I said we should not trust men to be around kids as much as we trust women. — RogueAI

You didn't just say that. You also said:

Also, the fact that he's 50 makes me suspect he's perving on them. — RogueAI

I'm a teacher and I'm always a little suspicious of male teachers in elementary school settings (and the priesthood). I think the reasons are obvious. I would not let a man or teenage boy babysit my daughter. I am equally suspicious of gay and straight men. — RogueAI

No, but we're about nine times more likely to sexually abuse children. — RogueAI

That biological men are nine times more likely than biological women to sexually abuse children isn't that biological men are likely to sexually abuse children.

Until that changes, men should not be trusted to be around kids as much as women. — RogueAI

Even if they shouldn't be trusted as much it doesn't then follow that they shouldn't be trusted.

I'm much more likely to die in a car crash than being eaten by shark, but I'm not going to assume that I'm going to die in a car crash. In fact, I'm very unlikely to die in a car crash.

It seems a bit of a strange and abstracted formulation to me but I am only looking at the paragraph. — Tom Storm

With my post above in mind, consider a slightly more realistic scenario: I knowingly have COVID, but nonetheless attend a party. Someone else catches COVID from me. I fully recover but they are soon to die. They can be saved with a partial lung transplant but none will be available in time. Am I morally obligated to donate a part of my lung to save their life?

My question is is this a valid analogy for the moral permissibility of abortion? — Captain Homicide

I'm not sure it's specifically meant as an analogy, but as a reductio ad absurdum against the premise that one person is obligated to save the life of another.

Of course, @Tzeentch raises the point that (at least when sex is consensual), the mother bares some responsibility for the situation in which abortion is considered, and so perhaps a better example would be to ask if Henry Fonda would be obligated to touch her brow if her illness was caused by Henry Fonda himself (even if unintentionally). But then we have to ask; what if he must do more than just touch her brow? What if he must donate a kidney to save her life? Is that too much? Does his obligation to help her only extend so far?

Although as for abortion, the very premise that the foetus has a right to life can also be questioned, and so even if Henry Fonda is obligated to touch her brow to save her life, it wouldn't then follow that abortion is morally impermissible, especially as bearing a child for 9 months and giving birth to it is a much greater burden than just touching someone's brow.

Biological men, however, cannot be trusted around kids to the same degree. — RogueAI

So just sexism. Biological men must be assumed to be child-molesting paedophiles. :roll:

Also, the fact that he's 50 makes me suspect he's perving on them. — RogueAI

So you're a transphobe, got it.

Would you assume that a 50 year old gay man using the men's changing room is perving on any 13 year old boys who also happen to be changing? Or a 50 year old lesbian in the women's changing room?

You think a 50 year old biological male should be sharing a changing room with teenage girls? You don't see any problem with that? What if the girls are 13? 8? — RogueAI

Is your concern their age or that they're transgender? Would you mind if it were a 50 year old cisgender woman, or a 16 year old transgender woman?

Amadeus has a good point about motive. Biological men are much more likely to have nefarious motives than biological women. — RogueAI

That biological men are more likely to have nefarious motives than biological women isn't that there is a good reason to believe that a transfemme swimmer has nefarious motives for competing in women's swimming competitions.

AmadeusD doesn't have a good point, it's simply transphobia. Much like it would be homophobia to suggest that a gay swimmer has nefarious reasons for competing in a men's swimming competition for anyone over the age of 16.

I'm unsure this makes it any better... The idea that 50 year old male is given unfettered (in context) access to vulnerable young females undressing and competing is — AmadeusD

Is your concern her age, that she's trans, that she's competing, or that she uses the women's changing room?

Regarding the competition, it is an open age category. Anyone over the age of 16 could compete. There is never a maximum age for these things. In fact, in terms of competitiveness, it is better for the other participants that she is 50 rather than say 18, as a 50 year old is much less fit.

Regarding the changing room, would you care if it was a 50 year old cisgender woman, or an 18 year old transgender woman?

you've got to question motive. — AmadeusD

She wants to compete in swimming competitions, like everyone else competing.

Your apparent suggestion that transgender people have some nefarious motives for being transgender is straight up transphobia.

