Negotiation about what, though? It's relatively easy to use the pronouns someone wants you to. It's a bit harder to see someone as the gender on a gut level if they identify with if they look or act stereotypically otherwise. I think those are behavioural commitments though. — fdrake

Sure. People push back on the pronouns, but the real flashpoints have been spaces and sports, and that's clearly a matter of negotiation.

I do think it's very unlikely that we could get, even in principle, a list that boils down who counts as a man or a woman without also constructing an incomplete stereotype of the role - in terms of behaviour, attitudes, social standings etc. And we'd already know that behaving in accord with a stereotype is neither necessary nor sufficient for being the type of being that stereotype is associated with. — fdrake

After many, many drafts, here's where I am at the moment.

When someone says "I'm a girl" or "I'm a boy," that expresses an intuition.

What we want to know is, what is the source of that intuition? Is there a mental module for gender, perhaps one that produces intuitions about the gender of others as well as yourself? Plausible. There's lots of research on the age at which children begin to distinguish between male and female in various ways, and it is just the sort of thing you'd expect natural selection to take an interest in.

But this is trouble. If there is a gender module, then the most natural thing to say about an anatomical boy having the intuition of being a girl is that the gender module is making a mistake. We would want to know if it's making other mistakes: does it get the genders of others wrong as well? I don't happen to know if there's any research whatsoever on that.

Or perhaps it's not making a mistake but producing the self-gender intuition differently. If -- and it's unclear so far as I can tell -- the brain is gendered, perhaps during development, then the gender module might not even be interested in your sexual anatomy but just report the usually well-aligned gender of the brain hosting it, even if that gender is not the same as your anatomical sex. --- And it's still conceivable for both to be true, that the brain is gendered and the gender module is producing the wrong intuition.

I've been using the word "gender" but we could substitute anatomical sex mostly. On the other hand, if there's always been variation in sexual expression and behavior, it might be worth the trouble for natural selection to classify that. Do gay male gorillas compete with cis male gorillas for female mates? They might, I don't know, but if they don't it seems like that would be worth knowing. Why fight with a guy who's not a threat to your reproductive success? --- Anyway, it seems not crazy that there might be a module for specifically gender intuitions rather than just anatomical sex, because gender might be helpfully predictive of some behavior that matters. In which case, despite it no doubt being mostly culture, there might be something to "gaydar."

parents' observations — Moliere

Honestly there aren't a lot of those and this is probably the only example you're going to get. (Wouldn't have posted what I did except the language is so interesting.) As a dad, I don't even need to understand my kids to support them and love them, so it's a whole different thing. And I don't ask my teenager for explanations, because he's not a research subject.

Anyway, I don't think much of anything I've posted about trans kids reflects my personal experience of the subject -- just not how I'm approaching it.

My personal experience of masculinity is part of my approach, which ought to be obvious.

[ Feel now I shouldn't have posted this at all, so if you missed it, it's too late. ]

correctness conditions — fdrake

If you mean something that could conceivably be negotiated, even if only implicitly, I don't know. Obviously there's something like that going on with words in general, but the problem here is that there seems to be no basis for negotiation: one side says the correctness condition for my claiming womanhood is that I know (feel??) myself to be a woman; the other side scrambles to find something else because whatever the criteria are that's not it. How will negotiation proceed?

If you dial the clock back a hundred years, say, and someone born a woman claims, without being metaphorical or something, to be a man, not to have a preference for presenting as a man, in the culturally standard way, though a woman, but to be a man full-stop, then the likely conclusion would be that this woman is suffering from a delusion.

I would even find that possibility tempting today except it just doesn't look delusional, or not like any delusion I'm at all familiar with. I literally do not know what it's supposed to mean, which suggests to me that people making such identity claims are up to something completely different.

What's not clear is whether my understanding is expected or required. Usually with words people say to me, it is, but I'm honestly not sure here, which is odd. I can think of two explanations for this: it is not a message, say, but a signal; or language is being used in some new way, and I don't just mean in a Humpty Dumpty way.

If it's the latter then the world has changed and maybe this is *real* postmodernism, not the piddly warmups we've been living through but the real thing, a through-the-looking-glass kind of change. All of us on the forum here are suddenly dinosaurs no matter how cool we thought we were.

Either way, negotiating assertibility conditions doesn't seem to be on the table.

