Michael seems to think there is something more here. — Banno

That facts about how the world ought to be have no practical relevance. The world is what it is and will be what it will be and that's that.

It just doesn't matter if we ought or ought not avoid suffering. All that matters is that we want to avoid it, and not because we believe we ought to, but because it's a viscerally horrible thing to experience. We're motivated by pragmatism and empathy.

I don't understand any supposed motivation to obey a moral obligation for its own sake.

There is no indication the president is considered an Officer in the constitution. — NOS4A2

The Colorado Supreme Court disagrees.

Then they do so against the constitution. Senate has already acquitted him of such charges. — NOS4A2

I didn't realise that the Senate was the ultimate authority and final arbiter on the matter.

She's following her own process — NOS4A2

They're not her own processes. They're Maine state law:

1. Review. When presented with a primary petition, the Secretary of State shall review it and, if the petition contains the required number of certified names and is properly completed, shall accept and file it.

2. Challenges. The procedure for challenging the validity of a primary petition or of names upon a petition is as follows.

A. Only a registered voter residing in the electoral division of the candidate concerned may file a challenge. The challenge must be in writing and must set forth the reasons for the challenge. The challenge must be filed in the office of the Secretary of State before 5 p.m. on the 5th business day after the final date for filing petitions under section 335, subsection 8.

B. Within 7 days after the final date for filing challenges and after due notice of the hearing to the candidate and to the challenger, the Secretary of State shall hold a public hearing on any challenge properly filed. The challenger has the burden of providing sufficient evidence to invalidate the petitions or any names upon the petitions.

C. The Secretary of State shall rule on the validity of any challenge within 5 days after the completion of the hearing described in paragraph B.

D. A challenger or a candidate may appeal the decision of the Secretary of State by commencing an action in the Superior Court. This action must be conducted in accordance with the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 80C, except as modified by this section. This action must be commenced within 5 days of the date of the decision of the Secretary of State. Upon timely application, anyone may intervene in this action when the applicant claims an interest relating to the subject matter of the petitions, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties. The court shall issue a written decision containing its findings of fact and conclusions of law and setting forth the reasons for its decision within 20 days of the date of the decision of the Secretary of State.

E. Any aggrieved party may appeal the decision of the Superior Court, on questions of law, by filing a notice of appeal within 3 days of that decision. The record on appeal must be transmitted to the Law Court within 3 days after notice of appeal is filed. After filing notice of appeal, the parties have 4 days to file briefs and appendices with the clerk of courts. As soon as the record and briefs have been filed, the court shall immediately consider the case. The court shall issue its decision within 14 days of the date of the decision of the Superior Court.

The 14th doesn't mention presidents. — NOS4A2

It mentions "officer of the United States" and the President is an officer of the United States.

Second, there is no indication of any insurrection, or that he engaged in it. — NOS4A2

The Colorado Supreme Court disagrees.

Lastly, this lady isn't a lawyer and used youtube videos for her case. — NOS4A2

Under Maine law it is the Secretary of State who must make any initial rulings on a candidate's eligibility. She is simply following the established legal process. The next step is for an appeal to be made to the Superior Court.

But they aren't. The natural sciences do not study pain and pleasure in themselves, and they certainly do not study pain and pleasure as normative realities. For example, the claim that suffering should be avoided is not within the domain of the natural sciences. Your article hedges precisely where you are begging the question, "Assuming that being pleasant is a natural property..."

In all probability you will be as unwilling to define "natural" as you are unwilling to define "moral," but the notion that the natural sciences study the normative value of pain and pleasure seems highly unlikely. If this is right then the many counterarguments in this thread which you unaccountably label "naturalistic," are in fact not naturalistic. — Leontiskos

I'm not saying that the natural sciences study the normative value of pain and pleasure. I'm saying that pain and pleasure are natural properties.

You seem to have skimmed some Wikipedia and SEP articles, constructed a position in your mind, and then constructed arguments against that position. But given that no one holds this constructed position, it seems that all you've done is erected a strawman. Do you know of any philosophers who hold this position you've constructed? — Leontiskos

Moore, as explained in that quote in my previous comment, and also from his open-question argument:

Moore’s “Open Question Argument” for the conclusion that goodness is a non-natural property is closely related to his worries about the naturalistic fallacy. Consider any proposed naturalistic analysis N of a moral predicate M. The Open Question Argument maintains that it will always be possible for someone competent with moral discourse without conceptual confusion to grant that something is N but still wonder whether it is really M. Whether goodness is co-instantiated with any natural property or set of natural properties is in this sense always a conceptually open question. If, however, N really was an accurate analysis of M then the question, “I know it is N but is it M?” would not be open in this way for a conceptually competent judge any more than the question, “I know he is a bachelor but is he unmarried?” can be an open one.

they illegally prevent a legitimate campaign — NOS4A2

If he's ineligible under the 14th Amendment then it isn't illegal and isn't a legitimate campaign.

