the senses don’t think. — Mww

That's why I specified the senses as being the second part to perception. The senses don't think and cognition doesn't sense. But perception involves both the senses and cognition. Take the duck-rabbit. Whether you see a duck or a rabbit involves more than just the raw sense data; it involves rational interpretation of that sense data.

That being the case, the meaningful sense in which we can say perception of distant objects is direct, is given from the fact the purely physiological operational status of sensory apparatuses is not effected by the relative distances of their objects. For your eyes the moon is no less directly perceived than the painting hanging on the wall right in front of you. — Mww

Simply saying that they're direct isn't explaining what it means to be direct. I offered the definitions from the SEP article above. The known mechanics of perception make clear that objects outside the body and their properties are not present in conscious experience (which does not extend beyond the body), and so in no meaningful sense are "directly presented".

Maybe you misunderstood what I meant by "distant". I just meant "situated outside the body".

If we draw enough meaningful correlations between green things and other stuff, we can become conscious of green things. That's not the same as being conscious of seeing green things. The apple is green. We can become conscious of green things before we know it. Being conscious of seeing the colour green is knowing how to group things by color and being aware of doing it. Being conscious of a big green monster does not require being conscious of seeing a green monster.

Seeing the color green as "green" is what we do after talking about it. — creativesoul

To repeat an earlier comment:

For the Rays, to speak properly, have no Colour. In them there is nothing else than a certain power and disposition to stir up a sensation of this Colour or that. — Isaac Newton

This is what physics, neurology, and psychology recognise.

The post hoc naming of certain wavelengths (or reflective surfaces) using the name of the sensation ordinarily caused by such wavelengths seems to be leading you and others to equivocate.

The sensation is distinct from and different to the stimulus, even if we often use the same word to refer to both.

The sensory information that an organism receives from its environment is a perception. You are basically saying that our perceptions are direct. — Luke

There are (at least) two parts to perception; sensation and cognition. The sensation is the body's response to stimulation (e.g. photons interacting with the eyes or chemicals interacting with the tongue). The cognition is the brain's intellectual processing of that sensation.

Given these facts about the mechanics of perception, in what sense is perception of some distant object "direct"?

The SEP article on the problem of perception offers these definitions:

Direct Realist Presentation: perceptual experiences are direct perceptual presentations of ordinary objects.

...

Direct Realist Character: the phenomenal character of experience is determined, at least partly, by the direct presentation of ordinary objects.

What does "direct presentation" mean if not literal presence? Given the actual mechanics of perception, conscious experience does not extend beyond the brain/body, and so distant objects and their properties are not present in conscious experience, and so in no meaningful sense does conscious experience involve the "direct presentation" of those distant objects or their properties.

The IEP article on objects of perception offers this account:

There are, however, two versions of direct realism: naïve direct realism and scientific direct realism. They differ in the properties they claim the objects of perception possess when they are not being perceived. Naïve realism claims that such objects continue to have all the properties that we usually perceive them to have, properties such as yellowness, warmth, and mass. Scientific realism, however, claims that some of the properties an object is perceived as having are dependent on the perceiver, and that unperceived objects should not be conceived as retaining them.

...

Scientific direct realism is often discussed in terms of Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities. The Primary qualities of an object are those whose existence is independent of the existence of a perceiver. Locke’s inventory of primary qualities included shape, size, position, number, motion-or-rest and solidity, and science claims to be completing this inventory by positing such properties as charge, spin and mass. The secondary qualities of objects, however, are those properties that do depend on the existence of a perceiver.

Physics, neurology, and psychology have refuted naive direct realism. Secondary qualities like colour and taste are the body's response to certain kinds of stimulation; they are not properties of the stimuli.

The scientific direct realist may be right in the sense that primary qualities are properties of the stimuli, but given the mechanics of perception it is clear that any primary qualities in conscious experience are only of the same type, not also of the same token. As has been mentioned above, conscious experience does not extend beyond the brain/body, and so distant objects and their properties are not present in conscious experience. Anything like "sense-data"/"qualia" that explains secondary qualities also explains primary qualities, albeit any primary quality sense-data can be considered an accurate representation of the stimuli's properties.

