Yes, I'm blowing very hard, just like the wind. — Metaphysician Undercover

:rofl: You seem more like a sailor whose ship is stuck motionless on a windless sea. You have a set of oars which would give you enough purchase to get you moving, but you don't realize it and instead stand in front of the sails futilely blowing at them.

Well sure, but my point is that the thing referred to here as "it" is a fiction. Therefore all that evidence does nothing for you. — Metaphysician Undercover

'Universe' just means 'the sum of what exists', so it refers to everything that exists, and is thus not a fiction at all.

And if you neatly ignore all the logical arguments against "the universe", insisting that empirical evidence is more important then logical necessity, you'll be restricted to believing in your fictitious story because all the available evidence points that way. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is very confused. What are the "logical arguments against the universe" exactly? Do you perhaps mean that there is no universe apart from the collection of all existing things inclduing spacetime? If so, I haven't denied that.

This definition is based in human experience. You define "exist" as what is not imaginary. So you base the definition in imagination, and say whatever is not imagination, exists. But that's self-refuting, because your definition is itself imaginary, you are imagining something which is not imaginary, i.e. exists, but by that very definition, it cannot exist. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is just playing with words sophistically. Of course the definition is based in human experience, everything we say is, so your "point" is without a point. The definition of 'existence' is not based in imagination, it is the counterpoint. 'To exist, to be real', only gets its meaning in distinction from 'to be imaginary, to be unreal', just as 'to be imaginary, to be unreal' only gets its meaning from 'to exist, to be real'.

What I dispute is the truth of "the universe". — Metaphysician Undercover

What are you disputing? It's far from clear. Are you claiming that nothing existed prior to humans?

There is much evidence like spatial expansion, and dark matter, to indicate that "the universe" is a failure as a concept. — Metaphysician Undercover

On what basis do you claim that spatial expansion and dark matter indicate that the idea of a universe is a "failed concept". What do you mean by "failed concept"? Did spatial expansion and dark matter exist prior to humans according to you?

concepts like "existence", and "universe", are just constructs derived from our experience. They may be completely misleading in relation to the way reality actually is. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, it can obviously be said that every concept is derived from experience, in which case noting that is pointless. All our concepts "may be completely misleading in relation to the way reality actually is", but then what could that mean? "Concept', 'misleading', 'in relation to' 'the way reality actually is' are all concepts which we might equally claim to be somehow in error. But then what could that "being in error' even mean and where would that leave us?

I've just challenged anyone to provide a description or definition which isn't based in human experience, or simply begging the question, because i strongly believe that is impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yet you have failed to give any argument for why we should agree with you. What's your argument? So far you are just looking like a blowhard.

Consistency doesn't imply truth. We can make very consistent fictions. And even when the story is consistent with empirical sensations, truth is not necessitated. — Metaphysician Undercover

I haven't said it is necessarily true that a Universe of things existed prior to humans existing. I've said that all the available evidence points to its having existed. You seem to be conflating logical necessity with empirical evidence.

Well then, give me an explanation of what it means to exist, which is not based in human experience, or simply begging the question. — Metaphysician Undercover

To exist is to be real, actual as opposed to imaginary. There are two logical possibilities―either the Universe existed prior to humans or it didn't. Neither is logically provable, since both are logical possibilities. We are left with what the evidence points to―which is that the Universe did exist prior
to humans.

It's very clear to me, and it ought to be for you as well, that "existence" refers to the specific way that we perceive our environment, and nothing else. "Existence" is defined by experience. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is not, in my experience, how 'existence' is generally understood, and it is certainly not how I understand it―it is merely your own idiosyncratic, tendentiously stipulated meaning. There is no reason why others should share your prejudices. If you want to live in your own little echo chamber that's up to you.

