Yet it remains open as to whether we ought cooperate. — Banno

Is it open as to whether we ought not move a pawn backwards in chess when playing chess?

What I am saying is that there are certain behaviours that society has deemed acceptable and certain behaviours that society has deemed unacceptable. According to some moral subjectivists when we talk about morality we are talking about these socially acceptable and unacceptable behaviours. The sentence "murder is immoral" is true iff society deems murder unacceptable because "murder is immoral" just means "murder is deemed socially unacceptable." — Michael

As a non-philosopher with a secular orientation, I've generally assumed morality simply referred to a culturally held (intersubjective) code of conduct (where, naturally, there are many outliers and dissenters). We have internalized or incorporated this intersubjectivity to the point where many of the principles have become oughts in a substantive emotional sense. Nevertheless it seems that many people who hold that killing is wrong don't object to killing men, women and children for the sake of territory, politics or religion, or for some different understanding of a 'greater good.' I now understand that I am a moral realist because I hold the position that we shouldn't cause suffering and should try to minimize it. But the interesting part for me in the ought business is the justification.

I don't see a problem with claiming that society has manufactured a set of rules that each member must abide by, and that these are the rules we talk about when we talk about morality. — Michael

Which supports a view that morality is fluid and constantly open to change. Today's outliers are tomorrow's conservatives.

There are many apologies for Abraham's behaviour. Seen at face value, he was morally culpable. — Banno

Yup, I agree. I also do not agree with the apologies -- when I say that Fear and Trembling doesn't end in aporia for me, I side with the conclusion that Abraham was a moral monster.

The interesting part for me in the ought business is the justification. — Tom Storm

The interesting part for me is the very meaning of obligation. I think Anscombe said it best when she described "ought" as "a word of mere mesmeric force".

Agree.

This is where I think things get tricky. I think moral language comes in two varieties:

1. X is wrong
2. One ought not X

Do these mean the same thing? If not, does the one entail the other? — Michael

I think they are both normative; they are both "ought"-claims. By "descriptive" I am thinking of the "is" in the is-ought distinction. It is the complement of normative.

I don't think that this is necessarily the case. There is a normative component to the rules of chess and to laws even though these are manufactured. I don't see a problem with claiming that society has manufactured a set of rules that each member must abide by, and that these are the rules we talk about when we talk about morality. — Michael

Right, understood. But morality is not conceived of as a voluntary activity, whereas chess is. "Pawns cannot move backwards," and, "Babies cannot be eaten," are not the same, because the former only holds given a prior decision to play chess. The latter is not like that.

No, if you would play chess. Yes, if you would be an arsehole.

Again, it's not clear to me what it is you are suggesting, both in that post and in your recent line of thought.

Ethics is difficult - intractable - to the point of there perhaps being no solution; after all, why must there be an answer to "what should we do"?

But morality is not conceived of as a voluntary activity, whereas chess is. — Leontiskos

We can choose to abandon society.

But rather than chess, perhaps laws a good example. We ought to obey the law, and not just for practical reasons.

We ought to obey the law — Michael

And yet sometimes we ought not obey the law. It's never simple.

Again, it's not clear to me what it is you are suggesting, both in that post and in your recent line of thought. — Banno

When playing chess one ought follow the rules and when going about your everyday life one ought obey the law, even though the rules of chess and the law are manufactured by us.

Perhaps there's nothing more to morality than those socially manufactured rules that we impose on one another.

But rather than chess, perhaps laws a good example. We ought to obey the law, and not just for practical reasons. — Michael

Right, but I touched on this earlier when I mentioned positive law and its relation to morality. The common opinion is that a law can be immoral. Further, and more importantly, the law example runs head-on into the circularity objection (). I admit that law is part of morality, but not that it is the whole of morality. I don't think consensus can describe morality in its entirety. See:

I don't have a problem with the idea that consensus carries moral weight, but I believe the circularity argument proves that morality cannot be simply reduced to consensus. — Leontiskos

And yet sometimes we ought not obey the law. It's never simple. — Banno

Yes, sometimes some other rule demands us to break the law. And perhaps this other rule is yet another manufactured rule. I can understand the moral subjectivist taking issue with the claim that there are rules that are simply "built in" to the world (or whatever it is that (robust) moral realists believe).

Rules without a rule-giver does seem spurious.

Yes, sometimes some other rule demands us to break the law. And perhaps this other rule is yet another manufactured rule. I can understand the moral subjectivist taking issue with the claim that there are rules that are simply "built in" to the world or whatever it is (robust) moral realists believe. — Michael

I think Anscombe sums up the problem. We can never manufacture binding rules for ourselves. Self-legislation does not bind:

Kant introduces the idea of "legislating for oneself," which is as absurd as if in these days, when majority votes command great respect, one were to call each reflective decision a man made a vote resulting in a majority, which as a matter of proportion is over-whelming, for it is always 1-0. The concept of legislation requires superior power in the legislator. — Elizabeth Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, p. 2

Good. And here we might start to differentiate morality from ethics, or expectation from obligation.