So, again, in what meaningful sense can we still say that perception of distant objects is "direct"? I think, as Robinson argues, many so-called "direct" realists here have retreated from the debate regarding the mechanics of perception to an unrelated and irrelevant argument about grammar, which has no bearing on the substance of indirect realism or on the epistemological problem of perception.

Secondary qualities are the result of interactions between the body and the objects that display them. For example, of course colour considered as a visual phenomenon, cannot manifest as such except as seen. I see no puzzle in that. — Janus

The entirety of vision and other senses is the result of interactions between the body and the forces (e.g. light and sound and chemicals in the air) that stimulate its sense receptors, and it is that sensory result that is processed by our intellect and with which we infer the existence and nature of objects at a distance to our body. The distant objects quite clearly aren’t present in sensory experience given that sensory experience doesn’t extend beyond the body.

How anyone can either reject this or think it anything other than indirect realism is what puzzles me.

The argument has nothing to do with the status of so-called 'secondary qualities' or particle physics and you seem to be conflating naive realism with direct realism, so I am a loss as to how to respond. — Janus

Once you accept that “secondary qualities” are not mind-independent properties of external world objects then you have to ask what are secondary qualities? Perhaps something like sense data/qualia? But once you accept that parts of vision are just sense data, and once you understand how vision works, it should be obvious that all of vision (and other modes of sensory experience) is sense data, even if the “primary qualities” in sense data are a mostly accurate representation of the mind-independent properties of external world objects. That’s indirect realism.

And even with “primary qualities” it isn’t so clear cut, e.g with the example here.

But on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, what are the primary qualities with respect to hearing, tasting, smelling, and feeling?

For the Rays, to speak properly, have no Colour. In them there is nothing else than a certain power and disposition to stir up a sensation of this Colour or that. — Isaac Newton

This is what physics, neurology, and psychology recognise.

The post hoc naming of certain wavelengths (or reflective surfaces) using the name of the sensation ordinarily caused by such wavelengths is leading you and others to equivocate.

The sensation is distinct from and different to the stimulus. This is easier to understand with other senses such as smell and taste and is why I think the almost exclusive focus on sight is unproductive.

We’ve looked in all the objects involved and have found no thing nor substance worthy of the noun-phrase. So perhaps it’s all a fiction after all.

In any case, it cannot be shown that there is any such intermediary standing between the perceiver and the perceived, there simply is no evidence to support any dualism of any kind. — NOS4A2

Consciousness doesn’t extend beyond the body, so objects outside the body are not present in my consciousness, and those objects’ properties are not present in appearances.

That suffices as indirect realism for me.

But what is “sensory experience”? — NOS4A2

That is still an open question. Perhaps property dualism is correct and sensory experience, and consciousness in general, is a non-physical phenomenon that supervenes on brain activity.

At the very least we have to accept that sensory terms like colour and taste do not refer exclusively to the surface properties of things like apples, and to take care not to conflate these uses.

70% of the time, sure. 30% of the time, not so much. — NOS4A2

But notice that nothing about phenylthiocarbamide has changed. Its existence and its properties are 'fixed'. So how can it be that a chemical with a fixed existence and fixed properties is sometimes bitter and sometimes not?

It must be that "is bitter" doesn't refer to phenylthiocarbamide at all. It's a pragmatic fiction; a naive projection of our sensations. It is just the case that when phenylthiocarbamide stimulates the sense receptors in some people's tongues, a bitter experience is elicited.

Do bitter representations or sense-data have phenylthiocarbamide in them? — NOS4A2

No, precisely because "this is bitter" doesn't (always) mean "this contains phenylthiocarbamide", much like "this is green" doesn't (always) mean "this emits photons with a wavelength of 500nm".

There is a meaningful sense in which terms like "bitter" and "green" don't refer to any property of some external stimulus. I would say that first and foremost they refer to the quality of the conscious experience, and that we might then also use them to refer to the ordinary cause of that quality of experience.

Would you say an object that appears green is not green? — NOS4A2

That depends on whether or not "is green" and "appears green" mean the same thing.

If they mean the same thing then it's a truism that an object that appears green is green, but then to say that an object is green is just to say that an object appears green, and so says nothing that conflicts with indirect realism.

