He doesn't think she should do what he wants him to do? — Leontiskos

No. In fact he might think that she shouldn't do what he wants her to do because he knows that what he wants her to do is wrong.

But the salesman was not merely wanting, he was acting to influence behavior. So too with the husband. In both cases we have cases of people who act to influence behavior on the basis of their desires. Are the salesman and the husband involved in a judgment about what another person should do? — Leontiskos

The conman is trying to influence her behaviour into giving him what he wants. He isn't trying to influence her behaviour into doing what he thinks she should do (e.g what is "right" or "good" or "best for her"). Maybe for the husband he's trying to do both.

I didn't realize that wants were incompatible with oughts. — Leontiskos

I didn't say that they are incompatible. I am only saying that the one does not necessarily entail the other. In the case of the conman, what he wants her to do and what he thinks she should do are opposed. In the case of the husband, what he wants her to do and what he thinks she should do might be the same.

To use your example, if someone is trying to sell Bonita a bridge, and they are trying to influence her to act such that she buys the bridge, do they possess the judgment that Bonita should buy a bridge? — Leontiskos

No they do not. They want her to buy a bridge. They don't think she should.

Next, I think that if one is attempting to influence the behavior of another, they are manifesting an explicit or implicit judgment about how that other person should act or behave. Do you agree or disagree? — Leontiskos

I disagree, as I keep saying. If I'm a conman trying to sell you a bridge I don't own then I am trying to influence your behaviour into giving me money but I don't believe that you have a moral obligation to give me money.

Now I say 'ought' involves a judgment about how someone should act. It involves a judgment about how someone should behave. Where such judgments are present, the reality of 'ought' is present. Do you disagree? — Leontiskos

Well yes, because that's a truism: "ought" and "should" are synonyms.

But again I refer you back to what I said here:

That may be true when you say it but it's not when I say it. When I say "I'd like it if you did this" I am only saying this. — Michael

You accused me (here) of saying something that I haven't said (that "we should act in a certain way"). I am simply trying to correct you on this. I have not said this, either explicitly or implicitly. You're reading something into my words that just isn't there and accusing me of believing something that I just don't.

'Ought' is a reality that is very often present even when the word is not present. Do you agree or disagree? — Leontiskos

Yes. So I refer you back to what I said here:

That may be true when you say it but it's not when I say it. When I say "I'd like it if you did this" I am only saying this. — Michael

You accused me (here) of saying something that I haven't said (that "we should act in a certain way"). I am simply trying to correct you on this. I have not said this, either explicitly or implicitly. You're reading something into my words that just isn't there and accusing me of believing something that I just don't.

Then you'll need to revise your definition. We are discussing whether an 'ought' is involved. — Leontiskos

And in this case an "ought" isn't involved as I keep saying. Here are a couple of sentences:

1. I would like it if you made others happy
2. I would like it if you were to give me your money

In both cases I am trying to influence your behaviour. In neither case is the word "ought" (or the word "immoral") involved, either explicitly or implicitly.

Someone who says, "I would be very sad if you cause them suffering," is obviously attempting to influence behavior. — Leontiskos

That I am trying to influence behaviour isn't that I believe that you have a moral obligation to behave a certain way.

When I try to convince you that I have a bridge to sell I am trying to influence you into giving me your money. That doesn't mean that I believe that you have a moral obligation to give me money. In fact I may be a moral realist who believes that what I am doing is wrong, but I care more about being rich than being good. Or I may be a moral nihilist who doesn't believe that anything is good or bad. But I still want your money.

You speak because you believe I ought to care how you feel — Leontiskos

No I don't.

You need to stop telling me what I believe.

Whether or not kindness and empathy and charity make the world a better place does matter though. — creativesoul

I know it does.

But whether or not kindness and empathy and charity are moral doesn't matter. Kindness and empathy and charity would make the world a better place even if kindness and empathy and charity aren't moral.

