Chalmer's language was more directed to reductive models. We don't know what is 'physical' but we can make models based upon what is observed. So, it is only a problem if it is interesting that consciousness has properties that other phenomena do not, as explored through scientific models. — Paine

"Reductive models" are models constructed in terms of causal relations as I understand it. It is not a matter of "knowing" what is physical but of stipulating; what is physical is what we can either directly observe or observe the effects of.

I agree that it is only a problem if the naively apparent properties of consciousness that might make it seem non-physical (according to the above criteria) are thought to be significant in some ontological way, or, as you say, "interesting".

No. I am arguing that the claim that the universe is experiential in essence is, as I said, not something we experience or know. Speculative ontology is not something I take seriously beyond its limited entertainment value. — Fooloso4

:100:

Consequently, when I insist on using immaterial (metaphysical)*2 language on a philosophy forum, some posters get riled-up. — Gnomon

It seems to me from having observed your interactions over a few years that it is more the case that others think your ideas are under-determined by evidence, and over-determined by arbitrary speculation, and that it is you who becomes defensive and riled up when your ideas are challenged and then go on to project your own anger and defensiveness onto others. That's an honest assessment and not intended as a put-down.

I don't understand why you are apparently so bugged by @180 Proof; it's true he annoys a few posters on here by asking for actual arguments to support their pet theories or speculations. As I see it, he's very well informed philosophically and is providing a good service. If you find yourself being annoyed when your ideas are being challenged, it's a good opportunity to rethink your own assessment of the worth of the ideas you are apparently attached to. (Of course, I'm referring to the general 'you' here).

But even Aristotle's theory of physical bodies combined Hyle (concrete matter) with Form (abstract pattern or design)*2. — Gnomon

Now here's an example of misusing Aristotle: for him form is not "abstract pattern or design" but the substantial actualization of potential (matter) as evidenced by your own footnote:

*2. Hylomorphism, (from Greek hylē, “matter”; morphē, “form”), in philosophy, metaphysical view according to which every natural body consists of two intrinsic principles, one potential, namely, primary matter, and one actual, namely, substantial form. It was the central doctrine of Aristotle's philosophy of nature. — Gnomon

I am not merely claiming that physicalism hasn’t explained mentality but, rather, that it can’t. That is the hard problem of consciousness. — Bob Ross

If it is true that physicalism (physics, chemistry, biology since all testable explanations are physical explanations) can't explain consciousness then it is not a hard problem but an impossible problem. It then follows that it is not a problem at all.

Or the question then becomes 'is there any alternative to a physical explanation'? and of course the answer would be 'no' since the so-called hard problem specifically calls for a causal, IE physical, explanation.

Much ado about nothing...?

OK, it seemed that you were offering passing the Turing test as a criterion for believing that AIs are conscious, but apparently you were not. So, if there is no test for consciousness, the passing of which should convince us that an AI is conscious, then there would seem to be little point speculating about it.

That said, I would believe an AI is conscious if it acted in a spontaneous way that could not be explained by its programming, and which showed that it really cared about something.

As I see it we are able to think about 'past' or 'future' or 'everything' or 'nothing' or 'the unknowable' and so on because we possess symbolic language.

We also have memory and anticipation, which I think are also enabled, or at least greatly augmented, by language. I don't think this means that "the past or future can exist in our brains"; to me that idea doesn't make sense, so I see no need for an alternative. The reason I think it makes little sense is that past and future are just ideas. If they exist at all they exist as now, meaning that when the past existed it was present and when the future will exist it will be the present. Perhaps all moments are always physically existent, just not so for us we crawl through time.

So, I'm not being "resistant", I just don't see the reasoning that leads to your conclusion that "mental content is universally immaterial". I don't even know what that could mean, to be honest. But that's OK; we don't have to agree, it's just a matter of different perspectives.

I didn't mean to offend you by inquiring into your personal preferences. — Gnomon

You didn't inquire into my personal preferences, but spoke as if you knew what they were, and here you go again; assuming what my personal reactions are. But don't worry, I don't get offended by people in online exchanges, it's just ideas being exchanged, or ignored, or critiqued or whatever.

