I'm arguing against this claim of his:

So the superstitious imply a physics of magical thinking that contradicts basic reality: that symbols and symbolic sounds, arranged in certain combinations, can affect and move other phases of matter above and beyond the kinetic energy inherent in the physical manifestation of their symbols.

It's false. I can open the blinds by saying "Siri, open the blinds."

They do address the issue that we’ve been discussing for pages. But you’re causing me to not understand. As far as I know eliminative materialism is the claim that some of the mental states posited thus far do not actually exist. What does quantum indeterminacy and hidden variables have to do with eliminate materialism? — NOS4A2

If eliminative materialism is true then mental states do not exist and everything is physical. If hidden variables explain quantum indeterminacy then all physical events — including human behaviour — are deterministic. If there are no hidden variables then quantum indeterminacy is true randomness, so all physical events — including human behaviour — are either deterministic or truly random.

If some human behaviour is neither deterministic nor truly random then some human behaviour has a non-physical explanation, and so eliminative materialism is false and something like interactionist dualism is true.

You’re speaking about the false analogy of non-agents designed by agents to activate upon certain sounds, mechanistically triggering a limited set of actions. Can you turn the lights on with your voice without saying “Siri”? That’s your causal power of speech in a nutshell. — NOS4A2

The comment I was addressing did not mention agency. It only mentioned “symbols and symbolic sounds, arranged in certain combinations, affect[ing] and mov[ing] other phases of matter above and beyond the kinetic energy inherent in the physical manifestation of their symbols.” That is precisely what happens when I say “Siri, turn on the lights” or “Siri, open the blinds,” and so it is not "superstition" or "magical thinking."

And you don’t appear to have a consistent response to this. You sometimes appear to accept that speech can causally influence machines and sometimes you don’t, explicitly denying that my speech can cause a voice-activated forklift to lift a weight but accepting that my speech can cause the lights to turn on?

I’ve avoided and and am satisfied and for the reasons I’ve stated. — NOS4A2

Your reasons do not address the issue at all. It's quite simple; if eliminative materialism is true and if hidden variables explain quantum indeterminacy then determinism is true. Therefore if determinism is false then either eliminative materialism is false or there are no hidden variables to explain quantum indeterminacy: Therefore if we have libertarian free will then either eliminative materialism is false or free will is nothing more than behaviour influenced by quantum indeterminacy.

But, again, free will has nothing prima facie to do with the involuntary behaviour of our sense organs.

I believe you can cause the lights to turn on, yes. — NOS4A2

So the causal power of speech extends beyond the immediate transfer of kinetic energy. I can cause the lights to turn on by saying "Siri, turn on the lights" and I can cause the living room blinds to open by saying "Siri, open the living room blinds". Therefore, your reasoning below is fallacious:

So the superstitious imply a physics of magical thinking that contradicts basic reality: that symbols and symbolic sounds, arranged in certain combinations, can affect and move other phases of matter above and beyond the kinetic energy inherent in the physical manifestation of their symbols. — NOS4A2

No, humans have invented various mechanisms and lights that can do nothing else but respond to their actions, and therefore their state of on or off is determined by the human being. — NOS4A2

So you accept that the appropriate speech can cause the lights to turn on or cause a voice-activated forklift to lift a heavy weight?

That’s why I’m incompatiblist. — NOS4A2

But you also believe that we have free will and are an eliminative materialist. So how do you maintain these three positions? Is it because we could have done otherwise? If eliminative materialism is true then we could have done otherwise only if quantum indeterminacy factors into human behaviour (and only if there are no hidden variables), but does this stochasticity really satisfy your agent-causal libertarian free will? Either way, it's still the case that A caused B to happen, even if A could have caused C to happen, and it's still the case that D caused A to happen, even if D could have caused E to happen, and so on and so forth (eventually involving events external to the body).

There's simply no avoiding this without rejecting eliminative materialism in favour of interactionist dualism. But even then, interactionist dualism would only apply to conscious decision-making, not to the involuntary behaviour of the body's sense organs.

I was asking specifically in 2025 what gender stereotype do people have to conform with? — Malcolm Parry

Nobody has to do anything (other than obey the law). But there are still expectations, e.g. men propose and women take their husband's surname.