You are advising — Leontiskos

No I'm not. I am expressing how I would feel if you were to behave a certain way. I'm not advising you to do something. I'm not telling you to do something. I am not asserting that there exists some objectively binding moral obligation to do something.

I think there's been some confusion. I said to Leontiskos that I would like it if he would make others happy. He then accused me of telling him that he ought make others happy. I was explaining to him that I wasn't because "I would like it if you did this" doesn't mean "you ought do this". I then presented that biconditional in an attempt to show him that they mean different things. As he is a moral realist I expected him to reject the biconditional and so accept that I wasn't telling him what he ought to do.

But then he confused the matter by accepting the biconditional whilst still claiming to be a moral realist.

I'm not sure what you want from me. You're putting words into my mouth and I'm simply explaining that I'm not saying what you accuse me of saying.

I'd like you to pass the salt. I'd like you to meet my parents. I'd like you to donate to cancer research. I'd like you to join the protest. None of this implies that I believe in some objectively binding moral obligation.

When I say that I'd like you to be kind to others and make them happy, that's all I'm saying. I am neither explicitly nor implicitly endorsing moral realism.

It not a statement of suggestion that one gives to another - for in the example all who know the alcoholic want him to continue drinking. The example I gave was given as a statement of fact. — javra

Is it a moral fact? We're discussing moral obligations, not non-moral obligations.

2) Why presume that morality is independent of pragmatics? — javra

I'm not. I'm explaining that if ethical non-naturalism is true then being moral has no practical benefit. If ethical non-naturalism is true then the consequences of eating meat are the same whether eating meat is immoral or not. If ethical non-naturalism is true then the consequences of drinking alcohol are the same whether alcoholism is immoral or not.

I'm not arguing that ethical non-naturalism is true.

That quote of yours does not address mine.

"You should stop causing suffering," and, "In my opinion you should stop causing suffering," — Leontiskos

I haven't said "in my opinion you should stop causing suffering". I have only said "I would like it if you would stop causing suffering". These propositions mean different things.

We've already acknowledged that the world would be a different, better place if everyone acted morally — Count Timothy von Icarus

I haven't acknowledged this. I can acknowledge that the world would be a different, better place if everyone acted with kindness and empathy and charity, but whether or not kindness and empathy and charity are moral makes no difference.

A) The alcoholic (who thereby self-destroys themselves via alcohol consumption) should become sober, this despite B) the alcoholic and all which surround him wanting the alcoholic to continue drinking alcohol (for whatever reasons, with these possibly ranging from that of wanting the alcoholic to continue being their merry self in the company of others when drunk to that of wanting the alcoholic to die).

What’s missing here for a satisfactory account of moral realism is the reason for why (A) is valid despite (B). Notwithstanding, to me this scenario presents an intuitive truth that I presume is universally shared. If so, then the proposition you’ve offered is not true - this, as you claim, just as the moral realist affirms. — javra

That they should become sober is not an objectively binding moral obligation. It is a pragmatic suggestion, like telling someone that they should brush their teeth.

See here where it's explained that the meaning of the word "should" is not exclusively moral.

Still, when I say to someone, "I'd like it if you stopped causing suffering for others," you are simultaneously saying, "You should stop causing suffering for others." — Leontiskos

That may be true when you say it but it's not when I say it. When I say "I'd like it if you did this" I am only saying this.

To make this clearer, do you accept that non-cognitivists, error theorists, and moral subjectivists exist? Do you accept that they do not believe in objectively binding moral obligations? Do you also accept that they express their personal preferences? Then you must accept that when they express their personal preferences they are not simultaneously asserting the existence of objectively binding moral obligations.

I believe the biconditional is true. I am a moral realist. — Leontiskos

That strikes me as a contradiction. You ought not eat meat if and only if I would like you to not eat meat? That seems like textbook moral subjectivism.

And if the "I" refers specifically to me then why am I the authority on what you should or shouldn't do?

