I would have thought that the force/ content distinction reinforces the role of the "first person"—when judgements are believed we have the subject in action, that is force. What is the logical status of a judgement or proposition apart from its being made or believed by anyone? If anything, it would be merely content, no?

Yes, it's puzzling.

If the quote <here> were true then we would talk past one another much more often than we do. — Leontiskos

Two men could be just alike in all their dispositions to verbal behavior under all possible sensory stimulations, and yet the meanings or ideas expressed in their identically triggered and identically sounded utterances could diverge radically, for the two men, in a wide range of classes

Do you think Quine intends this to be read as indicating a common occurrence or merely an outlying possibility?

Given charitability and good will I see little reason to think that divergences of intended meaning could not be discovered quickly enough and taken into account.

Doesn't the quote you provide imply that, if they started talking to each other, they may talk past each other entirely? — Leontiskos

That that it is possible to "talk past one another" relies on it not being the case that we always, or even mostly, talk past one another. It seems obviously possible to understand one another very well and yet disagree, nonetheless.

So Rodl believes that the force/content distinction is a discrimination between a "psychic act" or "mental event" and a "mind-independent reality" that does not involve "my mind, my psyche." It is this that he denies. — J

This seems obviously wrong. There is clearly a valid distinction between the content of judgements and the force of judgements. When I believe a judgement there will always be a force, the force of my belief. On the other hand I can consider some judgement, wonder whether it is true, or just analyze its content without believing anything.

The other thing that seems obviously wrong is that the self-conscious awareness of making a judgement is always present whenever a judgement is made. It seems an obvious fact about human life that we can make judgements without even being aware of doing so.

It is only in a kind of tendentious analysis-after-the-fact formal sense that the "I think" accompanies all judgements. And obviously, the "I think" is not synonymous with self-conscious awareness if it is considered merely formally.

Judging from Rödl's work as it is presented here by those who are reading him, he seems seriously confused. And I am self-consciously aware of making that judgement.

What definition of "inscrutable" would you offer, such that inscrutable reference poses no barrier to communication? — Leontiskos

No clear way of showing just how words refer to what we take them to refer to? And no clear way of showing that they refer to exactly and exclusively what we take them to refer to.

At any rate, what constitutes the center of a star system or galaxy is not arbitrary. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There's a kind of absolutism that belongs to a theistic outlook. It's the kind of absolutism that would have a person deny something as simple as Galilean transformation. Meh. — frank

Banno and Timothy are correct, it's not a matter of "absolutism' and it's not arbitrary. The Solar System as a whole has a centre of mass known as a barycenter around which everything in the system orbits. It is constantly changing its position depending on the positions of all the planets. The position of the barycenter is relative to the whole system, so it is not absolute but is also not a matter of perspective.

If there's no one to choose a frame of reference, there is no truth of the matter. This is not philosophy. It's physics. — frank

There is an actuality which is the Earth orbiting the Sun. We model that actuality using physics. And some silly philosophers say that because 'the Earth orbits the Sun' is a sentence which is, in this case, true, and because truth only pertains to sentences, judgements and beliefs, without language and linguistically competent beings there is not truth.

It's a lame and misguided argument in my opinion. The problem is that when it comes to arguments like that there doesn't seem to be a determinable fact of the matter as to whether they are true or false—and the result is that such arguments are interminable.

Partisans of either frame have their reasons for seeing the other as dangerous. Partisans of the immanent frame see any notion of transcendence as at best a dangerous distraction from real goods, at worst the specter of fanaticism (Taylor does note that communists squarely in the immanent frame have been plenty fanatical however). On the other side, there is the fear that those in the immanent frame have reduced the human good to mere consumption, the specter of consumerism and spiritual emptiness, or on the far side the fall into grave sin.