I don't think there's anything stopping us each having our own narratives and just thrashing it out when they clash. I just don't think it's a very good idea, and that requires a little stability, some predictability — Isaac

I'll come back to this.

it can't be a one-way system where Bob has a fully formed narrative in his head which he'd like other people to act in accordance with, but in interacting with Bob, Alice's own narrative must be discarded — Isaac

I have the same concerns, and I have additional concern about defining Alice's speech as per se harmful and dangerous. (I've even argued to my ex, who's an anti-fascist activist, that if you tried advocating Nazism in Tel Aviv, it wouldn't be dangerous to anyone but you.)

But if Alice's narrative is racist, we want her to discard it, right?

Or at least presumably Bob does, there being no Arbiter of All Narratives who settles these disputes for us.

And there absolutely are cases of hardcore racists changing their views, but none of those are from somebody just demanding they do so because they're wrong.

This is supposed to be different because what someone is denying is not your views, possibly not even your value as a human being, but your identity -- they don't even see you as what you are. In pushing back against that demand, we are in effect treating this as just another view of yours, maybe one you're very attached to in a number of ways, but still a view. That's going to bother a lot of people, and maybe they have a point that the rules of this sort of game are different.

I'm thinking of Philip Roth's telling his parents not to be drawn into defending him against charges that he's anti-semitic. "That's a losing game," he said, which I took to mean, treating the proposition as possibly true is already giving ground. (Aha! You admit he might be...)

Similar thing here. Maybe it puts the whole discussion on the wrong footing to think of these expressions of gender identity as, you know, opinions more or less. @Moliere for instance does not want discussion about whether someone's expression of their gender identity is "accurate" or something, and I think there's something to do that.

The trouble I have is that I want to get there by seeing those expressions as performance, but the people using these expressions keep talking like they're supposed to be taken as incontrovertible fact, or as witness -- however you do that you're opening yourself to the same types of skepticism and critique as any other expression.

No one would consider 'racist' an identity worthy of the same deference. Why gender specifically?

I'm still caught up in these meta issues, but I hope to write something about the use of words like "man" and "woman" in these conversations. Maybe soon.

The facts underdetermine the theory — Isaac

Hey you got it right this time! Good for you.

to tell that story we have to understand each other, we have to have a shared set of meanings for the words we use, including 'woman'. Otherwise, I can't hear your story because I don't know what you mean by anything you say. — Isaac

I'll preempt @Joshs saying that we creatively 'extend' or re-determine those meanings through this dialogue, rather than them being external to our practice, fixed, and pre-existing, meanings we just use like hammers and screwdrivers.

On the other hand, we don't start from zero, so while dialogue might change our understanding of a word, it doesn't create that understanding ex nihilo.

And that's the sticking point, the off-the-shelf narratives we bring with us to the discussion. Is there a process for rewriting those scripts, how does it work, what is required for that process, and how robust is it?

Also Buber's I and Thou, if memory serves.

listening to another's story — Moliere

Clearly at least listening would be a good start.

Moreover, I, on my side, require of every writer, first or last, a simple and sincere account of his own life, and not merely what he has heard of other men’s lives; some such account as he would send to his kindred from a distant land; for if he has lived sincerely, it must have been in a distant land to me. — Thoreau

If even responding to such childishness makes me petty too, as you’re implying, so be it. But I don’t initiate these things. — Mikie

"He started it!" Yeah, that's not childish.

What kind of person you are is none of my business. I do think you might consider whether your behavior here is good for the forum -- that's the extent of my interest here, so that's all I'll say. You can put me on the "sanctimonious" list if you like, I won't mind.

Sad to say, you’re as petty a member as they come. — Mikie

You can hear yourself, right?

When I think "taking your word" I guess I mean I believe it. — Moliere

Oh. That's exactly contrary to my linguistic intuitions. (We don't need to argue about this, but if I take your word for it that you'll be at the restaurant at 8, I agree to set aside my judgment about whether you will be and behave as if you will be.)

Okay so this is exactly analogous to "Believe women". It's not that you can't exhort people to hold some belief, but the basis being offered -- and reasons will be required here -- is essentially that you can't be wrong about this, that identity beliefs are special and incorrigible.

I'd really love to see a different solution.

when it comes to someone's basic identity that they live with I'd say we take people's word for it almost always — Moliere

Hmmmm. If you want to say that we don't take their word for some things but we do for others, the identity things, then you're back to having to clearly demarcate those identity things even to make your point. Your religion example, for instance -- I could tell you a long story about my second marriage that would undermine claims that self-reported faith is reliable. So maybe sometimes it's an identity thing and sometimes it's not. What are we doing here?

