I'd definitely be interested in getting a copy of that! Going for a more widley shared format than .numbers might be good if you're looking to share spread it around as well.
Good luck!

The pictures, although nice, aren't that big a deal. However, it seems that a lot of the notes have been broken as well :sad:

This is still a really cool idea though, I wish I had a mac so I could see the full thing.

Thanks, I sent a request to download the file.

@Blurrosier

Thanks, could I get the excel version instead?
(Sorry for taking a while to check back, been busy)

@Blurrosier
Doesn't look like the downloads work anymore, any chance you could give me a new link?
I would PM this instead, but the button is greyed out for me on profiles, probably because my account it new.

@Hippyhead
Do you have the same intuition in this scenario?
“If I believe that high-cholesterol food is bad, but I’m so focused on articulating this that I ignore you eating a greasy burger, do I even believe it?”
Of course this scenario differs in one important respect, even if you eat the burger I can convince you to not do so going forward, and while you are unlikely to shoot yourself again, the ill is already done. Perhaps we can fix that with the following:
“If I believe that removing your pinky is bad, but I’m so focused on articulating this that I ignore you chopping off your pinky, do I even believe it?”
Again, there’s not, to me, an obvious contradiction in granting the belief – I might think it’s a bad thing to do, but I have additional beliefs about personal responsibility/agency/etiquette or whatever else might come between my belief and my preventing you from removing your pinky. I don’t share your intuition about rationality and normativity in either of the gun scenarios. Could you develop, in some detail, what you take rationality to be and why?

I don’t think that this changes when we move the question to existential threats. Is it irrational for the oncologist to focus on treating his patients instead of solving the control problem in AI, or any other large-scale existential threats? Philosophers work with theory, sometimes it ends up being useful, and sometimes not – whether it’s irrational, I think, depends on their reasoning for working on this over that; perhaps they think that it’s being solved by others; perhaps they think that it’s unsolvable; perhaps they think that their engagement will make it less likely to be solved; perhaps they’re hard-nosed anti-natalists; perhaps they don’t think there’s a genuine risk; perhaps they think that something like the right theory of truth will help – there’s any number of possibilities, and to accuse them of irrationality without a comprehensive address of those is premature.

@Hippyhead
Thanks for the thoughtful (and quick!) response.
Yea I recognize that the definition you gave is, let’s say, controversial – I wouldn’t use it to describe my goals when doing philosophy.
However, even granted that definition I think there are issues. Human welfare is a multifaceted thing, and what I was hoping to illustrate when replacing the philosopher with an oncologist was that different people can work at different ends of it. I think that this is very relevant because it seems that, in order for us to swallow this definition of philosophy, we need to grant that human welfare is enhanced by abstract work like theories of truth/meaning/good et cetera (what else would motivate this conception of philosophy?) And if this holds, it’s not obvious why it’s irrational for philosophers to focus on the subject matter of their discipline over other things.

To really secure your argument you’d do well to show that your critique of philosophers don’t end up applying to all people as well, since if it does the conclusion that philosophers are somehow less capable of evaluating quality falls flat.

@Hippyhead
Could you elaborate a little on your reasoning towards the end? I’m not sure what I should be picking up from the scenario with the gun, and what bearing it has on whether philosophers are well equipped to judge quality content.
It can’t be that the scenario is a counter example to advancement of human welfare, since we could exchange the philosopher with some other person we’d grant as sharing this goal, like an oncologist, maybe a philanthropist, or whatever fits your idea of someone advancing human welfare. None of these people would be better equipped to resolve the situation, but it doesn’t seem like that’s grounds to say that oncology and philanthropy are bad at advancing human welfare.