It's great you're digging into this, but you will need to understand that you can't both agree with Chalmer's argument, and also hold that consciousness is physical. — Wayfarer

Oh, I don't agree with it. I just don't have a problem with it. When he defined what it was that was separate from 'physical', I understood what he meant. Chalmers is not asserting that subjective consciousness is necessarily separate from the brain. What he's saying is we can't at this moment measure it as a physical entity, and that I have agreed with the entire time. Just like we can't measure space as a physical entity, nor can we measure time as a physical entity. And in this, subjective consciousness is not 'physical'. But it doesn't mean its apart from the physical, or that its even its own entity.

He's using physical in the sense of 'the physical and mental'. It doesn't mean the mental is existent in some reality, just like being mentally unconscious doesn't mean your physical brain is in a state of unconsciousness. He's not claiming mental as 'some other thing existence'. Its a classification of a state of being. And we know as beings, that we are physical. As long as none of his claims outright deny the idea that consciousness does not have a physical origin, I'm fine with it.

David Chalmers: "It's not physical"

Yes, this is his opinion to the solution of the hard problem, but not the hard problem itself. I still believe what I have said does not contradict what the underlying issue of the hard problem is. I disagree with his solution to the problem, because he also currently has no evidence to deny that subjective consciousness could be an aspect of matter and energy. The only thing he can truly conclude is that we cannot be other matter that has the subjective experience, therefore we cannot measure it. If you listened to the rest of the video, he notes that scientists right now are working to correlate their own subjective experiences with their brain states, something I've noted before. His, "Not physical" at best is using a category that does not require us to know whether it is physical or not. Which here, I have no disagreement again.

he says it might be an additional property that is associated with matter (a position which is called 'panpsychism'). But it's crucial to recognize that he doesn't say it can be explained in terms of known physical properties. He says that science has to admit consciousness as a fundamental property. By that he means it is irreducible, it can't be explained in terms of something else. — Wayfarer

No, he does not mean that it can't be explained in terms of something else if he is intending it to be like space or time. Space is a concept we use in relation to matter. We measure it with matter, yet space itself is not matter, but the absence of it. Time is not an existent 'material' concept, but it is is determined by watching and recording the differences in materials. Subjective consciousness as well, if it can only be known by being a material, is still known and defined in terms of the material that it is. Chalmers cannot deny this by his own reasoning. Just that we can't directly measure what it is like to be some other thing.

So if he wants to claim subjective consciousness as an existence that cannot be directly measured like space or time, I'm fine with this. He's not claiming that space and time exist apart from matter and energy, and he has no legs to claim with any evidence that consciousness is not in the same boat. This fits fine into the behavior version of consciousness, and simply gives another linguistic approach to the discussion. I certainly don't see it as a paradigm shift. It gives no argument that the brain does not or cannot cause consciousness, or that consciousness could exist without matter and energy. At most, its an option we can explore, of which I have always been open to.

Right. There's your 'thinking stuff' again. — Wayfarer

Just like Chalmers came up with his ideas using 'thinking stuff' too. He's just a man like you or me. Its fine if you don't agree with my conclusions, but don't discount thinking and questioning ideas, because you will subtly be against it in yourself as well. People move forward and discover by using the proposals, thoughts, and ideas of others as a springboard for new and better ideas. The alternative is dogma, and the elevation of an idea to a pedestal where most do not belong. It is great that you like the idea of subjective consciousness as another category of thinking, but I think the idea that the existence of the hard problem leads to the necessary conclusion that it is some other form of existence unrelated to matter and energy, does not follow.

Tim, all I'm feeling over here is hostility and not a discussion. Lets just shelve this one and I'll catch you on another thread.

Last things first: philosophy is not logic — tim wood

I highly disagree Tim. Without logic, philosophy is simply imagination and emotional exploration. These are elements of philosophy, but the tie that binds them together to be philosophy is logic.

Your views (near as I can tell) are reductionist, legalistic, amoral, and inhuman. — tim wood

You have not asked me why I have those views or have come to my conclusions. You are assuming things that I don't think are true here. Perhaps they are, but neither you nor I will be able to confirm that if you aren't interested as to why I've made my conclusions.

And partner with that is the expectation that the guest and the stranger will themselves meet certain standards of behavior. I would like to see something like that employed at the US Southern border: respect, courtesy, concern and care, and the possibility of entry on meeting certain conditions. — tim wood

We have that today. If you enter through legal means you are treated just like that. Its those crossing the border without permission that generate much of the anger in America. I'm feeling this is more of a political and personal issue to you then a philosophical discussion. I don't care about politics, and I like to think of the subjects from a stable base that builds a compelling argument. If you're interested in that, I'm interested. But if this is a political or venue to assume I'm evil because I conclude something you dislike without exploring more, I'm not.

That is not what Chalmer's says at all. So stop saying that you're 'interpreting' or 'supporting' Chalmer's argument, when you're actually disagreeing with it. If you were honest, what you would say is 'there is no hard problem as Chalmers describes it'. — Wayfarer

I decided to get Chalmer's words himself.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=yHTiQrrUhUA

Check out around 6:40. His notes are:

"The hard problem is concerned with phenomenal consciousness: what its like to be a subject.

At 8:26 he goes into the Easy problem. Again, this is about consciousness as behavior.

We have to be careful when we speak of consciousness to understand the implicit aspect that we're talking about. When I say, "Consciousness is your brain" I'm talking about the behavioral aspect of consciousness, which has not been refuted as of today.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bejm1mYsr5s

In this video at about 5:40 to the end, he covers what he means by 'consciousness as a subjective experience is immaterial'. He notes its like space, time, etc. Of this, I have no problem. This is a question I've been asking for some time now from you Wayfarer, "What is it for consciousness to not be physical?" Here Chalmers gives a clear reply. And this definition of 'not physical', I have no problem with. Its a classification of category, not a claim that, "It is not matter and energy". Just like we cannot have space without matter, and time without matter, it is not a claim that we can have consciousness without matter. This definition of 'immaterial' is perfectly fine for me. This is because it is the creation of a concept within reality that does not care as to the specifics of its makeup. As long as one does not conclude from this that consciousness exists as some essence apart from the physical reality we live in, its fine.

Information itself is not a medium. If I transmit information electronically, the medium is copper or electromagnetic waves, or through speech as sound waves in the air. They are physical media. But the interpretation of information is not a physical process, and information is not physical — Wayfarer

If it is not a physical process, then what is it Wayfarer? I've already described a radio. I've already noted the brain processes information through the senses, and I don't think you deny those are physical. Its fine to claim its not physical, but if you can not demonstrate it as something else, then I don't see it being viable.

Humans build radios to do that and then interpret the sounds as meaningful. There is nothing in the 'physical world', if you mean the world outside human affairs, that will do that. — Wayfarer

Ok, but you're not countering the point that information can be interpreted by physical things. If humans are physical, then there is nothing odd with them interpreting information either. I think the only way this works for you is if its assumed that humans aren't physical. Since this is not the general viewpoint, we need to provide evidence that they aren't physical. Otherwise my point that information can exist a physical medium and physical interpretation holds.

For decades, radio telescopes have been scanning the universe looking for signals from intelligent life. Overall, they've found none (with one possible exception.) All the signals so far have a physical or natural origin. If they found a signal originated by an alien intelligence, it would be something other than physical or natural. — Wayfarer

I was with you until you said it had to be something other than physical. We don't even know if something other than the physical exists.

As noted, psychosomatic medicine, the placebo effect, etc, undercut physicalist accounts of mind. — Wayfarer

This does not if one assumes that consciousness is an aspect of physical reality like 'wetness'. In which case consciousness is also a part of physical reality, and conscious thoughts could affect the brain and body.

I am not understanding what you aren't understanding. Why risk the fate of a country on an issue so complex on average citizens and not experts in that field that have access to information that the general public may not. like I said in my previous post, it should be down experts chosen by elected officials. — Samlw

Democratically elected right? We're talking about the same thing. Ultimately this is the people choosing, through representatives usually.

If someone broke into your house for a warm nights sleep when its cold outside, when you did not want to invite them in yourself, that's a violation of your sovereignty of your home.
— Philosophim

Again, the comparison doesn't meet the severity of the topic. I understand the logic you are trying to use however you simply cannot use a blanket answer from the situation you just described as the answer for a topic that is so complex as immigration. — Samlw

Then I don't understand your topic. This seemed to be to be a sovereignty vs justifications for breaking sovereignty question. What is your point? You use illegal immigration combined with the question of who to let in and not. Are these meant to be part of the same topic, or different questions?

My answer was that a country should decide who to let in, and not. Period. The morality is sovereignty, and the idea that a country is best equipped to handle its own immigration based on a complex number of factors that only a society can handle itself. As such, there is no justification that I can see for illegally entering into a country and living there against its citizens wishes.

What do you think about this?

