↪Philosophim

To be fair, we proceeded to have a discussion and I think we reached a kind of agreement. Which I'm forgetting now. :sweat: — Manuel

Ha ha! All good!

A first cause has no prior explanation for its existence. If you posit that there are known entities that have no prior explanation for your existence, you're not countering the OP, you are affirming its logical necessity with its existence in reality.
— Philosophim

Okay, but that still does not answer the question. Does the atomic decay in time span 2 as opposed to the atomic decay in time span 1 have an explanation for its existence?

In order for that atom to decay, there must be a prior... the atom must exist. — InPitzotl

Ok, I see what you're asking now. Lets address your reasoning.

At the same time, there is no explanation for why it decayed versus did not decay; any explanation given for why it decayed in time span 2 would have to describe why it didn't decay in time span 1. — InPitzotl

You are incorrect here. BT does not posit that there is no explanation. It posits that one explanation cannot be addition of a hidden variable. But that's it. It replaces it with the idea of action at a distance, like gravity.

Here are a few links to back my claims:
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Bell%27s_theorem#Controversy_and_common_misunderstandings
From this link here is a deeper link about Bells Take on his own theorem.
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Bell%27s_theorem#The_EPR_argument_for_pre-existing_values

I will quote a few points of the article for guidance.

"Whatever the historical explanation for the misunderstanding might be, it turns out that the general understanding within the physics community regarding Bell's theorem was that it established the impossibility of "hidden variables" (or, for those a little better informed, of "local hidden variables") and the role of the EPR argument (i.e., the fact that the non-locality problem arises anyway if we regard quantum theory as complete) was missed entirely. Moreover, many authors took Bell's theorem to be a proof that, with regard to the EPR argument, Einstein was wrong and Bohr was right. While it is indeed true that Bell's theorem shows that Einstein was wrong, in that the assumption of the EPR argument (locality) turned out to be incorrect, it is not at all true that Bell's theorem shows that the EPR argument itself is not valid. In fact the EPR argument is correct and plays a crucial role in establishing that its main assumption is wrong."

"Already at the time Bell wrote this, there was a tendency for critics to miss the crucial role of the EPR argument here. The conclusion is not just that some special class of local theories (namely, those which explain the measurement outcomes in terms of pre-existing values) are incompatible with the predictions of quantum theory (which is what follows from Bell's inequality theorem alone), but that local theories as such (whether deterministic or not, whether positing hidden variables or not, etc.) are incompatible with the predictions of quantum theory. This confusion has persisted in more recent decades, so perhaps it is worth emphasizing the point by (again) quoting from Bell's pointed footnote from the same 1980 paper quoted just above: "My own first paper on this subject ... starts with a summary of the EPR argument from locality to deterministic hidden variables. But the commentators have almost universally reported that it begins with deterministic hidden variables." "

And what is the EPR?

"In a celebrated 1935 paper11, however, Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen pointed out that, in situations involving specially-prepared pairs of particles, this orthodox principle conflicted with locality. Unfortunately, the role of locality in the discussion is often misunderstood — or missed entirely. One thus often hears that the EPR paper is essentially just an expression of (in particular) Einstein's philosophical discontent with quantum theory. This is quite wrong: what the paper actually contains is an argument showing that, if non-local influences are forbidden, and if certain quantum theoretical predictions are correct, then the measurements (whose outcomes are correlated) must be revealing pre-existing values. It is on this basis — in particular, on the assumption of locality — that EPR claimed to have established the "incompleteness" of orthodox quantum theory (which denies the existence of any such pre-existing values)."

To sum this all up, the EPR assumed locality and hidden variables. BT pointed out that locality and hidden variables were not compatible in regards to quantum entanglement and spins. To bring the relevant quotes out of the above quotes:

" in that the assumption of the EPR argument (locality) turned out to be incorrect, it is not at all true that Bell's theorem shows that the EPR argument itself is not valid. In fact the EPR argument is correct and plays a crucial role in establishing that its main assumption is wrong."

and:

""My own first paper on this subject ... starts with a summary of the EPR argument from locality to deterministic hidden variables. But the commentators have almost universally reported that it begins with deterministic hidden variables." "

So again, BT is not claiming that cause and effect is destroyed, or that there aren't potentially other variables we don't know about. His claim was to show that locality could not work while there were hidden variables. This is not the destruction of cause and effect, or spooky science with out comes that have no possible explanation.

Call this first cause w. It's obvious that w too underwent a transformation from possible to actual. Hence, another cause is necessary that effected this. Reiterate this line of reasoning ad infinitum, ad nauseum and we're quickly face to face with another thorn in our side viz. infinity. — TheMadFool

That's what the OP does. I examine the idea of a universe with infinite regress, and finite regress. In examining the idea of an infinite regress of causality, I find it cannot escape the question of, "Why is there an infinite regress of causality opposed to a finite regression of causality?" The answer is, "It simply is". Thus, even an infinite regress of explanations still has a first cause for its existence.

Also, this is not a theist argument. It seems to be making people think the argument is trying to argue something that it is not. If anything, this is a hard counter to theistic arguments.

However, something which has always been, in one form or another, does not have a beginning. Without a beginning, there would not be a first cause, only a continuously changing cause. — Present awareness

"First cause" does not designate a beginning, it designates the first state of causality chain. If it is the case that everything has always existed, the reason for that, is evidenced by the fact that it has always existed. There is no prior reason why something has always existed correct?

