In order to get things done, one must hold certain things to be the case, not to be in doubt. One must hold some things as certain. — Banno

I agree with you on this, but I wonder whether you think that those things we hold certain are in any degree fallible. Do you think they could ever be falsified?

Both cases require believing that there is something to be mimicked; believing that another individual behaved in some certain way; believing that someone else did something or another — creativesoul

I would say 'seeing that there is something to be mimicked', 'seeing that another individual behaved in some certain way', 'seeing that someone did something or other'. Unless the case is that those things were not seen but reported by someone else, in which case 'believing' would be, for me, the apt term.

As far as the OP goes, you and I agree much more than disagree. It's when we unpack our respective notions of knowledge and belief that things begin to get more contentious. It seems that way to me anyway. — creativesoul

Yes, I agree. We each have our favored ways of parsing and talking about things. :smile:

That is to draw a distinction between mimicry and mimicking for the sake of mimicking. — creativesoul

I would say the difference there would be intention, not belief.

"In that" is not how I would put it. It's that mimicry presupposes at the very least, that the mimicker believe they are mimicking. — creativesoul

OK fair enough—I just don't see why one cannot merely mimic. If I am conscious of an intention to mimic then I know that is what I am trying to do. Some say there can be no knowledge where doubt is not a possibility. I don't see it that way; the way is see it is that there is no place for belief where there can be no doubt. If I'm trying to mimic something, I don't see how there can be any doubt about that.

I agree with you that belief plays a major role in all our lives. I just think we will disagree as to just where it has its roles, or to put it another way, about where it is appropriate to speak about belief being a factor..

The most we seem to be able to conclude from more sophisticated parsings of "I doubt" is that "something doubts", and not what that something is. — Banno

Perhaps "this body doubts"?

I'm not fond of the notion of "proposition" — creativesoul

I just mean by that something like "assertion that something or other is the case".

I think that you're getting at or pointing towards the kind of habitual muscle memory habits that develop given enough time and repetition. With that I'd wholly agree, but as "cross-purposes" implied, that's not what I was talking about. — creativesoul

What I meant about planing boards and riding bikes is that you can watch others doing them, and then have a go, trying different things and improving with practice. I see no need for any particular beliefs in that, just willingness to have a go.

Belief less creatures cannot know how to plane boards. — creativesoul

Creatures without hands cannot plane boards. Look, I agree that you can frame things in terms of belief, and I think they can be framed in terms not including belief. Which is the better framing? That depends on preference and/or intuition.

My point is that we can be aware of a particular thing without believing or knowing anything about that thing, we can believe a particular thing without being aware of or knowing anything about that thing, and we can know how to do something without believing anything or being aware of doing the thing.

Examples may help me to grasp what you're saying here. The above, as written, seems plainly false to me. I would argue that all three candidates/examples/suggestions are false, as they are written. — creativesoul

I can be aware of whatever it is that is present to me right now without believing or knowing anything about it in any propositional sense. You can believe something, for example that your wife is having an affair, without being aware of (having evidence) or knowing anything about any actual infidelity on her part. I can know how to ride a bike without believing anything about bikes, and I can ride a bike without being aware that I am doing it (automatic pilot). I don't know about you, but when I ride a bike I am on automatic pilot for much of the time.

Either all knowledge is existentially dependent upon belief or it is not. — creativesoul

I don't think there is an empirical matter of fact about that (certainly not a determinable one, in any case), just different ways of looking at it, talking about it. So, you can say it is or it isn't. it comes down to personal preference or intuition

But I would go further and suggest that "absolute certainty" is a nonsense formed by concatenating two otherwise innocent words. Trying to make use of such a term leads immediately to misunderstanding. — Banno

I think you're probably right about 'absolute' being a loaded term. Perhaps 'complete certainty' would be a better fit. I'm completely certain, i.e. have no doubt whatsoever that I am currently typing this response to you.

:up:

.

That's intriguing. Especially the 'elevated experince and understanding' part of it. What would be an example of this? Are you thinking enlightenment... gurus and such? — Tom Storm

I don't count "elevated experience and understanding' as being demonstrably more than a feeling. In other words I don't think we can know what the implications of such experiences might be. The guru thing might be helpful for some people, personally I dislike the smell of it.

