person who has lived with different memories (A fantastic example) we can detail it to understand why immediateness is important. It is not that the memories are old. It is that that which was once possible, is now no longer possible when you apply your distinctive knowledge to your current situation.

We don't even have to imagine the fantastical to evaluate this. We can look at science. At one time, what was determined as physics is different than what scientists have discovered about physics today. We can look back into the past, and see that many experiments revealed what was possible, while many theories, or plausibilities were floating around intellectual circles, like string theory.

However, as pluasibilities are applied to reality, the rejects are thrown away, and the accepted become possibilities. Sometimes these possibilities require us to work back up the chain of our previous possibilities, and evaluate them with our new context. Sometimes, this revokes what was previously possible, or it could be said forces us to switch context. That which was once known within a previous context of time and space, can no longer be known within this context.

With this clarified, this will allow me to address your second part about plausibility.

Take that tree example from a couple of posts ago: we may never be able to applicably test to see if the tree is there, but I can rationally hold that it is highly plausible that it is. — Bob Ross

Is it possible that the tree is not there anymore, or is it plausible? If you applicably know that trees can cease to be then you know it is possible that a tree can cease to be. It is plausible that the tree no longer exists, but this plausibility is based on a possibility. The devil is in the details, and the devil understand that the best way to convince someone of a lie, is to mix in a little truth.

The reality, is this is a plausibility based off of a possibility. Intuitively, this is more reasonable then a plausibility based off of a plausibility. For example, its plausible that trees have gained immortality, therefore the tree is still there. This intuitively seems less cogent, and I believe the reason why, is because of the chain of comparative logic that its built off of.

But the end claim, that one particular tree is standing, vs not still standing, is a plausibility. You can rationally hold that it is plausible that it is still standing, but how do we determine if one plausibility is more rational than another? How do we determine if one possibility, or even one's applicable knowledge is more cogent than another? I believe it is by looking at the logic chain that the plausibility is linked from.

The validity of a plausibility claim is not about if it is directly applicable to reality or not, it is about (1) how well it aligns with our immediate knowledge (our discrete experiences, memories, discrete knowledge, and applicable knowledge) and (2) its relevancy to the subject. For this reason, I don't think the claim that unicorns exist can be effectively negated by claiming that it is not possible that they exist. — Bob Ross

I think the comparative chains of logic describes how (1) it aligns with our immediate knowledge and inductive hierarchies. I believe (2) relevancy to the subject can be seen as making our distinctive knowledge more accurate.

Going to your unicorn example, you may say its possible for an animal to have a horn, possible for an animal to have wings, therefore it is plausible that a unicorn exists. But someone might come along with a little more detail and state, while its possible that animals can have horns on their head, so far, no one has discovered that its possible for a horse to. Therefore, its only plausible that a horse would have wings or a horn, therefore it is only plausible that a unicorn exists. In this case, our more detailed context allows us to establish that a unicorn is a concluded plausibility, based off of 2 pluasibilities within this more specific context.

Logically, what is pluasible is not yet possible. Therefore I can counter by stating, "It is not possible for a horse to have wings or horns grow from its head. Therefore it is not possible that a unicorn exists in the world."

I am a firm believer in defaulting to not believing something until it is proven to be true, and so, naturally, I don’t believe unicorns exist until we have evidence for them — Bob Ross

I think this fits with your intuition then. What is plausible is something that has no applicable knowledge. It is more rational to believe something which has had applicable knowledge, the possible, over what has not, the plausible.

Now, I think this gets a bit tricky because someone could claim that their belief in a unicorn existing makes them happier and, thereby, it is relevant to them. — Bob Ross

Hopefully the above points have shown why a belief in their existence, based on their happiness of having that belief, does not negate the hierarchy of deductive application and induction. Recall that to applicably know something, they must have a definition, and must show that definition can exist in the world without contradiction. If they give essential properties, such as a horse with a horn from its head and wings, they must find such a creature to say they have applicable knowledge of it.

Insisting it exists without applying that belief to reality, is simply the belief in a plausibility. Happiness may be a justification for why they believe that plausibility, but it is never applicable knowledge.
Happiness of the self does not fulfill the discovery of the essential properties of a horn and wings on a horse in the world.

I would, personally, rephrase “Despite a person’s choice, it does not negate that certain inductions are more rational” to “Despite a person’s choice, it does not negate that certain inductions are more rational within a fundamentally shared subjective experience”. — Bob Ross

I agree with the spirit of this, but want to be specific on the chain comparison within a context. What is applicable, and the hierarchy of inductions never changes. What one deduces or induces is based upon the context one is in. Something that is possible in a specific context, may only be plausible in a more detailed one as noted earlier. But, what is possible in that context, is always more rational then what is plausible in that context.

For example, your #3 (degree of harm) principle doesn’t really address two ideas: (1) the subject may not share your belief that one ought to strive to minimize the degree of harm and (2) the subject may not care about the degree of harm pertaining to other subjects due to their actions (i.e. psychopaths). — Bob Ross

I agree here, because no matter what formula or rationale I set up for a person to enter into a particular context, they must decide to enter in that particular content of that formula or rationale! This means that yes, there will be creatures that are not able to grasp certain contexts, or simply decide not to agree with them. This is a fundamental freedom of every thinking thing.

So then, there is one last thing to cover: morality. You hit the nail on the head. We need reasons why choosing to harm other people for self gain is wrong. I wrote a paper on morality long ago, and got the basic premises down. The problem was, I was getting burned out of philosophy. I couldn't get people to discuss my knowledge theory with me, and I felt like I needed that to be established first. How can we know what morality is if we cannot know knowledge?

Finally, it honestly scared me. I felt that if someone could take the fundamental tenants of morality I had made, they could twist it into a half truth to manipulate people. If you're interested in hearing my take on morality, I can write it up again. Perhaps my years of experience since then will make me see it differently. Of course lets finish here first.

That would be my main point: it is not really about what is "true", but what is "useful" (or relevant). — Bob Ross

I just wanted to emphasize this point. Applicable knowledge cannot claim it is true. Applicable knowledge can only claim that it is reasonable.

And with that, another examination done! Fantastic points and thoughts as always.

I believe what you are describing is more epistemology, the study of knowledge, then it is metaphysics. I'm in a great discussion with Bob here https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge if you want to look at an epistemology that takes certainty and attempts to apply it rationally to an uncertain world.

Not quite. So in blindsight, your eyes work fine. This means the light is traveling to your eyes, and up to your brain. The problem is the brain's processing is damaged. Meaning that there is some level of processing inside, but not enough to get up to building a visual picture in your head. Likely there are still cells that can process something to an effect, and send that limited effect up the pipeline. There's probably not enough to get up to the "Display Monitor" of your mind, but you're probably still getting some types of signals that your mind interprets prior to it being placed on your inner display monitor.

I've never understood this idea personally. We see, "things" and we assume there is space between them. There is space between atoms, between quarks, between everything. Something exists within the space of nothingness always seemed more reasonable to me, then the idea that something could cease to be.

So how is your conclusion of whether there could be nothing, or whether there must always be something, is more of an emotional argument than one of proof. Do you have a motivation for wanting something to always be, or is it just something you feel is right?

The left has gotten carried away — Hanover

My BS propaganda radar goes off whenever I see, "The left" or "The right". Those are lazy labels filled with bias, and generally do not lead to good thoughts. I recall reading a study years ago that stated people think critically about their opposing party, identifying all of their negatives, but gloss over their own. Conclusion: Identifying with a "left" or a "right" makes you stupid.

There are people that tried to stop the certification of an election. Violence was made. I blame those people, no one else. I blame those who lie that nothing bad happened because they are worried that those individuals actions, will somehow rub off on them. That's cowardice. I respect people who speak up for what is right, even if someone might try to smear them for it.

You concern about who gets the blame beyond those involved is entirely misplaced. It causes you to lie, and make excuses for those who committed violence, and attempted to stop the peaceful transfer of power. Remove "the left" and "the right" from your brain, it is poison. If you excuse evil, because you are worried that punishing it will harm you, you are complicit.

There really is no rational debate over what happened. Its an open and shut case that people tried to overturn the election through violent means. It was foolish, stupid, traitorous, and should never be supported or excused. All decent people should be coming out to condemn it instead of being worried about the utter irrelevancy and pathetic priority of tribal politics.

:100: Feyerabend couldn't have said this any better. — 180 Proof

Thank you for the kind words 180 Proof.

What you're noting is that most people are rationalizing, and not rational creatures. Philosophy attempts to address that rational beyond the rationalizing. And if practiced well, I believe it does its job well. Will many people reject rationality in favor of their own personal feelings and biases? Of course. You can't make a person change their mind, and many are much happier in their own bubble of belief then actively challenging and thinking about what they believe.

