There was no secession. Secession is when a state leaves the union. — frank

Secession from reality.

That's a representation. Those objects in the thought bubbles are representations of apples. — Isaac

They are no more representations of apples than pain is a representation of fire or cold a representation of a temperature of 0°C. They are just an effect of stimulation.

When we say "the post box is red" we don't mean that there's some thing 'redness' which the post box possesses — Isaac

We do according to the (phenomenological) direct realist. They commit themselves to something like colour primitivism. Indirect realism is a response to such claims.

Then why have representations at all? Why have the word? — Isaac

I try not to use the word. I think it's a distraction. I have repeatedly said that the epistemological problem of perception – the very thing that gave rise to the distinction between the direct (naive) realist and the indirect realist – concerns the relationship between the phenomenology of experience and the mind-independent properties of external world objects.

The pain I feel isn't a mind-independent property of fire. The cold I feel isn't a mind-independent property of the air. The sweetness I taste isn't a mind-independent property of sugar. The colour I see isn't a mind-independent property of the apple.

It makes no real difference if we describe this as feeling or tasting or seeing "mental representations" or if we describe this as feeling or tasting or seeing fire and air and sugar and apples. That semantic argument is, really, a non-issue.

When I talk to my parents on the phone, it is perfectly acceptable to say that I talk to my parents on the phone, not to some representation of my parents; but it is also correct to say that our conversation is indirect; that their voice isn't actually "present" in my experience (given that sound can't travel that fast, and at the volume they speak also can't travel that far).

When I talk about my parents, it is perfectly acceptable to say that I talk about my parents, not about some representation of my parents; but it is also correct to say that there is no "direct" connection between my words and my parents; that they are not actually "present" in my conversation.

This is the problem I have with so-called semantic direct realism. It doesn't actually address the epistemological problem of perception, or the substance of the indirect realist's arguments. As was argued in the paper I referenced before, semantic direct realism is just an attempt to maintain direct realist terminology in the face of the insurmountable problems of illusion and hallucination, and to our current scientific understanding of the world and perception. It abandons the direct (naive) realist's claim that we see things as they (mind-independently) are, and retreats simply to the claim that we see things, which doesn't really say anything significant.

In my preferred model of perception, we attempt to predict the external causes of our sensory inputs so that we might combat the entropy otherwise induced by external forces and maintain our integrity. You could put that in evolutionary terms as being a need to predict the environment so that we can survive what it's going to throw at us.

But this requires that what we're predicting is the external world, the actual thing outside of us which might impact our integrity. And when we live in groups, we do this socially. We co-operate to better predict external causes and make ourselves more predictable to others (in the hope they will return the favour). So the important thing about labelling something 'red' is the co-operation, the surprise reduction, entailed by doing so. It's important that we agree and it's important that what we agree about is an external cause.

If all we're labelling is our own private 'representations', then I really can't see the point. Why would you care? Why would I? What difference does it make to anyone what your private representation is called? — Isaac

It's not an either-or. When you tell me that something is cold, I understand it both in the sense that the temperature is low and in the sense of how such things feel. I can make sense of someone being out in such temperatures and yet not feeling cold. I am able to recognize the distinction between cause and effect. The same with pain, and smells, and tastes, and colours. The mistake direct (naive) realists make is to project the effect onto the cause, e.g. in the case of colour primitivism.

I would rather they gone after him on the Georgia case. — RogueAI

It’s not an either-or. The New York prosecutors are prosecuting him for alleged crimes committed in New York, the Georgia prosecutors are investigating him for possible crimes committed in Georgia, and federal prosecutors are investigating him for possible crimes related to classified documents.

But there is a difference between these two explanations, one metaphysical and one scientific. The scientific explanation has physical theory behind it. Verified countless times by a community of scientist. It has power to predict future occurrences and the power to construct our environment. All verifiable in the public realm. — Richard B

Yes, and the science shows that objects don’t have colour properties, a la colour primitivism. It is just the case that objects reflect light of a certain wavelength stimulating the sense receptors in the eye which in term stimulate brain activity, creating the experience of coloured objects. I referenced an experiment earlier that explicitly determined that colour is a perceptual construct of this kind, not to be found in light or apples.

