If an animal has rights then it does not qualify as property in the ordinary sense. Does your lawnmower or your car have rights?

That depends upon who the libertarian ideal is taken to extend to. Are you claiming there are no libertarians who fight for animal rights?

P1. Pets (dogs) are property — Oppyfan

False! Dogs are dependents and companions, not property.

Assuming you are self-conscious, you can sense what you are thinking and thus you should consider your thoughts substantive, in your way of thinking. — Olivier5

No, I said that what I consider to be substantive is what can be an object of the five senses. I might add to that the proprioceptive sense, and sensations and bodily feelings, but to speak of sensing thoughts is a step too far. In my own experience I directly am aware of thinking only in the act of thinking itself, which is a kind of internal speaking and listening. Most of thinking seems to be more of the internal speaking kind, absent the self-conscious listening.

Thoughts are elusive and are not determinate objects of attention as bodily sensations, sounds, smells, visual and tactile objects are. Perhaps that should not be surprising, given that we have no sense of neural processes, as we do have a sense of for example digetsive processes.So, if thoughts are not internally linguistically intoned they are like faint traces of cloud, or dimly sensed movements or visualizations; they seem to be anything but substantive.

Does anyone have any absolute, objective understanding of reality?

No, absolutely not...objectively speaking...

It would be, if I were mistaking ideas for empirical objects. I am advocating the view that ideas (in the sense I have explained) are of a different order of reality to empirical objects. I say that the world that you assume has 'substantial reality' actually doesn't possess that and that this is borne out by the massive conundrums that now exist in theoretical physics. — Wayfarer

Physical objects and processes do have substantial reality, though; as they act on us in substantial ways. To my way of thinking that's all it means to say that the physical is substantive, and the so-called "massive conundrums" of theoretical physics have no bearing on that lived reality.

When it comes to philosophy, the subject was always been seeking out the imperishable, changeless, the first principle — Wayfarer

That is mistakenly seeking an idea as though it had substance; committing Whitehead's "fallacy of misplaced concreteness". I don't believe such a thing can ever be found in any determinate sense. It may be alluded to via art or poetry, or meditated upon; but that wouldn't constitute determinate rational knowledge. The fact that past philosophers have mistakenly taken "the imperishable, changeless, first principle" to possess substantive existence is no reason to follow them in their (understandable) error.

Objects of the five senses. Ideas don't have substantive existence except in their physical instantiations. This is not to say they don't possess non-physical attributes. For me this is the point of aspect dualism; from a human perspective (at least some) things possess both mental and physical attributes or aspects, but it does not follow that anything is substantial in a mental sense. To be substantial is, to my way of thinking, to be an object of the five senses and their augmentations.

The 'substantive existence' of the sensable world is in constant flux, arising and perishing from moment to moment. In the vastness of cosmic time, it is a mere shadow, a lightning flash, a bubble on a stream. — Wayfarer

I don't see it that way at all. The substantive existence of things is obviously not changeless, but, taken as a whole, it is virtually, perhaps actually, everlasting. According to physical theory the atoms that constitute your body were formed billions of years ago in stars and are virtually indestructible.

And Jaspers makes a whole philosophy out of that.

I'd say the sense of self (in the sense of identity) is dependent on memory, and may be lost due to amnesia. There also seems to be a sense of individuality based on felt embodiment, which obviously is not lost in amnesia, and is common to animals as well as humans.

So what remains when the illusion (of "self-identity") is made explicit as such? The body – continuity of memories, feelings, awareness via embodiment. — 180 Proof

I see you are making a similar point. :up:

I'm still unclear on this. Are the different ways of meaning simply different attitudes by the speakers of different languages toward the words/meanings of their respective languages? Or a different attitude towards the signified objects? Or something else? — Luke

I'd say that as bread may be of quite different kinds and have somewhat different uses and roles in the cuisines of Germany and France, that these differences of practice vis a vis bread constitute the differences of intention in how the words 'Brot' and 'pain' embody meaning in their respective cultures.

If nobody on earth thinks of the alphabet for one full minute, did the alphabet disappear for one minute? — Olivier5

Disappear in what way and from where? In any case the alphabet is instantiated in countless texts, bur apart from that and from people thinking and speaking in alphabetically constituted words, what kind of existence do you think it has?