Science is not intended to be persuasive to people. Science is intended to be the most rational way to evaluate the world. People at their core are not rational, they are rationalizing. Rationalizing is the act of forming some type of explanation that justifies your own personal emotions and beliefs. Being rational requires effort, training, and character. Further, being rational is inefficient in most of your day to day living, so even rational people aren't going to be rational all the time.

You can lead a person to science, but it doesn't mean they'll accept it. Generally to persuade people, you have to use rationality in combination with addressing their emotional feelings. Many people will often times reject rational arguments in favor of their own personal feelings, but that doesn't mean science is currently one of the most valuable tools we have to accurately assess the world.

So I do agree that science alone will not persuade or motivate most people. It it wants to do so, it must make great efforts at creating the positive emotions in people that will make them open to accepting the rationality that science has to offer.

That's my issue with liberals: they care about 'ideas', and not one bit about reality. — StreetlightX

Both liberal and conservative Americans hold that a peaceful transfer of power is something we aspire towards. You are using "the liberals" as some boogeyman. Maybe you don't realize it, but its clouding your judgement and causing you to make logical fallacies left and right.

Who is getting murdered on election day? None of those rioters was concerned about needing to eat or pay their bills because of an election. America is not a regime that tortures its citizens, or where people disappear in the night for having opinions the government doesn't like. I think it way outside of anything reasonable to think that.

Streetlight, before you cast that others are being emotional, maybe examine yourself first. Its late on my end, so lets sleep on it. Have a good night.

People who systematically extra-judicially murder citizens on a regular basis are an "other". — StreetlightX

You've been on these boards for a long time StreetlightX. A major goal of philosophy is to carefully examine our own presumptions and prejudices about the world, and see if they hold up in the light of rationality.

Can you say your words do? Were the defenders at the capitol riot who got beaten, feared for their life, and put into the hospital extra-judicially murdering citizens on a regular basis? Are they really an "other", or are they human beings like you and me?

Never seen so many people driven into collective hysteria on the basis of a glorified cosplay convention gone awry. — StreetlightX

One of the prides of America is that we have peaceful transitions of power. You vote your guy, they vote their guy, and whoever wins at the end of the day, wins. This was an attack on that pride. Don't you think some people have a right to be offended and outraged?

People who didn't like losing the vote, decided to act like spoiled punks. People got hurt. A few died. Was it a coordinated take over with law rockets, bombs, and tanks? No. But it was an attack on the idea that we can have a peaceful transfer of power. That we can work out our differences through discussion, reason, and voting.

As a person who enjoys philosophy, don't you find that offensive? Isn't that the antithesis to free thought, speech, and handling matters without violence? Are you being rational, or are you rationalizing your own emotions and biases?

I couldn't care less. What happened to some pig somewhere is not a systemic problem. — StreetlightX

I am incredibly disappointed and disheartened to hear this. I feel you have made people into "the other". This is what allows racism, sexism, and hate to foster in people's hearts. You should actively seek out an opportunity to talk with a police officer, or interact with some liberals in your community. They are not "some pigs". They are people in your community just trying to make a living like you do.

I would say its our inability to escape from primitive status. Did you know fruit flies will flip each other over to assert dominance? It takes the brain power of a fruit fly. We unfortunately have many people who have the brain power of a fruit fly when it comes to status.

Don't get me wrong. Status can be a very important thing if its used as as tool to see who should be in charge for the good of everyone around them. But that's many times not the case. People don't want to give up power, or perceived status in society, even if it would make the world a better place. As long as we care more about status than the people around us, we will keep making the same primitive mistakes that lead to many of the world's preventable ills.

Oh no they damaged property and hurt some pigs for a process which is meaningless how sad :( — StreetlightX

Maybe you don't understand that those pigs were men with families doing their job to protect the people in the capitol.

Here's testimony from Michael Fannon, one of the police officers that was beaten during the riot.

"Fanon delivered emotional opening remarks criticizing those who downplayed the assault in the weeks since January 6.

“What makes the struggle more difficult and more painful is knowing so many of my fellow citizens, including so many people I risked my life to defend, downplaying or outright denying what happened,” he told the nine lawmakers. face. “I feel like I went to hell and came back to protect them and the people in this room, but many now tell me that hell doesn’t exist – or that hell wasn’t actually that bad.”

Footage from Fanon’s body camera was shown during the hearing, showing him and other officers trying to fend off the rioters as they attempted to storm the Capitol, and Fanon carried inside by fellow officers after he was injured.

In the footage, an officer holding a fanon shouts, “We need a paramedic. We need EMTs now!” While another implored him to “stay there, my friend.”

In May, Fanon wrote a letter describing the emotional toll of the January 6 attack, telling CBS News last month that he had been “tortured,” dragged into a crowd, shocked and beaten by a mob of former President Donald Trump’s supporters. He told the House Select Committee on Tuesday that he lost consciousness during the Capitol attack and suffered a mild heart attack and brain injury. "
-https://tittlepress.com/latest/1012027/

There was nothing innocent, or light about that. If these men had not held off the rioters until congress was able to evacuate, who knows what else might have happened. Its like saying a person who went into your house with a machete, stole some of your stuff and left isn't a big deal because you weren't home and he didn't have the opportunity to kill you.

Jan 6 was a minor kerfuffle but because liberals are literally incapable of systemic analysis — StreetlightX

This has nothing to do with liberals. Any systematic analysis should reveal that. People busted windows, beat up police officers, destroyed and took things like podium's out of the house, and all with the aim to stop the election from being certified. Thank goodness people in congress got out. Can you imagine what would have happened if they had been caught? Can you imagine if someone had brought bombs, or a foreign spy had tagged along and found this to be his opportunity?

Conservative, liberal, or independent, it should be condemned by everyone.

The retired Obama and Clinton-supporting generals weave media articles with their own fears in order to knit an anti-Trump narrative, which will surely become another self-fulfilling prophesy, like the Russia hoax and the insurrection hoax. — NOS4A2

Since we're on a board where we do a little more thinking than others, I want you to consider this. The person with insight never worries about the other party. Your party will shower you with reasons to dislike the other party, and will always fight them. The insightful person worries about their OWN party. No one on the other side is going to get a one up on you. But your own leaders will always attempt to get a one up on you to stay in power.

Anyone who defends their own party from clear evil needs to take a re-examination of their self. Not for others, but for their own sake. A party that can lie to you that easily for power, will see you as a convenient tool to be used. This is not anything I say from an armchair either, but something I practice as well. I'm more interested in the lies the party I support tells me, then the party I don't. I would assume your own party is lying to you in regards to January 6th, and look for information that supports that. Only after you do that, then you should make a judgement.

You'll never be fooled by the other party. Don't be the one fooled by your own.

According to one view in this thread, no, 1 cannot both equal and not equal 1. But one particle can both be and not be in the same place at the same time. That's because LNC applies to arithmetic but (as it happens) not to superposition. So the theory goes. — Cuthbert

I think this is misunderstood. Superposition can only occur when the particle is not observed. This doesn't mean observation from humans fyi, but observed by anything, like what we use for measurements. For math purposes, we state they are in simultaneous positions when we have no way of measuring which specific position its in.

Setting limits on our knowledge, and consequences of them, is a common practice in math, like in calculus. If I wanted to tell a layman how calculus works in a mysterious fashion, I could state, "Calculus brings limits where they do not exist. The math itself creates limits out of infinity. This is only due to the existence of human brains however. Without them, the reality is there is no limit, but the conclusions of the equation extend into infinity".

Quantum mechanics is really understood at a mathematical level, and people make mistakes in applying that math to reality beyond what is intended. Just like calculus does not magically create a finite solution out of the infinite, quantum mechanics does not prove that a particle can exist in two places simultaneously, beyond the mathematical limitations it works with. In practice, testing, and application, a particle cannot exist in two places at once.

Why should the universe (1) make sense (2) to us? — Agent Smith

There is no reason why the universe should, or should not make sense. The point of knowledge is to attempt to make sense of the universe for our survival and proper use of it. The struggle of epistemology is to come up with a tool that can enable us to do this in the most rational manner possible.

Logic is the tool we use for rational thought. Rational thought eliminates as much uncertainty as possible, but also recognizes its limits. Calculus for example is a form of logic that evaluates limits to never ending equations. When we apply that tool, we are able to get consistent enough results about reality to use it to our ends.

