Sure, but according to the metaphysical realist the truth is independent of any kind of falsification or verification, and so even if something like brains in a vat are impossible in principle to prove or disprove, it is nonetheless either true or false.

And that’s precisely why Putnam’s argument is an attempt at refuting metaphysical realism. If metaphysical realism is true then we might be brains in a vat, but we can’t be brains in a vat, and so therefore metaphysical realism is false.

since everything would then be an artificial construct — Janus

Yeah, we would experience fabricated evidence that either brains in a vat are possible or aren’t.

The point is that we can’t know whether or not what we see is real or the product of a scientist’s (or evil demon’s) manipulation. So to use what we see as evidence that brains in a vat are impossible is to beg the question and assume that we are not brains in a vat and so can trust what we see.

How does it show that you’re in 2 and not 4?

These are the logically possible scenarios:

1. We are not brains in a vat and the evidence suggests that brains in a vat are physically possible

2. We are not brains in a vat and the evidence suggests that brains in a vat are physically impossible

3. We are brains in a vat and the evidence suggests that brains in a vat are physically possible

4. We are brains in a vat and the evidence suggests that brains in a vat are physically impossible

If the evidence suggests that brains in a vat are physically possible then we are in either 1 or 3.

If the evidence suggests that brains in a vat are physically impossible then we are in either 2 or 4.

We can’t have empirical evidence that rules out 4.

If a physicist says it is physically impossible for something to travel faster than the speed of light, are they begging the question? — Richard B

No, because he’s not addressing the argument that we are brains in a vat.

However, as you put it, this does not refute the possibility that this experience of “scientists demonstrating the BIV cannot function” was not fabricated in some BIV. But why should we say logical possibility trumps physical impossibility? — Richard B

If we are brains in a vat then us being a brain in a vat isn't a physical impossibility, even if our fabricated world suggests otherwise.

To use the world we experience as empirical evidence that brains in a vat are physically impossible is to beg the question and assume that we are not brains in a vat.

This is where this type of metaphysical reasoning fails, it starts out trying to say something about the world in which we live in, but quickly degrades into phantasm where it logically excluded any verification, falsification, confirmation gathered by our experiences. — Richard B

At least according to metaphysical realists, something can be true even if it can neither be verified nor falsified. This is central to Putnam's argument. Metaphysical realism entails global skepticism ("we could be brains in a vat"), and so if he can prove that we cannot be brains in a vat then he can disprove metaphysical realism.

When I shake someone’s hand I believe I experience the situation with my entire body, since the entire thing is being used to perform the act. My trouble is with the biology of it. My question is: How can one take every experience of a handshake, from standing to grasping someone’s hand to leaning forward etc, and put all that as an experience in the brain? — NOS4A2

That seems to be what our study of human biology shows. Much like with the case of phantom limb syndrome, the human brain is able to make it seem as if the experience extends beyond its actual location.

The nerves in my fingers might send signals to the brain, but it is brain activity that produces the actual tactile percept. That same tactile percept can be produced artificially by direct stimulation of the somatosensory cortex without the need to stimulate touch receptors in the skin.

Stimulating the visual cortex with electrodes in the blind is a far cry from mimicking reality. — NOS4A2

Maybe it doesn't. Perhaps we are brains in a vat and actual reality is nothing like the world we experience. That's really the entire skeptical hypothesis.

I'm not following this. If you accept semantic externalism, the object language "I am a brain in a vat" does not and cannot speak to the meta language assertion that the speaker is a brain in a vat. — hypericin

Exactly.

I am a brain in a vat iff “I am a brain in a vat” is true (Tarski’s T-schema).

“I am a brain in a vat” is only true if such a sentence refers to a state of affairs that is “outside” the world I experience.

“I am a brain in a vat” doesn’t refer to a state of affairs that is “outside” the world I experience (semantic externalism).

Therefore “I am a brain in a vat” is false.

Therefore I am not a brain in a vat.

I think the fact that both Putnam and Descartes remove the senses and the rest of the body from their thought experiment is telling, as if experience could occur without blood and bones and lungs.

Other more fundamental perceptual and sensual cues would be absent, for instance the perception of up and down, the effects of gravity, wether one is standing or sitting, or the fact that he forever has to see his own nose in his periphery, not to mention that such a being could never be alive in the first place. — NOS4A2

I don't see a problem with it. I think experience happens in the brain, albeit usually as a response from stimulation by signals sent from the rest of the body. I think it's plausible that we can bypass our sense organs and artificially stimulate the appropriate areas of the brain to elicit the relevant experiences.