It’s no different to a low temperature causing me to feel cold or a punch to the face causing me to feel pain. A temperature of 0 degrees doesn’t have a property of coldness and fists don’t have properties of pain. I don’t know why anyone would think colour is any different given our modern science of the world and perception.

If you want to argue that the feeling of being cold isn’t some essentially private mental phenomena but is reducible to brain activity then fine, but the same must also be said of seeing colours. Sight isn’t a uniquely special sense. They key point is that colour, like coldness and pain, aren’t properties of the external stimulus that trigger such experiences.

I just meant that there's no intermediate object, no 'representation' of an apple. — Isaac

I’m not saying that either. I’m saying that the reality of colour perception is like this:



Or maybe even that both the man and the woman have the same kind of experience. The essential point is that the apple in between them isn’t coloured. It reflects a certain wavelength of light, but that’s all. Colour primitivism, which naive realists believe, is false.

And further, that when the man uses the term “grue” to describe the colour of the apple, he’s referring to what’s present in his experience and not present in the woman’s (in the particular example of that image), not to the fact that the apple reflects light with a wavelength of 450nm.

Searle wrote "… the experience of pain is identical with the pain" — RussellA

Yes, same with colour.

However, I think you would agree that you can't say to me that "I actually see a blue object when I say "I see red object." This make no sense. — Richard B

But it does make sense to say "what you mean by 'red' might not be what I mean by 'red'".

Referring back to this picture, if the man were able to see through the woman's eyes, he wouldn't say that the colour red looks different to this woman; he would say that the apple doesn't look red to the woman, it looks green.

Or at least that's what I'd say were I that man and able to see through the woman's eyes.

The indirect realist may want to posit "sense data" as the explanation for the difference between people reporting different colors, and claim it the best explanation. Unfortunately, I would have to break the news to the indirect realist that this is an unnecessary explanation. The car was painted with a pigment called ChromaFlair. When the paint is applied, it changes color depending on the light source and viewing angle. In this example, this was intentionally done, and I am sure this can happen un-intentionally too. — Richard B

But there are occasions where people see different colours despite nothing like this happening. Arguing that sometimes the differences can be explained with reference to the light source and viewing angle doesn't disprove that sometimes the differences must be explained with reference to something other than the light source and viewing angle.

The example of the dress is one such example that cannot be explained away the way you do here, as is the experiment I referred to before.

Pay attention to the malum per se and malum prohibita distinction. That was the point. — Hanover

So any law that prohibits something that isn't, in itself, an evil, is an unjust law that shouldn't be a law and so shouldn't be punished?

They eventually got him for tax evasion. That crime is not malum in se, but is a regulatory crime and a convenient excuse to take him down. — Hanover

So are you saying that tax evasion shouldn't be crime? That nobody should be punished for not paying their taxes? That taxes should be optional?

The Georgia fraud issue is the real crime, not this NY one, and it will appear to some that the NY crimes are BS, and now they just keep taking stabs trying to get one to stick. — Hanover

I can't quite understand the reasoning here. Is it that if someone has committed some greater crime then they shouldn't be punished for their lesser crimes? That committing some major wrong somehow absolves them of some minor wrong?

Like, I'm a murderer, so you shouldn't imprison me for stealing that car?

A crime is a crime. Either argue that the crime shouldn't be a crime (for anyone), or accept that people who break it should be prosecuted.

I don't think there's any good reason to argue that the average guy who embezzles money should be punished for it, but a rich, powerful ex-President who embezzles money shouldn't be punished for it because he might have done much worse.

But you were arguing earlier that even language-less creatures see colours. Now you're saying the only reason we're the same is that we were taught the language. You're using our response again (saying 'blue') and then just inserting this other element (a colour experience) in between the actual light and our response to is without any need for it to be there. — Isaac

You asked me "Why is it .. that .. the overwhelming majority of people will see that it's blue and black."