Logically in the classical sense (categorical, sentential, predicate logic), the key premise being the law of noncontradiction (LNC) can't be violated! — Agent Smith

As for this, try to disprove the law of non-contradiction yourself. Can 1 equal, and not equal 1 at the same time? And by equality, I mean down to the smallest scale of measurement you can imagine, that 1 is both equal, and not equal to 1 at the same time.

Equality is a term we've invented, so of course its impossible for something to be a contradiction. Something cannot be both equal, and not equal to itself. At that point, we need a refinement of words or measurements. And that is partly what logic is. An invention of terms and words that consistently work with each other, and apply to reality without contradiction.

As I have said many times in this thread: I do agree that people should be polite and respectful and such, when they discuss controversial issues. I don't think "free for all freedom of speech" where everything should be allowed to be said in any way, works or even is true freedom of speech, since then only those who are the loudest and most abusive of such freedom would be heard.

I quite simply think that the subject of equality has become such a taboo topic nowadays, that it distorts the public and scientific discourse on the subject. And that such is harmful, whether it's called freedom of speech or not. I don't even care what results the scientific or public discourse on equality end up with... I just care that the discourse is done with good methodology. — Qmeri

I agree that we should be polite and discuss even controversial topics. Perhaps the reason others are suspicious of your motives, is it seems one sided. Not that I think you're trying to be, but I do feel your are unconsciously biased. This is not meant to be offensive, we all have them. Let me point out what I mean.

For those against the equality movement, do you feel most people are willing to sit down with a nice debate and explain in rational terms, without retaliation, why a colored person is inferior to a white person? No. The same "intolerance" applies to both sides. Rational debate requires both sides be willing to calmly discuss the issue, and that requires both sides have a belief the other side will be fair and trustworthy.

People are not saints, even when they are on the side of "good". They will be messy arguers, impassioned, make illogical points, and generally type things they don't intend to convey. That doesn't mean their side is wrong, it just means people are messy everywhere. With that in mind, the fact that you've only picked out the messy people on one side, while not seeing the messy people on the other side, makes people suspicious that you're not being honest. Further, you seem to not be seeking out the people who are willing to debate, and have painted the whole movement with a negative brush. Of course, that doesn't mean you're not being honest, maybe you just don't realize you've been unfair.

If you still believe that perhaps the equality movement is special, or particularly rude or dangerous to society in its behavior, it would help to point out specific examples, and compare them to the anti-equality movement. And if you want to debate not the tactics, but the conclusions of some in the equality debate, feel free to make another thread on those topics. Many will not treat you fairly, but I'm sure that some will. Just be sure you're up for the task, as well as up for many people who will be very impassioned and not respect your viewpoint.

I think there's a bit of a difference between pretending that I'm a super hero saving the world, vs wondering about the meaning of life. Play is purely for entertainment, while thinking is about solving real questions about life. Can some people approach philosophy as entertainment? Certainly. But the core of philosophy is thinking.

Personally I've likened philosophy to figuring out detailed and rational definitions to what we already use daily. What is "good"? What is "meaning"? It asks us to examine the words we've been using without thinking about them, and finally thinking about them.

The process of thinking involves imagination, and thought experiments. How else would a hypothesis be formed in science? The same goes for a premise in philosophy. A fine philosophical question by the way!

Those calling for a Civil War are spoiled children. No one is enslaved, starving, or lacking of a future because of an oppressive tyrannical government. Its petty differences. None of those advocating for Civil war understand the death, the disease, the loss of electricity, water, services, comforts, and economic crash such a thing would entail. Not to mention opening us up to enemy infiltration from abroad.

No, we should not have a civil war. It is a dream of the brain-addled and foolishly ignorant.

Nowadays, the modern equality movement does not respect the freedom of speech too much… At least where I live, arguing against people being genetically equal is pretty much a taboo and you get almost immediate social repercussions for it — Qmeri

I think you might misunderstand what freedom of speech means. Freedom of speech, at least in America, is the idea that the government cannot make a law restricting what you say. Freedom of speech has nothing to do with what other groups of people do. If you walk into a crowd of people and start telling them they're a bunch of losers, they are allowed to pressure you to stop speaking, and may voice their opinion in kind.

The right to free speech does not mean you are free from social repercussions. You may be hated, scorned, lose your job, your respect, and your social dignity. The only thing you are free from, is being thrown in jail because you said something the government didn't like.

Perhaps what you are referring to is that you believe the modern equality movement is not open to debate. Perhaps it is, and perhaps it isn't. Have you asked someone in the modern equality movement to debate you? To discuss the pros and cons of positions? While many people are not open to debate in any movement, I find if you ask and search, there are usually some who will.

If you are perhaps referring to "the internet", it depends on where you go, and of course how you approach the subject. When you approach any people who hold an ideology to debate it, it must be done with respect, humbleness, careful wording, insight, and possibly one of the most important, being open to also having your mind changed as well. If not, you can come across as offensive, rude, or someone who isn't open to debate yourself. Why should anyone give their time to someone like that?

I am not a Christian myself, but I think this interpretation is from people who don't understand the faith very well, or who had it twisted to scare them into being believers. Lets also not forget that Christianity was formed 2000 years ago, and does not come from a culture with our modern sensibilities. War, disease, famine, and death were common bed fellows.

My understanding of the Christian doctrine is that everyone that is human will eventually die. The reason for this is "sin", or that humans are unable to live in accordance with God's laws. Anyone who doesn't follow God's law, dies. There is essentially very few who are worthy. There are various interpretations, but Jesus is seen as an incarnation of God as a human being. Its the idea that God wanted to live as a man to see why they couldn't uphold the laws God set.

So you have God as a man, living, and feeling like a human being. Trying to teach the mortals around him. Due to the fact that Judaism is a very law like religion, God didn't want to break his law, so he willingly suffered incredible pain and death, perhaps to see what it was like, but to also "pay for the sin of all of humanity".

The idea, is that you've been paid for. We all have. It doesn't matter whether we believe it or not. I believe St. Paul states something to the effect that the only advantage Christians have over non-Christiains, is that Christians have the joy of knowing this sacrifice, and that we all have eternal life. This joy is to make you want to spread the word, and inspire people to live more fulfilling and better lives, knowing that death is not the end.

On "the last day", the dead are supposed to rise again once more. Jesus will let them know that their life has been paid for, if they simply accept it. Some will reject it. Some may not want to live forever. But all are essentially forgiven. If you refuse, you die. That's it. No torture, no eternal fire, you burn away to the ash you began as.

Of course, over the years mankind has taken a hold of this and twisted it for its useful purposes. The church needs people to come to mass and donate, or it will cease to function. So you have to give a reason to come to the pews. While Jesus' message is mostly a one and done, that doesn't keep institutions going. So a lot is done to keep people fearful and thinking Christianity is something its not.

Do we blame the person who merely wants to do the right thing, and trusts in an institution to tell them this? Many people are not into thinking deeply about ideologies, and the church forms a social tie and connection to family and friends. The same can be said of extreme political ideologies, sports teams, and many other social groups with strong ties. I feel it is unfair to pick on religion in particular, when I see the same "evils" coming from so many other social groups. I suppose a mac person doesn't tell a pc person they'll burn in hell for all eternity, but they might wish it. :)

Likewise, though these social groups can form evil ideologies, do we neglect their good as well? I feel if we examine our own lives honestly, we might find we have our own blind spots and illogical inconsistencies we live by. The older I get, the more difficult I find it to judge others, when you realize we're all human at our core, and we all get caught up in things that aren't always ideal.

Its little more than pop psychology and modern day astrology. People are not stereotypes, and that's all MBTI tries to label you as. Be you, don't worry about the label.
— Philosophim

people criticize and deny what they are too lazy and ignorant to study — Miller

If you had asked me, you would find I am quite familiar with MBTI. There is irony in the fact that you didn't ask for "details to study", but simply criticized and denied my statement. If you want a discussion, engage those that disagree with you. Otherwise all you'll ever listen to is people who agree with you. What's the point besides ego?

Great conversation so far Bob! First, I have had time to think about it, and yes, I believe without a denominator, one cannot have probability, only possibilities that have occurred multiple times. I think this ties in with your idea of "immediateness" when considering cogency, and I think you have something that could be included in the cogency calculus.

I believe immediateness is a property of "possibility". Another is "repetition". A possibility that has been repeated many times, as well as its immediateness in memory, would intuitively seem more cogent than something that has occurred less often and farther in the past. Can we make that intuitiveness reasonable?

In terms of repetition, I suppose repetition means that you have applicably known an identity without distinctive alteration or amending multiple times. Something that has stood applicably for several repeats would seem to affirm its use in reality without contradiction.