I'm just not sure you can make good on identifying identity such that identity related claims should be treated as incorrigible. I would rather we not even require something that messy become tidy just to make political progress.

Consider this. If I want to be seen as what I feel myself to be, you taking my word for it that I am what I claim to be is just not the same thing, is it? If you truly don't see me as I desire, what does your taking my word for it amount to? Even if you manage to do both, how will you handle the cognitive dissonance?

Seems to me the "taking my word for it" is a cheap substitute for the real thing. And it might be worse than nothing, because one way of handling the cognitive dissonance is to try not to see me at all, so you can continue to endorse my claim without discomfort. That's not what I wanted!

Politically, it looks like the "take my word for it" view is all but openly a stopgap, a kind of expedient compromise. There's something similar in dealing with rape: "Believe women." Well no that's just dumb, but it's a deliberate over-correction to the overwhelming tendency to dismiss women's claims. If there ever comes a day when women's words aren't discounted, no one will think "Believe women" a suitable rallying cry.

I agree with everything you've said there — Janus

Cheers. Let's hope I said what I was trying to say then.

I think what I've found is that it's far too easy to believe you have judged another's self-awareness when there's something missed. — Moliere

Oh but I didn't say we make good, reliable judgements about the self stories of others, only that we do. All of our own biases will certainly be in play when we try to figure out how other people understand themselves.

But to come back to the point @Isaac was making, there seems to be a demand that we all not do what we all do, that we not even consider the possibility that particular sorts of stories people tell about themselves are not perfectly true. You argued that we need to just ask and take people's word for it when they answer, but we don't do that for anything and it's an unreasonable demand.

But we can still recognize that you construct your identity in part by telling these stories -- "We are who we pretend to be" -- and grant this constructive role without acquiescing to the folly that anyone ever simply reports the truth they find within.

I admit that politically this sounds like crap. People want to be told they are seen as who they know themselves to be. But that's not a courtesy we extend to anyone, so if we refuse here it's not singling out these claimants. But on the other hand, no one else makes the demand in so many words, perhaps because they know it's a non-starter. (As I write, I keep thinking of exceptions to these generalities, mostly in arguments among family, close friends, romantic partners.) But for whatever reason, no one else asking means no one else being turned down, so the effect of refusing here on general principles still looks like singling out trans people as not being trustworthy. So yeah, still political dynamite, even if perfectly consonant with psychology and our everyday ways of dealing with each other. The natural thing is to consider the political situation and make an exception. Maybe in time trans people won't have to ask to be seen the way they want, and we can go back to not treating their self-knowledge as uniquely privileged.

self-knowledge isn't exactly history — Moliere

Oh! You should have said the opposite. Identity is precisely an issue of the autobiographical self.

But I don't think that identity-talk relies upon a notion of a private language as much as it relies upon a standpoint of some kind, which is much more defensible than a full-blown Subject. — Moliere

Same.

In terms of how we converse people will know more about themselves than you know about them because they've been around themselves the whole time — Moliere

There's obviously something to this; I know lots of things about my personal history that no one else does. But there's also the Burns Problem: we are biased when it comes to ourselves, and sometimes others can see us more clearly.

the simple fact that people will be better able to construct a story about themselves than strangers who know nothing about them. — Moliere

But it is a story and serves a purpose. It's not just the unvarnished truth.

even though all identity is a kind of performance that doesn't make it false -- or, rather, the truth and falsity isn't as relevant as the significance of one's identity — Moliere

Right. It is just not one of the purposes of the autobiographical self to be a truthful record of your life. So yes truth and falsehood are irrelevant to its function -- for you. Not entirely irrelevant to other people I think. We do tend to make judgements about how self-aware people are, because we need to know how seriously to take what they say about themselves.

What I don't believe for a moment, is that a) some constitution of this mental goings on is correct, immutable and sacred, and b) known only to you and not picked off the shelf of publicly available models associated with the word you choose.

I don't believe (a) because we see too much the same mental goings on interpreted as different constructions by the same people at different times. We're wildly unfaithful even to our own models and we've absolutely no better idea what's going on than the person sat next to us.

