Racist claims seem unfalsifiable. As far as we can tell they are. I'm just allowing for the possibility that they might be falsifiable. If they are unfalsifiable, then there is no possibility of either logical proof or empirical evidence to disconfirm or confirm them.

My statement that they can have no logical proof or empirical evidence simply follows logically from the assumption that racist claims are unfalsifiable. If they are falsifiable then my claim that they are unfalsifiable would also be falsifiable, in fact it would be false. That's all I'm claiming. I don't think it's a trick.

You ask me to show you an unfalsifiable claim. If a claim can have no logical proof or empirical evidence to support or refute it then it would be unfalsifiable. We can never be one hundred percent sure that particular claims are unfalsifiable, though and that's why I allow for the possibility.

Two well-used examples of what are often characterized as unfalsifiable claims are the Multiple Worlds Interpretation in QM, and the Multiple Worlds hypothesis in cosmogony. They both certainly seem to be unfalsifiable because we have no access to those posited other universes or worlds.

As I said I think the crisis, if there is one, consists in too much meaning, too much choice and too much trivia, coupled with too many looming real-world crises: environmental, military, economic, political and so on.

So yes, I agree there is no crisis of meaning as such, if that is meant to assert that loss of traditional meanings constitute a crisis. I think that idea is arrant nonsense and is also elitist considering the low levels of literacy in the past, and how the masses were in thrall to supposed religious authorities. That is what religion is really about—control.

I never said anything about allowing murder. — NOS4A2

What about inciting people to murder then? Or even inciting them to persecute others? To anticipate a likely objection: you might argue that people make up their own minds what to do, in which case you would be hopelessly naive.

Yet what is it that was supposedly lost?

The god botherers have taken to posting en masse; a symptom of something... but what? — Banno

There are so many problems we now face, and solutions seem to be unlikely because of humanity's incapacity for globally coordinated action. Despair leads to searching for answers somewhere other than in this world, which can seem, given certain mindsets, to offer so few, I guess.

I don't think the crisis is one of a loss of meaning, but rather one of too much meaning, much of it trivial and much of it threatening and what there is of value perhaps seems to those who are after easy explanations like a return to tradition, to take too much effort and discipline and critical thought to pursue.

Which beliefs are matters of faith and which are not, cannot be rendered in black and white terms.

Right there are deistic conceptions of God, such as Spinoza's, whose god is not concerned with humanity, or anything else, at all.

You may be right about a return to Catholicism. Interest in gods or gods does not seem compatible with Buddhism though. I think the real struggle is with the notion that some kind of intellectual insight has been lost in modernity. I don't find that idea remotely supportable—I think it stems from a yearning for the magical, the magical and otherworldly which science, and critical reasoning has shown to be nothing more than superstition.

The huge market for fantasy literature shows that this yearning is still well and truly alive and kicking. I think we all still may enjoy a good fantasy. For some fantasy has apparently supplanted truth.

Like this

The irony with this OP is that the "Hotel Manager" analogy presented is not a theodicy, but a critique. A theodicy is an apologetic.

I see you have no argument, so your only strategy is to question my intellectual honesty. I told you exactly how those claims could be falsified if it were indeed possible to falsify them, and asked if you disagreed and if so, why. How is that intellectual dishonest? The intellectual dishonesty seems to be yours, and I say that because you keep trying to distort what I have been saying.

Also, you say you agree that 2. is falsifiable, and yet won't say how it could be falsified, presumably because there is no imaginable way other than the way I have laid out.

* The logical conclusion of this form of sophistry is that there are no unfalsifiable claims, for every single claim without exception would be falsified if it were falsified and is therefore falsifiable. — Leontiskos

No the logical conclusion is that a claim would be at least possibly if not actually falsifiable if we can imagine how it could be falsified, if we can say what falsification would look like, which is what I have done.

What you are missing is that the general criterion for falsification is the possibility of either empirical evidence or logical self-evidence (as in mathematics, for example). Now it obviously is not logically self-evident that any racist claims are true, so we can rule that out as a possibility. So we are left with the possibility of some new empirical evidence for the claim that some races are superior to others. As far as I can tell it is impossible to imagine how empirical evidence could support a general claim of superiority, even though it might support a contextual claim, for example that some race is generally physically stronger than another. But the problem is that any evidence of particular superiority cannot support a claim of general superiority as far as I can tell.

So, when I said those 3 claims as you set them out could be falsified if definite proof or evidence of superiority could be found I was not claiming that such would be possible. In fact, I don't believe it is possible for the reasons I've outlined, and that impossibility does seem to be logically self-evident to me.