They don't like that Trump contested the election — NOS4A2

They don't like that he tried to illegally prevent the legitimate transfer of power.

Pretzel logic. — NOS4A2

Again, it was tongue-in-cheek. Do you honestly not understand this? Are you that incapable of inferring the intention behind someone's words? Can you only ever take words at literal, face value?

Trump claims he won all 50 states in the 2020 election

I’m afraid Trump was not sworn in... — NOS4A2

The 22nd Amendment says "No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice". It doesn't say "No person shall be sworn in to the office of the President more than twice".

... so the notion is ridiculous

...

It just goes to show the lengths they are willing to go and the contortions they are willing to commit themselves to in order to disguise their malfeasance. — NOS4A2

Yes it's ridiculous. Do you honestly not recognize it as being tongue-in-cheek?

continuous 24/7 morphine drip — 180 Proof

Sign me up.

Trump is so unhinged that he recently claimed winning all 50 states in the 2020 election. — GRWelsh

I don't think he actually believes that. It's all a grift to stoke up his delusional supporters.

The obvious defence is that "elected" in the context of the 22nd Amendment refers to being elected by the Electoral College, which he wasn't.

Funny all the same.

However, Mr. Trump may be able to remove this obstacle of his own creation. If he were to submit a letter sworn under penalty of perjury acknowledging that he lost the 2020 election and repudiating all previous statements undermining the integrity of that election, the question of the 22nd Amendment would no longer be relevant.

Brilliant.

It's almost as if we act on what we believe to be true, rather than on what is true independent of our beliefs. — Leontiskos

That's precisely my point. Moral beliefs matter. Moral facts don't. A moral belief being false has the same practical implications as that same moral belief being true (if ethical non-naturalism is correct).

You beg the question by assuming that these are non-moral features. — Leontiskos

See here:

Very roughly, non-naturalism in meta-ethics is the idea that moral philosophy is fundamentally autonomous from the natural sciences.

...

Most often, ‘non-naturalism’ denotes the metaphysical thesis that moral properties exist and are not identical with or reducible to any natural property or properties in some interesting sense of ‘natural’.

...

Moore famously claimed that naturalists were guilty of what he called the “naturalistic fallacy.” In particular, Moore accused anyone who infers that X is good from any proposition about X’s natural properties of having committed the naturalistic fallacy. Assuming that being pleasant is a natural property, for example, someone who infers that drinking beer is good from the premise that drinking beer is pleasant is supposed to have committed the naturalistic fallacy. The intuitive idea is that evaluative conclusions require at least one evaluative premise—purely factual premises about the naturalistic features of things do not entail or even support evaluative conclusions. Moore himself focused on goodness, but if the argument works for goodness then it seems likely to generalize to other moral properties.

Harm, suffering, and pain are natural properties. If moral properties are not natural properties then harm, suffering, and pain are not moral properties.

Perhaps this whole thread could be boiled down to a single question, "If you are an ethical non-naturalist, then what is the reason for your 'ought'?" "You say we ought to do such and such, but why ought we?" — Leontiskos

I'm asking about the ethical non-naturalist's moral motivation.

Maine secretary of state disqualifies Trump from primary ballot

Bellows said she received three challenges to Trump's primary nomination petition, two of which argued that the former president did not meet the qualifications for the presidency because he had engaged in insurrection and is therefore ineligible to hold public office under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

The third challenge argued that Trump should be found ineligible under the 22nd Amendment, which establishes that "no person should be elected to the office of president more than twice." Under this theory, the petitioner, Paul Gordon, said that Trump should be disqualified because he has long claimed to have won the 2020 election.

...

Bellows concluded that Trump had engaged in insurrection and that sufficient evidence had been provided to "demonstrate the falsity of Mr. Trump's declaration that he meets the qualifications of the office of the presidency."

That third challenge is hilarious.