Does the soundwave have some other causal power over-and-above that transfer? — NOS4A2

I can turn on the lights by saying "Hey Siri, turn on the lights" or by clapping my hands or by pushing a button.

Or are you going to argue that no human has ever turned on a light because no human is capable of discharging electricity from his body?

You keep repeating it, telling me I’m misguided, but i have yet seen any reason why I should believe otherwise. You won’t even mention any other forces, objects, and events “causally influencing” subsequent acts.

Rather, what you leave me to picture is a cause A that causes both B and not-B, and I can’t wrap my brain around it. The joke caused me to laugh and the other guy to not laugh, for example, without admitting the reasons for the different effects, the reasons for B and not-B. I wager that is why you wish to stick to more predictable causal relations like button pushing and explosions, so you don’t have to mention the actual causes of, and reasons for, varying responses, for example if the bomb didn’t explode or if the Venus flytrap didn’t close. — NOS4A2

If the bomb isn't wired appropriately then pushing the button won't cause it to explode, but if it is then it will.

To my mind there is nothing non-physical about it. — NOS4A2

So how do you avoid determinism? Again, as it stands I don't see how your position is incompatible with compatibilism.

Is it because we could have done otherwise? If eliminative materialism is true then we could have done otherwise only if quantum indeterminacy factors into human behaviour (and only if there are no hidden variables), but does this stochasticity really satisfy your agent-causal libertarian free will? Either way, it's still the case that A caused B to happen, even if A could have caused C to happen, and it's still the case that D caused A to happen, even if D could have caused E to happen, and so on and so forth (eventually involving events external to the body).

There's simply no avoiding this without rejecting eliminative materialism in favour of interactionist dualism. But even then, interactionist dualism would only apply to conscious decision-making, not to the involuntary behaviour of the body's sense organs.

His position that words cannot cause actions in others defeats his position that laws cannot limit and must protect freedom of speech. — Fire Ologist

He's also arguing that soundwaves cannot cause sense organs to send electrical signals to the brain. It's this argument of his that I have primarily been addressing. If we can't even agree on this then there's no point in even starting a discussion on free speech.

I’ve already conceded that the environment stimulates our sense organs, simply due to the fact that they collide, and have factored it in. But that’s where their influence ends. in the case of hearing or reading, the words do not exert enough force on the body to move it in the way you say it does. It has neither the mass nor the energy to do so. All the energy and systems required to move the body comes from the body. That’s why hearing and reading are capacities of the body, and not soundwaves. That’s why I say words cannot determine, govern, or control our responses. — NOS4A2

And this is a misguided understanding of causation, as I have been at pains to explain. Causal influence doesn't simply end after the immediate transfer of kinetic energy. I can cause a bomb to explode by pushing the appropriate button. Your reasoning is a non sequitur when applied to machines and a non sequitur when applied to biological organisms.

What I believe is that each of us are the source of our own actions — NOS4A2

Which is a very vague claim. As it stands it's consistent with compatibilism and so consistent with determinism.

Yet you said before that you endorse agent-causal libertarian free will, but that is inconsistent with eliminative materialism. From here:

Accounts of libertarianism subdivide into non-physical theories and physical or naturalistic theories. Non-physical theories hold that the events in the brain that lead to the performance of actions do not have an entirely physical explanation, and consequently the world is not closed under physics. Such interactionist dualists believe that some non-physical mind, will, or soul overrides physical causality.

Explanations of libertarianism that do not involve dispensing with physicalism require physical indeterminism, such as probabilistic subatomic particle behavior.

...

In non-physical theories of free will, agents are assumed to have power to intervene in the physical world, a view known as agent causation.

You have no control or will over anything. Isn’t that so? — NOS4A2

No, I'm a compatibilist.

Your position, though, is unclear. You're a free will libertarian but also an eliminative materialist. I assume, then, that you believe that libertarian free will is made possible by quantum indeterminancy? So we "could have done otherwise" only because the applicable human behaviour operates according to probabilistic causation rather than determinism?