The universe doesn't give a damn if it follows our logic or not. — Manuel

Of course. But that can be said about anything, and isn't an argument. The entirety of physics could be wrong. We could all be brains in vats. Doubting something because you can think, "Of course our logic could be wrong," doesn't make the logic wrong.

quote="Banno;620484"]↪Philosophim It's plain that the leap from "this has a cause" to "everything has a cause" is unjustified.[/quote]

But that's not what I assume at all Banno. The first very first statement is:

Banno, does a first cause have a cause? Of course not.

1. Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows. — Philosophim

Would it help if I reshaped it to say:

Either everything has a prior cause for existence, or there are things that have no prior cause for existence. A thing which has no prior cause for existence will be a "first cause". It is called a first cause, because it is within existence, and part of causality. But as for why it exists in particular is not because of some prior cause, but by the fact of its existence.

People are continuing to straw man the argument and see something that isn't there. The only thing I think could have been said against it is, "There is no cause to anything," which of course you agree is bunk. If I can show that even one cause exists, the proposition stands within reason.

In thinking on causality, I have concluded that the nature of existence necessitates a "first cause".
— Philosophim

Causation is eternal. It never began. — Miller

See a few posts up above. I'm thinking of putting this mention in the OP because I've seen it a few times now.

There's a prediction before the observation though. — InPitzotl

But that doesn't negate cause and effect. That's the only thing that matters right now. I'm not here to argue whether BT is correct or not. I'm here to see if BT negates cause and effect. A prediction before an observation does not.

Bell's Theorem lent credence to a theory that the idea of locality did not apply to entangled electrons.
— Philosophim
...this is too restricted. Bell's Theorem is an argument against Hidden Variable Theories under certain assumptions (locality, realism, etc). — InPitzotl

Stating that hidden variables cannot exist as the cause of an effect is not a refutation of cause and effect.

We don't have to use any math to understand it.
— Philosophim
I blatantly disagree. If you don't understand the math, you have no clue what I'm talking about. — InPitzotl

I have all I need to know for the purposes of this argument. I'm not interested in debating BT. I'm interested in knowing whether it violates cause and effect. A science experiment that had odds one way under assumptions, but found the odds to be different means the assumptions were wrong. That's not complicated, nor does it violate C&E. If results of your experiment result in different odds then you were expecting, then that means you lack a full understanding of the causes underlying the reality of the experiment. You predicted causes would result in the effect of a particular odds. When they do not, you need to re-evaluate that the effect you predicted was wrong. That means something is wrong with what you think is causing the effect.

That resulted in removing the cause of locality.

But you're arguing for logical necessity, so you cannot add assumptions. If therefore you are to propose something, to meet your burden, you must derive your proposition. — InPitzotl

I'm not arguing for logical necessity that any one cause and effect must be true. I'm arguing that in any chain of causality, it is logically necessary that it results in a first cause.

What I'm asking about is how you account for a state that cannot be fully accounted for from priors. I can logically entertain theories of physics that have such states. If your analysis holds under such theories, it should describe them. If it does not hold, you should explain why it's logically impossible to hold such theories; otherwise, you did not demonstrate logical necessity. — InPitzotl

I think you might have forgotten the original argument. (Its been a while, no worry!) The first statement of the above quote is the conclusion of the OP. It is logically necessary that first causes exist. A first cause has no prior explanation for its existence. If you posit that there are known entities that have no prior explanation for your existence, you're not countering the OP, you are affirming its logical necessity with its existence in reality.

What I would question though is whether your theory really is a first cause. it is not any one theory in particular, it is any theory that assumes it has found a first cause. Proving a first cause an be extremely difficult to do. First, there is the question of whether you've found a first cause, or whether we don't have the tools or understanding yet to observe or understand a prior cause that we don't know about yet.

Second, when a first cause incepts into reality, everything that follows from it is within causality. Meaning after its here, everything after is part of cause and effect. Thus, we could develop rules up to its cause and effect chain, and conclude there must be something prior. For example, an alpha could appear spinning in place at 3 rotations a second. We could establish the rules of this alpha, then predict something must have set it into motion. Of course, it just appeared that way, but our rules would imply there is something prior that set it into motion.

While a first cause is logically necessary, I cannot honestly say that even if we found it, proving it is a first cause would be easy, or even possible.

The answers to these questions are just points of view, not facts by any means. Without any proof, I choose to believe that existence has always existed, but I don’t know how or why. — Present awareness

I understand your joy of philosophy! You may hold that without debate. What I'm asking is can your view point avoid what the OP is stating? If its always existed, then there is no prior reason for its existence. Thus the reason things have always existed is the fact of its existence. That's the first cause. I'm stating that no matter what we can envision in a chain of causality, it will always logically end up to end at a first cause.

Since there was no first cause, a first cause is not necessary, so I disagree that a first cause is logically necessary. — Present awareness

Why has existence always existed? What caused it to be that way?

I would contend that a determined motion can cause a random effect — Gregory

While I have my own opinions on this, your viewpoint does not negate cause and effect, so to avoid going on a tangetnt, its fine if you hold it for the purposes of the OP. If you believe this somehow violates cause and effect, please show me why with a real world example, and I will address it.

quote="Gregory;620410"]Yes, but there may be true randomness and it would still remain casual.[/quote]

No. True randomness has no prior cause. The result of that randomness will be causal, but the production of the random result is completely unpredictable and without cause. Anything which has prior causality is not truly random, but caused by something else.