Okay, I did somehow miss your answers...in a bit of a hurry...I know that's no excuse, so apologies seem to be in order.

So, it now seems we are not substantially disagreeing at all...

Saying "Trans women are not women" doesn't fall into this category. — AmadeusD

Here we might disagree somewhat...I agree it doesn't qualify as hate speech, but if someone who is biologically male identifies as a woman and wishes to be treated as such, I think to do so is the decent thing to. What would you lose by that? Or if you find it offensive you could simply have nothing to do with them.

On the other hand, to tell such a person that they should not identify as a women would be bordering on being hateful. and would certainly be unwarrantedly intrusive and grossly impolite.

More than this: I am telling you that is what's already happening, in practice, when we talk about Hate Speech publicly. It is a slippery slope. Yes, there are clear cases. — AmadeusD

None of the rest of what you said is cogent as I see it, so I won't respond to it; I don't like wasting time. I might agree that the criteria that determine what counts as hate speech has been unreasonably extended in some arenas of the social sphere.

However, that is irrelevant to the argument that there are clear examples of hate speech, which in my view, it is right to disallow. Do you disagree with that? You haven't actually answered my questions about whether you would allow the examples I gave and the like.

"Our conflict" seems to me to be that you, on the grounds that some things are unreasonably counted as hate speech and should not therefore be banned, conclude that no hate speech should be banned. Perhaps I've misunderstood you, but you have not clearly answered the questions I posed.

1. "There simply are no sound criteria for considering one race to be, tout court, inferior to another." (↪Janus)
2. "No race is, tout court, inferior to another." (my paraphrase)
3. "there is no imaginable evidence for racist claims" (↪Janus)

Since we are talking about falsifiability, what is your opinion? Is (1) falsifiable? Is (2) falsifiable? Is (3) falsifiable? The claims are all laid out in front of us; this should be a simple matter. — Leontiskos

1. would be falsified if sound criteria for considering one race to be, tout court, inferior to another were found. Do you disagree with that? If so, on what grounds?

2. would be falsified if definitive proof or evidence that one race is inferior to another could be found. Do you disagree? If so, why?

3. would be falsified if you could imagine what sound evidence could look like. Do you disagree? If so, on what grounds.

I agree with (2), but I don't think (2) or its mirror contradiction are unfalsifiable. — Leontiskos

It seems you do agree that 2. is falsifiable. So how about you tell me you tell me what such falsification evidence could look like? And then tell why it would not also falsify 1. and 2.

Scientific theories are falsifiable only insofar as their predictions fail to account for observed facts.
— Janus

(Again, this claim is simply false. Accurate theories can still be falsifiable even when they have not been falsified.) — Leontiskos

I've already addressed your misinterpretation of the intended meaning of this sentence. Perhaps it wasn't expressed in the clearest of ways. Why bring it up again?

Well yes, if there is no imaginable evidence for your claim or the racist's claim, then both claims are unfalsifiable, are they not? It seems like you are on the verge of simply admitting that your claim is unfalsifiable, and such an admission would not imply that the racist does not have the same problem. If I just look at the two claims it seems obvious that both claims are unfalsifiable.* — Leontiskos

My claim really just consists in the observation that there is no imaginable evidence for racist claims, and that they should thus be considered to be irrational. If you agree that there is no imaginable evidence for racist claims then why are you continuing to argue with me?

So do people who think misgendering is hate speech and needs to be a criminal offense. — AmadeusD

Misgendering is not clearly hate speech. I don't believe it qualifies as such. It doesn't follow that there are no clear cases of hate speech. You seem to be mounting a "slippery slope" argument.

We don't agree on utterances about animals entirely - those sorts of things are often said as sarcasm etc... — AmadeusD

That's a weak response! What, you think that someone who posted on public forums that th3ewy think it is good to torture animals for fun would be just "being sarcastic'. If you really think that, then it's ridiculous!

I don't think i've said anything that would insinuate this. I didn't mention any type of utterance, for instance. I'd think the answer is 'it depends on the context'. — AmadeusD

I didn't say anything about you insinuating anything. I asked you a question which apparently you don't want to answer. The examples, and others like them, are clear examples of hate speech. The context is the public forum. Do you think such utterances should be allowed on public forums?

I am. But I'm anti nanny-state type legislation. I think those with this view should stop thinking the lowest common denominator is the best way to inform ourselves. — AmadeusD

It has nothing to do with informing ourselves. It has to do with influencing those who are the least informed in ways which are inimical to social life. Why would you not want to prevent such a thing?