Perhaps the problem is not, not being able to find "absolute certainty", but the framing of these issues in terms of "absolute certainty". Garbage in, garbage out. — Banno

I agree—absolute certainty is not possible except relative to some context or other.

It is MORE accurate in every way to claim some dearth of awareness by forgoing the term 'knowledge' and similar absolutes that partake of perfection by implication. — Chet Hawkins

I think what we know is restricted to what is right in front of us at any time, and what we have experienced to the extent that we can rely on our memories and what we are able to do.

Beyond that it's all more or less justified belief, with the assessment of justification being reliant on what we do know if it relies on anything at all more substantial than merely a feeling of being more or less certain.

The Gang-gang is a kind of Australian cockatoo. Them dancin' cockatoos is amusin'—better than any fuckin' cat video in my book!

I've also generally held that there is no absolute certainty. And no realm where certainty or truth lives (in the Platonic sense). But I sometimes wonder what is served by adding the word 'absolute'. Isn't certainty finally just a human word, an artifact of language use and convention which can mean various things depending on context?

There are things we can call true because to deny them would result in catastrophe - eating arsenic, jumping from a plane without a parachute, etc. Which unfortunately for my antifoundationalist tendencies suggests that truth (certainly in some instances) is not merely a product of human construction but is grounded in an objective reality that exists independently of our beliefs and perceptions.

On the positive side, having a definition of knowledge or truth is of almost no use in my day-to-day life, so there is that. All I need to know about truth exists in convention, usage or domains of intersubjective agreement. — Tom Storm

I don't believe in any Platonic realm either, but I do believe in the mystical experience, meaning I believe that it is an altered state of consciousness that seems generally to carries with it a sense of elevated experience and understanding—the problems come when people try to use it to prove some metaphysical claim or other. I prefer to draw no conclusions in that regard.

Like you, I'm happy to live with uncertainty, with not-knowing. And I agree with you about the existence of a mind-independent actuality. I have no need of a definition of truth either, I feel as though I know what it is wordlessly, so to speak, and no need to attempt any more fine-grained analysis

I suppose what is noteworthy here would be to ascertain just how well you "got" what the other person was thinking. One thing is to have a general indication of what they may be thinking, the other is those moments of knowing exactly what they are thinking. But sure, point taken. — Manuel

Right, it's always going to be more or less of an approximation, even in relation to knowing what I myself am thinking. I'm not one who believes in perfect introspection..

Cock or two.

They don'tknow it, though, do they? — AmadeusD

Not with absolute certainty. As I have said already absolute certainty is possible only in relation to what is in from of you right now, and then only within the context of what call 'the shared world" and not beyond that to some absolute.

Given that they can be certain of their memories (and that indeed may be questioned), they can be certain about what their partner or good friend has thought about whatever or what thoughts, as expressed, have been in their minds in particular situations or regarding particular issues.

Of course, disregarding the possibility of telepathy, no one can know what is in another's mind in particular situations unless it has been expressed often enough. Of course, it you want to get real cynical, you could say it's possible they've always been lying about what they think.

You may be a good mind-reader. Or you have special powers! — Manuel

I wasn't referring only to myself. I have observed many times that people know what their partners or close friends will think about certain things. This is simply because they know them well, no special powers required.

You are confusing absolute knowledge with knowledge.

If knowledge is a justified belief that has a high enough probability of being true, then you can know you know X IFF you have a justified belief that has a high enough probability of being true that X.

All you have noted, is that you can’t be absolutely certain that it is true; which is not a qualification of knowledge. — Bob Ross

For me 'absolute knowledge' refers to knowledge which is true independent of any and all contexts. I don't believe such knowledge is possible, so I am not confusing ordinary knowledge, which is knowledge relative to contexts, with that.

If you cannot be certain what the probability of something being true is, then you would be operating with a mere belief to support your conclusion that your original belief was justified. An infinite regress ensues.

Absolute certainty is possible within contexts. I can be absolutely certain of what I am doing and experiencing right now. If I look outside and I see that it is raining, I can be absolutely certain that it is raining, or if I see a caterpillar climbing a tree, I can be absolutely certain that there is a caterpillar climbing that tree while I am seeing it. But all of such certainty is within the context of the collective representation we call "the world", it has no application beyond that.