Hume didn't prove that there is no causes. All he seemed to prove is that that we don't know where the cause can be. — Gregory

For me, Hume's true genius was in realizing that our belief that cause and effect will be repeated in the future, or occurred in the distant past before humanity was around to observe, was an induction, and not a knowable fact. We take it on a matter of faith, and so far, it has held up. I cannot for the life of me refute Hume on this.

There was no cause. If something has always been, then it was not caused to be. The idea that there MUST be a beginning seems logical but not necessarily true. — Present awareness

Then you agree with the OP.

I'm glad you came back InPitzotl! I knew you were going somewhere with BT, but I needed to learn where so I could figure out how this applied to the argument.

First, Bell's Theorem does not violate causality. Bell's Theorem lent credence to a theory that the idea of locality did not apply to entangled electrons. The experiment for BT demonstrates causality is alive and well. We don't have to use any math to understand it.

The observation was that if you entangled two electrons, then separated them at a distance, you could predict the spin of another electron with a certain accuracy by spinning the other electron, even at a large distance. The question was, "What causes this to happen?" There is an effect, and one cause was proposed. Assuming that locality was true, one proposal was to place an unknown variable within consideration. I'm no advanced physicist, but I don't have to understand the equation completely. I only have to understand one thing, this was an attempt to provide a cause for a consistent, and repeatable observed effect.

Now that particular proposal for a cause failed. But why it failed is when the experiment was repeated, the outcome which was expected with the introduction of the third variable did not occur. So we know (If Bell's Theorem holds) that the cause of the effect was not a third variable. Bell's conclusion then is that locality does not apply to entangled electrons. So what causes the electrons to respond over large distances? The cause that is proposed is that it is a non-local influence.

Action at a distance is not new in physics. Newton proposed that gravity violated locality as well. His idea was that everything in the universe, no matter the distance, was always exerting gravitational forces on one another. Action at a distance is the cause for the effect.

Of course you can ask, "Well why can action at a distance occur?" You are back in the OP once again. Either there is a prior cause for this, or it simply happens without prior cause, and is evidenced by its own existence.

Proposing a cause to an effect, and having that proposed cause fail as an explanation for that effect, does not show that cause and effect does not exist. That's like saying, "Because a unicorn cannot be used as a cause for why it rains, we can conclude that rain destroys our notion of cause and effect".

Your argument therefore has a hole in it. You need to explain how your argument addresses the notion that there can be states which are not fully explained by priors — InPitzotl

As we can tell, my argument doesn't have a hole in this by your point. The conclusion points out it is logically necessary that such alphas must exist along the chain of causality.

My thought is this, if humanity could deal with the obvious meaninglessness of life, and realize that all we have is each other, could we not move on to a higher level than to dwell in delusions and denial. — boagie

No. This is because people are not rational beings. People are rationalizing beings. A rational being will come to a conclusion that is logic, and act on it despite their emotional and personal misgivings or dislike of the solution. A rationalizing being will attempt to present arguments and logic that rationalize their view on life. Most people will reject logical and rational arguments in favor of what they want to believe.

And I'm not talking about others. I'm talking about both you and me. The best we can do is attempt to minimize our propensity to rationalize, and actually attempt to use reason and logic. It requires humbleness, strength of character, an inquisitive mind, and a willingness to admit when one is wrong, even when it hurts or shames. This takes training, effort, and a will to do. Most people will never do this.

Suspend disbelief for a moment and imagine that everything that is here, now, has always been here, now. No beginning and no ending, just continuous change. The changes that flow out of what is here, now, make logical sense and are predictable but there is no beginning or end to it. — Present awareness

Certainly. What caused reality to be that way? If you answer, "Something else", then I'm going to ask the same question. If you answer, "It simply is", then you have provided a first cause. My statement is that it is logically necessary that a first cause will happen in the chain of cause and effect. Am I wrong?

↪Philosophim I make it a rule not to argue with idiots. Maybe study some actual cosmology. — Benkei

A person who only insults an intellect then runs away from a request to viably back that insult. I suppose you think everything you believe is right, and never argue with yourself.

What is the purpose of justice? I think its key to your argument, and needs to be clarified.

Jesus fuck. 11 pages of scientific illiteracy despite having been pointed out that fact on almost every page. :roll: — Benkei

And 11 pages of myself pointing out why these proposals of scientific illiteracy are incorrect. Feel free to take a stab at it yourself Benkei.

It seems as though that you are implying that we should assess our options and pick the best one: I do not think this is the case. — Bob Ross

That is a choice, and one I respect. I believe there is no "correct" answer when this problem occurs, and should be left up to the individual.