I don't believe (b) because we don't just pick random words to describe these 'identities', we pick words we've learnt, and we can only have learnt those words from a community of language users, who must, therefore, know what the word means, which means, by definition, you could be wrong. — Isaac

I like this, but I think I'd like it more if you aimed at the level of narratives instead of going all the ways down to words -- though I understand it looks like it's the use of individual words that's at stake, of course it isn't, they're pieces of a larger puzzle.

Somehow this all reminds me of a moment in The Sting, when Redford (I think) is at the apartment of a criminal associate of his. I think it's grandkids sitting on the floor listening to a cops and robbers show on the radio and one of them cheers the cop hero, which elicits from the old guy a "Hey! Who are y'all rootin' for?!" and possibly a gentle smack on the head (it would fit, but I'm not sure I'm not imagining that). Can be tricky to keep your identity fixed.

Here's another one from the criminal world -- so more masculinity stuff here -- that I would have heard on the radio I guess during the crack epidemic. There was a culture clash in America's high security prisons. I remember clearly some old cons who were interviewed who did not understand the new younger cons in their midst. "We were just outlaws," they would say. And there'd be talk of still having some kind of code. "These guys, though, they don't seem to care about anything, shoot anyone, for no reason, kids too." I remember some old guy particularly put off by these younger guys laughing when someone got shot in a cop show on TV. Just couldn't wrap his head around that.

Upshot of these little stories, I guess, is that identity is always something you perform, rather than something that you are, and your ideas about yourself play a part in that performance but are also a reflective simplification of that performance. There's a feedback loop, but I think it starts with the performance and it's the performance that will keep updating the ideas. (My motto these days, is "How can I know what I think till I see what I say.") If that coupling is too loose, you get people whose ideas about themselves and their performance diverge enough to be troublesome, and then we're talking about neurosis, I guess. But it's always a little loose.

It seems we part company here, as I don't believe our interest in sex is entirely down to its reproductive function. — Janus

Fair. That was poorly expressed. With the word "interest" I was trying to point at the physiology of sexual desire, why these arousal effects were selected for in the first place, not to say that we have a specific interest in and desire to reproduce. The way you have an automatic response to someone in your environment who may present a threat, without any awareness of what about them triggered that, without necessarily even being aware that your awareness of them is threat-awareness, that's the kind of thing I was going for, the response to potential sexual partners that you don't experience as voluntary, noticing someone, finding them attractive, etc.

I'm also hungry right now and trying to ignore those signals to finish this post. I'm not forced to act on what my body is encouraging me to be interested in doing.

I agree that the existence of sex in the first place is down to reproductive function, but that is almost tautologically, and hence trivially, true — Janus

I would have thought so, yes.

I think we also agree that sexual desire is in part hormonal and in part conditioned by socio-cultural influences. — Janus

Yes, of course, and obviously culture plays a huge rule in the range of behavior open to us as acting on those desires. But I think of culture primarily as channeling desire, controlling it, leveraging its existence for other purposes (selling things!), and so on. I'm not at all sure culture can reach deep enough to be a source of desire itself, directing your attention without your permission, quickening your pulse, releasing hormones. Your body has its own ideas about who you ought to be interested in right now and why, and I don't think culture is nearly so powerful or reaches so deep into your physiology.

As I've said, I think the big lesson of the last hundred and fifty years is that we're apes that wear clothes.

We know you read my post, since you replied to it — Banno

A well chosen example. People on this forum accuse each other of responding to posts they haven't read, but as you note that's simply impossible. We all know for a fact that @Vera Mont read every word of your post before she clicked on the little arrow.

Thank you. I've done no googling.

with the advent of more effective contraception the reproduction and the desire for sex are separable — Janus

Well, yeah.

It seems likely that some have an instinctive desire for children and others not. — Janus

The question is not whether we want children and whether that desire is instinctive or not.

Our interest in and capacity for sex is down to its reproductive function, and hence an obvious result of natural selection. We don't choose when and whether and how to be sexually aroused, we just are. It's your hormones. And we are that way because reproduction matters. Natural selection didn't make sex pleasurable and all but goad us into acting on the impulses it arranged for us to have so that we could unwind after a long day of surviving and adapting. It did all this so the surviving and adapting would lead to reproduction.

It seems you are saying that the reproduction part (given safe and effective contraceptive and/ or abortive methods) is optional — Janus

No, the opposite.

