It seems like the thought you were having was something like this:

1. If something promotes arrogance, it is immoral.
2. Christianity promotes arrogance by setting people up to judge each other.
3. Therefore, Christianity is immoral.

I think in this case premise 2 is objectionable. I’m not sure how Christianity sets people up to judge each other. It’s not really clear what you meant by judging a person, but you said it’s something “a God” does and through the title of your post I see that this is a discussion about the Christian God. I think the two ways the Christian God can be said to judge are whether or not someone should receive a punishment or a reward or simply whether or not someone has done something morally good or bad.

I don’t see how Christianity sets people up to judge each other in either of those ways. There are several verses in the Bible about not judging others. One example is James 4:12 (ESV), which says, “There is only one lawgiver and judge, he who is able to save and to destroy. But who are you to judge your neighbor?” This is clearly saying that only God is supposed to judge.

You may be thinking about certain Christians who do judge others. I don’t think it’s specific to Christians though. I think all people have judged others. We definitely all think judgments of other people, but I feel certain that we have all audibly judged another person as well. I’d be surprised if there is a person out there who can fully express their thoughts and has not said that another person did something morally wrong. People in general also say things like, “She deserved to live a longer life.” This would be something that only God can judge, but I don’t think most people would consider it wrong to think or say.

Maybe you were thinking of Christians who condemn things that they believe to be sins because the Bible says they are. In this case as well though, it’s not Christianity that is setting people up to judge each other. People already naturally do this themselves, but Christianity also says that only God can judge, like I have mentioned before.

Hi Maureen, it seems like your post had the following argument:

1. If Christians actually knew that their God exists, then they could easily provide irrefutable evidence and there would not constantly be disputes by atheists asking for said evidence.
2. Christians cannot easily provide irrefutable evidence.
3. Therefore, Christians don’t actually know that their God exists.

I think premise 1 is objectionable. I don’t think knowing something entails that you can “easily provide irrefutable evidence” for it. For example, I can witness something, like someone getting pushed, and I would know it happened, but I would not be able to easily provide irrefutable evidence to someone who was not there. I could also see a weirdly shaped cloud and know it exists, but I would not be able to easily provide irrefutable evidence to someone who was blind. I could get a glimpse of a very attractive person in a public place and know that person exists, but if I try to point him out to a friend, and he is no longer there, then I can no longer easily provide irrefutable evidence for the person’s existence.

Furthermore, a lot of your argument has to do with knowing, but it’s hard to “know” what it means to know something. The following paradox is an example of this:

A. If I know I have hands, then I know I’m not a handless brain in a vat (BIV).
B. I know I have hands.
C. I don’t know I’m not a handless BIV.

A, B, and C all seem true, yet they can’t all be true because they would contradict each other. C seems true since if I was a handless BIV, I would not know that I was one so I can’t say I know that I’m not one. At what point would Christians be considered knowing that God exists if doubt can be placed on the existence of my own hands? I think doubt can be cast on any subject. We can’t even really know that we aren’t dreaming right now. However, I think for at least some Christians who claim to know that God exists, they believe that they know because of evidence that isn’t easily shared, like spiritual experiences, or possibly after looking through and weighing various philosophical arguments for both sides. Things like that are then supported by how their evidence for God existing dovetails with their evidence for everything else in the world. It’s like how there can be doubt cast on me typing on my laptop right now, like if I was being deceived by some being into thinking I was typing on my laptop. However, me typing on my laptop dovetails with my evidence for everything else in the world so I say I know I am doing it even if there can be doubt cast.

I think I agree with you that premise 2 is objectionable. I was curious on what your objection to premise 2 was since you mentioned refuting it, but you never elaborated. I think that even though we can’t change the future, it’s not because of a lack of free will. Knowing our future actions is just knowing what we’ll use our free will to do.

It seems to me that reading this post was my own choice and anyone knowing that I was going to read this, even an omniscient being knowing that I was going to read this, doesn’t change that it was a choice I made myself. It’s like in those tv shows or movies where someone has psychic abilities and knows what’s going to happen. A show I grew up with was That’s So Raven on Disney Channel, and the main character, Raven, had the ability to know what was going to happen at certain moments, just not how they’d happen. She’d then try to avoid the unfavorable outcomes that she’d seen in her visions. The things in her visions always happened so the characters didn’t have the power to change the occurrences, but it wasn’t because her having the vision caused them to become reality. It was the other way around. She was just getting glimpses of what people were certainly going to use their free will to do.

