It comes back to the issue of identity. Same kind is not identical kind. — Joshs

Kind is an abstraction from natural regularities, and as such is a fixed or static identity. Abstractions, like number, are static, although obviously their instantiations are not.

Exactly. We invented the concept of ‘same kind’ in order to count, but same kind doesn’t exist in nature. — Joshs

Something must exist in nature that would support the judgement of 'kind' otherwise how would we have arrived at the idea? Animals generally associate with their own kinds, and for that matter 'animal' is a different kind than 'plant', and 'human' is a kind of animal. Then we have the biological and non-biological kinds of substances and even the different kinds of microphysical "particles".

So, I am not convinced we are entitled to say that kind does not exist in nature, I think the evidence points rather to the conclusion that kind does exist in nature, on every level of being.

I happen to agree with you on that, but just to make sure we’re on the same page, do think that any of the following cognitive assessments can be rationally justified, and if so , which ones and on what rational basis? — Joshs

When I spoke of rational justification I was referring to "pure' rational justification, I think the examples you offered may be cases of practical rational justification. The difference is that practical rational justification does not issue from the nature of the thing as pure rational justification does, but from the nature of the effect the thing has, or the nature of the effect that holding the judgement has.

Recognition does involve difference and similarity, but number requires the concept of identity , the repetition of the exact same. — Joshs

Kind and generality consist in identity. Each particular is unique, so there is no identicality of particulars. Things are counted as being of the same kind, so there is identicality of kind.

I don't see the question you are asking— that is, simply put, "how is abstraction possible" as being capable of an answer. I tend to think that questions that cannot be answered are, discursively speaking, non-questions. however interesting or inspiring they may otherwise be.

So, I agree with you that science cannot answer such a question, however I don't think there is any other way to answer it either (which is not to say there are not various ways to think about it).

Right. And it's a difference that makes a difference! — Wayfarer

Yes, I agree it most certainly is. There is no rational requirement to deny that what is real for humans in general is "really real" on the basis that we don't think it is real in itself. I'd go even further and say that what is experienced by any individual is what is most real for that individual and that what is experienced by all individuals is what is most real for humanity.

Still doesn't mean 'number is invented'. — Wayfarer

I agree—recognition and thus the workability of cognition itself entails difference and similarity, which in turn entails diversity and kind and thus generalities and number.

No, I haven't pared down the concept of blame, but made a distinction between blame which can be rationally justified and blame which is merely affectively driven.

I say that blame is not any more rationally justifiable in cases where harm is caused by humans than it is in cases where harm is caused by other animals or natural events.

This perspective suggests that universals have a kind of reality that is both independent of individual human minds and intimately connected to the rational structure of the universe. — Wayfarer

I'd say universals are inherent to cognition because cognitively enabled organisms could not survive without re-cognition, which involves pattern discernment and of course memory. If any sentient being's umwelt was a play of unrelated and unrelatable particulars (James' "buzzing, blooming confusion") no orientation would be possible; the animal would not be able to recognize food, water, prey, predator, shelter, and so on.

So, recognition is the seed of generality, of universals; an essential aspect of cognitive apprehension of anything. Symbolic language of course enables this implicit recognition to be explicitly elaborated into the conception of universals.

I disagree with everything you've written there, or at least find it all irrelevant to the question. I remain convinced that whether determinism or indeterminism is the case, that there is no sui generis will and that therefore no one is, in any purely rationally defensible sense, blameworthy or praiseworthy for their actions. Of course, people will continue to praise and blame if they cannot refrain from, or see no reason to refrain from, doing so.

On the other hand, it seems obvious to me that some individuals can deliberately cultivate their freedom from culturally acquired and genetically determined compulsions, but whether or not a particular individual is capable of this and the degree to which they are capable of it is down to what they are constitutionally equipped to be capable of. Blame is not pragmatically necessary but of course restraint is necessary in cases where individuals are a threat to others.