Note that in this lecture Popper challenges both the monist and dualist views and proposes, instead, "a pluralist view ... a view of the universe that recognizes at least three different but interacting sub-universes": the physical world; the mental world; and the world of ideas and cultural artifacts. — Olivier5

I don't deny there is a mental world, or more accurately there are mental worlds, nor that there is a world of ideas and cultural artifacts. But these worlds are not hermetically sealed from, or independent of, the physical world. Actually I agree with Markus Gabriel that worlds don't really exist, and I quite like his term for these "worlds": which is 'fields of sense'.

So, in this kind of sense there is the world of fashion, the world of football, the world of advertising, and so on; there are countless worlds in this sense, and they all have a different kind of existence. The important point though, relating back to the thread from which this thread was created, that these worlds do not have a substantive existence as the physical field of sense does. This point seems to create a lot of confusion, as shown in your question, conceptualized in physical ( visual) terms, about the alphabet disappearing, which to me seems like a kind of category mistake.

OK, I read it, but I couldn't find any explanation of how concepts or universals are thought to exist beyond the instances of their being thought, spoken or written, in anything but a merely formal or stipulational sense. The concept is only the same for each "observer", in my view, insofar as it can be specified in language.

Take the triangle; it is specified as a space enclosed by three conjoined lines; and anyone who is familiar with and understands that specification can visualize a triangle. But each person's visualization will be different, unless the triangle is an equilateral, and even then it seems plausible to think the visualization process would be different in each case.

Yes, I believe the concept exists as well. Signs are meaningful, they are not just what they seem. — Olivier5

So, does the concept exist apart from the instances of it being thought?

They are all identifiable as saying the same words: 'New York', even by one who never heard of the city. Are words embodied? — Olivier5

Do you think the name 'New York' exists apart from it's visual and auditory embodiments?

If there can be one city that is never the same from moment to moment why can a number not be the same, in the sense of not being changeless, while being perfectly capable of being referred to by a name? — Janus


The point was that "New York" written in seven different fonts is NOT seven different names of the city. They are just one name. — Olivier5

I thought you were arguing that the fact that there is one name of the city, just as there is one city, entails that the name is changeless.

I see those seven differently type-faced examples of 'New York' as sharing a common recognizable pattern, and hence being identifiable as signifying the same thing, not as representing some changeless disembodied name.

But are those truth claims really unwarranted? How can we possibly know? — baker

To be counted as warranted a truth claim requires either corroborable empirical evidence or logical necessity.

One city, one name: New York. This unique name (aka concept) can be written down in an infinite number of different ways. — Olivier5

If there can be one city that is never the same from moment to moment why can a number not be the same, in the sense of not being changeless, while being perfectly capable of being referred to by a name?

How do you know it is 'necessarily' true, as opposed to just true? — Bartricks

because otherwise discussants could make whatever self-contradictory statements they liked, and discussions would be reduced to nonsense. — Janus

So I know that it is necessarily true that the LNC is necessary for rational discussion because its negation leads to the negation of all possibilty of rational discussion.

I know it is necessary for rational discussion because otherwise discussants could make whatever self-contradictory statements they liked, and discussions would be reduced to nonsense.

As I said, I won't make any metaphysical pronouncements; I am only saying that the LNC is necessary if there is to be rational and sensible discussion. And that is not going to change either.

I haven't changed the terminology. You are changing the topic from metaphysics to epistemology. Now, you tell me how you know the law of non-contradiction is true - i mean, you think it is true, right? - and that'll almost certainly be how I know it is true as well.

Then you tell me how you know that it is 'necessarily' true, and I will show you that it is contingently so. — Bartricks

No, I haven't. You made a metaphysical claim; that the law of non-contradiction is certain but contingent. I asked you how you know that it is certain (or for that matter how you know it is contingent).

I know the law of non-contradiction is necessary....for rational discussion. I make no claims beyond that. Any claim beyond that would probably be a category mistake anyway. You cannot say the law of non-contradiction is contingent by saying something self-contradictory; to make sense, anything you say must itself be a non-contradiction: which rather proves the point.

Claiming that God is necessary being is not equating God with being. — aletheist

I don't understand how being can be divided into necessary and contingent.Non-being cannot be, so being must be necessary. It is only beings that can be contingent or so it seems to logically follow.