I did say "if Englishness exists". — Janus

Well, there is such a thing as being English, but it's not a biological or behavioural feature of people; it's a legal status.

We know humans are biological organisms; do we have any evidence that they are more than that? — Janus

If humans are conscious and if consciousness is non-biological then consciousness is evidence that humans are more than biological organisms.

Of course whether or not consciousness is biological is the very thing being questioned, which is why it begs the question to argue that humans are just biological organisms.

We don't know whether or not consciousness is biological and so we don't know whether or not humans are just biological organisms.

I’m just asking what the word “consciousness” refers to. I have to Imagine a string going from the word to what it is in the world the word refers to. The dualist would have nowhere to put it because it would either attach to some biology, or nothing. Non-physical stuff is just a roundabout way of saying “nothing”, in my view, because nothing indicates such stuff exists. — NOS4A2

So this is just begging the question.

Maybe it’s an abstract term denoting abstract qualities of physical things, particularity conscious organisms. — NOS4A2

Are abstract qualities physical? If not, are they real?

No, that's right, it would be observed in behavior, also a physical phenomenon. — Janus

Because no true Scotsman puts sugar on his porridge?

But that aside, I'm questioning NOS's assertion that because the adjective "conscious" is used to describe biological organisms then consciousness must be biological. I don't think that at all follows. "English", "wet", and "stylish" are adjectives that are used to describe biological organisms, but it doesn't follow that Englishness, wetness, and style must be biological.

Consciousness may very well be physical, but this cannot be proved simply by looking at how adjectives are used.

And, of course, the assertion that humans are just biological organism begs the question.

Would not "Englishness", if it exists, be some manifest quality or qualities? — Janus

If it is you're not going to find it by putting my body under a microscope. At best you can check my birth certificate or passport. Even though it's me that's English, not those pieces of paper.

So it's really strange that NOS thinks that dualism can be refuted by looking at the grammatical use of the adjective "conscious".

Physiology applies to an organism and the way it functions. Consciousness applies to what? — NOS4A2

I have no idea what you're asking here.

Dualists claim that humans are a collection of physical and non-physical (mental) stuff. The term "biology" is used to refer to the physical stuff and the term "consciousness" is used to refer to the non-physical (mental) stuff. To say that a human is conscious is to say that it has this non-physical (mental) stuff.

Whereas materialists claim that humans are a collection of physical stuff alone and that the term "consciousness" refers to some subsection of that physical stuff. To say that a human is conscious is to say that it has this subsection of that physical stuff.

There is no hard problem if the term "conscious" describes the concrete. — NOS4A2

Yes, if. But either way, there undoubtedly seems to me a hard problem, hence the existence of substantial contemporary philosophical literature on the nature of consciousness and of substance and property dualism. So either it is the case that consciousness is a physical thing, but significantly more complex than every other physical thing in the universe, or it isn't a physical thing.

The circularity begins when you promise that “ when we describe ourselves as being conscious we're describing that non-physiological aspect of ourselves”, and when asked which non-physical aspect of ourselves we’re describing, you answer “consciousness”. — NOS4A2

I don't think it's circular. If you asked me what "physiology" describes, the answer is physiology.

I’m only arguing that if consciousness does not apply to the physiology, there is no other object to which it can apply. — NOS4A2

What does physiology apply to? The question doesn't make sense. Physiology is just its own thing. Similarly, if dualism is correct then consciousness is just its own thing.

The reason I would say no such aspects exist is because there is no indication such aspects exist. — NOS4A2

There's certainly something peculiar about consciousness given that a "hard" problem of consciousness is even considered. We don't consider a "hard" problem of electricity or water after all. Of course, that might just be because consciousness is significantly more complicated than every other natural phenomenon in the universe. Or it might be because consciousness really is non-natural and that there really is a "hard" problem.

That we are conscious is that consciousness is an aspect of our being, and consciousness is some non-physical supervenient phenomenon (according to the dualist).

You cannot argue that such a thing doesn't exist by arguing that we describe ourselves as being conscious and that our being is exhausted by our physiology, because in arguing that our being is exhausted by our physiology you are begging the question.

What non-physical aspect of ourselves does the word "conscious" describe? — NOS4A2

Consciousness.

I honestly don't know what other kind of answer you're expecting.

What non-physiological aspects are you speaking of? — NOS4A2

Consciousness.