I disagree; blame is attendant upon the idea that the person really could have done otherwise; it is based on a libertarian notion of free will which is entrenched in the western psyche. Perhaps it is inextricably linked to the libertarian notions of intent and responsibility, but those are not the only conceptions of intent and responsibility.

Perhaps we are talking at cross-purposes. Of course, as I already acknowledged, for perhaps most people intent and responsibility may be inextricably linked, by mere affect, to blame (and praise). My point was that there is no indissoluble logical or rational connection between intent, responsibility and blame.

For example, the man-eating tiger intends to kill; do we blame her? She is certainly responsible for the killing, but do we hold her morally responsible? Of course, some people, so enraged by their loss may even seeks revenge on the tiger, but this would not be rationally driven.

But are concepts like murder, hate, deceit, exploitation, cowardice, cruelty and evil at all intelligible without the implication of blame? We only blame persons for actions that they performed deliberately, with intent. Is it possible to be an accidental, unintentional murderer, coward, deceiver or hater? — Joshs

Of course they are intelligible without the implication of blame. We can say as Jesus reportedly did: "forgive them for they know not what they do". The idea of intent and responsibility may be inherent to those ideas, but the imputation of intent and responsibility is not indissolubly linked with the idea of deserving blame.

This is not to say that the great majority of people do not think in terms of blame and the concomitant terms of punishment and vengeance, but perhaps the great majority have not thought deeply enough about the connection of intent and responsibility with blame.

It seems to be "stuff-ing" all the way down, but then that's the nature of thought I guess. Maybe it's really "nuff-ing" all the way down, and really no way down to boot.

To be serious, though, I think the realest things in human life are those things that are universally valued; love, freedom. knowledge, wisdom, creativity...

Thanks.

I think Kafka gave this some thought. In his Reflections, [a collection of aphorisms]. this one is an affirmation through negation of a sort:

There are questions which we could never get over if we were not delivered from them by the operation of nature.
— Kafka, Reflections, 54 — Paine

Right, it is not productive, healthy or even tenable to focus too exclusively on the obvious plethora of evils that seem to be an integral (or dis-integral) part of human life.

But perhaps the true antipode to the gnostics is Walt Whitman:

These are really the thoughts of all men in all ages and lands.
they are not original with me,
If they are not yours as much as mine they are nothing, or
next to nothing,
If they are not the riddle and the untying of the riddle they
are nothing,
If they are not just as close as they are distant they are nothing.
This is the grass that grows wherever the land is and the
water is,
This is the common air that bathes the globe.
— Walt Whitman, Song of Myself, 17 — Paine

Nice! Whitman is one of my favorite poets and is also a fitting "antipode" to postmodern relativism. Some see modernism as the elimination of all but subjective values and postmodernism as the radical relativization of all value.

I assume you mean the almost universal agreement concerns when to assign blame and culpability? — Joshs

No, not addressing the question of blame. but rather of value and disvalue. Love is generally preferred over hate, courage over cowardice, selflessness over selfishness, kindness over cruelty, help over harm and so on. Murder, rape, torture, theft, deceit, exploitation and the like are universally (perhaps sociopaths excepted) condemned as being evil acts. As far as I can tell these facts about people are the only viable basis for moral realism, not some imagined transcendent "object" or whatever.

Thanks, I'll have a look. I hadn't thought of the Gnostics considering matter as such to be evil, but rather the forms it takes and their activities in this world.

From the Wiki article:

Plotinus, at least in his texts against the Gnostics, portrayed God as a separate entity that human souls needed to go towards, whereas Gnostics believed that in every human soul there was a divine spark of God already. However, Gnostics did not disagree with the neoplatonist notion of getting closer to the source.

This it seems. if true, would place the Gnostics closer to Plato than Plotinus would be. As far as I understand the Gnostics did not believe that God is the source of this world, and nor, on the other hand, did they believe that the Demiurge was the source of matter, but was rather a "craftsmen god" (as Plato's Timaeus tells it) who shaped the world out of pre-existent chaotic matter. The difference being that the Gnostics did not think the Demiurge, or the resultant world, is in accordance with the Good, as Plato apparently did.

