And you're simply assuming the opposite. And, what is 'physical', anyway? What does it mean? — Wayfarer
No, I'm not assuming anything. I'm taking what we know, which is that the physical brain produces consciousness. One thing you have not done is shown any evidence that it can be anything other than this. I'm not talking about theories, but facts. I have asked you a few times now, "If the mind is not physical, what is it?" I have already said what physical is, but I'll say it again. Matter and energy. Einstein confirmed that they are the same thing, just expressed in different forms.
My point, exactly. Can't be fit into the bottom-up scenario. — Wayfarer
You conveniently ignored the parts about placebo's we do know. I'm not talking about a bottom/top scenario. I'm talking about the brain processing and parts of that being consciousness. Consciousness works within the brain. It is not above it, or below it. Its like molecules of water reacting to the wind. Waves form. Molecules are part of the water. They explain the fundamentals of why the water reacts at a molecular level, but they are not below or above the water itself.
Have you ever heard Karl Popper's expresssion 'the promissory notes of materialism'? This refers to the tendency to say in just such cases, 'hey, science hasn't figured it out yet, but we will! It's just a matter of time!' — Wayfarer
The science of brain and consciousness is not binary. Its not, "We understand it all, or we understand none". We understand plenty of parts that show the mind is produced by the brain. When you alter the brain, you alter the mind. We're still figuring out to the science what exactly that entails. We have flashes of light here and there, but designing THE scientific process for how consciousness and the brain works is still in progress. I have asked you a few times now, and you still have not answered this vital question to your ideology. If consciousness is not the brains inner workings,
what is it? Give me facts, evidence, a viable theory. If you can't, saying, "Well I just doubt it," is not a rational argument. We can express doubt about anything. What I am looking for is viable and rational alternatives.
— Wikipedia (For Chalmers) — Wayfarer
When people debate the meaning of philosophers even as old as Descartes, I don't think Wikipedia is a good source of summing up his philosophy. I'm going to post the first sentence of the Chalmer's paragraph again.
A nonreductive theory of consciousness will consist in a number of psychophysical principles, principles connecting the properties of physical processes to the properties of experience. We can think of these principles as encapsulating the way in which experience arises from the physical. — Philosophim
These are not ontologically distinct. These are descriptors that ultimately connect to the physical process. Water is molecules of H20, but we don't refer to water as H20. We say it has waves, flows, etc. But all of these terms are reducible to the molecular make up and laws of H20. That is all Chalmers is saying. He is NOT saying "Water" is different from "Molecules of H20". It is a different way of describing the mass of H20 molecules, basically a different measurement scale. Inches instead of millimeters. Even though one is feet, and the other is meters, they are different descriptors of "length" that describe the same thing. Perhaps in this we could call inches ontologically distinct from millimeters, but not the thing they are both measuring.
— Howard Pattee — Wayfarer
In other words, because semantic and semiotic laws can't be derived from physical laws. — Wayfarer
You have drawn the wrong conclusions from biosemiotics. They are talking about a conceptual model, not that the conceptual model does is not separated from physical laws. They're just saying the current conceptual model of physics is not adequate to describe the physical process of life.
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12304-009-9042-8
"The solution proposed by Pattee, in short, is that signs and codes do not require new laws of physics, because they are a special type of constraints and constraints are an integral part of normal physical theory. The whole argument is developed in three logical steps: (1) life requires evolvable self-replication (a biological principle), (2) evolvability requires symbolic control of self-replication (von Neumann), and (3) physics requires that symbols and codes are special types of constraints (Pattee).
This proposal is undoubtedly a form of biosemiotics, because it states that semiosis exists in every living cell, and since it is based on the idea that signs and codes are physical constraints, it can be referred to as physical-constraint biosemiotics, or, more simply, as physical biosemiotics (Pattee himself, in a private correspondence with the author, has accepted that this is an adequate name for his approach)."
Models to describe systems are constantly being proposed and used. Again, the molecular model of water versus the flow model of water are two different ways of identifying and communicating the underlying physical reality. No where is Pattee claiming that the model of biosemetics supercedes or replaces the underlying physics.
So again, I sense a lack of understanding of what all of these conceptual models and word choices are about. All evidence points to consciousness being a function of the brain. No evidence points otherwise. Current physical models have a difficulty in marrying our generic concept of consciousness with the mechanics of the brain. Many models are proposed that can marry these two in such a way that it is easier to conceive of what is happening. BUT, they do not supercede the underlying physics, and should ultimately reduce to physical reality.
I appreciate the citations and information you've put forward. It has been a good conversation. But I can show you exactly what I would need to doubt the idea that consciousness does not result from the brain.
1. Provide an evidence based model that shows consciousness as necessarily existing apart from the brain. One that does not, and cannot, reduce down to the physical reality of the brain.
Because everything I know of reduces down to an evidence based model that shows consciousness as necessarily originating from the brain. If you can provide one, and it withstands an examination, I will concede that consciousness may be separate from the brain. If not, then I have no rational choice but to accept that consciousness is a function of the brain.