On Taylor's view, almost everyone will be some degree of closed or open towards either frame, but radical closure on either side suggests a sort of dogmatism, particularly if one has never "stood in the middle" or traversed from one side to the other. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The problem I see here is that all such "frames" when dogmatically posited are actually, or at least potentially, ideologies. It is ideology, whether immanentist or transcendentalist, which "detracts from real goods", and generally devalues this life. Dogmatism is only really possible to sustain in the case of strictly undecidable questions. Religion and metaphysics, as well as beliefs about what political system is the absolutely true and best one fall under the category of "strictly undecidable", or so it seems to me.

When I say "undecidable" I mean something like 'underdetermined by evidence or logic". Of course there are many things we can rightly say we know, but I think those things all fall under the categories of observation and logic. So, to relate this to the OP, for me skepticism, when it comes to those areas which cannot be decided by observation or logic, is the appropriate response. Philosophy is not a means of gaining definitive knowledge but of creating new ways to look at things and of gaining clarification of concepts.

'Objectivity' can mean different things. In the pragmatic context it just amounts to intersubjective agreement. In the realist context it is an acknowledgement of things having an existence of their own, independently of the human. If objectivity is independent of the human, and everything we experience and know is not, then we cannot fully know a purportedly independent existence even though our experience has obviously induced the idea of it in us.

The absolute idealist conception that objective existence just is what we experience seems inadequate. It certainly seems to be true that our experience itself is objectively real, meaning that we experience just what we experience, but even here we don't seem to have full access to just what it is that we experience. Unknowing seems to be as important as knowing in human life. That doesn't satisfy those who are addicted to finding certainty.

Thanks Paine, that clears up my apparent misunderstanding.

The obvious response is that what it is we recognise when we recognise a tiger is, well, the tiger. — Banno

So would it be fair to say that, in the example of the tiger, we must refer to the tiger itself? And a disagreement about the tiger's "essentiality" (or definition, if you prefer) would be investigated by saying, in effect, "Let's return to the tiger. Let's examine him more closely in the relevant aspects so we can learn which of us is right"?
— J

This isn't meant to be some sort of trick question that implies there's no such thing as "being a tiger."
Of course there is. Nor am I suggesting that "how to recognize a tiger" is the same problem as "what constitutes a tiger." But we should think carefully about how we determine both these things, because when we move to abstracta, the problems increase by an order of magnitude. — J

When we recognize an individual tiger we recognize the tiger, and we don't even need to recognize it as a tiger. So, it seems to me that the question is 'when we recognize something as a tiger what is it that we are recognizing?'.

The answer that comes to me initially is that we recognize a unique example of a kind of pattern or form that we have come to associate with the concept 'tiger'. Not sure if that is an adequate answer.

@Joshs is well read and articulate to be sure. It doesn't follow that he has hold of the right end of the stick. I have no doubt he has a response, of course.

I edited my above post as you were responding. Note there "same' people and "different" people. Use of these expressions, where we all know what we are talking about, does not imply that any of us are exactly the same from one moment to the next.

:up: Nicely explained! There is all too much ado about what amounts to nothing of any importance. When it is claimed that say 'cat' never means the same between two instances of thinking it, all that I can see is being pointed out is that different people may entertain different associations with the concept, or the same people entertain different associations at each different instant of thought.

Then what need have we for essence? What do they do? — Banno

It seems that we like thinking about trying to discover just what it is we recognize when we recognize something. We don't have any need for the idea of essence, unless it might be in the form of an attachment to thinking about such things.

Yes. Acceptance up to a point. There is a tipping point where action must be taken. I don't agree with the passivity associated with bowing to greater powers.

Not sure I would be brave enough to form part of a war resistance movement.
However, I think that active courage in holding fast to certain values derives from desperate situations and hope for a better future. Even basic survival. — Amity

Right, acceptance is appropriate of those things we cannot change. So, the idea of acceptance should not preclude, for example, political action, where it is both possible and desirable.

As I understand it, we don't look to science for guidance, we look within ourselves. — T Clark

Our understanding of ourselves is definitely influenced by science, though.