What you mean by this is "why is it that the overwhelming majority use the words 'blue' and 'black'" to describe what they see".

And I explained that. We have learnt to use the words "blue" and "black" to describe objects that, upon closer examination, are found to reflect a certain wavelength of light.

My theory has the additional benefit of actually explaining why it is that we sometimes use different words to describe what we see, despite the shared external stimulus, i.e. light of a particular wavelength. Clearly something is going on in my head that isn't going on in your head that explains why you reach for one word and I reach for another. We can argue over whether this thing is some non-physical mental phenomena like "qualia" or simply physical brain activity, but we need to at least agree that something different is going on in our heads to explain the different descriptions.

It is certainly insufficient to argue that it is just the case that we use different words, and that there's no further explanation as to why this is.

It's not 'reasonable' at all. It don't understand from where you're getting this assumption that assuming the world to be the way you think it is is reasonable, but for others to disagree isn't. — Isaac

And I don’t understand how you think you can gaslight me into rejecting the reality of my first person experience. It is the foundational truth upon which all my other empirical knowledge rests.

If you were just trying to have me question the existence of other minds, and consider solipsism, then your arguments aren’t unfounded, but that seems to be for a different discussion. I think it fine to assume that solipsism isn’t the case when discussing direct and indirect realism.

At the very least, the indisputable (to me) reality of my first person experience is proof enough (to me) that me seeing red and me saying “I see red” are completely different things. I can see red things without saying so. I can lie about seeing red things. There are no rational (or empirical) grounds for me to deny this about myself.

b) There's something wrong with my brain - in which case it's perfectly possible for brain to interact directly with the world, and so no reason to think indirect realism is necessary. — Isaac

I don’t understand this conclusion. Given that your brain is inside your head and the apple is on the table in front of you, in what sense does the brain “interact directly” with the apple? There’s a whole lot of intermediate stuff in between, such as the air, light, your eyes, the nerves leading from your eyes to your brain, etc. Unless you want to stretch the meaning of "direct" into meaninglessness, in a very factual, physical sense, the brain does not interact directly with the outside world.

You're talking to someone who disagrees with you about these 'private experiences' and yet are wanting to use their apparently self-evident nature as evidence. It's directly contradicted by the fact that I don't feel that way. — Isaac

Then perhaps you are, in fact, a p-zombie, which would also explain your inability to make sense of p-zombies. Someone who doesn't have anything like first-person experience/qualia isn't going to understand the proposed distinction between something that has them and something that doesn't.

So at best you can argue that it's unreasonable of me to assume that other people are like me rather than like you. Maybe everyone else is like you, and I'm the only person in the world with first-person experience. But I think it unreasonable to assume that I'm unique. I think it more reasonable to assume that everyone else is much like me; that I'm an example of the typical human. Of the course the paradox is that you have to think the same, and assume that, like you, nobody has first-person experience.

Perhaps the more reasonable assumption is that everyone who denies the existence of first-person experience/qualia and the sensibility of p-zombies is a p-zombie, and the rest of us aren't.

a law created by the government — Hanover

Isn’t that all laws?

Again, all you're showing evidence of is responses. — Isaac

Yes, and different private experiences are the best explanation for the different responses. I know that the reason I describe the colours of the dress to be white and gold is because it appears to me to be white and gold. My description comes after the fact, if I choose to describe what I see at all. It's not unreasonable to assume that this is the case for everyone else.

The fact that we can lie about what we see, or refuse to talk, is proof enough that there is a very real distinction between how the dress appears to us and our public description of how the dress appears to us. Of course, it's entirely possible that either everyone who describes the dress as black and blue is lying, or that everyone who describes the dress as white and gold is lying, but I don't think that a reasonable assumption at all. It is reasonable to assume that most people are being honest and that, like me, first the dress appears to have certain colours and then (if they choose) they describe the colours.