If you want to argue that there is no motivation — frank

I'm not arguing that there is no motivation. I'm explaining that I have no motivation to be moral and am asking others why they have it given that there are no practical benefits to being moral. Is it entirely a matter of principle?

What's the difference between saying "I'd like it if you did X," and, "You should do X"? — Leontiskos

Is this premise true?

1. "You should do X" is true iff I'd like it if you did X

According to moral realists it's not. According to (some) moral subjectivists it is. I'm assuming moral realism, not moral subjectivism, for the sake of this argument. And you've previously argued against moral subjectivism so I presume you believe that the premise is false.

You think we should act in a certain way (seek happiness and avoid suffering) and yet you refuse to call this predilection "moral," even though any definitions of "moral" that you provide entail that your predilection is moral. — Leontiskos

I don't say that we should. I only say that I do, and that I'd like it if you did too.

I would say that those who promote happiness believe that happiness ought be promoted, and given your definition here that would mean that happiness is moral. Is it possible to promote something while not believing that it ought be promoted? When I do something it is because I think it should be done, especially when it is something I've deliberated about. — Leontiskos

I promote happiness because I enjoy it and because I have empathy for others. Moral considerations do not factor into my decision making at all.

But the second question presumably asks why it is immoral to cause suffering. You want to know how to answer the second question on a Moorean ethics, — Leontiskos

I'm trying to explain that it doesn't matter if it is immoral to cause suffering.

If it is impermissible to cause suffering and I cause suffering then the consequences are the same as if it is permissible to cause suffering and I cause suffering.

The permissibility of causing suffering does not affect the outcome of my decision to cause (or not cause) suffering.

Whereas the viability of antibiotics can very much affect the outcome of my decision to take antibiotics. If they're viable then my sickness is cured, if they're not then I will probably die.

The viability of antibiotics matters. The permissibility of causing suffering doesn't. Suffering is just suffering whether permissible or not.

You aren't presenting an argument that shows that its wrong to look at things that way. — frank

I'm not trying to. I'm not arguing in favour of moral realism and ethical non-naturalism over moral subjectivism or error theory or divine command theory or cultural relativism or non-cognitivism. I am only arguing that if moral realism (specifically ethical non-naturalism) is correct then moral facts don't matter.

You have to have some sort of framework or context for the usage, otherwise there isn't any meaning to your expression. — frank

Then "this is immoral" means "one ought not do this".

I don't care if I ought or ought not promote happiness or if I ought or ought not cause suffering. I'm going to promote happiness and not cause suffering either way.

If you were a Roman stoic, you would say the latter is tied up in the former. What is the cultural framework within which you're using the word "moral?" You have to have some sort of context, otherwise it's language on holiday. — frank

I'm not working under any cultural framework. I am assuming, for the sake of argument, that Moore's ethical non-naturalism is correct: that "this is immoral" doesn't mean "this causes suffering". As such it isn't a truism that suffering is immoral.

You might be concerned about whether your existence makes the world better or worse. — frank

I'm concerned about promoting happiness and reducing suffering. I don't care whether happiness or suffering is moral or not.

Perhaps I can make this easier. Assume, for the sake of argument, that everybody knows with irrefutable certainty that it is immoral to kill wild animals for food. Assume also that we are a fully libertarian society that does not punish people (whether legally or socially) for doing things that they ought not do (except where their actions bring harm to other people).

I know with irrefutable certainty that I ought not kill wild animals for food. I also know that I will not be punished or shunned for killing wild animals for food.

Why does it matter that I ought not kill wild animals for food? What is my motivation to be moral? Perhaps I simply don't care that I ought not kill wild animals for food; I'm going to do it anyway because I like the taste of meat.

However, a full analysis would show that I believe antibiotics will cure my infection because they will actually cure my infection, that I think my wife cheated on my because she actually cheated on me, etc. The possibility of false beliefs here doesn't negate this connection if there are ways to come to true beliefs. If beliefs are properly related to facts, including moral facts, I don't see an issue here. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I address this in the first part of my post:

22% of people believe that eating meat is immoral and 88% don't. Either some (or most or all) of the 22% believe what they do because eating meat is immoral or some (or most or all) of the 88% believe what they do because eating meat is moral.

