What's up with all of this mumble-mouth crap? — GRWelsh

He's mentally challenged.

You're the one who said that not causing suffering is both pragmatic and moral, so I'm asking you what you mean by "moral" when you say this.

If that were so, your presence in this forum seems inexplicable. — Banno

Why?

You don't see the incongruity here? — Banno

No. Unless you want to argue for some form of naturalism where "moral" just means "pragmatic"? In which case see Moore's open question argument.

Do you agree with me that, ceteris paribus, one ought not cause suffering for themselves? — Leontiskos

As a pragmatic matter, yes. But I'm asking about morality.

It looks as if you have decided that you cannot act unless you are certain of what to do, and yet you must act and without certainty. So you are stuck. — Banno

I don't need to posit something like "moral obligations" to decide how to act. Wants and pragmatic concerns are more than sufficient.

In all the theorising in this thread we may lose track of the purpose of ethical thinking: to decide what to do. Ethics has to be about the relation between belief and action. — Banno

Lots of things we do have nothing to do with ethics. Lots of things we do are amoral. I don't sleep with men, play baseball, or cut my wrists.

So when do we get to the part where you actually explain morality?

In your other thread you ask if something like A1 is a moral claim or a pragmatic claim.

...

Why can't it be both? — Leontiskos

I accept that I have a pragmatic reason to not cause myself suffering. But what do you mean by saying that we also have a moral reason to not cause myself suffering? What does the term "moral" add? And what evidence or reasoning suggests that, in addition to being pragmatic, avoiding suffering is also moral?

Yep.

You choose for yourself what to believe. You choose whether to laugh with them or to stop them. — Banno

What does any of this have to do with morality and moral obligation?

But outside of this debate, you would not kick the puppy. That's not who you are. That's the point. — Banno

Others do. It's who they are.

One demonstrates the reality of the world by interacting with it, hence the reality of ethical statements by enacting them. — Banno

You don't kick a puppy. I kick a puppy. We've both interacted with the world.

Your comments don't really say anything relevant at all.

The mystery of the missing binder: How a collection of raw Russian intelligence disappeared under Trump

A binder containing highly classified information related to Russian election interference went missing at the end of Donald Trump’s presidency, raising alarms among intelligence officials that some of the most closely guarded national security secrets from the US and its allies could be exposed, sources familiar with the matter told CNN.

Its disappearance, which has not been previously reported, was so concerning that intelligence officials briefed Senate Intelligence Committee leaders last year about the missing materials and the government’s efforts to retrieve them, the sources said.

In the two-plus years since Trump left office, the missing intelligence does not appear to have been found.

The binder contained raw intelligence the US and its NATO allies collected on Russians and Russian agents, including sources and methods that informed the US government’s assessment that Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to help Trump win the 2016 election, sources tell CNN.

The intelligence was so sensitive that lawmakers and congressional aides with top secret security clearances were able to review the material only at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, where their work scrutinizing it was itself kept in a locked safe.

The binder was last seen at the White House during Trump’s final days in office. The former president had ordered it brought there so he could declassify a host of documents related to the FBI’s Russia investigation. Under the care of then-White House chief of staff Mark Meadows, the binder was scoured by Republican aides working to redact the most sensitive information so it could be declassified and released publicly.

...

But an unredacted version of the binder containing the classified raw intelligence went missing amid the chaotic final hours of the Trump White House. The circumstances surrounding its disappearance remain shrouded in mystery.

I take it that since you cannot make the possibility of any kind of moral obligation believable, you do not believe it is immoral to kill babies. Therefore there are no possible worlds in which we can discuss these worlds you propose as your presence makes them impossible. — unenlightened

That doesn't make sense. There's a possible world where I believe in moral obligation. There's a possible world where I'm a bartender. There's a possible where I dye my hair.

I'm not sure what you think possible worlds are.

But why must it end there? This seems like fleeing from battle while declaring your victory. Admitting that your belief is just an arbitrary dogma gets you points for honesty but not much else. — goremand

Some here seem overly fond of appeals to the stone.