I am only in this thread like ... for ... moral objectivity. But if there is something called moral realism that is different for glossy technical reasons, I am trying to understand so that I can either agree or disagree there. — Chet Hawkins

It's useful to separate a moral theory out into its constituent parts. There are, roughly speaking, three considerations when discussing meta ethics:

1. Are moral propositions truth-apt?
2. If moral propositions are truth-apt then are any true?
3. If there are true moral propositions then are they objectively true?

We can set out these three considerations as affirmative claims that are then either accepted or rejected:

a) Moral propositions are truth-apt
b) Some moral propositions are true
c) Some moral propositions are objectively true.

(c) entails (b) entails (a).

If you reject (a) then you are a moral non-cognitivist. If you reject (b) then you are an error theorist. If you reject (c) then you are a non-objectivist.

Some say that you must accept (c) to be a realist, others say that you need only accept (b) to be a realist, and that to accept (c) is to be a "robust" realist.

Although I wouldn't get too caught up in labels, they're just pragmatic tools with no real philosophical significance. What matters is whether or not (a), (b), and (c) are true.

I mean, I agree. — Chet Hawkins

If some moral propositions are objectively true then:

a) moral propositions are truth-apt and b) some moral propositions are true.

Suggestion: let's vote against him — Relativist

Would that I could.

To my understanding, the subset issue was because you could have a set of all sets that are members of themselves. Since you could have this you should also have been able to have a set of all sets that are not members of themselves — Philosopher19

I don't see how that follows.

Wanting to have a set of all sets that are not members of themselves that is itself not a member of itself is a contradictory thing to want. — Philosopher19

That's exactly what Russell was proving.

• that the J6 conspiracy trial will have concluded before the election, but even if it is - pending appeals will keep him out of prison. If he's elected, he'll pardon himself and put an end to that. — Relativist

He can't do that for the Georgia case.

The Russell set is the set of all sets that are not members of themselves.

Yeh, it's good that we're invitation-only. — Jamal

Thanks, Marco.

Self-Sacrifice and the Trolley Problem, Ezio Di Nucci

Does the 1st amendment extend to this philosophy forum? — alan1000

This is the First Amendment:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Given that this philosophy forum isn't the United States Congress, the answer is no.

Also, as per the Terms of Service:

Except to the extent applicable law, if any, provides otherwise, this Agreement, any access to or use of the Website will be governed by the laws of the state of England and Wales.

in Canada a 50-year-old man really is being allowed to compete in swimming competitions alongside 13- and 14-year-old girls. — RogueAI

It's hard for me to believe this is true, but it sounds like it might be. — RogueAI

What is true is that a 50 year old transgender woman was allowed to compete in the women’s events for athletes 16 and older.

Morality is objective. — Chet Hawkins

What does this mean if not "some moral propositions are objectively true"?

The golden rule? Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.

I am absolutist in that regard. — NOS4A2

Well, Trump isn't, so they're just applying the golden rule.

Given that I haven't said what you've accused me of saying, your questions are misplaced.

Well in that case you are claiming that 'good' involves flourishing, but that flourishing does not exhaust goodness. — Leontiskos

Nowhere in saying "some people use the word 'good' to describe chastity" am I saying anything about flourishing.

You seem to be saying the very strange thing, "Well I agree that we use the word 'good' to describe that which conduces to flourishing, but I don't see why the word 'good' means that which conduces to flourishing." This would not be a legitimate objection. — Leontiskos

It's not a strange thing. Some people use the word "good" to describe chastity. It doesn't follow that "good" means "chaste".

You seem to be saying the very strange thing, "Well I agree that we use the word 'good' to mean that which conduces to flourishing — Leontiskos

I don't agree with that.

There's a difference between using a word to mean something and using a word to describe something. The latter does not entail the former, which is where Bob Ross' argument falters. He argues that because we use the word "good" to describe acts which are conducive to flourishing then "good" means "conducive to flourishing". That just doesn't follow.

It is different to say, "Good is different from أخلاقي," and to say, "Arabians have no conception of good." That is the first problem. — Leontiskos

That's why I said if there's no Arabic word that means the same thing as 'moral' then they might not have a conception of good.

Do you have a conception of أخلاقي?

These are both false. Do you have a concept of a Ford sedan? On your theory, you could only have a concept of a Ford sedan if you have a word for a Ford sedan. This is plainly false. We don't have a word for a Ford sedan. — Leontiskos

We have the phrase "Ford sedan". I didn't mean to suggest that it requires a single word.