If they mean different things then it depends on what "green" means. An object is a collection of atoms with a surface of electrons that absorb and emit photons of various wavelengths. Does the word "green" refer to something here? If it doesn't then an object isn't green.

If it does refer to something here, then what does it refer to? Perhaps "green" means "emits photons with a wavelength between 500 and 600nm". But then what do we mean when we say that an object is green but appears blue? Does it mean that the object emits photons with a wavelength between 500 and 600nm but appears to emit photons with a wavelength between 450 and 495nm? I don't think so.

I think colour terms like "green" and "blue" and "red" ordinarily refer to something else when we are talking about how a thing appears. The "green" in "is green" means something different to the "green" in "appears green". They share the same word because of the consistency with which the former is causally responsible for the latter. This has unfortunately led some to equivocate.

This is why I prefer to talk about things other than sight, because there's less room to equivocate because there's more variety in how we respond to the same stimulation. For example, there's phenylthiocarbamide, a chemical that tastes bitter to 70% of people but is tasteless to everyone else.

We might say that food tastes bitter because it contains phenylthiocarbamide, and so "this is bitter" means "this contains phenylthiocarbamide", but then the 30% of people who find phenylthiocarbamide tasteless will agree that it contains phenylthiocarbamide but disagree that it's bitter.

So is food that contains phenylthiocarbamide bitter?

What does "is bitter" mean? What does "tastes bitter" mean? What does "bitter" mean?

Well sure, one implies a little more certainty than the other. A little more examination ought to suffice and relieve any doubts. What is it about the object that says otherwise? — NOS4A2

Sorry, I'm a bit confused now as my comment originally misunderstood your answer but your response now suggests that I understood it correctly? Were you saying that they mean the same thing or that they mean different things?

I don’t think so. — NOS4A2

Then "this object is green but looks green" isn't a contradiction, and so "this objects looks green therefore it is green" is a non sequitur, and so "we know that the object is green because it looks green" is false.

Sorry, misread my own question.

If "this object is green" and "this object looks green" mean the same thing then "we know that the object is green because it looks green" means the same thing as "we know that the object looks green because it looks green" which says nothing to address the arguments made by either direct or indirect realism.

We know the object is green because we because that’s what it looks like. — NOS4A2

Do these mean different things?

1. The object is green
2. The object looks green

There's more than swarms atoms in fundamental physics, such as the forces that bind atoms together so that they necessarily form what we in our scale see as cars etc — jkop

Yes, but that "what we in our scale see as cars" depends on us (and our sense organs) and is an essential component. The notion that a car is reducible to atoms and the forces that bind them together is a false one, but is unavoidable if you try to remove humans from the equation.

I think the article I referenced here addressed something like this, although I don't have access to it at the moment to confirm.

Carrying on from this, the argument is something like:

If ordinary macroscopic objects are fully mind-independent then ontological reductionism is correct.
Ontological reductionism is incorrect.
Therefore, ordinary macroscopic objects are not fully mind-independent.

As an example, "I drive a car" is true but "a collection of atoms drives a collection of atoms" is false. Therefore, I am and/or the car is not reducible to just being a collection of atoms. But there's no way to draw a mind-independent distinction between cars and collections of atoms. That distinction is only meaningful in the context of the world as-seen and as-understood and as-talked-about by organisms like us.

Collections of atoms exist independently of us, but that this collection of atoms is a car is not independent of us.

(B) solves (or appears to solve) a number of philosophical problems, which is why it shows up perennially. — frank

And introduces new (bigger?) problems, like why did the conveyor belt come back with six dots rather than three? And why/how do things cease to exist when we turn around and come back into existence when we turn back?

Ordinary language is tied to a frame of reference where the direction of the center of gravity of the Earth plays an important role. So it's not really a problem to translate, "Banno (in Oz) reached down to catch the cup falling off the table." to a frame of reference suitable for an accurate understanding of what happened. — wonderer1

In my scenario here, both groups use the same word to refer to the direction of the Earth's gravitational centre.

But what one group sees when standing on their feet is what the other group sees when standing on their head, and vice versa.

It's not the case that one of the groups is seeing things the "right way up" and the other isn't, because there is no "right way up". There's just the way each group ordinarily sees things given their physiology.

The point is: fundamentally, there's no difference. — frank

I don't understand this. There is a difference between something continuing to exist and something ceasing to exist and then coming back into existence.