It may make it seem like they didn’t have free will then since they couldn’t change the future, but the visions were just showing what their choices would end up producing. I think knowing the future means knowing what surely will happen at least at a certain point so if one knew the future, the future he’d see would account for him having seen the future and the rest of the free will choices he’d make. He’d still be making his own choices, and his free will wouldn’t have been affected. He’d merely be getting a preview of what his choices will lead to.

While God supposedly knows everything about the future compared to Raven only seeing glimpses of the future, I think us not being able to change the future He sees works the same way. I think we have the free will to make all of our choices, but God just knows which of those choices we’re going to choose.

Furthermore, to touch on you mentioning how this argument could mean that God doesn’t have free will, I think that God sees the future of all of His own choices as well. He would choose to do the best actions so He wouldn’t want to change that. If He wasn’t omnibenevolent but still omniscient and omnipotent, then I think He could choose to do worse actions, but He’d still know what He was going to do. His choices aren’t affected by anything or anyone else, but He knows what He’ll end up choosing to do.

I know you said premise 3 was the most contentious, but premise 2 seems like the most contentious to me because it assumes that God has to achieve certain “purposes.” In your argument you mention the God that most theists believe in. I’m not sure if most theists actually believe in the same God, but I’ll refer to the Christian God since that is a very popular one and one that I know the most about. For at least the Christian God and most likely other gods or God that some other theists might believe in, I don’t think God would be said to have a purpose. I’m not sure what you meant by purpose, but I thought of purpose like the Google definition of purpose, which is “the reason for which something is done or created or for which something exists.” The God that at least I am thinking of would not have been created and exists necessarily. In this case, it would be possible for the world not to exist, but only if God did not want it to.

Your first premise says, “According to the FTA, if some property x was not present at the conception of the universe, then the universe would not have existed.” This doesn’t seem to affect your argument as much as the objection to premise 2; however, if I remember correctly, the FTA was saying that the universe required a very precise combination of factors to exist and be inhabitable. This precise combination of factors actually happening is supposedly extremely unlikely without God. There wasn’t just one property that had to be present for the universe to exist. The Christian God seems almost like the x in the premise, except I suppose without Him, the universe could have existed, albeit it would have been extremely unlikely. To summarize, the FTA just seems to be saying that our universe seems more likely under a being like God rather than by chance. This being can be any universe creator, including the Christian God.

Going back to objecting premise 2, maybe you meant that God could have failed to achieve something that He wanted to do. However, like I have said earlier, it can be said that the universe could not have existed, but under the FTA, that refers to an existence by chance where God does not exist. It seems to me that the FTA would allow that if God exists, He created the universe and is omnipotent, but the FTA was just trying to show whether an omnipotent God creating the universe or a universe created by chance is more probable. Since the FTA says that the universe could have not existed if it was created by chance, then I don’t think that itself entails that God could have failed because in that scenario God does not exist.

What is God, anyway? If it’s Jesus, the Holy Spirit, or the Trinity then what do you call Allah, the Flying Spaghetti Monster, for that sake? If you consider them false gods, they still are “gods” by definition. So then what can be considered a god? — Abdul

If the Trinity is real, then the other “false gods” are called that because they are being worshipped in place of the real 3-in-1 God. It’s not because they are actual gods. It’s kind of like a term used to say who/what are mistaken as gods but are really not. They might be seen as god-like but are not God. Furthermore, they might be referred to as gods by some people, but if they are not the Trinity, in this scenario where we are supposing the Trinity is real, then they are not God or gods. For example, if you stole my identity and were able to convince any amount of people that you were me, no amount of people believing you were me would make you me. Also, if I convinced any amount of people that I was a doctor, which I am not, no amount of people believing that I am a doctor would make me a doctor.

The answer to “what is God” is hard to determine. I want to propose that for a being to be God it would have to at least have eternal and necessary existence and probably some divine agency. There are other criteria commonly stated like omnipotence, and God could very well be omnipotent or have other supernatural qualities, but I don’t think He would necessarily need those to be God. It would be possible for there to be no being that meets my criteria, or it is also possible for multiple beings to meet these criteria.

