Maine secretary of state disqualifies Trump from primary ballot

Bellows said she received three challenges to Trump's primary nomination petition, two of which argued that the former president did not meet the qualifications for the presidency because he had engaged in insurrection and is therefore ineligible to hold public office under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

The third challenge argued that Trump should be found ineligible under the 22nd Amendment, which establishes that "no person should be elected to the office of president more than twice." Under this theory, the petitioner, Paul Gordon, said that Trump should be disqualified because he has long claimed to have won the 2020 election.

...

Bellows concluded that Trump had engaged in insurrection and that sufficient evidence had been provided to "demonstrate the falsity of Mr. Trump's declaration that he meets the qualifications of the office of the presidency."

That third challenge is hilarious.

I did say "if Englishness exists". — Janus

Well, there is such a thing as being English, but it's not a biological or behavioural feature of people; it's a legal status.

We know humans are biological organisms; do we have any evidence that they are more than that? — Janus

If humans are conscious and if consciousness is non-biological then consciousness is evidence that humans are more than biological organisms.

Of course whether or not consciousness is biological is the very thing being questioned, which is why it begs the question to argue that humans are just biological organisms.

We don't know whether or not consciousness is biological and so we don't know whether or not humans are just biological organisms.

I’m just asking what the word “consciousness” refers to. I have to Imagine a string going from the word to what it is in the world the word refers to. The dualist would have nowhere to put it because it would either attach to some biology, or nothing. Non-physical stuff is just a roundabout way of saying “nothing”, in my view, because nothing indicates such stuff exists. — NOS4A2

So this is just begging the question.

Maybe it’s an abstract term denoting abstract qualities of physical things, particularity conscious organisms. — NOS4A2

Are abstract qualities physical? If not, are they real?

No, that's right, it would be observed in behavior, also a physical phenomenon. — Janus

Because no true Scotsman puts sugar on his porridge?

But that aside, I'm questioning NOS's assertion that because the adjective "conscious" is used to describe biological organisms then consciousness must be biological. I don't think that at all follows. "English", "wet", and "stylish" are adjectives that are used to describe biological organisms, but it doesn't follow that Englishness, wetness, and style must be biological.

Consciousness may very well be physical, but this cannot be proved simply by looking at how adjectives are used.

And, of course, the assertion that humans are just biological organism begs the question.

Would not "Englishness", if it exists, be some manifest quality or qualities? — Janus

If it is you're not going to find it by putting my body under a microscope. At best you can check my birth certificate or passport. Even though it's me that's English, not those pieces of paper.

So it's really strange that NOS thinks that dualism can be refuted by looking at the grammatical use of the adjective "conscious".

Physiology applies to an organism and the way it functions. Consciousness applies to what? — NOS4A2

I have no idea what you're asking here.

Dualists claim that humans are a collection of physical and non-physical (mental) stuff. The term "biology" is used to refer to the physical stuff and the term "consciousness" is used to refer to the non-physical (mental) stuff. To say that a human is conscious is to say that it has this non-physical (mental) stuff.

Whereas materialists claim that humans are a collection of physical stuff alone and that the term "consciousness" refers to some subsection of that physical stuff. To say that a human is conscious is to say that it has this subsection of that physical stuff.

There is no hard problem if the term "conscious" describes the concrete. — NOS4A2

Yes, if. But either way, there undoubtedly seems to me a hard problem, hence the existence of substantial contemporary philosophical literature on the nature of consciousness and of substance and property dualism. So either it is the case that consciousness is a physical thing, but significantly more complex than every other physical thing in the universe, or it isn't a physical thing.

The circularity begins when you promise that “ when we describe ourselves as being conscious we're describing that non-physiological aspect of ourselves”, and when asked which non-physical aspect of ourselves we’re describing, you answer “consciousness”. — NOS4A2

I don't think it's circular. If you asked me what "physiology" describes, the answer is physiology.

I’m only arguing that if consciousness does not apply to the physiology, there is no other object to which it can apply. — NOS4A2

What does physiology apply to? The question doesn't make sense. Physiology is just its own thing. Similarly, if dualism is correct then consciousness is just its own thing.