If an Arabian has a concept of flourishing then they very likely have a concept of Bob Ross' "good." It doesn't matter at all whether that concept is represented by the word أخلاقي. — Leontiskos

If they have a concept of "flourishing", and if this concept is different to their concept of "أخلاقي", and if "good" means "flourishing", then "أخلاقي" and "good" don't mean the same thing.

(1) is also partially true and partially false — Leontiskos

Which is precisely why I said that determining the meaning of the word "good" isn't as simple as just looking at which things we describe as being good. (1) is an oversimplification. Bob Ross' account of the meaning of "good" is insufficient.

Why? Your argument is like saying that if I haven't studied C++ then I can't know what "if" means in Java. When Bob uses the word "good" he is not making a supra-English utterance, at least not in the way you seem to suppose. — Leontiskos

Because this is a contradiction:

1. The meaning of a word is determined by the things it is used to describe
2. The words "moral" and "أخلاقي" mean the same thing
3. The things the word "moral" is used to describe are not the things the word "أخلاقي" is used to describe

One of these must be false. I think (3) being true is uncontroversial, and so we must determine which of (1) and (2) is false.

If (1) is false then Bob Ross' explanation of the meaning of the word "good" fails.

I am not going down that rabbit hole, but note that this is not a matter of words, it is a matter of concepts (as you seem to recognize). — Leontiskos

What's the difference? Do you have a concept of أخلاقي? Perhaps only if "أخلاقي" and "moral" mean the same thing. If they don't mean the same thing, and if there's no other English word that means the same thing as "أخلاقي", then you probably don't have a concept of أخلاقي.

And conversely, if there's no Arabic word that means the same thing as "moral" then Arabic speakers probably don't have a concept of moral.

So if Arabic speakers do have a concept of moral then surely there must be an Arabic word that means the same thing as "moral". Perhaps "أخلاقي". And so premise (2) above is true. Therefore premise (1) above is false, and Bob Ross' argument has failed.

There is no necessary contradiction if "good" does not mean the same thing as "أخلاقي". — Leontiskos

But does it mean the same thing?

If it does mean the same thing then Bob Ross' explanation for how we determine the meaning of the word "good" doesn't work, or at least is insufficient.

If it doesn't mean the same thing then it doesn't make sense to say that Arabic speakers have different moral values, because they don't really have any moral values, given that they don't have a word for or concept of "moral" (much like we don't have a word for or concept of "أخلاقي"). Comparing our moral values to their أخلاقي values is comparing apples to oranges. It certainly wouldn't make sense to say that our moral values are "correct" and that their أخلاقي values are "incorrect", given that what they mean by "أخلاقي" isn't what we mean by "moral".

The only proper response is to offer an alternative definition of good — Leontiskos

You're shifting the burden of proof. If Bob Ross suggests that the meaning of "good" is X then he needs to support this claim. I don't need to offer an alternative.

The meaning of words comes from language users, and is tied up with their intent. This intent is generally communal/linguistic, but it is always a back-and-forth between the community and the individual. — Leontiskos

I address this in my post above, which I rewrote before you replied (because it said that you hadn't been online for 2 hours). I'll say it again:

Bob Ross is saying that we determine the meaning of the word "good" by looking at what sort of things we describe as being good.

The problem with this is that different cultures with different languages describe different things as being good (using their words for "good"), and so if we accept Bob Ross' reasoning then the word for "good" in one language doesn't mean the same thing as the word for "good" in another language.

If this is an unacceptable conclusion then we must reject Bob Ross' reasoning. Something else is required to determine the meaning of the word "good".

In order to understand the meaning of a predication, one must understand the meaning of the words within the predication — Leontiskos

This is the issue I am addressing. We say that something is good, but what does "good" mean?

Bob Ross is saying that we determine the meaning of the word "good" by looking at what sort of things we describe as being good.

The problem with this is that different cultures with different languages describe different things as being good (using their words for "good"), and so if we accept Bob Ross' reasoning then the word for "good" in one language doesn't mean the same thing as the word for "good" in another language.

If this is an unacceptable conclusion then we must reject Bob Ross' reasoning. Something else is required to determine the meaning of the word "good".