On the contrary, I would argue that we suspend judgment until an adequate alternative is produced (in other words: I am perfectly fine stating that I simply do not know enough to make a meaningful conclusion). — Bob Ross

I have situations like that well. For example, if prior to the moon landing someone said, "The moon is made of green cheese, or blueberries, no alternatives", I would definitely suspend judgement until we arrived at the moon. Such inductions do not use tested reality as any basis. But, when we are living life, and questions about what the life means come up, I find I have to pick something. For example, morality. Lots of people have different inductions as to what they believe morality is. Some people choose to dispense with all of them, stating we cannot know. But some choose to pick one. In the second situation, I am the personality type that is the later. But in no way is the former personality type incorrect or inferior. I believe that is part of human variety, and essentially a way of humanity rolling the dice on different inductions to hedge our bets. :)

To keep this brief, consider the process of perception, which I would argue one witnesses: I would argue one utilizes their built in “rudimentary reason”, which is essentially the most basic derived faculty of their existence, to “induce”, technically speaking, that they are indeed perceiving. However (and, again, I am keeping this extremely brief), this is very distinct from your OP, which I would characterize as mediate knowledge: the use of immediate knowledge that is extended (in this case via induction) to derive a principle from which to deduce. You see, if one were to remove a mediate form of knowledge, there immediate forms stay intact (left unaffected) because (I would argue) mediate forms of knowledge should never be prioritized above the immediate forms. Therefore, if all the options regarding a topic (that, most importantly, pertains to mediate knowledge claims) are unreasonable, then they should be removed even in the case that there is no alternative provided. — Bob Ross

Fantastic point, and I am in agreement. I believe I understand the general meaning you wanted to convey with mediate and immediate. Because I do not know all the subtleties behind the definitions, let me list out the concepts that were pertinent from them.

If I understand correctly, there are conclusions from experience, and conclusions from our minds. Ideally, we want conclusions from experience and conclusions from our minds to match up. But in the heirarchy, conclusion of experience are more reasonable to pursue then conclusions of the mind which are contradicted by experience.

The difference in the OP is that there is a situation in which we cannot discover by experience, because arguably we may never be able to confirm an alpha through experimentation. If we did posit an existence as an alpha, one could always state, "Perhaps we do not have the tools at this time to discover the prior cause." Even further, since an alpha has its own effects it creates once it has been incepted, we could simply work backwards and reasonably conclude that there must have been something prior, despite the reality it just formed in a particular state.

For myself, when left with a situation that cannot be confirmed through experience, I like to cobble together logic of the mind that is confirmed by experience, and see where that takes us. Perhaps I could "logically" conclude the moon is made of green cheese, despite no experience that would lead to this conclusion. This would be an irrational induction that I would throw away like yourself.

But, I know that causality is both confirmed by experience, and the mind. I can take that, and predict a logical conclusion. Is this logical conclusion's final steps purely from the mind? Absolutely. But do they have an underlying basis that is based on conclusions of experience and the mind? Absolutely. As such, I take this as the most reasonable induction to use when faced with a situation that may never be able to be confirmed by experience.

However, mathematical induction (as far I as I understand it) attempts to induce that P(n) will be true for all natural numbers, which therefore is perfectly within its own scope and not over-extending, but it does not, most importantly, attempt to say that P(n) fundamentally works outside of a space/time fabric. — Bob Ross

To this, I would translate and state, "Just because we can create a system of infinite numbers in our mind, it does not mean there actually exists an infinite amount of numbers in reality. If this is what you are implying, then yes, we are in complete agreement.

one can’t assume that causality would be behave (even if they had extraordinary inductive evidence of causality’s uniformity in our universe) even remotely similar outside of the very two (conjoined) concepts: space and time. — Bob Ross

True. But isn't the idea of something being outside of space and time an induction that cannot be confirmed by experience? If so, in your case it shouldn't be a consideration. In my case, I have an experience of space and time. If I compare the two theories, that there may be situations that do not have space or time, versus the reality of space and time that is also logically confirmed, I'm going to take the more viable induction that uses space and time. If you disagree with this, I see nothing wrong with that. But on the flip side, I don't think you could state there is anything wrong with what I am doing either.

Now, this gets contradictory (on my part) very quickly because of my next issue: the seemingly semantic basis for this OP—that to ask for a sufficient reason for a self-explained first cause makes no sense! — Bob Ross

That is the conclusion of the OP. What I show is if you take the idea that everything must have a prior cause for its existence, it cannot withstand its own logical conclusion when examined fully. The principle of sufficient reason in other words, has a glaring flaw, and logically, cannot be true. The POSR is an induction as well correct? And an induction that cannot be confirmed by experience, just like the conclusion of the OP. As such, the POSR is a conclusion of the mind alone. Yet, if taken to its end, we find the POSR breaks down. My conclusion does not break down. Therefore, if we have two conflicting inductions that can only be created within the mind, if one logically breaks down when fully examined, while the other does not, I am going to take the conclusion that does not logically break down.

To sum it up, the POSR states that everything has a reason, cause, or ground. But if we take it to its logical conclusion, we realize that does not mean that the reason, cause, or ground, is always due to something prior to that state of existence. Even if we envision the idea of an infinite regress, we still come to some conclusion that has no prior reason for its existence, besides that fact that it is. To preserve the POSR, we must add an addendum. "One reason for a things existence that has no prior cause, is the fact that it exists."

The OP points out the only logical conclusion that can be made while still preserving the POSR. To deny that there must be at least one alpha, points out a flaw in the POSR that cannot be answered, and it is refuted.

I do not deny that it may be impossible for true nothingness to exist, but I find it also impossible to deny that it might. The fact that we can doubt one, does not eliminate the possibility of the other.

