So injustice is beneficial so long as it suits your concerns. I cannot abide by that, myself. — NOS4A2

And I cannot abide by the claim that you being able to own a gun is more important than a child being safer from gun violence.

I believe what drives actions like these is an incredible resentment, hatred, a desire for revenge, etc.

Is no one but me interested in what exactly causes such an amount of hate to manifest in relatively young children?

That's not normal where I'm from. — Tzeentch

But is there more resentment and hatred in Americans than in, say, Brits? Or is it the same, and it’s just that Americans have more guns and so more violent means to express their resentment and hatred?

It’s certainly important to consider why people do what they do, but it’s also important to consider what enables them to do what they do. And it might be easier and faster to limit their opportunities than to limit their motivations.

You don't think kids committing mass murders is a mental health issue?

Ok then. — Tzeentch

If countries with the same rate of mental health issues have a lower rate of mass shootings then something other than mental health must explain the higher rate of mass shootings. One explanation is the higher rate of gun ownership. Another is that there is something almost unique about US culture and upbringing that people are more violent than in more civilised countries. Perhaps their obsession with gun ownership fuels that.

I’m pretty sure all these school shooters know that the police are going to kill them. A lot of them even kill themselves. The threat of ”mutually assured destruction” might work for international relations, but it won’t against the types of person who will mindlesly kill innocents.

Perhaps. But I doubt if everyone owned a gun people would start shooting each other. — NOS4A2

Not everyone would start shooting each other, but more would. Or do you think that if more people have guns then fewer people would use them?

Then why don’t you put everyone in prison? You’ll eliminate violence entirely. — NOS4A2

Because that's a far greater injustice than the injustice it tries to solve.

I'm against the death penalty because of the possibility of false convictions, and killing innocent people is a greater injustice than whatever injustice would follow from not killing guilty people.

I'm not against taking away people's guns, because taking away good people's guns isn't a greater injustice than the injustice that would follow from not taking away bad people's guns.

It's a utilitarian approach to choose between injustices. There's always going to be injustice, that's just a fact of life. A good society is one that knows how to weigh one injustice against another.

That’s why utilitarianism is unjust. You’ll punish people for things they haven’t done. — NOS4A2

Often a necessary price we have to pay to live in a safer society. Judges and juries are not infallible. Sometimes they imprison innocent people. That's an unfortunate injustice that we just have to accept.

The same, I would say, with taking away people's guns. It's a necessary injustice to limit the far greater injustice of innocent children being killed at school.

Yes I believe I ought to be able to defend myself with whatever I want. — NOS4A2

On what grounds? You have a basic human right to defend yourself with the most powerful means available?

I am entitled to my guns because I own them. — NOS4A2

So your argument against gun control is that it is unjust for the government to take away your property (without good reason)?

Firstly, the utilitarian concerns I mentioned before might be good reasons to take away your guns. Given that we don't live in the Minority Report and can't know who is going to shoot someone in the future, we ought to err on the side of caution, assume that anyone could be a potential shooter, and so take guns from everyone.

Secondly, what about only making it illegal to sell or trade guns and bullets? You're entitled to keep what guns and ammo you own, but you're not entitled to come into possession of more. Would that be just?

I have a basic human right to defend my life, liberty, and property, and owning weapons extends from this right. — NOS4A2

Are you saying that because you have the right to defend yourself, you have the right to defend yourself with guns? What about with dynamite or with tanks or with fighter jets?

It’s unjust because they are mine, I am entitled to them, and I have done nothing to justify taking them away. — NOS4A2

Why are you entitled to guns? Do you have a basic human right to own them?

It’s unjust to ban my weapons if I didn’t shoot anyone or do not intend to. — NOS4A2

Why is it unjust? Is it unjust because you have a basic human right to own a gun?

Why can I not own a firearm if I didn’t shoot anyone or do not intend to? — NOS4A2

Asking me a question doesn't answer mine. You said that banning guns is unjust, and prior to that referenced basic human rights. So are you saying that we have a basic human right to own guns? If not then that comment was a non sequitur.