So this:

For example, take correspondence theory of truth: what makes the correspondance theory of truth true? If one accepts that theory, then they would say: it is true IFF it corresponds with reality. — Bob Ross

goes to that point. If I say it is raining my statement will be true if it is raining. If I see that it is raining, I can be certain that I am justified in saying that it is raining. So, my statement would correspond to the actuality, it would be true, I would know it to be true and that would count as knowledge. When it comes to past events I rely on memory, so I can't claim knowledge there because my memory may be faulty (and studies have shown that people's memories very often or even most often, are mistaken).

Not that it's super common, but not a miracle either. — Manuel

In my experience it is "super common".

Knowledge requires that it is true, and not just a belief. Now, whether or not it is true is probabilistic, so it could turn out that what we think is true isn't; but that doesn't negate the importance of knowledge (i.e., true, justified, belief) vs. belief. — Bob Ross

From what you say it follows that we don't know that we know. If knowledge must be true and everything I think is true may not be, then I cannot be confident that I possess knowledge, even though I may, despite not knowing it or even being able to know it, possess knowledge.

Likewise, a belief could be justified, insofar as the probability of it being true is sufficient to warrant a belief, but not considered knowledge; because the probability of it being true isn't high enough.

Knowledge, to me, denotes sufficient confidence (credence) in it being true, given its probability/plausibility of being true. — Bob Ross

If we have no knowledge, then by what standard could we assess the likelihood of something being true?

If we don't know what is true, and we don't even know what beliefs are justified, then what do we know, if anything, according to you?

I don't agree with you anyway, I think there many things I can know to be true, or at least can be certain are the case: namely everything I am presently experiencing and doing. Of past events I can only be as certain as I am of the accuracy of my memory, so confidence must diminish with the temporal distance of events.

The essential issue is that the word 'knowing' is used to invoke delusional certainty, just like 'facts' and even the term 'certainty' itself. — Chet Hawkins

Yes, I agree with you here—the most significant and dangerous example of that being religious fundamentalism.

Thanks for trying, but I'm not seeing any actual arguments to recommend your position, so I remain unconvinced. I think we agree that there is no absolute truth at all to be had, so that is some commonality at least.

Humility and the 'fact' that I cannot know truth in any way, only approach it in many ways. — Chet Hawkins

But you do know that you just responded to my previous post, and that it's true that you did. What possible reason could you have to doubt that? It seems to me that you are confusing yourself unnecessarily.

When it comes to metaphysical matters, I agree that nothing is known or knowable. We cannot know truth in any absolute sense. It is in the metaphysical domain that belief reigns supreme.

It is not really the real me that is reading this. It is a subjective interpretation of me that I am projecting currently onto the real me. — Chet Hawkins

What leads you to believe there is a "real you" over and above, beyond or apart from the you that you are familiar with?

If knowledge requires perfection, by which I take you to mean certainty, can I not be certain that I am presently sitting in my house at the computer typing this and looking out my window at the forest adjacent to my house with one of my dogs at my side and the other I know not where?

But I think that there are empirical facts of the matter.

Direct awareness, knowledge, and belief are distinct, but given the need for evolutionary progression, I cannot agree with claiming that they are independent. — creativesoul

For me an empirical fact is something that can be directly observed. That said, I think we may be talking at cross-purposes. I agree that, in the sense that everyone is aware of things, believes things and knows things that awareness, believing and knowing cannot be completely independent.

My point is that we can be aware of a particular thing without believing or knowing anything about that thing, we can believe a particular thing without being aware of or knowing anything about that thing, and we can know how to do something without believing anything or being aware of doing the thing. Of course, we do have to be aware of what we are doing when we are learning to do something. I think it really comes down to how you want to think about it. There is not just one correct way.

Do you mean Chet has managed to escape before being burnt by the fire, together with the stick? — Alkis Piskas

It's a possibility, although for all we know he may already have felt he was burned.

Chet has flown the coop and the plastic stick has melted.

"Shrug"...if you say so...

The key thing about this limit to logically justified certainty is that it opens the mind sufficiently for things as a Buddhist enlightenment to occur. If not for this the true nature of reality would always be dismissed out-of-hand as ridiculously implausible and never even cross the mind as a remote possibility. — PL Olcott

I don't believe anything in the propositional sense is known in the kinds of altered states of consciousness people refer to as "enlightenment". But such altered states are a kind of knowledge: a kind of familiarity or know-how.

And if you can learn to alter your state of consciousness without drugs that would be a case of know-how even more so. That said, even doing it with drugs should count as know-how.

