"One ought not x" is only referential if you have a state of affairs to refer to. In this case, you haven't established it. You end up on 'brute fact' but i don't accept that position, so, as i actually began this part of the exchange - we have no further to go on this journey together. — AmadeusD

As I said above, it doesn't refer to anything that exists external to the mind, but as I have been at pains to explain, something doesn't need to exist for it to be a state of affairs. That Santa doesn't exist is a state of affairs.

You seem to be suggesting that something is a state of affairs if it is (or was? or will be?) a physical thing. Realists reject this assumption. There are non-physical states of affairs; that Santa doesn't exist, that 1 + 1 = 2, that certain arguments are valid, that it is irrational to believe in something if the evidence suggests otherwise, etc. Moral realists argue that that one ought not harm another is another such non-physical state of affairs.

It's the linguistic representation of a thought, not a state of affairs. If your position is that a sentence is necessarily representative of a state of affairs, i find that bizarre and hard to grasp.

No, i understand the distinction you're making. — AmadeusD

You clearly don't understand the distinction.

"The cat is on the mat" is the linguistic representation of a thought, but that the cat is on the mat is not the linguistic representation of a thought; it's a state of affairs. Note the difference that removing the quotation marks makes.

You said:

"One ought not x" ... is a thought, not a state of affairs.

Firstly, "one ought not x" is a sentence, not a thought. Specifically, in this case, it is a written sentence.

Secondly, I'm not saying that "one ought not x" is a state of affairs; I'm saying that that one ought not x is a state of affairs. Note the lack of quotation marks; it's important. Again, see the use-mention distinction.

it certainly doesn't refer to anything external to the mind. — AmadeusD

It doesn't refer to anything that exists external to the mind, but as I have been at pains to explain, something doesn't need to exist for it to be a state of affairs. That Santa doesn't exist is a state of affairs.

You should look up the use-mention distinction.

"The cat is on the mat" is a sentence. That the cat is on the mat is a state-of-affairs.
"One ought not harm another" is a sentence. That one ought not harm another is a state-of-affairs.

You misunderstand what that is saying.

Moral realism claims that there are facts of the matter about which actions are right and which are wrong.

Moral realism doesn't claim that these actions are right and that these actions are wrong.

One can be a moral realist and claim that moral sentences are truth-apt and describe objective features of the world without commenting on whether or not abortion is wrong.

This is the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics. Moral realism – like non-cognitivism, subjectivism, and error theory – is a theory in metaethics. Utilitarianism and deontology are theories in normative ethics.

all “alien” refers to is non-human, non-Earthbound life forms. All of those elements have direct referents which we almalgamate. — AmadeusD

The sentence "angels do not live in Heaven" is true even though the words "angel" and "heaven" do not refer to anything.

But noting the issue you’re outlining my question is - what moral facts could exist a priori? That is, without human knowledge of them? — AmadeusD

That we ought not eat babies. It's true even if we all believe otherwise (and even if we never consider it at all).

What are we discovering when we come across moral facts? — AmadeusD

We are discovering moral facts. You seem to be asking me to reduce moral facts to non-moral facts. Moral facts can't be reduced to non-moral facts. See Hume.

As I understand it, "moral realism" --I don't like and never use this term-- is basically about making a list of what things are right and what are wrong. — Alkis Piskas

No, that's normative ethics.

Moral truths are necessarily attendant to the world in which we live. They must refer. — AmadeusD

If there is no intelligent alien life in the universe then the sentence "there is no intelligent alien life in the universe" is true, even though the phrase "intelligent alien life" wouldn't refer to anything that exists.

If one ought not eat babies then the sentence "one ought not eat babies" is true, even though the phrase "ought not" wouldn't refer to anything that exists.

I see no reason to believe your assertion that if obligation isn't a physical then then there are no obligations. You have yet to justify this assertion.

mathematical facts are not moral facts. — AmadeusD

I'm not saying that mathematical facts are moral facts.

I'm saying that mathematical truths do not depend on the existence of anything (whether material or abstract).

Therefore, it is fallacious to say that truths depend on the existence of something (whether material or abstract).

Therefore, it is prima facie fallacious to say that moral truths depend on the existence of something (whether material or abstract).

You need positive evidence or reasoning to assert that moral truths depend on the existence of something (whether material or abtract).

Trump’s Gag Orders Reinstated by Appeals Court in New York Civil Fraud Case

I’m glad there are still some adults in the system, to be honest.