Banning guns is unjust. — NOS4A2

How so? We have a basic human right to own firearms?

Before that it was car accidents. Maybe we should ban cars. — NOS4A2

Banning cars would cause insurmountable damage to the country and the economy, and so car accidents are an unfortunate price we have to be willing to pay.

I can't say anything of the kind about gun ownership.

Most mass shooters are male. — NOS4A2

So how does this being a transgender shooter suggest that it isn't uncharacteristic? I'm pretty sure transgender mass shooters are a significant minority.

Apples appearing red, just means that I think apples are red. — Isaac

There's more to experience than just rational thought. Seeing and feeling and tasting aren't just cases of thinking.

But what does it mean to think that apples are red? You suggested before that to be red is to have a surface that reflects light with a wavelength of 700nm, so to think that apples are red is to think that apples have a surface that reflects light with a wavelength of 700nm? How does that make sense given that people saw, and thought, that apples were red long before they even had the concept of electromagnetic radiation?

There's no separate thing 'the appearance of red' with which we might mistake the property of the apple. — Isaac

You think that they're red because they appear red. You "reaching" for the word "red" to describe apples isn't just something that happens in a vacuum. And presumably you're not a p-zombie that just mindlessly responds to stimulation by spouting out words.

It would indeed since a 'red appearance' is utter nonsense. — Isaac

You don't think that apples appear to be red?

Why is it a mistake? If an object can have the property 'reflects light with a wavelength of 700nm' why can't we call that property "red"? — Isaac

You can call it anything you like. But it would be fallacious to conflate redness in this sense with redness as the appearance. We'll just be using the word "red" to mean two different, albeit causally connected, things.

Can an apple not be both red and 'reflective of 400nm wavelengths'? — Isaac

I'm not saying anything about what they can or can't have. I'm saying something about what they do and don't have. And there's no indication that an apple has anything like a sui generis property of "redness", equivalent to a red appearance. The evidence is just that objects reflect light at certain wavelengths, and that when light with a wavelength of 700nm stimulates the eyes of the typical human then the object appears red to that person (and when it stimulates the eyes of the atypical human then the object appears orange, or green, or whatever to that person).

It's a mistake to then project this coloured appearance onto the external world. It's the naive view that modern science has refuted.

Surely things must appear to the scientists to be the way they now report them to be; otherwise why are they reporting them to be that way?

Things are not as they once appeared. — Isaac

I meant specifically that things aren't as they appear to ordinary human perception, e.g. that objects aren't coloured, in the colour primitivist sense that was believed by direct realists. Objects only appear coloured because of the way the human body responds to stimulation by electromagnetic radiation.

it would be really helpful if people would state what definition of "direct realism" and "indirect realism" they are using when they are posting. — prothero

I'll take a rather simple definition from the problem of perception:

In the context of the Problem of Perception, these cases are usually distinguished as follows: a veridical experience is an experience in which an ordinary object is perceived, and where the object appears as it is; an illusory experience is an experience in which an ordinary object is perceived, and where the object appears other than it is; a hallucination is an experience which seems to the subject exactly like a veridical perception of an ordinary object but where there is no such perceived or presented object.

The direct realist view is the view that things are as they appear. Directness is their explanation of how this is the case. It is how they resolve the epistemological problem of perception. Things appear as they are because perception is direct.

The indirect realist view is the view that things might not be as they appear. Indirectness is their explanation of why this is the case. It is why there is an epistemological problem of perception. Things might not appear as they are because perception is indirect.

Semantic direct realism, as Howard Robinson calls it, seems to accept the indirect realist's view that things might not be as they appear, but wants to call this direct perception anyway, even though directness was used to explain how things appear as they are.

I really don't care if you want to describe perception as "seeing a tree" or "seeing the appearance of a tree". It makes no real difference. The relevant fact is that an object's appearance is not its mind-independent nature, and that it is an object's appearance rather than its mind-independent nature that is the direct object of rational thought, and so there is an epistemological problem of perception. Seeing something might not show us what it’s like when we don’t see it. And I think modern science has proven that things aren't as they appear.