Natural selection is clearly able to select for behavior as well as physical traits, at least by tweaking the endocrine system, and it's generally accepted that among all other animals there is something amounting to an instinct to engage in sex at the time and in the way required for sex to lead to reproduction, and I find it absurd to think we are any different. (And if our ancestors were like other animals, natural selection would keep us that way.)

Of course we're not compelled to reproduce, but our sexual characteristics and sexual behaviours were selected for because they lead to reproduction. That's how natural selection works. If there's one thing natural selection is not going to fuck up, it's this.

Also we produce gametes and have specific organs for delivering and receiving those, and those organs respond to arousal in particular ways to facilitate that transfer, ... There are a thousand ways in which we are designed to reproduce and the idea is that all of this is maintained down through the generations but that so far as natural selection is concerned it just gives you the wherewithal to reproduce but leaves the rest entirely up to you and your culture, the actual behavior part, actually putting your elaborate sexual toolkit to some use, responding to those hormones flooding your system, making some babies -- nope, natural selection has had no effect. It builds your reproducing body just on the off chance that you might choose to.

crisis of meaning — Quixodian

From the geek side of the things there's David Chapman.

maybe you're like a dark cloud that says it's going to rain — frank

This is a Grice thing, natural meaning vs non-natural meaning, which then splits into sentence meaning and speaker's meaning (what you mean by saying something rather than what it means). Most philosophers treat natural signs (it's always dark clouds) as a completely different sense of the word "means" but not Grice.

what we think the world would say if it could talk. — frank

My all time favorite quote about a writer is on the back of a collection of Boris Pasternak's poems. Might have been Tsetayeva, I don't remember, and it was something like "He wrote as someone might who had witnessed the creation of the world, a man who understood the voice of the mountains and of the rain." Now that's praise.

One thing that interests me is how deeply embedded this is. When I find my misplaced cup of coffee, I might say, even to no one, "There it is," or I might say to the cup, "There you are."

I used to think about how readily we say things like, "The sign says they close at 8." A philosopher might insist this is metaphorical, or that it's short for "There is an inscription of the words a person would use to say that they close at 8." But either way, you'll be told "The sign doesn't *say* anything." I remember wondering what would happen if we reversed that, if we took words as saying things and instead said it was us borrowing that capacity, that we're the ones who don't literally *say* anything, only our words do.

It's almost always interesting to flip the script, just to see what you get.

In this case the idea that our inferences about people might be the basis for our inferences about the inanimate world, so there's no ancient problem of 'other minds' only a process of noting how predictable some minds are, and eventually instead we say there's no mind there at all.

Sellars has that cool story about how the uniformity of nature is derived from the predictability of people, if you imagine how the natural world was seen before it was depersonalized. Big River is an old man set in his ways, freezing and thawing about the same time every year, flooding fields when the snow melts, a predictable person.

There are some patterns we can see, and we know something about the hardware, but yeah black box, and 'model' is kind of an approximation of what goes on. We are able to answer questions and we are able to look for and fetch teacups but we don't really know how we do any of that. 'Belief' is also a useful approximation, especially when predicting how other people are going to behave. *

* Should have said we probably 'model' ourselves in quite similar ways.

I think you just replaced beliefs that are just sitting there, to a model that's just sitting there. — frank

Then I expressed myself poorly.

What I intended was to agree with Lewis Carroll (is that right?), that I'll know what I think when I see what I say.

Something produces what I say, and broadly that something is guiding my expectations and actions, but it needn't be any sort of representation of the world or of myself in it, not that kind of model. Saying "I check my model" was meant as a kind of transitional description, between thinking you call up a belief and recognizing that you aren't generally privy to what produces your candid speech.

But this is new territory for me, and I'm still getting a feel for it.

I think I would say this: conscious beliefs of the sort we express by saying stuff aren't just sitting there waiting to be retrieved, but are produced as needed, on the fly. The whole time the cup was in the cupboard but I wasn't thinking about it, I had no need to express a belief so I didn't produce one. If asked, I check my model of the cup and find there was no update, so I go with what the model last 'recorded', but really what I'm doing is not retrieving a belief but inferring how I should answer the question.

If I have to give reasons for that expressed belief, I can, easy as pie, but those are justifications, not the reasons from which I inferred the belief I expressed. There probably aren't any of those. The model does its own thing, and I'm not privy to how it inferred what I should say about the cup.