Carrying on from this, one of these must be true:

1. Mathematical truths depend on the existence of spacetime
2. Mathematical truths depend on the existence of material objects
3. Mathematical truths depend on the existence of abstract objects
4. Mathematical truths depend on the existence of magic
5. Mathematical truths depend on the existence of God
6. Mathematical truths depend on the existence of [some other thing]
7. Mathematical truths do not depend on the existence of anything
8. There are no mathematical truths

I know that mathematical realists will say that (3) is true. Mathematical antirealists like myself will disagree. I can't even make sense of the existence of abstract objects. I certainly will say that (1), (2), (4), and (5) are false.

That leaves me with (6), (7), and (8). I'm unwilling to accept (8) and I can't comment on (6) because it doesn't really say anything.

So I must accept that (7) is true.

And if mathematical truths do not depend on the existence of anything then I see no reason to dismiss the claim that moral truths do not depend on the existence of anything.

Finally, as a passing consideration, "Santa does not exist" being true does not depend on the existence of anything. Rather, by definition, it depends on the non-existence of something (namely, Santa), and I don't think it makes sense to say that Santa's non-existence is itself the existence of something (such as an abstract object).

Now replace “Santa” with “objective moral fact.” Error theory being correct depends on an objective truth that does not depend on the existence of anything, and so an error theorist dismissing realism on the grounds that it depends on an objective truth that does not depend on the existence of anything is self-refuting.

Just because it seems as though there are moral facts because we colloquially express our norms in a moral realist kind of manner does not entail they exist whatsoever: it's a non-sequitur. — Bob Ross

I’m not saying that there are moral facts.

I'll set out my argument as clear as I can:

1. All moral sentences assert that there is some objective moral fact
2. Either there is at least one objective moral fact or there are no objective moral facts
3. If there is at least one objective moral fact then at least one moral sentence is true
4. If there are no objective moral facts then all moral sentences are false
5. If at least one moral sentence is true then realism is correct
6. If all moral sentences are false then error theory is correct
7. Therefore, either realism is correct or error theory is correct
8. The sentence "one ought not eat babies" is a moral sentence
9. If error theory is correct then the sentence "one ought not eat babies" is false
10. If the sentence "one ought not eat babies" is false then it is not the case that one ought not eat babies
11. Therefore, if error theory is correct then it is not the case that one ought not eat babies
12. Therefore, either realism is correct or it is not the case that one ought not eat babies

I can't figure out how a moral fact could escape needing to be tied to space and time — AmadeusD

Do mathematical facts need to be "tied" to space and time? Or are there no mathematical facts?

I don't think this is right: the statement is valid, but in that abstract generic form is not truth apt. — Janus

1. All As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore all As are Cs
2. "All As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore all As are Cs" is a valid argument

I'm not saying that (1) is objectively true; I'm saying that (2) is objectively true.

It is objectively true that (1) is valid, and this does not depend on the existence of an external world; it certainly does not depend on the existence of spacetime or any material object, and I would even say that it does not depend on the existence of any abstract object (à la Platonism).

Objective truths do not depend on the existence of anything (except in the obvious case of something like "X exists").

You seem to be talking about normative ethics, applied ethics, and/or descriptive ethics. I'm talking about metaethics.

Metaethics:

One of the central debates within analytic metaethics concerns the semantics of what is actually going on when people make moral statements such as “Abortion is morally wrong” or “Going to war is never morally justified.” The metaethical question is not necessarily whether such statements themselves are true or false, but whether they are even the sort of sentences that are capable of being true or false in the first place (that is, whether such sentences are “truth-apt”) and, if they are, what it is that makes them “true.” On the surface, such sentences would appear to possess descriptive content—that is, they seem to have the syntactical structure of describing facts in the world—in the same form that the sentence “The cat is on the mat” seems to be making a descriptive claim about a cat on a mat; which, in turn, is true or false depending on whether or not there really is a cat on the mat. To put it differently, the sentence “The cat is on the mat” seems to be expressing a belief about the way the world actually is. The metaethical view that moral statements similarly express truth-apt beliefs about the world is known as cognitivism. Cognitivism would seem to be the default view of our moral discourse given the apparent structure that such discourse appears to have.

I have extended this line of reasoning to argue that moral sentences seem to be expressing a belief about the way the world objectively is. The sentence "it is wrong to eat babies" is closer in kind to the sentence "the cat is on the mat" than it is to the sentence "chocolate is tasty."

When we claim that chocolate is tasty we are expressing an opinion but when we claim that it is wrong to eat babies we are doing more than just expressing an opinion. We disagree about morality in a way very unlike how we disagree about the tastiness of certain foods.

As such, it seems clear that subjectivism (like non-cognitivism) misunderstands the meaning of moral sentences.

Therefore, either moral realism is correct or error theory is correct, and if error theory is correct then it is not the case that it is wrong to eat babies.

I am not quite sure what you mean by "theory of meaning" — Bob Ross

Theories of Meaning

nor why I would need it for this discussion. — Bob Ross

The starting point of any metaethics is the question "what do moral statements mean?".