A transgender shooter. It might not be as uncharacteristic as we’d like to admit. — NOS4A2

What do you mean?

The direct realist says that seeing is constructing a model of the tree. The process of construction is part of the "self" doing the seeing. — Banno

In fact I think this is a prime example of the problem. The indirect realist will agree with this, and say that this model is a representation of the tree, and that it is this model that (directly) informs our understanding. You appear to be describing indirect realism, but calling it direct realism.

Arguing over the semantics of whether this should be called "seeing a tree" or "seeing a model of a tree" is a red herring. It's like arguing over whether I'm talking to my parents (over the phone) or talking to my phone, or arguing over whether I feel the fire or feel the burning pain in my hand. They're just different ways of talking that make no real difference to the underlying philosophical consideration.

And here's the reason this topic is recalcitrant. Both sides describe the situation in almost the same terms, but mean slightly different things in each case, talking past each other using much the same language. — Banno

I make much the same point every time this discussion happens. My earlier comments here and here get to the heart of the issue.

Arguing over whether we see external objects or see some mental image of external objects doesn't address the epistemological problem of perception. The concern is the relationship between the phenomenology of experience and the mind-independent properties of external objects.

According to (phenomenological) direct realism, I see the apple to be red because colour primitivism is the case, and when I see the apple its mind-independent properties are actually present in my experience.

According to indirect realism, I see the apple to be red because its mind-independent properties are such that it reflects light with a wavelength of ~700 nm, and light at that wavelength, when stimulating my eyes and central nervous system, triggers the experience of the colour red -- and this redness is a property of my experience, not a property of the apple (much like pain is a property of my experience, not a property of the fist that hits me). Redness is a "mental representation" of a surface that reflects light at a particular wavelength.

“Color is that portion of the visible spectrum of light that is reflected back from a surface. The amount of light that a surface reflects or absorbs determines its color.” — Richard B

Even addressing this specifically, if colour is “the portion of the visible spectrum of light that is reflected back from a surface” then it is light that is coloured, not apples.

This seems problematic to say. Let take a simple scientific definition of color. “Color is that portion of the visible spectrum of light that is reflected back from a surface. The amount of light that a surface reflects or absorbs determines its color.” Notice in this definition there is no appeal to mind or brain. Light is not being produces by the brain/mind, but is independently being produce outside the brain/mind. — Richard B

It would be fallacious to equate colour in this sense with colour experience, and isn’t what is meant by colour realism.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/color/#PrimSimpObjeViewColo

Color Primitivist Realism is the view that there are in nature colors, as ordinarily understood, i.e., colors are simple intrinsic, non-relational, non-reducible, qualitative properties. They are qualitative features of the sort that stand in the characteristic relations of similarity and difference that mark the colors; they are not micro-structural properties or reflectances, or anything of the sort. There is no radical illusion, error or mistake in color perception (only commonplace illusions): we perceive objects to have the colors that they really have.

What it is like to be color-blind is what it is like to have the biology conducive to color blindness. We don’t need to insert sense-data, experience, qualia, and other figments between perceiver and perceived to account for these differences. — NOS4A2

We need to insert sense-data/experience/qualia to account for the first-person experience that should be evident to all of us. We’re not p-zombies. Biology doesn’t account for the hard problem of consciousness.

Or at least, I’m not a p-zombie. I assume others aren’t. Although maybe I should take your responses as evidence that you are.

The “character of their experience” is not different because no such property exists, biologically or otherwise. — NOS4A2

Yes it does. It’s what differs between the experience of the colour blind man and the typical man. It’s the seeing differently. We’re not just behavioural machines that respond to stimulus. There’s an inner quality to experience, a “what it is like to be” aspect that distinguishes us from p-zombies.