And I think THIS is definitely debatable. It is the moral question of whether the person in control of the land/property should or should not let a person in.
— Philosophim

This is literally the question from the start. — Samlw

Yes, and I've put my answer forth. Now why do you disagree? To be clear, my answer is: Nations can manage their own immigration issues. If a nation freely decides to limit or let in more immigrants, that's their decision." There is no, "A nation should let immigrants in when X, Y, and Z happens" if people don't want to. Immigration is a willingness of its citizens to accept foreign change and influx, it is not a moral responsibility.

They could instead fight for their own country, or move to a place in their country that is not affected by war.
— Philosophim

Both of those options are terrible, either potentially die and kill people for your country, or move to a poor place due to your country being war-torn and have a terrible quality of life. — Samlw

These are less ideal choices yes, but not choices that compel others morally to provide them the more optimal choice. Life is often unfair, cruel, and less than ideal. It is not a moral responsibility of anybody to make life fair for everyone else across the board, because that takes time, resources, and effort that people are generally using on themselves to make their own life acceptable first. And by 'moral responsibility' that if they don't do this, someone else has the right to take from them, or coerce them to assist others.

Can I ask what happens if a majority of a nation voted for open borders and the country gets ruined because of it? — Samlw

Then they made a mistake obviously. Why it got ruined would be the question here. Was it because they didn't understand the culture they were letting in? They were too altruistic for their limited resources? The issue is not whether legal immigration vs illegal immigration is moral in this case, but whether they made a misjudgement. If you're looking for a benefit vs cost analysis on a countries capacity for immigration, that's fine. If you're looking for a moral justification for illegal immigration, I still have yet to see it.

You are comparing someone who has potentially escaped a war zone, their family killed, scared and not knowing where to go. To someone stealing a car... — Samlw

No, I was comparing to Tim's scenario. My point was that he was already assuming that if a person commits a crime, they have moral justification for doing so. They do not. A crime committed alone does not determine whether that crime was morally justified. If you believe a crime is morally justified, then you need to explain why, not just assume the crime is morally justified.

If you're claiming illegal immigration is morally justified because the other illegally entering person does not get the benefits they want, I don't agree. If someone broke into your house for a warm nights sleep when its cold outside, when you did not want to invite them in yourself, that's a violation of your sovereignty of your home. Now, we could argue that you denying the person a place to sleep, despite not knowing what quality of character they are, is immoral. And I think THIS is definitely debatable. It is the moral question of whether the person in control of the land/property should or should not let a person in.

I believe that the sovereignty of one's property is in the decision of the person. We can judge their decisions as who to let in or not let in as immoral, but defying that decision because someone else wants the benefit of being on that property needs a good reason. I can't see any viable reason except in matters of immediate life or death, and In the case of a nations decision, I see even less of a good reason why someone should force themselves in to live there against the wishes of its people.

In the case of a refugee for example, it is not a life or death situation that they travel to a country that does not want them. They could instead fight for their own country, or move to a place in their country that is not affected by war. It is not an immediate life or death situation in most war torn situations for people to immigrate to a new country. Its more convenient, higher quality of life, and much more beneficial. But it is a want, not a need. Therefore I see no justification in illegally going to one.

No moral issue? Another categorical statement? Well, maybe not for you. — tim wood

Then please explain how it can be moral.

Assuming they have a good reason for being here, likely necessity, there is nothing immoral about it - the necessity being instead grounds for a moral claim. — tim wood

This is a lot of assuming. That would be like me saying, "Assuming people have a good reason for stealing your car, there is nothing immoral about it - the necessity being instead grounds for a moral claim." Can you note when you think it is moral to illegally immigrate somewhere, and why it is moral for a country to allow that illegal immigrant to be there? This is not an emotional issue for me or a "Its obvious" question. Lets engage in philosophy, the logic of it all.

Physical processes don't suggest conscious awareness, unless you mean behavior. The physical processes that don't suggest awareness don't suggest the absence of conscious awareness either. Nor do they suggest that awareness could not arise from physical processes.

You ask why subjective awareness at all. Presuming it is a real thing then why not? We have a subjective prejudice that physical stuff could not have subjective experience. Exactly what would be the argument supporting that conclusion? We have nothing to compare our situation with so it remains just an assumption based on intuitive feelings I think. — Janus

Well said Janus.

Again, that is not the point of David Chalmer's essay, Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. I'm taking issue with your paraphrase of his argument. If you want to argue that this is what he should say, feel free. But it's not what he does say. — Wayfarer

As I've noted before, I'm not quoting Chalmers. I appreciate the point out to Chalmer's words, but I'm simply noting the underlying support and reason for the hard problem. Think of it this way. Lets say that we could examine a brain, and objectively know exactly what it feels like when that brain functions in a particular way. The hard problem would disappear. But as long as we can never objectively know what its like to have the subjective experience of another being, the hard problem stays.

Again, it's not what he says. He says that there is no satisfactory theoretical account of ANY conscious experience, not just of other people's or of animals. — Wayfarer

Again, I'm not quoting Chalmers. As to what he's talking about, its not behavior. Its the fact that we cannot experience the subjective experience of another being. We are not in disagreement on this.

Drugs can alter mood and behavior, and brain damage can lead to significant changes in consciousness and personality. But this doesn't demonstrate that consciousness is entirely a product of brain activity. — Wayfarer

True, but do we have evidence of something independent of the brain in regards to consciousness?

Neuroplasticity—the brain’s ability to reorganize itself by forming new neural connections—shows that consciously undertaken actions and thoughts can have real, measurable effects on the brain’s structure and function. — Wayfarer

The fallacy here is the assumption that consciousness is independent of the brain. If it is not, and simply a result of the brains functions, it is the brain affecting the brain. While an interesting avenue to look into something independent of the brain, we need evidence of that something for this to be a viable point.

This is an example of top-down causation, where mental processes, such as attention, intention, and practice, influence neurophysiological changes, distinct from the bottom-up causation that is implied by physicalism. Your proposed schema is all 'bottom-up'. — Wayfarer

My proposal doesn't use top or bottom. I simply believe that physical matter and energy can have subjective experiences. It is a property of matter like, dry, wet, sandy, etc. It is what it is 'to be'. To what point? I don't know. That's the hard problem. We can't know what its like for a skin cell to be that skin cell. At what point does a clump of brain cells have a subjective experience? Is the subjective experience of being drunk the same across every individual? We can't objectively know.

Furthermore, the analogy of the brain as a receiver rather than just the generator of consciousness provides a different way to look at this issue. Just as a radio receives and tunes into waves without generating them, the brain may play a focusing or filtering role, modulating and organizing conscious experience but not wholly creating it — Wayfarer

Sure. I have no problem with this idea. But do we have evidence that the brain is only a receiver? We do have evidence in regards to how the senses are processed. So in that regard, it is. But as for consciousness, where does the brain receive this? How? Is there some type of measurement we can find that shows there is something independent of the brain affecting the brain? For that, we don't. So while its a nice idea to explore, the lack of evidence leads this to a dead end.

We have no scientific theories that explain how brain activity—or computer activity, or any other kind of physical activity—could cause, or be, or somehow give rise to, conscious experience. We don’t have even one idea that’s remotely plausible — Donald Hoffman, The Case Against Reality, Pp 18-19

Correct, and I am not disagreeing with this. What he is not saying is, "Consciousness is not physical." What he's really asking implicitly is, "Why is consciousness physical?" Why can something physical have a subjective experience? To me, its like asking why water is wet. Why does a rock exist at all? Why is there something instead of nothing? It is the mystery of being.

What do we want in a scientific theory of consciousness? Consider the case of tasting basil versus hearing a siren. For a theory that proposes that brain activity causes conscious experiences, we want mathematical laws or principles that state precisely which brain activities cause the conscious experience of tasting basil, precisely why this activity does not cause the experience of, say, hearing a siren, and precisely how this activity must change to transform the experience from tasting basil to, say, tasting rosemary. These laws or principles must apply across species, or else explain precisely why different species require different laws. No such laws, indeed no plausible ideas, have ever been proposed. — Donald Hoffman, The Case Against Reality, Pp 18-19

Again, nothing that I've said contradicts this. At the crux of it all, why is this? Because we cannot objectively determine what its like to have the subjective experience of tasting basil. I can know what its like for me, and you can know what its like for you. But we can't objectively know what its like for the other person.

Information doesn't exist in the same way that matter and energy do—it isn't a physical substance or force. Instead, information exists in the relationships between entities, and its significance depends on interpretation. — Wayfarer

And yet wasn't there a relationship between the radio waves, the radio, and then the sound played? Isn't an interpretation a physical response to stimulus or an event?

The book itself is not one thing and its meaning another; rather, the meaning emerges through the interaction between the symbols on the page and a mind capable of understanding them. — Wayfarer

Your book example is spot on. And I can agree that we can have an interpretation of information as both a medium which exists, and the interplay between that medium and an interpreter. What hasn't been shown is the noun or the interpretation of information that isn't through some physical medium. Can you think of one?

Information, in this sense, is relational. It depends on the patterns or structures that carry meaning and on the existence of an interpreter. This makes information fundamentally different from matter and energy—it’s not a physical object but something that manifests through relationships and interpretation. — Wayfarer

What are thing things in relationship, and what is doing the interpreting? What is easier to state with what we know, is that matter and energy can hold particular states (information as noun) and can have reactions when that state collides with another state which we call an interpreter (information as relation). What is wrong with saying that this is an aspect of the physical world, when we have evidence of a radio interpreting waves?

