Lamias enchant their victims, who only see their beauty, the soft tones of their voice, once enchanted the monster has her way with them. Reason sees through the enchanting beauty of the rainbow, but that's the rub.

I have not read Dawkin's book, but I have read Keats poem Lamia. Here are the line that Dawkins uses as his title:

Do not all charms fly
At the mere touch of cold philosophy?
There was an awful rainbow once in heaven:
We know her woof, her texture; she is given
In the dull catalogue of common things.
Philosophy will clip an Angel's wings,
Conquer all mysteries by rule and line,
Empty the haunted air, and gnomèd mine—
Unweave a rainbow, as it erewhile made
The tender-person'd Lamia melt into a shade

.

Keat's, was perhaps the greatest Romantic poet ever. He was critical of Science's attempt to explain everything, to demythologize the world, giving explanations for beauty "In the dull catalogue of common things" whereby all mystery melts "into a shade". My understanding is that Dawkins wants to defend Science by saying that its work reveals the unseen beauty of the world, defending the Enlightenment. He's a Bright who melts life's mystery into a shade of possibilities.

Kinda of a tricky question. I think conscious awareness suggests a manner of being conscious, and not separate or identical brain states. We are always conscious, but we are not always aware of it in the same manner. Even in a deep sleep our body keeps us going, it is aware of itself and makes all the necessary adjustments to keep us going, which I think is also a form of consciousness.

You need to come to terms with your monster, your avatar, swimming around in its amniotic lake.

I think anger expresses an intensity of feeling. We are all in some sort of mood all the time, we feel: happy, sad, fearful, indifferent, anxious, angry...these moods can be in response to something that we experience or simply the way we feel at the time. I think that the higher the intensity of feeling the more likely that these feelings become intentional; with things we can identify as objects of these feelings. I suppose a person could be just angry (as a personality trait), but I think more generally someone who is angry is angry at something or someone for a reason.

I do think anger is a natural part of our nature as animals, which we learn how to express, learn how to behave, control which becomes part of how we construct our self. Animal aggression may have territorial roots where survival involved establishing a certain space or area of operation, where unfamiliar intruders particularly of the same species are challenged or feared for a variety of reasons.

Wrath, I think is more intensive and more directed than anger, as in the wrath of God, or of the just. It seems more principled in some manner than anger, a direct and reasoned response to some transgression, where the expression of anger become the medium of response.

Also rage seems to be extremely intensive, suggesting irrationality at its apex, as in a blind rage. I think rage is a temporary state that 'normal' persons might experience, but I cannot envision someone being in a 'normal' state of rage.

If there were inaccessible moral truths, what would be the mechanism by which one would know there were such truths?

How about a transcendental method? Kant does not prove morality (or evil), he accepts that both are real. All you have to do is look around to see examples of both. Kant tried to determine the form of the transcendental principles necessary for there to be a moral law. The transcendental in itself is inaccessible to our understanding, forming a limit on what we can know, but which we can still can think.

So my conclusion regarding the coveting bit is that it is not good for me because it treats someone as a means for pleasure and not as being an end, a person with dignity deserving, my respect.

So this argument morphs itself to fit any occasion. I think doing something immoral might cause guilt in me, but that guilt does not make the action moral or immoral. It is the rules, the laws I set for myself, or that I believe in that determine the morality of my action and my guilt.

How is that, I don't think it follows. I can transgress laws obtain pleasure and continue to do so and I may never experience any pain associated with my transgressions.

Pain and pleasure say nothing about morality, in my opinion.

K, but I don't think 'harm' as you using it here, is the same as the harm associated with pain (as the OP would have it), this harm is based on observance or non-observance of laws and as such it may be associated with either pleasure or pain.

Well the commandment is nonspecific. "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife"

If it causes pleasure for me and no harm to anyone else then it must be ok under this system?

But, if I am a good Christian, or perhaps a virtue ethicist, it is a sin because it transgresses either God's law, or the laws I give myself.

I like your thought but I seem to get pleasure from the idea.

What harm is it to "covet thy neighbor's wife"?