We're justifying racist policies. — AmadeusD

I am not; I don't know about you. I'm merely saying that unfairly disadvantaged groups may warrant additional rights.

It depends what your definition of hate speech is, and this is always the problem. I am 100% against any kind of hate speech legislation because (even taking the underlying loadedness of your question as legitimate) no one has that authority. We cannot rely on 'perceived hate' because that's utter bollocks, and so we need an objective measure. — AmadeusD

I think this is disingenuous. Hate speech is readily recognizable. If someone says, referring to a human racial group, "kill all Xs" or "Xs are inferior and should be treated not as human but as animals" or any statement of that kind that is hate speech. Are you saying that such should be allowed on public forums?

I don't think such things should be allowed even in relation to animals. If someone said, for example, "torturing dogs is good fun, we should all do it", or said that about any other animal, I believe that should be banned on public forums too. What you are not allowing for is that there are impressionable people who may be influenced by such hateful propositions.

Scientific theories can only be falsified insofar as their predictions fail to account for observed facts.
— Janus

We are talking about falsifiability, not falsification. Scientific theories can be falsifiable even if they are not falsified. — Leontiskos

"Scientific theories can be falsified insofar" means "scientific theories are falsifiable insofar" so I am talking about falsification. We won't get far if you keep presenting distorted readings of my posts.

Again, in that case it sounds like both you and your interlocutor are making unfalsifiable claims. — Leontiskos

The claim that no evidence for or logical proof of a racist claim is falsifiable if such proof or evidence is possible. It would be falsified if someone produced such empirical evidence or logical proof. The further point is that no such evidence or proof is even imaginable, and I think that's why you keep saying my claim is unfalsifiable. But the fact that no such proof or evidence is imaginable only strengthens my position.

And yes, as I've been discussing with Joshs, this framework can't be neutral in respect to any values whatsoever. — J

This is of course true—the framework cannot be neutral when it comes to fairness, or neutrality, itself. Fairness, or neutrality is a value simply because there cannot be any rational justification for rejecting it.

When you consider that justice is undermined when one person is treated more harshly than another for exactly the same crime or misdemeanor or rewarded more richly than another for the same contribution, it becomes obvious that justice cannot be separated from fairness and the fact that there is no rational justification for privilege.

So, saying that

Justice (like friendship) involves fostering this plurality of autonomies

is the same as saying that one's autonomy is not unconditionally more important than another's, and this is precisely the idea of fairness—that there can be no purely rational justification for considering one's autonomy to take precedence over another's.

That there might be pragmatically conditioned contexts in which, for practical reasons, one's autonomy predominates, as authority say, is a separate issue. Such arrangements are or should be. agreements that are freely entered into by all participants, and if that is not the case that would be unfair, an injustice.

But autonomy is not something that can be bestowed by a distribution of goods or opportunities.

But autonomy is something that can be curtailed by a lack or failure of distribution of goods or opportunities.

Scientific theories are falsifiable only insofar as their predictions fail to account for observed facts.
— Janus

I don't think this is right at all. I think the word "falsified" would make your claim true. It is not only inaccurate theories that are falsifiable. The very best scientific theories are also supposed to be falsifiable. — Leontiskos

I think you are reading what I said in a different way than intended. Scientific theories can only be falsified insofar as their predictions fail to account for observed facts. It means that they are never definitvely falsified, or at least that they can never be definitively falsified is a defensible claim, and if you look at the literature this counter claim to Popper-s idea of falsification has indeed been made.

And again, if one is banking on the burden of proof, then they cannot make the claim that you have made about no races being inferior. — Leontiskos

I'm saying the claim that some races are inferior certainly seems to be unsupportable on the grounds that no one has been able to show any cogent evidence for it, and it seems impossible to imagine what cogent evidence would even look like.

I don't have time to say more right now.

So your response is to say that scientific theories don't need to be falsifiable? That doesn't seem like a promising route. — Leontiskos

You seem to be distorting what I said. I said some think that scientific theories are not falsifiable, I didn't say I endorse that view. Simple observations are definitively falsifiable—you just need to look—you gave the 'flat earth' example. Scientific theories are falsifiable only insofar as their predictions fail to account for observed facts.

My claim is that racists cannot come up with definitive empirical proof that supports their case, and that their case is not logically self-evident. That claim is falsifiable—someone would just need to come up with an empirical or logical proof.