Why is it, do you think, that when shown the actual dress in normal lighting conditions the overwhelming majority of people will see that it's blue and black. What explains that extraordinary convergence? — Isaac

Because in normal lighting conditions objects which reflect a certain wavelength of light always appear to have a certain colour to me, and always appear to have a certain colour to you, and as children when shown such objects we are told that it is blue, and so we come to associate the word "blue" with the colour we see. Given the normal regularity between the wavelength of light and the apparent colour, there is normally a regularity in when we use the word "blue".

But then, in abnormal conditions, when an object which reflects a different wavelength of light nonetheless appears to be blue to me, but a different colour to you, I use the word "blue" to describe the colour I see and you use a different word.

This explains how it is the case that a) colour terms refer to a thing's private appearance, that b) in normal conditions we usually use the same colour terms to describe what we see, and that c) we sometimes don’t use the same colour terms to describe what we see. It’s a parsimonious explanation that’s consistent with the empirical evidence.

The same experiment triggers conflicting conclusions. It is clear evidence of direct realism. The dress is a duck-rabbit. Everyone can see the same duck-rabbit dress, and that is indeed the assumption on which the experiment stands. If they didn't see the same thing, there would be nothing to explain. Because it is only an image, it can be ambiguous; if it were even a short movie, let alone a live encounter, the illusion could probably not be maintained, any more than anyone is deceived for long about ducks and rabbits, (or frogs and horses). One can mistake what one sees for something it is not, but this is no reason to deny that one sees it. — unenlightened

I think you need to read this.

Indirect realism is a response to naive realism (what the author of the above paper calls "phenomenological direct realism"), not to what he calls semantic direct realism, which is in fact consistent with indirect realism, but for whatever reason uses direct realist language.

Indirect realists argue that the cold I feel isn't a mind-independent property of the Arctic air but a private experience caused by a particular temperature range. It's not the case that the polar bear who lives in the Arctic, but isn't cold, lacks the means to detect the cold in the air; it's just the case that he doesn't feel cold in such temperatures. Things like colour are no different in principle; they're just a different mode of experience (visual) caused by a different kind of stimulus (electromagnetic radiation).

This is not a fact, it's completely unsupported conjecture. Where is your evidence? — Isaac

The fact that two people, fluent in English, describe the colours of the dress differently is evidence that the colours the dress appears to have to one are not the colours the dress appears to have to the other.

If we assume that we do have eyes and brains, and that the mechanics of perception is as we currently understand it to be, then the explanation above shows indirect realism to be the case. — Michael

Interestingly, I've just discovered that Bertrand Russell made much the same argument in An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth.

Scientific scripture, in its most canonical form, is embodied in physics (including physiology). Physics assures us that the occurrences which we call ''perceiving objects'' are at the end of a long causal chain which starts from the objects, and are not likely to resemble the objects except, at best, in certain very abstract ways. We all start from "naive realism', i.e., the doctrine that things are what they seem. We think that grass is green, that stones are hard, and that snow is cold. But physics assures us that the greenness of grass, the hardness of stones, and the coldness of snow, are not the greenness, hardness, and coldness that we know in our own experience, but something very different. The observer, when he seems to himself to be observing a stone, is really, if physics is to be believed, observing the effects of the stone upon himself. Thus science seems to be at war with itself; when it most means to be objective, it finds itself plunged into subjectivity against its will. Naive realism leads to physics, and physics, if true, shows that naive realism is false. Therefore naive realism, if true, is false; therefore it is false.

We do something similar to the experiment I referenced before in my discussion with Issac, show individual A an object that he previously described as being blue, but have it fire neuron cluster 11 instead of 99 and ask him what colour the object is. If he says red then we know that the colour terms he uses refer to something that goes on in his head, not to something that goes on in the external world.

But, again, we don’t even need to consider anything so complicated. What colours do you see this dress to be? I recall a survey being done that showed that 2/3rds see it to be white and gold and 1/3 black and blue. How could I make sense of this and describe this if colour terms can’t refer to private experiences?



But as I’ve mentioned before, all this talk of language is a red herring. The fact remains that the dress appears differently to different people. The same stimulus triggers different, even conflicting, private experiences, and it is these private experiences that directly inform our understanding (hence why people use different words to describe that they see). That is clear evidence of indirect realism.

or he’s guilty

It really is a cult.