Immediateness also ties into this logic. Over time, there is ample opportunity for our distinctive knowledge to be expanded and amended. Whenever our distinctive knowledge changes, so does our context. What we applicably knew in our old context, may not apply in our current context.

I think immediateness is a keen insight Bob, great contribution!

"Plausibility" is a spectrum of likelyhoods, in a generic sense, where something is "Plausible" if it meets certain criteria (of which do not need to be derived solely from mathematics) and is "Implausible" if it is meets certain other criteria. — Bob Ross

I'll clarify plausibility. A plausibility has no consideration of likelihood, or probability. Plausibility is simply distinctive knowledge that has not been applicably tested yet. We can create plausibilities that can be applicably tested, and plausibilities that are currently impossible to applicably test. For example, I can state, "I think its plausible that a magical horse with a horn on its head exists somewhere in the world." I can then explore the world, and discover that no, magical horses with horns on their head do not exist.

I could add things like, "Maybe we can't find them because they use their magic to become completely undetectable." Now this has become an inapplicable plausibility. We cannot apply it to reality, because we have set it up to be so. Fortunately, a person can ignore such plausibilities as cogent by saying, "Since we cannot applicably know such a creature, I believe it is not possible that they exist." That person has a higher tier of induction, and the plausibility can be dismissed as being less cogent.

With this explored, we can identify probability as an applicable deduction that concludes both a numerator and denominator, or ratio. Possibility is a record of applicable deduction at least once. It is a numerator, with an unknown denominator. Repetition and immediateness intuitively add to its cogency. Finally plausibilities are distinctive knowledge that has not had a proper attempt at applicable deduction.

Another way to think about it is: if my entire life (and everyone else testified to it in their lives as well), when presented with three cards (two of which are aces), I always randomly drew an ace--as in every time with no exceptions--then I would say the the "sureness" reverses and my math must have been wrong somehow (maybe probability doesn't work after all? — Bob Ross

I pulled this one quote out of your exceptional paragraph, because I think it allows an anchor to explore all of your propositions. Probability is based off of applicable knowledge. When I say there is a 4 out of 52 chance of drawing a jack, part of the applicable knowledge is that the deck has been shuffled in a way that cannot be determined. The reality is, we applicably know the deck is deterministic once the shuffle is finished. If we turned the deck around, we could see what the card order is. The probability forms from our known applicable limits, or when we cannot see the cards.

In the case that someone pulled an ace every time someone shuffled the cards, there is the implicit addition of these limits. For example, "The person shuffling doesn't know the order of the cards." The person shuffling will doesn't try to rig the cards a particular way." "There is no applicable knowledge that would imply an ace would be more likely to be picked than any other card."

In the instance in which we have a situation where probability has these underlying reasons, but extremely unlikely occurrences happen, like an ace is drawn every time someone picks from a shuffled deck, we have applicable knowledge challenging our probable induction. Applicable knowledge always trump's inductions, so at that point we need to re-examine our underlying reasons for our probability, and determine whether they still hold.

We could do several tests to ascertain that we have a situation in which our probability holds. Perhaps pass the deck to be shuffled to several different people who are blindfolded. Test the cards for strange substances. Essentially ensure that the deck, the shuffle, and the pick all actually have the context for the probability to be a sound induction.

It could be physics changes one day and it turns out that an ace will always end up at the top of any shuffled deck. At that point, we have to retest our underlying applicable knowledge, and discover that some of it no longer holds. We would have to make new conclusions. Fortunately, what would not break is how we applicably deduce, and the hierarchy of inductions.

However, I don't think we should have to limit our examinations to their specific contexts: I think it is a hierarchy of hierarchies. You are right about the first hierarchy: you can determine the cogency based off of possibility vs probability vs plausibility vs irrationality. However, we don't need to stop there: we can, thereafter, create a hierarchy of which contextual claims we are more "sure" of and which ones we are less "sure" of (it is like a hierarchy within a spectrum). — Bob Ross

An excellent point that I think is applied to another aspect, context. Within the context of a person, I believe we have a heirarchy of inductions. But what about when two contexts collide? Can we determine a hierarchy of contexts? I believe I've mentioned that we cannot force a person to use a different context. Essentially contexts are used for what we want out of our reality. Of course, this can apply to inductions as well. Despite a person's choice, it does not negate that certain inductions are more rational. I would argue the same applies to contexts.

This would be difficult to measure, but I believe one can determine if a context is "better" than another based on an evaluation of a few factors.

1. Resource expenditure
2. Risk of harm within the context
3. Degree of harm within the context

1. Resource expenditures are the cost of effort in holding a specific context. This can be time, societal, mental, physical effort, and much more. As we've discussed, the more specific and detailed one's distinctive knowledge, the more resource expenditure it will require to applicably know within that that distinctive context.

2. The risk of harm would be the likelihood that one would be incorrect, and the consequences of being incorrect. If my distinctive context is very simple, I may come to harm more often in reality. For example, lets say there are 2 types of green round fruits that grow in an area. One is nutritious, the other can be eaten, but will make you sick. If you have a distinctive context that cannot identify between the two fruits, you are more likely to come to harm. If you have a more specific distinct context that can enable you to identify which fruit is good, and which is not, you decrease the likelihood you will come to harm.

3. The degree of harm would be the cost for making an incorrect decision based on the context one holds. If for example, I have a very simple distinctive context that means I fail at making good decisions in a card game with friends, the risk of harm is very low. No money is lost, and we're there to have a good time. If however I'm playing high stakes poker for a million dollar pot, the opportunity cost of losing is staggering. A context that increases the likelihood I will lose should be thrown out in favor of a context that gives a higher chance of winning. Or back to fruit. Perhaps one of the green round fruits simply doesn't taste as good as the other. The degree of harm is lower, and may not be enough for you to expend extra resources in identifying the two fruits as having separate identities.

I believe this could all be evaluated mathematically. Perhaps it would not be so useful to most people, but could be very important in terms of AI, large businesses, or incredibly major and important decisions. As such, this begins to seep out of philosophy, and into math and science. Which if the theory is sound, would be the next step.

Really great points again Bob! Holidays are on the horizon, so there may be a lull between writings this week, but should resume after Christmas. I hope you have a nice holiday season yourself!

Its little more than pop psychology and modern day astrology. People are not stereotypes, and that's all MBTI tries to label you as. Be you, don't worry about the label.

I don't think people hate vegans per say. They hate vegan evangelists. Vegans who do it because they think its the right thing to do, and don't believe it makes them better than other people, I think are respected like anyone else. But, these vegans don't make a display of it, they're just living their life. As you get to know them, it might come up, but you might never know they were vegan at all.

People also don't like vegans that expect everyone around them to change. If you're invited to a party for example, and you insist how vegan they are, and that they won't come if there aren't vegan options, its annoying. If you quietly note you're vegan, and would they mind if you brought your own vegan dish to the party to share with everyone, people won't mind at all.

Finally, if a vegan is offended that they are served non-vegan food, or offended at people who decide not to be vegans. If you're going to dislike people who aren't vegans, they shouldn't be surprised when people dislike them back.

Its really not being vegan per say, its whether you're rude, inconsiderate, or a socially inept person about it.

If you want people in your thread discussing with you, and possibly persuading them to your view point, keep to the topic.
— Philosophim
Oh no don't mind me. I'm not the one whose belief is being challenged here. Our society backs me up on this. I don't even have to lift a finger. It's there for your pleasurable viewing. — L'éléphant

But you said,

Then, what can threaten a society's integrity? — L'éléphant

A society, does not mean our society alone. If you would like to change your viewpoint to being only our society, that's fine, but that is not what your original topic implied. If that is so, I'll drop the China and North Korean comparisons.

What holds together a society is the enforcement of morality through the use of force (the law). You get enough dissent and nonconformity to your society's morals, you kill your society. — L'éléphant

Your entire premise is that our society, (I'm assuming America now) creates laws to enforce morality. Who's morality? It can't be Christian morality, because Jesus stated you should sell everything you have and follow him. A morality based on Christianity would eliminate poverty and channel the extra wealth to keeping society free from degradation or sin. That is clearly not what American law does.

Many laws, tax laws for example, benefit the wealthy over the less wealthy. Is that moral, even apart from Christianity? Or how about a law against smoking marijuana that can get you put in jail for holding a few grams (and disproportionately puts blacks in jail), when speeding at a potentially lethal level for both you and those around you is just a fine?

The nature of Democracy is that plenty of people get a say. And it turns out that while many people have different views of morality, very few people seem to want to sacrifice their own comfort and money to help those who could really use a hand. Many laws are about preserving power over other people, and in a Democracy, that is much more difficult to do.