Absolutely. Many of the common terms come from Latin translations of the Greek, but then words in English get used because they come from the Latin and yet their standard usage has changed dramatically. With Aristotle, there is the added problem of the same Greek word often being translated into different English words based on context, or different Greek words being translated into the same English word. "Essence" is just such a case, since ousia is also sometimes rendered as "essence," "actuality" is another, or dunamis as either potency or power. The choices aren't without their reasons (e.g. it may make sense to say Plotinus' One has "power" but not "potentiality") but they are confusing. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, the concepts of substance, being, essence seem to be all closely associated. We could say that the essence of something is the archetypal idea of that thing, but then that could come down to recognition of form or pattern. We can all recognize a tiger when we see one, even though we cannot say what the essence of being a tiger is. Perhaps the essence of something, if we are thinking of essence as a kind of defining quality, is more like the 'feeling' of that thing, rather than anything determinate.

"Privation" is necessary because you are employing a Platonic version. Note that for Plato there is no "undeviated circle" among the realm of singulars, here below. The perfect Form is never found in a singular. — Leontiskos

Yes, that accords with my understanding.

I'm curious. How does it 'work' for you? From what perspective or belief? How meaningful is it in your everyday experience? The actual practice of Taoism or reading/interpreting the TTC? — Amity

A few thoughts—

It works for me as poetry, evoking a sense of connectedness with both nature and the affairs of humans. It is also a kind of metaphysics, allusive, not determinate. It is about unknowing more than it it is about knowing—metaphysics is not and can never be a science, but it is an inspiring activity as it is so closely allied with the arts.

The Dao has long been associated in my mind with the Dharma, and most particularly as the Dharma is evoked by the great Zen teachers—Dogen, Hui Hai, Han Shan, and my favorite modern Zen text: Zen MInd, Beginners Mind by Suzuki.

I also associate it with the teachings of the Stoics, the Epicureans and Spinoza—I mean I think it is coming from the same place of radical acceptance of those things which are beyond our control. The Dao, like Spinoza's "deus siva natura' has no concern for humans, and to live well we must bow to the greater power.

:roll:

I have no desire to engage further but if you insist on misrepresenting me then I feel compelled to correct you.

False. Your attitude is observable in the way that you choose to express yourself and communicate yourself in your written text. — Arcane Sandwich

False. I actually know what your character has been throughout this conversation, in the same sense that a Lawyer could, and in the same sense that any ordinary person can. — Arcane Sandwich

And your interpretations are infallible? I guess not since my attitude was never one of wishing to disrupt the thread. And the fact that others disagree with you about my attitude shows your idea of an "observable attitude" to be false.

False. I already addressed your arguments on your own terms, many times. — Arcane Sandwich

You may believe that. It is not the way I see it. Call in the mods and let's see what they think.

Your views are mistaken. If you disagree, explain why you disagree. Simple as that. — Arcane Sandwich

What views are you referring to and why do you think they are mistaken. Answer that, and if I think you are right, I will change my views and if I disagree, I will defend the views in question.

But you did it anyways. The fact that you're having this conversation with me is disruptive to the Thread. — Arcane Sandwich

I am merely defending myself against your personal attacks. You are disrupting your own thread.

This is not how a noble book such as the Tao Te Ching deserves to be spoken about. Do you even understand this basic concept, yes or no? — Arcane Sandwich

I love the Tao Te Ching, and I have said nothing against it. I have merely questioned assertions you have made about its correct interpretation and asked you to explain them, which, as I see it, you are yet to do. I question the very idea of a correct interpretation.

but apparently not.
— Janus

Oh, so you know the inner workings of my mind, but I don't know the inner workings of yours? — Arcane Sandwich

I'm not claiming to know that. I only know how it appears to me—hence "apparently". Perhaps you should learn to read more carefully.