It takes dedication and training to be the sort of person who can fight. A bully is never going to commit to that because if they were prepared to make that kind of self-sacrifice, they wouldn't need to bully. — Isaac

And because the whole point is to pick on those who are weaker. The stereotypical bully is a big guy who just takes advantage of his god-given advantage, with no effort. (Hence the way older brothers treat their younger siblings.) More important is the guy who's smart enough to spot people's weaknesses and manipulate them, bullying them through psychology. That's Trump, that's Finchy in The Office.

boys growing up need some narrative options that will suit them, and that requires a culture to have some archetypes, even if they don't apply to everyone — Isaac

We haven't talked enough about this. I think it was @Moliere who mentioned that the key opposition is not man/woman, but man/boy. There's so much to say about this, but the first thing is that it's not just archetypes but your father that is your primary exemplar of manhood, so it's inevitable that you chose to emulate his example or reject it, and for most a mix of both they don't recognize until they're older. A child's first definition of woman is going to be "someone like my mom" and of man "someone like my dad".

We need to know when it's D-Day and when it's not, but that decision is viewed through the lens of our political position and our right-wing neighbours aren't going to have the same answer as us. — Isaac

The whole topic is very tricky for me, because I am pretty committed to a certain take on masculinity -- my sense of what it is to be a "good man" -- but there are two problems with that: one is that there's some overlap I'm afraid with what people I don't like take as their ideal of being a "real man"; the other is that there's no definably masculine "content" to the ideal -- what it's good for a man to do is generally good for a woman to do as well, so it's really more a matter of style, of a man's way of being good, of enacting the generic ideal, what it is to be good as a man.

For instance, your point about political perspectives almost completely co-opts what I think is one of my core expectations of a good man: standing up to bullies. Good men see followers of the real-man ideal, machismo, toxic masculinity, whatever, as bullies, or at least as bullies in training. Even if they don't have consciously malicious intent, but are just acting on what they understand as their prerogative, the effect is that they become bullies. --- The political point, before I forget: in the US, the right regularly paint themselves as standing up to bullies, big tech, the liberal media, corporate wokeness, blah blah blah. And there is a sense in which they are fighting forces more powerful than them, so it's not completely irrational for them to read the situation that way. It's just that in many cases their opponents, while hegemonic, are not actually bullying them and have not targeted them; and what they are fighting for is generally the freedom to bully trans kids and queers and black and brown people. (Here in Georgia, you will still hear people say the Civil War wasn't about slavery, but states rights -- which, yeah, the right of states to allow slavery. Similar logic here. The federal government is by definition a bully in red states.) So the left says they're obviously standing up to bullies -- racists and sexists and the rest -- and the right says they're standing up to the bullies on the left.

Standing up to bullies -- how does that work? If bullying is the stronger taking advantage of the weaker, the weaker could always stand up for themselves, which would be noble perhaps, or brave, but also probably foolish. They'll need help, and the usual options are many more of their weak brethren pitching in, so all of them together are stronger than the bully, or someone about as strong as the bully stands up for them. (In revenge fantasies, your ally is way bigger than your bully.) This is the guy who says, "Hey, why don't you pick on someone your own size." (I'm not quite 5'10" and a buck fifty, so I can only use that line or your smaller bullies.)

I just don't know if it's true elsewhere, but I'm convinced that this is a core element of how America sees itself. Hitler was a bully, Europe was in a general way too weak to stand up for itself, the minorities Hitler especially targeted like Jews and Gypsies and the mentally ill -- I'm telling the American version here -- they were obviously weak and needed a Captain America to stand up for them. It's why I posted that stuff about the American ideal of the reluctant warrior. It's why Shane is the quintessential analysis of American manhood. --- Shane is particularly interesting because he is a reformed gunfighter. He, like America, has a dark past in which he was the bully, so he has the capability but has forsworn using it. He only takes his guns out of the bottom of the trunk when there's no avoiding the conclusion that there's a bully in town the farmers and womenfolk just can't handle on their own.

(This is also why it's complicated talking to Americans about foreign policy. The belief that we are the good guys runs really, really deep. Some of us, a lot of us, learned when we were teenagers that the history of the US's foreign interventions doesn't reflect entirely well on us, so the critics of American foreign policy aren't telling us anything we don't know. But we understand the American self-image and treat it as aspirational. We have not always been the good guys, but it's baked into us to want to be. And it's why Captain America says, "I'm loyal to nothing, General -- except the Dream." --- I looked it up. It was Frank Miller, of all people, who wrote that line. Even Frank Miller, glorifier of masculine violence, gets it.)

