Let me try to paraphrase this. If 'pain' does not refer to different private experiences but rather to the same private experience, then I can sensibly talk about your pain, because it's the same as my pain.

How is this not a version of : if I happen to be right, then I happen to be right ? — green flag

I don't quite understand the question.

Consider this statement: your brother is older than you.

If you happen to have a brother then I am talking about him, and if he happens to be older than you then what I say is true.

I don't need to know that something is the case to talk about it, or be right about it.

So by the same token, even if I don't know that you experience something like my pain, if you do then I can (truthfully) talk about it.

I think this is a motte and bailey situation, where the motte is the ordinary use of 'pain' and the bailey is the dualistic metaphysical version. — green flag

If something like dualism is true and the pain I feel is some essentially private thing then there is no distinction between the "ordinary" use and the "dualistic metaphysical version". The "ordinary" use of pain is to refer to that private, mental phenomena. So this accusation seems to beg the question.

Indictment

34 counts of "falsifying business records in the first degree".

The defendant ... with intent to defraud and intent to commit another crime and aid and conceal the commission thereof, made and caused a false entry in the business records of an enterprise...

Statement of Facts

1. The defendant DONALD J. TRUMP repeatedly and fraudulently falsified New York business records to conceal criminal conduct that hid damaging information from the voting public during the 2016 presidential election.

2. From August 2015 to December 2017, the Defendant orchestrated a scheme with others to influence the 2016 presidential election by identifying and purchasing negative information about him to suppress its publication and benefit the Defendant’s electoral prospects. In order to execute the unlawful scheme, the participants violated election laws and made and caused false entries in the business records of various entities in New York. The participants also took steps that mischaracterized, for tax purposes, the true nature of the payments made in furtherance of the scheme.

3. One component of this scheme was that, at the Defendant’s request, a lawyer who then worked for the Trump Organization as Special Counsel to Defendant (“Lawyer A”), covertly paid $130,000 to an adult film actress shortly before the election to prevent her from publicizing a sexual encounter with the Defendant. Lawyer A made the $130,000 payment through a shell corporation he set up and funded at a bank in Manhattan. This payment was illegal, and Lawyer A has since pleaded guilty to making an illegal campaign contribution and served time in prison. Further, false entries were made in New York business records to effectuate this payment, separate and apart from the New York business records used to conceal the payment.

4. After the election, the Defendant reimbursed Lawyer A for the illegal payment through a series of monthly checks, first from the Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust (the “Defendant’s Trust”)—a Trust created under the laws of New York which held the Trump Organization entity assets after the Defendant was elected President—and then from the Defendant’s bank account. Each check was processed by the Trump Organization, and each check was disguised as a payment for legal services rendered in a given month of 2017 pursuant to a retainer agreement. The payment records, kept and maintained by the Trump Organization, were false New York business records. In truth, there was no retainer agreement, and Lawyer A was not being paid for legal services rendered in 2017. The Defendant caused his entities’ business records to be falsified to disguise his and others’ criminal conduct.

You are assuming that 'pain' is like a label somehow pinned on something simultaneously understood to be radically elusive and ineffable. — green flag

It’s hardly elusive. When I’m in pain it’s pretty obvious. I have a private experience which is immediately apparent to me and I refer to it using the word “pain”. I then assume that there’s nothing special about me and that you experience something much the same, and refer to that experience using the same word.

Now it’s entirely possible that there is something special about me, and that whatever you feel when you burn yourself is nothing like the pain I feel when I burn myself, in which case you don’t feel pain (as I understand it) but instead feel something else that you happen to also call “pain”. But that it’s possible isn’t that it’s true, and if it’s not true then it is both the case that I can talk about and understand your pain and the case that your pain is private to you.

Yes, that's part of the grammar of the word. — green flag

It doesn’t have anything to do with grammar. I can be in pain even if I don’t have a language. It’s not as if pre-linguistic humans never had headaches.

I really don’t understand this devotion to Wittgenstein and this obsession with language. It just has nothing to do with whether or not there are private, first-person experiences (or whether or not the external world is coloured).