Otherwise, I'll just keep pointing out the fact that your interventions just keep impoverishing the quality of this Thread, and what's worse is that you've turned me into your accomplice in that sense. — Arcane Sandwich

If my "interventions" that is questions have impoverished the thread, then how much more have your ad hominem attacks on me done so?

Shall we leave it here? Or if you want to answer my questions about precisely which views of mine are mistaken and why you think they are we could resume a civil discussion. It's your call.

And your view is mistaken. Your questions are not disruptive: your attitude is the disruptive element here. — Arcane Sandwich

You know only my questions, you don't know my attitude. and it is presumptuous of you to think you do.

It's not an ad hominem, it's a description of your character. It would be ad hominem if I said that your views are mistaken because of your personal characteristics. — Arcane Sandwich

It is an ad hominem because instead of addressing my arguments on their own terms you presume to know my character and dismiss what I say on account of that, which is of course absurd. Did you really think my views were not mistaken?

Here's what you're saying: "I'm not satisfied. Satisfy me."
Newsflash: I'm under no obligation to satisfy you. — Arcane Sandwich

Of course you're not obligated. I had no intention of disrupting the thread, and even if I had you had no obligation to respond at all. you could have just ignored my posts. That's what I would do if I thought someone was being intentionally disruptive. I had thought that you might be interested in alternative views and in presenting actual justifications for your own views, but apparently not.

Anyway. I have no interest in attempting to engage with you further.

You'd have to define perfect I suppose. If it is the older usage of "having no privation" then yes, circleness cannot be deprived of any aspect of circleness. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So, on the "no privation" view the perfect form of a tiger would be 100% tigerness, just as the form of the perfect circle would be 100% circularity. Same for the Good, Justice, and Beauty. 'No deviation' might be a better term than 'no privation'.

I think it also pays to remember than when these terms were originally translated into English (which was not way back in the day) the English words chosen would reflect the presuppositions of the translators. So, it is translations we are working with, not the original texts.

you rude, uncivilized, uneducated barbarian. — Arcane Sandwich

This ad hominem shows you are obviously taking it personally. Others, with more balanced views have said they did not see me being disruptive but merely questioning. I have carefully read your responses, and they did not satisfy me at all. I still don't know why you want to separate Dao from Nature.

Call the mods in: I am confident they will not see my questions as disruptive. The disposition of one who finds reasonable critical questions disruptive rather than acknowledging them as being simply disagreements is more that of the proselytizer than the philosopher in my view.

Anyway, I have no desire to offend, so I won't bother you again.

:up:

Then why were you so argumentative? — T Clark

I was questioning the justification for this interpretation which was being presented as the one true interpretation:
:

"Tao follows what is natural". Therefore, if you wish to follow the Tao itself, do not follow the Tao itself, follow instead what the Tao itself follows: you should follow what is natural, not the Tao itself.

"What is natural" = Nature.

In some other translations, the last line says "Tao follows itself". That, is an entirely different interpretation. — Arcane Sandwich

I wanted to know why the OP was saying that the Dao is not Nature. To my mind I did not receive a satisfactory response, so I continued to question what was offered.

I have argued that the text, being poetical, does not have one true interpretation. The OP took it personally, so I decided to desist. I've no desire to offend anyone, and I always assume that people who post on a philosophy forum are open to having their ideas critiqued, until they show that they are not so open after all.

If it doesn't work for you, that's no surprise. It doesn't work for lots of people. It works for me. — T Clark

Cheers T Clark, it actually does work for me. It and the Bhagavad Gita are two of my favorite texts.

Even Plato never claimed that we have perfect knowledge of the Forms, or that we can give a perfect account of the Forms. — Leontiskos

That's not the point though. The point is that he conceived of the forms as perfect—the perfect circle (which does not exist in nature) being the archetypal example. Does the idea of an imperfect essence (in the traditional sense) make any sense?