What I'm noting is that the standard model of science posits that the brain is the source of human consciousness, at least in terms of behavior.
— Philosophim

I think, actually, that you will find that a very difficult claim to support. You assume that this is what science posits, but there's some important background you're missing here.

At the beginning of modern science, proper, 'consciousness' in the first person sense was excluded from the objects of consideration. — Wayfarer

I want to be clear again, I am noting that science can measure consciousness as behavior, and agree 100% with you that it cannot currently objectively know the first person sense of it. As for behavior, the entirety of neuroscience, pharmacology, and psychiatry operates and functions as if consciousness as a behavior is an objective result of the mind. Without this, the entirety of modern medicine would not work.

Now, when you say 'the standard model of science', this is what you mean (whether you're aware of it or not.) And within that model the only 'real objects' are, well, objects. If 'mind' or 'consciousness' can be said to exist, then it can only be as a product of those objects. That's why you're incredulous at the denial of a causal relationship between brain and mind - to you, it's just 'the way things are'. But I'm afraid it doesn't hold up to philosophical scrutiny. — Wayfarer

I don't believe its a product of these objects. I believe it is the experience of being these objects. If it was a product, we could see it. We can't see it, because we aren't 'what it is like to be that'. The radio exists. What is it like to be it? The cells in your feet exist. What is it like to be those living cells? Its not a product, its an aspect of being that matter and energy has. The only way to know, is to be it.

Does this sound far fetched? Go with me for a second and take the idea that you're a physical being. Then you are 'something'. You are the existence of that. Not a chair over there, or the light bouncing around. You are a physical human being, and that is what it is like for you to exist. If you were 'something else' then you would be what it is like to be 'that something else'. Why keep introducing 'something else' when we have no evidence for it? Why introduce unnecessary complexity when we have the simple answer in front of us that works in accordance near perfectly with the behavior aspect of consciousness as well?

Regardless Wayfarer, thank you for tackling those points again. You're an intelligent and well spoken person, and I do enjoy reading your perspective even if I don't always agree on it. We also may be going around and around at this point, and if you feel we're rehashing old ground, you have my respect if you feel there is nothing more to add.

If we use the Turing_Chalmers' argument to the effect: a cyborg externally programmed to behave like a conscious human will appear to be conscious i.e., have a selfhood without that actually being the case, then we cannot be certain that an observed person is really internally conscious i.e., in possession of a selfhood. — ucarr

What we don't know if whether the robot actually has a subjective experience of being a robot. Its does not have to be the consciousness of a human to have a subjective experience. A dog likely has a subjective experience because of its behavior, but we still don't know what its like to BE a dog.

To quote Patterner:

As you say, re: the rock's possible subjective experience, we simply assume not. So, possibly (but unlikely) the rock could be suppressing it's selfhood from expressing as behavior so as to keep its selfhood hidden from observers.
— ucarr
Another (unlikely) possibility is the rock subjectively experiences, but has no capability of expressing any behaviors. Maybe it's exactly what we think it is, but conscious. — Patterner

I've underlined the part of your above quote wherein you describe what it's like to be a color blind person without being one yourself. How is it that you can do that? You have enough information, both from science and from descriptions given by color blind persons to approximate in your understanding what the experience of color blindness is like. There is presumably some degree of separation between what the actually color blind person experiences subjectively, and your cognitive simulation of that experience but, again, I claim the difference is by a navigable degree, not by an impenetrable categorical difference. — ucarr

Its not unnavigatable, its just not objective. We take these conclusions through behaviors, approximations, and logical applications. I can imagine what it is like to be confused about something I see. So I take that feeling, and combine it with colors. Then I imagine two colors, and both are grey. Now I have an approximate understanding of what its like to be color blind, but I still don't have the objective 'subjective experience' of an actual color blind person.

Its like describing an apple to someone. You could probably make a pretty good approximation through descriptions based on what people know that aren't apples. But you wouldn't actually know what an apple was like until you saw it front of you. Until you tasted it yourself.

Or to be simpler, if you believe nations cannot do wrong or be wrong, then what is there to discuss? — tim wood

No, I'm noting that a nation run largely by its people are free to decide their immigration policy. If they feel they don't have enough immigrants, they can open their doors. If they feel they have enough, they can close them. If there are mistakes for that nation in having too little and too much immigration, a nation is free to change it to fix these issues, and I see no broader moral issue here. In any case, I see no moral justification for illegal immigration.

I did ask if you had an example you wanted to cover. Since you don't, and I've stated my points, then I suppose the discussion has reached its end.

Yes and No. Yes, we know that it happens in the brain. No, we do not know HOW. That's the HPoC. — Patterner

We're really not that far off from one another. Please don't take my disagreement as hostile. :) The reason why we don't know how is because we cannot currently know what its like to be the thing having the subjective experience. If we could, the hard problem would be solved.

I am the being having the subjective experience. That does not help me understand how it is achieved. — Patterner

Actually, you could determine how you experience. If you were in brain surgery and a doctor stimulated a region of your brain in the same way and you experienced a sensation every time, you would know how to create the sensation by stimulation your brain. In a less sense, we do this with drugs like alcohol, caffiene, or pain killers. You are the only one who knows what it feels like however. We can't take, "the state of Patterner's subjective experience," and say, "Any time a person drinks alcohol, they will have the same subjective experience of being tipsy as Patterner does."

We do not know how to go about the HP. That's why it's named the Hard. Because we don't know. How is all of that subjectively experienced? — Patterner

Right. We're along the same lines here again. This is because we can't know what its like objectively for something else to experience being them. That's all there is to it.

Physicist Brian Greene says there are no known properties of matter that even hint at such a thing. Why do I see red, rather than just perceive different frequencies, the way a robot with an electric eye might? — Patterner

The problem is we're looking at matter and energy externally for behavior. Since we cannot look internally to see what the experience of being that thing is like, we're stuck for now. Do we know how a robot with an electric eye experiences processing? We don't. We can observe behaviors, break it down into its bytes and bits, but when the entire process is running, when the code is flying by at millions of bytes per second, processes being monitored and checked...what is the experience like? We don't know. We currently can't know.

These things can, and do, take place without any subjective experience. — Patterner

Incorrect. We don't know. Just like I don't know if you have a subjective experience that is like mine at all. We do not know if a robot or a program doesn't have a subjective experience. It doesn't behave like a consciousness, but it doesn't mean there isn't a subjective experience. What is it like to be a bacteria? It responds, eats, and divides. What is it like to the be cells in my hands? The blood in my veins? All of these are living things. Do they have a subjective experience of being? We can't tell, because we can't BE the thing we're looking at.

I think your point above makes an important clarification: there's something about the native point of view of the sentient that obstructs, so far, our understanding how (or if) physical processes give rise to the subjective experience. — ucarr

Yes, that's correct.

As I understand you, you're implying that the subjectivity of the sentient is insuperable i.e., it is a container which has no exit. — ucarr

Also correct.

If it’s true that the subjectivity of the sentient is insuperable, that then calls into question the possibility of objectivity in general. If the sentient cannot know what it’s like to be beyond its own subjective being, then it follows that the sentient cannot know what it’s like for anything, other than itself, to be, whether a stone, a galaxy or another person. — ucarr

Because we go by behavior. Lets say I eat a poison apple and get sick. My eyes glaze over, my pulse races, and I start to sweat remnants of the poison. That's a physical reality that does not depend on how the personal is personally experiencing the sensations of being poisoned.

It sounds strange, but, in my context here, when we claim to know the chemical composition/interactions of a rock, we’re also claiming to know “what it’s like to be that rock.” — ucarr

Its not strange at all. We objectively do not know what its like to be that rock. What we do is look at the measurable existence of the rock and 'its behavior'. Since we do not ascribe anything the rock 'does' to an internal locus, we say it doesn't behave like its conscious. But do we objectively know it does not have a subjective experience? No. We simply assume.

To be sure, knowing a rock by knowing its chemical composition/interactions is a much more simple phenomenon than knowing another person by knowing their consciousness, but the difference is a difference of degree, not a categorical difference. — ucarr

The difference is that a human has different behaviors that we ascribe to being conscious. But we cannot objectively know what its like for that other human to have the subjective experience of being themself.

If we’re locked out of objectivity because of insuperable subjectivity, then we’re thrown all the way back to securing our beliefs on the basis of faith rather than on the basis of science. — ucarr

We are locked out of objectivity in determining the subjective experience of any existence. It is faith that you and I share a similar consciousness. We can note that our behavior may be different, but that doesn't mean our subjective experience during that behavior is different or the same. For example, we could both see the color green, but I subjectively experience it differently then you. Indeed, some people are color blind. This means their subjective experience of green is so similar to another set of colors, that they can't really tell much of a difference. But can a color sighted person every objectively know what that's like? No.