Don’t you mean perceived, rather than identified.
To be perceived, something merely needs to be witnessed, this does not require identification. — Punshhh

To be perceived is to stand out as a gestalt. To stand out as a gestalt is to be identified, although not necessarily in a linguistically self-reflective sense, since non-linguistically enabled animals are obviously capable of identifying the things that matter to them in their environments.

That also seems about right to me. The thing is, though, that identifying a difference is a rather different exercise from identifying an object. — Ludwig V

I wonder whether there are any free-floating differences that could be identified without identifying what the differences consists in. 'Objects' in the widest sense would include features like colours, textures, tones, smells, tastes and so on, insofar as these are all generally counted as objects of the senses.

I can see how one might want to say that. But "different" is a relation, so it requires two objects to be compared. Of course, from another perspective, those objects might be dissolved into a bundle of differences, which then require a range of other objects to establish themselves. — Ludwig V

:up: It seems we are agreeing.

I think there is some ambiguity around the word perceived. (Which I realised after posting) I was thinking of it meaning something is noticed, but not identified. — Punshhh

To be noticed is to be identified as something―a flash of light, a subtle odour, a patch of colour, something moving, and so on.

But many aspects of that concept indicate to us that it is a misrepresentation of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

All our science is consistent in indicating that there was a universe, galaxies, star systems, planets and on Earth many organisms, plants, creatures long before there were humans. I see no reason to doubt the veracity of that conclusion.

This is highly doubtful. "To exist" is very clearly a concept structured around human experience. If you think otherwise, I'd be interested to see a good explanation of "existence" which wasn't based in human experience. And a simple definition which begs the question would not qualify as a good explanation. — Metaphysician Undercover

"To exist' is a human concept, as are all other concepts. There is nothing about that concept that necessitates it being confined to the human. Given that we all and some animals manifestly perceive the same environments and things in those environments there is no reason to consider that the concept applies only to what humans have experienced. You seem to be conflating two different things―that 'existence' can be understood to be a linguistically generated concept and the range of the application of that concept.

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The logic of thinking difference involves things which are identified as being different. I don't see how you can escape that.

How can you say there is difference if it is not identified? How is it possible to think difference without thinking (identifying) the things which differ?

More precisely, there can be difference without a prior identity. So how does that work? — Joshs

How could there be difference unless some difference is identified? Identity and difference co-arise―you can't have one without the other.

I copied a couple of paragraphs from the original post, and then added commentary to the effect that it is not being argued that there was no universe prior to observers. — Wayfarer

So, you agree there was a universe prior to observers. What then are we disagreeing about?

The question I’m raising is not whether the universe existed, but what it means to say so. — Wayfarer

It's obvious what it means to say there was a universe prior to observers...it means, if true, that there was a universe prior to observers.

When you say “the cosmos was visible prior to the advent of percipients,” you're smuggling in a category — visibility — that only has meaning within the context of experience. That’s the point I keep returning to. — Wayfarer

It's a lame point though, and nothing is being "smuggled in" because it is simply a truism that everything we say only has meaning within the context of human experience and the judgements we make on the basis of experience. Since it obviously applies to everything there is no point bringing it up. As to visibility, we know what it means for something to be visible, and the idea doesn't depend on it being seen. Similarly we know what it means for something to exist, and it doesn't depend on the existence of humans.

It's about the conditions for meaningful discourse — the structure that allows us to form concepts like “universe,” “visibility,” or “existence” in the first place. I’m not making a deductive claim about what did or didn’t exist. I’m making a transcendental claim about what makes it possible to talk about existence at all. — Wayfarer

The fact that we exist and possess language makes it possible to talk about existence and anything else. As to "meaningful discourse", what makes sense to each of us may differ depending on our preconceptions and assumptions. You speak as though there is a fact of the matter regarding what it could be meaningful to say, but that is simply not true.

You are entitled to say that the idea of existence independent of human experience makes no sense to you, but you cannot justifiably pontificate about what should or should not make sense to others. It is that kind of dogmatic assumption that leads you to think that anyone who disagrees with your stipulations must not understand.