Your sense organs send electrical signals to your brain. — NOS4A2

And the infrared sensor sends electrical signals to some other part of the TV. But it's still the case that I cause the TV to turn on by pushing the appropriate button on the remote. Your reasoning is a non sequitur, even despite your assertions that humans, unlike TVs, have "agency" – because this "agency" does not factor into the behaviour of our sense organs in response to stimulation, e.g. I can't just will myself to be deaf (even if I can will myself to cover my ears).

I’ve already stated my reasoning. The effects cannot be shown to reach as far as you say they do. The objects, structures, and energies responsible for such movements, responses, and actions are not the same as the ones you claim they are. — NOS4A2

And as I have explained, this is a misguided understanding of causation. I cause the bomb to explode by pushing a button, I cause the machine to turn by telling it to, the fly causes the Venus flytrap to close by moving its hairs.

The relationship between each pair of events isn't merely correlation. It's not an accident or happenstance or coincidence. It's causal.

My sense organs send electrical signals to my brain because they have been stimulated. If they do so for any other reason, e.g entirely caused by internal, biological activity, then that's a sign of an injury.

So you don't accept that the fly's movements cause the Venus flytrap to close its jaws and you don't accept that spoken words can cause a voice-activated machine to lift some weight.

This just isn't the "superstitious imply[ing] a physics of magical thinking that contradicts basic reality" as you accuse it of being. It's the truth, and common sense. And if this is your best defence of free speech absolutism then so much the worse for your position.

If the action potential is in the plant, then yes, the biology of the flytrap causes it to close if and when such a stimulus happens. — NOS4A2

And the fly causes it to close. The two are not mutually exclusive. Exactly like with machines.

I can and will hand wave it until you can show that something else in the universe beats the heart. Until then there is nothing else that can be shown to determine the heart beat. — NOS4A2

You're not addressing what I'm saying. I’m saying that even if we have libertarian free will, this could-have-done-otherwise agency does not apply to our heartbeats and does not apply to our sense organs, and so there’s no good reason to say that the behaviour of our sense organs is not causally determined by some stimulus and its source.

I do not accept it. — NOS4A2

Why not? Do you reject the claim that my speech can cause a voice-activated forklift to lift a heavy weight?

That means they are not autonomous.

...

But the fact that we have to build them, program them, etc negates their autonomy. — NOS4A2

Autonomous robot.

So the superstitious imply a physics of magical thinking that contradicts basic reality: that symbols and symbolic sounds, arranged in certain combinations, can affect and move other phases of matter above and beyond the kinetic energy inherent in the physical manifestation of their symbols. — NOS4A2

Taking a step back for a moment, and re-addressing this, do you at least accept that my speech can cause a voice-activated forklift to lift a heavy weight, and so that the above comment of yours is completely misguided?

Venus flytraps, yes, but machines no. — NOS4A2

Are you saying that the fly walking inside a Venus flytrap does not cause the Venus flytrap's jaw to close?

Machines are designed, built, and operated by human beings. — NOS4A2

So?

They cannot change their own batteries or plug themselves in. — NOS4A2

They can if we build them that way. But also: so?

I never said it was an application of agency. I used “agency” to distinguish between the human being and your analogies. But the fact remains that the heart beat and digestion is caused by this same agent. So it is with the operation and maintenance with everything else occurring in the body. — NOS4A2

But the heart beat is not an application of agent-causal libertarian free will. And neither is the sense organ's response to stimuli. So there is no good reason to claim that the behaviour of the sense organs in response to stimulation is any less determined than the behaviour of a radio receiver in response to stimulation. You can't simply hand-wave this away by saying that in other circumstances the organism does have agency.

If not the agent, then what causes the heart beat and digestion? Is the Sinoatrial node a foreign parasite or something? Like I said, abstract nonsense. — NOS4A2

You're equivocating. It is true that the human organism is responsible for its heart beat and digestion but it is not prima facie true that its heart beat and digestion is an example of agent-causal libertarian free will, comparable to the supposedly could-have-done-otherwise decision to either have Chinese or Indian for dinner.

The point I was making is that even if humans – but not plants and machines – are agents, our agency does not prima facie apply to everything our body does.

You need to do more than simply assert that humans are agents to defend the claim that the behaviour of the sense organs is not a causal reaction to stimuli.