I 100% agree here, but to be able to doubt something is distinctly different from doubting something on reasonable grounds. I am not advocating that we should disband notions because it is possible (or room to) doubt it, but, rather, it should be disbanded if the doubt introduces reasonable justification to disband it. — Bob Ross

True. But can you point to a situation in reality in which there is literally no space between anything? At this point, that is and induction, but not observed reality. In all cases in which we have observed reality, we have found space between objects, and also in between the smaller objects we discover. So for my case, I believe it is much more reasonable to conclude that there is "nothing" between things. This is not an affirmation that I am correct. I am just trying to point out my induction is not less reasonable then the idea that "nothingness" doesn't exist.

You have done a marvelous job at addressing my questions! And thank you for that! But I would say that I am still having a hard time understanding how a “self-explained first cause” isn’t solely a semantical distinction? And even if I were to grant that it is perfectly valid to simply define PSR out of the concept, I would still have to confess that PSR (having such a strong will to live, metaphorically speaking) will wiggle itself back into existence! For I could then ask for a sufficient reason for why PSR is defined out of the concept. Hopefully you see my confusion. — Bob Ross

And you have done a magnificent job of questioning and providing alternatives to think on. I do not believe anyone else has grasped the argument to your extent, nor provided such detailed and insightful criticism such as yourself. I think we are reaching a conclusion with the points I made about the POSR. I look forward to your response!

I think that the truth-status of such conjectures is undecidable; that is I can't decide whether we should say they could be true or false, or that they cannot be true or false. — Janus

Technically I would say "It may be true or false, but it is extremely likely that it is unknowable." It may just happen that the first planet you look at contains the penny. Extremely unlikely, but not implausible. But that is the way I see truth and falsity. They are independent of our knowledge.

At that point, we make a judgement call. Do we potentially spend countless time and money on something that is likely outside of our reach? I believe a large part of philosophy is figuring out what we should spend our efforts on pursuing in reality. If someone tells you to live a certain life, is that reasonable to do so? Should we fear death? How do we know things? Is it reasonable to search for that unicorn?

Randomness doesn't mean "without a cause" but instead "not perfectly predictable" — Gregory

I am trying not to interfere in your discussion with Banno, but I thought it would be useful to point this out for others. True randomness has no prior cause. A coin flip is not truly random. We say its random because the ability to measure it exactly is outside of our capability. Physics does not vanish on a coin flip, only our ability to measure it. If there is any confirmed limitation on randomness, then there is a cause for that. Which means, its not truly random. I hope this helps others understand the argument better.

A first cause would be an alpha. .....What I conclude is that an alpha must logically exist.
— Philosophim
No it doesn't need to logically exist. That's what I'm saying. You call it a given. — Caldwell

What? How? That's the conclusion of the argument. I do not say anywhere in the initial set up that an alpha necessarily exists. I am setting the stage to show what the idea of an entity without prior cause would entail. No where in the premises am I stating that an alpha is a given. A given is something that does not need to be logically proven. I am logically pointing out that if the given premises are true, the conclusion is true.

If you look at the threads, everyone here gets that the argument is sound and valid. The only way to attack it, is to attack one of the initial premises by showing it is false. Check out Banno's critique. What I have been defending this entire time isn't the argument, because everyone knows its sound. I've been defending the idea of cause and effect. So far, I have not heard one valid argument against the existence of cause and effect. Check the example I gave Banno. That is how you can attack the argument.

Your assumption cannot be your conclusion. This is a fallacy. Therefore, I disagree. — Caldwell

Of course that would be a fallacy. The argument does not do that. Read it again please.

I just don’t get how a thesis of a lousy couple hundred words, that’s been around in its various iterations for millennia, and argued to death, can be misunderstood, but apparently half of us, have. — Mww

Apparently. A few people in this discussion have gotten the argument after discussion and clarification. Straw men attacks, or attacks on my character, are not counters to it. You stopped addressing the arguments and counter points, and have devolved your character. You can do better than that.

↪Philosophim The problem is basically in (1), where you set up an erroneous picture of causality.

Have a think about Has physics ever been deterministic? — Banno

I'm not assuming physics is deterministic though. I even mention several times that the physics of today might not have been the physics of thousands of years ago. Its because its not important to the argument. This is about barebones causality. Some state occurs because of a prior state correct? Either some prior state causes a current state, or nothing causes the current state but the fact that it simply is. While a few have stated this might be erroneous, no one has shown how it is erroneous.

Banno, I know you've been on these boards for a while and have a keen mind. I've been using a fairly basic example. Did the message that you typed simply display itself without any prior cause, or was there some chain of events that happened to make them appear? This is not claiming that it must have been a chain of events in any one particular way, only that there had to be a chain of events.

To counter it, you must type a message to display. But if you type a message to display, you are part of the chain of causality that lead to the event of your answer displayed. Can you explain the fact you can type a message and have it display on the boards and yet claim cause and effect is erroneous?

I think Philosophim's mistake is haphazardly assigning logical necessity, without question, to the "first cause", identified as Y. A better way of calling it is the given. — Caldwell

I'm not sure you understood the OP, which is perfectly fine. The first cause is not Y. Y is when we look at a state and wonder, "Does this have a prior cause for its current being?" That would be the X, which comes before Y. A first cause would be an alpha. An alpha happens when we examine a Y, and conclude there can be no X. I use the term alpha because "A" is used also as a word, and I wanted the nice representation that it is the first letter of the alphabet with nothing prior. What I conclude is that an alpha must logically exist.

Given that, re-read the OP one more time. Does the conclusion make sense, or do you see a flaw somewhere?