Existentialism, which is centered on “existence precedes essence,” gives us a way forward with our database of scientific disciplines and their methodologies. We, as existentialists, can assert that we don’t really know the world beyond realistic-seeming narratives that, ultimately, in the absence of epistemological certainty, we hold as true on the basis of faith. — ucarr

This seems to hold on a surface level. Great points Ucarr!

How do you feel about slavery? Do you think the Taliban are doing a good and admirable job of governing Afghanistan? How abut Iran? Or if the US state of Texas (et al) criminalizes abortion, well done them, yes? — tim wood

None of this has anything to do with the topic of immigration.

How about if the will of the American public is to deliver all of its "illegal" immigrants to England. Why should the English object? — tim wood

Because each nation can determine their own immigration policy. If England doesn't want America's immigrants, it has the right to say no.

We know that an individual can do wrong. Your proposition amounts to saying that in a group constituted in any of a particular set of ways, those people so constituted can do no wrong, or at least nothing you could object to. Which I think is ridiculous and absurd. Are you that? Or have you just misspoke? — tim wood

There's a large emotional undercurrent for you here that isn't come out as points or policy yet. So I'll ask to focus the conversation. What's wrong with a democratic nation deciding how much immigration it wants to let in? If you believe that a democratic nation can make a wrong choice in its immigration policy, what is it, why? If there is a problem, what would fix it?

You may have addressed it, but you are still using an inaccurate definition of the HPoC. As J pointed out early on: — Patterner

And I'll note again, the only reason we cannot figure out how physical processes give rise to the subjective experiences of the mind is because we have no way of objectively knowing what it is to hold that subjective experience, because you must BE that being having that subjective experience.

It is NOT that we don't understand that the brain causes subjective experiences. We know portions of the brain that affect the different interpretation of sensations we have. We can stimulate areas of the brain and a person can say, "When you do that, I imagine a dog." What we cannot do is know what they are experiencing directly when they say, "I imagine a dog". When a patient takes a particular type of medication, they feel woozy. This is an objective fact. Do we know what its like for the patient to have the subjective experience they have when they say, "I feel woozy?" No. So we can never objectively note what 'woozy' is as a subjective experience, only an observed behavior. That's the crux of the hard problem.

These things change various aspects of how the brain works, and, therefore, what we subjectively experience. They don't address how it is that we subjectively experience them at all. That's the HPoC. — Patterner

No, that's the easy problem.
"For Chalmers, the easy problem is making progress in explaining cognitive functions and discovering how they arise from physical processes in the brain. The hard problem is accounting for why these functions are accompanied by conscious experience."

https://www.jstor.org/stable/43853850#:~:text=For%20Chalmers%2C%20the%20easy%20problem,are%20accompanied%20by%20conscious%20experience.

And why is it hard to find why these functions are accompanied by conscious experience? Because we cannot know what it is like to BE that other conscious experience. Consciousness as a behavior is simple to observe. Consciousness as a subjective experience can only be known by being that subjective experience.

So when we give a drug that treats schizophrenia, we know that it works by behavior. We don't know what its like to be that person having schizophrenia, or what they are feeling as a subjective experience when they take the medicine. That's it.

It is not in any way an implication that the brain is not the source of consciousness. It does not in any way negate the behavior based approach to consciuosness and mental health that has worked for decades. It does not negate the fact that the brain causes your subjective experiences. Its just noting that because we can never know what its like for another being to experience their own subjective experience, we cannot objectively match brain state "X, Y, Z" and say, "Whenever X, Y, Z is matched, all people will experience the exact same subjective sensation of wooziness." We might see they all have the same behavior, but we can never objectively know what each individuals subjective experience of 'woozy' is.

Is factually incorrect. Chalmer’s argument is directed at the inadequacy of physical accounts to accurately capture first-person experience, yours or anyone else’s. — Wayfarer

Didn't you and I already address this on your first response to me? My point was that the heart of why this was is because we cannot know what its like to be another subjective individual. However, I'm not sure I tackled why I say 'other'. Neurolink is a physical account of a first person experience to the person experiencing the link. Otherwise it wouldn't function. It it by the conscious willing of the individual that the link work. When they have a particular feeling, they can trigger the link. So we have a physical account and a subjective account. However, no one else can know what that feeling is like, only the person feeling it.

Against better judgement, I will tackle some of these arguments. — Wayfarer

I don't understand why you feel this way. If you're going to argue your position convincingly to someone else, you need to be open to tackling them. Even if we disagree, the result of thinking about them may produce something else down the road for both of us.

Firstly, your response begs the question of whether and in what sense physical matter is conscious, or alternatively whether conscious beings are physical. You're assuming that a self-aware being can (1) be reduced to 'a brain', and (2) comprises only matter and energy. But whether these are true are the very things that need to be explained, hence, begging the question. — Wayfarer

Not quite, but I might need to be more explicit about this. What I'm noting is that the standard model of science posits that the brain is the source of human consciousness, at least in terms of behavior. What I'm asking you is this, "What does this model fail to explain?" besides being able to objectively model personal subjective experience? Second, "What alternative can you present that explains it better, and has evidence of existing?"

As for the brain being aware of itself, that is another contested claim. Brains themselves aren't aware of anything unless they're embodied in a conscious being. Certainly conscious self-aware beings have brains (although there are some strange anomalies) but saying that 'brains are aware' is described in The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience as 'the mereological fallacy', that is, attributing to an anatomical part something that can only be rightly attributed to the whole being. — Wayfarer

I think we're cutting hairs in context here. My point is that consciousness comes from the brain, and the brain is composed of matter and energy. Therefore consciousness is a property of a physical object. Short hand for this I'm using the phrase, "Brains are aware", but if that phrase bothers you, the sentences above are the intention. Also, you'll have to explain this sentence to me a little more: "Brains themselves aren't aware of anything unless they're embodied in a conscious being." This is 'begging the question'. What is a conscious being that is not a brain? How does a brain embody a conscious being?

What I do note is that we cannot know what its like to BE that consciousness, therefore we cannot objectively measure what its like to have a subjective experience as that physical matter. Which to me, opens up the question of how much matter and energy in the universe is conscious. Since we cannot know what its like to be other matter, and we only determine consciousness objectively by behavior, are there things we think aren't 'behavior', but are? But i digress and I hope you see the argument.

As to ' physics of a note an air vibration against a metal Tuba?', why only tubas, of all the instruments in the world? And so what? What does that prove? — Wayfarer

To put a little levity in the conversation I hope. :) Pick any instrument of course.

The fact that Bach’s music is transmitted through the radio also has precisely zero bearing. Yes, sound waves are physical, but your hearing of the music as music is not physical, for reasons outlined in Facing Up to the Probem of Consciousness, which you don't recognize. — Wayfarer

That would be 'interpretation of information'. Are you saying that if no one is around to hear the radio waves play, the information doesn't exist? The radio was the mechanical interpretation of the waves into the vibration of sound, showing a complete physical process of information, transmission, and interpretation. You seem to think that information can only matter if a human is involved. But if information can exist apart from matter and energy, how can this be?

I have been more than fair in presenting what would be needed to help your point gain footing.
— Philosophim

And I have answered them. — Wayfarer

Some of them. You didn't answer my 3 points, which I was referring to here.

Alright, then try to counter these points, because these points note that our autonomy is physical.

1. Drugs that affect mood and decisions. A person getting cured of schizophrenia by medication for example.

2. The removal of the brain or physical processes that result in life from the brain, and the inability of autonomy to persist.

3. Brain damage resulting in differing behaviors and consciousness. — Philosophim

Two persons understand each other to a limited degree because they share important attributes common to personhood.

We share our stories because the bond of human identity allows us to walk a mile in each others' shoes. How much we relate to another person varies widely, but the connection rarely drops to zero. — ucarr

Its a nice attitude Ucarr. Nothing wrong with holding that. :)

I would agree with ucarr that the basic sense of self is plausibly thought to be the same across species. Obviously this is not an empirically checkable assertion. It seems that almost nothing in philosophy is. — Janus

I wouldn't say its plausible that the sense of self is the same across species. Even among humans, its known that people have different sense of selves. Did you know that some people cannot mentally visualize? When they close their eyes, all that's there is darkness. That would clearly be a different sense of self then someone who visualizes. Now compare that to a dog, a lizard, and a house fly who have different dna and brain compositions. I'm not saying they don't have a sense of self, but I don't think its plausible that they are the same.

I would argue as well that poor philosophy is that which cannot be verified, or has no pathways to verify it. Good philosophy does, and eventually becomes part of science or is incorporated into culture.

As far as I know Bach composed no symphonies. Concertos yes. — Janus

Ha ha! I only used Bach because I didn't want to type a longer name. :D Thanks, I'll stop using that example.

FTR, Bach did not write any symphonies. — Patterner

See above.