When we forget this distinction, we turn methodological naturalism into a metaphysical doctrine — and mistake the limits of our mode of knowing for the limits of what is. — Wayfarer

The irony is it seems that it is you that wants to restrict "what is" to what humans can know. I allow that all the things we experience have their own existence and had their own existence before there were any humans.

I don’t have the academic credentials to make the cut in a journal of that kind, but I’d suggest that the core argument of Mind-Created World would be regarded as fairly stock-in-trade in that context — not a mistake, but a well-recognized philosophical position. — Wayfarer

Perhaps...I tend to doubt that, but in any case so what?...that there are others who might think as you do doesn't mean much. There are others who think all kinds of things, and the majority of intelligent well-educated people seem to be metaphysical realists. I'm not going to find appeals to authority convincing.

the meaning of philosophy proper, — Wayfarer

The very idea of "philosophy proper" is dogmatic. There is no fact of the matter...it cannot be anything more than your opinion.

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What I think I see is that conversations on the forum often get stuck around 1) the justification of axioms, 2) accusations of misunderstanding or bad faith, 3) acrimony. It’s as if we’re hard-wired for conflict over difference. The worst offenders seem to call others liars and sophists when they are challenged by difference. — Tom Storm

These are good points Tom. I think people often forget that what they are presenting is merely one perspective. If they react defensively it seems to indicate that they have so much invested in their particular hobbyhorse that critique feels threatening. Hence the accusations of misunderstanding and lack of education.

The irony with the situation between Wayfarer and myself is that I am very familiar with all the arguments he presents, I used to present such arguments myself (and he knows this but does not want to admit it), but I have come to think there is very good reason to question the soundness of the presumptions upon which those arguments are based. He seems to take my critiques as personal attacks, when all I'm doing is expressing genuine objections.

Your capacity for self-delusion is truly remarkable. "Proper grasp" of course means 'understood as Wayfarer the enlightened one does". You apparently have no capacity to understand other perspectives or to deal intelligently with critiques of your stipulative nonsense.

The urge to devour and assimilate what is not oneself. — Jamal

That's an interesting take. Instead of oneself being a small part of the Universe, the Universe must instead be seen as being a small part of oneself.

It must also be a need to have everyone agree with oneself, given that the rejoinder to any disagreement is always predictably "if you don't agree then you must not have understood" coupled with some attempt to cast aspersions on the others' level of education. It's a sorry spectacle...

Don't feel bad. — Jamal

No, he really ought to feel bad.

An unfortunate deductive error inferring from our inability to say with certainty what kind of existence unperceived objects have to a conclusion that there could be no such actual existence, and that saying there is any such existence is incoherent. It's called 'confusing oneself with a truism'; the truism being that it is only minds that can know anything. What is more remarkable is that this confusion is obstinately repeated ad nauseum, making me wonder what the point or motivation for such idiocy could be.

In answer to the second question, the short answer is no. In order to count something as visible it is only necessary to demonstrate that it is capable of being seen. However the best, and arguably only conclusive way to demonstrate that something is capable of being seen is to see it. — Ludwig V

Right, so we know that the cosmos was visible prior to the advent of percipients, otherwise there never would have been any percipients.

On the assumption that "intelligible" means "capable of being understood", is the analogy a good one? Showing that one understands something is a good way of showing that it is capable of being understood; that's a parallel with "visible". But there is also a difference. Seeing something can be completed - one can reach a point at which one has actuallly seen whatever it is. But understanding is (usually) incomplete - there is almost always further that one could go. Usually, we settle for an understanding that is adequate for the context and do not worry about whether our understanding is complete.
So the answer is (as it usually is with analogies) the parallel is partial. Yet it is somewhat strange that we also use "see" to describe understanding as well as vision. So perhaps there is more to be said. — Ludwig V

I'd say there is always more to be seen in the seeing of anything, more and finer detail and also different ways of seeing as per the different ways, for example, different species see things.