Fair enough but I have settled upon the belief that the "stuff" of minding is neither the stuff of the body (as in organic matter) nor even of its nature or being. — ENOAH

Now, I would say there's no "stuff" of mind or minding, because it is an activity, and as such is merely conceptual unless it is equated with brain processes. That said, there is a sense in which the same could be said not only of mental, but also physical processes, and also of all entities whatsoever, including the body, since this is all notional.

I'm pressed for time right now but intend to return to address some of your other thoughts.

Cheers, whenever you find both the time and inclination...

That it is easier to reach agreement in physics than in ethics is not an argument for ethical statements not having a truth value. — Banno

It seems that there is almost universal agreement about the most serious ethical issues. Physics on the other hand is rife with disagreement (regarding its metaphysical implications at least) and is in any case accessible only to the very few (which doesn't stop the many from pontificating about its purported metaphysical implications).

I tender Plotinus' objections to the Gnostics as evidence for this view. The conflict between views of a natural good and a flawed creation concern the expectations of the future, for all who live. — Paine

This is a very interesting comment. I've recently been reading Cormac McCarthy's works and a book, A Bloody and Barbarous God the Metaphysics of Cormac McCarthy by Petra Mundik, which aligns McCarthy's philosophy with the Gnostics, with the idea that this world was created by a flawed deity. It does seem that the natural human demand for Justice and search for the Good cannot be realized, or at least not comprehensively, on a societal scale.

Although this inability to realize the Good seems apparent I'm reluctant to admit it, because it seems defeatist, and I think this might be what you allude to when you say

concern the expectations of the future, for all who live. — Paine

Do you have a ready reference for Plotinus' objection to the Gnostic vision? If so, I would be interested to look at it.

The body is a being in itself. The body feels, senses, has drives, explores, bonds, and acts in present aware-ing of these and the world around it. We can understand all of that fairly well enough. But the intuition which has puzzled philosophy for millennia (not necessarily always expressed in the same way) is never mind all that; how does this lump of flesh "do," in your words, "experiencing/thinking/aspiring/acting"? — ENOAH

Right, the living, aware body is minding, so mind is more of a verb than a noun, an activity rather than an entity. I think the question as to how a "lump of flesh" could do all this is the wrong question and will be endlessly misleading. We simply cannot understand how processes we conceive of as being mechanical could give rise to a mind that reasons and values, and I think this is not simply because we have not found such an explanation, but because such an explanation is impossible insofar as its realization would demand the unifying of categories of understanding which are inherently incompatible.

Hence (and I'm being presumptuous as hell) your two-fold intuition, both-folds being "right". First, your intuition that when your talking about your real being, you know (in spite of millennia of chatter) it's the body which moves, feels and senses that you're talking about. Second, your intuition that the "experiencing/thinking/aspiring/acting" is not the body itself but is being generated by and in mind. The latter seems like it's doing its own thing, yet the body is real. Thus, ultimately, you turn to "mindbody." — ENOAH

There is no problem with presumption in my view as it is necessary to get the engine of thought moving. I agree that it is the body which moves, feel and senses and that the experiencing/ thinking/ aspiring/ acting processes are not the body itself, but I have no problem with thinking that these are bodily activities generated by the body itself, and the first three we refer to as activities of the mind, but we could just as well, or better refer to them as minding, itself conceived as the central activity of the living body. So, I say 'bodymind' to indicate that I don't believe the mind(ing) is an illusion just on account of its not being a physical object. I find the idea that only physical objects exist absurd simply because objects have no existence in isolation; they are relational and are themselves congeries (although don't take this term to suggest disorder) of processes which are in turn themselves not physical objects, but the activities of such.