The point here is that if two people disagree with respect to a predication, "X is good," then they are either disagreeing about what good is or else they are disagreeing about what X is. — Leontiskos

This is a false dichotomy. Some people claim that chastity is good; others that it isn't. Both groups might agree on what chastity is, and on what it means to be good (e.g. "something we ought support"), but still disagree on whether or not chastity is good.

My comment to Leontiskos here is worth reading.

The crux of this issue is this:

Regardless, we have to distinguish the type of use that establishes the meaning of a word from the type of use that is a fallible act of predication. It's not entirely clear which kind of use is in play when we say that acts which promote flourishing are good.

These are two different kinds of claims:

1. A three-sided shape is a triangle
2. This plastic object is a triangle

Whereas (1) is true by definition, (2) isn't, and so (2) is possibly false. If (2) is false then looking at that plastic object isn't going to help us determine the meaning of the word "triangle".

You seem to be saying that "acts which promote flourishing are good" is similar to claim (1). This needs to be justified. Perhaps it's similar to claim (2).

Ross is saying that acts which promote flourishing are good because that is what 'good' means, and we know what 'good' means by looking at the way the word is used. — Leontiskos

That's a reasonable approach, but as I explained here there might be some issues with his application of it.

To summarise; those who speak another language might use their word for "good" to describe things that English speakers don't describe as being good. If we follow Bob Ross' reasoning then it would seem to follow that their word for "good" isn't in fact their word for "good" because, given how they use it, it must mean something else.

But this does seem problematic. We often say that people of other cultures (with their own language) have different moral values. How can this be unless relevant words share meaning across languages but are used to describe different things?

Perhaps it's more accurate to say that we use the word "good" to describe things that we ought do and the word "bad" to describe things that we ought not do. This is somewhat supported by the etymology of the related word "moral", from the Latin "moralis" meaning "proper behavior of a person in society". Other languages have their own words used the same way. We just disagree on which things we ought and ought not do.

Regardless, we have to distinguish the type of use that establishes the meaning of a word from the type of use that is a fallible act of predication. It's not entirely clear which kind of use is in play when we say that acts which promote flourishing are good.

I'm not a subscriber. I can see the article fine?

Also, Trump struggles to say the word ‘climate’ and reveals he recently took a cognitive test

At a New Hampshire campaign rally, Donald Trump claimed to have “aced” a recent cognitive test and struggled to pronounce the word “climate,” footage from the event shows.

“I don’t know if you saw, but a few months ago, I took a cognitive test my doctor gave me,” Mr Trump told supporters at the Saturday event.

His comments came just after former South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley questioned whether the former president was mentally capable of taking office again after he appeared to repeatedly confuse her with former US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi in a campaign speech on Friday.

“I said, ‘give me a cognitive test, just so we can you know,’ because you know what the standards were, and I aced it,” Mr Trump continued.

Dr Jonathan Reiner, a medical analyst for CNN and professor of medicine and surgery at the George Washington University School of Medicine and Health Sciences, called into question why Mr Trump would need multiple cognitive tests, considering he also took a cognitive test while serving as president.

“Why has Trump had multiple cognitive exams? According to the Cleveland Clinic ‘cognitive tests are usually done if there’s a suspicion of mental decline or impairment,’” Dr Reiner posted on X. “Last night we saw the former president mistake Haley for Pelosi. Has he experienced other symptoms?”

In their post on cognitive testing, the Cleveland Clinic also states, “a good score doesn’t necessarily mean there’s no brain impairment.”

“There still could be brain functioning issues,” their website reads.

At the same event, the former President inexplicably referred to the climate as “clime,” appearing to struggle to pronounce the word correctly.

“They don’t go far,” Mr Trump said, referring to electric vehicles. “But it’s certainly not great for your clime. Your clime. They call it climate.”

In the case of #1, you would be disagreeing that the word ‘good’ should be used to refer to ‘acts which promote flourishing’; and, to that, my response is, briefly, that I think this is historically how the word tends to be used. We say ‘I am doing good’ when our bodies are healthy (i.e., our body parts are acting in harmony and unity to accomplish survival and thriving) and our goals are being fulfilled; and, most universally, we say ‘everything is going good’ when everyone is acting in harmony such that each person is respected and sufficiently sovereign. Likewise, when we say society is ‘doing good’, we usually mean that each part of the society is acting in harmony and unity to achieve the safety and sufficient sovereignty of its citizens. You see the pattern. — Bob Ross

Though this is an interesting take if we consider other languages.