I recall reading that it was due to a technicality and that Starr messed up. — Michael

Here's where I read it:

"Have you ever had sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky, as that term is defined in Deposition Exhibit 1, as modified by the court?"

...

"Sexual relations" was defined as follows: "A person engages in 'sexual relations' when the person knowingly engages in or causes contact with the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh or buttocks of any person with an intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person."

Why would your personal conclusions about the function of your brain (or mind, even) be treated with any more authority that your first person feelings about gravity, or electromagnetism, or evolution? — Isaac

My experiences aren't self-evidence of gravity, but they are self-evidence of my experiences. That's common sense.

Exactly. By their responses. Not their private experiences. — Isaac

Yes, it's entirely possible that only adult humans have private experiences. Or it's entirely possible that only I have private experiences, and that the rest of you are p-zombies. But I think it more likely that I'm nothing particularly special and that the rest of you have private experiences, and that non-human animals have private experiences too.

When Hume suggested a human with otherwise correct vision can install a missing shade of blue, he has already granted that the name of the color doesn’t reflect the capacity. Could have been any gap in the spectrum, which makes the name of it irrelevant. — Mww

I agree. If some future scientist were able to modify my eye and give me tetrachromacy, I would see more colours than I see now, even though I wouldn't have words to refer to these new colours.

You know this how? — Isaac

Evolution of colour vision in mammals

You want to say that distinction consists in different 'experiences'.

I'm claiming there's no evidence for that. — Isaac

Experience is evidence of itself. My different experiences are self-evident.

The second point I want to make is, even if two differences are detectable between colours, for example 2 different shades of green, at what point do we determine when green is no longer a shade of green but a shade of blue.
Some argue turquoise is a tone of blue. Some argue it is a tone of green. Others say its its own unique colour.

There is a tribe in Africa, swahili I believe, where blue and green are but shades of the same colour. Are they any less correct in believing so verses our distinction?

In a spectrum of colour where changes are seamless, fluid and graduating, placing borders to define categories is more or less arbitrary to a point and you could place 100 borders or 20 or 8. — Benj96

I agree with this, but it has nothing to do with what I'm saying. I don't care what words one uses to refer to the colours one sees. It doesn't matter. What matters is that we do see colours, and that seeing colours and talking about colours are two completely different things. I do the former even without the latter.

It's not the case that if John has a single word "grue" that refers to the colours that the rest of us call "blue" and "green" that if shown something green and something blue then they will appear to be identical, just as I don't need individual words for each shade of red to see that one shade of red isn't identical to a different shade of red. I might use the same word "red" to describe both colours, but I can see that they're different.

@Isaac

I refer you to this. Are you really trying to argue that without a language then we would just see a single non-coloured circle (or maybe nothing, because that there is a circle at all depends on it being coloured in contrast to the white background?), and not a coloured circle surrounded by a differently coloured ring surrounded by yet another differently coloured ring?

I think that that's an extraordinary claim, inconsistent with common sense, and that the burden is on you to prove it, not on me to disprove it.

Not having a language doesn't make the world appear black and white (or me outright blind).

I'm quite aware of your point, what I'm waiting for is any grounds for asserting it. — Isaac

On the grounds that babies and non-human animals and illiterate deaf mutes raised by wolves in the jungle can see colours.

On what grounds? — Isaac

First-person empirical evidence.

He should have gone down for that. The Democrats have no moral standing here either. — Baden

I recall reading that it was due to a technicality and that Starr messed up. Clinton was asked if he had had sexual relations, and was given a list of activities that count as "sexual relations". Receiving a blow job wasn't on the list.

It would have been interesting if he'd answered "yes" because under a "normal" understanding of the phrase it would have included receiving a blow job, and then he be found guilty of perjury because receiving a blow job wasn't on the pre-defined list of what was meant by "sexual relations".

No. You can see five different colours there. That they are all shades of 'red' is something you were taught by the culture you grew up in. — Isaac

This is nonsense. You might as well say "you don't see five different colours; you see five different things. That they are all 'colours' is something you were taught in the culture you grew up in".