Winner” is a noun. I was talking about the switch from adjectives to nouns, for instance “happy” becomes “happiness”. Try describing “happy” without referencing an object. It’s difficult. Luckily language permits us to make of the adjective a noun, treating it as if it was concrete and its own thing, where we can start to apply more adjectives to it. It becomes a “quality”, “state”, or “condition”. This raises the question: a quality, state, or condition of what thing? In the case of human consciousness, the answer is the human, which is physiological. If we cannot answer that question, we just start compounding adjectives, describing really nothing. — NOS4A2

Then "wet" or "well-dressed".

Of course, the other issue is that in saying "the answer is the human, which is physiological" you're begging the questioning. If there is something like a non-physical consciousness that humans have then humans aren't just physiological; we're physiological and conscious, and when we describe ourselves as being conscious we're describing that non-physiological aspect of ourselves.

The adjective describes the thing, which in the case of an organism is wholly physiological. It does not nor cannot describe anything else. — NOS4A2

When I describe John as being the winner of the race I'm describing John, but being a winner is not the same thing as being John. In fact, nothing about John's base biology has anything to do with him being the winner of the race. Of course, his base biology obviously plays an explanatory role in how he won, but having his biology and being the winner of the race are independent things.

When I describe John as being conscious I'm describing John, but being conscious is not the same thing as being John. And, like above, it may be that nothing about John's base biology has anything to do with him being conscious. Of course, his base biology seems to play an explanatory role in how he's conscious, but having his biology and being conscious may be independent things.

The adjective “conscious” describes the organism, which is physiological. So why would we even approach anything non-physical with the word? — NOS4A2

I don't quite understand this. When I describe myself as English the word "English" is an adjective, being used to describe me, but "Englishness" isn't some physiological thing.

The fact that we use the word "conscious" to describe a physiological organism doesn't mean that consciousness is physiological. That a physiological organism is conscious is that (according to the dualist) the physiological organism has/produces non-physical consciousness.

It’s evident, to me at least, that a person is conscious for biological reasons. — NOS4A2

That a person is conscious for biological reasons isn’t necessarily that consciousness is physiological. Consciousness may be a non-physical product of certain physical processes. Disrupting those physical processes will disrupt consciousness, but they can nonetheless be distinct things.

Otherwise, it creates a legal loophole where a President can commit any crime he wants and then pardon himself, over and over. — GRWelsh

Well, what's supposed to happen is that if the President tried to do this then the upstanding members of Congress would impeach him and remove him from office.

Can a convicted felon even serve as POTUS — GRWelsh

Yes.

What if he gets a sentence of prison time? Can he serve as POTUS from prison? — GRWelsh

I suspect any sentence will be suspended until after his term, and then if it's a federal conviction he will pardon himself. Who knows how the Supreme Court will rule on that.

I'm not sure about a specific moral system, but there's Moore's open-question argument, as explained here:

Moore’s “Open Question Argument” for the conclusion that goodness is a non-natural property is closely related to his worries about the naturalistic fallacy. Consider any proposed naturalistic analysis N of a moral predicate M. The Open Question Argument maintains that it will always be possible for someone competent with moral discourse without conceptual confusion to grant that something is N but still wonder whether it is really M. Whether goodness is co-instantiated with any natural property or set of natural properties is in this sense always a conceptually open question. If, however, N really was an accurate analysis of M then the question, “I know it is N but is it M?” would not be open in this way for a conceptually competent judge any more than the question, “I know he is a bachelor but is he unmarried?” can be an open one.

Another issue with ethical naturalism is related to the problem of deriving an ought from an is. If "this is immoral" just means "this is harmful" then "one ought not be immoral" just means "one ought not be harmful", but how can we justify the assertion that one ought not be harmful? Can we do so with reference to some other natural fact, or must we depend on some non-natural fact?

So there are good reasons to believe that if there are moral facts then these moral facts (whatever they are) must be non-natural facts.

Although, as you say, without a substantive positive definition this is a rather vacuous claim, and if, as I say, non-natural moral facts would have no practical relevance, and if moral facts must have practical relevance, then if there are moral facts then these moral facts must be natural facts.

Which leads us to the crux of the issue: natural moral facts don't appear to work and non-natural moral facts don't appear to work, suggesting some kind of antirealism, whether that be subjectivism (whether individual or social), error theory, or non-cognitivism.