What's really uncomfortable about this whole analysis though is that it does accept that the world is divided into strong and weak, and while the good man stands with the weak as a matter of choice, he is with the bully as a matter of nature, being strong. That also means that as a matter of psychology, choosing to see yourself as a protector of the weak is choosing to see yourself as not one of them, but as strong. And that means unavoidably making strength a part of your self-image rather than incidental to it. The other famous superhero line fits here: with great power comes great responsibility. If you accept the responsibility, it's a way of seeing yourself as powerful.

Usually all of this relies on a simplistic understanding of power or strength as something some people have and some people don't, but you can take it as situational. That was always my understanding of Oppenheimer, that he acted as he did because he recognized he was uniquely positioned to act (to try to stop the super, for instance) and that granted him power he had a responsibility to exercise.

(And this is all another reason for the right to cast itself as standing up to the bullies on the left -- it's a way to indirectly cast yourself as strong rather than weak. The real-men crowd despise weakness and will do whatever it takes not to see themselves as weak, and the first option is usually bullying. Can't be a bully if you're not strong. This seems to be Trump's deal, and why he thrived at the military school he was sent to.)

Coming back finally to my first paragraph -- that being a good man is a man's way of being good -- if you recognize that your society has given men privileges and authority, and that includes you, then you ought to recognize you've been given power to act for the good. That power is situational, not inherent to you, but it's real. And it's not necessarily something you wanted, but you have it. (Refusing more power than you've already been given, or more power than you need to do what's right, is another classic good man move, from Cincinnatus to Washington to -- Mike Pence. For all his flaws, and they are considerable, when he told Trump he did not have the authority to pick the winner of an election, Trump (or was it Eastman? I don't remember) asked him, "Yeah, but if you could, wouldn't you want to?" To which Pence replied, "No! Of course not. No one should have that kind of power." Apparently even Christian dominionists can understand that power corrupts.)

So it may well be that the ideal of the "good man" is largely an artifact of patriarchy. (There may also be something in the inherent differences in physical strength between men and women, on average, and using that relative strength responsibly too.) Being a good man is an adaptive behavior, a way to be as good as you can given that the society you live in has given you unequal power, something like that.

Yikes, this was a long, rambly one. Hope there's something in here worth taking up.

You simply fall into making a false analogy. Other animals don't have the kind of language and cultural transmission that we do. — schopenhauer1

What I specifically argued was that the transition from genetically driven reproductive behavior to culturally driven reproductive behavior is unlikely, unmotivated, and inexplicable.

It's the transition.

Unless you intend to deny that the reproductive behavior of our distant ancestors was genetically driven.

But if it was, I don't see how the transition to culturally driven reproduction behavior is even possible. That's not to say that culture isn't layered on top of biology, of course it is, in all sorts of ways that both encourage and discourage mating.

But if there's no actual selection pressure against the procreative genes, they're not going anywhere. And if biology is already guaranteeing reproductive behavior, there is no purpose served by a cultural construction driving it.

What we do see is cultural constructions trying to control it, direct it, prevent it, encourage it, assign it various social roles, assign it meaning, on and on and on. But the behavior itself goes on whether culture tries to put it to use or not.

It's the transition I argued makes no sense.

It was giving a counter example- one based on culture. — schopenhauer1

That's not a counter-example, it's an alternative description.

And you continue to ignore the argument I've presented, in detail, that the description you give, whatever its merits may be, cannot at any point be apt. You just keep saying that it could be culture, or you think it is culture, but I've presented a case that it cannot be.

A coherent alternative description is not an argument. I could offer a dozen more without half trying. (If you doubt that, google creationism.)

Archived that one too, so feel free to edit it.

I also removed all of my statements from 2015 and 2016 where I said Donald Trump would be the best president ever. — T Clark

But not before I archived them.

I accept PayPal and Venmo

I just don't see how you can pull off attacking evolutionary psychology for its just-so stories and then, with a straight face, begin an argument

Let's imagine there was a world whereby sex was unknown. — schopenhauer1

Evolution of mammals is gonna have some sex in there, just the way it is.

And once you've got sex, natural selection will make sure you keep it, that's my argument.

Your whole post could not have been more beside the point or less responsive to the issues that have been raised.