Or maybe "you don't see; you [something]. That it is 'seeing' is something you were taught in the culture you grew up in".

Or maybe "you don't get taught in a culture you grew up in; that it is 'being taught in the culture you grew up in' is ... [unintelligible rubbish]".

Again, you seem to fail to understand the use-mention distinction.

But this isn't the main point. The main point is that seeing colours has nothing to do with "reaching" for some word or other. Sight (and hearing and feeling and tasting) has nothing to do with language. And also that the colours you see when looking at a photo of a dress might not be the colours that I see when looking at that same photo of a dress.

We have sensory inputs, we have behavioural responses, we have post hoc self reports. — Isaac

We have consciousness. We're not just input-output machines. I have a first person experience when I'm sitting still, in silence, watching and hearing and feeling the things going on around me. I don't need to say, or think, "I'm in pain" to be in pain. I just feel it.

Clinton committed perjury. — Hanover

And he was rightfully impeached for it. Whether or not he was wrongfully acquitted is a different matter. But also, as I said before, impeachment and prosecution are two different things.

It just strikes me as naive and unrealistic to suggest that politicians are apolitical. — Hanover

I'm not saying that they're apolitical. I'm saying that it's wrong for you to suggest that Bragg should have considered how prosecuting Trump would have affected the Democrat Party at the next election. If there's evidence of a crime than it is right to press charges.

Or pay attention to whether you're going to secure a conviction and ask yourself what the consequences of your decisions will be. I've not created a per se rule protecting former presidents. I've just asked that politicians pay attention to the political landscape. — Hanover

I assume they believe that there is a good chance of conviction, and that the consequences are that a criminal is punished for his crimes.

It is corruption, plain and simple, for a distinct attorney to refuse to convict because it may damage their preferred political party's chances at the next election. I'm sure you wouldn't like it if Bragg were to refuse to prosecute a Democrat congressman for a crime because he wants that congressman to be re-elected.

At least acknowledge the irony of the left demanding law and order and siding full step with law enforcement. Cities burned in lawlessness as politicians offered tempered politically motivated responses the past few years. And today it's being argued that the right is the party of innocent until proven guilty? — Hanover

I don't know what you're trying to say here. Is there evidence that some Democrat politician committed a crime and that some Democrat district attorney refused to prosecute them because they are a fellow Democrat, and that "the left" are okay with this?

The impeachment of Clinton was a massive mistake and is often cited for the reason why the Republicans lost power after great gains.

There is a political reality that cannot be ignored. You can go on about how justice demands the prosecution of every prosecutable crime damn the torpedoes, and we can then end up with failed impeachments and acquittals followed by emboldened politicians who should have lost power. — Hanover

Impeachment and prosecution are different things.

The Manhattan case is a case about misuse of campaign funds and falsification of records. It's a finance regulatory case. — Hanover

It's a financial crime, and financial crimes should be prosecuted (and punished if found guilty).

Either apply the law equally to all offenders or get rid of the law. Why should Trump be given special treatment just because he's a former President? It may be politically expedient, but the fair application of the law shouldn't be motivated by politics. That reeks of corruption.

I wish he'd be hit for something real, not whether he might have improperly paid off the woman he slept with. — Hanover

This is a very rhetorical way to phrase it. It's like me embezzling funds from some company I manage and then describing the subsequent prosecution as being just about "improperly paying for a new car".

I think there's also a case of people taking "innocent until proven guilty" too far. They presume innocence (which is fine), but then use that to baselessly assert that therefore all the evidence that proves guilt must be false or fake or fabricated or whatever. Or they just ignore the evidence altogether, and just assert that the prosecution was politically motivated, and so even if he's clearly guilty he shouldn't be held accountable.

It is not that we don't have private experience but the language to articulate, like we do in the public sphere. — Richard B

Yet we can quite coherently talk about the well-observed fact that to some people the infamous photo of the dress appears white and gold, and to others black and blue. We can quite coherently talk about the colour blind. We can quite coherently talk about a situation such as that shown in this picture.