Perhaps you are implicitly assuming that I have the same pain beetle in my box, but assumption is parasitic on ordinary criteria for being in pain, such as talking about it or taking aspirin. — green flag

I can be in pain without talking about it or taking aspirin. I assume you can too. Maybe I’m wrong, but the idea that I can’t talk as if I’m right just makes no sense to me.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/world-us-canada-65167017

Following his arrival at court, Donald Trump is now formally under arrest and in police custody ahead of his upcoming arraignment.

19:15 for those of us living in the One True Timezone.

As I see it, the problem is assuming some kind of a dualism and then 'deriving' some limitation of science. — green flag

It’s not a case of assuming dualism, just as it’s not a case of assuming materialism on the other side.

It’s the case that either one finds a physicalist account of one’s first person experiences convincing or one doesn’t. And I’m not convinced by the claim that my first person experience of pain just is some particular arrangement of atoms (and other particles).

It might be that my first person experience of pain depends on and is caused by such an arrangement of atoms, but it doesn’t then follow that they are one-and-the-same.

My central point is that 'metaphysical' consciousness is semantically indeterminate and even paradoxical. — green flag

Something like Wittgenstein's argument against a private language? I'm not convinced by it. I made a passing comment about it here.

I'd say that your interior monologue is still bodily. Technology is being developed that can read your thoughts by little motions in the throat, etc. — green flag

There are studies that show that decision-making is unconscious, and that conscious decision-making is post hoc. So it could be that the technology you reference is reading that pre-conscious decision-making, not consciousness itself.

I would say that consciousness causes (some) behaviour, not that (some) behaviour is consciousness. As I mentioned before, I can think many things that I never "manifest" in behaviour.

Without merely assuming some strange and elusive entity that is essentially the same in all of us ? — green flag

That is indeed what we assume. Whether or not it's reasonable is a separate issue. The skeptic who questions the existence of other minds might argue that such an assumption is unreasonable.

I don't really understand your comments. I accept that consciousness often determines behaviour, and so that behaviour can indicate consciousness. But it doesn't follow from that that consciousness is behaviour. As you even say yourself "much of our behavior, I would say most, is not driven by consciousness" and so clearly they are two different things.

Why do you say it is a fact and it is true? — Richard B

Because I believe it to be so.

First, you will need to make some acknowledgements to the points made before answering your question. I don't want to address the same claims again and again. — Nickolasgaspar

Depending on your answer to my question, the other points are irrelevant. Almost nobody denies the causal relationship between brain activity and mental phenomena. It's accepted that we feel pain because of such-and-such brain activity, and so can infer how someone feels by examining their brain and other bodily functions.

That the neuroscientist can explain that such-and-such brain activity causes the first-person experience of pain isn't that he can explain how or why it does so, or the nature of first-person experience itself.

You said this is a fact. Is that because you have testified to this, and thus, it is a fact because you say so? — Richard B

No, I'm saying so because I believe it to be a fact. And because it is a fact, what I say is true.

The word "Natural" can be used as an umbrella term when we want to make a distinction between mental and physical properties of matter. — Nickolasgaspar

If there's a distinction between mental and physical properties then you accept that a) the mental is non-physical, that b) mental things exist, and so that c) non-physical things exist.

If you do not like verifiability, how does this fact establish its truth or falsity? One can make claims, but we do need to know how to establish whether it is a fact or not. — Richard B

I don't understand the question.

It is either a fact that intelligent, extra-terrestrial life exists or it isn't.
It is either a fact that private experiences exist or they don't.

Whether or not intelligent, extra-terrestrial life or private experiences exist has nothing to do with what we can or can't verify. The world just either is that way or it isn't.

Well it depends form the meaning of the word. This is why I always use the term "natural". — Nickolasgaspar

What's the difference between "natural" and "physical"?

IT is physical since the mechanisms are physical, the emergent property is Natural (mental property). — Nickolasgaspar

So are you arguing for property dualism?

Of course it is, just look at the huge bibliography on the phenomenon...Scientific books and papers can not be written without analyzing the actual phenomenon. — Nickolasgaspar

There are lots of scientific papers on brain activity and behavioural responses. This does not prima facie say anything about first-person experience.