If the brain is aware of itself, and the brain is matter and energy, then matter and energy in the right circumstances can be aware of itself. How is this inadequate? Is there evidence of some existence that is not matter and energy that is aware of itself that we know of?
— Philosophim

Because you could never arrive at an understanding of it through physics and chemistry, which is the analysis of matter and energy. — Wayfarer

Isn't the physics of a note an air vibration against a metal Tuba? Have we not made Bach's first symphony over the radio, which is essentially a physical radio wave that interacts with a radio, vibrations, and can be calculated through physics? This broad claim is not good enough Wayfarer, and doesn't actually answer the question. Not answering the question is the same as saying, "No". You need to demonstrate why example's I've given of matter and energy being aware of itself are false. I gave you three to tackle. If you choose not to tackle them, that's your call. But I have been more than fair in presenting what would be needed to help your point gain footing.

You do understand that all you're arguing for - in fact, pretty well all you ever argue for - is what is called 'physicalist reductionism', don't you? — Wayfarer

It doesn't matter what its called. I just care about the logic. And we're not really talking about my viewpoints, but yours. I'm asking you to present evidence for your viewpoints that makes them a viable logical alternative to explore then what is commonly known today. If you cannot, then it is your viewpoints, not mine, that are circumspect.

In this framework, there is no need to posit non-physical substances or properties. — Wayfarer

If there is no need to posit non-physical substances or properties, and this is a sound and logical position to hold, why should anyone hold anything else? I'm not married to it, but you're not presenting anything that shakes its foundations. If you're done, that's fine. But if you want to give it another stab, feel free.

Then you are content with whatever any country decides to do within its borders - without qualification? I doubt you mean that, but it's what you seem to be saying. — tim wood

If it is the will of the people of that state, I do. Why would you disagree with this?

There are plenty of people in life I don't understand. And I'm sure there are plenty of people in life who don't understand me. Bonding often comes from like goals. Survival, or accomplishing a task together require a closeness and understanding of another person up to a point to get this done. It does not require me to understand exactly what another person is experiencing in life.
— Philosophim

I assert this is an overstatement of the degree of difference_disconnection separating feelings from thoughts in terms of people understanding each other and moreover, it is therefore an overstatement of the degree of sameness_connection necessary for a human to know what it’s like to be a bat. — ucarr

That is because we are different people. Ucarr, I feel very little similarity in myself to other people. I know objectively that I am. But my feelings are worthless. I do not feel what some call "connections" with other people. If I listened to my feelings I would be a lone hermit, and perfectly content to do so. Fortunately, I understand that actions and consequences are far more important than feelings in life.

I am not trying to discount the fact that some aspects of consciousness can be similar. I'm just noting that similarity is not necessary for morality.

I assert there is no impenetrable membrane called what-it’s-like-to-be-an-individualized-self. It’s this mistaken belief that creates the hard problem. It's this mistaken belief that falsely divides subjective from objective. Clearly, the selfhood of the self is the object of that selfsame self's consciousness.

I assert there is a reasonably accurate one-size-fits-all-what-it’s-like-to-be-selfhood, accessible to many if not all sentients, that supports the sympathy and morals essential to the peaceable animal kingdom and civilization. — ucarr

This is a nice thought, but can we demonstrate this to be something known, or will it only remain a belief?

If it is not a soul, what is it?
— Philosophim

A form of existence that is aware of itself. — Wayfarer

Thank you, this is a good answer. That's a theory, which is fine. If the brain is aware of itself, and the brain is matter and energy, then matter and energy in the right circumstances can be aware of itself. How is this inadequate? Is there evidence of some existence that is not matter and energy that is aware of itself that we know of?

If you take a piece of information, be it a formula, a story, a recipe, or whatever, it can be translated between different media such as binary data, handwritten, engraved in brass and so on. The information remains the same while the material form is completely different. So the information is not material. — Wayfarer

You conceive of an identity that ties commonalities between these physical things together, while removing the physical aspects of them. The idea of an abstraction does not entail an actual abstraction that exists apart from matter and energy. Again, if you could show how information can exist apart from any matter or energy, try to do so.

What you're doing is saying, "I can think of information as if its not tied to any physical medium, therefore information can exist not tied to any physical medium." Just like I can think of a unicorn that cannot be sensed or detected through its magic, but cannot prove such a thing exists. Please don't take this as belittling, I'm simply trying to give a clear example of the issue here. It is a very common mistake for us to assume because we can come up with a concept that seems logical and has nothing outright contradicting it in our head, that it is a viable reality outside of our head.

So again, I can have an idea of Bach's first symphony, and we are going with the idea that ideas are matter and energy in the brain. I can have it expressed as notes on a page. I can have it expressed by the playing of a tuba. How does the information of Bach's first symphony exists apart from matter and energy? Can you point to it? How is this not a Platonic form with all the logical problems that it brings?

Its an identity distinction, and there is nothing in the application of this distinction that notes that our functional autonomy is not physical.
— Philosophim

Nothing that can be described only in terms of physics exhibits those atttributes. Taking all of the known laws of physics, there is no way you could arrive at a functional description of an organism. — Wayfarer

Alright, then try to counter these points, because these points note that our autonomy is physical.

1. Drugs that affect mood and decisions. A person getting cured of schizophrenia by medication for example.

2. The removal of the brain or physical processes that result in life from the brain, and the inability of autonomy to persist.

3. Brain damage resulting in differing behaviors and consciousness. For example:

"In ‘split-brain’ patients, the corpus callosum has been surgically cut to alleviate intractable, severe epilepsy. One of the Nobel Prize-winning discoveries in neuroscience is that severing the corpus callosum leads to a curious phenomenon (Fig. 1): when an object is presented in the right visual field, the patient responds correctly verbally and with his/her right hand. However, when an object is presented in the left visual field the patient verbally states that he/she saw nothing, and identifies the object accurately with the left hand only (Gazzaniga et al., 1962; Gazzaniga, 1967; Sperry, 1968, 1984; Wolman, 2012). This is concordant with the human anatomy; the right hemisphere receives visual input from the left visual field and controls the left hand, and vice versa (Penfield and Boldrey, 1937; Cowey, 1979; Sakata and Taira, 1994). Moreover, the left hemisphere is generally the site of language processing (Ojemann et al., 1989; Cantalupo and Hopkins, 2001; Vigneau et al., 2006). Thus, severing the corpus callosum seems to cause each hemisphere to gain its own consciousness "

https://academic.oup.com/brain/article/140/5/1231/2951052

Your challenge is to demonstrate the existence of something that is not matter and energy.
— Philosophim

Your arguments, tendentious though they may be. — Wayfarer

This is not biased, nor even really my argument. If you're going to claim that something exists which is not physical, it is normal to point out any evidence for what it is, and/or why the claim that "X is physical" is unreasonable.

The laws should be whatever the citizens desire in a democratic nation. Do you disagree?
— Philosophim
Can't let this pass. Care to qualify this in some way that will move it from nonsense to sense? — tim wood

My question is this: How do you decide who to let in and who to deny entry?
— Samlw
It's not clear to me that anyone here has understood the question. — tim wood

Looking at the replies I'm receiving, I apparently don't understand the question either.

I am not disagreeing with you, I am simply asking about your independent view on what we can do about this situation, lets dive into the topic and what your personal beliefs are, maybe even come up with an idea. — Samlw

This is my independent view and personal beliefs. Illegal immigration is never justified. There is no, 'right' answer as to how many immigrants can be allowed in to a society, as immigrants often time take societal resources such as enough infrastructure, employment opportunities, and tolerance for cultural dissimilarity and the rate of the melting pot for the society.

The only fair way to judge is to let the society as a whole decide. If you are fairly letting people decide through democratic and representative processes, then that is what works for that society. Any individual going against the wishes of that society is deciding they know better than society, and is morally circumspect.

↪Philosophim I posted a response yesterday:
To say that mind is not reducible to physical constituents, is not to posit some ethereal substance or 'ghost in the machine' (if that is what 'soul' means to you)... — Wayfarer

Yes, I understood that was how you believed I was approaching this. But that doesn't answer how you are approaching this. If it is not a soul, what is it? How Is it different than just a descriptor of personal subjective experiences we all try to hash out with each other?

Information would be a good candidate in our scientific age. 'Information is information, not matter or energy', said one of founders of computer science. 'No materialism which does not admit this can survive at the present day.' Why? Because the same information can be encoded in completely different material forms, and yet still retain its meaning. — Wayfarer

I'm sure they're a great programmer, but not a great epistemologist. I've noted this in the past, but I'll repeat it again. Knowledge only exists expressed in some medium to be interpreted by something else. He's noting information as 'a Platonic form'. What is the form of Bach's first symphony? Does it exist out there as something ethereal, expressed in something other than matter or energy? Maybe it does, but it would have be expressed in that third unknown type of reality.

Otherwise Bach's first symphony can be expressed as information on paper, bits, pictures, and the instruments its played on. Every time its played, that is a unique expression and interpretation of the symphony. Our brain is matter and energy, so too are those concepts. Without a brain to think of them, they are gone.

I think the issue we have as people, and why this idea of the immaterial keeps coming back up, is because we shortcut a lot of concepts to be manageable in day to day life. We have a very active imagination, and are able to cut out the solid reality undergirding those concepts when we get excited at trying to apply them outside of our minds. We get excited at a concept that seems logical in our head, it excites us, and so we want to believe its real. This is great if it is then used as an impetus for exploration, careful application, and the willingness to amend it as tests come back with failures or unforeseen consequences. But if we start to elevate the concepts themselves of applicable testing, we fall into an illusion of holding something true, when it does not deserve it.