We have from Plato for example ideas of The Good, Justice, Beauty, Truth. Does the idea of the essence of any of those being imperfect makes any sense?

Are you sure about that? It sounds to me that one can speak "around" it, one can allude to it, indirectly. — Arcane Sandwich

So, it's just poetry then? I have no argument with that.

Because it reveals itself to you, in a non-linguistic way. — Arcane Sandwich

It seems to me that something that can only be apprehended non-linguistically cannot be spoken about except poetically or allusively. Poetry is always a matter of interpretation with no detreminate meaning, so there cannot be any detreminable "missing of the mark".

Because I am attempting to combine two translations of the Tao Te Ching that contradict each other. See:

Tao follows what is natural.
— Lao Tzu (Laozi)

The Tao follows only itself.
— Translated by Stephen Mitchell, 1988

Why am I doing such a thing? Because you made that specific request when you said the following:

If you don't understand the language the text was written in, how do you know that the translator avoids a mistake? — Arcane Sandwich

OK, so the translations contradict one another. How do you know which is correct, or considering what I said just above, how can there be a correct and incorrect at all?

I am trying to be as charitable as I can towards your intentions, Janus. Are you trying to be as charitable as you can towards my intentions, yes or no? — Arcane Sandwich

I am not concerned with your intentions. I don't know them, I know what you say, and I respond to that with my own questions and ideas and as much on its own terms (that is without distorting it) as I can. Isn't that what we do (or should be doing) here?

What source do you use to come to this idea about "this notion of a perfect form"? — Leontiskos

It seems uncontroversial that Plato considered the forms to be perfect and their physical manifestations imperfect. Do you deny this?

Yes, they have. (Missed the mark) — Arcane Sandwich

If everything that can be said misses the mark then there is no point discussing it. On the other hand how could you know if the mark has been missed if you don't know what it is?

The preceding verse has nothing to do with Nature, nor with what is natural. It is speaking about Tao (Greatness). — Arcane Sandwich

Nature = what is natural.
Tao follows what is natural.
Tao follows only itself.
The Nature (Tao) that can be told is not the eternal Nature (Tao). — Arcane Sandwich

You contradict yourself or the text or both.

Man follows the earth.
Earth follows the universe.
The universe follows the Tao.
The Tao follows only itself. — Translated by Stephen Mitchell, 1988

So, Man follows the Earth, which follows the Universe, which follows the Tao. No mention of Nature there.

That is what the Ancient Roman philosophers called the Quaestio here. — Arcane Sandwich

If you cannot say what you think Nature is, then how can say it is different than the Tao?

and the noumenal?
— Janus

I'll let Lao Tzu himself answer you question, in the very first line of the Tao Te Ching: — Arcane Sandwich

So, you do equate the Dao with the noumenal?

I still have no clue what you think "Nature" refers to, and much less how it could be different than the Dao.

Not "perfect," just a substantial (type-of-thingal) form (actuality), which could be rendered "actual type of thing" or "what-it-is-to-be of certain types of thing." — Count Timothy von Icarus

So, you are not talking about Platonic essentialism?

The straightforward translation of essence is just "what-it-is-to-be" and form is what anything is, any whatness it has, and so to be anything at all, instead of sheer indeterminate potency (nothing) involves form. — Count Timothy von Icarus

OK, but what it is to be a particular tiger is not what it is to be any other tiger, because their forms are not identical. Leaving aside Plato's conception of transcendent forms, my limited familiarity with Aristotles idea of immanent forms does not think those forms in terms of sets or bundles of attributes or characteristics, as far as I know. I could be wrong about that, admittedly.