We know that the color-blind person sees it differently because his biology is different. We needn’t assume that something about the apple is different. Simple. Direct realism is maintained. — NOS4A2

If they see it differently then the character of their experience is different. If the character of their experience is different then the character of their experience isn’t the mind-independent nature of the external world. If the character of their experience isn’t the mind-independent nature of the external world then it isn’t direct realism. You’re just describing indirect realism but calling it direct realism.

I refer you to this. You’re arguing for semantic direct realism which is consistent with phenomenological indirect realism.

You have no response to any of the questions put to you. You claim the high ground of objectivity but cannot explain how you overcome the subjectivity you project onto everyone else. — unenlightened

I don't understand your questions.

My argument is simple; if scientific realism is true then indirect realism is true, and scientific realism is true.

You seem to think that if I'm an indirect realist then I can't also be a scientific realist? I don't understand why. Given that much of science involves things that cannot be directly seen, e.g. gravity, dark matter, electrons, etc. it then follows that any scientific realist doesn't have to directly see something to believe it to be there, and so therefore there is no contradiction in being both a scientific realist and an indirect realist.

There is, however, a contradiction in being both a scientific realist and a direct realist, given that scientific realism (and our current understanding of how perception works) entails indirect realism. Colours and smells are not mind-independent properties of objects but are products of brain activity that result from (usually) external stimulation. A direct realist has to reject modern science to maintain his position. And if I have to choose between accepting direct realism and accepting modern science, then I will accept modern science, and the indirect realism that follows.

Indirect realism is where I end, not where I start. I start from scientific realism, and I believe it for likely the same reasons as many other scientific realists. And those reasons have nothing to do with being able to directly perceive many of the things that science says are there. I believe in things despite not being able to directly perceive them. I'm sure many direct realists are the same.

I don't think I see the apple's colour, or the apple's shape, or the apple's surface; I think I see the apple, and I think the colourblind person sees exactly the same apple, and if you give the apple to Tommy the deaf dumb and blind kid, he will be able to feel and smell and taste the very same apple. — unenlightened

This is the intentionality argument for semantic direct realism, and has nothing to do with the phenomenological issue that is at the heart of the disagreement between direct and indirect realists. See here and here.

But, even more, surely we can be realists who are not scientific realists? That is, we may not infer that our scientific understandings are reality. — Moliere

Perhaps. Maybe direct realists have to be scientific instrumentalists, and reject the idea that the external world is exhaustively explained by something like quantum mechanics. You'd have to argue for something like that to be a colour realist, for example.

I thought SDR was saying that one would acknowledge that "I was talking to my parents" is true. — frank

Yes, which has nothing to do with perception.

That's a pretty picture; it looks to my dependent mind like a picture of some apples, with some kind of filter applied to one half. We direct realists may be naive, but we can tell the difference between a picture and an apple, and likewise between a filter and a red-green colourblind person.

Again, how do you know so much about other people's inner worlds when you don't even have access to the common outer world? — unenlightened

I don't understand what you are asking. Do you or do you not accept that some people are colour-blind; that the colours they see things to be are not the colours that you see things to be? If so then you must accept that direct realism fails as it cannot be the case that both you and the colour blind person directly see the apple's "real" colour and that you see different colours.

As it happens, I am short-sighted; it doesn't make me think the world is blurry until it gets with 30 cm of my face, it makes me think I cannot see as well as I'd like. — unenlightened

That's exactly the point. The structure of your experience is one thing, the mind-independent nature of the world is another thing, and it's the structure of your experience that informs you, not the mind-independent nature of the world. You see a blurry world, but the external world isn't blurry. The blurriness is all in your head. And so too is the colour, the smell, the taste, the feel, etc.

What do you mean by red herring ? — RussellA

The epistemological problem of perception asks whether or not we can trust that our experiences show us the nature of the external world. It's a question regarding the relationship between phenomenology and mind-independent properties. Indirect realists argued that we can't trust our experiences to show us this because phenomenology is at best representative of mind-independent properties (although I would go further and say that it isn't even representative of them, it's only causally covariant with them). Direct realists argued that we can trust our experiences to show us this because there is no distinction between phenomenology and mind-independent properties (i.e. there is no "sense data").