But I think your intuitions (presumably) are right. These goings-on of experiencing/thinking/aspiring/acting (oh, and I'd delete "acting" which is plainly the body; unless you really mean, choosing) are just the stories generated by mind. They are not really happening as mind "depicts" them. Body is affected; but just as body is affected by a sad movie. Images trigger feeling, drives, action. — ENOAH

You are right, acting is most obviously an activity of the body. You say they are stories generated by the mind, but I have no problem with saying they are stories generated by the body, they are also part of the activity of the body. You say they are not really happening as mind "depicts" them, and I would agree insofar as mind's depictions are inherently and inevitably dualistic, whereas I think we have good reason to believe ( dulaistically :wink: ) that there is nothing dualistic about the body and its activities, or about anything else for that matter. I can anticipate an objection to that last statement that says that since human judgment and narrative is inherently and inevitably dualistic that all those mental activities of the body are also dualistic, and that therefore the dualistic nature of those activities being real in human experience, must be an aspect of reality. I don't know how to answer this other than to say that I think this is merely a "seeming" and not a reality, but then this could devolve to being a merely terminological issue, throwing into question what we mean by 'reality'.

As you say this dualistic 'seeming' "provides a function".

"I" displace the body in Mind's projections; but the body remains present and real. Though body is attuned to its representation as "I/Me" it never ceases being (body). And from there--from present being; not becoming--there is no self. Not only is there no self; but [for many Buddhists] no Mind. — ENOAH

Yes, we talk about "having bodies" rather than being bodies, and this is again an example of the dualistic nature of our conceptions. In Cartesian fashion the elusive "I" has a body, and it is ultimately more real than the body!

I'm intrigued by the idea that there are Buddhists who deny the reality of the mind; I haven't encountered anything like that. That said, Buddhism, although I have been peripherally interested in it for many years and have studied it formally to some degree, is not one of my central interests.

:up: Of course.

I was referring to the idea that the self is something more than the experiencing/thinking/aspiring/acting bodymind.

Note; I changed body to bodymind and added aspiring after you quoted me apparently.

I may be a subject, but me is an object just like all the others. — T Clark

Agreed, that is to say the self is not anything beyond the experiencing/thinking/aspiring/acting bodymind. We can be an object to ourselves, and we can also feel ourselves in ways others cannot. The rest is smoke and mirrors.

I agree.

Do you accept that a claim of ancient wisdom is largely dependent upon a description of what those old people were saying? — Paine

This intrigues me; are you saying that claims that (some of) the ancients were wise depend on current interpretations of what they have written? The problems of anachronism and hermeneutics?

Better to be a sad Socrates than a smug swine. — 180 Proof

:cool:

:up: I would add that I think freedom comes with the self-examination necessary to identify where we are under the thrall of bodily appetites or introjected norms, and not (yet) being guided by free-thinking reason.

Unfreedom is to be compelled by yet to be examined and yet to be rationally assessed aspects of our instinctive or culturally acquired natures. It is awareness and critical rationality that can potentially unify our beings and make us free.

"The unexamined life is not worth living" may be a bit extreme, but the examined life is certainly better, ceteris paribus, than the unexamined.

Surely you don't mean that love or concern may never shows themselves in any actions at all? The moral worth of that is, let us say, debatable. — Ludwig V

It is perhaps unlikely, but not impossible. Some may live solely by the principle of "do no harm", for eample. Also I was thinking more of sitiations than of whole human lives when I said that moral feelings may not be expressed in action.

There's that higher/lower metaphor again. But I can't see just what you mean without examples. — Ludwig V

Perhaps thinking in terms of the arts and greater and lesser works of art representing more and less heightened states of consciousness. Think of a heightened state of moral awareness and feeling and that should give you the pic ture.

Those laws have been developed from what many people think are moral imperatives. Think of Kant's categorical imperative — Ludwig V

Sure, in some people's thinking a moral intuition may be transformed into what they think of as an imperative. But I don't see morality as primarily consisting in following rules but as being guided by human feelings.