Apart from , so far in this thread we haven't treated of the existential break, the actuality of choice. And it's this that in the end breaks the rule of law. We each still must act.

No one here is being as escalating or trollish as you are. — Leontiskos

See:

↪hypericin I find myself constantly lowering my expectation of what you understand of philosophy. — Banno

When pressed why, he gave his usual confused gibberish. I have a negative history with him over several discussions.

With you, I may have misconstrued you as dismissing my view on ethics because subjectivism is "chimerical" (I think its subjectivism, but the borders between these "isms" get blurry). This combined with some mounting frustration with you, and what I felt was an arrogant, dismissive attitude, your victory laps... But, this happens, these kind of frictions sometimes build in the course of a discussion. I apologize, you didn't deserve that.

We can never manufacture binding rules for ourselves. Self-legislation does not bind — Leontiskos

Well, I know lawmakers like to think themselves above the law, but they're not.

I think it an indisputable fact that society does in fact dictate rules that each member must follow.

Whether or not these are the rules that we refer to when we talk about morality is the very issue that (robust) moral realists and moral subjectivists disagree on. Realists think that moral rules are something other than the rules society manufactures for itself, subjectivists don't.

And error theorists agree with the realist that when we talk about morality we intend to talk about something other than the rules society manufactures for itself, but agree with the subjectivist that there are no such other rules.

- Fair enough, I appreciate that. Sorry for being dismissive. :victory: (A peace sign, not a victory sign :razz:)

A peace sign, not a victory sign — Leontiskos

:lol:
Thanks.

Well, you did make a series of silly mistakes. And it is quite plainly right, that "that we do cooperate does not imply that we ought cooperate."

Well, I know lawmakers like to think themselves above the law, but they're not. — Michael

Those who make laws for themselves don't need to break laws when they can simply change them, or grant themselves a dispensation, or something like that. This problem becomes painfully obvious when, say, a U.S. president is impeached.

Whether or not these are the rules that we refer to when we talk about morality is the very issue that (robust) moral realists and moral subjectivists disagree on. — Michael

I think the circularity objection stands (). Again, go back to my distinction between a theory about "morality," and a moral theory (). You are now moving back into "moral theory" territory for subjectivism. You're not just saying, "Morality is just the laws we pass;" you are saying, "Morality is the laws we pass and we ought to obey those laws." You're moving back into the normative territory, and that is precisely what my circularity objection addresses.

Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy"


This remains for me the central and most troubling article in Ethics. It's what drove me to virtue ethics.

You're not just saying, "Morality is just the laws we pass;" you are saying, "Morality is the laws we pass and we ought to obey those laws." — Leontiskos

Not exactly. I'm saying that society says "you ought not kill babies" and then we either obey or we don't, and if we don't then we're doing what society says we ought not do. Moral subjectivists claim that there is nothing more to morality than this. According to them, when we say "you ought not kill babies" we are implicitly (or explicitly) saying "according to society you ought not kill babies."

Moral realists, on the other hand, think that "you ought not kill babies" is never prefixed with some "according to X". Moral subjectivists think this nonsensical as they believe one cannot have a rule without a rule-giver.

This remains for me the central and most troubling article in Ethics. — Banno

Yep. It's a tough nut to crack. I sometimes think I've overcome it but of course doubts always remain when it comes to Anscombe. Granted, I have less at stake than you do. :wink:

I'm assuming you take on the modus tollens reading, with god on your side - or you on his.

I'll join Philippa Foot in changing my mind every couple of years.

I'll set it out as a syllogism.

1. "one ought not harm another" means "society says one ought not harm another"
2. "society says one ought not harm another" is true iff society says one ought not harm another
3. Therefore, "one ought not harm another" is true iff society says one ought not harm another

The argument is valid.

Moral realists (and error theorists) believe that (1) is false, whereas (some) moral subjectivists believe that (1) is true.

I'll join Philippa Foot in changing my mind every couple of years. — Banno

Hah. What is the "modus tollens" reading, or the logical implication that you have in mind? I couldn't find that reference in the SEP article you link to in your thread.

Rules without a rule-giver does seem spurious. — Michael

This is the reason for my discomfort with the idea of moral truth.

This is the reason for my discomfort with the idea of moral truth. — AmadeusD

Perhaps there are moral truths because there is a rule-giver, e.g. society.

Huh...the buggers have updated the SEP page since then.

Then you would go along with the modus tollens reading...?
(1) If religiously based ethics is false, then virtue ethics is the way moral philosophy ought to be developed.
(2b) It is not the case that virtue ethics is the way to develop moral philosophy
(3b) Therefore, it is not the case that religiously based ethics is false. — Banno

Here's the archive:

https://web.archive.org/web/20190311014303/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/anscombe/#VirEth

Now I'll have to re-read the SEP article.

Perhaps there are moral truths because there is a rule-giver, e.g. society. — Michael

For sure. I wrestle with it a lot - I guess i see society as an arbitrary rule-giver. Assenting to just plum majority rule does not sit well.