When the OP says "a world that is fully real and determinate independently of mind", what could 'determinate' mean in a world containing no perceivers? How could something be determined when there is no one there to determine it? Percipients do determine their objects. If they could not do that they could not survive. It seems to follow that things were determinable , just as they were visible and understandable, but obviously not seen, understood or determinate, prior to the advent of percipients.

As Tom Waits put it: "I'd rather have a bottle in front of me than a frontal lobotomy".

As to wokeism; I wonder why there must be such partisan polemic regarding it. Surely there were, and are, real concerns that lead to advocating wokeism as an attempt to deal those problems. No social movement is immune from downsides. Correcting those rather than rejecting the whole of woke culture would seem to be a better strategy. Instead we see more instances of black and white thinking from the ideologues on both sides.

Therefore the whole cannot be causal in its own creation. We can assume that something external puts the parts together, creating the whole, in a top-down fashion, but this would be nothing but what is called "external telos". — Metaphysician Undercover

Genes are generally understood to provide the information that governs the growth, development and functions of organisms. So, it seems you are right that it is not "the whole of the organism" (whatever we might take that to be) that governs its own growth and development. Should genes be considered "external" though?

I’m clear that intelligibility is something that is constituted (“created”?) in the interaction between mind and world. However, our understanding of the world tells us that it has not changed in any radical way since we appeared and that many of the processes now going on must have been going on long before any sentient or intelligent creatures appeared. So is it not reasonable to infer that the world would have been intelligible if there had been anyone around to understand it? (Note that this is a counter-factual, not a blunt assertion.) — Ludwig V

Must the world be understood in order to be intelligible (able to be understood)? As an analogy, must something be seen in order to be counted as visible?

that gives us an easy way to measure bullshit in this thread. See which group is having an easier time defending their position - the group that's having a harder time of it must be right — flannel jesus

First you have to determine which group is having the easier and which the harder time defending their positions. What're the criteria? Which ones do you think are which, and why?

a world that is fully real and determinate independently of mind. — Wayfarer

Can you explain what you take that to mean, if you are implying something beyond "A world that does not depend for it's existence on any or all minds"?

To make this clearer, consider the example you cite of Neptune’s pre-discovery existence. The realist insists: “It existed all along—we simply didn’t know it.” But the claim I'm advancing would point out that what “it” was prior to its discovery is not just unknown, but indeterminate. — Wayfarer

It couldn't have been "indeterminate" if by that you mean indeterminable, because otherwise it could not have been discovered. If "indeterminate" it you means something more that "undetermined' or "indeterminable", then please explain what that additional meaning is.

And finally, the reason this matters is so we do not lose sight of the subject—the observer—for whom all of this is meaningful in the first place. The scientific, objective view is essentially from the outside: in that picture, we appear as one species among countless others, clinging to a pale blue dot, infinitesimal against the vast panorama that scientific cosmology has revealed. But it is to us that this panorama is real and meaningful. So far as we know, we are the only beings capable of grasping the astounding vistas disclosed by science. Let’s not forget our role in that. — Wayfarer

How can the scientific view be "from the outside"? Perhaps you meant "of the outside". Surely all human views of the external world are, by definition "from the inside" (if you want to speak at all in terms of "outside" and "inside"). It's more accurate to say that all views of the world, including human ones, are views of what lies outside the skin of the viewer.

That we are, as far as we know the "only beings capable of grasping the astounding vistas disclosed by science" is a simple truism. I'm puzzled as to what you think the import of these trivial factoids, acknowledged by anyone who thinks about it for a minute, are.

I've been reflecting on a thought: if people were given the chance to do things society and general are considered "bad" or "evil" with no one ever finding out, and with zero chance of anyone suspecting them, most would likely take it(correct me if i am wrong). — QuirkyZen

How could you possibly know that? At best you know (apparently) that you would do those things if you had the chance. Be wary of projecting your own badness onto others.

