On the other hand, the 14th amendment does confer the power to enforce the provisions to Congress, so one can assume correctly that that power belongs with Congress and no one else. — NOS4A2
Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment declares that
"[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
This declaration has always been treated as self-executing, and has repeatedly been construed, without further legislative specification, to invalidate state voting qualifications or procedures which are discriminatory on their face or in practice.
Section 5 entails that Congress has the power to enforce the provisions of the article. It doesn’t confer that power to anyone else. So why assume someone else can have that power? — NOS4A2
I’m talking about the 14th amendment, section 5. — NOS4A2
It doesn’t say that any court has the power to enforce the provisions of the article. — NOS4A2
It says there in plain English that those powers are left to Congress. — NOS4A2
[The thirteenth] amendment, as well as the fourteenth, is undoubtedly self-executing without any ancillary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any existing state of circumstances. By its own unaided force and effect it abolished slavery, and established universal freedom.
I suppose yes because the 13th amendment also grants “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation”.
No state or federal court has authority in either matter. — NOS4A2
Congress shall have power to abolish slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States...
It’s probably why section 5 of the fourteenth amendment says “The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” In regards to enforcing these provisions It doesn’t mention states or state courts. — NOS4A2
An originalist would need to consider this as a glaring problem with the state’s ruling, and also the fact that the president is not mentioned in the list of people who would be unable from holding office. — NOS4A2
I think he's right, but that's because I'm a panpstychist. I suspect all causation is, at bottom, psychological. That avoids overdetermination. — bert1
The point here is that we have a moral claim that we know to be true, such as, "No one should torture babies." — Leontiskos
If moral subjectivism is unable to rationally justify such a truth, then moral subjectivism is an inadequate moral theory. — Leontiskos
Nice, definitions from the 19th century. Thanks for clearing that up. — NOS4A2
Oddly enough they didn’t look up what “engage” means, because he wasn’t even present where the event happened, yet they conclude he engaged in it. — NOS4A2
The expression “engaged” in insurrection, as used in the amendment, implies a voluntary effort to assist the insurrection.
Attorney General Stanbery’s opinions on the meaning of “engage,” which he issued at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was being debated, are in accord with these historical and modern definitions. Attorney General Stanbery opined that a person may “engage” in insurrection or rebellion “without having actually levied war or taken arms.” Stanbery I, 12 Op. Att’y Gen. at 161. Thus, in Attorney General Stanbery’s view, when individuals acting in their official capacities act “in the furtherance of the common unlawful purpose” or do “any overt act for the purpose of promoting the rebellion,” they have “engaged” in insurrection or rebellion for Section Three disqualification purposes. Id. at 161–62; see also Stanbery II, 12 Op. Att’y. Gen. at 204 (defining “engaging in rebellion” to require “an overt and voluntary act, done with the intent of aiding or furthering the common unlawful purpose”). Accordingly, “[d]isloyal sentiments, opinions, or sympathies would not disqualify; but when a person has, by speech or by writing, incited others to engage in rebellion, [h]e must come under the disqualification.” Stanbery II, 12 Op. Att’y. Gen. at 205; accord Stanbery I, 12 Op. Att’y Gen. at 164
...
For example, in Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 126 (1807), Chief Justice Marshall explained that “if a body of men be actually assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable purpose, all those who perform any part, however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors.” In other words, an individual need not directly participate in the overt act of levying war or insurrection for the law to hold him accountable as if he had.
Well... I think that rules come down to individual particulars. I'm sure you'll agree. Different communities hold different rules/moral belief.
So, with enough qualification it may be the case that kicking puppies is forbidden in some communities but not in others.
I'm okay with that. — creativesoul
But why the need for rules here? Kicking puppies is wrong in and of itself. — creativesoul
Premise 2 is stating the rules. — creativesoul
The judges believe he engaged in insurrection, a federal crime, and are keeping him off the ballot because of it, even though no one has been charged (let alone convicted) of said crime. So much for the constitution. — NOS4A2
How do we 'justify' stating the rules? — creativesoul
I suppose then that guns shoot people? Lock them up! — NOS4A2
Sorry, guns are killers now. I wonder how they get away with it. — NOS4A2
Guns are murderers now. — NOS4A2
If it is the case that kicking puppies is forbidden, then it is the case that one ought not kick puppies. Those two claims express the same state of affairs. Hence, "one ought not kick puppies" is true. — creativesoul
Humans don’t command or order, then, only their words do? — NOS4A2
My position is that some utterances of ought are true. Utterances of ought are a kind of claim. All true claims correspond to reality. Some utterances of ought correspond to reality. — creativesoul
Do orders order, commands command, according to you? — NOS4A2
He used the word 'verify'.
I don't think he's equivocating the two the way you are — AmadeusD
Can you verify those claims? I'd love to see that. — creativesoul
Are people orders now? — NOS4A2
These are all irrelevant questions. — creativesoul
I didn’t say their orders coerced her. — NOS4A2
A company is a thing, and is not physical. So is a promise, and a mortgage, and a marriage. — Banno
They’ve ordered her to remove Trump from the ballot. — NOS4A2
People coerce others. — NOS4A2
That particular state of affairs consists of both physical and non physical things. — creativesoul
I am blaming the court for coercing the secretary — NOS4A2
It seems your argument is something like if a claim cannot be verified it ought not be believed — creativesoul
Well, you were seeking verification. Hence... rules. Rules... are an example of b. — creativesoul
I personally do not feel the need to verify that we ought not kick puppies. I do not need a rule for that. — creativesoul