But say a community finds (B) to be more parsimonious. They would advise you to accept (B) unless there's actual evidence to the contrary. — frank

Presumably one of us is wrong. Either (A) is more parsimonious or (B) is more parsimonious. I'm not sure that logic is relative.

Think of two scenarios:

A. Contemporary science starts with the assumption that each person is a body responding to stimulation (and simultaneously altering the environment). The image is similar to a computer arrayed with analog to digital converters. The question scientists grapple with is how the computer is creating a seamless experience out of the flood of data.

B. Now compare this to Berkeley's view: the "stuff" isn't even out there until we turn our gazes upon it.

What draws one to accept A over B? — frank

Say we have a conveyor belt, and situated in the middle is a device that prints a dot on the conveyor belt at regular intervals. We watch it print three dots and then turn around. We wait a few seconds and turn back. We now see six dots.

According to (A), the conveyor continued to exist and the device continued to print dots at regular intervals.

According to (B), the conveyor belt and the device ceased to exist and then reappeared, albeit the conveyor belt now has six dots rather than three.

I would say that (A) is the more parsimonious explanation and so should be favoured, unless there's actual evidence to the contrary.

Wouldn't they "flip" the image in the way your paper describes, seeing the world right way up? — Banno

There is no "right way up". There's just the way things seem to you and seem to me, determined entirely by how our bodies respond to stimulation.

For there to be a "right way up" would seem to require something like absolute space and/or a preferred frame which I believe is at odds with modern scientific theory.

Here's a relevant paper I've referenced before.

The most common form of direct realism is Phenomenological Direct Realism (PDR). PDR is the theory that direct realism consists in unmediated awareness of the external object in the form of unmediated awareness of its relevant properties. I contrast this with Semantic Direct Realism (SDR), the theory that perceptual experience puts you in direct cognitive contact with external objects but does so without the unmediated awareness of the objects’ intrinsic properties invoked by PDR. PDR is what most understand by direct realism. My argument is that, under pressure from the arguments from illusion and hallucination, defenders of intentionalist theories, and even of relational theories, in fact retreat to SDR. I also argue briefly that the sense-datum theory is compatible with SDR and so nothing is gained by adopting either of the more fashionable theories.

It's "distorted" in the sense that objects appear to be coloured (in the sense argued by primitivist realists like Keith Allen), even though they aren't, as our science shows. Objects are just a collection of atoms that emit and absorb electromagnetic radiation of certain wavelengths, and certain organisms like us experience the colour red when the relevant sense receptors are stimulated by electromagnetic radiation of ~700nm.

Have you noticed how little of the SEP article on the problem of perception has to do with either direct/indirect realism, or with the science? — Banno

It defines terms like:

Direct Realist Presentation: perceptual experiences are direct perceptual presentations of ordinary objects.

...

Direct Realist Character: the phenomenal character of experience is determined, at least partly, by the direct presentation of ordinary objects.

And the science shows that this isn't the case. Consciousness doesn't extend beyond the brain, so conscious experience doesn't extend beyond the brain, so objects beyond the brain are not present (and so are not "directly presented") in conscious experience at all.

Conscious experience is just a response to the body being stimulated by some external force like light, sound, or chemicals in the air. Our projection of this conscious experience and its qualities (such as colour) out into the world is simply a pragmatic fiction.

The indirect realist almost has to invent the direct realist in order to get this debate going. — Banno

It's what direct realism always was, e.g. going back to Aristotle. Direct realists believed in things like A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour/primitivism, whereas indirect realists believed that colour is a mental phenomenon (which may be reducible to brain states).

Now that the science shows that the indirect realists are right, it seems that direct realists have retreated to a completely different position, consistent with indirect realism, but insist on calling themselves direct realists anyway.

while the direct realist is agreeing as to the science but pointing out the grammar. — Banno

Pointing out the grammar doesn't address the epistemological problem of perception, which is the problem that direct and indirect realists are trying to resolve. You seem to have just co-opted the label "direct realism" to describe something else entirely.