I'll just substitute "worse" for "lower". OK? Certainly most selfish people are hypocritical at some level, since their personal interests depend on mutual recognition of other people. My property is my own, but only because other people have the same rights as I do. — Ludwig V

I'm not sure why the higher/ lower terminology is giving you trouble. Is it because you associate it with religious thinking?

God has to be reduced to its essential meaning before one can talk about why one should believe in God. — Constance

For me 'God' signifies nothing beyond the highest feelings and principles that humans aspire to. Unconditional love, unwavering steadfastness, indomitable bravery and so on,

I like to explore this idea that "we don't believe(or know) nothing can travel faster than light" or "we don't know that for sure." One reason I have often heard is that you would need an infinite amount of energy to move a mass to the speed of light that makes it impossible, and no one knows where to get an infinite amount of energy — Richard B

That we would need an infinite amount of energy is a central plank of the theory, but the theory might turn out to be wrong. Or there might be things we are not aware of that travel faster than light. The rest of what you say also consists of a number of corollaries of the theory, and this begs the question.

I'm not saying the theory is likely to turn out to be wrong, and I would agree that we have very little reason to believe it is wrong. On account of having little reason to believe it is wrong we believe it is right, but I don't count that as knowledge, but would rather call it belief.

In another sense, as per the quote from Wittgenstein, the scientific paradigms within which scientists work are not questioned, and are the background against which questions are asked and answered, and I think this qualifies them, insofar as they are methodologies or ways of working, as being knowledge in the sense of know-how.

Of course. But concern, love, intention and judgement are all realized in actions. — Ludwig V

Sure, they can be realized in actions, but they are not necessarily.

If you had said that living in that way was a better form of life, I would entirely agree with you. — Ludwig V

That was just what I was saying, only I used the term "higher" instead of better while meaning "better". I prefer the term higher, despite its possible metaphysical baggage, because I tend to think in terms of greater love, freedom, moral sensibility, sense of justice and creativity as manifesting heightened states of consciousness, that is I think there are higher and lower states of consciousness.

The problems arise when you think that some people are not really people. — Ludwig V

We are all defined biologically as being human, and as members of societies we are all defined as being people. I'm not concerned to define some individuals otherwise, but was merely pointing to the common tendency to think of those who completely lack empathy or moral sense as being less than human and worse than animals.

There is a concept of "human rights", which aims to establish minimal norms for the treatment of all human beings. — Ludwig V

I'm not advocating removing the anyone's rights. That would be in the domain of legal policy and that is not what I am addressing.

But it is right to look after one's own interests. I don't see that it is a "lower" value than helping other people to look after theirs. What is wrong is not looking after and helping others as well.
You are forgetting that it is quite easy to do terrible things in pursuit of a selfless ideology - indeed, I sometimes think that a set of values is often the basis for worse things than self-interest - like tyranny, torture and genocide. — Ludwig V

I haven't compared looking out for one's interests with looking after the interests of others, or helping other to look after their own interests; what I've been saying is that one who is concerned only with their own interests is morally lower than one who is concerned with their own interests and the interests of others.

I am also not advocating ideologies of any kind.

:cool:

I am wondering if this is just Janustein or Wittgenstein though.. — schopenhauer1

It is my inexpert interpretation of one of Wittgenstein's ideas.

Let me ask you, are there many philosophies that would advocate that the world is composed of false states of affairs? — schopenhauer1

There are no "false states of affairs", there are only states of affairs. I think Wittgenstein's statement shows a kind of relational 'process' view of the nature of the world rather than a 'substance' or essentialist view.

I take him to be referring to actual states of affairs, the point being that things are not 'stand alone' but are relational.

Facts are not debatable, whether or not something is a fact may be debatable.

Since you bring in the mix scientific theories, I will go with that theme. Is Newtonian and Einsteinian physics knowledge? I think it would be difficult to argue with a scientist to say that it was not. — Richard B

I would say they are knowledge in the sense of being kinds of know-how.