The semantic realist argument related to intentionality doesn't address this issue at all. In response to the indirect realist arguing that when I talk to my parents on the phone, I don't hear their actual voices, I only hear the sounds made by the phone's speaker, the semantic realist argues that I'm talking to my parents, not to my phone. It's a red herring response.

Oh, that's news to me. I thought colour blind people couldn't see colours. — unenlightened

This is an example that shows the difference between how most people see things and how someone with red-green colour blindness sees things.



And I suspect a mantis shrimp with their far more advanced eyes would see something very different to both. It can't be the case that we all see things as they directly are and that how we see things is different. But, again, more than that our current scientific understanding of the world and perception shows that it's naive to think of colours as being mind-independent properties at all, such that one of the mantis shrimp, the typical human, or the man with red-green colour blindness is seeing the apples' "real" colours "correctly".

Searle proposes the "intentionality of perception". — RussellA

This is the exact red herring that is almost always brought up in the debate between direct and indirect realism. There's a paper by Howard Robinson, Semantic Direct Realism, that addresses this:

The most common form of direct realism is Phenomenological Direct Realism (PDR). PDR is the theory that direct realism consists in unmediated awareness of the external object in the form of unmediated awareness of its relevant properties. I contrast this with Semantic Direct Realism (SDR), the theory that perceptual experience puts you in direct cognitive contact with external objects but does so without the unmediated awareness of the objects’ intrinsic properties invoked by PDR. PDR is what most understand by direct realism. My argument is that, under pressure from the arguments from illusion and hallucination, defenders of intentionalist theories, and even of relational theories, in fact retreat to SDR. I also argue briefly that the sense-datum theory is compatible with SDR and so nothing is gained by adopting either of the more fashionable theories.

My previous example of talking on the phone is a good example of this. In terms of intentionality I'm talking to my parents, not to my phone, but it still counts as an example of indirect communication. The same is true of face-to-face communication. In terms of intentionality I'm talking to (and seeing) my parents, but given the physics and mechanics of external objects and light and sound and the central nervous system, the phenomenology of experience is indirect.

Is it not the naive assumption that there are brains and eyes and noses and internal and external worlds? — unenlightened

I addressed this here. Either we assume that there are brains and eyes, and then the science of perception shows indirect realism to be the case, or we assume that there aren’t brains and eyes, and so that indirect realism is the case.

It is impossible to maintain both direct realism and our scientific understanding of the mechanics of perception and the world. It’s either direct realism or scientific realism, but not both. I side with scientific realism, and so therefore indirect realism.

What is the source of your sophisticated indirect realism? — unenlightened

The fact that a colour blind person and I can both look at the same thing and yet see different colours. It therefore follows that at least one of us isn’t seeing the colours that the object “really” has.

And compared to something like a mantis shrimp, every human is colour blind.

And more than that, the very notion of objects having a mind-independent colour is refuted by modern science. Objects have a surface of electrons that interact with electromagnetic radiation in such a way that it reflects and/or emits photons at a particular wavelength, which then happens to stimulate in most humans the experience of the colour red. But to then argue that therefore “redness” is a property of that object is as nonsensical as arguing that because most humans get hurt when they’re punched in the face then “pain” must be a property of other people’s fists.

Then why not assume we have trees? — unenlightened

We can, and do. But that doesn’t refute indirect realism. It is still the case that the look and smell and taste and feel of a tree is a mental “representation” and not a mind-independent property that is “directly” perceived.

A direct realist is naive to think that shit smells — unenlightened

It’s not naive to think that shit smells. It’s naive to think that shit having a smell (especially a bad smell) is a mind-independent fact that we “directly” perceive.

Things have a smell only for organisms that have an olfactory sense, and only if their olfactory sense responds in a certain way to the chemicals exuded by those things. And the quality of that smell depends on the organism itself; things that smell bad to us can smell good to something else, e.g a dung beetle.