Whatever we can talk about, exists? Something like this, you mean:

If I can logically conclude that it must exist, then it must.
— Philosophim

Yikes. — Mww

Of course the idea exists. The idea of a unicorn exists. But can we discover a unicorn in reality apart from the idea? No. The idea of cause and effect exists as an idea. I clearly demonstrated it is real and well applied to reality as well from the keyboard example.

Are we at the point in the argument when you have nothing further to add or refute, so you start taking my phrases out of context and saying things like, "Yikes"? Will it be you start ignoring the points and start demeaning my intelligence? I've seen these patterns in argumentation many times, which are face saving techniques. You've been one of the better people discussing, and I don't want to see you devolve into that. There is nothing wrong with stating you cannot counter my points, but you just don't like it. I would have a lot more respect for you, and it would leave our conversation on a high note, not a low note.

But you didn't explain a complex concept - you gave the sort of use example that would help four-year-olds connect the words "cause" and "effect" with something of which they already have some intuitive grasp. You didn't actually explain anything. Not only is this inadequate to a philosophical discussion of causality, but your repeated appeal to these simplistic examples is patronizing and insulting. — SophistiCat

I'm not seeing any refutations here, which means despite your personal feelings, means the point stands. Your personal feelings or unbacked accusations do not matter in philosophy. Only points, counter points, and logic. If you are unable to counter my points, we both know they stand.

There has to be a point where I stop and say "We've found no evidence. We can't see any way of testing this hypothesis. That's the best we can do." I don't know if we are at that place yet with the QM multiverse interpretation or, say, string theory. It is my understanding that many scientists think we are. — T Clark

I call these philosophies Gandolfian theories. There are plenty of people who postulate what Gandolf from The Lord of the Rings would do in a certain situation. How was he feeling? How was he thinking? But at the end of the day, everyone forgot that Gandalf wasn't real. if he was real, we could take all of these conversations seriously, and it would probably solve a lot of problems and mysteries in life. But he's not.

For me, to find that part where I say, "There's no way of testing this hypothesis," I invent a hypothesis that cannot be tested, and try to think why I cannot test it. Take an invisible unicorn for example. Perhaps there are invisible undectable unicorns that exist. It seems in our head like it could be true. But that's nothing we can actively test in reality, because its undetectable.

If you cannot apply an idea to reality, then it is a Gandolfian idea. It can be a lot of fun to think about, but ultimately, its fiction.

Thought about it some more: the whole omnibenevolence thing seems weaker with a god that can arbitrarily change what is good whenever he wants. Technically I think it can be retained, but it isn't as meaningful as it is with a god that commands what is good because it is good because god could potentially change morality at any time and commit any act and still be omnibenevolent. A truly omnibenevolent god would command that morality cannot be changed and relinquish his omnipotence in the process. — ToothyMaw

This is exactly it. Omnibenevolence is a restraint on what we do, because there is some greater purpose than our own personal whims. An omnipotent God could decide that we should torture and eat all of our babies, but an omnibenevolent God would not.

Not like billiard balls and acorns, no, the concept abstracted from principles does not really exist. The principles themselves don’t really exist either. — Mww

Of course they exist. We're talking about them right now. Further, when they are applied to reality, reality does not contradict their application. So not only do these concepts exist, when we use them, reality does not contradict their use. Just like math right? 1 exists as a concept. When we apply it to reality, it turns out reality does not contradict its use. Now you can apply math improperly, that's true. That doesn't deny its existence either. It only denies its misapplication. What you can't do is deny that cause and effect exist at this point. What you could do, is make an argument showing that I'm misapplying it. That may be the case, but I need a good argument for that to be true.

Somewhere in that chain the empirical mechanisms....physical causality.... necessarily become exhausted. — Mww

So at some point there is a part in the chain that has no prior cause? That's what I've been describing in the OP this entire time. That's not a counter, that fits the conclusion of the argument.

Not counter. Satisfy. By finite regressive causality. Like I said. You claim a time and place for an alpha but not the when or the what — Mww

I do not claim any time, place, when or what an alpha is incepted. All I am claiming is that at least one alpha must exist along the chain of causality. In fact, it concludes from the argument that it is possible that there would be more than one alpha, and that they could appear anytime. There could be many alphas and many chains of causality in existence that stay separate, or intertwine. It is not about the nature of any specific chain. It is a logical conclusion about the chains themselves.

It is reasonable to logically grant, but it is an empty proof, in that the proof of empirical conditions is not served by merely logical conclusions. — Mww

Formulas are often not provable by application, but by logic. I can conclude that there is no end to the placeholder of a number. 10, 100, 1,000 etc. But it can never be empirically proved. Do you want to deny the idea that there are an infinite amount of numbers based on the fact it cannot be empirically proved. If you do not, then you are accepting a proof based purely on logical consequence. That is the form of my argument. If you accept one proof of logical consequence, then I see no logical reason you would not accept my proof of logical consequence. Unfamiliarity with the logical proof, or displeasure at the idea is not a valid reason.

Finally, this is not an argument from authority. We have the terms in front of us. We can challenge the logic of the terms, and the logic of their application. Feel free to continue to try.

Now you first need to define this nature of existence in order to argue about it. — Nickolasgaspar

Certainly. Cause and effect are measures of states over time based on interactive forces. A very simple and real world example is when you press you keys on the keyboard to type a response. The keys on the keyboard do not press themselves, you do. When we see your message on the screen, we can know the prior state of you pressing the keys caused that to be.