The very notion that perception, globally speaking, distorts reality is incoherent anyway, since it is only via perception that we get any notion of reality. Any supposed reality beyond the possibility of our perceiving it is, since unknowable, completely useless as a point of comparison. — Janus

As I said in my previous comment, you're reading too much into the phrase "distorts reality". That we naively assume that colours and smells and tastes are properties of things like lemons rather than just mental/bodily responses to stimulation isn't that the Standard Model and neuroscience cannot be trusted.

The science shows us that objects are constituted of atoms, that the surface atoms absorb and emit electromagnetic radiation of particular wavelengths, that this electromagnetic radiation stimulates the sense receptors in our eyes, that our eyes send signals to our brains, and that our brains then produce the conscious experience of colour. The science also shows us that in most humans in most lighting conditions, electromagnetic radiation with a wavelength of ~700nm is responsible for the experience of the colour red, but that differences in eye or brain structure can entail the experience of a different colour.

With respect to the epistemological problem of perception that gave rise to the distinction between direct and indirect realism, this is indirect realism.

Direct realism would entail something like A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour, which claims that "colours are mind-independent properties of things in the environment that are distinct from properties identified by the physical sciences" or like primitivism, which claims that "there are in nature colors, as ordinarily understood, i.e., colors are simple intrinsic, non-relational, non-reducible, qualitative properties. They are qualitative features of the sort that stand in the characteristic relations of similarity and difference that mark the colors; they are not micro-structural properties or reflectances, or anything of the sort."

These direct realists views have been refuted by the science of perception (and of the wider world).

One can imagine your creature's physiologist making the "discovery" that half the population sees things upside down, and their philosophers explaining carefully that no, they don't. — Banno

The philosopher would be wrong. The scientist knows best. They're the ones actually studying how the world and perception works.

Not so much. If the smell is only a thing constructed by the mind, then there is no reasons that lemons might not on occasion smell like mint. — Banno

The reason is that physics is mostly deterministic. The same stimulus is going to elicit the same response in the same organism. When taste receptors in the tongue interact with sugar then the same kind of electrical signal is sent to the brain which then processes it in the same sort of way, with the same mental phenomenon occurring as a result.

And if something in the tongue or the brain changes then the mental phenomenon will change.

And if your tongue or your brain is different to mine in the relevant way, then the mental phenomenon you experience when eating lemons will always be different to the mental phenomenon I experience when eating lemons. A lemon's taste to you would always be different to a lemon's taste to me.

See, for example, this:

A 2011 study by Cornwall College found that sprouts contain a chemical, similar to phenylthiocarbamide, which only tastes bitter to people who have a variation of a certain gene. The research found that around 50 per cent of the world’s population have a mutation on this gene. The lucky half don’t taste the bitterness usually associated with sprouts, and therefore like them a whole lot more than everyone else.

Again, no; the "object of their rational consideration" is the snake and the competing males. — Banno

Well, no. They both see the same thing - the world. They both see the snake coming to have one of them for dinner. They both see the competing males. — Banno

And when we both watch Biden's inauguration on TV (and in different rooms), we're both seeing the same thing; Biden's inauguration. And Biden's inauguration is indeed an object of our rational consideration.

But it's still indirect. The TV is an intermediary/more immediate. And then appearances a further intermediary and even more immediate.

Again, that lemons smell like lemons, and not like (say) mint. — Banno

That lemons smell like lemons is a vacuous claim that has no bearing on the arguments made by direct and indirect realists.

As Austin showed, the framing of the argument in those terms is muddled. — Banno

Then you're welcome to present Austin's arguments. I don't see how saying irrelevant things like "lemons smell like lemons" is helpful at all.

In fact, they see the world the same. — Richard B

They don't. Relative to each other, they see things upside down.

Imagine an organism with a peculiar sex difference; the males' eyes and the females' eyes are, relative to the other, upside down such that what the males see when standing is what the females see when hanging upside down, and vice versa.

The way the males see the world is very different to the way the females see the world (with respect to its orientation).

Imagine also that this organism is intelligent with a language. Both males and females use the same word to describe the direction of the ground and the same word to describe the direction of the sky.

And we can add to this by imagining differences in size (e.g. that one of the sexes has a magnified vision relative to the other) and colour (not to mention smell and taste).

The way they navigate and talk about the world is the same, and yet the way they see (and smell and taste) the world is very different. The appearance of the world is a mental phenomenon, and it is the appearance of the world that is the immediate object of their rational consideration.