The reason I would say no such aspects exist is because there is no indication such aspects exist. — NOS4A2

There's certainly something peculiar about consciousness given that a "hard" problem of consciousness is even considered. We don't consider a "hard" problem of electricity or water after all. Of course, that might just be because consciousness is significantly more complicated than every other natural phenomenon in the universe. Or it might be because consciousness really is non-natural and that there really is a "hard" problem.

That we are conscious is that consciousness is an aspect of our being, and consciousness is some non-physical supervenient phenomenon (according to the dualist).

You cannot argue that such a thing doesn't exist by arguing that we describe ourselves as being conscious and that our being is exhausted by our physiology, because in arguing that our being is exhausted by our physiology you are begging the question.

What non-physical aspect of ourselves does the word "conscious" describe? — NOS4A2

Consciousness.

I honestly don't know what other kind of answer you're expecting.

What non-physiological aspects are you speaking of? — NOS4A2

Consciousness.

Winner” is a noun. I was talking about the switch from adjectives to nouns, for instance “happy” becomes “happiness”. Try describing “happy” without referencing an object. It’s difficult. Luckily language permits us to make of the adjective a noun, treating it as if it was concrete and its own thing, where we can start to apply more adjectives to it. It becomes a “quality”, “state”, or “condition”. This raises the question: a quality, state, or condition of what thing? In the case of human consciousness, the answer is the human, which is physiological. If we cannot answer that question, we just start compounding adjectives, describing really nothing. — NOS4A2

Then "wet" or "well-dressed".

Of course, the other issue is that in saying "the answer is the human, which is physiological" you're begging the questioning. If there is something like a non-physical consciousness that humans have then humans aren't just physiological; we're physiological and conscious, and when we describe ourselves as being conscious we're describing that non-physiological aspect of ourselves.

The adjective describes the thing, which in the case of an organism is wholly physiological. It does not nor cannot describe anything else. — NOS4A2

When I describe John as being the winner of the race I'm describing John, but being a winner is not the same thing as being John. In fact, nothing about John's base biology has anything to do with him being the winner of the race. Of course, his base biology obviously plays an explanatory role in how he won, but having his biology and being the winner of the race are independent things.

When I describe John as being conscious I'm describing John, but being conscious is not the same thing as being John. And, like above, it may be that nothing about John's base biology has anything to do with him being conscious. Of course, his base biology seems to play an explanatory role in how he's conscious, but having his biology and being conscious may be independent things.

The adjective “conscious” describes the organism, which is physiological. So why would we even approach anything non-physical with the word? — NOS4A2

I don't quite understand this. When I describe myself as English the word "English" is an adjective, being used to describe me, but "Englishness" isn't some physiological thing.

The fact that we use the word "conscious" to describe a physiological organism doesn't mean that consciousness is physiological. That a physiological organism is conscious is that (according to the dualist) the physiological organism has/produces non-physical consciousness.

It’s evident, to me at least, that a person is conscious for biological reasons. — NOS4A2

That a person is conscious for biological reasons isn’t necessarily that consciousness is physiological. Consciousness may be a non-physical product of certain physical processes. Disrupting those physical processes will disrupt consciousness, but they can nonetheless be distinct things.

Otherwise, it creates a legal loophole where a President can commit any crime he wants and then pardon himself, over and over. — GRWelsh

Well, what's supposed to happen is that if the President tried to do this then the upstanding members of Congress would impeach him and remove him from office.

Can a convicted felon even serve as POTUS — GRWelsh

Yes.

What if he gets a sentence of prison time? Can he serve as POTUS from prison? — GRWelsh

I suspect any sentence will be suspended until after his term, and then if it's a federal conviction he will pardon himself. Who knows how the Supreme Court will rule on that.