Classical theism, even in its Abrahamic versions, maintains that God is simple (not individual) and impassible--God acts on the world, but does not react with it. — aletheist

If God is distinct from other beings then God must be individual, no? Is the Abrahamic God impassible? Does He not become angry and disappointed with his creatures? You say God does not react with the world; does he react to it, and if so, is that a difference that makes a difference?

Not when existence is understood as only one mode of being--reaction with other individual things in the environment. Possibility and conditional necessity are other modes of being. — aletheist

I guess we can use terminology however we like provided we are consistent in that use. Ordinary parlance, however, would have it that possibilities and conditional necessities exist, albeit in different ways than concrete entities.

So, the argument looks silly to me from the get-go. — Janus

Like I said, it is really a definition rather than an argument. — aletheist

I was responding to this:

The debate, then, is whether there is any possible world in which there is no God; theists say no, atheists say yes. — aletheist

The law of non contradiction is certainly true, just as my own existence is. But both are contingently true. — Bartricks

You've evaded the question by changing terminology, but for the sake of the argument I'll play along; how do you know the law of non-contradiction is certainly true?

The law of non-contradiction is TRUE. Contingent. But true. — Bartricks

If the law of non-contradiction is contingent, how do you know it is true right now. It might have been true five minutes ago, yet now not true; how would you ever be able to tell whether it was true or not at some particular time?

As some have already hinted, classical theism maintains that God is necessary being, not that God is a necessary being. In other words, God is not conceived as an individual being who "exists" in the sense of reacting with other individual things. — aletheist

The equation of God with being seems odd, since being or existence, (per se, as opposed to individual beings or existents) seems necessary, if anything does. And God, at least the Abrahamic God, does "react with other individual things" via revelation and prayer. Also, the distinction between being and existence seems forced and unnecessary. A being is logically equivalent to an existent, and being is logically equivalent to existence, or so it seems to me, as I cannot see any distinction which doesn't seem artificial in the sense of not being based on ordinary parlance, but on some tendentious stipulation.

The debate, then, is whether there is any possible world in which there is no God; theists say no, atheists say yes. — aletheist

If being is necessary, as it seems to be and God is equated with being, then it would seem to be tautologically, and hence trivially, true that God is in all possible worlds, since being must be so, or else it would not be a world. That said, it seems odd to talk about being or God being in a world, since a world is being, and God is taken to be the creator and sustainer of worlds. So, the argument looks silly to me from the get-go.

:up:

Even if the argument form explosion did not work, it remains that (p .~p) is not a thesis in any possible world. — Banno

I agree that the idea of a contradiction being true is impossible to parse. So, yes, a contradiction could not be a coherent (and much less a self-consistent) thesis, which I guess means it could not be a thesis at all, and could be nothing more than nonsense.

Putting it more formally, (p .~p) is not a thesis in any possible world. Indeed, it is the very definition of what it is to be an impossible world. — Banno

But that argument assumes what it seeks to prove; the universality and necessity of the law of non-contradiction.

Suppose (p & ~p) is true in some word . Then any proposition will be true in any possible world.

But that might be, Suppose (p & ~p) is true in some word . Then any proposition will be truein that world. — Banno

Yes, that seems to follow. Any proposition will be true in a world in which the law of non-contradiction does not obtain, but this would have no bearing on worlds where the law of non-contradiction does obtain, as far as I can tell.

That contradiction implies that anything can be true, not just in that possible world but in any possible world. The Principle of Explosion is not restricted to just that one possible world.

Hence if contradictions can occur in any possible world, they can occur in every possible world. — Banno

I don't see how this follows. Allowing for the sake of argument that the law of non-contradiction is only, contingently, not necessarily, true in this world, the fact that it is possible that contradictions might be true in other worlds does not entail that they must be capable of being be true in this world. You haven't provided an argument, as far as I can tell, to support that conclusion.

A being that necessarily exists cannot coherently be thought not to exist. And so God, as the unsurpassably perfect being, must have necessary existence—and therefore must exist. — Tom Storm

That's basically the Ontological Argument. Note, as I pointed out to @Banno, it is not the Logical Argument (although of course the entailment of the conclusion from the premises is deemed to be logically valid).