Otherwise you're left with the undefined term of "morality." — Hanover

That is indeed one of my other gripes with ethical non-naturalism. It states what morality is not but seems to lack a substantive positive definition.

I suppose one account is to define it by saying that "X is immoral" just means "one ought not X".

If so then my statements above can be rephrased as:

1. If a) it is the case that one ought not eat meat and b) I believe that it is the case that one ought not eat meat then c) I won't eat meat.

2. If a) it is not the case that one ought not eat meat but b) I believe that it is the case that one ought not eat meat then c) I won't eat meat.

The practical implication of each b) is each c), but I can't see what the practical implication of each a) is.

See the second section of this where I set out ethical non-naturalism.

Yeah, you introduced that only after folk showed the OP wasn't working. — Banno

I alluded to it on the second page, 7 years ago:

Presumably obligations are not identical to natural properties like causing harm, for example. "One ought not kill babies" doesn't mean the same thing as "killing babies causes harm". So it seems to me that obligations, if anything, are something "extra". So there's no prime facie reason to believe that there couldn't be a world that has the same empirical facts as ours but without these obligations (whatever they are). — Michael

I was then explicit about it on the third page, 14 days ago:

What are the practical consequences of having a true belief? What are the practical consequences of having a false belief? I can't see that there are – or could be – any.

It seems to be a necessary consequence of any ethical non-naturalism that moral facts are irrelevant. — Michael

I think it's just the case that some people aren't actually reading what I'm writing.

The practical implications have to do with eating, harvesting, and producing animals, as I already noted. — Leontiskos

They're practical implications of having the belief. I'm asking about the practical implications of that belief being true.

If eating meat is immoral and I believe that eating meat is immoral then I won't eat meat.
If eating meat is not immoral but I believe that eating meat is immoral then I won't eat meat.

Whether or not eating meat is immoral has no affect on whether or not I eat meat or on what will happen if I do or don't.

Yet you refuse to conceive of morality in a non-Kantian manner, and so instead of identifying a flaw in one very localized moral theory, you falsely conclude that all of morality is inherently flawed. — Leontiskos

Firstly, I am specifically addressing ethical non-naturalism, which states that:

1. Ethical sentences express propositions.
2. Some such propositions are true.
3. Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of human opinion.
4. These moral features of the world are not reducible to any set of non-moral features.

Secondly, I am only saying that if moral features are not reducible to non-moral features (e.g. pain, harm, suffering, etc.) then the existence (or non-existence) of these moral features has no practical implications.

And I'm not necessarily saying that therefore ethical non-naturalism is false. I'm only saying that if it's true then I don't understand the motivation to be moral.

No, not even that, not yet. — Banno

Well as I've made clear several times I am considering the implications of ethical non-naturalism. If ethical non-naturalism is true then ...

If you want to argue against ethical non-naturalism then that's a topic for a different discussion, and one on which I might be inclined to agree with you.

So here's the foundation of ethics: "What to do?" — Banno

I'm not sure what to make of this. Is this even cognitivism?

And yet we each must act, and hence each must choose what to do. — Banno

Yes, so as the OP asks, why consider morality when choosing what to do? Why not just consider our desires and pragmatism?

* Our standing with our fellows, with society at large, and with ourselves is elevated by being moral, and reduced when seen to be immoral. — hypericin

This has nothing to do with moral facts and everything to do with moral beliefs. It is pragmatic to behave in ways that society believes is moral.

* Our moral training induces a feeling of guilt when we are moral immoral, and self-satisfaction when moral — hypericin

This has nothing to do with moral facts and everything to do with moral beliefs. We feel guilty when we behave in ways that we believe are immoral.

Empathy causes us pain when we cause harm to others, by literally feeling it. Similarly, when we see others in pain, we feel that pain, and ease our own suffering by easing theirs. — hypericin

If ethical non-naturalism is true then it might be that causing harm isn't immoral.

So your thread argues that apart from the moral reasons for being moral, there are no other reasons to be moral. — Banno

I'm not even sure it makes sense to say that there's a moral reason for being moral. It's like saying that there are pragmatic reasons for being pragmatic. It strikes me as a strange way to talk. Rather we should only say that there's a moral reason to not eat meat or a pragmatic reason to eat meat.

The question of the OP, then, is why we choose to consider moral reasons at all. At least we get something out of being practical. There are prima facie no benefits to being moral. Being moral for the sake of being moral seems pointless.