I am accepting, for the sake of argument, that whoever is right believes what they do because of the moral facts.

What I want to know is why it matters who is right?

It matters if antibiotics can cure my infection because if they can then if I take them then I won't die. But why does it matter if eating meat is immoral?

@Merkwurdichliebe has been banned for trolling and child-killing apologism.

Isn't it begging to question to assume the correct moral beliefs are distributed such that being correct about them is a 50/50 proposition? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not saying that they are. 50% was just an example. If you prefer, we can reconsider my question using the actual apparent percentages (according to this):

22% of people believe that eating meat is immoral and 88% don't. Either some (or most or all) of the 22% believe what they do because eating meat is immoral or some (or most or all) of the 88% believe what they do because eating meat is moral.

Why does it matter who is right? The consequences of eating meat (or not eating meat) are the same whether eating meat is immoral or not.

The same seems true with assuming that those who commit immoral acts face no heightened risk of suffering due to later realizing they have acted immorally. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The same is also true of someone who is falsely convinced that they have acted immorally. So it isn't the fact that they have acted immorally that has caused them to suffer but the belief that they have acted immorally that has caused them to suffer. It makes no difference to their suffering if their belief is true or false.

There can be "natural" consequences of immoral acts without morality being constituted by these outcomes. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, but my point is that the immorality of that act is irrelevant. The natural consequences of that act would be the same even if that act wasn't immoral.

This is true only if you assume that people's beliefs about morality have nothing to do moral facts. But if people have the moral beliefs they do because of moral facts (at least in part)... — Count Timothy von Icarus

This isn't relevant to the argument I am making. Let's take this example:

Half of everyone believes that it is moral to eat meat and half of everyone believes that it is immoral to eat meat.

If it is a fact that it is moral to eat meat then those who believe that it is moral to eat meat do so because it is moral to eat meat, and those who believe that it is immoral to eat meat are, in some sense, delusional.

If it is a fact that it is immoral to eat meat then those who believe that it is immoral to eat meat do so because it is immoral to eat meat, and those who believe that it is moral to eat meat are, in some sense, delusional.

So this grants that moral facts can influence moral beliefs.

Now let's assume that everyone who believes that eating meat is moral eats meat and that everyone who believes that eating meat is immoral doesn't eat meat.

Half of everyone eats meat and half of everyone doesn't eat meat. Why does it matter if eating meat is immoral or not?

It's not the case that if it's immoral to eat meat then those who eat meat are going to suffer from some unwanted consequence as a result of their meat eating (or at least not any consequence that wouldn't also be a consequence even if it is moral to eat meat).

So why the motivation to be moral? There are no practical benefits, either for ourselves or for others. Is it entirely a matter of principle?

As long as a hedonist does not purport to derive his 'ought' from natural science, he is not a naturalist. He could do this in two ways: he could argue that pleasure is good, but that its goodness is not an object of natural science, or else he could independently claim that the oughtness that attaches to pleasure is not an object of natural science. In either case he is not a naturalist, and all hedonists I have encountered deny that their valuative/obligatory premises are the product of natural science.

I think you are misreading Moore's argument as overdetermined. The so-called "naturalistic fallacy" depends on his Open Question about the ambiguity of goodness. If that ambiguity fails then the fallacy charge also fails. — Leontiskos

There's an ambiguity in your proposition that "he could argue that pleasure is good". Are you saying that "this is good" means "this is pleasurable" or are you saying that pleasure happens to have the property of goodness? The former is naturalism, the latter is non-naturalism. I think it important not to get too caught up in the particular labels used. If you prefer, rather than use the labels "naturalism" and "non-naturalism" we can use the labels "Type X" and "Type Y".