For example, see Dynamic Stimulation of Visual Cortex Produces Form Vision in Sighted and Blind Humans.

Or in the more complex case consider Boltzmann brains, which physicists seem to accept as physically possible.

Should this be, "If semantic externalism is true then we cannot claim to be brains in a vat"? — hypericin

Much like with Tarski's theory of truth, to make sense of this we need a meta language and an object language.

The meta language is the language of the scientist and the object language is the language of the brain. In the meta language the sentence "this is a brain in a vat" is true and in the object language the sentence "I am a brain in a vat" is false because the words "brain" and "vat" in the object language do not refer to what the words "brain" and "vat" refer to in the meta language.

No words in the object language can refer to what the words "brain" and "vat" refer to in the meta language (if semantic externalism is true).

Given this, it must be that the sentence "I am a brain in a vat" in my language is false, and so I am not a brain in a vat (this is simply Tarski's T-schema).

I suppose a simple modus tollens would be:

1. If it is possible that we are brains in a vat then a brain's language can refer to objects outside its simulation
2. A brain's language cannot refer to objects outside its simulation (as per semantic externalism)
3 .Therefore, it is not possible that we are brains in a vat

Personally, I reject 2.

I am curious, do you all believe that a "BiV" is possible? If so, why do you believe it is possible? Just because you can imagine it? — Richard B

I certainly think it’s logically possible, and so if semantic externalism entails that it isn’t logically possible then semantic externalism is false.

I think it may even be physically possible. It is in principle much like a Boltzmann brain, and physicists seem to accept that they are physically possible.

But of course if we are brains in a vat then it may be that “real” physics isn’t exactly like the fabricated physics that we are being programmed to experience, and so one cannot really use physics to disprove the physical possibility of brains in a vat without begging the question.

I was being overly simplistic. It’s not just vision that’s being fabricated but all the senses. You don’t really seem to be addressing the actual hypothesis.

There’s just no prima facie reason to suggest that experiences like ours cannot be elicited artificially. There’s nothing magic about the workings of the brain or the body as you seem to agree.

But wouldn't he be referring directly to the light and the patterns, even if he mistook them for a real tree? — NOS4A2

Sure, in that case he can refer to light and shapes and colours just as we can. But he can’t refer to trees and brains or truthfully claim that the things he sees are fabrications.

If the person is awake, they are aware that they are BiV. — NotAristotle

Not necessarily. You’ve been arguing that we might be brains in a vat despite the fact that we’re not aware that we are.

Even awake, the brain and/or body only experiences what the computer makes it experience. The brain and/or body is cut off from every other kind of external sensory stimulation.

It’s logically possible, and that’s enough for the hypothesis to have philosophical significance.

In that case, he would directly see the headset — NOS4A2

No need for a headset. Just shoot beams of light into the eyes in various shapes and patterns and colours that generate the image of a tree.

To be the same principle the body would in some way need to be silenced, or asleep, or unconscious, as in the movie Matrix. — NOS4A2

Sure. The point is that its experiences are elicited artificially by a computer directly manipulating the sense organs.

It never sees a tree or a brain or a vat and as such no words in its language can refer to these things.

I agree with you, but that's different than saying that if semantic externalism is true then we cannot be brains in a vat. — NotAristotle

It entails it. No sentence in the brain’s language can refer to the fact that it is a brain in a vat.

And you'd be like, "a real tree is not a BiV tree." But of course you'd be assuming that the tree you were pointing to was not a BiV tree. And that's the problem. There's no reason that you, the scientist, are not also a brain in a vat. The semantic externalism argument against BiV only goes through by assuming not BiV. — NotAristotle

It’s a real tree given what “real tree” means in my language.

The point still stands that if semantic externalism is true then none of the words in the brain’s language can refer to the vat.

Of course you could just deny semantic externalism, as I do.

The assumption that the body only keeps the brain alive and does not factor into phenomenal experience is a materialist form of dualism that ought to be dismissed as nonsense. — NOS4A2

If you prefer, consider instead a body in a vat. It’s the same principle. This person never sees trees, only “hallucinations”, but if the causal theory of reference is true then none of the words in its language can refer to (real) trees.

Given the causal theory of reference, the word “A” can only refer to some object B if that objects stands in a particular causal relationship to the word, e.g I see a B and intentionally coin the word “A” to refer to it.