Read the article, it does not deaden the pain, it removes it.

[


Kevin is a friend. He is one of the few native Floridians I have met here in Florida. He is very conservative, flies the flag, and works on his house and yard almost religiously. His yard is all fenced around, his protection. He barbecues like a pro.

Thank you, I edited it, it should work now.

You might be interested in the research the University of British Columbia did on existential angst back in 2013. The effect of Tylenol/Acetaminophen on dread, anxiety et al...here Test subjects on Tylenol felt normal, only 'normal' now meant without emotional dread or anxiety.

Fascinating dream ..,plenty of Freudian possibilities.

Metaphysics is about Being, First Principles, the concept of necessity, which is why Kant following Hume demolished Descartes's ontological proof of god. Thought cannot confer being, because being is not a predicate, a perfect being does not have to exist by virtue of its being perfect. I think absolutes/universals/transcendentals must exist epistemologically, in order for there to be knowledge, but I do not agree that the structure of the world is necessarily the same as the structure of thought.

If I understand what you are saying: 'mind' evolved by means of material evolution to the point of self-awareness, but it is only by virtue of this self awareness that we became aware of this material evolution. I don't think this is contradictory. I think thought as self-awareness, the unity of apperception is a mode that matter has the potential to assume given the correct composition, as it is in us ...a kind of panpsychism that asserts thought as possible mode of matter.

Science might say that events (things, matter, whatever) existed in the universe for eons without us, but it does not offer an opinion on the philosophical topic on the table here. I'm asking if there is an objective fact-of-the matter, independent of our ability to find meaning in it, or our ability to detect it.

Science may not offer an opinion on whether or not what exists, exists independently of us, but philosophically & objectively we form opinions based on the data science presents to us about our empirical world. Science's rendition of the universe's ancestral history, has & needs no human manifestation, what existed in reality was prior to and independent of our existence. So yea, there is an objective "fact of the matter", it existed prior to us, and I don't see a reason to suppose this independence has changed because we appeared on the scene.

What I am questioning in this thread is what distinguishes U itself from existing or not, especially absent a member-observer being aware of some portion of the contents of the U. Not asking why U exists and certainly not how it 'became to exist', but what it means at all. Is there an objective fact to the matter, despite the lack of anything that can actually know said objective fact?

We distinguish it, we find meaning in it, we live in it, we give nature a point of view that's "what it means at all". Science tells us that the universe existed for eons without us, but its existence was meaningless without us, we assert meaning into an indifferent universe. The only alternative to this is the belief in god whose viewpoint (immanent, transcendental or both at the same time) is indeterminable. The universe has a point of view, and as far as we know, we comprise it, even if it is imperfect, it's all its got :)

This is clearly true of the idea, held by certain prominent atheists and some of my fellow conservatives and Christians, that the heart of Islam is necessarily illiberal — that because the faith was born in conquest and theocracy, it simply can’t accommodate itself to pluralism without a massive rupture, an apostasy in fact if not in name.

I think the assertion that "the heart of Islam is necessarily illiberal" also can be said of Christianity. Religions must be fundamental or reactionary at "the heart", and it is their moral role that is problematic when it is mixed into with politics where pragmatism ought to reign. No religion "at heart" can stand pluralism.

I was thinking:
a) 7 is a number, same as 8. To say 7 is prime or 8 is even is to state some knowledge that describes properties of these numbers. As product of knowledge, what it is to be a prime number, has no effect on their assumed 'ontology'
b) The set of primes is separate from the rest of the sets of numbers, yet what it excludes both limits it and helps define the set.
c) To say the universe is this or that, is not viciously circular, since we have no independent viewpoint.

Each object is unique, but ideas seem to rely on each other.

or

How exactly is this abstract cow supposedly related to the cows in the world?

Isn't the 'abstract cow' an epistemological or nominal concept describing what we know about cows; and that 'cow', that particular one sitting in the pasture is ontologically real. Epistemological universals seem to be necessary for the possibility of knowledge, their ontological status might be described an subjectively real, or as realities of thought, the objectivity of their existence as such being both
publicly known and agreed/disagreed on normatively or intersubjectively.