I'm not sure about a specific moral system, but there's Moore's open-question argument, as explained here:

Moore’s “Open Question Argument” for the conclusion that goodness is a non-natural property is closely related to his worries about the naturalistic fallacy. Consider any proposed naturalistic analysis N of a moral predicate M. The Open Question Argument maintains that it will always be possible for someone competent with moral discourse without conceptual confusion to grant that something is N but still wonder whether it is really M. Whether goodness is co-instantiated with any natural property or set of natural properties is in this sense always a conceptually open question. If, however, N really was an accurate analysis of M then the question, “I know it is N but is it M?” would not be open in this way for a conceptually competent judge any more than the question, “I know he is a bachelor but is he unmarried?” can be an open one.

Another issue with ethical naturalism is related to the problem of deriving an ought from an is. If "this is immoral" just means "this is harmful" then "one ought not be immoral" just means "one ought not be harmful", but how can we justify the assertion that one ought not be harmful? Can we do so with reference to some other natural fact, or must we depend on some non-natural fact?

So there are good reasons to believe that if there are moral facts then these moral facts (whatever they are) must be non-natural facts.

Although, as you say, without a substantive positive definition this is a rather vacuous claim, and if, as I say, non-natural moral facts would have no practical relevance, and if moral facts must have practical relevance, then if there are moral facts then these moral facts must be natural facts.

Which leads us to the crux of the issue: natural moral facts don't appear to work and non-natural moral facts don't appear to work, suggesting some kind of antirealism, whether that be subjectivism (whether individual or social), error theory, or non-cognitivism.

Otherwise you're left with the undefined term of "morality." — Hanover

That is indeed one of my other gripes with ethical non-naturalism. It states what morality is not but seems to lack a substantive positive definition.

I suppose one account is to define it by saying that "X is immoral" just means "one ought not X".

If so then my statements above can be rephrased as:

1. If a) it is the case that one ought not eat meat and b) I believe that it is the case that one ought not eat meat then c) I won't eat meat.

2. If a) it is not the case that one ought not eat meat but b) I believe that it is the case that one ought not eat meat then c) I won't eat meat.

The practical implication of each b) is each c), but I can't see what the practical implication of each a) is.

See the second section of this where I set out ethical non-naturalism.

Yeah, you introduced that only after folk showed the OP wasn't working. — Banno

I alluded to it on the second page, 7 years ago:

Presumably obligations are not identical to natural properties like causing harm, for example. "One ought not kill babies" doesn't mean the same thing as "killing babies causes harm". So it seems to me that obligations, if anything, are something "extra". So there's no prime facie reason to believe that there couldn't be a world that has the same empirical facts as ours but without these obligations (whatever they are). — Michael

I was then explicit about it on the third page, 14 days ago:

What are the practical consequences of having a true belief? What are the practical consequences of having a false belief? I can't see that there are – or could be – any.

It seems to be a necessary consequence of any ethical non-naturalism that moral facts are irrelevant. — Michael

I think it's just the case that some people aren't actually reading what I'm writing.

The practical implications have to do with eating, harvesting, and producing animals, as I already noted. — Leontiskos

They're practical implications of having the belief. I'm asking about the practical implications of that belief being true.

If eating meat is immoral and I believe that eating meat is immoral then I won't eat meat.
If eating meat is not immoral but I believe that eating meat is immoral then I won't eat meat.

Whether or not eating meat is immoral has no affect on whether or not I eat meat or on what will happen if I do or don't.

Yet you refuse to conceive of morality in a non-Kantian manner, and so instead of identifying a flaw in one very localized moral theory, you falsely conclude that all of morality is inherently flawed. — Leontiskos

Firstly, I am specifically addressing ethical non-naturalism, which states that:

1. Ethical sentences express propositions.
2. Some such propositions are true.
3. Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of human opinion.
4. These moral features of the world are not reducible to any set of non-moral features.

Secondly, I am only saying that if moral features are not reducible to non-moral features (e.g. pain, harm, suffering, etc.) then the existence (or non-existence) of these moral features has no practical implications.

And I'm not necessarily saying that therefore ethical non-naturalism is false. I'm only saying that if it's true then I don't understand the motivation to be moral.

No, not even that, not yet. — Banno

Well as I've made clear several times I am considering the implications of ethical non-naturalism. If ethical non-naturalism is true then ...

If you want to argue against ethical non-naturalism then that's a topic for a different discussion, and one on which I might be inclined to agree with you.