The reason this distinction is important can be shown with the question I asked earlier:

Given that I believe that it is immoral to cause suffering, what follows if suffering is immoral and what follows if suffering is not immoral?

If "this is immoral" means "this causes suffering" then part of my question would contain a logical contradiction: my belief that it is immoral to cause suffering would be true by definition, and so we cannot even ask what would follow if that belief was false.

But if "this is immoral" doesn't mean "this causes suffering" then there is no such contradiction and so the question is coherent.

So for the sake of this discussion I am assuming non-naturalism (or if you prefer, "Type Y" moral theories): the propositions "this is immoral" and "this causes suffering" do not mean the same thing and the propositions "this is moral" and "this causes pleasure" do not mean the same thing.

Now given the assumption that "this is immoral" doesn't mean "this causes suffering", what does it mean to say that it is immoral to cause suffering? On some accounts we cannot define the proposition "it is immoral" in any simpler terms. However, given that such claims are intended to be normative, I am assuming that "this is immoral" just means "one ought not do this". At the very least this definition allows us to avoid having to explain why we ought not be immoral.

This then entails that the proposition "it is immoral to cause suffering" means "one ought not cause suffering" (and the proposition "it is moral to seek pleasure" means "one ought seek pleasure").

My question, then, is:

Given that I believe that one ought not cause suffering, what follows if it is a fact that one ought not cause suffering and what follows if it is not a fact that one ought not cause suffering?

The problem I see is that nothing follows in either case. The existence or non-existence of such obligations is inconsequential. It is true that if one ought not cause suffering and I cause suffering then I have done something I ought not, but so what? What is my motivation to obey obligations?

Well, the non-natural moral facts would be involved in the consequences of your actions to the extent that your family won't come to see you because they think you acted immorally. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's a consequence of acting contrary to moral beliefs. They won't come to see me because they believe I acted immorally. They might be wrong.

That's a question that would seem to deal with causality, which would tend to require a naturalistic answer.

The difference for someone like Moore would seem to be precisely that you have acted immorally versus morally in any situation, independent of any causation downstream of your actions. As I understand him, which isn't very well, moral facts aren't reducible to natural facts, and so asking about what changes "in the world," outside of your having acted rightly or wrongly doesn't make sense given his premises. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's precisely my point. If ethical non-naturalism is correct then moral facts entail no consequential outcomes. Suffering is still suffering, so why does it matter if it's moral or not? Would you really seek suffering if it could be proved that suffering is moral? Or, like me, is your visceral aversion to pain and empathy of others all that matters?

2. Go back and re-respond to this here and explain why my response doesn't now apply, particularly to (b). Just plug in Moore's definition of morality into (b), and that offers a reason why it matters what you think is moral for a non-naturalist. — Hanover

Moore doesn't have a definition. As he says in the Principia Ethica:

‘Good,’ then, if we mean by it that quality which we assert to belong to a thing, when we say that the thing is good, is incapable of any definition, in the most important sense of that word.

And as I mentioned before, the way you've worded your examples doesn't reflect the argument I'm making. You are comparing the case where I believe something is moral with a case where I believe that same thing to not be immoral. I'm considering two cases where I believe that something is immoral (or two cases where I believe that something is not immoral), but where in one case the belief is true and in the other case that same belief is false. This is perhaps clearest when phrased like this:

Given that I believe that it is immoral to cause suffering, what follows if suffering is immoral and what follows if suffering is not immoral?

The consequences of acting immorally would tend to be to make the world shittier, to put it in the simplist terms possible. Because your ordered a veal parm the restaurant is going to order more veal. In the aggregate, the sort of behavior you engage in will lead to many more veal calves leading lives of atrocious suffering, while also contributing to ocean acidification and global warming. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What is the connection between acting immorally and causing suffering? Remember that I'm arguing about the implications of ethical non-naturalism.

I'll ask the previous question a different way:

Given that I already believe that it is immoral to cause suffering, what follows if my belief is true and what follows if my belief is false?