When I say "you ought not murder" am I saying something like "don't murder" (non-cognitivism), am I saying something like "I disapprove of murder" (subjectivism), or am I trying to describe an objective feature of the world (realism and error theory).

My example argument is that non-cognitivists and subjectivists misunderstand the meaning of moral statements: "you ought not murder" just doesn't mean either "don't murder" or "I disapprove of murder". When we claim something like "one ought not murder" we are trying to describe an objective feature of the world. As such, if there are such features then realism is true and if there aren't such features then error theory is true.

what's the source of the state of affairs — AmadeusD

I'm not sure what you're asking.

I can only imagine (as previously mentioned) a supernatural origin for such a brute claim. — AmadeusD

What do you mean by "supernatural"? If you mean "non-physical" then yes, the moral realist will accept that moral facts are not physical facts; a moral statement being true has nothing to do with the existence of matter, energy, space, or time. Some moral realists may believe in the existence of abstract moral entities (much like mathematical realists believe in the existence of abstract mathematical entities), but I don't think this is required.

"One ought not harm others". Its a judgment, not a state of affairs. But i've just realised we've been over this — AmadeusD

Yes, we have. The moral realist will say that that one ought not harm another is a state of affairs.

But the statement is an opinion, not universally held. — AmadeusD

What statement?

Are you suggesting that what is necessarily an opinion, not universally held, is a brute fact, with this statement? — AmadeusD

No.

or how to get from an is to an ought. — GRWelsh

There need not be an ought from an is. There need only be an ought.

I'd rather not divert this discussion into one on the merits of ordinary language philosophy.

If one accepts ordinary language philosophy then the argument I presented might be used to support moral realism. A moral realist who doesn't accept ordinary language philosophy will offer a different argument.

If there are any examples of (b) then this proves that the world exists
even if the world is mere a projection from one's own mind. — PL Olcott

That's not the kind of world that the OP is asking about. It's clearly talking about something like a world of mind-independent material objects. The very first sentence of the OP reads: "I have been asked ... if I believed in the existence of the world, when I am not perceiving it" and later mentioned being asked "if I believed in the existence of the cup, when I was not seeing it."

Pain isn't proof that fists exist when not being perceived.

Indeed, our aggrieved “ordinary language” response to such a situation, if it's revealed, is, “You didn’t mean it!” So what’s going on here? — J

You're equivocating. When we say "you didn't mean it" we're not saying something like "the words you used didn't mean what they (ordinarily) mean". Instead we're saying something like "you weren't being honest."

Yes, but, as I said, I don't think it is a strong argument when it depends on ordinary language. It doesn't actually negate moral subjectivism, it just states "ordinary language is used in accordance with moral realism, regardless of whether moral realism is true or not"--and the italicized is what is missing in premise 2. I can agree with the fact that ordinary language aligns with moral realist positions while refraining judgment or even negating that moral realism is true. — Bob Ross

To be clear, I'm saying:

1. Ordinary language philosophy is correct.
2. Moral non-cognitivism and moral subjectivism are inconsistent with ordinary language use.
3. Therefore, moral non-cognitivism and moral subjectivism are incorrect.
4. Therefore, either moral realism or error theory is correct.

I am then saying that if there is no positive evidence in favour of either moral realism or error theory, and if we refuse to remain agnostic, then we must either assume moral realism or assume that it is not the case that one ought not eat babies.

Obviously if you reject the premise that ordinary language philosophy is correct then the argument will fail, but then what better theory of meaning do you have?

which is really an intuition based off of ordinary language (that moral realism is true) — Bob Ross

That's not quite correct. The premise is that non-cognitivism and moral subjectivism are inconsistent with ordinary language use, and so that if ordinary language philosophy is correct then either moral realism or error theory is correct.

We then have to decide which of moral realism or error theory is the better "default" position.

Either moral realism, or it is not the case that we ought not eat babies.

just because "one ought..." is usually linguistically interpreted as a fact of the matter, it does not follow that they actually are. — Bob Ross

The meaning of a word is its linguistic use. That's what Wittgenstein tries to show in his Philosophical Investigations. How can meaning be anything else?

As I said, the argument depends on an acceptance of ordinary language philosophy. If you reject ordinary language philosophy then the argument is going to be unconvincing.

In which case, you will no longer be part of the conversation about how to determine what is objectively real — Patterner

Only if you're right and our experiences are accurate. If you're wrong and our experiences are inaccurate then we might just wake up.

The general premises are something like:

1. The meaning of the word "ought" is such that the statement "one ought not X" is truth-apt (cognitivism).

We can defend this with reference to Wittgenstein. In our ordinary language use, as understood by any competent speaker, we agree or disagree with the claim that one ought not X, and agreement and disagreement only makes sense if the claim is truth-apt.