But, it's that "some other way" definition of immaterial that is controversial. Besides, on this Philosophy Forum, personal feelings about hot-button words are all too often the crux of argumentation on divisive topics, as opposed to dictionary definitions. — Gnomon

I don't see "some other way" as being uncontroversial, but as being philosophically useless unless it is explicated in a cogent manner. I haven't encountered any such explications, on here or anywhere else.

So, it's the emotional baggage attached to some words that make rational dialog difficult. — Gnomon

I'm not attached to any metaphysical views, but I realize that some, in particular those who have developed some kind of system or relate to some pre-existent dogma they are attached to, may have emotional baggage or investment in their ideas and beliefs. If you want to function fruitfully on this forum you would do well to drop such attachments and be open to learning new things. I'm referring here to the general "you" here, not you in particular, just to be clear.

I've seen quite a few people over more than a decade on these and other forums, touting the same set of ideas. like dogs who won't let go of their bones, and I'm astounded how attached some people become to their ideas. They are just ideas, for fuck's sake!

in order to communicate I need to know which implicit meaning of the term you are intending. To be explicit, when I use the term "immaterial" or "meta-physical", I'm referring to concepts that may be "unimportant" for scientists, but centrally important for philosophers. Are you approaching the topic from the science side or the philosophy side? — Gnomon

For me, 'metaphysical' denotes 'speculative ideas about the nature of things', which cannot be empirically tested or logically proven. As such, they may be interesting or not, fruitful for science or not. So, I agree with Popper that (some) metaphysical ideas are not unimportant for scientists, and I also think some metaphysical ideas may be important for some philosophers.

In general, though, I would say that only those metaphysical ideas which are informed by science can be important for philosophy as a whole, since Kant. So, for example, I don't think the idea of God is of much philosophical use these days, which is not to say that it could not be useful to some individuals in relation to their own personal philosophies; it's just that there are some things it is futile arguing for (or against).

So, to sum up, I don't see a division between the "science side" and " the philosophy side". Science informs us about ourselves, but it cannot answer all the questions that may be of importance to people, and it cannot prescribe how people should live either, but those are ethical, not metaphysical, issues.

:up:

It might be just word problems. For me the immaterial is something brains can assign parameters to but they don't exist other than as brain state. — Mark Nyquist

As 180 says you seem now to be speaking about the imaginary when you refer to the "immaterial". So, if consciousness. or mental states, to return to the original example should be counted as immaterial, does it follow that they are then to be thought of as being imaginary?

:up: I enjoy these forums too; I see them as being the modern equivalent of the agora.

Marx said that after turning Hegel on his head. I won’t argue the case beyond noting dissent. — Wayfarer

Marx said that he stood Hegel on his feet, since Hegel saw everything upside-down. But then Hegel agreed with Marx that everything humans do is a product of culture and society; they just disagreed as to what the most significant cultural and societal drivers are.

I think it's also worthwhile reading available works on the questions that interest you. I read as much as I can find time for.

No special occupation or training other than undergraduate level philosophy. I also took a hell of a lot of psychedelics and practiced meditation daily for about 18 years. What about you? Do you have a special kind of training or interest?

You're entitled to that view, but I can see no reason to hold it. That said, all of us hold groundless views, so it's no biggie...

The search for proof for the incorporeal is at the heart of idealism, I guess. — Tom Storm

Since there seem to be only two kinds of proof or evidence: the logical and the empirical, I think it's going to be a
very
long.........................................................................................................................(and fruitless)
search.
:fire:

The issue is that I see no reason to think that the things you refer to as immaterial are not physical phenomena. They may not be observably material, or physical, phenomena, but then neither are fundamental particles or quantum fields, and yet no one seems to want to claim those are not material, or physical.

So, the situation as I see it is that there are some phenomena we can observe and other phenomena that can only be detected via observable effects.

I said the immaterial IS supported by physical processes. The reasoning is because we contain immaterials such as past and future (that physically do not exist) and that is evidence our brains have this ability. — Mark Nyquist

The past and future are ideas; are ideas immaterial? Ideas are abstractions, generalizations but they are not necessarily immaterial, except in the sense that they are not objects of the senses.