Much of the science on first-person experience depends on taking for granted what people self-report, which is why the issue of animal consciousness is problematic (they can't tell us anything). But someone saying "I am in pain" is not the same thing as that person's first-person experience of pain, and so that there is scientific evidence of the former isn't that there is scientific evidence of the latter.

The phenomenon is mental but it is physically induced. — Nickolasgaspar

If the phenomenon is mental, and if the mental is non-physical, then the phenomenon is non-physical.

That it has a physical cause isn't that it, itself, is physical.

The other problem with your claim is that a personal experience....is a personal experience! So accusing science for not being able to experience "your experience" is like accusing a tuna sandwich for being slow in a 100m race. — Nickolasgaspar

I don't know what you mean by science experiencing something.

Either my first-person experience is susceptible to scientific analysis or it isn't. So which is it?

If it isn't then either a) my first-person experience isn't a physical phenomenon or b) some physical phenomena are not susceptible to scientific analysis. So which is it?

But, in principle, this claim cannot be verified as either true or false, so we are not talking about facts here. — Richard B

I don't think facts depend on verifiability. It just either is or isn't the case that private experiences exist.

I suppose some anti-realists might disagree, but then I don't think anti-realists are going to be direct realists anyway.

That is not the point, you are avoiding to consider the evidence in favor of its physical nature by using a bad excuse (science can not experience our personal experience) — Nickolasgaspar

It's not a bad excuse.

The argument is:

1) all physical phenomena is susceptible to scientific analysis
2) we have first-person experience
3) some aspect of first-person experience is not susceptible to scientific analysis
4) therefore, some aspect of first-person experience is not a physical phenomenon

The argument is valid, and so to reject the conclusion you must reject one of the premises. But you've previously accepted premises 2) and 3), and I assume you also accept 1), so it's irrational to then reject 4).

Secondly nothing in your "if" statement takes our current scientific evidence in to consideration! — Nickolasgaspar

Obviously, that's the point. If some aspect of consciousness is non-physical then there can be no scientific (physical) evidence of it.

Arguing that because there is no scientific evidence for it then it doesn't exist is to beg the question and assume that if something exists then there is scientific evidence for it.

-So why are you doing this? — Nickolasgaspar

Because the purpose of this discussion is to assess the evidence either for or against the neuroscientist's claim that consciousness can be exhaustively explained by brain activity (or other physical phenomena). It is perfectly correct not to beg the question and assume either materialism or dualism from the start.

You really do sound like some kind of evangelist. It seems @bert1 was right about you in the OP.

You say "if consciousness is non physical....". That statement can only be meaningful if non physical is considered to be an available option for the ontology of consciousness — Nickolasgaspar

No it doesn't.

If God is real then...
If ghosts are real then...
If magic is real then...
If parallel worlds are real then...

I'm not assuming anything about what's possible.

Obviously you are suggesting an option without even knowing if it is possible. — Nickolasgaspar

Correct.

I don't know if it's possible. I also don't know if it's impossible. Unlike you I'm not going to beg the question and assume that materialism is the case – that everything, including consciousness, is physical.

Maybe consciousness is physical. Maybe it's non-physical. And if it is non-physical then...

This isn't difficult Michael..You are suggesting an ontology. This ontology needs to be assumed by definition. The same is true of its qualities.
You can not escape from those underlying assumptions! — Nickolasgaspar

If you give me £1,000,000 then I will quit my job.

Am I assuming that you have given me £1,000,000? No. Am I assuming that you can give me £1,000,000? No. Am I assuming that someone has given or can give me £1,000,000? No (although, incidentally, there are people who can).

If consciousness is non-physical then there is no evidence that consciousness is physical.

Am I assuming that consciousness is non-physical? No. Am I assuming that consciousness can be non-physical? No. Am I assuming that something is or can be non-physical? No.

Do you just not understand what "if" means?

You state: " if an aspect of consciousness is non physical"
A.You assume that non physical things exist — Nickolasgaspar

No I don't.

you state:"science can not detect conscious experience because its non physical".

No I don't.

b. that consciousness can be a non physical

Given that I'm not begging the question, as you seem to be, and assuming from the start that consciousness cannot be non-physical, that is correct.

Although strictly speaking, my actual claim doesn't assume this.