It just means autonomy: the energy and force required to move is provided by that which is moving, generated by itself, and wholly determined by the biology, not by external forces. — NOS4A2

And the same is true of the Venus flytrap and the remote control car (albeit with machinery in place of biology). Yet their internal behaviour is still causally influenced by some stimulus and its source. So this reasoning is a non sequitur.

I’m not a dualist. The behavior of the sense organs, the brain, the nervous system etc. is the behavior of the whole. I reiterate this because pretending one and then the other are discreet units outside of the scope and control of the whole is abstract nonsense. — NOS4A2

And the same is true of the Venus flytrap and the remote control car (albeit with machinery in place of biology). Yet their internal behaviour is still causally influenced by some stimulus and its source. So this reasoning is a non sequitur.

In the case of human sensing, the transduction of one form of energy to another, as in the conversion of outside stimulus to internal chemical and electrical signals, is performed by the human organism. No external system involved in the event of listening performs such an action. And when I look at what changes the force of a soundwave can possibly cause inside the human body the effects are exactly the ones I said the were and no more. Past the transduction, that force is simply no longer present and therefor neither is its “influence”. There is no soundwave or words banging around in there like billiard balls.

All subsequent movements occur due to the potential energy stored in the system itself, in this case the body, as determined by the internal process by which your body expends energy and burns calories. The energy and ability to move, or do the work involved in listening, or speaking, or any activity, is converted, stored, and used by the body and no other system. It determines any and all activity involved, and in fact is physically identical to that activity. — NOS4A2

And the same is true of the Venus flytrap and the remote control car (albeit with machinery in place of biology). Yet their internal behaviour is still causally influenced by some stimulus and its source. So this reasoning is a non sequitur.

I consider the body to be one holistic system. It is only this system in its entirety that decides, or can decide. — NOS4A2

You can’t simply assert that because the human organism as a whole can “choose to do otherwise” then the behaviour of its sense organs is not causally influenced by a stimulus and its source.

Even the interactionist dualist accepts that some of the body’s behaviour is not “agent-caused”, e.g our heartbeats and digestive systems.

I’m inclined towards sourcehood arguments and agent-causation of libertarian free will. — NOS4A2

And how do you maintain this whilst endorsing eliminative materialism? Agents are physical systems and agency is a physical process and like every other physical system and physical process in the universe its behaviour can be and is causally influenced by physical systems and physical processes external to itself, whether that be deterministic causation or probabilistic causation (e.g quantum indeterminacy).

Physical systems vary in properties and behavior. Why would that be irrelevant? — NOS4A2

Because these differences do not allow it to escape being causally influenced by things external to itself. Organic compounds still react to the environment in deterministic ways. So saying that the internal behaviour of the TV can be causally influenced by an external stimulus because it is a metal machine but that the internal behaviour of a human cannot because it is a living organism is a non sequitur.

You might as well try to argue that because a plant is not a machine then its behaviour cannot be causally influenced by the sun.

I don’t need to believe in non-physical substances to believe objects can move on their own accord. — NOS4A2

What does it mean to “move on their own accord”? Does the Venus flytrap closing its jaws “move on its own accord”? Does the robot left to its own devices to navigate a maze “move on its own accord”?

You keep throwing around these vague phrases as if they somehow avoid determinism. As it stands I don’t see how this is incompatible with compatibilism.

It didn’t grow organically and learn to deal with the environment and others through years of experience and learning — NOS4A2

Why is that relevant? Matter is matter. All physical systems operate according to the same physical laws.

You are engaging in special pleading when you assert that “the entity takes over” applies to human organisms but not machines (and not plants?).

It cannot choose to do otherwise should it desire to do so. — NOS4A2

Okay, so now we might be getting somewhere.

Firstly, are you arguing against determinism and in favour of libertarian free will? If so, how do you maintain this whilst also endorsing eliminative materialism?

There are in general two types of free will libertarians. One type argues for interactionist dualism and the second type argues.that our “choices” are really just the random outcomes of quantum indeterminacy, which to me doesn’t seem much like libertarian free will at all.

Which are you endorsing? If the latter then we’re still dealing with causal influence, albeit probabilistic causation.

Secondly, where does decision-making occur? In the inner ear? Or later in the “higher-level” brain activity? If the latter then you must at least accept that the causal power of stimuli extends beyond the immediate interaction with the sense organs, being causally responsible for the signals sent to the brain and the behaviour of “lower-level” neurons.