Hannah Arendt is a 2012 German-Luxembourgish-French biographical drama film directed by Margarethe von Trotta and starring Barbara Sukowa.

I read about half scanned the rest. Do you think objectivity in science and elsewhere is based on consensus, the ability of others with similar levels of experience to come to similar conclusions based on similar circumstances, facts, experiences. If not what do you think makes something objective.

I think joy is different than the feeling you have from - say - helping an old lady cross the street. That is pleasure (whether "higher" or "lower"), but what I mean by joy is different than that. Joy is experiencing your life as inherently meaningful - worthwhile. Joy is unconcerned with pain or pleasure -

Perhaps pleasure and pain are somatic intensities and joy is the cognitive assignment of these feelings under the united concept of joy.

The following is based on the Impure Somatic Theory of Barlassina & Newen, very detailed abstract here.

There is a question whether emotions are caused by our perceptions of our own bodily states. Do we fear because we tremble or do we tremble because we fear. Or, are our somatic and our cognitive processes fully integrated so that emotions are constituted by the integration of bodily perceptions with representations of external objects, events, or states.

An adequate theory of emotion has to account for facts concerning the intentionality and the phenomenology of emotion. If I am sad due to the death of a child, this is not due to my bodily state it is due to the loss of a child. The emotion has a particular object , the child and a formal object (relational property), the loss. Sadness is a basic emotion (animals can also display basic emotions), higher emotions such as guilt can be cognitively constructed from lower emotions such as sadness (most animals can not demonstrate higher emotions).

I think we all come with some very basic functionalities. We can feel intensities of pleasures and pain, and we have certain basic drives like hunger and sex & certain very basic reflexes such as the sucking and the grasping reflexes. We learn how to apply and combine these basic responses normatively, these applications become much more complicated as we mature.

Is it worth experiencing pleasure if it means you will also experience pain, or is it better to minimise pain first and foremost, and then enjoy pleasure as it comes?

The economic answer is: have the pleasure first, the future is always discounted.

Emotions come in pairs, so even in pain, pleasure is possible. Pleasure and pain are emotional measures, which help direct our normal conduct. We tend toward the more pleasurable and less painful, but the body tends toward homeostasis, which means that extreme pleasure/pain offset each other over time.

The opponent-process theory is a model that views two components as being pairs that are opposite to each other, such that if one component is experienced, the other component will be repressed. Therefore, an increase in pain should bring about a decrease in pleasure, and a decrease in pain should bring about an increase in pleasure or pain relief. This simple model serves the purpose of explaining the evolutionarily significant role of homeostasis in this relationship. This is evident since both seeking pleasure and avoiding pain are important for survival.

Wikipedia

I think they are the main components, but what comprises an act is also an issue. Are our actions series of independent events, some of which may be linked causally or perhaps acts are just correlated together, or are actions generations based on singular events which then evolve over time. I think how pleasure and knowledge blend may depend on the answer to whether or not actions are caused, or related to previous actions, or if they evolve from prior acts.

It seems to be that the way psychologists and psychiatrists diagnose mental illness is through conversation with the patient. The patient tells them what bothers them, what they feel, their thoughts, etc. So, if you have lost enjoyment in life, and experience constant sadness, you are diagnosed with depression (based on the things that you said to the mental health professional.) The way in which we diagnose depression seems to be way less reliable than the way that for example you would find a tumor on someones body, or a life weakening viral infection. The latter seems to have more epistemological validity than the former. What are your thoughts on this? And given this problem, can psychology really be called a science?

The conversation depends on the type of therapy.

Cognitive Control Therapy begins at media res and proceeds to establish goals which the patient sets with the assistance of the therapist. This method removes symptoms, which may be sufficient for normal functioning in society. I think it tries to transfer (the unconscious redirection of feelings) these symptoms into the goals the patient has established. The US Military use Cognitive Control Therapy to treat cases of PTSD. This is the quickest treatment method, 3 to 6 months avg and it can be combined with online sessions.