You seemed to make the following argument towards the end of your post:

1. If the requirement to be a god is to be something that is worshipped, then the power lies behind the worshipper.
2. If the power lies behind the worshipper, then God is not omnipotent.
3. Therefore, if the requirement to be a god is to be something that is worshipped, then God is not omnipotent.

I think premise 1 may be objectionable because almost anything is worshipped by someone from celebrities and animals to probably some objects. I guess the power that the worshipper would have is declaring the being as a god. However, it seems possible that there could be an omnipotent being that is not worshipped. That being would still have omnipotence. It just would not be called a god by mankind, and not being acknowledged by humans just doesn’t seem to take away from its power in any way. I guess in this case being a god seems more like a label, not a state of being or an identity, which is why that doesn’t seem to be the right definition for a god.

To more clearly address your argument, I will lay out your premises and conclusion according to my understanding of the argument.

1. Trial and error displays a limited understanding in a problem-solving area.
2. If God is the one behind all of creation and his preferred method is trial and error, then he is displaying a limited understanding in a problem-solving area.
3. If God is displaying a limited understanding in a problem-solving area, then He is not omniscient but is a simpleton.
4. Therefore, if God is the one behind all of creation and his preferred method is trial and error, then God is not omniscient but is a simpleton.

I strongly disagree with premise 3. If anyone displays a limited understanding in a problem-solving area, then I would grant that they are not omniscient, but it does not seem to entail that they are a simpleton, at least not your definition of a simpleton.

I'm going to try and prove that god is a simpleton, a simpleton herein meaning a being that far from being a genius is actually possessed of only child-like intelligence, even apish I might add. — TheMadFool

If displaying a limited understanding in a problem-solving area, entails that one possesses only child-like or apish intelligence, then it seems like all humans would only reach child-like or apish intelligence. All adult human beings do at least one of the following examples of trial and error:

• Dating
• Working (It seems rare for someone to work one job for one company for the entirety of his adult life)
• Moving homes
• Trying different hobbies
• Trying different foods

This is only to show that all adult human beings practice trial and error to an extent and to equate that to having child-like or apish intelligence seems wrong. If all adult humans do this, then it does seem to meet the standard of adult human intelligence. This could also be an objection to premise 1 because it seems possible for trial and error to be the best option in some cases. Even with trying new foods, there may be ways to figure out what kinds of foods you will be most likely to like, but it seems to me that you can’t decide whether you like certain foods or not without some trial and error.

In the case that you were not arguing that God is a simpleton but just that His understanding is limited, I think someone could still object to premise 2. One could say that God is omniscient and the reason He chose to create the world in the way that He did is only perplexing to us because we have limited understanding. Furthermore, it doesn’t seem like God would be the one practicing trial and error in this case. It could be the case that God created the world and His creations are making their own free will decisions and sometimes use trial and error to make those decisions.

It seems like your argument goes something like this:
1. If animals are innocent and feel pain, it is wrong to cause pain to them.
2. Animals are innocent and feel pain.
3. It is wrong to cause pain to animals.
4. If God exists, He created a world which causes pain to animals.
5. If God exists, He did something that is wrong.
6. If God did something that is wrong, then He is not omnibenevolent.
7. Either God is not omnibenevolent or He did not create a world which causes pain to animals.
8. Therefore, either God is not omnibenevolent or God does not exist.

I would object to premise 3 though. While I don’t think that one should go around torturing animals, causing pain could mean either directly or indirectly causing pain. I think that if we are to attribute the pain of animals to God, He at most only indirectly caused them pain. I don’t think one should be held morally accountable for being an indirect cause of something though. It’s like when we give someone money as a gift. They are free to use the money as they please. If they buy something that causes them pain or causes someone else pain, we should not be held morally accountable for that.

To use the Christian God as an example of how God can be omnibenevolent despite us living in a world with pain and suffering, if God created the world, He supposedly created a perfect world without any pain or suffering. A part of a perfect life is having free will. Humans then used that free will and brought pain and suffering into the world. God should not be held morally accountable for the pain that is caused to each animal then since He is not the one directly causing it. Supposedly, human beings knew that there would be consequences to their actions, and those consequences were allowing pain and suffering in the world. He had to have consequences because God is supposed to also be just, and I think being just can also fall under being omnibenevolent. You might wonder why the rest of us have to suffer if we were not the ones who brought pain and suffering into the world, but I think we all would’ve brought the consequences upon ourselves.