2. The meaning of the word "ought" is such that if the statement "one ought not X" is truth-apt then either a) for every X the statement "one ought not X" is false (error theory) or b) there is at least one X such that the statement "one ought not X" is objectively true (moral realism)

We can also defend this with reference to Wittgenstein. In our ordinary language use, as understood by any competent speaker, when someone claims that one ought not X we understand them as attempting to express an objective fact. As such, moral subjectivism is inconsistent with ordinary language use, and so it must be that if moral statements are truth-apt then either moral realism or error theory is correct.

3. It is not the case that for every X the statement "one ought not X" is false

We can defend this by arguing that there is insufficient evidence or reasoning to support the claim that for every X the statement "one ought not X" is false, and that if there is insufficient evidence or reasoning to support this claim then we are justified in rejecting it.

It would then follow that there is at least one X such that the statement "one ought not X" is objectively true.

I think 3) is the weakest premise as any opponent could instead replace it with:

4. It is not the case that there is at least one X such that the statement "one ought not X" is objectively true

And, like above, they can defend this by arguing that there is insufficient evidence or reasoning to support the claim that there is at least one X such that the statement "one ought not X" is objectively true, and that if there is insufficient evidence or reasoning to support this claim then they are justified in rejecting it.

So if we accept an ordinary language approach that suggests that either moral realism or error theory is correct then we must decide which of the two is the "default" position absent any positive evidence or reasoning in either's favour.

Either it is the case that one ought not eat babies or it is not the case that one ought not eat babies. If you agree with the former then you're a moral realist; if you're an error theorist then you agree with the latter. Pick your poison.

Why can I assume that my experiences are accurate without reason or evidence but can't assume that my experiences are inaccurate without reason or evidence?

Why is the default position that experiences are accurate?

But is there any reason or evidence to suspect either is the case? — Patterner

Is there any reason or evidence to suspect that neither is the case?

Any reason not to accept that things are as they seem?

Are you suggesting that the reason we believe in the veracity of our experiences is simply that we have no good reason to believe them false? Believing them accurate is the "default" position that should be assumed unless presented with evidence to the contrary?

Perhaps the default position should be to remain agnostic?

Facts can be measured whereas principles can only be observed. — Wayfarer

Is this objectively true?

It was just an example. I am trying to explain moral realism. Some facts are brute, and the moral realist will claim that some brute facts are brute moral facts.

There is some X such that "one ought not X" is objectively true because it is a brute fact that one ought not X.

This meta-ethical position need not then address normative ethics.

Not at all. We know that the simulation of a giant star millions of miles away is a very terrible simulation. — PL Olcott

I'm going to remind you of what I said before:

But if one had only ever experienced a poor simulation of reality and never experienced reality then one wouldn't know that one was experiencing a poor simulation of reality and not experiencing reality.

Perhaps in reality grass is red and the Earth has two moons.

You're begging the question, assuming that the world you have experienced your entire life isn't a simulation, and so claiming that a poor simulation would look different to the world we currently experience.

If we keep seeing the guy that changes the light bulb of the Sun changing its light bulb then we would know that the Sun is not a giant star millions of miles away. — PL Olcott

Okay? I don't see how this answers the question.

If we keep seeing the guy that changes the light bulb of the Sun changing its light bulb then how would we know that we are experiencing reality and not a poor simulation (or vice versa)?

Don't you think that might be asking a little too much? It seems to me that Ockham's Razor suggests it's fairly reasonable to chop off the evil scientist as unparsimonious. — wonderer1

Ockham's Razor is a useful heuristic, not an objective measure of metaphysical truth.

If it was a poor simulation we would never be having this conversation because it would be common knowledge that everyone would know. — PL Olcott

I don't see how this follows.

That seems reasonable to me. But you ask: "How do I know that I am perceiving a physical thing in a real world and not just dreaming or hallucinating..." If you don't know how to tell the difference, how do you know there IS a difference? — Patterner

I know that there's a qualitative difference between the experiences I consider dreams and the experiences I consider wakefulness. I presume that the things I experience when I dream are not of external world objects. I then wonder if perhaps that the things I experience when I'm awake are also not of external world objects. I then further wonder if there are external world objects at all.

We can tell that it is not a poor simulation. — PL Olcott

How so? Maybe this is exactly what a poor simulation is like. Perhaps in reality grass is red and the Earth has two moons.

Is there a difference between reality, dreams, and hallucinations? — Patterner

The things we see when we dream and hallucinate are not mind-independent, and don't continue to exist when we don't see them, whereas (many believe) the things we see when we are awake and not hallucinating are mind-independent, and do continue to exist when we don't see them.