I think that "queerness" is not easy to establish -- or, at least, is as hard to establish as "not-queer". I don't know how we get to a place where we know, or are even able to judge, what queerness is. — Moliere

Rather than "queer", how about "non-physical" and "non-mathematical"?

We can learn of and test physical and mathematical claims; empirically in the case of the physical and rationally by applying rules of inferences to some set of axioms in the case of mathematics (and other formal logical systems).

What about for moral claims? As that article continues to say, "in order to track such weird properties we would need 'some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else'."

What evidence or reasoning is there for such a thing? As @hypericin says, it introduces a new ontological category, apparently a propos of nothing. If you cannot justify the existence of such things, why posit them in the first place?

I suspect many just have something like a base need to "validate" their disgust of certain behaviours.

But I will just point out that you have undermined all of your thread which is based on various scenarios of "everyone believes..." — unenlightened

What do you mean by this?

There what is again?

In the first case, there is harm; in the second, no harm — Banno

There is harm in the second case. We're just not morally obligated to not harm.

This post explains it more clearly.

Value systems are not true or false. — Joshs

My questioning is direct at moral cognitivists, i.e. those who believe that moral propositions are truth-apt. In particular it's directed at ethical non-naturalists, i.e. those who believe that moral facts are non-natural, and robust moral realists, i.e. those who believe that moral facts are mind-independent.

I really don't understand what you are saying.

Here are two possible worlds:

1. We have a moral obligation to save the human race from extinction
2. We do not have a moral obligation to save the human race from extinction

If we believe that we have a moral obligation to save the human race from extinction then what is the practical difference between us being in world 1 (where our belief is true) and us being in world 2 (where our belief is false)?

In neither case do we know which world we're in, but in both cases we believe that we are in world 1.

If there is no practical difference then which world we're in is inconsequential. All that matters is that we believe that we have a moral obligation to save the human race from extinction and so act accordingly.

At least the house members you cited are acting in good faith — NOS4A2

Well that's delusional thinking.

But you cannot make the possibility believable? — unenlightened

I can't make the possibility of any kind of moral obligation believable. That's really what I'm trying to show here.

If it's logically possible for there to be a moral obligation to harm and if it's logically possible for there to be a moral obligation to not harm, and if there's no practical difference between being morally obligated to harm and being morally obligated to not harm, then moral obligations are a vacuous concept.

That’s why an inquiry is in order, to find the answers. — NOS4A2

So because some member of Biden's family (Hunter?) received money from some foreign company an impeachment inquiry into Presidential corruption is warranted? That's one hell of a stretch.

It's far more tenuous than any of the allegations against Trump, and yet you railed against them as being politically motivated. Do you recognize the hypocrisy and bias in your approach to this allegation against Biden?

What's written there is so vague that I can't say. e.g.:

"After the Chinese company wired the Biden associate account the $3 million, the Biden family received approximately $1,065,692 over a three-month period in different bank accounts."

Who is the "Biden associate"? What work was he doing for the Chinese company? Which members of the "Biden family" received money from him, and what work were they doing?

I suspect that the Republicans are being intentionally vague so as to give the false appearance of impropriety as part of their political stunt. Which is why they refused Hunter Biden's offer of a public testimony. They can't falsely accuse him of saying things he didn't actually say if everyone can hear it for themselves.

You would have to make that believable to me. — unenlightened

It simply follows from the fact that "we have a moral obligation to prevent environmental catastrophe and population crash" is not true by definition.

If it's not true by definition then it's not necessarily true, and if it's not necessarily true then it's possibly false. I believe that's straightforward modal logic?

I would not like to be around folk who do that shit. — Banno

What relevance is that? Is liking or not liking to be around folk the measure of obligation?

One ought keep one's promises.

And this because a promise just it the sort of thing one ought to keep. — Banno

Well that's just begging the question.

Such a world would at least have to be a world without humans — unenlightened

Why?

Unless "we have a moral obligation to prevent environmental catastrophe and population crash" is true by definition there is a possible world (with humans) in which we do not have a moral obligation to prevent environmental catastrophe and population crash.