Many believe that all mental issues are chemical related. Imbalances in the brain. This is the case for schizophrenics and others with severe forms of psychosis. Structural issues need to be addressed with such treatments, talk has limited utility in these cases.

Neurotics make up the majority of those with mental issues and in order to get at the causes of these issues long term psychiatric sessions are necessary. The psychiatrist does not effect the relief, the patient does, and over time with the careful guidance of a skilled psychiatrist good results are possible. It is not so much finding causes but leading the patient to make his own realizations.

Is is a science? Perhaps at the structural level but...I get the impression that finding the right fit between patient and therapist is critical to the success of the treatment.

In trying to figure out how to live the best life, I arrived at the hypothesis that all actions are ultimately to achieve happiness.

I think your hypothesis is only partly correct. I think all actions are a mix of pleasure and knowledge and that the best life is the involves getting the mix right.

Does "everything" include potential entities that could and could not happen, exist in our world or not exist, and are abstract, fictitious, or imaginary?
Do we include "everything" in addition to material things, non-material things, spiritual things, etc.?

What is possible includes what is real and unreal, it excludes what is inconceivable. We determine what is possible by reflecting on what we experience, what we have learnt from others and by our own conclusions.

Thoughts exist, we can express them to others using a common language. We communicate what we experience, learn or what we have concluded with others, and I think objectivity starts here. with what is commonly agreed upon.

Scientists tell us what they commonly agree on, what exists outside of our thoughts and I generally believe what they say if it is widely accepted or if I like some aspect of what they are saying. This is not the same situation when it comes to thought. Thought is only constrained by imagination, conceivability, and language. People have many opinions when it comes to what comprises morality, art, justic et al. These thoughts have a history, they are part of our common experience and they are objectively real in that sense.

Thoughts about morality & justice and the rest form convenient ways to condense and to explain our common experiences with others, as they form part of our knowledge. Their reality is in thought but they are causative of our behavior. I like what Plato said:

I suggest that anything has real being that is so constituted as to possess any sort of power either to affect anything else or to be affected, in however small a degree, by the most insignificant agent, though it be only once. I am proposing as a mark to distinguish real things that they are nothing but power

I don't think that anything is 'non-existent' in the sense of non-being, this is a misnomer, I think that what is said to be 'non-existent' in this sense is different from what is stated. Plato again:

When we speak of that which is not, it seems that we do not mean something contrary to what exists but only something different.

Do you mean what is animalistic in us?

Rosenstein (who is not known to be a political hack) is the 'dupe'. Sessions had recused himself from the Russian investigation. In order for the reasons for firing Comey to officially come from Department of Justice Trump/Sessions needed someone to compose the it, so he could just sign off it and his deputy's recommendation fit the bill.

Samantha Bee said that Comey may be a turd, but at least he is an independent turd. Trump's firing of Comey puts the whiff of obstruction of justice in the air, especially since, prior to being fired he was asking the Department of Justice to expand the FBI's investigation of Russia's interference in the US general election.

Perhaps instead of pragmatic effect of making murder legal, which strains current conceivability this argument might be applied to pornograpthy, where its proliferation may conceivably reduce the occurrence of overtly illegal sex acts. Do you think that pragmatism justifies the proliferation and legality of all kinds of porn, even kiddie porn, assuming there is a strong correlation.

We are entering into a virtual reality state of technological development where artificially generated virtual humans will be indistinguishable from the organic version. This means that moral arguments that generate around the disposition or degradation of porn actors will become meaningless. If so then the fantasy of porn, is just that a prurient fantasy.

Pragmatism seems to me to be the basis of technological morality. If x is more productive than y [and x meets all normative criteria otherwise], then x. The quantification of x can be measured, and morals becomes a kind of normative epidemiology.

I don't agree with this direction because, in my opinion, it conflates utility with goodness. I am not saying that pornography is wrong, but that the basis upon which we decide what is right or wrong is normatively skewed in the wrong direction. As a society we may achieve our pragmatic goals and reduce sexual crimes, but there are costs involved, costs that change us, our outlook, what we consider beautiful, terrifying, mysterious...