When I say that living organisms display attributes and characteristics that cannot be extracted from the laws of chemistry and physics alone, I'm pointing to the fact that organisms are fundamentally different from machines. Unlike machines, which serve purposes imposed on them from the outside, living organisms exhibit intrinsic agency and functional autonomy. — Wayfarer

That's simply because we don't program most machines to be this way. I think you're confusing the fact that we design machines, and we don't often design them with intrinsic agency and functional autonomy.
If we want to program something with limited internal agency, we can. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hCmrMOzx5VA
We set AI to have goals, and to learn over repeated attempts. While the game is a simple example, we use it to teach machines as well.

Now you might think we're different, but we're really not by much. We have emotions and internal processes that drive us don't we? If you're hungry enough, you'll eat. Gotta pee? You find a way to do that. A child pees wherever until they learn just like a brand new AI that has basic functionality. And that's all a physical process. Noting that we have agency is not the same as demonstrating why that agency is separate from our physical brain.

This fundamental distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic purpose is key to understanding why organisms cannot be reduced to mere physical or chemical mechanisms. — Wayfarer

Its an identity distinction, and there is nothing in the application of this distinction that notes that our functional autonomy is not physical. Just because you can have the idea that its somehow separate, does not mean you've demonstrated that this idea works when applied. Can you show how human autonomy can exist apart from the brain? That's the real question here.

I’m trying to get the point across that why it seems so obvious that only the physical can be real, is because of the way the problem has been set up in our culture. It is why when the question is asked ‘what alternative is there?’ the expectation is that the answer must necessarily entail something spooky. — Wayfarer

I'm asking the question, "What alternative is there?" and not expecting it to be spooky from you in particular. Your challenge is to demonstrate the existence of something that is not matter and energy. Saying, "I don't think matter and energy explains everything" is not enough.

Your answers are sidestepping the purpose of the OP. — Leontiskos

You sidestepped my answer and question. If you disagree with them, point out why please. I plainly entered into the discussion as one of those democratic citizens. I firmly believe that each nation should be able to vote to decide how immigration works. If a nation wishes to have full and free immigration, then they can. If they want to be restrictive, then they can. It is up to the individuals of each nation to determine what they as a nation can allow in without risk to resources, population limits, housing, food, etc. There is no one size fits all, because every nation has different limits they have to consider.

What if there is not only individualized what-it's-like-to-be selfhoods but also a one-size-fits-all what-it's-like-to-be selfhood both universal and constant?

With this supposition, we can say that what-it's-like-to-be a bat living in a cave is the same as what-it's-like-to-be a human living in a college dorm. — ucarr

But its not. A bat can't speak for one thing. Its brain is also of a different type and size from a human being. It cannot have the same experience.

Morals are about doing no harm to other innocent beings. How can we value this principle governing our behavior if we don't have some semblance of a one-size-fits-all what-it's-like-to-be selfhood that we access and utilize to support the sympathy that fuels our moral thinking and behavior? — ucarr

Because whether we do harm to things or not should be more than feelings. Just because I feel disgust at something doesn't mean I should kill it. Just because something makes me happy doesn't mean I should embrace it. For me, it is a respect for its agency, the fact that despite all the odds that get thrown at every life, it has survived until now. Why should I harm or end it over something as trivial as just an emotion?

How is it that many humans easily shuttle between an individualized selfhood and the one-size-fits-all what-it's-like-to-be selfhood that enables the bonding of friendship and love so important in their lives? — ucarr

There are plenty of people in life I don't understand. And I'm sure there are plenty of people in life who don't understand me. Bonding often comes from like goals. Survival, or accomplishing a task together require a closeness and understanding of another person up to a point to get this done. It does not require me to understand exactly what another person is experiencing in life.

The edifice of the arts (literature, drama, music, dance, painting, sculpture) depends upon the interpersonal identification of artist, art work and audience. Is this not, to some observable degree, a communal experience wherein the one-size-fits-all what-it's-like-to-be selfhood exerts a very useful and desirable power? — ucarr

Art is highly interpretive. I think Starry Night from Van Gogh is overrated. Some underappreciated art I find immensely powerful. Many times we interpret art differently from what the artist intended. I have a friend who writes, and he frequently tells me his audience has feeling and expectations he never expected.

So, after all, maybe we really do know all what-it's-like-to-be selfhoods. Isn't this access to all what-it's-like-to-be selfhoods the underlying assumption that supports the edifice of morality?

Doesn't morality lose it's existential imperative within our justice-governed lives without it? — ucarr

No, I don't think so Ucarr. Being moral because you're alike is just sympathy for an extension of yourself. Being moral towards beings and people who are nothing like you is real as a logical set of guidelines for treatment of them.

Another, possibly important speculation, goes as follows: the foundation of consciousness is memory. — ucarr

Its an interesting idea. I think we definitely need memory to form thoughts and analysis. But is memory doing the thinking and analysis, or is that something else?

Think of it as a question about what the laws should be. — Leontiskos

The laws should be whatever the citizens desire in a democratic nation. Do you disagree?

The noting of the current limitations of science being able to objectively capture personal experience are just that, a limit.
— Philosophim

They're not that. There are limitations to scientific method in this respect as a matter of principle, which you're not seeing. It requires a different kind of approach to what has been up until now understood as scientific method. — Wayfarer

If I don't see it, try to show me. What is the different kind of approach you wish to propose? Otherwise this is retreating into your own mind, and I cannot follow.

As a footnote to the above, what really is 'physical'? Is the brain physical? Living organisms? I question these assumptions, because living organisms generally display attributes and characteristics that can't be extracted from the laws of physics or chemistry alone. — Wayfarer

I have nothing against questioning these assumptions. The physical world is matter and energy. To have something non-physical, you would need something that does not fit in the category of matter and energy. But questions and gaps alone are not an argument. We can doubt anything we want, including the fact we are ourselves. Maybe we're really possessed by some other being and only have the illusion of control. But such doubts are only plausibilities, and plausibilities are only limited by the imagination.

To have something more than a plausibility, there needs to be some viable angle beyond 'a doubt'. I've gone over a few with you before. Can we detect energy from thoughts? When we die is there some measurable essence that leaves the body? Are there things missing from the behavioral mode of consciousness that cannot be generally explained as, "You are your brain?" As far as I can tell, no. Get brain damaged, you become a different person. Get drunk? Your consciousness changes. Surgeons and psychiatric doctors have decades of real results from viewing consciousness as from the brain. So what specifically is missing that "You are your brain" cannot explain in terms of behavior?

When you say living organisms display attributes and characteristics that cannot be extracted from the laws of chemistry and physics alone, could you give some examples? Can you show that these examples invalidate the idea that, 'You are your brain?"

In my opinion that is a very cold, black and white way of looking at it. Would you turn away a human trafficking victim, would you turn away an unaccompanied minor on the border? What about an asylum seeker. — Samlw

That's what the laws of a nation are for, especially a democratic one. We decide as a whole, not as an individual. If we're all so noble, we'll create laws that allow it to the capacity we think we can handle.

And if you were to say we should say no regardless then I would say that you need some compassion for your fellow human. — Samlw

And I say you are too self-righteous in your denial of the bonds and rules of your nation. Are you better than everyone else? You'll be the one to decide? Where does that stop? If laws are to be broken whenever we deem, what good are they?

You deny entry when the immigrant does not meet the countries established laws for entry. I don't think its any more complicated then that. If you want to let more immigrants in, change the law. If you don't, change the law. The one thing which is completely unacceptable is when immigrants are allowed in against the law.

There is some ability to infer some obvious physiological correlations like pain or epilepsy from neuroscience, but you still fall back on the assumption that subjective experiences are still ultimately physical, without addressing the real crux of the issue — Wayfarer

I really don't feel that you and I are that different in our intention here. Its been a while, but I've noted before that I am very open to a non-physical explanation of consciousness if there is evidence that there is. You and I may have a very different approach to 'what knowledge means', which is no surprise because its not exactly settled philosophy.

To me, knowledge is a tool, not an element of truth. Its an attempt by people to demonstrate a logic and process that gives us more confidence that what we say we know is more than a belief and wish. When I say, "We know that consciousness is from the brain," that can be translated to, "Everything we currently understand logically leads to consciousness coming from the brain. Its not that it couldn't be true that consciousness is apart from the brain, but there is not any viable evidence that demonstrates that its not."

Yes, I fully agree that neuroscience has not filled in all the gaps yet. But those gaps grow smaller every day. Pharmacology and neuroscience give us the knowledge in countless real world results that consciousness is a physical expression of the brain. Physical of course being matter and energy.

While we can muse about those gaps, prod, question, and study in the hopes of finding something different from the physical (which I encourage!) hypotheses and questions alone do not elevate themselves to knowledge, or even likely outcomes. There is the risk of creating a 'god of the gaps' here and stating, "Because we don't understand this fully yet, it has a viable chance of not being physical.' No, the reality is that its probably physical, as we've never encountered anything in life that isn't physical.