So here's the foundation of ethics: "What to do?" — Banno

I'm not sure what to make of this. Is this even cognitivism?

And yet we each must act, and hence each must choose what to do. — Banno

Yes, so as the OP asks, why consider morality when choosing what to do? Why not just consider our desires and pragmatism?

* Our standing with our fellows, with society at large, and with ourselves is elevated by being moral, and reduced when seen to be immoral. — hypericin

This has nothing to do with moral facts and everything to do with moral beliefs. It is pragmatic to behave in ways that society believes is moral.

* Our moral training induces a feeling of guilt when we are moral immoral, and self-satisfaction when moral — hypericin

This has nothing to do with moral facts and everything to do with moral beliefs. We feel guilty when we behave in ways that we believe are immoral.

Empathy causes us pain when we cause harm to others, by literally feeling it. Similarly, when we see others in pain, we feel that pain, and ease our own suffering by easing theirs. — hypericin

If ethical non-naturalism is true then it might be that causing harm isn't immoral.

So your thread argues that apart from the moral reasons for being moral, there are no other reasons to be moral. — Banno

I'm not even sure it makes sense to say that there's a moral reason for being moral. It's like saying that there are pragmatic reasons for being pragmatic. It strikes me as a strange way to talk. Rather we should only say that there's a moral reason to not eat meat or a pragmatic reason to eat meat.

The question of the OP, then, is why we choose to consider moral reasons at all. At least we get something out of being practical. There are prima facie no benefits to being moral. Being moral for the sake of being moral seems pointless.

An interesting article I've just found:

Why Should I Be Moral? Revisited, Kai Nielson (1984)

Some philosophers have resisted the very posing of this question. They have taken it to be a pseudo question. I first want to respond to them in a rather brisk manner. That is, I will respond to those who want to reject the question not because it is immoral to ask it but for the reason that it is – or so they believe – senseless to ask it. It makes about as much sense, they claim, as asking "Why are all scarlet things red?" If we reflect carefully on the occurrence of the word "should" in the putative question "Why should I be moral" we will come to see, the claim goes, that we are trying to ask for the logically impossible: we are asking for a moral reason to accept any moral reasons at all.

That objection evaporates as soon as we reflect on the fact that not all intelligible uses of "should" are moral uses of the term. When I ask, "Should I put a bandage on that cut?" I am not normally asking a moral question and the "should" does not here have a moral use. When I ask, "Why should I be moral?" I am not asking, if I have my wits about me, "What moral reason or reasons have I for being moral?" That indeed is like asking "Why are all scarlet things red?" Rather, I am asking, can I, everything considered, give a reason sufficiently strong – a non-moral reason clearly – for my always giving an overriding weight to moral considerations, when they conflict with other considerations, such that I could be shown to be acting irrationally, or at least less rationally than I otherwise would be acting, if I did not give such pride of place to moral considerations?

All of this is to say (1) there are consequences to breaking moral codes, (2) the distinction between moral codes and legal codes is idiosyncratic to secular societies and not some metaphysical distinction, and (3) the truth value of a claim can be based upon a social norm that is reducible to nothing more than an idea or belief. — Hanover

This would be something like cultural relativism? That isn't the kind of meta-ethics I'm asking about. As per the OP I'm specifically assuming some kind of robust moral realism (objectivism) – and specifically of the non-naturalist kind.

Change the word "moral" to "legal." Now does it matter? — Hanover

Yes, because there are consequences to the breaking the law.

Morality affects people's behaviors and it affects people's responses to you. — Hanover

Moral beliefs affect people's behaviours. If you believe that it is immoral to eat meat then it makes no difference if your belief is true or false. Either way you're going to bitch at me for eating meat.

It remains that if vegetarianism is true, then eating meat is bad. — Banno

I haven't claimed otherwise.

I'm trying to understand what you're getting at I guess. — Hanover

Assume that it is immoral to eat meat. I eat meat. What are the practical consequences?
Assume that it is not immoral to eat meat. I eat meat. What are the practical consequences?

Any practical consequences in the first case are the same as any practical consequences in the second case. As such, whether or not it is immoral to eat meat makes no practical difference.

