Before I address your most recent reply, I wanted to apologize for a such a late response! — Bob Ross
Not a worry! It isn't as if we are typing a few paragraphs. A quality analysis is worth the wait!
With respect to the first sentence, I would like to ask: what laws are you referring to? Newtonian laws? — Bob Ross
By laws, I do not mean any specific law. I mean a consistency in the way existence works. One potential argument against cause and effect, is that we cannot prove that cause and effect will work tomorrow, or that they worked before recorded history. We can assume, but its not provable. That being said, if there is an argument against this, I have a counter point ready. Before getting into the messy details, I try to set things up in a way that gives a clear picture of where I'm going first. So feel free to dig further if you wish.
You seem to be inducing a basic principle from which to deduce, which makes perfect sense — Bob Ross
Yes, you have it. I believe it is a reasonable induction, but it is without question an induction. In short, I find it impossible to function without induction. The only thing we can do is figure out which inductions are more reasonable than others. The paper ends up declaring that. Regardless, if you do find it an unreasonable induction, I would ask a more reasonable alternative be provided. Doubt for its own sake doesn't lead anywhere.
I genuinely would like to know to what theories are you referring? Or, and this will be my last conjecture, are you referring to infinite series summations (and such)? — Bob Ross
I am referring to mathematical induction.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_induction#:~:text=A%20proof%20by%20induction%20consists,case%20n%20%3D%20k%20%2B%201.
Basically think proving formulas. If A is true, and B is true, C will always be true. But we will never be able to actively prove C is true by experience, because we cannot possibly test all C's in existence. C is logically necessary, but is ultimately an induction based on the idea that the truth of A and B will always hold no matter the situation.
To sum this section up, I will would say that, although you are totally right in utilizing the knowledge that we do know, I would say your statement “causality must either continue indefinitely, or definitely” to be, as you admit in the following sentence, to be only a given certainty in terms of what is closest to our lives — Bob Ross
Absolutely correct. And I understand your point about taking logic too far.
:) If you can point out where I do, please do. I am interested in getting to the truth of the matter, and only other people can point out my blind spots.
Just like how I deem it impossible to truly conceive of true nothingness, I would also (for the same reasons) deem it impossible to truly know “Logic”. — Bob Ross
While it may be impossible to truly conceive of true nothingness, I find the opposite to also be true. I cannot truly conceive of an absence of nothingness. In every thing that we know of, there is space between things. Every time we drill down, we find a piece that makes up another piece, but there is clearly space between them. Is that space also filled with other smaller things? Is space truly all one thing that touches everything else with no room for anything else to fit?
I only mention this to bring back to the idea of doubting an induction, but replacing it with a more reasonable one. I do not deny that it may be impossible for true nothingness to exist, but I find it also impossible to deny that it might. The fact that we can doubt one, does not eliminate the possibility of the other. To this, I feel the OP holds up in both scenarios. In the case where nothingness can exist, we have the instance of a self-explained entity forming. But in the case where there is no space, we have the question, "What caused existence to be without any space between it?" It does not escape the chain of causality question, and ends in the same answer as the OP.
Furthermore, and most importantly, the extension of this principle, which is already on fragile grounds when extended into the quantum realm, to that which is beyond our basic understand of all things (namely space/time fabric) greatly increases my skepticism and uncertainty on the issue at hand. So much, in fact, that I am hesitant to grant the idea that it is even useful to derive any concepts from any sort of greatly extended forms of induction (at least, ontologically speaking). — Bob Ross
I have heard this from a few posters. How exactly does the quantum world not have cause and effect? If it does not have cause and effect, then is it not simply an alpha? In which case, it seems the OP still stands.
Which means, as you said, that the term ‘self-cause’ doesn’t really make any sense anymore — Bob Ross
Correct. Something cannot cause itself, because then we are left right back to the question, "What caused it to cause itself?" So I find ascribing self-cause results in a contradiction, so should not be used.
However, as hopefully I am demonstrating, there is still a level of explanation that I don’t think you are entirely addressing. — Bob Ross
I hope I addressed it. If not, please point it out!
if complex objects are merely constructed of smaller objects, then wouldn’t that be their explanations? — Bob Ross
Correct. That is why I believe complex objects cannot be defined as alphas. A complex object could be composed of alphas, but once a complex object exists, the cause of its existence is its constituent parts. So it could be that any mixture of alphas and Y's with X's could have mixed together to make a complex component. The key is that an alpha really is no different from any other existence (in our universe) beyond the fact that its inception had no prior cause. Now it could be the case that a bunch of alphas incept in such a way that they form a complex object. The reason for the objects formation is the combination of those alphas. But the reason those alphas incepted in the formation of a complex object, has no prior cause. The complex object is not an alpha itself. This is I think the only way that the proposal stays logical and consistent.
those smaller parts are actually made of smaller ones, so, in a sense, the smaller parts of my hand are actually complex objects compared to its smaller parts (and so on and so forth!). Hence, I would argue, we end up with explanatory-collapsibility. I would say that we arbitrarily, within a relative scope, defining my hand to exist with respect to its smaller parts (objects), but I can also shift the scope to be of my cells to its smaller parts (objects) and the cells would now become the complex object. As far as I can tell, if one zooms in or out (so to speak), the explanations begin to cave in on themselves (providing little explanatory power the closer or farther away one goes). — Bob Ross
Yes, you get it! The problem you are proposing is the exact problem of the OP. And according to the conclusion of the OP, there must be a point in which the chain of causality ends. What the OP cannot answer, is what that specifically is.
Not to reiterate, but, again, what is the sufficient reason for a self-explained entity (first cause) to be indivisible (other than the fact that semantically speaking it is pre-defined as such)? Again, I may simply be misunderstanding you, but I don’t see how that doesn’t require a reason. — Bob Ross
Your questions are all fair. It would be because if an self-explained entity was divisible, the reason for its existence would be the combination of those divisible parts. This is the complex object being addressed again. A complex object may be composed of many alphas, but a complex object itself cannot be an alpha, because its existence is caused by the alphas (and possibly non-alphas) that make it up.
Absolutely fantastic questions that have helped me shape the points on the edge of my mind into something more concrete. Thank you again, and continue to follow up as needed.