This, to me, is closer to indirect than direct realism with respect to the epistemological problem of perception.

It is kind of annoying that you cannot italicize on mobile. There is room for a tweet icon, but not italics? — hypericin

You can if you turn your mobile to landscape.

As a conclusion based on the assumption that perception enables an undistorted picture, namely the scientific understanding of perception, it is a contradiction of the grounding assumption, and therefore self-refuting. — Janus

One of these must be true:

1. The science of perception is correct and suggests that perception distorts reality
2. The science of perception is correct and suggests that perception does not distort reality
3. The science of perception is incorrect and suggests that perception distorts reality
4. The science of perception is incorrect and suggests that perception does not distort reality

The science of perception suggests that perception distorts reality. So either (1) or (3) is true. So either perception distorts reality or the science of perception is incorrect.

But if perception does not distort reality then the science of perception would be correct. So if the science of perception is incorrect then perception distorts reality.

The above is a simple application of the law of excluded middle and of modus tollens, and without assuming anything about the reliability or perception, and so there's no contradiction.

The only contradiction is to argue that perception does not distort reality even though the science of perception suggests that it does.

Your only recourse is to argue that (2) is true, but then that would be to deny the existence of the actual empirical evidence.

Also, you're reading too much into "distorts reality". That we naively assume that colours and smells and tastes are properties of things like lemons rather than just mental/bodily responses to stimulation isn't that the Standard Model and neuroscience cannot be trusted.

Well, you might excuse me since it remains unclear to me what it is you are claiming. It seems to be something like that, since lemons sometimes smell lemony, therefore that is how they smell when nothing has a nose. — Banno

No, I'm making it explicit what "lemons smell like lemons" means, and explaining that this does not address the arguments made by either direct or indirect realists.

I'm also still trying to understand what you mean by saying that we smell things as they are. What does the "as they are" add to the claim that we smell things? Unless you're trying to argue that things like lemons have a smell even if nothing has a nose then it seems like a meaningless addition.

it means the effect already lies in the cause — LFranc

What does this even mean?

But overwhelmingly, lemons smell like lemons.

Seems some folk are perplexed by this. — Banno

Nobody is perplexed by this. It’s the vacuous claim that lemons cause me to experience what lemons cause me to experience.

It has no bearing on anything said by either direct or indirect realists.

How dod you get to that? — Banno

You said that we smell things as they are, which under any reasonable reading is to say that smells are properties of those objects that we are then able to detect.

The existence of organisms with noses has nothing to do with the properties of a lemon, and so if lemons have some property of smell then they have that property of smell even if no organisms have noses.

But lemons don't have smell properties of this kind. It is simply the case that lemons produce chemicals that cause humans (with functioning noses) to have a certain kind of olfactory experience (and likely cause non-human organisms to have a different kind of olfactory experience).

I haven't said the scientific understanding of perception is incorrect. I've said that if the assumption is that perception as such distorts reality then the scientific understanding of perception, which is itself based on perception, cannot be trusted. To trust it and base arguments on it, would on that assumption, be a performative contradiction. — Janus

If perception does not distort reality then the empirical evidence would show us that perception does not distort reality. The empirical evidence does not show us that perception does not distort reality. Therefore, perception distorts reality.

There's no performative contradiction in applying modus tollens.

I've said that if the assumption is that perception as such distorts reality then the scientific understanding of perception, which is itself based on perception, cannot be trusted.

That perception distorts reality isn't the assumption but the conclusion. We don’t start as indirect realists but as scientists and then accept what the empirical evidence tells us about how perception actually works. And that is that colours and tastes and smells are not properties of lemons but are a response to a lemon’s properties. The naive view that projects colours and tastes and smells onto lemons is mistaken.

In the context of this debate, there is no such thing as a direct experience of an external world object, since all such experiences are mediated by phenomenal experience. — hypericin

Direct realists recognize the difference between phenomenal experience and external world objects. So why do they still claim that perception of external world objects is direct?

In an every day context yes, but not in the context of this debate. — hypericin

In the context of this debate, what is required for an experience to be direct? In the context of this debate, is direct experience of an external world object only possible if that external world object is in physical contact with my brain/experience?