What might a Davidsonian aesthetic look like? — Banno

I imagine that you would probably be in a far better position than I to give an account of that.

Again I think it (obviously) depends on how you define the term 'art'. I am predisposed to think that examples of good visual art have colour and tonal and textural relationships that form strong, resolved and unified, compositions. Many works of visual conceptual art are not much or even at all concerned with aesthetics, but rather with conveying some idea or other.

A conceptual explanation just is a psychological explanation if it is assumed that a philosopher thinks a certain way on account of the time and cultural milieu they find themselves in and not on account of their own analyses.

I guess you could say that is the upshot. So we are left with the possibility of looking at things in many different (and hopefully interesting) ways.

The Davidsonian point that we all agree about most things is true when it comes to everyday stuff. Not so much when it comes to aesthetics.

There is a deep historical influence there. That Hume's Guillotine would be formulated first by someone who grew up in the context of the Reformed tradition is not surprising for instance. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You are always giving psychological explanations, which amount to just-so stories, in order to try to debunk what you don't agree with.

I can articulate it just fine — Count Timothy von Icarus

Your explanations lack cogent argument usually. Your articulations seem to amount to "get lost in the wall of words, and quotes from and references to, supposed authorities, many of them obscure". But perhaps I'm being too charitable.

It doesn't really differ. That's why I said from the start that all paintings can be thought of as pictures...or not...depending on the definition of the terms (interpretation).That's also why I offered the Ship of Theseus and Sorites examples as analogies.

I say there is no ontological fact that determines what it is correct to say. You said I am doing ontology in saying that...and I respond again that it depends on your interpretation of the term 'ontology'.

Exactly...now you are making my case for me.

Not at all. We can all form an idea of a black square. We don't need a separate realm where the idea lives.

Are these paintings to be considered pictures? Are they representational?
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Well, if you must. The idea that a black square only represents a black square looks a tad too platonic for my taste... it smells of perfect forms and such nonsense. — Banno

Platonism not needed; it is just the idea of a black square that is being represented, an idea which can be re-presented in countless ways, just as the form of a tree or a human face can be re-presented in countless ways.

I'd say it may be said to be one possible representation of a black square, a picture of a black square, and that it also may be said to be just a black square because squares are abstract objects.

Just as a representational, in the traditional sense, paintings are pictures of whatever it is they depict, and at the same time are just painted shapes on a flat surface. I see an intractable ambiguity when it comes to visual representation.

As I've said I see there is always an ambiguity between what a painting represents, whether it is an abstract object such as a square, circle or rectangle or a painting that depicts a landscape, person, still life or whatever, and the formal aspect of all paintings which exists regardless of the subject and which consists in some pattern of tones, textures and colors on a surface and which constitutes a strong well-realized composition or does not.

Cezanne, the Cubists the abstract expressionist painters and others all self-consciously explored in various ways the ambiguity between paintings as patterned flat surfaces and paintings as representations of three dimension space. Your definition of picture is one, but not the only one, and not so useful as it is too restrictive in my view. But "each to their own" I guess.

:cool:

It is a painting on canvas that we might say depicts a red rectangle and is thus to be considered a picture or we might say it is just red paint on canvas in rectangular configuration. If something is just paint on some surface, and does not depict anything then it is just a painted surface.

There is nothing substantive in these kinds of questions― as I've said a few times now it's all in the interpretation.

This is one of those perhaps odd consequences of accepting the institutional theory of art -- Van Gogh's paintings that were not known but found later were not art before they were found, even though they were painted by Van Gogh! — Moliere

Not merely an "odd" consequence, but an absurd one. Van Gogh's works are rich, beautiful and intelligently composed images which are markedly different than anything created before.