Premise 4 does seem like the most objectionable premise. I have something to add on to the objection you had mentioned though. It depends on what you mean by “being in a world that consists more of what one does not will.” I’m assuming that you mean that creatures were brought into this world against their will and being in this world entails experiencing additional events that are against their will. In that case, I think that it’s true that being in this world entails experiencing additional events that are against one’s will, but I think these events are because of each person’s free will.

I think the situations that people end up are a combination of the consequences of our own actions, whether these consequences were our aim or not, and the consequences of other people’s actions. Sometimes we end up in undesirable situations, but it is a consequence of free will. Having free will also seems preferable to not having free will and living in a world where everyone has free will seems preferable to living in a world where not everyone has free will. One could still say that God should not have brought us into existence at all, but God could have His own benevolent reasons for bringing us into existence that we may not understand.

A supreme being who is benevolent, all-power and all-knowing is a sacred concept that anyone should truly want to be true. Though if this is the case, then perhaps one should not desire that God exists then since the world with all its evils and horrors would be a dishonor to such a perfect being. It is out of reverence for the concept of God that one should rightly reject God’s existence. — Jjnan1

I think here you meant that it is out of reverence for the concept of God that one should not want God to exist. I don’t think that would lead to rejecting that God does exist. I don’t think we should not want God to exist based on that though. I think this means we should want God to exist because if God does exist, there would be a foreseeable end to all the evils and horrors. If God didn’t exist, our lives would be pretty meaningless. Everything we would all be working towards would ultimately be for nothing. Life would seem to consist of just trying to survive or wondering why we should even want to survive. Then, bringing children into the world would also seem like a morally bad thing to do if living in the world is so terrible. Do you believe that parents are undesirable? I️ think there is a significant amount of good in the world though and that we should want God to exist because without Him, life seems pretty pointless.

Furthermore, if He does exist, that means we should try to limit the evils and horrors of the world to the best of our ability in an attempt to honor Him, not that we should not want Him to exist because the world would dishonor Him. I think of it like a parent and child. I think if God exists, He just wants us to try our best, and that honors Him. Children inevitably do things that could dishonor their parents and what these parents wanted their children to be like, but parents usually just want to see their children trying their best.

we derive contradictory results from a premise, which further proves that the property of “omnipotent” does not exist. — xinye

It seems to me like one of your main arguments has the following form:
1. If the property of omnipotence contradicts itself, then the property of omnipotence does not exist.
2. The property of omnipotence contradicts itself.
3. The property of omnipotence does not exist. [1, 2 Modus Ponens]

While I agree with you on premise 1, I would object to premise 2. I believe that if a being did have the property of omnipotence, then this being would be able to make a rock of maximal size or weight. The being could then also carry any rock of maximal size or weight. In this case, the being wouldn’t be lacking power in any way.

You might think that this just means that the being should be able to make a rock larger or heavier than a rock of maximal size or weight since you mentioned the following:

Premise: God is omnipotent.
1)Is there such a thing as “a rock that God cannot lift”? (it either exists or it doesn't exist)
If there is no such rock, then -> god cannot create a rock that he cannot lift (because such rock does not exist) -> god is not omnipotent (because he cannot create the rock) -> which contradicts the original Premise — xinye

However, the claim that the rock doesn’t exist would not entail that God is not omnipotent. I think the rock doesn’t exist because it cannot exist, and I don’t think it’s required of omnipotence to be able to make things that cannot exist. This would be like saying an omnipotent being needs to be able to make a square circle, which is logically impossible. Being omnipotent seems to only require having maximal power, which would only require the ability to make what is logically possible. The rock in question again would not be logically possible because if a being were omnipotent, he could make anything of maximal size and weight but the being will always be able to lift anything as well.

You also made another claim that

the omnipotent paradox isn’t going to disprove God’s omnipotence because it is built on something that's contradict itself — xinye

You said this is because the cases presented all contradict the premise that God is omnipotent. That is the point of the paradox though. If the paradox worked, we would have to choose between God not being powerful enough to make a certain rock or God not being powerful enough to lift a certain rock. Either one was supposed to lead to the conclusion that God is not omnipotent so if they were able to show that God is not omnipotent, the paradox would be successful in disproving God’s omnipotence.

The paradox doesn’t disprove God’s omnipotence, not because of it contradicting itself, but because it is possible to accept that God cannot make the rock because the rock is something that cannot possibly exist.