You can say that if you want, but that has no bearing on our conversation — Harry Hindu

Then “our conversation” has only ever been your monologue as I’ve never said anything to the contrary.

You don’t mention that it is the body that does the listening. In fact, the body does all the work: produces all the components required, converts all the energy, guides the impulses to their destination, directs each and every subsequent bodily movement long after the sound wave has had any impression. Sound waves do none of that stuff. — NOS4A2

The same is true of the machine with a radio receiver, but it’s still the case that if I send it a radio signal then I can causally influence its behaviour.

The fact that the human body and sense organs are organic matter does not entail that they don’t follow the same principles of cause and effect.

Then I have no idea what you're saying, as usual. — Harry Hindu

I am saying that NOS4A2's claim that speech has no causal power beyond the immediate transfer of kinetic energy in the inner ear is a complete misunderstanding of causation.

Okay.

How is that relevant to anything I'm saying?

So what about my argument are you objecting to? You seem to think I'm saying something I'm not.

You not taking this understanding that there is a difference in our brains and applying it to the issue, is the issue. — Harry Hindu

I am.

Address the other points I made in the post you cherry-picked. — Harry Hindu

What points? Your question asking me who deserves a medal? I don’t know why you’re asking me that as it has nothing to do with anything I’m arguing.

Our brains do not have the same information. — Harry Hindu

What does that mean?

Brains are just a bunch of interconnected neurons sending electrical and chemical signals to one another. There’s nothing above-and-beyond this.

How the brain responds to its environment (e.g signals sent from the sense organs) is determined by the nature of these connections.

Different brains have different connections, and so respond differently to the same stimulus.

If that were the case, we would all be responding the same way — Harry Hindu

No we wouldn’t because our brains are not identical.

How is saying some words and getting no reaction the same as pressing the "A" key and getting a reaction? — Harry Hindu

There is always a reaction (unless they’re deaf). It’s just that not all reactions involve the muscles. Just as not all the computer’s reactions involve displaying a character on the screen, e.g for security when typing a password on the CLI nothing is displayed.

Is a person that hears some inciting words and is not inciting to a riot malfunctioning? — Harry Hindu

No.

——————

It’s really not clear what your issue is. Do you just object to physicalism? Do you think that human behaviour is explained by interactionist dualism?

Carrying on from this, I can't know what it feels like to give birth but I know that there is such a feeling, I know the public occasions that elicit such a feeling, and I know that the phrase "what it feels like to give birth" refers to that feeling.

The private language argument against private sensations has got to be one of the most unconvincing arguments I've encountered.

The difference lies in the reason why we observe a difference in behaviors when multiple people hear the same speech. For determinism to be true, which I believe it is, you have to provide a theory to explain what we observe in that multiple people react differently to the same speech. What is your theory? How do you explain what we observe? — Harry Hindu

I already explained it with the analogy of the computers. How each computer responds to someone pressing the "A" key is determined by its internal structure. But its response is still caused by someone pressing the "A" key.

How the human body (including the brain) responds to some given stimulus is determined by its internal structure. But its response is still caused by the stimulus.

The inverted spectrum problem is still alive and well. No brain scans or neural activity measurements will ever convince me that your experience of red is the same as mine. — RogueAI

Strictly speaking the inverted spectrum problem doesn’t even require qualia. Even if colour experiences are reducible to particular neural activity it is possible that the same wavelength of light triggers different neural activity in different people such that the neural activity that I describe as “seeing blue” is the same as the neural activity that you describe as “seeing red”.

So what they actually did was measure the neural correlates of colour experience.

Human beings are organic, living, beings that have the capacity to move, think, and act, among many other activities. Radio receivers cannot do any of the above and have no such capacities. Humans use their environment to sense while radio receivers cannot. — NOS4A2

I'm not asking you to compare radio receivers to humans; I'm asking you to compare radio receivers to sense organs. Why is it that I can be said to cause a radio receiver to send an electrical signal to the catalyst but I can't be said to cause a sense organ to send an electrical signal to the brain?