And you seem to be alluding to just this here:

I think what you've suggested is largely in line with that view, although there would be the further question of if what-a-thing-is is properly decomposable into properties. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Where your definition would also differ from the traditional view is that the traditional essence is not simply definitive but rather constitutive due to a notion of formal causality. Being a tiger explains why tigers do what they do. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Are the forms of things not constituted by their characteristics (leaving aside the further question of behavior)? And saying that being a tiger explains why tigers do what they do seems like a non-explanation which could be fleshed out by saying that how tigers are constituted enables them to do what they do, and if you included the brain in that constitution it would also explain (up to a point) why they do what they do. I say up to a point because individual tigers probably do not act exactly the same as other tigers—that is their behaviors may vary in small ways, since presumably no two tigers are exactly formally the same, and also the contingencies of experience may modify their behaviors somewhat.

It's rather difficult to form an opinion concerning essence while what an essence is remains obscure. — Banno

Yes, indeed!

So if nature is the manifest world
— Janus

Is it? Perhaps it is the real world instead. Perhaps Nature is Reality Itself. Tao (Greatness) is simply a manifestation of Nature. — Arcane Sandwich

How do you understand the difference between the manifest world and "reality itself". Are you invoking the phenomenon/ noumenon distinction? If so it sounds like you would be equating nature with the noumenal. But then how would you draw a distinction between the Dao as described in the verse below

Something mysteriously formed,
Born before heaven and Earth.
In the silence and the void,
Standing alone and unchanging,
Ever present and in motion.
Perhaps it is the mother of ten thousand things.
I do not know its name
Call it Tao.
For lack of a better word, I call it great. — Lao Tzu (Laozi)

the noumenal and Nature?

The preceding verse has nothing to do with Nature, nor with what is natural. It is speaking about Tao (Greatness). That is the name that Lao Tzu (Laozi) gives it, because he does not know its name. Perhaps it is the mother of ten thousand things. We call it great, only for the lack of a better word, as Laozi (Lao Tzu) says. — Arcane Sandwich

So if nature is the manifest world ( which seems to be the only option left) the Dao preceded it according to the verse in question. — Janus

Perhps you have another option in mind: you say nature is not the manifest world, and you also say that the verse (which sounds like an allusion to the noumenal) has nothing to do with Nature but is about the Dao but youo haven't spelled out just what you think Nature is. So then in your understanding what is Nature according to Lao Tzu?

The Tao follows what is natural. It does not say that Greatness follows Greatness, or that the Tao follows itself. There are translations that make this mistake, but Jane English did not make this mistake in her translation — Arcane Sandwich

If you don't understand the language the text was written in, how do you know that the translator avoids a mistake?

Please explain the equivocation going on, to the best of your ability. — Arcane Sandwich

See the above and provide unequivocal distinctions between the Dao, the manifest world, "Reality itself" and Nature as I have requested.

Something mysteriously formed,
Born before heaven and Earth.
In the silence and the void,
Standing alone and unchanging,
Ever present and in motion.
Perhaps it is the mother of ten thousand things.
I do not know its name
Call it Tao.
For lack of a better word, I call it great. — Lao Tzu (Laozi)

So if nature is the manifest world the Dao preceded it according to this verse. We cannot follow that which is
Born before heaven and Earth.
In the silence and the void,
Standing alone and unchanging,
But it is also
Ever present and in motion. which is also Dao but sounds like a description of nature. So, there seems to be some equivocation going on.

As with all philosophical problems, I argue, this matter is discovered in the simplicity of the world's manifest meanings. A proposition as such has no value, and this is true of anything I can imagine, a knowledge claim, an empirical fact or an analytical construction. States of affairs considered apart from the actuality of their conception sit there in an impossible abstract space. — Astrophel

I'm not sure what you mean by "manifest meanings". Do you mean to say that we are affected by how things appear to us? If so, that would be a truism. An empirical proposition has no inherent value to be sure. For example, take the proposition 'it is raining'—the proposition itself if assertoric is merely the expression of an observation and the only value, meaning or quality it has is that of being true or false, and it is the actuality of rain that may have some value, whether positive or negative.

States of affairs are concrete not abstract; it is propositions about states of affairs whose content can be considered to be abstract in the sense of being generalizations.