So you have a problem with your premise. You've stated the entire premise of now, our society, is to enforce morality. And yet, I can see several instances of laws that do not appear moral to me. It does not deny that there are certainly some laws that are in place due to some cultures or universal morality, but you cannot state it is the primary reason for laws, when the law is cluttered with so many instances in which morality does not matter.

Great comments so far Bob! I'll dive in.

Firstly, let's take probabilistic inductions. Probability is not, in itself, necessarily an induction. — Bob Ross

I understand exactly what you are saying in this paragraph. I've deductively concluded that these inductions exist. Just as it is deductively concluded that there are 4 jacks in 52 playing cards.

Now, where induction, I would say, actually comes into play, in terms of probability, is an extrapolation of that probabilistic application. — Bob Ross

For example, if I have 3 cards, two of which are aces and one is a king, I could extrapolate that it is "highly probable" that I will randomly pick an ace out of the three because of my deduced knowledge that the probability of picking an Ace is 2/3 in this case. — Bob Ross

Exactly. That is the induction I am talking about. We can know an induction discretely. But know an inductions outcome when we apply it to reality.

My point is that I view your "probabilistic inductions" as really being a point towards "mathematical inductions", which does not entirely engross probability. — Bob Ross

There are likely degrees of probability we could break down. Intuitively, pulling a jack out of deck of cards prescribes very real limits. However, if I note, "Jack has left their house for the last four days at 9am. I predict today on Friday, they will probably do the same," I think there's an intuition its less probably, and more just possible.

Perhaps the key is the fact that we don't know what the denominator limit really is. The chance of a jack would be 4/52, while the chance of Jack leaving his house at 9 am is 4 out of...5? Does that even work? I have avoided these probabilities until now, as they are definitely murky for me.

Secondly, I think that probabilistic inductions and plausible inductions are not always directly comparable. To be more specific, a probabilistic "fact" (whether deduced or induced) is comparable to plausible inductions and, in that sense, I think you are right to place the former above the latter; however, I do not think that "extended" probabilistic claims are comparable (always) to plausible inductions. — Bob Ross

Ah, I'm certain I cut this out of part four to whittle it down. A hierarchy of inductions only works when applying a particular set of distinctive knowledge to an applicable outcome. We compare the hierarchy within the deck of cards. We know the probability if pulling a jack, we know its possible we could pull a jack, but the probability is more cogent that we won't pull a jack.

The intactness of the tree would be evaluated separately, as the cards have nothing to do with the trees outcome. So for example, if the tree was of a healthy age, and in a place unlikely to be harmed or cut down, it is cogent to say that it will probably be there the next day. Is it plausible that someone chopped it down last night for a bet or because they hated it? Sure. But I don't know if that's actually possible, so I would be more cogent in predicting the tree will still be there tomorrow with the applicable knowledge that I have.

I was going to say much more, and elaborate much more, but this is becoming entirely too long. So I will leave you with my conclusion: the cogency (or "sureness", as I put it) of knowledge is not, at its most fundamental level, about which kind of induction the given claim stems from, but more about the degree of immediateness to the "I". — Bob Ross

With the clarification I've made, do you think this still holds?

Imagine that I didn't have an incredibly strong case for the tree still being there (like I walked past it three weeks ago and there was a strong storm that occurred two weeks ago), then it is entirely possible, given an incredible amount of analysis, that the "sureness" would reverse. As you have elegantly pointed out in your epistemology, this is expected as it is all within context (and context, I would argue, is incredibly complicated and enormous). — Bob Ross

This ties into my "degrees of probability" that I mentioned earlier. In these cases, we don't have the denominator like in the "draw a jack" example. In fact, we just might not have enough applicable knowledge to make a decision based on probability. The more detailed our applicable knowledge in the situation, the more likely we are to craft a probability that seems more cogent. If we don't know the destructive level of the storm, perhaps we can't really make a reasonable induction. Knowing that we can't make a very good induction, is also valuable at times too.

My apologies is this is a little terse for me tonight. I will have more time later to dive into these if we need more detail, I just wanted to give you an answer without any more delay.

Amazingly, America decided to relinquish power over gays, and let them be free to be who they are.
— Philosophim
Relinquish power over gays? Listen to yourself. Do not talk to me about ego trip while talking nonsense like this, please. Gays were not out to get power from others. They wanted to be treated as equals. — L'éléphant

Last time I ask you to just address the points and avoid the personal. If you want people in your thread discussing with you, and possibly persuading them to your view point, keep to the topic.

The word "relinquish" means "to let go". I did not say gays were out to get power from others. I stated they wanted the power that others held over them to be let go. To be able to marry, and to be able to sleep with who they want without risk of criminal prosecution.

The examples with China and North Korea still stand. If you don't address them, then I'm going to assume they adequately demonstrate the OP does not stand.

Gays for example, were able to get others to relinquish their power over them, and not be outlawed or denied state marriages.
— Philosophim
Incorrect. The gays got what they wanted because the public outrage of the majority diminished. Careful now. — L'éléphant

Careful now? Is this a discussion or an ego trip for you? Just make your points without snark. Prior to the legalization of gay marriage, homosexuality was a crime in many states. The power of the state controlled held a sword over their lives. Fortunately in America, we have an educated society, and people began to question whether it should be a crime. Amazingly, America decided to relinquish power over gays, and let them be free to be who they are.

That required changes and limitations of the law, not just moral outrage. In other countries, moral outrage does not necessarily change the law, and the majority can easily be oppressed by a minority. Do you think North Korea is a country run by morality? No. It is state power over individuals to benefit a minority.

You said:

What holds together a society is the enforcement of morality through the use of force (the law). — L'éléphant

But I've given examples of societies where this isn't the case. If you can explain to me how North Korea and China are enforcing morality, you'll have a point. Otherwise, you don't.

The question is, who has power? Is it 1% of the population, and they oppress the other 99%? Is it 50%? 80%?
— Philosophim
The majority of the members of society has the power. So long as they don't use logic, but public outcry and outrage. This so-called power has nothing to do with the 1% or the 99%. It's about what morality is being undermined. — L'éléphant

Untrue. In every government, someone has power over someone else. The state does not dictate morality, they dictate who holds power. Different states around the world allow more people to have influence than other countries. In the United States, a larger swath of people have a say then in many other places in the world. Gays for example, were able to get others to relinquish their power over them, and not be outlawed or denied state marriages.

Because people with hope change the world. If we all accepted, "It is what it is", people wouldn't work to change things. Changing thing is difficult, and the ground is littered with the corpses of failed attempts. But even a 1% chance of change has a chance.

My guess is that you were likely an optimistic person at one time in your life, and you failed. So from personal experience, you know that it is likely that other optimistic people will fail, and that idea depresses and saddens you.

But don't forget the big picture! Throw enough bodies at something over time, and it WILL change.

Great thread.

I would specify a bit further.

What holds together a society is the enforcement of morality through the use of force (the law). You get enough dissent and nonconformity to your society's morals, you kill your society. — L'éléphant

You do not kill your society if the laws of society are not followed. You disrupt those who are in POWER in society if the laws are disrupted.

The question is, who has power? Is it 1% of the population, and they oppress the other 99%? Is it 50%? 80%? In your case, we could break this down law by law. Perhaps a law protects the 80% of society, like the seat belt law. Perhaps a law protect 5% of society like the abortion law. And so and so forth.

In the end, it is about who holds power in a society. A better question is, who should hold the power in society? Intuitively, I believe those who allow the greatest protection and power to the safe people of society are those we should allow to have power. Giving anarchists power would hurt most of society for example. But enslaving a portion of society, who would do no harm on their own, for the benefit of another portion would be a poor society.

How about denying gay people weddings? Seems like that's a society that is oppressive. While power can be protective to those in charge, it can also enable those in charge to do evil as well. There is a joy in the black area of the human heart in holding power over another, just for the satisfaction of it after all.

Wonderful! We are about to get into part 4, induction hierarchies. I have never been able to discuss this aspect with someone seriously before, as no one has gotten to the point of mostly understanding the first three parts. While we discuss, recall our methodology of distinctive knowledge, and deductively applying them as applicable knowledge still stands. Within part 4, I subdivided inductions into four parts, but I can absolutely see the need for additional sub-divisions, so feel free to point out any you see.

For example, I could claim that I "know" that my cat is in the kitchen with no further evidence than simply stating that the claim doesn't contradict my or anyone else who is in the room's "reality". — Bob Ross

Applicably knowing something depends on our context, and while context can also be chosen, the choice of context is limited by our distinctive knowledge. If, for example I did not have the distinctive knowledge that my friend could lie to me, then I would know the cat was in the room. But, if I had the distinctive knowledge that my friend could lie to me, I could make an induction that it is possible that my friend could be lying to me. Because that is an option I have no tested in application and due to my circumstance, cannot test even if I wanted to, I must make an induction.