But if you want to compare humans to something then let's compare them to robots or Venus flytraps. Why is it that I can be said to causally influence the behaviour of robots and Venus flytraps but not humans? They move and act, and in the case of Venus flytraps are living, organic beings. Or will you say that I can't causally influence the behaviour of robots and Venus flytraps?

As for your reference to thinking, recall here where you said "when considering the human body, its activities, and what it expresses, nothing called a 'thought' can be found there." Are you now abandoning eliminative materialism in favour of folk psychology?

An agent is a general term in philosophy of mind denoting “a being with the capacity to act and influence the environment”. — NOS4A2

Everything has the capacity to act and influence the environment. Unless you mean something specific by "act" that applies only to humans and not also to insects, plants, bacteria, and volcanos? Then what is this specific sense of "act"?

Your link mentions "intentionality of action in terms of causation by the agent’s mental states and events", but once again such terms like "intentionality" and "mental states" are things that you have previously rejected. Are you now endorsing something like interactionist dualism?

All you can do is use agency in your analogies, then remove it when it comes to your physics, or when it’s otherwise convenient. — NOS4A2

You are the one who introduced the term "agency". I have only ever been addressing the physics. I can cause someone to turn around, the fly can cause the Venus flytrap to close its jaws, and the drought can cause a famine.

I said we are different, and that is the difference. — Harry Hindu

Different in what relevant way? A plant is different to a computer, but that would be an insufficient justification to simply assert that the behaviour of plants is not causally influenced by external stimuli. You need to actually flesh out what human organisms have that other things don’t that allows us to (uniquely?) defy determinism.

You're not answering the question.

What's the relevant difference between a radio receiver and a sense organ such that I can be said to be the cause of what happens after the radio receiver converts radio waves into electrical signals but cannot be said to be the cause of what happens after a sense organ converts sound waves into electrical signals?

You can't just assert that they're different without explaining what that difference is and why that difference makes a difference to the topic at hand (e.g. it's not enough to just say that the ear is organic and the radio receiver isn't).

You bring up the term “agent”, but what does that mean? If I say that the drought caused the famine am I putting the drought in the role of “agent”?

Your language reeks of folk psychology, which I thought you were against? We should only be addressing the physics of the matter, so commit to it. And when addressing the physics of the matter there is no good reason to believe that the human body’s response to sound waves is any different in principle to a bomb’s response to radio waves.

And on the example of the drought causing the famine, this once again shows that causal influence ought not be understood so reductively as only the immediate transfer of kinetic energy, as you try to do when misinterpreting what it means for speech to influence behaviour.

You should just accept that this approach you're taking to defend free speech is entirely misguided. You'd be better served arguing in favour of interactionist dualism and libertarian free will, or if that is a step too far then just that the causal influence speech has does not warrant legal restrictions.

I’ve stated this before but each one of your analogies invariably put the human being in the subject position as the agent of causation. — NOS4A2

It doesn't have to be a human. It could be that a rock fell onto the switch, in which case the rock caused the bomb to explode.

But you are not answering the question. You are the one who made these claims:

As an example, the hairs in the ear tranduce the mechanical stimulus of a sound wave of speech into a nerve impulse, as it does all sounds. The words do not transduce themselves. But there, in the ear, is essentially where the effects of the mechanical soundwave ends, and a new sequences of acts begin.

...

Any and all responses of the body to outside stimulus are self-caused. You are causally responsible for transducing soundwaves into electrical signals, for example. Nothing can cause transduction but the biology. Nothing can send those signals to the brain but the biology. Nothing can cause you to understand the signals but the biology.

It's simply special pleading to claim that my biology "governs, controls, and thereby determines" transduction but that a bomb's machinery doesn't. Flesh, blood, and bone is in principle no different to metal.

So, once again, I can cause a bomb to explode by flicking a switch and I can cause someone to turn their head by shouting their name. All your talk about transduction and the kinetic energy of speech is utterly irrelevant. Whether man or machine, I can and do causally influence another entity's behaviour, as can other men and machines causally influence mine.

Bombs do not have the capacity to govern, control, and thereby determine their behavior. That’s why it is a false analogy. — NOS4A2

Sounds like folk psychology to me.