The Arabic word for "moral" is "أخلاقي". But if we take an Arabic-speaking nation like Saudi Arabia, the things they describe as being أخلاقي are in many cases not the things that we describe as being moral. Islamic countries tend to have different values to non-Islamic countries.

If we follow your reasoning then it must be that the English word "moral" isn't a translation of the Arabic word "أخلاقي" as each word is used to describe different things.

So what we mean by "moral" isn't what they mean by "أخلاقي", so there aren't actually any moral disagreements as we're comparing apples and oranges. In fact, the Arabic-speaking people don't make any moral claims at all because they don't use the word "moral". They only make أخلاقي claims.

There certainly does seem something problematic here. I think there's a case to be made that the word "moral" is a translation of the word "أخلاقي" even though the things we describe as being moral are not the things they describe as being أخلاقي. If so then it must be that your approach to understanding the meaning of the word "good" is mistaken.

If the words "moral" and "أخلاقي" mean the same thing, and if the things we describe as being moral are not the things they describe as being أخلاقي, then one or both us are wrong in our claimed "particulars".

So, as I asked before, how do we determine whether or not something which is claimed to be moral really is moral? If we can't do that then we can't look to the things that are claimed to be moral to determine what "moral" means, as we may be looking at things that aren't moral.

In the case of #1, you would be disagreeing that the word ‘good’ should be used to refer to ‘acts which promote flourishing’; and, to that, my response is, briefly, that I think this is historically how the word tends to be used. We say ‘I am doing good’ when our bodies are healthy (i.e., our body parts are acting in harmony and unity to accomplish survival and thriving) and our goals are being fulfilled; and, most universally, we say ‘everything is going good’ when everyone is acting in harmony such that each person is respected and sufficiently sovereign. Likewise, when we say society is ‘doing good’, we usually mean that each part of the society is acting in harmony and unity to achieve the safety and sufficient sovereignty of its citizens. You see the pattern. — Bob Ross

So acts which promote flourishing are good because we have historically used the word "good" to describe acts which promote flourishing? This seems to be a kind of constructivism: moral facts are established by the conventions of our language use.

I think that you're on the right track, but I think that this is a form of anti-realism, not realism.

It is because it “satisfies the criteria ...”; but we only gain knowledge of that criteria by abducing it from the particulars. — Bob Ross

You seem to be saying that we learn what it means to be good by looking at what all good things have in common? But how do we determine that something is good in the first place?

You say helping the sick is good. I say helping the sick isn't good. Where do we go from there?

I don’t immediately know what the concept of a triangle is, but particular triangles are triangles because they meet the criteria of that concept of a triangle. I gain knowledge of the concept of a triangle by abstraction of particular triangles. — Bob Ross

Surely being a triangle is a mind-independent state of affairs? Some object either is or isn't a three-sided shape, regardless of what we believe or say. But in your OP you say that being good isn't a mind-independent state of affairs?

So I don't see how your example of triangles explains what it means for being good to not be a mind-independent state of affairs but to be some "non-Platonic objective abstract category".

I've read that but I can't see where it's actually explained what "good" means. It only seems to say that good is a "transcendental" and so not reducible to some natural property. There is mention of "desires", but it clarifies that it's not that something is good because we desire it but that we desire it because it is good.

So all I get from this is that "good" is supervenient and desirable. It still seems that "good" is undefined. How am I to distinguish "good" from some other supervenient and desirable property? Even if it's the only supervenient and desirable property, unless "good" means "supervenient and desirable" it is as-of-yet undefined.

Am I just misreading or misunderstanding the paper?

I think it poses enormous problems, and that it is directly related to these intractable problems of metaethics. — Leontiskos

I agree with that. But then there's also a problem with many of the proposed definitions. If we take hedonism as an example, if "this is good" means "this is pleasurable" then the proposition "pleasure is good" would be a tautology and so the question "is pleasure good?" would be a confused one, much like the question "are bachelors unmarried men?".

But the question "is pleasure good?" does seem to be a reasonable one, which suggests that "this is good" doesn't just mean "this is pleasurable". And so too for many (all?) other similar questions.

So if "good" being undefinable doesn't work and if "good" being defined in some natural term like "pleasurable" doesn't work then it seems that morality just doesn't work.