I feel this is the case for most trans people. Their mental states at large, and their reports of same, seem to indicate this. I don't think this is society doing anything wrong. They want to be something they aren't, and that hurts. I am not the greatest singer in the world, and it irks me. — AmadeusD

I don't think it is simple as you are painting it. We all have something of the female and something of the male in us. It's not as black and white as genitalia and bodily sexual characteristics might make it seem. I think you trivialize the desire to identify as other than those biological characteristics indicate by comparing it to being a firefighter. I believe it can be an overwhelming, all-encompassing disposition. In any case are such matters any of our business really? Why does it matter to you?

Separate rights for indigenous groups can be justified
— Janus

I disagree. But in any case, that isn't in issue. The fact that opinion is not socially acceptable is the problem. — AmadeusD

"Separate rights" was not a good way of expressing it. "Additional rights" would have been better. The reason it cannot be a point of public debate is that it is always going to come down to a matter of opinion. If most people think indigenous people should have additional rights, then (hopefully) they will have them and people carping about it will only cause unnecessary social conflict. Does it hurt us so much to give such consideration to those who have been injured? Is it not merely a matter of decency, of bringing into play a respect that had been lacking? It is not socially acceptable to appear nude in public—would you wish to question that?

Liberals, overwhelmingly, do to the point of justifying abuse and violence. This is simply not arguable in the wake of things like BLM, Occupy, assassination attempts etc.. etc.. (this is not to claim other ideologies don't lead here too. It's to say that the claim of 'Liberal' tends this way, currently) — AmadeusD

When it comes to mass demonstrations, things will often get out of hand. Citing assassinations is not apt because they are usually the acts of lone individuals or small groups. Do you really believe that most liberals would condone assassination, even of those they disagree with?

Social restriction of opinion being the absolute bane of a civilised society. And it is. — AmadeusD

So, you would include so-called hate speech as being unnecessary to restrict?

"How could someone, in principle, come up with a logical proof or irrefutable empirical evidence for a claim that contradicts your theory?" His answer is really nothing more than, "If someone falsified it then it would be falsified." Of course. But we are asking how that might be done in principle.

For example, suppose someone proposes the thesis, "The Earth is flat." I then ask, "What could falsify your thesis?" Now consider two answers to that question:

Answer 1: "Go into orbit, take a photograph of the Earth, and if the photograph reveals a sphere then my thesis has been falsified."
Answer 2: "If someone could come up with a logical proof or irrefutable empirical evidence for a non-flat Earth claim."

Do you see how Answer 2 is not an answer to the question at all? — Leontiskos

Of course, a simple claim about the form or other characteristics of an object, in your example, the Earth, can be falsified by an irrefutable observation. Scientific theories are a different kettle of fish. There are those who claim that just as scientific theories can never be definitively confirmed as true, they can never be definitively confirmed as false. So it is not a matter of scientific theories being true or false, but of their being coherent with the observed facts, and useful insofar as what they predict obtains.

So your points actually support the idea that there is no way to confirm or falsify a racist claim since there is no imaginable way to falsify or confirm it because it is simply not amenable to either logical proof or empirical evidence, and that is essentially what I've been saying. It is true that my claim that such is the case is also not falsifiable, but that is simply an observation, which in principle could be falsified if the racist could indeed come up with either a logical proof or definitive empirical evidence to support their racism. But we know they can't do that because it is impossible in principle anyway.

But If i were to, for instance, offer an opinion piece, speak publicly, publish etc.. in a way that received some public review there are several which would result (almost invariably does) in abuse, possible violent abuse, attempts to mar my family, friends and colleagues for associating with me, attempts to end my employment (this one has happened to me twice) among other possible outcomes that are chilling on freedoms to speak): — AmadeusD

That is lamentable, but it does not represent a liberal attitude—quite the reverse. There may be a dividing line between freedom and hate speech which is difficult to accurately define, but I think most reasonable people can recognize the differences even if they cannot fully explain them in a way that is completely immune to disagreement.

- trans women are not women;
- Indigenous thinking is not superior to any other kind of thinking;
- You can be objectively wrong about your beliefs;
- That the Treaty of Waitangi needs some serious legal definition;
- That separate rights for indigenous groups and others is wrong;
- That separate standards of assessment for white people and other groups is wrong;
- That the government is doing good (I don't actually hold this view, but its one which has resulted (before my own eyes) in multiple violent responses);
- Prison is a decent response to recidivist offenders;
- That violent Islamic activity is reprehensible and we should be allowed to assess for it;
- That sexual preferences are in fact, preferences, and I need not care what anyone else thinks;
- Thinking the pronoun debate is ridiculous** — AmadeusD

Has anyone the right to tell another how they should identify gender wise? What would be the motivation for wanting to do that if not some kind of desire to vilify?