First of all causality doesn't exist. Its an abstract concept we as observers use to identify the order between interactions among entities and forces. Causality is a real phenomenon enabled by the EXISTENCE of those entities and forces. — Nickolasgaspar

If you don't believe it exists, simply explain to me how it is that you did not cause the message that you typed. Of course, you'll have to type that out to prove it, so that's pretty much out. Still, give it a try if you think you can. What is a phenomenon in your mind? I find its a word that needs a hard definition to be useful in a conversation.

This is what energy does.....produces work. Work causes things. — Nickolasgaspar

So, a cause and an effect?

It is not so much flawed as inadequate. Your persistent examples of billiard balls are the sort one might use to explain what "cause" and "effect" mean to a four-year-old. — SophistiCat

An inadequate argument is a flawed argument. I was a teacher for five years. If you can take a complex concept and break it down so that even a four year old can understand, it is one of the greatest accomplishments you can do. Thank you. Now that I know you understand the point fully, I expect that if you find a flaw, it will be simple to point out. If you cannot, then I'll know that it wasn't because you didn't understand it, but that you were unable to counter it. I await to see if you are able to do so.

Before I address your most recent reply, I wanted to apologize for a such a late response! — Bob Ross

Not a worry! It isn't as if we are typing a few paragraphs. A quality analysis is worth the wait!

With respect to the first sentence, I would like to ask: what laws are you referring to? Newtonian laws? — Bob Ross

By laws, I do not mean any specific law. I mean a consistency in the way existence works. One potential argument against cause and effect, is that we cannot prove that cause and effect will work tomorrow, or that they worked before recorded history. We can assume, but its not provable. That being said, if there is an argument against this, I have a counter point ready. Before getting into the messy details, I try to set things up in a way that gives a clear picture of where I'm going first. So feel free to dig further if you wish.

You seem to be inducing a basic principle from which to deduce, which makes perfect sense — Bob Ross

Yes, you have it. I believe it is a reasonable induction, but it is without question an induction. In short, I find it impossible to function without induction. The only thing we can do is figure out which inductions are more reasonable than others. The paper ends up declaring that. Regardless, if you do find it an unreasonable induction, I would ask a more reasonable alternative be provided. Doubt for its own sake doesn't lead anywhere.

I genuinely would like to know to what theories are you referring? Or, and this will be my last conjecture, are you referring to infinite series summations (and such)? — Bob Ross

I am referring to mathematical induction. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_induction#:~:text=A%20proof%20by%20induction%20consists,case%20n%20%3D%20k%20%2B%201.

Basically think proving formulas. If A is true, and B is true, C will always be true. But we will never be able to actively prove C is true by experience, because we cannot possibly test all C's in existence. C is logically necessary, but is ultimately an induction based on the idea that the truth of A and B will always hold no matter the situation.

To sum this section up, I will would say that, although you are totally right in utilizing the knowledge that we do know, I would say your statement “causality must either continue indefinitely, or definitely” to be, as you admit in the following sentence, to be only a given certainty in terms of what is closest to our lives — Bob Ross

Absolutely correct. And I understand your point about taking logic too far. :) If you can point out where I do, please do. I am interested in getting to the truth of the matter, and only other people can point out my blind spots.

Just like how I deem it impossible to truly conceive of true nothingness, I would also (for the same reasons) deem it impossible to truly know “Logic”. — Bob Ross

While it may be impossible to truly conceive of true nothingness, I find the opposite to also be true. I cannot truly conceive of an absence of nothingness. In every thing that we know of, there is space between things. Every time we drill down, we find a piece that makes up another piece, but there is clearly space between them. Is that space also filled with other smaller things? Is space truly all one thing that touches everything else with no room for anything else to fit?

I only mention this to bring back to the idea of doubting an induction, but replacing it with a more reasonable one. I do not deny that it may be impossible for true nothingness to exist, but I find it also impossible to deny that it might. The fact that we can doubt one, does not eliminate the possibility of the other. To this, I feel the OP holds up in both scenarios. In the case where nothingness can exist, we have the instance of a self-explained entity forming. But in the case where there is no space, we have the question, "What caused existence to be without any space between it?" It does not escape the chain of causality question, and ends in the same answer as the OP.

Furthermore, and most importantly, the extension of this principle, which is already on fragile grounds when extended into the quantum realm, to that which is beyond our basic understand of all things (namely space/time fabric) greatly increases my skepticism and uncertainty on the issue at hand. So much, in fact, that I am hesitant to grant the idea that it is even useful to derive any concepts from any sort of greatly extended forms of induction (at least, ontologically speaking). — Bob Ross

I have heard this from a few posters. How exactly does the quantum world not have cause and effect? If it does not have cause and effect, then is it not simply an alpha? In which case, it seems the OP still stands.

Which means, as you said, that the term ‘self-cause’ doesn’t really make any sense anymore — Bob Ross

Correct. Something cannot cause itself, because then we are left right back to the question, "What caused it to cause itself?" So I find ascribing self-cause results in a contradiction, so should not be used.