I think that your hierarchy of inductions is a step in the right direction, but what is a justified claim of knowledge? — Bob Ross

When you can deduce nothing else within your context of distinctive knowledge. If you recall the sheep and goat issue, prior to separating the identities of a sheep and a goat, both could be called a "sheep". But once the two identities are formed, there is a greater burden on the person who is trying to applicably know whether that animal is either a sheep, or a goat.

Arguably, I think we applicably know few things. The greater your distinctive knowledge and more specific the context, the more difficult it becomes to applicably know something. Arguably though, the greater specificity also gives you a greater assurance that what you do applicably know, will allow greater precision in handling reality. It is easier for a person with a smaller imagination and vocabulary to know something. This reminds me of the concept of newspeak in 1984.

"In "The Principles of Newspeak", the appendix to the novel, Orwell explains that Newspeak follows most of the rules of English grammar, yet is a language characterised by a continually diminishing vocabulary; complete thoughts are reduced to simple terms of simplistic meaning.
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newspeak

Orwell understood implicitly that the simpler and more general the language, the more you could get your populace to "applicably know" without question. If this state is "good" no matter what the state does, then questioning anything the state does is "evil". Simple terms make simple men. But, simple terms also make efficient men. It is not that induction is wrong, it is that incorrectly understood, it can be misused. I think a useful term for when we are discussing a situation in which a person has extremely limited distinctive knowledge is the "simpleton context". We can use this when there is a question of fundamentals.

I would argue the bulk of our decisions are through intuitive inductions, and being able to categorize which one's are the most useful to us, is one of the strengths of the theory. Now that we have have a way to manage the cogency of inductions lets go back to your cat in the kitchen example.

As a reminder, hierarchy of inductions is as follows: Probability, possibility, plausibility, and irrational. Each are formed based on how much of their underlying logic is based upon deductions versus other inductions. First, lets examine the most basic of inductions.

Likewise, we could take this a step further: let's say that I, and everyone else in the room, get on a phone call with someone who is allegedly in that very kitchen that we don't have access to (in which I am claiming the cat to reside) and that person states (through the phone call) that the cat is not in the kitchen. — Bob Ross

I'll just cover the first three questions. We will not use the simpleton context here. It is a useful context for addressing fundamentals, so if there are any questions, we can return to it at anytime to find the underlying basis. We will be people who are normal seekers of knowledge.

Do I now "know" (applicably) that the cat is not in the kitchen?
No, because I know it is possible that my friend might lie, and I don't know if the person is telling the truth.

Do I "know" that that person actually checked the kitchen and didn't just make it up?
If it is possible that my friend could call me outside of the kitchen, and I have no way of verifying where he called from, then no.

Do I "know" that was even was a person I was talking to?
If I know it is possible that something else could mimic my friends voice to the point I would be fooled, then no.

From this discussion, I think I've actually gleaned something new from my theory I didn't explicitly realize before! If we have the distinctive knowledge of something that is possible or probable, these act as potential issues we have to applicably test and eliminate before we can say we applicably know something. This is because possibilities and probabilities are based on prior applicable knowledge.

Lets change the cat situation to different hierarchies so you can see different outcomes. The person who you're talking to is a trusted friend who rarely lies to you. Its possible they could, but its improbable. There doesn't appear to be a tell in their voice that they are lying, so it would be more cogent to look at the probability they are lying. They rarely lie to you, and they wouldn't have an incentive to lie (that you know of), so you assume they probably aren't lying.

They tell you the cat is in the kitchen as you hear them pouring the food into their bowl. You even hear a "meow" over the phone. You still don't know it, because you have distinctive knowledge of the fact that your friend could be lying this one, or playing a clever prank. You know that it is possible to get an electronic device that would mimic the sound of a cat. You know that it is possible for someone to pour something into a bowl that sounds like cat food, but that doesn't mean the cat is in the kitchen. But, again, its improbable that your friend is lying to you. Probability is more cogent to make decisions off of then possibilities. Therefore, you are more reasonable in assuming your friend is not lying to you, and making the induction that the cat is in the kitchen.

Of course, you could be wrong. All inductions could be wrong. But it would still be less reasonable for you to believe the cat was not in the kitchen based on possibility, when you have probability that indicates the cat likely is.

Another great example I have been pondering is this: do I "know" that a whale is the largest mammal on earth? — Bob Ross

It depends on your context. If you are implicitly including, "out of all the mammals we have discovered so far," then yes. Or you could explicitly give that greater specific context and add that phrase into the sentence. Often times, we may say things with implied contexts behind them, due to efficiency. The danger of efficiency is of course people can skip steps, overlook implicit claims, and take things literally when it was never intended to.

When we also state, "out of all the mammals we have discovered so far," we are also implicitly noting it is "out of all the possible mammals we've discovered so far". We do not consider plausibilities. For example, I can imagine an animal bigger than a whale that stands on four feet and reaches its neck into the clouds. But we have never applicably known such a creature, so it is not an induction that can challenge the deduction we have made.

I feel there is a lot to cover and refine with inductions, so I look forward to your questions and critiques!

quote="Joshua Jones;630465"]This is why for a conversation, acceptance of my premise is so necessary - that the end of the world is here.[/quote]

That is not an invitation to discuss philosophy. You are looking for people to agree with you on something you have already decided is right. Don't you think that's intellectually dishonest?

To everyone else that's like saying, "Its important that you accept the notion that unicorns exist before we talk about the magical powers they use."

Here's Pliny the Younger, witnessing the sudden, violent destruction of Pompeii: — Joshua Jones

Now this is a good example. But where do you see this happening today?

You started with,

Now that we seem to have quite definitely arrived at “the end of the world as we know it”, engines stopped, steam wafting through the air, conductors absent, and doors open, I’m not feeling fine. — Joshua Jones

Where do you see violent destruction happening? Where is the end of the world like Pompei? If you want people on a philosophy board to discuss with you seriously, back up your premises when people ask you to provide evidence for them.

How do you treat and care for your most poor and vulnerable?

I ask this question, because it is natural that a government treats its wealthy and powerful well, while using, exploiting, demeaning, and griping against its lowest social standings.

The greatest countries treat their poor well. The worst follow the primitive inclination of humanity.

I think you understand the theory Bob. Everything you said seemed to line up! Yes, I would be interested in your own explorations into epistemology. Feel free to direct where you would like to go next.

Fantastic points! It is a joy for me to see someone else understand the paper so well. I'm not sure anyone ever has. Lets go over the points you made.

Point 1: Differentiation is a product of error.

When I see a cup, it is the error of my perception. If I could see more accurately, I would see atoms, or protons/neutrons/electrons or what have you, and, thereby, the distinction of cup from the air surrounding it becomes less and less clear. Perfectly accurate eyes are just as blind as perfectly inaccurate eyes: differentiation only occurs somewhere in between those two possibilities. — Bob Ross

Instead of the word "error" I would like to use "difference/limitiations". But you are right about perfectly inaccurate eyes being as blind as eyes which are able to see in the quantum realm, if they are trying to observe with the context of normal healthy eyes. Another contextual viewpoint is "zoom". Zoom out and you can see the cup. Zoom in on one specific portion and you no longer see the cup, but a portion of the cup where the elements are made from.

Fortunately, we are no only bound to sight with our senses. Not only do we have our natural senses, we can invent measurements to "sense" for us as well. Sight is when light is captured in your eyes, and your brain interprets it into something meaningful. Same with measurements at the nano, or macro level, are the same.

Therefore, a lot of beliefs are both applicable knowledge and not applicable knowledge: it is relative to the scope. — Bob Ross

You've nailed it, as long as its realized what is applicable is within the contextual scope being considered. I can have applicable knowledge in one scope, but not another. This applies not only to my personal context, but to group contexts as well. In America at one time, swans were defined as being white, and applicably known as such. In Western Australia, "swans" can be black. Each had applicable knowledge of what a swan was in their own context, but once the contexts clashed, both had new challenges to their previous applied knowledge. The result of that, is within the context of world wide zoology, swans can be both black or white.