I wouldn't say that indigenous thinking is superior to any other kind of thinking as such. It may indeed be superior when it comes to looking after the environment or whatever. But I wouldn't say it is inferior tout court either.

If someone wants to show how your beliefs can be objectively wrong then they would need to do so, not merely assert it.

Separate rights for indigenous groups can be justified on the basis of showing that they have historically been and in some ways continue to be marginalized and disadvantaged.

Your own sexual preferences are indeed your own and nobody else's business as such.

I think in general that we have no right to dictate to others regarding their sexual preferences, religious or political beliefs, gender identification and so on. Why would we even wish to opine on such matters, unless someone wishes to impose their views on us, or seeks to convince us, when it comes to political or religious views (and not sexual preferences or gender identification which I think is obviously an entirely individual matter)? Marginalized minorities are seen as injured parties, and as such, it seems fair that they be given special consideration—why should that not be the case?

Generally the burden of proof is on those who are making extraordinary claims, and I think racism the idea that racism is rationally or empirically supportable is an extraordinary claim.

What could falsify our claim? If someone could come up with a logical proof or irrefutable empirical evidence for a racist claim.

Emotional crises such as grief and depression involve the loss of a sense of purpose. In these states we are plunged into the fog of confusion and chaos. Purpose is bound up with the sense of agency, of being able to act coherently by making sense of events in a consistent way, and this is taken from us in such moods. We lose our compass for action. Even though we are still alive, life loses its salience, relevance and meaning. The specter of physical death pales in comparison to this psychical death of meaning. — Joshs

Grief is usually a temporary loss of compass due to losing something that figured as central to what had been felt to be the meaning of one's life. It doesn't usually causes people to wish to be dead. Nor does depression. As far as I am aware research shows that suicide is most often motivated by an impulse towards seeking attention, proving something or punishing someone. In any case it seems reasonable to think it is usually associated with an extraordinarily intense emotional reaction. Many people are depressed, at least at times, and many more are probably depressed most or even all of the time, and it would seem that only a small percentage of those end their lives.

I think you are being too black and white in your thinking in saying that "life loses all its salience, relevance and meaning". In any case how do you know that is the general case? have you asked all the depressed people in the world?

The specter of death is with all of us, the actuality of impending death not so much.

But here's a question. Let's suppose—as you seem to imply—that claims must be susceptible to empirical data or logic. With that in mind, consider our claim, "There simply are no sound criteria for considering one race to be, tout court, inferior to another." What justifies this claim empirically or logically? — Leontiskos

I think the claim is supported logically by the fact that no purely logical reason for considering races to be inferior or superior seem to be possible. If they were possible, it should be easy enough to find them, or they certainly should have been found by now, and yet they have not been, and seemingly cannot be, found, hence the conclusion that they at least do not seem to be possible.

The same goes for empirical reasons. Even if, contrary to the actual situation we find, some races could be empirically demonstrated to be stronger or smarter in general than others, being stronger or smarter does not logically entail being superior tout court. That humans generally have considered themselves to be superior, tout court rather than just in this or that context, to animals is itself not a rationally defensible view.

This is not what it does in practice. It allows a certain range of opinion. And that, increasingly small. — AmadeusD

What restrictions do you find on your opinions in New Zealand. What opinions would you wish to express and yet find yourself increasingly unable to do so?

Since I have not a major interest in politics I've refrained from commenting on liberalism understood as a social/political praxis. I have read along though, and I see two predominant polarizations. First, there is the Marxism/Liberal democracy polemic. And there is a Traditionalism/ Modernism polemic.

I favour a liberal socialist democracy. Unfettered capitalism is a disaster and can only lead to ever greater enrichment of the rich and impoverishment of the poor. I also favour democratic elections, even though it seems that view people have the understanding to make informed decisions about which party to vote for—a situation which has been made even more difficult by the fact that politics in general has degenerated into vacuous sloganeering if not outright propaganda from both sides.

The problem for Marxism is that it is based on the idea of becoming established by revolution, not by democratic election, so introduction of a softer socialism seems much more attractive. But how to bring that about if not by education? And how to begin that education?

The problem is that the way things are set up where the choice is between two major parties, and everyone's focus seems to be more on economic management than anything else makes it very difficult to institute fairer social welfare practices and more equitable economic practices. This seems to be made even more difficult by global warming and diminishing resources and burgeoning populations. I don't hold out much hope for betterment of our societies.