Compare with:

Assume that the water is boiling. I put my hand in the water. What are the practical consequences?
Assume that the water is not boiling. I put my hand in the water. What are the practical consequences?

There are practical consequences in the first case that differ from the practical consequences in the second case. As such, whether or not the water is boiling makes a practical difference.

So I can see why it matters if the water is boiling. But I can't see why it matters if it's immoral to eat meat.

Ok, so except for all the morally bad things, nothing morally bad will happen...

Not such a profound observation. — Banno

I didn't say nothing morally bad will happen. I said that nothing non-morally bad will happen.

Clear as mud. "Nothing bad will happen if I disobey an obligation" - the "bad" thing that will have happened is that you will have disobeyed an obligation. — Banno

I didn't mean "bad" in the moral sense. I pre-empted this response and already changed the wording.

As if someone could have a moral belief that they ought not eat meat without believing that "I ought not eat meat" is true. — Banno

I'm not claiming otherwise.

If eating meat is immoral, then "eating meat is immoral" is true, and the direct practical implication is that one ought not eat meaty. — Banno

The existence of the obligation has no practical implication.

If I put my hand in water then it matters if it's boiling. If it is then I will burn my hand.

If I eat meat then it doesn't matter if I ought not eat meat. Nothing detrimental will happen if I disobey an obligation and nothing beneficial will happen if I obey an obligation. So why should I care about such an obligation?

Yes, a very odd post, in which you claim that there are no "practical implications" for vegetarianism while pointing out that the vegetarian will probably not eat meat.

What more practical an implication could you find? — Banno

See here:

Moral beliefs certainly have practical implications, in that if people believe that eating meat is immoral then it is likely that less meat is eaten and fewer animals are harvested, but that's not what I'm talking about.

I'm saying that eating meat actually being immoral has no practical implications and that eating meat actually not being immoral has no practical implications.

And from the OP:

Sure, if we believe that we ought not do X then we might not do X, but then it wouldn't really matter if our beliefs were true; only that we have them.

It's certainly not the case that if my belief that eating meat is wrong is true then I won't eat meat and that if my belief that eating meat is wrong is false then I will eat meat, as if moral facts themselves, as distinct from moral beliefs, influence my behaviour.

Hence the answer I gave previously - that it makes no sense to ask why we ought do what we ought do. — Banno

I'm not asking that.

I don't understand this phrase. — Banno

See here.

How is this not a slide from obligation to motivation? Sure, there are issues of weakness of the will. But they presume an obligation avoided, and hence an obligation.

What you are doing here is indeed incomprehensible. — Banno

Assume that we have some obligation. What is our motivation to obey such an obligation?

That's the question asked by the OP.

My stance is that if obligations have no practical import then the mere existence of an obligation is insufficiently motivating.

I ought do this? Okay, but I won't because I don't want to.

Well to be accurate, homosexuality is wrong by her (Muslim) community ethical standard, not her personal moral code (based on her actions). This is very common for folks' morals to clash with their community ethical standards. But she is, in fact, following her moral code. — LuckyR

She told me that she believes it's wrong and struggles with that belief.

Is your main point here just that you think non-naturalism doesn't work and you're therefore a naturalist consequentialist when it comes to ethics? — Hanover

No, I'm just asking a question of non-naturalists: why be moral? It seems to me that if non-naturalism is true then moral facts are of no practical import and so I wonder why they'd be motivated to be moral.

But now that you mention it, perhaps there's a case to argue that moral facts must be of practical import and so if non-naturalism entails that moral facts are of no practical import then non-naturalism must be false, but that's perhaps a topic for a different discussion.

Then I'll give you a real life example. My friend is a gay Muslim. She genuinely believes in the teachings of Islam – including that homosexuality is wrong – and yet she still dates women. She "knows" that this is "haram" but her desires trump her moral beliefs in deciding how to live her life.

Of course for her the choice is more difficult because she believes that she will be punished for doing wrong, but for the non-religious ethical non-naturalist, there's no such punishment. And so my question stands; what is the motivation to be moral?