Again too many ifs and assumptions. — Nickolasgaspar

You can keep repeating this, but it's still wrong. I haven't made any assumptions, and there's only one use of the term "if" in my claim.

If consciousness is non-physical then there is no evidence that consciousness is physical.

Again too many ifs and assumptions. — Nickolasgaspar

One if, no assumptions.

If your use of non-physical means a phenomena undetectable by any current or future scientific endeavour then is that not your own personal appeal to pseudo-science? — universeness

It's not pseudo-science because it doesn't claim to be scientific at all. It's just not-science.

Again to many assumptions, you need to assume that the phenomenon is non physical, that non physical phenomena CAN exist, and its interaction with the physical world shouldn't leave any traces....way to many. — Nickolasgaspar

I'm not assuming that it's non-physical. I'm saying that if it is non-physical then...

No, you are dealing with way to many ifs to make it even meaningful! — Nickolasgaspar

There's just one if, and that is: if consciousness is non-physical then nothing is evidence that consciousness is physical.

as you have also accused a scientist who is well respected within the scientific community, of being a pseudo-scientist. — universeness

I'm just going by his Wikipedia article.

Alfred Rupert Sheldrake (born 28 June 1942) is an English author and parapsychology researcher. He proposed the concept of morphic resonance,[3][4] a conjecture which lacks mainstream acceptance and has been criticized as pseudoscience.[5][6][7][8][9]

Your "if" hiding in a safe space while wearing a falsifiability proof vest is already in trouble with zero philosophical value. — Nickolasgaspar

It has philosophical value if it's true.

Why not say that you are not familiar with Sheldrakes work, in your first response to me after I mentioned it? — universeness

My response was fine. You accused me of saying something about his work. Given that I never mentioned him or his work, your accusation was wrong, which was my response.

And no, I'm not going to watch a 2.5 hour video on a pseudoscientist.

If you are not willing to comment on 'theories,' that may evidence aspects of consciousness that exist outside of the physical borderlines of the human being/other lifeforms, then you come across as 'reluctant' to defend your own side of the debate. — universeness

I don't understand what his theory is, or what "morphic resonances" are. Are they a physical thing? Then it has nothing to do with what I am saying. Are they a non-physical thing? Then I wonder in what sense he can be said to have scientific evidence of it.

If you want me to address it then you're going to have to explain his theory in detail.

-Ok, it took me some time but I think get what your goal is.
You are not looking for statements that will allow you to understand the phenomenon. What you are doing is entertaining 'ifs' and you justify their "possibility" by pointing to things we currently don't know or lacking the means to observer directly?
Am I right? — Nickolasgaspar

I'm just pointing out the problem with Isaac's question (as I understood it).

It's like asking "what evidence would prove that a non-interventionist creator deity doesn't exist?" Well, nothing would.

And so by the same token, if consciousness is non-physical then no evidence can prove that consciousness is physical.

What makes you talk about that if? — Nickolasgaspar

Because of Isaac's question to bert1. I understood it to be asking what would count as evidence that consciousness is entirely physical. I think his question is problematic, because if consciousness isn't entirely physical then nothing would count as evidence that it is entirely physical.

And what indications you have for non physical aspects existing in our cosmos. — Nickolasgaspar

It could be that I don't find any purely physical explanation of my first-person consciousness convincing. And if there is some non-physical aspect to my first-person consciousness then it isn't surprising that I'm unconvinced by a purely physical explanation.

If you are not willing to offer useful answers, to my main questions then there is nowhere to take this exchange between us. — universeness

You accused of something I didn't do. I'm not sure what kind of answer you expect from me.

Sure, but "ifs" need to be demonstrated not assumed. — Nickolasgaspar

I'm not assuming anything. My argument is only that if there is some non-physical aspect to consciousness then there cannot be any physical evidence that this non-physical aspect doesn't exist.

I'm not arguing that there is some non-physical aspect to consciousness.

In that case that untraceable "something else" is indistinguishable from something that doesn't exist! — Nickolasgaspar

It doesn't then follow that it doesn't exist.

If it does exist then any explanation of consciousness that doesn't include this thing doesn't (exhaustively) explain consciousness at all.