As to the Traditionalist/ Modernist divide, I think there are problems on both sides. The idea that materialism (in the metaphysical not the consumerist sense) is the problem shows, I think, a poor understanding of history. I doubt that life for the masses was better back in some imagined 'Golden Age'. The problems we face are problems of this world, not of some imagined otherworld or afterlife.

And the idea that there are 'wise ones' who know something beyond what practical wisdom , ordinary human compassion and science can tell us is a fantasy. This always becomes clear when it's advocates are asked to say just what they are advocating if not some form of authoritarianism—and they cannot offer any alternative to the idea that diversity of opinion is a good, not a bad, thing.

All they seem to be able to do is talk about a "vertical ontology' being better than a purportedly "flat ontology" without being able to say what either of these actually look like, and just whose ontologies they would be, and just how, if either were to predominate, they could become common coin without being imposed by power or indoctrination. We already have a great diversity of metaphysical views in our societies and across different societies. Thoughtful individuals are, at least in many if not most societies free to form their own views, wherever they are not restricted by one or another more or less rigidly imposed "aegis of tutelage".

.

I think I agree with most of that except the idea that traditional metaphysics departs from empirical knowledge and logic. — Leontiskos

I don't want to take the thread off-course, but I just want to say that I cannot see how metaphysical speculations can be either empirically or logically confirmed or disconfirmed.

...One can do an intersubjective thing and call that rational, even with respect to morality. So one might say that racism is not objectively irrational but it is intersubjectively irrational. That could perhaps constitute a point of more general agreement within the thread. — Leontiskos

I'm not sure what "intersubjectively irrational" could mean regarding racism. In the case of something like murder, it seems to work insofar as virtually no one would think murder is a good thing. But perhaps you are working with a different idea about what "Intersubjectively irrational" should be understood to mean.

I myself think racism is objectively irrational, in much the same way that "3 > 3" is irrational. Or as you imply, any implicit argument for racism will seem to be unsound, given that the conclusion is in fact false. This doesn't mean that we can beg the question and assume ahead of time that everyone's argument is unsound, but it is a basis for a judgment that the position is irrational. — Leontiskos

I think this is more along the lines I was thinking. There simply are no sound criteria for considering one race to be, tout court, inferior to another. And since such a claim could be the only justifiable premise for a rational defense of racism, it would seem to be objectively indefensible.

1. "Do you believe that life has intrinsic value, regardless of individual survival goals?"

2. "Is the concept of ‘value’ tied to the continuation of life, even beyond individual experience?" — James Dean Conroy

1. It certainly seems that life is the source of all value—no life, no value. Value is experienced, felt, and without life there is no experience or feeling. Is it possible there can be life without experience and feeling? Do plants, for example, feel and experience? Would there be value in a merely vegetative life, if such a life were without experience and feeling? It would seem not.

There are panpsychists or panexperientialists (like Whitehead) who believe it is experience all the way down. I'm not sure what that means, but surely it would entail that there is life all the way down, which would mean there could be no such thing as a dead universe of matter.

2. I don't understand just what you are asking here, but I'll have a stab at it. There are some who say that only humans see value in being. Should we take that to mean that only humans can conceptualize existence as being valuable or the source of all value. That sounds reasonable, but it doesn't rule out other organisms experiencing some kind of sense of value. The ultimate point still stands—without existence (at the very least) there can be no value, and it certainly seems plausible that mere existence is not enough and that there must be at least life, and perhaps sentient life at that. Where o where do we draw the line?

On the other hand, is the question as to whether there is a purpose beyond life (or at least beyond this life). There are religious systems which conceive of this life itself as having a purpose beyond itself. Can perfection be the overarching value? If so then the only perfect and ultimately valuable life would be eternal life. But what could that mean? Whose eternal life? If bare existence itself is life all the way down and it never begins or ends, then life is always already eternal, and temporality itself may be an illusion. But these are just thoughts that spring to mind, and I don't really know what they could mean.

It's straying a bit off topic, but two things I am convinced of are the non-duality of being, and the inevitable duality of discursive reasoning, from which it seems to follow that we cannot hope to adequately grasp the nature of reality.

It's easy to say you are not afraid of death when your life is under no threat. I doubt that if you suddenly found you had a terminal illness you would not be afraid. There is no such thing as a life without purposes, however humble those purposes may be. All purposes are geared towards either sustaining life, or fulfilling desires, even if only, in extremis, one's own life and desires.

You're right. The complexity is added with our ego, group dynamics etc, but the core biological imperative remains - good call. — James Dean Conroy

Yes, it is only humans who can say that life is the source of all value both good and bad. but animals also have purposes and value things, probably without the self-reflective awareness that symbolic culture and language enable.