However, as hopefully I am demonstrating, there is still a level of explanation that I don’t think you are entirely addressing. — Bob Ross

I hope I addressed it. If not, please point it out!

if complex objects are merely constructed of smaller objects, then wouldn’t that be their explanations? — Bob Ross

Correct. That is why I believe complex objects cannot be defined as alphas. A complex object could be composed of alphas, but once a complex object exists, the cause of its existence is its constituent parts. So it could be that any mixture of alphas and Y's with X's could have mixed together to make a complex component. The key is that an alpha really is no different from any other existence (in our universe) beyond the fact that its inception had no prior cause. Now it could be the case that a bunch of alphas incept in such a way that they form a complex object. The reason for the objects formation is the combination of those alphas. But the reason those alphas incepted in the formation of a complex object, has no prior cause. The complex object is not an alpha itself. This is I think the only way that the proposal stays logical and consistent.

those smaller parts are actually made of smaller ones, so, in a sense, the smaller parts of my hand are actually complex objects compared to its smaller parts (and so on and so forth!). Hence, I would argue, we end up with explanatory-collapsibility. I would say that we arbitrarily, within a relative scope, defining my hand to exist with respect to its smaller parts (objects), but I can also shift the scope to be of my cells to its smaller parts (objects) and the cells would now become the complex object. As far as I can tell, if one zooms in or out (so to speak), the explanations begin to cave in on themselves (providing little explanatory power the closer or farther away one goes). — Bob Ross

Yes, you get it! The problem you are proposing is the exact problem of the OP. And according to the conclusion of the OP, there must be a point in which the chain of causality ends. What the OP cannot answer, is what that specifically is.

Not to reiterate, but, again, what is the sufficient reason for a self-explained entity (first cause) to be indivisible (other than the fact that semantically speaking it is pre-defined as such)? Again, I may simply be misunderstanding you, but I don’t see how that doesn’t require a reason. — Bob Ross

Your questions are all fair. It would be because if an self-explained entity was divisible, the reason for its existence would be the combination of those divisible parts. This is the complex object being addressed again. A complex object may be composed of many alphas, but a complex object itself cannot be an alpha, because its existence is caused by the alphas (and possibly non-alphas) that make it up.

Absolutely fantastic questions that have helped me shape the points on the edge of my mind into something more concrete. Thank you again, and continue to follow up as needed.

All interesting points. I don't see why anything you said isn't a possibility. Fantastic conversation, and I loved the poems!

I think wisdom is when someone has knowledge, applies it correctly to a situation with the expectation of a particular outcome that occurs.

To contrast this with intelligence. I believe intelligence is the ability of someone without knowledge to quickly find, and continue to test what they should apply to a situation to arrive at a particular outcome.

Wisdom deals with solving the problems of the known. Intelligence deals with solving the problems of the unknown.

No, it appears from the successful QFT that all is field. The quantum 'vacuum' is the best candidate for the First Cause, its energetic points having a value at every point, which is all that's meant by a field. Its behavior matches the math model based on harmonic oscillators. The elementaries come forth directly as the quanta of field excitations, as field arrangements, not as any new substance different from field. So, here we have something to go on to confirm the philosophy of the one First Cause that cannot not be. — PoeticUniverse

It very well could be the alpha. But, there are a few things to understand about QFT. First, its tenants are not proven yet. It is very much theory, and a theory based on math. Second, a "field" is a mathmatical representation, much like a wave. But a wave in water is still composed of molecules, and emptyness between those molecules. For fields, we have electron fields. Yet they are still composed of individual electrons, and "nothingness" between them.

I have no doubt at a larger scale, it functions like a field. But, this does not mean its proven that there is nothing more granular if you examine that field at a closer level.

Since there is no evidence whether it is possible to determine the truth or falseness of the multiverse interpretation of QM, should that interpretation be given serious consideration as a scientific theory? — T Clark

In short, no. But that theory might inspire funding into trying to see if its possible to prove multiverse theory. You would absolutely need to prove multiverse theory first. But humans are often times fueled by dreams that lead us to truths we would never find otherwise.

Divine command theory is a way of avoiding the problem of evil, not solving it. The point that I used above is the same counter to divine command theory. If God commands that we torture our babies and eat them, that is a law. No one would think that this was good, much less "the perfect good."

But at this point I think we've both made our cases. I've pointed out you're not really talking about a God that is omnibenevolent, and given several reasons pointing that out. You believe for your part, that might makes right, and that omnibenevolent is simply an all powerful being making rules for others to follow.

Now that we understand each other, there's really nothing else to be said. Hopefully you'll get some others to chime in and present their own views.

I think the multiverse interpretation of quantum mechanics is meaningless because I believe it is not possible to demonstrate if it is true or false, but, I can't prove it is not possible. Given that, what is the status of the multiverse interpretation. — T Clark

Ok, I think I see what you're going for. In this case, I would say you would know what it would take to prove multiverse theory true or false, (humanity discovering an answer), you just believe it is impossible that humanity will ever have the capability to do so.

This is really a combined question with a premise.

a. It is impossible for humanity to ever discover if multiverse theory is true or false.
b. Consequently, the multiverse interpretation of quantum mechanics is meaningless.

As some could quibble with "meaningless", lets change it to "unprovable".

If A is true, then b is true by consequence. But it could happen that tomorrow mankind discovers multiverse theory is true or false. Therefore this proposal is more of a prediction such as, "Tomorrow the sun will rise again." As such, the only thing we can do in this case is wait. Maybe humanity will discover the truth about multiverse theory, and maybe they won't.