And as 180 Proof pointed out abstract objects really only exist in a physically instantiated form, which I agree with. — Mark Nyquist

Actually, I pointed this out earlier in the thread and 180 agreed:

Ideas, theories and generalizations only exist insofar as they are physically instantiated. Also, the idea of "material substance" is questionable; at the very least it is ambiguous. In ordinary usage it refers to tangibility, to some sensorially apprehensible aspect of the objects we see, hear, touch, and so on. — Janus

In any case, if abstract objects exist only in physically instantiated forms, then why refer to them as 'immaterial"?

It seems to me that those who insist on using this tendentious term have something invested in the belief that there is some reality over and above the physical.

Is ChatGPT conscious? What about a future version that passes the Turing Test? — RogueAI

BTW, there is another angle on this: if some AI passes the Turing test, meaning that it can convince anyone that it is conscious, would it necessarily follow that it is, in fact, conscious? In other words, if to be conscious is to experience, would an AIs ability to convince us that it is conscious prove that it experiences anything?

You say we can "contain" the immaterial, but what does this mean? I take it that you mean we can grasp abstractions or generalizations. So, if I understand you, you are saying that abstract content can affect other abstract content. If this is right, then how would you say the affect is effected if not by means of physical processes?

That's probably true, although it's not an aspect of everyday life. So, the only in principle private element is how I feel when I am conscious, or not.

As for one's own "consciousness", or subjectivity, I think it is only assumed and not observed (any more than an eye sees itself seeing). — 180 Proof

Sometimes I may be looking at something; I may not be conscious of what I am noticing, but if you asked, I could tell you what I've seen. At other times I am very conscious, in the moment, of looking at something, and of noticing what I'm noticing. You could observe me in either of these states, but you would not be able to know for sure whether I was conscious of what I was looking at, at the time. So, my own experience tells me that I can notice whether I am conscious or have been daydreaming and it is in this sense that I say this observation is private.

I don't have any observational grounds to doubt or disbelieve that I am (at least, occasionally) "conscious". Do you? — 180 Proof

So, I agree with you that we have no observational grounds to doubt that I am ( at times) conscious, and I would go further and claim that I have observational grounds to believe it.

Indeed - I should have said, 'is purported to operate throughout... ' etc. I agree. — Tom Storm

:up:

Our "rational grasp of things" as enacted or even as imagined, are neuronal processes as far as we know. What else could they be? It is true that what we experience, as such, is only observable by ourselves, but all of it seems to supervene on the physical. Are you suggesting that there could be experience, thought, feeling and desire without the physical?

It would mean that at least some of the primitive terms of both of those would be the same in all possible worlds, that if intelligent life evolved elsewhere, it would still be obliged to recognise the law the excluded middle and the notion of 'equals', for instance. — Wayfarer

I think it would only be the case that the law of the excluded middle and the notion of "equals" would need to be recognized in a world if its physical characteristics were such as to necessitate it. Perhaps it would be physically impossible for that not to be the case; fact is, we don't know and have no way of knowing such things. If our universe is a quantum universe where everything is entangled and ultimately one, then those kinds of laws and qualities might just be artifacts of the human embrained body, for all we know.



How do we know the logical absolutes of identity, non-contradiction and excluded middle hold everywhere in the universe? Perhaps all we know is that we cannot imagine it being otherwise; we certainly have access only to a vanishingly small sample of the universe. And even if it were true that they obtain everywhere, that would speak to the physical constitution of things, because that is what our study of the universe is: a physical study. In any case, QM seems to contravene some of those principles, so maybe they are artefacts of our macro-minds.

Therein lies something of a problem. :wink: Where do you sit on the notion that maths is Platonic? As you know, some people maintain that logic and maths transcend physical reality. Would mathematical Platonism quality as immaterial? — Tom Storm

I don't know what it could mean to say that logic and maths transcend physical reality. Would it mean that they would still exist, even if nothing else existed?

It exists only by fiat, as a set of agreements, has no material existence. — Wayfarer

I don't think this is true. Money has a physical existence as gold, or paper, or electronic configurations. The agreements exist as written or electronic documents, or as enactions or as thoughts which only exist by virtue of neuronal activity.

