it hasn't been proven that the categorical imperative "one ought not kick puppies" is true. — Michael

Need it be 'proven' in order for you to know it?

Need it be 'proven' in order for you to know it? — creativesoul

Well, it needs to be reasonably justified at least.

Does it? I mean justificatory regress has to stop somewhere, right? Why not right there?

Does it? I mean justificatory regress has to stop somewhere, right? Why not right there? — creativesoul

I did make much the same point elsewhere. You just either accept moral realism or you don't. I remain skeptical.

There's your resolution regarding the dissonance.

As an aside, Proust caused a severe case of cognitive dissonance within me after following his logic as he set out Gettier during a lengthy conversation he and I had over a decade ago. That was my first full fledged experience regarding deep considerations of the Gettier problem. That resolution wasn't nearly as neat or as tidy as this one.

:wink:

There's your resolution regarding the dissonance. — creativesoul

It doesn't resolve it because I don't know which side to take. Do I accept that, as a categorical imperative, I ought not kick puppies, or do I accept that categorical imperatives make no sense? You might be able to pick a side without justification but I can't.

Hence why I remain a skeptic.

Thank you for directing us to these essays. I'm reading Simpson now . . . and coincidentally, the group biography "Metaphysical Animals" which focuses on Anscombe, among other women philosophers.

I think this is the strongest argument against hard realism:

Looking at @Michael's options:

a) no moral sentence is truth-apt
c) no moral sentence is true
e) some moral sentence is true if everyone believes so
f) some moral sentence is true even if nobody believes so


f stands out as requiring a separate kind of thing in the universe: moral facts. That puts supporters of f at a unique disadvantage. If we are going to introduce a new ontological category, then there should be something only that new kind of thing can explain, or direct evidence of its existence, for the addition to not be gratuitous. But hard realists can furnish neither. Therefore f should be discarded.

This parallels the deism debate. It is famously hard to prove the non-existence of an (also ontologically novel) being. But it is up to the deists to provide direct evidence, or something that cannot be explained without a deity.

That's the very thing being discussed.

1. A categorical imperative is just "one ought not X".
2. A hypothetical imperative is "according to Y, one ought not X" or "one ought not X or Z will happen."

I cannot rationally justify the truth of any (1), and yet many seem to be true. It's something of a cognitive dissonance. — Michael

One ought keep one's promises.

And this because a promise just it the sort of thing one ought to keep.

And again, I don't see that "one ought not kick puppies for fun" needs any further justification. I would not like to be around folk who do that shit.

Hello, . You beat me to it.

I would not like to be around folk who do that shit. — Banno

What relevance is that? Is liking or not liking to be around folk the measure of obligation?

One ought keep one's promises.

And this because a promise just it the sort of thing one ought to keep. — Banno

Well that's just begging the question.

What relevance is that? Is liking or not liking to be around folk the measure of obligation? — Michael

Not at all. But this is where Wittgenstein was heading - that at some stage the justifications have to end, and we say: "This is what we do!"

You are bothered by "categorical imperatives", by authority, both looking for some way to ground your imperatives, to provide certainty. I don't see a need for that. You both agree that we ought not kick puppies, but want something more... as if, upon coming across a puppy-kicker, you would be able to convince them of the error of their ways by your brilliant philosophical argumentation. No, you get the bugger arrested.

Ethics is about what we do, and so it does not rest on argument but on action.

Well that's just begging the question. — Michael

Exactly!

This is the argument from queerness. I googled "argument from queerness" and found only responses and an old archived SEP article.

I think that "queerness" is not easy to establish -- or, at least, is as hard to establish as "not-queer". I don't know how we get to a place where we know, or are even able to judge, what queerness is.

Nice catch on the SEP archive.

The Argument from Queerness suggests that moral stuff presents us with “qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe”. Why can't a realist simply agree with this and say that these qualities and relations are indeed different, precisely because these are the characteristics of moral qualities...

Perhaps the supposed "queerness" is a consequence of their direction of fit being world to word.

Not at all. But this is where Wittgenstein was heading - that at some stage the justifications have to end, and we say: "This is what we do!"

But why must it end there? This seems like fleeing from battle while declaring your victory. Admitting that your belief is just an arbitrary dogma gets you points for honesty but not much else.

I think that "queerness" is not easy to establish -- or, at least, is as hard to establish as "not-queer". I don't know how we get to a place where we know, or are even able to judge, what queerness is. — Moliere

Rather than "queer", how about "non-physical" and "non-mathematical"?

We can learn of and test physical and mathematical claims; empirically in the case of the physical and rationally by applying rules of inferences to some set of axioms in the case of mathematics (and other formal logical systems).

What about for moral claims? As that article continues to say, "in order to track such weird properties we would need 'some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else'."

What evidence or reasoning is there for such a thing? As @hypericin says, it introduces a new ontological category, apparently a propos of nothing. If you cannot justify the existence of such things, why posit them in the first place?

I suspect many just have something like a base need to "validate" their disgust of certain behaviours.