I'm hesitant to justify art by its purposes. If anything I think it's entirely useless, and that's sort of the point. Rather than there being functions which art fulfills it can fulfill any function we want -- so a pot, though a useful item, can at the same time be a work of art. But in judging the pot as a work of art I am not concerned with its utility -- a pot in a museum from some ancient time is interesting because of when it was made and what it might mean for the history of art and ourselves, not because it's good at carrying water. — Moliere

Things like pottery and architecture may be considered to be art, and yet serve practical purposes. An American architect called Sullivan said in an essay that in architecture "form follows function". What I think all art has in common is that it attempts to bring an idea or vision into concrete being. We might say that some modern works embody an idea or vision which is quite trivial, aesthetically speaking and that their cultural value consists only in their reflective critical relationship with what had come to be considered "the canon" in an institutionalized monolithic, linear view of art history.

What does ontology have to do with that? — javi2541997

One of a couple of central questions @Moliere asked was what is the distinction between paintings and drawings. I originally simply pointed out that the usual distinction between paintings and drawings is one of the difference between pictures produced using wet or dry mediums.

I referred to paintings and drawings as pictures and then got drawn into a side issue as to whether all paintings and drawings can be thought of as pictures, and I pointed out that it would depend on definitions of the terms, not on some presence or lack of shared essential characteristics of paintings and pictures that make it necessary that they should be thought of as either in the same category or not.

I brought ontology into it to emphasize that it is a mistake to think that there are always some essential characteristics that make it necessary that something must be thought to belong to a particular category or identity.

What is?

I should have addressed this more thoroughly:

They are not all pictures but can all count as pictures. — Banno

You are putting words in my mouth. I'm simply saying that all paintings can count as pictures on reasonable definitions of the terms. On more restrictive definitions all paintings may not count as pictures. I haven't anywhere said that not all paintings are pictures.

On your definition of ontology, perhaps. Ontology is usually understood to be concerned with what exists, and what exists is usually considered to be not a matter of opinion or interpretation. Do you think there exists a fact of the matter as to whether all paintings are pictures? Of course I'm not denying that there might exist different opinions dependent on different interpretations of the terms.

Take the "Ship of Theseus': there is no fact of the matter as to whether the ship with all its parts replaced is the same ship or not, so not an ontological, but a semantic, matter. What does exist is the ship: that's ontology.

Right it's like the 'Ship of Theseus' and 'Sorites'...just a matter of definition not ontology.

How would you know about it other than by observing purposeful behavior? Of course it isn't substance like...although that said, neither purpose nor substance are observable.

I'm not about to trust your judgement as to why Wittgenstein said what he did.

1. Teleology does not exist — Leontiskos

This is a strawman. I'm not claiming teleology doesn't exist. A teleological explanation is an explanation in terms of purpose rather than causation, and teleological explanations are better fitted to understanding and explaining human and some animal behavior.

The idea that the universe as a whole has a purpose―that it was brought into existence on purpose rather than that it just came into existence either without cause, or from some unknown cause, is not supported by any evidence. It seems reasonable to think the universe could not have brought itself into existence on purpose. The other possibility is that it always existed.

Current scientific consensus seems to be that the universe did come into existence, but we cannot say anything about how it came about, because observational data cannot come to us from anywhere but within the already existent universe.

It seems to me you are clutching at straws attempting to confirm something you want to believe.

I was editing my previous post so there is more there for you to address now.

Why quote an ambiguous passage from Wittgenstein instead of answering directly and in good faith? Perhaps Wittgenstein just means that the human interpretations of human experience, replete with all the values and meanings inherent in those interpretations is not to be found in the physical world. Again, hardly controversial.

1. Modern science long rejected teleology, even among plants and animals — Leontiskos

Science has long since gone beyond such a mechanistic view of animality. It's obvious that (some) animals ( including humans) can respond to their environments in novel ways. Such a thing is not possible for simple mere mechanisms. It doesn't follow that there is any overarching purpose behind animal behavior.