Its not that philosophy should 'catch up' or that science not being able to currently capture objective personal experience doesn't matter. Its the question of, 'What is philosophy contributing from these conclusions?' Is philosophy contributing a question with a genuine wish for an answer, spurring scientific tests, approaches, and real change in society? Or is philosophy trying to find something that isn't there, disguising wishes and fantasy as word play to keep some hope alive of a mortal shell that isn't shackled to physical reality? The former is what propels civilizations, while the latter keeps us in the dark ages.

My point is that our current knowledge of consciousness as a physical expression of the brain is solving real problems in the world. It works. It makes sense logically, and has decades of data and results behind it. Until there is evidence that subjective experience is something that isn't physical, it is safest and most logical to assume it is, even when we have gaps.

Something I've also mentioned before which I think philosophy should address is, "If consciousness is physical, what else can the physical do?" We are made up of matter, and yet this matter can get to a state in which it becomes aware, or functions in a way that we call 'life'. How much of a separation is there then from life and non-life? Is consciousness more ubiquitous than we believe?

If we can look at a brain and not see the picture that it envisions, what else are we looking at and not realizing what's going on internally? Does fire have a feeling? Could it be the old idea of 'the spirits of nature' was in some limited way, not that far off the mark? Are local ecosystems living in a way we don't see? After all, a brain is a bunch of interconnected neurons. Do the connections of the people in a city make a consciousness that we can never observe? What do these five brain cells experience, and will they ever be cognizant of their contribution to the consciousness that is 'me'?

The noting of the current limitations of science being able to objectively capture personal experience are just that, a limit. We should not be pulling the wrong conclusions from this limit. We should be asking ourselves if that means our conception of consciousness transcends to other forms of matter that we've discounted. But I find no good logic or arguments that lead us to question whether consciousness is physical. Again, anything is plausible, but we should not elevate the unlikely and non-evidenced suppositions as being in any reasonable competition with what we know today. Its been a good discussion Wayfarer!

We have seen that there are systematic reasons why the usual methods of cognitive science and neuroscience fail to account for conscious experience. These are simply the wrong sort of methods: nothing that they give to us can yield an explanation. To account for conscious experience, we need an extra ingredient in the explanation.

That 'extra ingredient' is missing from physical explanations: — Wayfarer

Yes, and that extra ingredient is the inability to objectively grasp other subjective experiences. Again, this does not mean there is some actual essence we're missing. It means we are at a limitation of what we can evaluate objectively: the personal subjective experience. This does not mean subjective experiences aren't physical. We can evaluate a brain objectively and state, "According to what we know of behavior, this brain is in pain." We just can't objectively state 'how that brain is personally experiencing pain'.

I don't think Chalmers is trying to suggest that there is a soul or essence in that sense. I'm certainly not trying to resurrect a Cartesian soul. But I also think that the physicalist picture that arises from denying the reality of consciousness (in effect) is also mistaken, because it's grounded in faulty premisses from the outset. — Wayfarer

There is nothing faulty with the physical evaluation of consciousness and the brain in observed outcomes and behaviors. Give a person anasthesia, and you can knock them unconscious. We can know personally what its like to be knocked unconscious, but we cannot objectively know what its like for another brain to experience being knocked unconscious. The physical experience does not deny that a consciousness has a subjective component, it simply understands that objectively explaining the personal experience itself is outside of the realm of testing, as we need to know what its like for another consciousness to be that consciousness.

Its really just a variation of the old, "I see green, you see green, but do we really experience the same color?" Does this mean that green is not a wavelength of light, or that our conception of green in daily use is faulty? No. We still have physical eyes, and physical brains that interpret that light into the subjective experience of 'green'. We could poke around in your brain and trigger you into saying, "I see a green tree," We just can't objectively know what the personal experience of 'I see a green tree' is to you specifically.

The problem is the 'hard problem' has been used far too often by people to mean more than it is stating. It does not deny the physical reality of consciousness that has been discovered by neuroscience. You are your brain. The question is, "Can we objectively understand your brain as a subjective experience?" That's currently outside of what we can objectively know, and may never know, at least in our lifetimes.

Its not a difficult concept, but people try to make it difficult because they think its a way to make us more than our brains. Its not. The only way we're going to get that answer is continual research into neuroscience. Philosophy may have more to bring to the table, but I'm not seeing any further discoveries from this line of thinking.

I'm interested in how Neurolink is developing for example. This is a great article on the idea of how it will feel. https://medium.com/swlh/neuralink-what-do-isobars-feel-like-when-they-move-ff3070198263

Here's an article on the first patient playing Mario kart with the Neurolink: https://www.pcmag.com/news/neuralink-patient-also-uses-brain-chip-to-play-mario-kart

As we can see, the physical brain and consciousness is alive and well in terms of behavior and interfacing with other forms of reality like computer chips. What does THAT feel like? What brain activity are they recording to do that? This is the exciting stuff we should be thinking and talking about. Will we be able to achieve the science fiction dream/nightmare of having chip interfaces do more for us like access memory, help regulate our emotions, and more? Will all of this data through multiple chip use begin to map out the brain in ways we haven't imagined yet? If we want philosophy to stay relevant, we need to follow the discoveries that are being made today, or find some way to push science into areas we want to explore like 'personal experiences'.

That is your particular intepretation of the problem. David Chalmer’s original paper doesn’t say that. — Wayfarer

Correct, I was not quoting Chalmers. And its not an incorrect interpretation of the problem either, set for a layman's understanding. At the core of the hard problem, the issue is that we cannot objectively evaluate subjective experience, or what it is like to be another being. I go into more depth in some other posts here, see if my answers jive or not.

He never says that the problem is what it is like to be a conscious individual that isn’t ourselves. — Wayfarer

If we were able to objectively evaluate the subjective experience of an individual, we would have no hard problem. He doesn't have to say those exact words to understand the reason behind his claim.

Which he proposes as a 'naturalistic dualism'. The key point being the emphasis on 'experience' which is by nature first-person. — Wayfarer

Right, we cannot objectively evaluate subjective experience. So since we can't use objectivity in regards to 'what it is like to be the consciousness', we have to use non-objective terms. He can use the word dualism if he wants, but he's not implying that subjective consciousness isn't physical or some 'other'. He's just noting there's no objective way to evaluate the subjective experience of being consciousness in physical terms, as we have no way of evaluating what its like to be something we are not.

The point is to hammer home that the hard problem is not, "Is our consciousness in our brains?" Yes, it is. There is no soul, or other essence as neuroscience has shown repeatedly. It just means that we cannot objectively talk about the subjective experience of being conscious, because we have no way of objectively knowing what the personal experience a person is feeling when they say, "I feel pain". We can see their bodily reactions, their actions, and their brain functions, but we cannot currently understand what that 'feeling' is, unless we are that person themself. Perusing through your Chalmer's quotes, I don't see where I'm at odds, so we might be in agreement here.

Just for the record, that isn't the standard way of stating the problem, and it isn't David Chalmers' way (he coined the phrase). You can listen to Chalmers describe it here: He defines the problem as "how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experiences in the mind." — J

Correct. I'm noting it in a way that avoids the standard confusion of, "So we don't know if the brain causes consciousness? Its the subjective point that needs focusing on for most people. Because we cannot currently objectively know what a subjective experience is like, this makes it incredibly hard to say, "This is the subjective experience the brain has, and this is the objective physical brain mapping that causes it."

Consciousness, as a behavior, is capable of being mapped to the brain and is the "easy problem". We can monitor your brain, vitals, and behavior and say, "Objectively, they're in pain". But can we objectively say, "And this is their subjective experience of pain"? No. That's the hard problem.

Any thoughts we would have about it implies our consciousness, not someone else's, so it's impossible to know. — Skalidris

Correct.

"How can we objectively measure and explore the purely subjective experience of being conscious?" With our current understanding of science, we can't.
— Philosophim

Well we can't, however advanced sciences become, that's what this "logical proof" is about. — Skalidris

Never say never! Yes, this seems impossible today. But science is full of 'making the impossible possible'. Did we conceive that cell phones would exist 300 years ago? That mankind would ever be able to travel to the moon? Judging what is possible in the future based on what we know today has a history of throwing egg on the face of our collective human race. :)

This is why it is viable to call it 'the hard problem' instead of 'the impossible problem'.

I believe this is the point Skalidris is making: it is not about the advances in science. Even defining consciousness leads to problems. — Carlo Roosen

I only put that because perhaps one day we will actually be able to know what its like to be someone else. But with the knowledge we have today, this is the hard logical limit of our understanding, and thus we have an issue of objectively evaluating subjective experience.

Any thought experiment you try will fail on me, because you are not talking about the sense of being conscious, but about the content of that consciousness. — Carlo Roosen

Correct. We can monitor and map your brain to when you say you experience consciousness. We can map the brain to your behaviors, and even note what you are thinking before you are aware of it. But we cannot know what it is like to BE you. To BE your consciousness.