So what about Wayfarer's talk about clinging "to the transitory and ephemeral as if they were lasting and satisfying"? — Astrophel

That well laboured old chestnut? It is also a truism. That we are subject to being affected by those things which we are attached to would have to be one of the most obvious observations regarding being human (or animal). That things are transitory, and that humans often wish they were not so are also simply obvious facts.

When people start bringing out ideas like this I would say they have to try to justify their sine qua non historically. "If [insert absurdity] is not true, essentialism fails." The response, "Show where you are getting the idea that [absurdity] comes with essentialism." Objections to essentialism tend to be strawmen through and through. — Leontiskos

This notion of a perfect form, eidos or essence is the traditional understanding of essentialism. You admit that essentialism is not monolithic, and yet you call criticism of the traditional thesis a strawman on account of its failure to be a cogent critique of, and even though it does not purport to be critiquing, what you call "modal essentialism". It seems that any strawmanning here is on you.

Sure, it can be said that things have essential properties in the sense that they would not qualify as whatever those essential properties would qualify them as if they did not possess those qualities. To say this is very different than saying there is some essence we might refer to as "tigerness' or 'carness".

Here is the issue I spot. Tigers are animals, and being an animal seems essential to what a tiger is. But not only tigers are animals. Likewise, being a tree is essential to what an oak is, but not all trees are oaks. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's true. I think the individual characteristics are all necessary but only the whole set is sufficient to identify an entity or a kind of entity. And if there are other entities or kinds of entities that have the same set of characteristics then it would seem there must be at least one extra characteristic which is not shared by that other entity. I'm not sure I've expressed that in a way that is not open to equivocation, but let's see.

:up:

So here's my question, generally speaking. How is "blind faith" not an adequate response to the Problem of Induction? — Arcane Sandwich

We see regularities in nature everywhere. We have a coherent and vast body of scientific knowledge that tells us there is not any reason to think the Sun will suddenly cease working. The Sun has always risen throughout at least human recorded history, and we have good scientific reasons to believe it was shining long before life on Earth arose. So, I would not call our confidence in the Sun continuing to rise "blind faith". For me, blind faith is belief in something without any empirical evidence or logical justification at all.

Philosophers chasing after propositional truth (logos) is patently absurd. It begs the question, Why do it (for it is assumed one does it for a reason)? No one wants this. The summum bonum is not a "defensible thesis." — Astrophel

Are you not proposing something? And do you not need some justification that can be intersubjectively assessed in an (hopefully) unbiased way? Let's say for the sake of argument that spiritual insight, even enlightenment, is possible—what one sees is not explainable, not propositional, and yet ironically it is always couched in those terms, and people fall for it because they are gullible and wishful.

If altered states of consciousness were explainable, we would have all long been convinced. So, your epiphany may convince you of something, but it provides absolutely no justification for anyone else to believe anything. If they do believe you it is because you are charismatic, or because they feel they can trust you or they believe you are an authority, and so on. If you could perform miracles that might give them more solid reason to believe what you say.

Thanks, but I'm no clearer on what the problem or the "other problem" are.

Yep, and if we want to say that this is not a tiger then we are already appealing to the idea of an essence.

Folks like to say, "Well, unless you can give me the perfectly correct (real) definition of a tiger, I won't accept that essences exist," which looks like sophistry to me. It's like saying:

Do you have a car?
Yes.
Prove it. List every part that constitutes your car.
*Gives a list of tens of thousands of parts.*
This list omits a rear-left brake pad. Therefore you don't have a car. — Leontiskos

Things have characteristics, not essences. So, what's the problem if one or a few characteristics are neglected? It would only be a problem if some other object possessed all the same characteristics, and the few that have been omitted by the list were the very ones the other object did not possess.

It's not a matter of listing every part that constitutes a car (or tiger), but of listing that set of attributes which only cars (or tigers) possess.