But no part of organism survives in a literal sense over time. It is a unified pattern of functioning that survives, and this ‘survival’ is only an abstraction. What we call ‘this’ living thing is not a thing, it is a system of interactions with a material and social environment. This whole ecology is the unit of ‘survival’, not a ready-made thing thrown into a world like a rock. The whole ecological system ‘preserves’ itself by changing itself in a self-consistent manner. One could say, then, that it doesnt survive so much as transform itself in an ordered way. — Joshs

This reads like sophistry to me. Organisms are born, live for a time and then die. Surely you are not going to tell me that you didn't come into existence and will pass out of existence again one day? Did you have goals before you existed? Will you have goals when you no longer exist? Are you going to say you don't primarily want to survive, you wouldn't care if you knew you were to die tomorrow?

Okay, and I am wondering if we can simplify this a bit. I would want to say that if someone asserts a proposition then their assertion can be either true or false. If someone provides reasoning for a proposition their argument can be sound or unsound, and valid or invalid. So there are two basic categories: true/false and sound/unsound, where validity is presupposed by soundness and invalidity is a particular form of unsoundness. Everyone will agree that an invalid argument is irrational, but there are disagreements about whether things like false assertions or unsound yet valid arguments are irrational. — Leontiskos

Right, 'rational' is not strictly definable. You could say a rational argument is an argument consistent with its premises, in other words a valid argument. On the other hand, valid arguments can be utter nonsense. So, then we might want to say an argument needs to be valid and sound to count as rational. The problem is that premises are never justified by the arguments they justify, assuming the argument is valid. I think there is a normativity at play. Premises must be consistent with human experience and the overall human understanding of reality. Maybe they must be supported by either empirical observations or logical self-evidence, as with mathematics. But now we've ruled out much of metaphysics, at least as it is traditionally understood. We can thank Kant for that. But then his own purported synthetic a priori knowledge is not immune to critique.

'Rapture' is an emotionally charged word, a word that signifies intense emotion. Perhaps that is relatively rare. I think it's fair to say, though, that many people experience a sense of the sublime in the Kantian sense, a feeling of being part of something so much greater than the self. I think many people, if they stop to think about it, feel some wonder, even awe, at the mere fact of their existence. I find it hard to believe that you are a complete stranger to these kinds of feelings.

As with anything it's a matter of degree—these kinds of experiences are on a spectrum of intensity, and of subtlety and nuance. The other point is that attachment to ego i also seems obviously to be on a spectrum within the human race—and I think it's fairly reasonable to think that the less attached to ego one is, the more relaxed, and the more relaxed the more open to just these kinds of feelings.

Peace, brother... :wink:

There is no such thing as a gene in isolation. A living thing is a self-organizing system whose goal is not simply static survival , but the ongoing maintenance of a particular patten of interaction with its environment. — Joshs

You have to admit, though, that survival, that is life, is the ultimate—without it there are no other goals, which makes other goals secondary insofar as they depend absolutely on survival.

And I'm not just talking about human survival, human life, but all life.

I said the particles in a dead body have the same properties as they had when the body was alive. That may be incorrect. But if so, I don't see how it's a contradiction. Can you explain? — Patterner

The physical properties of particles cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances. Once they have combined in certain ways, into certain arrangements, the experiential property of particles - which was there from the beginning - causes the emergence of human consciousness. — Patterner

You've ignored this:

.

The corpse's particles all still have the same properties they had when the organism wads alive.
— Patterner

But apparently not the same relations with one another. — Janus

It seems reasonable to think that when an organism dies the ways in which the particles that constitute the body are combined change such that the capacity for experience departs. I think it's reasonable to say the capacity for those experience-enabling combinations exists in the natures of those particles. What reason would we have for claiming that experience or consciousness itself exists in the particles any more than we would say that of other emergent properties? You also ignored an earlier response:

What is the reason for thinking matter cannot subjectively experience at one level when we know it subjectively experiences at another level? Why is it deemed impossible at the micro when it is a fact (possibly the only undeniable fact) at the macro?
— Patterner

OK, so we know matter can experience, as we and the other animals are material beings and we know they and we experience things. Other emergent properties such as wetness, hardness and so on don't obtain at the level of fundamental particles because they are the result of interactions between particles, so why should we think the case is any different with experience or consciousness?

It's not a matter of saying that it is impossible that particles experience, but that we have no idea how it could be that they experience anything. In other words, we don't know what it could even mean to say that particles are conscious. We are satisfied with saying that particles have the potential, in their interactions with each other, for other emergent properties, so why not think the same for consciousness? — Janus

Why don't you try to address those objections?