Small digression. Is there an example of an immaterial 'something' we can point to uncontroversially? — Tom Storm

Good question! Not to my knowledge.

To my mind, simply put, material corresponds to instantiated (observable); physical corresponds to material system (configurable); and natural corresponds to physical structure (invariant). — 180 Proof

That all makes sense to me. So, on those definitions if consciousness is observable via brain-scanning then it would qualify as physical. On the other hand, if we each know from experience that we are conscious, then it must also be observable in another sense, the difference being that this other kind of observation is not publicly confirmable.

Since the prefix "im-" literally means "not", it follows that whatever is "not material" is literally "immaterial"*1. Yet apparently, those not-matter words have an unplatable implication for you. Perhaps, to you "immaterial" is equated with "unreal" or "spiritual", and "material" means "real" or "mundane". If so, your definition of "material" is even more metaphysical*2 than mine. Instead of those spooky notions though, I'm thinking in terms of reductive/pluralistic scientific categories, in which massive Matter is merely a condensed form of ethereal Energy (E=MC^2), or ultimately of elucidating Light. — Gnomon

I don't know why you are trying to bring what you speculate are my personal reactions to the term "immaterial" into the conversation.

When something is said to be material a common meaning is, as @180 Proof outlined above, that it is observable (or detectable in some way), and when something is said to be immaterial there are two common meanings: either that it doesn't exist or is unimportant, or that it exists in some way other than the material. So, which of these meanings do you intend, and if the second, then what other way of existing than the material are you proposing, or if you intend some other meaning altogether, then what is it?

So, if brain function is necessary for consciousness, what reason do we have for thinking consciousness could be something non-physical?

Is ChatGPT conscious? What about a future version that passes the Turing Test? — RogueAI

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that ChatGPT is conscious, then would its consciousness not be as dependent on a physical substrate as the human?

Are you saying he does not think it does or that you do not think it does? — Fooloso4

I was saying the latter. I don't find his definitions convincing. Also, I don't think his conflation of affective states with thinking helps to clarify anything. I mean in a purely formal sense the self is understood to be the entity that feels, experiences, desires and thinks, and that is clear enough until you begin to ask the further questions as to just what this entity is, if it is claimed to be anything more than the whole organism.

What I should have said was that it is not an ordinary “thing” (given, constant, observable), and that the characteristics (criteria) of this “thinking” type of thing are not those of an object. It only exists “while” we are thinking, and is feared to go away if we stop. “I exist—that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking. For it could be that were I totally to cease from thinking, I should totally cease to exist.” — Antony Nickles

So, the self is an "I-thought" or, since Descartes seems to include all kinds of feeling, sensation and voilition as thinking, what we might call a "sense of self"?

Math, logic, ideas in general are not obviously physical, but doing math or logic or thinking in general is a physical process, in the sense that they all involve burning calories.

I think it because the imagination will not give us a clear and distinct idea of the 'I'. But reason does. — Fooloso4

Does reason give us a clear and distinct idea of the "I"? It seems to me that it does not, but that it yields various possible understandings of the "I"; none of which are clear and distinct.

We understand the physical in causal/ mechanical ways. If there are things we cannot understand in these ways, then we can either accept that we simply cannot understand such things, or we can deny that they are physical. If we deny that they are physical how will that help us understand them? I mean what other ways do we have for modeling things and understanding them?

It's more that I am suggesting that there are aspects of the physical that we cannot understand in the customary mechanical ways that we understand the physical.

This is an answer I just posted in another thread to basically the same question:

Maybe the feeling, the seeing and the thinking are just physical processes, but not physical processes that we can understand in the "mechanical" way we understand some other physical processes. Perhaps it is our ability to understand some physical processes in a mechanical way that leads to the prejudice that all physical processes must be mechanical, and that therefore the experience of seeing, feeling and thinking cannot be physical because we cannot understand them in mechanical terms. — Janus

As you said, Abstractions are not material objects. Which is why they can be described as immaterial. I don't mean that mental images are Spiritual, but merely that they are Ideas or Theories or Generalizations that have left behind their material substance, and exist in the Mind as imaginary Concepts, not sensory Percepts. — Gnomon

From the fact that abstractions are not material objects it does not follow that they are immaterial. They may be material processes. Digestion is a material process which is not a material object.