I am a scientist and I have a human brain in a vat. The brain is conscious, much like me, except its experiences are elicited by a computer directly stimulating the sensory areas of the brain.

None of the words in this brain’s language can refer to the vat because the vat does not stand in the particular causal relationship that is required for it be the referent of a word. Every word in this brain’s language refers only to some feature of its artificial experiences. Even if it has a language that superficially resembles English, what it means by “brain in a vat” isn’t what I mean by “brain in a vat”. What it means by “brain in a vat” is what I mean by “simulated brain in a simulated vat”, and given that it isn’t a simulated brain in a simulated vat, the sentence “I am a brain in a vat” in its language is false.

But he assumes that we are not BiV in proving it. — NotAristotle

He starts by defending semantic externalism, then by trying to show that if semantic externalism is true then we cannot be brains in a vat, and so concludes that we are not brains in a vat.

His paper is an attempt to show that if semantic externalism is true then we cannot be brains in a vat, so it doesn’t make sense to claim that it’s question begging. You can argue that his reasoning isn’t valid, but that’s not that it begs the question.

What specifically is question-begging? The argument as I understand it is:

1. If metaphysical realism is true then we could be brains in a vat
2. If semantic externalism is true then we cannot be brains in a vat
3. Semantic externalism is true
4. Therefore metaphysical realism is false

It isn’t obvious to me that the conclusion is contained in one of the premises.

Doesn't semantic externalism require some kind of distinguishability? — NotAristotle

Semantic externalism is a consequence of the causal theory of reference. Words can only refer to things if these things have had some relevant causal affect on the development and use of these words.

If Neo is in the Matrix and there is a tree outside the Matrix then none of Neo's words can refer to this tree. What the word "tree" means and refers to for him isn't what the word "tree" means and refers to for those of us living outside the Matrix.

Given that if metaphysical realism is true then something like us living in the Matrix is possible, Putnam's argument is that metaphysical realism and semantic externalism are incompatible, and because he believes that semantic externalism is true he concludes that metaphysical realism is false.

It's been a bad couple of days for Trump.

Prosecutors: Trump Mar-a-Lago security aide flipped after changing lawyers

A Trump employee who monitored security cameras at Donald Trump’s Mar-a-Lago estate abruptly retracted his earlier grand jury testimony and implicated Trump and others in obstruction of justice just after switching from an attorney paid for by a Trump political action committee to a lawyer from the federal defender’s office in Washington, prosecutors said in a court filing Tuesday.

Georgia’s fake electors acted at Trump’s direction, indicted ex-GOP chair says

David Shafer, former chairman of the Georgia Republican Party and one of the 19 defendants in the Georgia election interference case, claimed in a court filing that he and the other Republican electors who tried to falsely certify Donald Trump as the winner in Georgia were acting at the former president's behest.

Meadows told special counsel he could not recall Trump ever declassifying Mar-a-Lago docs

Appearing to contradict former President Donald Trump's primary public defense in the classified documents case, former White House chief of staff Mark Meadows has told special counsel Jack Smith's investigators that he could not recall Trump ever ordering, or even discussing, declassifying broad sets of classified materials before leaving the White House, nor was he aware of any "standing order" from Trump authorizing the automatic declassification of materials taken out of the Oval Office, sources familiar with the matter tell ABC News.

When knowledge is defined as a justified true belief such that the justification necessitates the truth of the belief then the Gettier problem is no longer possible. — PL Olcott

The purpose of the Gettier problem is to show the limitation of the traditional JTB definition of knowledge.

If you define knowledge as something like certain true belief, as you seem to, then it would be immune to Gettier problems, but as a consequence much of what we think of as knowledge isn’t actually knowledge, and that might be an untenable consequence.

It's not clear.

Ass'n of Am. Physicians Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993)

The anti-nepotism statute, moreover, may well bar appointment only to paid positions in government. See 5 U.S.C. § 3110(c). Thus, even if it would prevent the President from putting his spouse on the federal payroll, it does not preclude his spouse from aiding the President in the performance of his duties.

Although the Court didn't outright say that it is allowed, they seemed open to it.

Also there's 3 U.S. Code § 105 which says:

Subject to the provisons  of paragraph (2) of this subsection, the President is authorized to appoint and fix the pay of employees in the White House Office without regard to any other provision of law regulating the employment or compensation of persons in the Government service.

So it seems that the White House is an exception to the "Executive agencies" mentioned in 5 U.S. Code § 3110.

