"The book is possibly in my room" implies that I do not know where the book is. — Metaphysician Undercover
However, if I recall correctly, you made the absurd claim earlier that "possible" is not the opposite of "impossible".
— Luke
That's right, imposible ought not be considered as opposite to possible, because it leads to the ambiguity of "necessary" which I described and you don't seem to understand. — Metaphysician Undercover
Then you have likewise rendered "possible" as extremely ambiguous and misleading.
— Luke
Yes, "possible" is extremely ambiguous and misleading. But it has been this way for a long time, so it is not I who has rendered it thus. — Metaphysician Undercover
Seems to me that we're perfectly capable of understanding what sorts of thoughts are exclusive to humans and what sorts are not. — creativesoul
What you don't seem to understand MIchael, is that whether or not the book is actually in your room is completely irrelevant here. — Metaphysician Undercover
It wouldn't hurt to distinguish the epistemic and alethic modalities now and then. — Srap Tasmaner
there are other rules than logic at work in what people say to each other and what it will be taken to mean. — Srap Tasmaner
It is not the case that (1) entails (2). It just doesn't. But conversationally, we take an utterance of (1) to implicate a commitment to (2). And that commitment is purely conversational; you do not contradict yourself if you say, "Well, it might be in my room — as a matter of fact I know that it is." — Srap Tasmaner
There's no more a contradiction here than there is in Mitch Hedberg's joke, "I used to do drugs. I still do, but I used to too." Implicature is not entailment; that's the whole point. — Srap Tasmaner
And that's another reason that approaching all philosophical problems in terms of what people say or can't say is so misleading; there are other rules than logic at work in what people say to each other and what it will be taken to mean. — Srap Tasmaner
"Possible" is the opposite of "impossible". It is absurd to deny it. — Luke
You do not get to personally decide the meanings of these words. — Luke
Whether or not the book is actually in my room has nothing to do with what I believe. — Michael
No it isn't. It's the only thing that's relevant. We're concerned with truth, not belief. Your mistake is to continue to treat the word "true" as meaning "honest", which it doesn't. — Michael
The book doesn't just cease to exist, or fail to have a location, simply because I don't know where it is. — Michael
Interesting. What other rules might those be? — Mww
Since the meaning concerns what you believe... — Metaphysician Undercover
The meaning of "the book is in my room" doesn't concern what I believe. — Michael
Since it is very obvious that you could state "the book is in my room" when the book is not in your room, then it is also very obvious that "the book is in my room" means something other than that the book is in your room. Do you not agree with this? — Metaphysician Undercover
No, I don't. It's a nonsensical inference. — Michael
That I can assert a falsehood isn't that it doesn't mean precisely what it says. — Michael
"The book is in my room" is true iff the book is in my room. In this example, "the book is in my room" only means that the book is in my room, if the statement is true. In other instances "the book is in my room" means something else. — Metaphysician Undercover
Look at the T-schema discussed earlier by Banno. — Metaphysician Undercover
Suppose "possible world" means that if we identify all the possible worlds, one of the possible worlds must be the actual world. That is, we assume such a thing as the actual world, and we assume we've identified all the possible worlds, so necessarily one of the possible worlds is the actual world. Then we proceed to identify one of the possibilities as the actual world, the real world. As soon as we do this, we negate the defined status of "possible" from all the other worlds. They can no longer be the actual world, because we've identified the actual world and it's something else. Since we've named one as "actual", the others can no longer be classed as "possible", without changing the original definition of "possible". — Metaphysician Undercover
I think this is the common misconception of free will, which leads to all sorts of problems. After you have marked the box, engaged in the free will act, we cannot, from that temporal perspective, say that you might have marked a different box. From that temporal perspective, after the fact, it is impossible that you might have done otherwise. You did what you did, and at this time it is impossible that it might be otherwise. And this misconception (straw man), that if you had free will, you might have done otherwise, when you really can't because what's done is done. gives fodder to the determinist argument, . However, this does not change the fact that prior to the act you have many choices, and there are many possibilities for boxes which you might mark. So free will is very real from this perspective, despite the fact that you cannot have dome other than what you did. — Metaphysician Undercover
Whether we're considering epistemic or alethic modality, if something is true then it is possible. — Michael
Therefore, your claims that the meaning of "the book is in my room" has something to do with what I believe, or that truth is honesty, are false. — Michael
Seems to me that we're perfectly capable of understanding what sorts of thoughts are exclusive to humans and what sorts are not.
— creativesoul
You seem to think I have disagreed with this — Janus
You can take a further step and claim that there is nothing more to the book being in Michael's room than people who hold the belief that it is honestly expressing that belief by saying, or being disposed to say, "The book is in Michael's room."
Now what does this mean, that there is "nothing more to it"? That suggests there is a biconditional that looks like this: — Srap Tasmaner
Yes, of course we can say that only language capable beings can have linguistically mediated thoughts. It's analytically and trivially (insofar as it doesn't really tell us anything) true. — Janus
(1) If you want to convey your honest belief that the book is in Michael's room, the words you choose to express that belief are "The book is in Michael's room."
(2) You choose those words because the literal (or conventional) meaning of that sentence represents your belief accurately. — Srap Tasmaner
The sentence that expresses that you believe it is "I believe that the book is in my room". — Michael
it can be true that I believe something even if what I believe is false. — Michael
That's how to avoid anthropomorphism.
The notions of 'linguistically mediated thought' and 'language capable beings' don't - ahem - can't. — creativesoul
Which ought tell you something. That's not something I would or have said, nor does it follow from anything I would or have said. — creativesoul
Or an assertoric utterance of "The book is in Michael's room." — Srap Tasmaner
But you have no way of saying this as a report of your beliefs. — Srap Tasmaner
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