Ideas, theories and generalizations only exist insofar as they are physically instantiated. Also, the idea of "material substance" is questionable; at the very least it is ambiguous. In ordinary usage it refers to tangibility, to some sensorially apprehensible aspect of the objects we see, hear, touch, and so on.

Maybe the feeling, the seeing and the thinking are just physical processes, but not physical processes that we can understand in the "mechanical" way we understand some other physical processes. Perhaps it is our ability to understand some physical processes in a mechanical way that leads to the prejudice that all physical processes must be mechanical, and that therefore the experience of seeing, feeling and thinking cannot be physical because we cannot understand them in mechanical terms.

I don't know what those who think it is an illusion think it is. Still working on it. — Patterner

I believe they think it is a physical process, just like anything else. Of course, that begs the question as to what exactly "physical" denotes.

I can't say I understand the argument in any way. — Patterner

Only we sees illusions. — Patterner

The camera records the illusion we call a mirage, which means the illusion is a real phenomenon. The idea that self and consciousness are illusions is the idea that they are real, but not what we naively think they are, just like the mirage. The illusion consists in thinking that something is something it is not.

Mental states, if they are equivalent to brain states, may be material. Abstractions generally are not material (IE they are not objects of the senses) but concepts, not physical, but conceptual. Calling such things "immaterial" is tendentious, in my view.

Voidism= Nirvana gives rise to Nevermind (also an album reference).

Now your "never mind" has disappeared into the eternal ether....never mind. :wink:

Another question: "Why Monism why not moremonism". Apologies...I'm losing the serious...

Nirvana?

The term "metaphysical" refers to concepts or principles that transcend the physical or empirical realm and are typically associated with supernatural aspects of reality (bearing in mind that the Greek-derived 'metaphysical' is a synonym for the Latin-derived 'supernatural'). Metaphysics posits the reality of immaterial or non-physical factors that are not necessarily amenable to empirical observation or scientific investigation. — Wayfarer

Materialism is a metaphysical standpoint. Metaphysics is not restricted to "concepts or principles that transcend the physical or empirical realm and are typically associated with supernatural aspects of reality". Also 'metaphysics' is not synonymous with 'supernatural'; the former term, in its "popular" sense may share some associations with 'supernatural', but not so in its philosophical sense. There is no 'philosophy of the supernatural'.

The idea that that which views illusions is, itself, an illusion makes no sense. The idea that an illusion is viewing itself makes no sense. — Patterner

The argument that consciousness and the self are illusory does not entail that we don't exist. As I understand it, it is more saying that we imagine consciousness and the self to be in some kind of way persistent entities, and that this is an illusion of reification.

Your 'mirage' example, the illusory appearance of water on a road or plain will "fool" a camera just as it may fool a human.

In any case I'm not arguing for the position I have (rightly or wrongly) imputed to Dennett; it doesn't make convincing sense to me. either, but I acknowledge that making sense is a subjective matter; meaning that what makes sense to me may not make sense to you.

Are one’s thoughts on the same constitutive footing as one’s qualia in terms of their sense of self or are one’s thoughts a step removed or a step “higher” than one’s qualia? Would I still have a sense of self without any qualia but with my thoughts? And is the role played by my thoughts any more important to, or constitutive of, my sense of self than the the role played by my qualia? — Luke

Interesting questions! If qualia are constituted by our awareness of experience, which we would have, presumably, even without language, are thoughts, or at least a certain class of thoughts, only possible in virtue of an added symbolic layer of experience and/ or judgement made possible by language?

I imagine that pre-linguistic humans and some animals have a sense of self and other, but no abstract general notion of 'self' and 'other'. Could we have the abstract notion of self, of entity and identity, without the more primordial sense of difference, leading to the sense of self and other(s)?

We seem to be in agreement, which is not the best for furthering discussion... :smile: