I believe he's referring to this.

Leading counterintelligence officials issued a memo to all of the CIA’s global stations saying that a concerning number of U.S. informants were being captured and executed.

The CIA’s counterintelligence mission center investigated dozens of incidents in the last few years that involved killings, arrests or compromises of foreign informants. In an unusual move, the message sent via a top secret cable included the specific number of agents killed by other intelligence agencies, according to The New York Times.

Officials said that level of detail is a sign of the significance of the cable. Announcing the specific number of killings is rare as that figure is typically held under wraps from the public and even from some CIA employees, the Times noted.

The cable, which also cited the issue of putting “mission over security,” comes amid recent efforts by countries like Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan to find CIA informants and turn them into double agents, the Times reported.

The memo also noted long standing issues like placing too much trust in sources, a speedy recruiting process and inadequate attention to potential intelligence risks among other problems.

The uptick in compromised informants highlights the more sophisticated ways in which foreign intelligence agencies are tracking the CIA’s actions. These mechanisms include artificial intelligence, facial recognition tools and other hacking methods, per the Times.

The New York Times also reported that CIA case officers were sometimes promoted for recruiting spies often regardless of the success, performance or quality of that spy.

“No one at the end of the day is being held responsible when things go south with an agent,” Douglas London, a former CIA operative who was unaware of the cable, said to the Times. “Sometimes there are things beyond our control but there are also occasions of sloppiness and neglect and people in senior positions are never held responsible.”

People who have read the cable added that it was intended for the officers who are most directly involved in enlisting and vetting potential new informants, the Times reported.

The CIA declined to comment on the matter.

@creativesoul wasn't quite accurate in saying that it's "since Trump left office". Rather it's "in the last few years". And it's not American agents, but agents working for America.

@Srap Tasmaner

Consider this exchange:

John: The book is in my room
Jane: What you say is wrong because the book is not in your room

Should this be interpreted as the below?

John: I believe that the book is in my room
Jane: I believe that what you say is wrong because the book is not in your room

So Jane believes that John doesn't believe that the book is in his room because the book isn't in his room? That doesn't seem right.

Even if John's assertion that the book is in his room implies that he believes that the book is in his room, his assertion being true or false has nothing to do with what he believes (or what Jane believes), and everything to do with whether or not the book is in his room.

If I candidly assert an indicative sentence, I imply that the content of my belief is represented by that sentence — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, you imply it. But that asserting a sentence implies something isn't that that sentence (or assertion) means that thing. The sentence (even as an assertion) "I am going to vote in the next election, and I believe that Joe Biden is the best candidate" implies that I am going to vote for Joe Biden in the next election, but that's not what the sentence means.

This is where I think you're conflating different senses of "meaning" or "expression". I can assert something that expresses my anger or my love or my disapproval, but that's not the same thing as the assertion meaning "I am angry" or "I love you" or "I disapprove of this".

You can't assert that the book is in your room, or that you believe the book is in your room, and that it is not true that the book is in your room. — Srap Tasmaner

Sure I can: I believe that the book is in my room but the book isn't in my room. I can assert anything I like.

But I don't really see the relevance of this. If we accept that we are fallible then what left is there to discuss? We accept the distinction between truth and belief; between the book being in my room and believing that the book is in my room.

Or an assertoric utterance of "The book is in Michael's room." — Srap Tasmaner

Again, I think this is ambiguous. I think you're conflating two different senses of "meaning". I'm concerned with meaning in the sense of definition. "I believe that the book is in my room" and "the book is in my room" do not share a definition.

Otherwise how do you make sense of the "the book is in my room" part of "I believe that the book is in my room"? The latter isn't to be interpreted as "I believe that I believe that the book is in my room".

I think you're just taking meaning-as-use to an irrational extreme.

But you have no way of saying this as a report of your beliefs. — Srap Tasmaner

I thought I just did? "It can be true that I believe something even if what I believe is false" is something I believe. Or, more succinctly, "I am fallible".

(1) If you want to convey your honest belief that the book is in Michael's room, the words you choose to express that belief are "The book is in Michael's room."
(2) You choose those words because the literal (or conventional) meaning of that sentence represents your belief accurately. — Srap Tasmaner

I think this is ambiguous. The meaning of the sentence is what you believe, but it isn't that you believe it. The sentence that expresses that you believe it is "I believe that the book is in my room".

And, of course, it can be true that I believe something even if what I believe is false. @Metaphysician Undercover appears to conflate these.

Look at the T-schema discussed earlier by Banno. — Metaphysician Undercover

OK.

"The book is in my room" is true iff the book is in my room.

Notice that it isn't:

"The book is in my room" is true iff I believe that the book is in my room.

Therefore, your claims that the meaning of "the book is in my room" has something to do with what I believe, or that truth is honesty, are false.

I can honestly claim "the book is in my room" if I believe that the book is in my room, but if the book isn't in my room then my claim is false.

This is how almost everyone understands truth. It's the common use. Your use is uncommon. You have presented no adequate evidence or reasoning to support your use.

"The book is in my room" is true iff the book is in my room. In this example, "the book is in my room" only means that the book is in my room, if the statement is true. In other instances "the book is in my room" means something else. — Metaphysician Undercover

You appear to be equivocating on the meaning of "means". We're using it in the sense of a definition, not in the sense of entailment.

The T-schema doesn't say that asserting the proposition "the book is in my room" entails that the book is in my room. It only says that the book being in my room is the truth-condition of the proposition "the book is in my room", and according to Davidson the definition of a proposition is given by its truth-conditions.

I could state "I believe that the book is in my room" even when I don't believe that the book is in my room. Therefore, according to your reasoning, "I believe that the book is in my room" means something other than that I believe that the book is in my room. Do you not see how ridiculous this is?

That I can assert a falsehood isn't that it doesn't mean precisely what it says.

The fact that you understand the notion of dishonety proves that you understand the difference between the meaning of an assertion and the beliefs of the person making the assertion.

Since it is very obvious that you could state "the book is in my room" when the book is not in your room, then it is also very obvious that "the book is in my room" means something other than that the book is in your room. Do you not agree with this? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I don't. It's a nonsensical inference.

Since the meaning concerns what you believe... — Metaphysician Undercover

Given that "I believe that the book is in my room, therefore the book is in my room" is invalid, "I believe that the book is in my room" doesn't mean "the book is in my room".

The meaning of "the book is in my room" doesn't concern what I believe.

It wouldn't hurt to distinguish the epistemic and alethic modalities now and then. — Srap Tasmaner

Not sure if it matters in this instance. Whether we're considering epistemic or alethic modality, if something is true then it is possible.

What you don't seem to understand MIchael, is that whether or not the book is actually in your room is completely irrelevant here. — Metaphysician Undercover

No it isn't. It's the only thing that's relevant. We're concenred with truth, not belief.

Whether or not the book is actually in my room has nothing to do with what I believe. I don't know where the book is so I say "the book is possibly in my room", but as a matter of fact, distinct from my belief, the book is actually in my room.

The book doesn't just cease to exist, or fail to have a location, simply because I don't know where it is.

When you say that the book is possibly in your room, you imply that the book may be elsewhere. — Metaphysician Undercover

But I'm not implying that the book isn't actually in my room.

This is because the two concepts are mutually exclusive, inconsistent with one another, such that if something is truthfully said to be possible, it cannot at the same time be truthfully said to be actual. That's what I explained to say one when you believe the other, is to be dishonest. — Metaphysician Undercover

The former, as I explained — Metaphysician Undercover

So you're saying that if the book is possibly in my room then it isn't actually in my room, and so if I tell you that the book is possibly in my room then you know to not look in my room.

Clearly this is opposed to common use.

You misquoted me. I said "non-actual". — Metaphysician Undercover

So what's the difference between "not actual" and "non-actual"? What's the difference between "not human" and "non-human"?

That aside, either if something is possible then it isn't actual or something can be both possible and actual. So which is it?

"Possible" refers to what may or may not be. "Actual" refers to what is and is not. If you say that the book is possibly in your room, then you are saying that it may or may not be in your room. This is logically distinct from saying that it actually is in your room, or actually is not, according to the definitions. Therefore the conclusion I stated is sound. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not it isn't.

There's a difference between saying "possible" doesn't mean "actual" and saying "possible" means "not actual".

You asserted the latter, which is false.

I suppose some is kept in the bank, some given as dividends to shareholders, and some invested into the stock market.

None of this is really of any use or benefit to anyone except the rich playing their game of buying shares from one another.

As I said, the two (possible and actual) are not opposed to each other. But obviously, saying "the book is possibly in my room", is to say something completely different from saying "the book is actually in my room". — Metaphysician Undercover

What you said was:

... since actual is defined as what is, it is a logical conclusion that the possible is non-actual. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is false. That the book is possibly in my room isn't that the book is not actually in my room.

Shame there’s not a GE till Jan ‘25.

Obviously, this is the problem, we are working on a different definitions of "possible". I define it as what may or may not be, consistent with common use. — Metaphysician Undercover

When I say "the book is possibly in my room" I'm not saying "the book isn't actually in my room".

Otherwise telling you where something might be is telling you where not to look.

Your position doesn't appear consistent with common use.

"Possible" is not defined as non-actual, it is defined as what may or may not be. And, since actual is defined as what is, it is a logical conclusion that the possible is non-actual. — Metaphysician Undercover

In modal logic "possible" is defined as "not necessarily not": ◇p ≔ ¬□¬p. Therefore if something is true then it is possibly true: p → ◇p.

From the SEP article on belief:

Philosophers often distinguish dispositional from occurrent believing.

...

Suppose Harry thinks plaid ties are hideous. Only rarely does the thought or judgment that they are hideous actually come to the forefront of his mind. When it does, he possesses the belief occurrently. The rest of the time, Harry possesses the belief only dispositionally. The occurrent belief comes and goes, depending on whether circumstances elicit it; the dispositional belief endures.

Maybe we need to make a similar kind of distinction for knowledge; dispositional and occurrent knowledge. I've only been considering occurrent knowledge, whereas you also appear to consider dispositional knowledge.

A recent example from my life:

Jane: “Is this my pint or yours?”
Michael: “Mine”
Jane: “Are you sure? Pretty sure you’re drinking faster than me.”
Michael: “Yes, you’re right, my mistake”

You’re saying that at the time that I believed that the pint was mine I knew that the pint was Jane’s? I knew something that I believed was false?

I should clarify that it wasn't the case that I inferred from her comment that the pint with less beer must be mine; rather her comment prompted me to reconsider and in doing so I explicitly remembered which glass I had been drinking from.

B knew where the book was, but that knowledge was unavailable to her for the moment. It seems clear that the belief was unavailable as well — Srap Tasmaner

So she believed that it was on the nightstand, but that belief wasn’t available to her? That just seems very farfetched.

I think it far more sensible to say that, at the time, she didn’t believe that it was on the nightstand, and so didn’t know that it was on the nightstand. Further prompting then elicited the memory, and from that spawned the belief and the knowledge.

Are you claiming she *discovered* that she herself put A's book on A's nightstand? That she *inferred* it from the evidence of her memory? — Srap Tasmaner

I’m saying it’s strange to suggest that she knew that it was on the nightstand at a time that she didn’t believe that it was on the nightstand.

“Jane knows p but doesn’t believe p” and “Jane knows p but believes ~p” strike me as wrong.

What exactly do you think forgetting is? I would say something like the loss of knowledge. I once knew the first 100 decimals places of pi. I don’t anymore. I forgot. Jane forgot where she put the book. That she later remembered doesn’t change this, does it?

That was the point of having B suddenly remember that she moved the book; A suggested that her book would have been in the way, and B then remembered that it was in the way and she moved it. — Srap Tasmaner

She didn’t know where it was before being reminded, and after being reminded she had certainty, so I’m not sure what the relevance of that argument is.

Unless you want to say that she knew all along, despite not have the relevant justified true belief all along? Where exactly do you stand on the JTB definition?

But we’re not just interested in what people mean by what they say. — Srap Tasmaner

Why not? If "I'm not certain" means "I don't know" then "I know but I'm not certain" means "I know but I don't know" which is, of course, a contradiction. So it doesn't make sense to say "I know but I'm not certain".

And if it doesn't make sense to say "I know but I'm not certain" then it shouldn't make sense to say "I can know without being certain".

But here I’m talking about what someone might say, not about the fact of their knowing that P being consistent with ~P. — Srap Tasmaner

Well, I was never arguing that knowing that p is consistent with ¬p, only that "I know but I might be wrong" can be true, which you appear to have now accepted. I think you just misunderstood what I was saying. But then let's not rehash that old argument.

From “I’m certain that Trump won,” we can’t infer that Trump won. We can’t infer that you know that Trump won. We can’t even infer that you are certain that Trump won. It’s a thing you are saying. What it means, what you mean by it, what you mean by saying it, all that might be interesting, but is not the same as addressing the question of whether knowing that P is equivalent to being certain that P, or if there’s some other relation or what. — Srap Tasmaner

I wasn't trying to suggest that knowing that p is equivalent to being certain that p. Rather I was trying to see if certainty is a necessary condition, such that if I'm not certain then I don't know (much like if I'm wrong then I don't know).

My reasoning for this is based on my translation of "I know but I'm not certain" which I don't think you've addressed. To repeat:

1. I know that p but I'm not certain, which is:
2. I know that p but I have some doubt that p, which is in part:
3. p but I have some doubt that p, which is:
4. p but I don't know that p, and so (1) is:
5. I know that p but I don't know that p

What's strange here is that I accept that "I am certain" doesn't mean "I know" but it does seem to me that "I am not certain" does mean "I don't know". I suppose ordinary language just isn't always consistent.

Unless we intend to define certainty or knowledge, that’s about all we’ve got so far. — Srap Tasmaner

Well, yes, that's exactly what I'm trying to do. What does "but I'm not certain" actually mean? It might be that when we tease this out we are confronted with the conclusion that "I'm not certain" actually means "I don't know", in which case our initial assumption that we can have knowledge without being certain is mistaken, and that such cases were simply successful guesses (with or without some degree of justification).

I’ve already presented a case in which someone flatly denies having knowledge that they do in fact have. — Srap Tasmaner

That might be begging the question. They were right, but does it then follow that they knew? It might have simply been a successful guess.

"Oh, I know where the keys are, they're in the cupboard! Wait, they're not here. Oh, I know where they are, they're in the drawer! Here they are!"

We might say that they knew all along, but maybe they didn't. They just happened to be right in the end.

And in fact we could introduce something like a Gettier case here. They were actually in another room, but moments before Jane checked the drawer John found them and put them in the drawer without Jane knowing.

“I know the answer! — At least, I think I do. I could be wrong.” — Srap Tasmaner

I know but I could be wrong? I was the one saying that last time and you spent days telling me that was nonsense.

(Sorry, couldn't resist)

I tried with Trading212 using practice money. Lost more than I won. Decided to then do the opposite of what I wanted to do. Lost more than I won. It's rigged, I tell you, rigged!

The cynic in me thinks that this is all one big con. Short the pound, announce idiotic economic policy, profit (already done), go long on the pound, announce reversal, profit.

Your argument is that if there’s something odd about saying “I know that p but I am not certain,” then (“perhaps”) knowledge requires certainty.

Except that’s not an argument. From S asserting “I know that p,” it does not follow that S knows that p; from S asserting “I am uncertain,” it does not follow that S is uncertain; we can’t infer that if S were to assert the problematic sentence then S would have to be in a problematic mental state. — Srap Tasmaner

I'm aware that I haven't presented an argument as such. I'm just looking at a potential line of enquiry that may lead us somewhere interesting (or maybe nowhere at all). If you're interested in considering it then I'll repeat and add to something I said earlier.

"I know that p but I'm not certain" presumably means one/some/all of these:

1. I know that p but I have some doubt that I believe that p
2. I know that p but I have some doubt that my belief is justified
3. I know that p but I have some doubt that p

These in turn can be simplified to:

1. I believe that p but I have some doubt that I believe that p
2. My belief that p is justified but I have some doubt that my belief that p is justified
3. p but I have some doubt that p

I'd like to address (3) first. How do we make sense of a claim such as "p but I have some doubt that p"? What does it mean to doubt that p? I suppose we could define it circularly as not being certain that p, but that seems lazy.

In the previous discussion on the matter, I interpreted it as accepting the possibility that not p, and not just in the "there is a possible world where not p" sense. I couldn't really explain it any further than that, although you interpreted it as not knowing that p.

But if "p but I have some doubt that p" means "p but I do not know p" and if "I know that p but I'm not certain" means (sometimes) "I know that p but I have some doubt that p" then "I know that p but I have some doubt that p" means "I know that p but I don't know that p", which is of course a contradiction.

Now, it might very well be that there is a distinction between the assertion "I know that p but I'm not certain" and the proposition "I know that p but I'm not certain" such that the former is the aforementioned contradiction but the latter is not, although I wonder if a Wittgensteinian approach would allow for this distinction. He does spend three pages addressing Moore's paradox (which this seems to be a variation of) in the Philosophical Investigations, but I can't really glean much of an answer to it.

But even if we were to accept a distinction between the assertion and the proposition, it still needs to be explained what "I'm not certain" actually means, as it may very well lead to the same conclusion above; that "I'm not certain" means "I don't know".

And In fact the third-person claim "John knows that p but he is not certain" presumably avoids having to draw a distinction between an assertion and a proposition. Does "John knows that p but is not certain" mean "John knows that p but has some doubt that p", and does this mean "John knows that p but does not know that p"?

For example: you vote for Labour — javi2541997

Well, we vote for a person, not a party.

but... who chooses the person who would run for the presidency? — javi2541997

We don't have a President.

Truss reminds me of a quote Christopher Hitchens once made about David Cameron:

Q: What do you think about David Cameron?

A: He doesn't make me think. — Manuel

That's from Ayn Rand's The Fountainhead.

Toohey: Mr. Roark, we're alone here. Why don't you tell me what you think of me? In any words you wish. No one will hear us.
Roark: But I don't think of you.

I think it would make more sense to let public decide who leads the party — I like sushi

That's would represent a real democratic system! — javi2541997

Like, I don't know, a General Election? And with something like alternative vote or proportional representation? Labour have recently committed to the latter.

And before anyone decides to talk about "taxation is theft": Fine. It's theft. And it's a very simple trolley problem; either steal from the rich or let the poor suffer. Easy choice.

Robin Hood for PM.

But this is the Liz Truss who thinks you plebs don't show enough graft. — Baden

But having a stock broker who invests your inheritance, or collecting rent from your tenants, is a shining example of a working man.

State they can't afford inflation-matching pay rises for public sector workers but borrow a ton of money (while interest rates skyrocket on repayments) to give the rich a massive tax cut > Respond to the markets subsequently fleeing sterling due to said bonkers policy by asking them to be nice. — Baden

It's always about helping the rich stay rich (or get richer) at the expense of everything else. The lie of trickle-down economics. People are going to starve and freeze because a minority want to buy a fifth house.