For example, the "cup" is a meaningful distinction, but is contradicted by reality: the more accurately we see, or sense in general, the more the concept of a "cup" contradicts it. Therefore, since it technically contradicts reality, it is not applicable knowledge. However, within the relative scope of, let's say, a cup on a table, it is meaningful to distinguish the two even though, in "reality", they are really only distinguishable within the context of an erroneous eye ball. — Bob Ross

If you remove the word error, and replace it with "difference" I think you've nailed this. Within the context of having human eyes, we see the world, and know it visually a particular way. We do not see the ultra violet wavelength for example. In ultra violet light, blue changes to white. So is it applicably known as blue, or white? Within the context of a human eyeball, it is blue. In the context of a measurement that can see ultraviolet light, it is white. Within the context of scientific reflective wavelengths, it is another color. None are in error. They are merely the definitions, and applicable knowledge within those contextual definitions.

Point 2: Contradictions can be cogent. — Bob Ross

I would like to alter this just slightly. Contradictions of applicable knowledge can never be cogent within a particular context. If there is a contradiction within that context, then it is not deduced, and therefore not knowledge. If two people hold two different sets of distinctive knowledge, but both can apply them within that particular context and gain applicable knowledge within that set of distinctive knowledge, then they are not holding a contradiction for themselves. But if two people are using the same distinctive context, then they cannot hold a contradiction in its application to reality.

The real conflict is the conflict of which distinctive knowledge to when there is a conflict. I'll try not to repeat myself on how distinctive contexts are resolved within expanded context, but the examples I gave in part 3 show that. If you would like me to go over that again in this example, and also go point by point on your example, I will. I'm just trying to cover all of your points at a first pass, and I feel getting into the point by point specifics could be too long when trying to cover all of your initial points. Feel free to drill into, or ask me to drill further into any of these points more specifically on your follow up post.

Building off of point 1 and 2, the distinction between an accidental and essential property seem to be only different in the sense of scope. I think this is the right time to invoke Ship of Theseus (which you briefly mention in the original post in this forum). — Bob Ross

Nailed it. And with this, we have an answer to the quandary that Theseus' ship posed. When is a ship not a ship anymore? Whenever we decide its not a ship anymore within the scale of context. The answer to the question, is that there is no one answer.

For example, one society could state that both the original parts, and replaced parts, are Theseus' ship. However, the ship that is constructed with the newest parts is the original ship. So if two ships were built, Theseus ship would be the newest part ship, while the oldest part ship would be another ship made out of the originals old parts.

Another society could reverse this. They could say that once a ship has replaced all of its old parts, it is no longer the original ship anymore, and needs to be re-registered with the government. This could be due to the fact that the government assures that all vessels are sea worthy and meet regulation, and it figures if all of the original parts are replaced, it needs to be re-inspected again to ensure it still meets the regulatory standards.

It is a puzzle that has no specific answer, does have specific answers that fulfil the question, but has puzzled people because they believed there was only one answer.

What is essential and accidental in each is within the context of each society. For accidental properties, perhaps society B wasn't detailed enough, and it turns out you can replace "most" of a part of a ship, like an engine besides one cog, and that's still "The original engine with a lot of pieces replaced on it." In society A, they might say "Its a new engine with one old piece left on it". In the first case it is essential that every piece be replaced for something to be considered a "new" part, while in the later, a few old parts put on a new part still means its a "new part with some old pieces".

There is another type of induction: "ingrained induction". You have a great example of this that you briefly discuss in the fourth essay: Hume's problem of induction. Another example is that the subject has to induce that "this" is separate from "that", but it is an ingrained, fundamental induction. — Bob Ross

Recall that the separation of "this" and "that" is not an induction in itself, just a discrete experience. It is only an induction when it makes claims about reality. I can imagine a magical unicorn in my head. That is not an induction. If I believe a magical unicorn exists in reality, that is a belief, and now an induction.

Now you could argue that in certain cases of discrete experience, we also load them with what you call "ingrained inductions". Implicitly we might quickly add, "that exists in reality" and "this exists in reality". You are correct. Most of our day to day experiences are not knowledge, but inductions based off of past things we've known, or cogently induced. Its much more efficient that way. Gaining knowledge takes time experimentation, and consideration. The more detailed the knowledge you want, the more detailed the context, and the more time and effort it takes to obtain it.

And that is ok. I do not carry a ruler around with me to measure distance. Many times I estimate if that is a few feet with my eyeball. And for most day to day contexts, that is fine. Put me in a science lab, and I am an incompetent who should be banned. Put me in a situation in which I need to know that the stream is a little under a foot wide, and I can easily cross, and I am an efficient and capable person.

For example, the fact of gravity (not considering the theory or law), which is an induction anchored solely to the "ingrained induction" — Bob Ross

Hm, I would ask you to specify where the induction is. Gravity is not a monolith, but built upon several conclusions of application. Is there a place in gravity that has been applied, and found to be inconclusive? The induction is not what gravity claims to describe itself as, the induction would be in its application. Off the top of my head I could state the idea that "Gravity is always applying a pull from anything that has mass to every other mass in the universe" an induction for sure. That does not negate its application between particular bodies we can observe.

But more to your point, I believe the theory allows us to more clearly identify what we can conclude as knowledge, and what we can include as cogent, and less cogent inductions. It may require us to refine certain previous assumptions, or things that we have unintentionally let slide in past conclusions. As science is constantly evolving, I don't see a problem with this if it helps it evolve into a better state. If you would like me to go into how I see this theory in assisting science, I can go into it at a separate post if desired.

The properties and characteristics that are apart of discrete experience do not in themselves prove in any way that they are truly differentiating factors: the table and the chair could, in reality, be two representations of the same thing, analogous to two very different looking representations of the same table directly produced by different angles of perspective. — Bob Ross

By discrete experience and context, they can, or cannot be. Recall the situation between a goat and a sheep. If I include what a goat is under the definition of a sheep, I can hold that both a goat and sheep, are a "sheep" The reason why we divide up identities into smaller groups of description is that they have some use to us. It turns out that while a goat and sheep share many properties, they are consistently different enough in behavior that it is easier and more productive to label them as two separate class of animals.

The idea that the table and chair are two separate things is not a truth in reality apart from our contexts. So there could be a context where chair and tables are separate, or they are together as a "set". We can identify them as we like, as long as we are clear with our identities, and are able to apply them to reality without contradiction.

Point 6: Induction of possibility is not always cogent

You argue in the fourth essay that possibility inductions are cogent: this is not always the case. — Bob Ross

Cogency is a way to define a hierarchy of inductions. But an induction is still always an induction. Its conclusion is not necessarily true from the premises. Just because something existed once, does not mean it will ever exist again. We know its possible, because it has at least existed one time. So in the case where you have a memory of iron floating on water, as long as you believe in the accuracy of your memories, you will reasonably believe it is possible for iron to float on water.

Of course, when you extended that context to another person, you would be challenged. Person after person would state, "No, I've never seen or heard of any test that showed iron floated on water." What you do is your choice. You could start doubting your memory. You could start testing and see that it fails time and time again. You are the only one in the world who thinks its possible, while the rest of society does not.

And finally, inductions are not more reasonable than deductions. If you believe it is possible for iron to float on water, but you continually deduce it is not, you would be holding an induction over a current deduction. You might try to explain it away by stating that it was possible that iron floated on water. Maybe physics changed. Maybe your memories are false or inaccurate. And as we can see, holding a deduction as the greater value than the induction, gives us a reason to question our other inductions instead of holding them as true.

And for our purposes, we might indeed be able to prove that their memories are false. Surely they had memories of parents. We could ask the parents if they knew of his birth. They would quickly realize they did not have an id, or a record of it anywhere in society. Once the memories were seen as doubtful, then they could not be sure they had actually seen iron float. At that point, its plausible that the person's memories of iron floating on water were applicably known, but it has been reduced from a possibility, and is even less cogent now then affirming the deduction of today, that iron does not float on water.

Point 7: the "I" and the other "I"s are not used equivocally

Here's where the ternary distinction comes into play: you cannot prove other "I"s to be a discrete experiencer in a holistic sense, synonymous with the subject as a discrete experiencer, but only a particular subrange of it. You can't prove someone else to be "primitively aware", and consequently "experience", but only that they have the necessary processes that differentiate. In other words, you can prove that they differentiate, not that they are primitively aware of the separation of "this" from "that". — Bob Ross

You may be correct. We would need to clarify the terms and attempt to apply them to reality. And that's fine. As for this line, " In other words, you can prove that they differentiate, not that they are primitively aware of the separation of "this" from "that", yes I can. Differentiation within existence is "primitive awareness". Lets not use that phrase anymore if it causes confusion. If we don't have solid definitions between us, we won't match up in the context of discussion.