And if it is true by definition then it's a case of ethical naturalism, in which case it's vulnerable to Moore's open question argument.

Well, looking at the first thing in the list, all it says is that "the Biden family" received a lot of money from foreign nationals whilst Joe Biden was Vice President.

What's the issue there? How much money did "the Trump family" receive from foreign nationals whilst Trump was President?

I don't understand what you're saying.

I cannot help you beyond pointing out that moral beliefs are efficacious, and some are life affirming and others life denying. — unenlightened

I agree. Moral beliefs are efficacious. But I'm asking about the efficacy of moral facts.

Given your comments, I have a more tailored question: what is the practical difference between a world in which we have a moral obligation to prevent environmental catastrophe and population crash and a world in which we don't have a moral obligation to prevent environmental catastrophe and population crash, assuming that in both worlds we believe that we have such a moral obligation and so act accordingly.

By my reckoning we could replace moral facts with empirical facts and end up in the same quandary. — Joshs

They’re not equivalent. The world being round or the world being flat has practical consequences. There hasn’t been explained what the practical consequences are of homosexuality being moral or homosexuality being immoral.

Later, we notice that our numbers are dwindling, and there is no one left to change our nappies when we become incontinent. — unenlightened

What does this have to do with the truth or falsity of "one ought not kill babies"?

They don’t have the receipts — NOS4A2

They don't have anything. At best it's a fishing expedition, at worst they know there's nothing to it and are simply carrying it out as a political stunt to hurt Biden and help Trump.

And there are no practical consequences to changing one’s view from ‘it is true that homosexuality is sinful’ to ‘it is false that homosexuality is sinful’? Let’s say the person who has a change of heart is a legislator or a parent of a homosexual child. — Joshs

There are practical consequences to moral beliefs. There appear to be no practical consequences to moral facts.

Imagine two worlds:

1. Homosexuality is immoral but everyone falsely believes that homosexuality is moral
2. Homosexuality is moral and everyone truthfully believes that homosexuality is moral

In both worlds everyone believes that homosexuality is moral. This has practical consequences (e.g. the legality of same-sex marriage). But in one world everyone's belief is correct and in the other everyone's belief is incorrect.

What are the practical consequences of having a true belief? What are the practical consequences of having a false belief? I can't see that there are – or could be – any.

It seems to be a necessary consequence of any ethical non-naturalism that moral facts are irrelevant.

Where are the quotes from everyone else involved, for instance those outlining the evidence so far? I imagine those are all minimized while this one is amplified. — NOS4A2

You mean like this?

Some House Republicans Admit There Is No Evidence to Impeach Biden

Is the belief that homosexuality is sinful a moral belief? — Joshs

Yes.

For example if we all believe it is wrong to kill babies, but we are wrong about that, then there will be more living babies than there ought to be, and hence population overshoot environmental catastrophe, and eventual population crash. — unenlightened

What is the connection between a moral obligation to kill babies and environmental catastrophe?

1. One ought not kill babies, we (truthfully) believe that we ought not kill babies, and if we don't then there will be an environmental catastrophe

2. One ought kill babies, we (falsely) believe that we ought not kill babies, and if we don't then there will be an environmental catastrophe

Whether our belief that we ought not kill babies is true or false has no practical consequences. Either way we believe that we ought not kill babies and if we don't kill babies then there will be an environmental catastrophe.

He said "Donald Trump 2024", therefor he's admitting it's a political sham. — NOS4A2

He said in response to being asked what he was hoping to get from an impeachment enquiry.

Therefor he's admitting real concern for the president's behavior. — NOS4A2

He's feigning real concern.

Openly admitting it's a political stunt.

I see that our interest in high crimes and misdemeanors has really fallen off. — NOS4A2

What high crimes and misdemeanors has Biden committed?

Does the shape of the world not matter? — unenlightened

I address that in my post?

"Unlike other kinds of beliefs, our moral beliefs being right or wrong has no practical consequences."