That's one way to talk about it. — creativesoul

I agree that it comes down to which should be thought the best way of talking about it, since there is no empirical fact of the matter to be found. I personally prefer to think in terms of direct awareness, knowledge and belief all being quite distinct and independent of one another. So, we can simply be aware of things and entities. We can know how to do things and recognize things, entities, events, characteristics, relations and regularities which can feed into propositional knowledge about things which goes beyond simple awareness. And we can believe things we cannot be certain about. This is a simple picture, and no doubt there are crossover cases, but it seems to me worthwhile to start simple before working our way into understanding the subtleties.

Because of the brain in a bottle thought experiment we cannot be logically certain of any empirical truth. Instead of saying {there is} a dog in my living room right now we must qualify this {there appears to be} a dog in my living room right now. It is not 100% logically impossible that all of reality is not a mere figment of the imagination. We can be logically certain that 2 + 3 = 5; — PL Olcott

Such skepticism based on mere imaginable possibilities seem toothless and irrelevant to me. I see a dog in the room, I have no cogent reason to doubt its existence. And that is exactly why I say that where there is no possibility of genuine, as opposed to merely feigned, doubt, then speaking in terms of belief is inapt.

I'm reminded of something that came up on a thread about, I think, Wittgenstein's On Certainty: I think it was regarding Moore's statement he knew he had hands, and the point was that to speak in terms of knowing such things is inapt, because in those kinds of cases there is no possibility of doubt. @Banno may remember this point better than I. My point here is that I think the same inaptitude applies, perhaps even more so, to speaking in terms of belief in those kinds of cases.

Even if you want to bracket out 'knowing how' (and I agree with Moliere and @Banno that knowing is entangled with doing), there is still more than one way in which 'knowing that' is used propositionally — SophistiCat

Totally agree, and i haven't wanted to say otherwise.

Knowledge is bound to objective criteria for understanding whereas belief may involve subjectivity. However, the interplay between the objective and subjective may mean that the nature of belief and knowledge remains fluid in human understanding. — Jack Cummins

As above, I agree. That said, I see the whole theoretical side of science as being, in the propositional sense, a matter of belief. I think the way in which it can be understood to be knowledge turns on a different way in which it can be thought of: not as propositional belief, but as know-how which consists in all the ways scientific theories enable us to do new things and investigate in novel ways. For example, I think we all agree that in the propositional sense the ancient belief that the Earth is flat was not knowledge but could be counted as such in the 'know-how' sense, insofar as it enabled new activities and approaches.

Cool, that gave me a good laugh, and made a lot of sense to boot.

Yep. And if know-how were a subset of know-that, that might be a problem. But if knowing-that is a subset of knowing-how, that is not a problem - is it? — Banno

Yes. you're right.

I may know how to ride a bicycle and that knowledge seems to have nothing necessarily to do with belief.
— Janus
Well, it implies belief in Bicycles and riding.

Animals know how to do things, and we commonly attribute knowing-that to them. The cat knows that the bowl is empty, and so on.

The temptation is there to draw a hard line between knowing-how and knowing-that. But they are not as distinct as folk might presume. — Banno

I don't frame it that way, but that is a possible way of framing it. I tend to think that with things we can see, like bicycles and do, like riding, there is no need for belief.

I also agree that there is no hard line between knowing how and knowing that, and I think even knowing that (given that we apply the idea of knowing in relation to things we can simply be aware of such as having hands and countless other things) does not necessarily involve believing.

To include believing in those kinds of instances would be to capitulate to what I consider to be pointless skepticism. For example, I see the bike, and belief in its existence would only come into play if I could doubt its existence. I don't know if I've explained where I'm coming from with that adequately, but I hope so.

One sees the bike, handles it...no need for belief. I have to go right now...will resume later.

I don't think belief is required. You see people riding bikes. You see the bike and grasp how it works. You want to learn to ride. You learn to ride. No need to believe anything.

What particular belief that would be necessary in order to learn to ride a bike did you have in mind.

In both agreement and good standing. Glad to join you, if that's okay? — creativesoul

I think we do generally agree and are in good standing too. I always welcome your input.

Nonsentient Boulderism — jgill

That made me laugh!