What's the relevant difference between a radio receiver and a sense organ such that I can be said to be the cause of what happens after the radio receiver converts radio waves into electrical signals but cannot be said to be the cause of what happens after a sense organ converts sound waves into electrical signals?

Remember, you are the one who made these claims:

As an example, the hairs in the ear tranduce the mechanical stimulus of a sound wave of speech into a nerve impulse, as it does all sounds. The words do not transduce themselves. But there, in the ear, is essentially where the effects of the mechanical soundwave ends, and a new sequences of acts begin.

...

Any and all responses of the body to outside stimulus are self-caused. You are causally responsible for transducing soundwaves into electrical signals, for example. Nothing can cause transduction but the biology. Nothing can send those signals to the brain but the biology. Nothing can cause you to understand the signals but the biology.

It's simply special pleading to claim that my biology "governs, controls, and thereby determines" transduction but that a bomb's machinery doesn't.

You are simply incapable of being intellectually honest. — Harry Hindu

I am being honest. Determinism applies to human organisms just as it applies to every other physical object and system in the universe. We're not special in any relevant way.

You don’t believe a sensory receptor causes the transduction of the mechanical energy of a soundwave into electrical impulses? — NOS4A2

I do.

Just as I believe that the bomb's radio receiver causes the transduction of radio waves into electrical signals that trigger the catalyst.

But it's still the case that I caused the bomb to explode by flicking the switch. So, once again, you are engaging in non sequiturs.

So you think that the internal workings of a bomb are equivalent to the internal workings of the human brain? — Harry Hindu

In the sense that they both follow the same natural laws of cause and effect; yes. The human brain is just more complicated. It's not as if it contains some immaterial soul that is able to put a stop to one causal chain and then begin a completely independent one.

I'm tired of going in circles with you. — Harry Hindu

And I'm tired of you refusing to answer the question.

You claim that one's sex parts dictate which bathroom one should use. So how does your rule account for those who have had genital surgery?

Should the transgender man who has had genital surgery continue to use the women's bathroom?

This only requires a single word response: either "yes" or "no". Why is it so difficult for you?

Well, you set the bomb, put it in a place that would kill people, wired the whole thing up, flicked the switch, and so on. You didn’t just flick a switch. The way it is framed is misleading, as these false analogies often are. — NOS4A2

I did just flick the switch. Someone else planted the bomb. Not that it would matter either way. The point still stands that I caused the bomb to explode even though the bomb "operat[ed] its own movements and utiliz[ed] its own energy" and even though my bodily movement lacks the kinetic energy required to cause an explosion in isolation.

Which is precisely why all your talk about the kinetic energy of speech and the listener's body being responsible for transduction is a complete non sequitur.

The only thing that can explain the variation in behavior, why one person might be “incited” by a word and another will not, is the person himself. This necessarily includes his biology, but also his history, his education, and so on. For example, he must have first acquired language. He must understand what he is hearing. It’s the person, not the word, that fully determines, governs, and causes the response. — NOS4A2

And the bomb only explodes if it was built a certain way and contains the necessary catalyst, and so on. It's still the case that I caused it to explode by flicking the switch.

Unless you want to argue that human organisms are special in some way that allows them to defy the natural laws of cause and effect that govern every other physical object and system in the universe you're still engaging in non sequiturs.

No one is saying that isn't the case. — Harry Hindu

NOS4A2 absolutely is. He says such nonsense as:

Physically speaking, speech doesn't possess enough kinetic energy required to affect the world that the superstitious often claims it does. Speech, for instance, doesn't possess any more kinetic energy than any other articulated guttural sound. Writing doesn't possess any more energy than any other scratches or ink blots on paper. And so on. So the superstitious imply a physics of magical thinking that contradicts basic reality: that symbols and symbolic sounds, arranged in certain combinations, can affect and move other phases of matter above and beyond the kinetic energy inherent in the physical manifestation of their symbols.

And:

If you want to employ causal chains to explain it then the causal chain occurring in one environment is taken over, used and controlled by another system, operating its own movements and providing its own conditions, and utilizing its own energy to do so.

Which is exactly like arguing that I do not cause the bomb to explode because my finger lacks the necessary kinetic energy; that the bomb caused itself to explode by operating its own movements and utilizing its own energy.

It's beyond absurd.