I am not following how we only know through contradictions (between our experiences and reality). I can imagine perfectly fine a person who infers correctly, without contradiction, that their conscious experience is representational; and then proceeds to correctly identify that there must be a thing-in-itself which excites the senses which, in turn, begins the process to construct the conscious experience which they are having. — Bob Ross

Lets break this down. First, remember at this point that there is a difference between having the idea of what a 'thing in itself' is, and whether its something that exists and is knowable. We also need to break down what we mean by 'knowable'.

This is why in my knowledge theory I broke down what knowledge is into two camps. Distinctive, and applicable. Distinctive is 'knowing the experience I have'. So if I have an experience of a 'goat'. That's the experience I know I had. Then there's applicable knowledge. "Was that actually a goat, or was it a sheep I misidentified?" "Distinctively I know the definition of a goat and a sheep. But was my belief that what I experienced was a goat, correct in reality? So I have the distinctive knowledge of 'experience' of identifying a goat, but not the applicable knowledge that the identification of a goat was of an actual goat.

Ok, now back to 'things in themselves'. As an identity, I can distinctively know what 'a thing in itself' is. "A thing in itself is a logical conclusion that there is something that I am observing, but can only observe it through the senses and brain interpretations. But because I can only know it through observations, I can never know it apart from the interpretation of those observations". How do I applicably know this? According to its definition, I cannot.

So what is applicably knowing? If I take a definition of a goat, and apply its properties to a creature without contradiction, and without it overlapping a separate identity I've created in my mind (like a sheep), then I applicably know that creature as a goat.

Of course, unknown to me, its a space alien. Its so good at disguise, that there is no way with my current capabilities that I can detect its a space alien. "The thing in itself" is a space alien, but I applicably know it as a goat. Now this first part is simply a primer to the next step, "I applicably know that this thing is a goat, but I can never applicably know if that's 'the thing in itself'.

If I can only know applicably through testing, observation, and a lack of contradiction, how do I applicably know of something apart from all sensation and interpretation? I would have to 'be' what I am trying to applicably know. Its like consciousness. I can observe that my friend is conscious by their actions. But do I know what its like to 'be' that friend? To know them as they are 'in themselves'?

Applicable knowledge is obtained from our interactions and interpretations of the world. We know a 'goat' by the fact that its not contradicted. If our 'goat' started flying and shooting laser beams from its eyes, our applicable knowledge would then be contradicted. But even if it did not, if it was really a space alien, we would only be able to applicably know it as a goat. "The thing in itself" is the conception of something which CANNOT be applicably known. Therefore it is entirely a logical conception that results from our understanding that 'we cannot be what we observe, so we can only known it from our outside observations of it'.

Can you cite something we could say is knowledge that did not require any experience to gain it?

The most basic example that comes to mind is mathematical knowledge. Your brain necessarily has to already know how to perform math to construct your conscious experience; and this is why mathematical propositions, in geometry, are applicable and accurate for experience: the axioms of geometry reside a priori in our brains — Bob Ross

This is incorrect. What we have is the ability to discretely experience, and over time, learn to conduct comparisons and quantities between them. A newborn does not come with the knowledge of 'addition', '1', or anything else. This is all learned over time through experience. What they have is the capacity to understand these relations, but by no means does this entail that there is some innate born knowledge.

For example, we applicably know math through 'base 10'. But math can be in any base. Base 2, or binary, is the math we use for logic circuits. Hexadecimal, or base 16, is used to calculate computer memory. Are we born with the innate knowledge of hexadecimal? Did you know when you were born that the number for base ten '11' is 'A' in Hexadecimal? Of course not. Just like you had to carefully be taught base ten, and basic math as a kid, you would need to have the experience of learning hexadecimal.

As for geometry, this also has to be learned. As a baby, you don't quite understand depth perception yet. It takes time. You grow and learn how the world works as a physical set of interactions. You have to be taught, or can learn through logic and observation, that "A squared + B squared = C squared" on a triangle. But all of these things have been rigorously proved over centuries through careful testing, observation, and application. None of this is known innately.

Mathematical propositions are valid in virtue of being grounded in how our brains cognize; and they are only valid for human experience. They are true, justified, beliefs about experience—not reality. — Bob Ross

They are valid in the fact they can be applicably known in reality. It is 'the logic of discrete experience'. But this must be experienced, tested, and learned to be applicably known. We can of course create what ever experience of math that we want distinctively. I can distinctively create a math in base Steve. Steve + Visit = Snacks for example. But this can only be applicably known if ever time Steve + Visit happens there always results in Snacks.

Perhaps that’s where the confusion was: the a priori knowledge we have is not knowledge about reality, but about how we cognize it. — Bob Ross

The ability to think is not generally prescribed as 'knowledge'. Just like the ability to 'move my limbs' doesn't mean I know 'how to move them to walk'. This is why I noted earlier we were very close on the definition of apriori. I agree that we have instincts, innate capacities, and 'our innate existence'. But none of that is 'knowledge'. Knowledge can only be obtained after some kind of experience. Even distinctive knowledge is the creation of an identity that we then remember. But we must first have an experience to identify because we can claim knowledge of it.

So what is a flower apart from any observation

I would say that we merely say that there is some thing which is exciting our senses, and of which we represent as what we normally perceive as a flower. — Bob Ross

Correct. But notice you've described how you know a flower purely through your representations and senses. What is a flower apart from that? What if the thing in itself that we're 'dividing' into a flower is really a few other things around the flower? What if the air two millimeters away from the flower is also part of the flower in 'the thing in itself' but we just don't interpret it that way? What if its a space alien? (I really like that example don't I?) What is it like to BE the flower? These are all things that are outside of our capacity to applicably know. This limit is a logical reminder that there are some things outside of our applicable knowledge. At that point, we induce if you recall. So a thing in itself is not a probability or a possibility. It is a cogent inapplicable plausibility. It is a concept that we can never applicably test, but one that pure reason cannot seem to do without.

And that's all the 'thing in itself' is. Its an unknowable outside of the mind existence.

Agreed; but that’s not a purely abstract thing, then. It is a concrete—unknown. — Bob Ross

It is purely an abstract thing that cannot be applicably known. Its plausible that it is a concrete thing. We know that we cannot applicably know it. And that's as far as we can go.

First, lets clarify what 'the hard problem is'. Is it that we're conscious? No. Is it that the brain causes consciousness? No. The idea that consciousness is caused by our physical brains is the easy problem. The hard problem is, "Will we ever know what it is like to BE a conscious individual that isn't ourselves".

In other words, we ever be able to duplicate the experience of being another person? Or an animal? An insect? Because despite all of our capability to study the actions of a consciousness, we can't 'experience' what its like to be that consciousness. Its very much like the question of, "What does it feel like to be water?" We say its not conscious because of its behavior, but what is it to BE water?

Lets say that one day we're able to replicate what seems to be consciousness from the brain. How do we objectively determine this? Do we don a helmet on another person and ask them, "We're emulating your consciousness. Does this feel what its like to be you?" Beyond the fact that it would be a conscious being thinking about the consciousness outside of their consciousness, where's the objective test? The measurements that don't rely on subjective experience? They don't exist. Because to know what its like to be conscious is a subjective experience. There is no objective measure but the honesty of the subject itself. And can such experiences be communicated in words? Can the person experiencing a perfect replica of the consciousness as a third party observer really have the full experience?

If anyone tells you, "The hard problem is proving that the brain causes consciousness," they misunderstand. It isn't even "Why does this cause concsiousness" that's the hard problem either. Its really saying, "How can we objectively measure and explore the purely subjective experience of being conscious?" With our current understanding of science, we can't.

Agreed, to some extent. By physical, I do not mean material: I mean mind-independent.

Even if we could not even know that it is mind-independently existing; the thing as it is in-itself is not purely logical (in that case): we are talking about some ‘thing’ which exists—we are talking in concreto. — Bob Ross

Agreed. But what exactly are we proving? All we can prove is that there is something mind-independent. That's it. And we can only prove there is something mind independent because we have experiences that contradict what our mind wants to believe about reality. We only know that there have been contradictions and that there may continue to be contradictions. We don't know what's causing it.

Now, once it has that capacity, of course, I agree it still has to learn how to walk; but this is disanalogous. — Bob Ross

My point is that capacity is not knowledge. Knowledge is learned through experience. Can you cite something we could say is knowledge that did not require any experience to gain it? And if you can, how is it knowledge and not a belief?

https://acidmath.com/blogs/news/here-s-how-bees-and-butterflies-see-flowers-no-wonder-they-love-them

As you can see in the above article, how a bee or a butterfly knows a flower is very different from how we do. So what is a flower apart from any observation? Is it actually a flower as we think of it? Is it an evil demon manifestation? Can we even call it a 'flower'? Or is it the part of something more? We just can't know. And that's all the 'thing in itself' is. Its an unknowable outside of the mind existence.

Huh, never knew about the guy. I think I have a much better argument then his here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary/p1

I go along very similar lines, but go a bit deeper then him. He gets stuck at infinite series, I do not.