But why must it end there? This seems like fleeing from battle while declaring your victory. Admitting that your belief is just an arbitrary dogma gets you points for honesty but not much else. — goremand

Some here seem overly fond of appeals to the stone.

Ethics is about what we do, and so it does not rest on argument but on action. — Banno

Aren’t actions themselves forms of questions we put to our world, experiments anticipating a response which may either validate or invalidate the action? Isnt even the firmest statement of ethical principle, and the most confident action in service of it, a kind of pragmatic question? Both thought and action seek justification, the first via further thought, the second through a material response from the world.

↪Banno
Not at all. But this is where Wittgenstein was heading - that at some stage the justifications have to end, and we say: "This is what we do!"

But why must it end there? This seems like fleeing from battle while declaring your victory. Admitting that your belief is just an arbitrary dogma gets you points for honesty but not much else — goremand

Not only that, it reveals an implict doubt and self-questioning that directly correlates with the intensity of dogmatic certainty.

Is this the third, our fourth, change of guard on this thread...

But why must it end there? — goremand

Because at some stage one must act.

...as if, upon coming across a puppy-kicker, you would be able to convince them of the error of their ways by your brilliant philosophical argumentation. No, you get the bugger arrested. — Banno

@Leontiskos might find the puppy-kicker culpable for going against the will of god, @Michael can't make a case that kicking puppies is culpable, but we might agree that the act is blameworthy.

...appeals to the stone... — Michael

One demonstrates the reality of the world by interacting with it, hence the reality of ethical statements by enacting them.

is partly right, but perhaps has too sharp a distinction between thought and act. and act. Next he can't decide if doubt is worthy, or a sign of weakness.

One demonstrates the reality of the world by interacting with it, hence the reality of ethical statements by enacting them. — Banno

You don't kick a puppy. I kick a puppy. We've both interacted with the world.

Your comments don't really say anything relevant at all.

But outside of this debate, you would not kick the puppy. That's not who you are. That's the point.

- Sounds good J. I'd be curious to hear what you think, either publicly or privately.

That's the exact problem. "One ought not kick puppies" seems meaningfully true and yet the concept of categorical imperatives seems vacuous. I don't know how to resolve this contradiction.

I have something like a visceral acceptance of such categorical imperatives but I cannot rationally accept the almost magical, wishful thinking of them. — Michael

I think you need to read Simpson's, "Autonomous Morality and the Idea of the Noble." There are some people in this thread who are laboring under the intuitions of modern moral philosophy without understanding the origins. There are others who are also working from that framework while also understanding the origins, and who possess a bit of skepticism about the approach. My post about Simpson, Diem, et al. was directed to the latter group. The knot needs to be loosened before it can be untied.

But outside of this debate, you would not kick the puppy. That's not who you are. That's the point. — Banno

Others do. It's who they are.

Yep.

You choose for yourself what to believe. You choose whether to laugh with them or to stop them.

Yep.

You choose for yourself what to believe. You choose whether to laugh with them or to stop them. — Banno

What does any of this have to do with morality and moral obligation?

That's the exact problem. "One ought not kick puppies" seems meaningfully true and yet the concept of categorical imperatives seems vacuous. I don't know how to resolve this contradiction. — Michael

I started to sketch out a thread relating to your dilemma, but I am finding that I am simply covering ground Simpson has already covered better. Still, here is something I say in that sketch:

Objection 1. [The is-ought problem]

Reply to Objection 1. The way my favorite Thomists address the is-ought problem is by granting the is/ought distinction but denying the fact/value distinction (or something to this effect). It is not possible to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, and the idea that there are brute ‘oughts’ is implausible. But if there are self evident “values,” or teleological realities which also implicate the human mind, then ‘oughts’ will naturally flow from these. And they do. The two arguments in the OP are two examples. Once we know what suffering is we know we ought to avoid it. The same would hold of ‘injury’, which is the more robust concept. — Leontiskos' draft

So let's take an example that more or less grants the modern paradigm (and for that reason I am tempted to strike it from my draft):

• A1. Ceteris paribus, I should not cause suffering for myself
• A2. Others are like me
• A3. Therefore, ceteris paribus, I should not cause suffering for others

In your other thread you ask if something like A1 is a moral claim or a pragmatic claim (). Let's just leave your notions of "naturalism" and "non-naturalism" to the side for a moment. Why can't it be both? And more fundamentally, do you believe it to be true or do you believe it to be false?

That suffering ought to be avoided should not be a contentious claim. "Suffering ought to be sought" is a sort of synthetic contradiction (). We might choose suffering for some ulterior reason, but we never do (and never should) choose suffering as an end in itself.

What I want to say is, "Let this truth reorganize your flawed system. Your system says that there are no normative truths, but this argument disproves that thesis, and therefore the system is flawed" (). Of course this is very hard for people to do, for it requires overthrowing the entire modern way of doing moral philosophy (and philosophy of mind). Wayfarer was clearly not able to do it in that thread. That's why I offered stepping stones in my earlier post ().

What does any of this have to do with morality and moral obligation? — Michael

In all the theorising in this thread we may lose track of the purpose of ethical thinking: to decide what to do. Ethics has to be about the relation between belief and action.