3. Given that this conclusion about plant and animal teleology turned out to be unsound, do we have any reason to believe that the conclusion about teleology more generally is sound? — Leontiskos

It was the overwhelming evidence found in observational data and being unable in the face of it to cling on to entrenched prejudices that enabled biologists to see purpose, and even intelligence and reasoning, in animal behavior. What imaginable kind of data is going to provide the evidence to allow us to see universal teleology.

The question is, "What is the rational basis for an anti-teleological view, given that the anti-teleological view as applied to plants and animals turned out to be baseless?" — Leontiskos

The analogical reasoning from one case to the other is not valid. The argument against holding the veiw that there is an overarching purpose to the universe is simply that there is no evidence for such a thing. We don't have to outright deny the possibility, but without evidence that is what it remains; a mere possibility.

They certainly thought they had good arguments in the past, and the current state of science sees most of those arguments as faulty. — Leontiskos

Those arguments were not so much arguments as prejudices, if you are referring to intentionality in animals. Some, perhaps much, of that prejudice came form religious views that propounded the idea that humans are not animals and that animals did not have souls. Luckily good observations of animal behavior exploded that myth.

Of course you won’t see anything like purpose or agency in the data that these instruments collect - but as I said, this is red herring. — Wayfarer

Why is it a "red herring"? We see purpose or agency in the data collected by observing animal behavior. Are you claiming there is purpose or agency there in the inorganic even though we cannot detect it? If you are claiming that, then on what grounds?

I’m interested in a perspective based on phenomenology - that the appearance of organisms IS the appearance of intentionality. It is how intentionality manifests. It’s not panpsychism, because I’m not saying that consciousness is somehow implicit in all matter. The fact that inorganic matter is not intentional in itself is not particularly relevant to that. — Wayfarer

That intentionality, at least in some "proto" sense comes into being with organisms (well at least with animal organisms) is hardly controversial. You are not saying that consciousness (and intentionality?) is somehow implicit in all matter, so that leaves me wondering what you are saying.

Why don't you answer the question in my last post? My first paragraph there explains what I found in your OP, that I can actually agree with.

OK, I'll play along:

However the question of purpose, or its lack, doesn’t always require invoking some grand ‘cosmic meaning.’ Meaning and purpose are discovered first in the intelligibility of ordinary life—in the way we write, behave, build, and think. — Wayfarer

You say "doesn't always require"―does it ever require? I agree that meaning and purpose would be impossible without our experience being intelligible to us in the ways it is, just as meaning and purpose for animals presumably could not be possible for them without their experience being intelligible to them in the ways it is.

Furthermore, the belief that the Universe is purposeless is itself a judgement about meaning. — Wayfarer

It's a judgement based on critical thought. The human notion of purpose presupposes agency. and agency presupposes perception/ experience. If the universe as a whole has no agency, no perception/ experience then how could it have a purpose?

Even the most rudimentary organisms behave as if directed toward ends: seeking nutrients, avoiding harm, maintaining internal equilibrium. Nothing in the inorganic realm displays these (or any!) behaviours. This kind of directedness—what might be called biological intentionality—is not yet consciously purposeful, but it is not mechanical either. — Wayfarer

Who ever said that the basic nature of life is mechanical? Mere mechanism doesn't allow for change based on feedback other than degradation. 'Intentionality' is a slippery term. We think of human behavior as intentional. We also think of some animal behavior as intentional, but it seems a stretch to call the behavior of simple organism, or even plants or fungi, intentional. You agree that the inorganic universe is not intentional or purposeful, and if the vast bulk of existence is inorganic, then how do you reconcile that?

I'll leave it there for now, because if you won't answer the questions already posed, I don't want to waste any more time.

"Your just a positivist". The usual lame response when you have no comeback that actually addresses my questions. Your OP says there is purpose and meaning for organisms. I can agree with that as a way of understanding animal, and perhaps plant, behavior.

Do you want to say something more than that? If so, what? I couldn't find it in your OP beyond some vague intimations.