I presume you would argue that Einsteinian physics proved Newtonian physics false. — Richard B

No, I wouldn't say that. Aspects may be false, for example Einstein's idea that nothing can travel faster than light may be false. I would agree with saying that Newtonian physics is less accurate or less "fine-grained" than Einsteinian physics.

For example, I can imagine something faster than the speed of light therefore Einsteinian physics is only a belief not knowledge. If this is how one sows the seeds of doubt on a scientific theory, thank goodness most scientists would ignore it as a philosophical eccentricity and get on doing science. — Richard B

It is believed that nothing can travel faster than light, we don't know that for sure, but if it turned out to be untrue it would not invalidate Einsteinian physics, because the latter demonstrably works to a very high degree of accuracy.

Since you bring in the mix scientific theories, I will go with that theme. Is Newtonian and Einsteinian physics knowledge? I think it would be difficult to argue with a scientist to say that it was not. — Richard B

I would say they are knowledge in the sense of being kinds of know-how.

I presume you would argue that Einsteinian physics proved Newtonian physics false. — Richard B

No, I wouldn't say that. Aspects may be false, for example Einstein's idea that nothing can travel faster than light may be false. I would agree with saying that Newtonian physics is less accurate or less "fine-grained" than Einsteinian physics.

For example, I can imagine something faster than the speed of light therefore Einsteinian physics is only a belief not knowledge. If this is how one sows the seeds of doubt on a scientific theory, thank goodness most scientists would ignore it as a philosophical eccentricity and get on doing science. — Richard B

It is believed that nothing can travel faster than light, but if that turned out to be untrue it would not invalidate Einsteinian physics, because the latter demonstrably works to a very high degree of accuracy.

But was that even addressed by Witt? — schopenhauer1

Well, he did say that the world is the totality of facts not of things.

Well, I can see that there's a difference, but let's not get picky about language. Values are related to action in a way that facts are not. That's the important difference. — Ludwig V

I'm not sure what you are addressing here Ludwig; I was making a distinction between moral imperatives and moral intuitions and relating the latter to aesthetic intuitions, love and care.

Values are related to action, but they are also related to concern, love, intention and judgement.

I'm aware that many people like to see ethical values as rooted in the human condition living in the world. I'm very sympathetic.
However, we do dehumanize people who behave very badly - and it is not difficult to find people doing things that pass my (and, I hope, your) understanding. However, I think this is a mistake. The people who set up a huge administrative and industrial system to eradicate people of certain kinds from their society (to give just one hackneyed example) are human beings. We are capable of heroism and horror. We should not pretend otherwise even though the recognition is not comfortable.
And there's the problem. If values are rooted in the human condition, how come people behave like that? — Ludwig V

For me ethical values are rooted in caring about how we are to live. My earlier talk in terms of higher and lower was meant to show that I think living with care, concern and love for others and for the whole environment, the whole Earth, is a higher form of life than living without such care.

I don't agree with dehumanizing people in the extreme, but I do think it is fair to see people who have no such care as being less than fully human. By human I mean something like "able to transcend being ruled by mere self-interest and the passions of the moment, able to be aware of and care about one's effect on other beings, both human and animal and even plant".

I am not sure what you mean by "eradicating people of certain kinds" so I can't comment on that other than to say that I think certain kinds of people certainly need to be restrained; namely those who possess little or no self-restraint or even self-awareness.

I think values are rooted in the human condition, but it does not follow that all of us will be able to live up to those values, perhaps none of us perfectly and all of us only more or less. And that refers only to those who are actually aware of and care about those values; some may have no awareness of them, or even if they do have some awareness, do not care at all about them.

But, then one can ask, in what sense can P, a proposition made up of words, correspond with reality made up of objects? — 013zen

I don't see the problem. A reality made up of objects is always already a linguistically mediated or interpreted reality.