Okay, good. I would even go so far as to say that they are irrational. Is that the same as what you are saying? Or are you making a more conservative claim? — Leontiskos

Interesting question! Let's take racism; if someone thinks a person is to be shunned, dismissed as inferior or even vilified on account of their skin colour, it is obvious that there is no rational justification for such an attitude because there is no logical or empirically determinable connection between skin colour and personal worth, intelligence or moral rectitude.

So, shall we say their attitude is irrational or simply non-rational? I'd say that if they concocted some completely bogus supposed connection between skin colour and personal worth or intelligence then their attitude would be based on illogical or erroneous thinking, and it would then be fair to say they are being irrational.

If on the other hand, they said they just don't like people of whatever skin colour then perhaps we could say their attitude was simply non-rational or emotionally driven. Then again it seems unlikely that their emotional attitude would not be bolstered if not entirely based on some kind of erroneous thinking,

Presumably your hesitancy would come in the religious realm, where you want to say that a religious tenet could fail to be rationally justifiable without being irrational. I think this may end up splitting too many hairs between holding a proposition and "giving air to an assertion." On my view a religious tenet can have a characteristically different form of rational adherence, but it nevertheless requires rational justification. In any case, this is opening a whole new vista and can of worms for the thread. — Leontiskos

I think there is a valid distinction, somewhat along Kant's lines, between pure reason and practical reason. For example, in regard to justice, to the idea of all people being equal before the law and being equally subject to it and equally deserving of rights. I think this is not so much positively rationally justified as it is negatively, and by that, I mean that there is no purely rational justification for treating one person differently than another tout court.

On the other hand, perhaps there is a practically rational justification for treating the POTUS differently than the rest of the people. Not to say I think that's a good idea, mind. I'm not a moral non-cognitivist, I'm more of the persuasion that morality is objective in the sense that it evolves out of the needs of the community. So, murder is objectively wrong because it is not something a functional community could condone ( at least when it comes to its own members). Obviously, communities may have practical reasons, at least in some cases, war for example, for not considering the killing of non-community members to be murder. It's a messy business this morality!

I don't think it is rational to do that. Do you think so? — Leontiskos

No, and I think the examples you gave of the kinds of attitudes which you say are deemed to be beyond the pale are generally attitudes which are not rationally justifiable. You could even define "beyond the pale" as "not rationally justifiable".

Is it rational to give air to assertions which are not rationally justifiable?

Good to know. I don't think I have a sense of the numinous, so I can only go with what I hear from others. My experience of this word is mainly confined to New Age groups I was a member of decades ago and Christianity - which I grew up in. I also studied Jung at university in the 1980's and I have a range of vestigial traces of that frame in my head whenever I hear this word "numinous" — Tom Storm

This leaves me wondering what the numinous, which you apparently don't find yourself having a sense of. means to you. It must mean something, have some associations, or you would not be able to say that you don't think you have a sense of it. You would instead say that you don't even know what the word 'numinous' means. (Funnily when I thought I had written the word 'numinous' I had hit the 'h' at the beginning of the word instead of the 'n' and the spell prompt suggested 'humongous'). Do you have a sense of the humongous?

For years, also decades ago, I was a member of the Gurdjieff Foundation. Perhaps back then I associated the word numinous with the Mysteries, with the fantasy that we can come to know the Ultimate Truth, that anyone could come to know such a thing. that there could be, that there are those who Know.

Now I simply associate the word with the very real fact that, although we may know many facts about the world, the existence of the world and of ourselves is nonetheless absolutely mysterious. That the only absolute truth to be known is that there are questions that can never be answered. That the only possible liberation is to accept this fundamental ignorance down to the very depths of ourselves. I think this is a truth which is hard to deny.

I'm not particularly partial to the light-and-dark dichotomy. I tend to see everything as shades of grey. But, I understand the symbolism. — Tom Storm

You don't see the light and the dark sides of life? That leaves me wondering how you enjoy the arts and literature. What about nature? It is overwhelmingly beautiful, isn't it? But also overwhelmingly violent, and ultimately dangerous? For me to see only shades of grey would be to be distracted from these realities.

Yes, we seem particularly keen on golden era nostalgia, don't we? — Tom Storm

We do. And for me it is like the difference between reading escapist works of fantasy and works that reflect the realities of human life. (Of course, not all works of fantasy do not reflect the realities of human life—they might instead be allegorical, so I have in mind here the most puerile works).