Another thing to consider, is I don't need to prove anything deeper in the "I" then I did in that context. If you read the paper and understand the concepts, are you a discrete experiencer? Can you deduce? Can you take the methodology, apply it, and it comes away with consistent results that give you a useful tool to interact with reality in a rational manner? It is there to prove yourself. If you can understand the paper and follow its conclusions, then you have actively participated in the act of distinctive and applicable knowledge. If you want to produce another "I" for your own personal context, there is nothing stopping you, or contradicting the "primitive I" in the paper.

What I want to take away from this instead of debating over an "I" is a broader concept that there will be some things that we cannot applicably know based on the context we set up. Will I ever applicably know what it is to discretely experience as you do? No, nor you for I. But can I applicably know that this is impossible? Yes. Applicably knowing our limits is just as important. Calculus was invented to measure limits of calculation, where the calculation eventually forms an asymptote of results. While I may not be able to know what its like to discretely experience as yourself, I can know you discretely experience, and use that knowledge to formulate a tool that can evaluate up to our limits.

There is my massive reply! Out of all that, pick 2 that you would like me to drill into for the next response. When you are satisfied with those, we can go back and drill into two more, so I don't approach the questionable limits of how much I can type in one post! Wonderful contributions as always.

Yes, I am enjoying the discussion of getting to the essence of the work. I much appreciate your desire to understand what the argument is trying to say, and I hope I am coming across as trying to understand the argument you are making as well.

It is irrelevant if a being that discretely experience realizes they are doing this, or not. They will do so regardless of what anyone says or believes.

You are 100% correct. I do not need to recognize that I am differentiating the letters on my keyboard from the keyboard itself: the mere differentiation is what counts . But this, I would argue, is a recognition of your "awareness" (aka awareness of one's awareness), not awareness itself. So instead, I would say that I don't need to be aware (or recognize) that I am aware of the differentiation of the letters on my keyboard from the keyboard itself: all that must occur is the fundamental recognition (awareness) that there even is differentiation in the first place. — Bob Ross

Good, I think we're thinking along the same lines now. That fundamental recognition matches the definition of discrete experiencing. Such discrete experiencing does not require words. We could say that words are a "higher" level of discrete experiencing. But I don't do that in the paper, because that differentiation is not important as a fundamental.

Now can the theory be refined with this differentiation? It could. Someone could call that consciousness. Someone could say, "I" isn't the primitive part of me, "I" only requires that I have consciousness or higher level defining. The theory allows this without issue. But that refinement of I would be a different context of the "I" in the argument. The "conscious I" versus the "unconscious I" are one possible example.

I think you are wrong: "I" am not differentiating (separating "this" from "that"), something is differentiating from an undefined flood and "I" recognize the already differentiated objects (this is "awareness" as I mean it). — Bob Ross

This is a perfect example of your discrete experience, versus mine. I am not wrong. My definition of "I" applies to reality without contradiction. Your definition of I is also100% correct. Can it apply to reality without contradiction? Perhaps. But we are not having a disagreement about the application of the word, we are having a disagreement about the construction of the definition.

My "I" contains both the fundamental, and the "higher" level discrete experiences we make that I believe you are pointing out. Whether its the fundamental awareness, or meta awareness (making a fundamental awareness into a word for example), they are both discrete experiences. A house cat and a tiger are both cats. For certain arguments, it is important to differentiate between the two. And it may be necessary as the theory grows, or someone creates a new theory based on these fundamentals. But for now, for the fundamentals, I see no reason by application, why there needs to be a greater distinction or redefinition of "the primitive I". The only reason I have the primitive "I", is to quickly get into the idea of context without contradiction, or needing to dive into some form of consciousness, which would likely be another paper.

You are putting your own desired definition of "I" into the argument. Which is fine and perfectly normal. You might be thinking I am stating that my definition of "I" is the definition that is 100% correct, and we should all use it forevermore. I am not. I am saying "I" in this context of understanding knowledge as a process is all that we need. I am not saying we couldn't have "I" mean something different in a different context. In psychology, "I" will be different. For a five year old, "I" will be different. Each person can define "I" as they wish. If they can apply it to reality without contradiction, then they have a definition that is useful to them in their context.

"I" here is simply a definition useful within the context of showing the fundamental process of knowledge as a tool between more than one "I", or discrete experiencer.

I'm fine with saying that "experience" initially precedes definition (or potentially that it even always precedes definition), but I think the fundamental aspect of existence is "primitive awareness". If the beating of something in your neck, which is initially just as foreign to you as your internal organs, wasn't something that you were "primitively aware" of, then it would slip your grasp (metaphorically speaking). — Bob Ross

Agreed. If you don't discretely experience something, then it is part of the undefined existence. To reiterate, this applies to primitive awareness. I'm not sure we both have the same intention when using this new phrase, so but for my part, its merely the barest of discrete experiences. Think of it this way. My primitive discrete experience is seeing a picture and the feelings associated with it. Then I look closer, and see a sheep in the field. Then I look again and see there is another sheep crouching in the grass in the field that I missed the first two times. While the crouching sheep was always in my vision, I did not discretely experience it. Or, as I think you are implying, have primitive awareness of it.

For example, if something (the processes) wasn't differentiating the keys on my keyboard, then I would not, within my most fundamental existence, "experience" the keys on a keyboard. — Bob Ross

If you define "I", as consciousness, then you are correct within this context, and could applicably know that. But if I define "I" as a discrete experiencer, you are incorrect in your application. If I am able to pick out and type a "k" on the keyboard, that cannot be done without a discrete experience. Just because you haven't registered it beyond haptics, or have to put a lot of mental effort into it, doesn't mean it isn't a discrete experience.

Do you see the importance of definitions within contexts? We have two different contexts of "I", and they are both correct within their contexts. The question is, which one do we use then? But if we are at this point, then we are at the level of understanding the fundamentals of the argument to address that point.

First, I asked you to understand the context of "I" that I've introduced here, which I believe you have done more than admirably. I hopefully have returned the idea that I understand your context of "I" as well. At this point, we attempt to apply both to reality without contradiction. We both succeed. Why I'm asking you to use my "I", is because it helps us get to the part of the argument where we introduce context. Perhaps I could introduce "consciousness" and get to the same point. But that would likely extend the argument by pages, and would only be explaining a sub-division of discrete experience. Why introduce a sub-division when it doesn't seem necessary to talk about context? If you can explain why my definition of an "I" does not allow me to identify other discrete experiencers, then you will have a point. But so far, I do not see that. Therefore, I do not think we need that context of your "I".

What I'm trying to indicate is that your context of "I" for the argument isn't the "I" of the context of this argument. Within my contextual use of "I", can I apply that to reality without contradiction? You might say yes, but feel that it is inadequate and does not address so many other thing you want to discuss. That is fine. My "I" does not negate your "I", nor its importance in application. If it makes you more comfortable, we could make a different word or phrase for it like, "Primitive I". It is not the word that matters. It is the underlying meaning and context. For the context of ultimately arriving at applicable knowledge, and then the idea that there are other discrete experiencers besides myself, is this enough?

I would not constitute this as a real proof: that discretely experiencing doesn't contradict reality and, therefore, it is "correct". — Bob Ross

I do not believe it is an axiom. Someone can question if what they discretely experience is "real". The axiom I think is, "That which does not contradict reality is knowledge". I don't have any proof of this statement when it is introduced. I state it, then try to show it can be true. If the axiom is upheld, then I can conclude that what I discretely experience is known to me. But without the axiom of what knowledge is, I don't believe I claim that. Even then, I don't like the idea of "something that is true by default". I believe we can start with assumptions, but when we conclude there should be some proof that our assumptions are also correct in some way. But like you said, this is an aside to the conversation. I will not say you are wrong, and I am just giving an opinion that may also be wrong. The discussion of proofs and axioms could be a great topic for another time though!

Perhaps you misunderstand what "evil" is in entertainment. Evil serves the purpose of representing a challenge to overcome for growth. Evil is seen as a thing to be conquered for success. It is a lens to learn a lesson, so you do not commit evil in your own life.

Real world evil is not interesting. If someone kidnapped you and sawed your arms off without any sedatives, would that be entertaining? How about a bomb in real life that blows a child's head off, and permanently twists and disfigures the remaining people around it?

You are confusing the world of fiction, and its purpose, with the real world. Evil is never entertaining, except perhaps to the one committing it. Terrorists mangle and ruin lives for some ideology that obviously most people don't want to live by.

We must learn to admire fundamentalist, terrorists, extremists AS FAR AS their determination and solidarity is concerned. — Wittgenstein

If they are evil fundamentalis, terrorists, and extremists, never. That is determination and ideology that has become twisted for nefarious purposes. It is shameful and tragic; not a thing to be admired.