We are fallible creatures. I agree we are not always mistaken. I think we do know some things, even many things. I agree that the common idea of objectivity is archaic, unexamined. I agree that propositional statements are either true or false, regardless of opinion.

Where does that leave us?

All knowledge requires belief.
— ENOAH
That's true, but the OP asks if knowledge is merely belief. Apparently, it's implying that the difference between knowing and believing is empirical verification or rational justification. And so, we argue about shades of truth. :smile: — Gnomon

I question whether all knowledge does require belief. I know how to ride a bike, plane a board, paint a picture, write a poem, play the piano and so on, and I don't see how any of that requires belief.

Sure, knowledge is a rigorously arrived at belief in JTB theories of truth. — Bylaw

Yes, that's the way JTB is conceived. The problem is that we may not always know that what we (think we) know is true or be that clear about just how what we consider to be justification really is justification.



Right, in practice what is judged to be knowledge counts as knowledge, and what is judged to be true counts as truth. Objectivity is a chimera or is reducible to intersubjective agreement.

I don't think I've seen a propositional knowledge out in the wild though. I have seen the others I referenced. I can perhaps see a propositional knowledge out in the wild if I put a particular kind of retrospective goggles on. But if you insist... — fdrake

I haven't seen any kind of knowledge out in the wild, except know-how. I have seen all kinds of claims to knowledge, including claims to know that this or that proposition is true, claims to know this or that person or place, claims to know God or the Absolute Truth, and so on. I agree with you that the idea of knowledge and its modes of expression are many-faceted. I also agree that JTB is a limited conception.

As I said in the OP, my motivation for this thread was a response to a request by @Chet Hawkins to create a thread if I wanted him to explain his reasons for claiming that there is no knowledge, but only belief. So far, he has not come to the party and seems to have dipped out.

That's an interesting counterpoint. Do you think there is a fact of the matter as to whether people are cowardly or courageous, honest or deceitful, and so on, or is it just opinion all the way down?

I'll argue that knowing-that reduces to knowing-how; so by way of an example knowing that water boils at 100℃ is knowing how to boil the kettle and how to use a thermometre and how to answer basic physics questions and so on. I take this as a corollary of meanign as use. The meaning of "water boils at 100℃" is what we are able to do with it.

Notice also that this approach makes knowedge more social or communal. It is part of our langauge use. — Banno

There is something to what you say, but I think you may be working with too broad a brush. Know-how involves skills that may not be dependent on knowing anything in a propositional sense.

The various ways "know" is used can perhaps all be related by changing locutions, but I don't think it's a matter of one concept being reducible to another.

So, I may know things in a propositional sense that have no effect on what I do, or how I do things. For example, I may know that my friend regularly arrives late to appointments, but I need not necessarily do anything with that knowledge. Or I may know that many religious people think Jesus died for our sins but find that knowledge quite irrelevant to how I live my own life.

Another point is that, for example, I may know how to ride a bicycle and that knowledge seems to have nothing necessarily to do with belief. I think that's a salient difference. This is a complex subject not readily amenable to reductive thinking.

So, I agree with you that knowledge is, to a fair extent, social and communal, and is related to our language use, but that is not the end of the story. Animals, even solitary animals, know how to do things without knowing anything propositional

Do you subscribe to virtue ethics yourself?

Much of this would seem to be perspectival, 'virtue' perhaps being somewhat rubbery. — Tom Storm

I do tend to think of what are generally considered to be the main virtues as desirable. I mean I find that I don't want to associate too closely with those who seem to be cowardly, deceitful, inconsiderate, dishonest, unreliable, duplicitous, devious, self-serving and so on.

Either way, how does it help us to promote the notion of ethics as transcendental? — Tom Storm

I think this is an important question. I don't think it helps us at all to think of ethics as transcendental. I don't think ethics is transcendental except in its connection to aesthetics. Beauty is transcendental, and virtue ethics seems to connect virtues with what is generally attractive to humans. Courage is attractive, cowardice is not. Kindness is attractive, cruelty is not. Consideration of others is attractive, disregard of others is not, And so on.

On the other hand, we could ask why these things are attractive, and we might give pragmatic reasons for their attractiveness. The virtues promote social harmony and the vices (those that consist in behavior towards others at least) may lead to social discord. Actions may be kind (the idea of which I imagine as deriving from being conceived as appropriate towards one's own kind) or vicious (a characterization I imagine as relating to the word 'vice').