You seem to be conflating logical necessity with ontological necessity. Of course it is logically possible that God does not exist; that has never been contested as far as I know.

Another problem with your argument is that God, by definition, does not exist in worlds, but as the creator and sustainer (if God exists) of all worlds. The ontological point really is that God's existence, if God exists, is ontologically necessary.

Likewise.

They become tedious, as I fear this is becoming. — Tom Storm

No one is forcing you to particiapte.

I said agnostics are stupid only if they don't recognize the distinction between faith and knowledge, — Janus


Partly yes. But you said they were pretty stupid for arguing against Christianity/Islam - a response to my comment. Agnostics I've known are often very critical of the truth claims and practices of religions. — Tom Storm

I don't remember saying anything about Islam or specifically about arguing against Christianity. Perhaps you can cite what I wrote? Also I said it was fine ( not stupid) for agnostics to be critical of the truth claims and (harmful) practices of religions.

It would benefit the discussion if you read what I actually wrote, but if you want to cease discussing these issues that's fine with me too.

Not from what I've seen. At least on internet forums, I've seen plenty of aggressive agnostics trying to fight it out both with theists as well as atheists. — baker

Sure, but are they not fighting against unwarranted truth claims from both sides, a practice I have already acknowledged and agreed with?

Some Atheists operate on the basis that harmful ideas harm human beings. All myths of the Enlightenment aside, the reality is right now laws and society all over the world are being changed by religious folk with disproportionate power.

I have no interest in getting into a ceaseless slanging match on this and wish you well. Maybe just be open to considering that atheism is not necessarily the dysfunctional reaction you seem to think it is. And there's no need to call an agnostic stupid if they don't conform to your definition of the term. Feel free to have the last word. :pray: — Tom Storm

Sure, atheists and most everyone else probably believe that harmful ideas harm human beings. And some religious ideas are unarguably harmful, and those ideas are arguably always fundamentalistic ideas, in contexts where faith has become ideology, where faith has been conflated with knowledge.

Can you give me any examples of where and what "laws and society all over the world are being changed by religious folk with disproportionate power" other than in the case of theocratic societies?

Also, I don't see this as a slanging match but a discussion being held (at least from my side) in good faith, on account of what seem to be honest disagreements. Surly you can countenance my disagreement without imputing bad intent on my part?

I said agnostics are stupid only if they don't recognize the distinction between faith and knowledge, just as I have said fundamentalist religious believers are stupid for the same reason. I have also acknowledged that it is not stupid to argue against fundamentalism in all its forms (although, it may be a waste of time since such arguments often fall on deaf eras).

I'm not merely concerned with having the last word, either.

No, you are missing something which is that professions of faith are not claims unless we are talking about fundamentalism. In the case of fundamentalism it is the adherents themselves who mistake faith for knowledge, and that mistake indeed ought to be argued against.

No, I'm not "projecting"; it sounds more like you are projecting your own idea of projection onto me.

If people argue against the incursion of religious ideas into the political realm they are arguing for separation of church from state, which has been the official reality since the Enlightenment in the West at least, and they are not (necessarily) arguing against theism as such.

Not in my experience. I have met many agnostics who debate Christians fiercely, not on the basis of God's existence but on the basis of how a believer can possibly know and why the Christian version not Islam, etc. Most agnostics I have known have found Abrahamic faiths absurd. They are more inclined to have a soft spot for deism. — Tom Storm

They must be pretty stupid agnostics then since religious faith is based, as the term indicates, on faith not on knowledge. Or else, if they are smart they are arguing, not against theism, but against any claim to know that theism is true.

The term 'atheist' seems to indicate indifference to or simply lack of theism, as 'asexual' indicates indifference to or simply lack of sexuality. That position would seem to be pretty much indistinguishable from agnosticism. (Interestingly 'agnosticism' could be understood as either indifference or antithesis to gnosticism}. Many, if not most avowed atheists though would be better characterized as antitheists. Are you an antitheist or merely one who is indifferent to theism?

What puzzles me is why people are so concerned about the metaphysical or religious beliefs of others. I think it must stem from insecurity.

The counter is that for practical purposes agnosticism and atheism have the same outcome. — Banno

Not true; an agnostic is not going to waste time arguing against theists.

If they are genuine likes they might be of some use, because then they might indicate how much in tune with the herd you are.