There is really no difficulty (for me at least) in understanding and talking about other people having a different private experience to the same external stimulus.

Now imagine that that photo represents the reality of two people living on Twin Earth. They speak a language much like English except with a different colour vocabulary. The apple reflects light with a wavelength of 450nm. They have learnt to refer to the colour of such objects as "foo".

I wouldn't say that "foo" refers to some public thing (such as light with a wavelength of 450nm, or a surface that reflects such light). I would say that "foo" refers to the quality of their private experience. If I were the man in this picture and able to learn of this picture, and of the fact that objects which reflect light with a wavelength of 450nm appear differently to the woman, I wouldn't think that the colour foo appears differently to the woman; I would think that objects which reflect light with a wavelength of 450nm don't appear to be the colour foo to this woman; they appear to be a different colour. The colour she calls "foo" isn't the colour that I call "foo".

But, again, this discussion on the meaning of colour terms is irrelevant to the actual disagreement between the direct and indirect realist. What matters is the relationship between the man and the woman's private experiences (which are different) and the mind-independent nature of the apple they are looking at. Would it be an accurate representation of reality to colour the apple in that picture, and if so should it be red or green (or other)? A direct realist (at least of the colour primitivist kind) would argue that it should be coloured, and that if it is coloured green then the woman is seeing it correctly and the man incorrectly, or if it is coloured red then the man is seeing it correctly and the woman incorrectly. This is a position that I believe is refuted by our scientific understanding of the world and perception. Colour is "in the head", not in apples (or light).

It may be that seeing some colour is causally covariant with certain wavelengths of light, but so too is the feeling of being cold or hot causally covariant with certain temperatures, and pain causally covariant with having one's nerves cut with a knife. But that there there is some regularity between cause and effect isn't that they are the same thing, and even if you want to adopt the same vocabulary to refer to both the cause and the effect it would be a fallacy of equivocation to then deny the distinction, and I think that this fallacy is all-too-common in discussions on colour.

I see this as a major fuck up by the Democrats. — Hanover

If there is evidence of a crime then the grand jury was right to vote for indictment and the DA right to bring charges. He might be a Democrat, but it was the decision of him and his Manhattan attorneys (and the grand jury), not the Democratic Party.

Are you suggesting that the Democratic Party should have pressured a DA into not bringing charges despite evidence of a crime because it would have been better for them politically? Surely we should all be against that kind of corruption. I'm sure we'd all be against it if it was a Republican DA ignoring evidence of a crime committed by Trump, or a Democrat DA ignoring evidence of a crime committed by Biden. The fact that the DA and Trump belong to different political parties shouldn't make any difference. Political expediency shouldn't influence law enforcement.

Apparently being charged with 34 counts of falsification of business records.

I think your point is reasonable, but you are ignoring that 'see' is part of a system of concepts. — green flag

Seeing is a type of experience. Babies can see, non-linguistic animals can see, the illiterate deaf mute raised by wolves in the jungle can see.

Take this picture as an example:



Does anyone really want to argue that without a language with colour words such as "red", "green", and "blue", then we would just see a single (non-coloured?) circle, and not a coloured circle surrounded by a differently coloured ring surrounded by yet another differently coloured ring?

Another approach to color and the like is to think how color terms play a role in the larger context of conversation. — green flag

Why? What is this obsession with language? Is it impossible for me to see that the sky and the grass are different colours without some language which includes a vocabulary to name such colours? I don't think so. The fact that we need language to talk about the colours we see is irrelevant to this discussion.

Animals get around the world without language, and they certainly are experiencing the world.

But humans use language to understand and communicate what is going on in their experience. So, sometimes what we say makes senses and sometimes it does not. — Richard B

And so trying to say that language entails that we don't have private experiences is saying something that doesn't make sense. Any theory of language that entails this is demonstrably false.

More like a grammatical fiction. — Richard B

It has nothing to do with grammar. Experience isn't language. I can be an illiterate, deafblind mute, and yet still feel pain.