The wording suggests that they can be employed as volunteers just not as paid employees. If section b meant they can't be employed under any circumstances then there would be no need for section c.

The nepotism I was referring to happened in the 2016-2020 time frame when President Trump hired Jared and Ivanka in defiance of the anti-nepotism statute 5 U.S. Code § 3110. — GRWelsh

That statute only says that they can't be paid for the work, and I believe they weren't.

Are these the same indictments published before the grand jury got a chance to decide whether to indict him or not? Yes, yes they are. — NOS4A2

Not exactly. This case information file was posted and then removed. It seems to be an error given that the case number on it (23SC188945) is apparently unrelated to Trump.

My guess is that someone mistyped the case number and so when case 23SC188945 had its information posted it included the Trump file by mistake.

Another farce, almost like everyone is infected with the same disease, rendering their sense of justice impotent.

Or a simple mistake that does nothing to exonerate Trump from the crimes he is alleged to have committed.

https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23909543/23sc188947-criminal-indictment.pdf

At all times relevant to this Count of the Indictment, the Defendants, as well as others not
named as defendants, unlawfully conspired and endeavored to conduct and participate in criminal enterprise in Fulton County, Georgia, and elsewhere. Defendants Donald John Trump, Rudolph William Louis Giuliani, John Charles Eastman, Mark Randall Meadows, Kenneth John Chesebro, Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Jenna Lynn Ellis, Ray Stallings Smith III, Robert David Cheeley, Michael A. Roman, David James Shafer, Shawn Micah Tresher Still, Stephen Cliffgard Lee, Harrison William Prescott Floyd, Trevian C. Kutti, Sidney Katherine Powell, Cathleen Alston Latham, Scott Graham Hall, Misty Hampton, unindicted co-conspirators Individual 1 through Individual 30, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, constituted criminal organization whose members and associates engaged in various related criminal activities including, but not limited to, false statements and writings, impersonating public officer, forgery, filing false documents, influencing witnesses, computer theft, computer trespass, computer invasion of privacy, conspiracy to defraud the state, acts involving theft, and perjury.

https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-lawyers-challenge-limits-evidence-sharing-prosecutors-warn-threats-2023-08-11/

Federal prosecutors revealed on Friday that they intend to soon release to Trump's defense team 11.6 million pages and records of evidence, in addition to a hard drive containing images extracted from electronic devices.

That's a lot of evidence.

I don’t know how that number could be real :chin:

I said it didn’t seem like much of a crime — NOS4A2

Meaning he only broke the law a little? Or that the laws he broke shouldn’t be laws at all?

Either way it isn't a fallacy to appeal to the law when discussing whether or not Trump broke the law.

Yeah, I am aware they are illegal according to law and will be prosecuted by lawyers. According to law it was once legal to own human beings. That's why its a fallacy to appeal to law, and you're consistently guilty of it. — NOS4A2

It's a fallacy to appeal to the law when arguing over whether or not someone broke the law?

What are you smoking?

??? is this a mis-type? Or maybe I'm not following you. You're not seriously suggesting that someone could commit murder but unless they confess then all other evidence does not count and they should be declared innocent by a jury? — EricH

I was being sarcastic as a passive-aggressive jab at NOS4A2's defence of Trump.

Bannon will likely testify that Trump had a scheme in place to claim the election was stolen if he was losing. That Trump, Bannon, Stone, etc. all talked about it and went forward with it. Wouldn't you agree that would be very damning? What do you think a jury would think of such testimony? — RogueAI

Only a confession by the accused counts as evidence of a crime.

There is no evidence of any crime or criminal activity. — NOS4A2

That you know of. They know more than you. They believe they have evidence, hence the indictment.

No one proved he defrauded the United States or denied people their rights, and they certainly didn’t prove he did so corruptly. — NOS4A2

That's precisely what the prosecution will try to do in court. They believe they have the evidence to do so, hence the indictment.

You seem to be suggesting that they must prove to the public their case before the trial even starts? That's not how the legal system works. You're putting the cart before the horse.

"Creator," in my context, means perceived "close simulation of 'creator of the universe.'" — ucarr

How is it a simulation of the creator of the universe?

This state of affairs will lead logically to an ever, upwardly-evolving teleology that, after enough time, will resemble a cosmic teleology that can, with reason, be called a creator. — ucarr

Not sure what you mean by "a creator" here. It certainly can't mean "the creator of the universe".