You know what, let's just all pretend we are all biological essentialists/determinists. — substantivalism

Let's not.

rather than some psychiatrist just says so — Harry Hindu

It’s not just “some” psychiatrist. It’s the DSM and the ICD.

Also from your quote:

Most reasoning of this kind is not fallacious, and much of our knowledge properly comes from listening to authorities.

I see no good reason to disbelieve the DSM and ICD in favour of your bare assertion that gender incongruence is a psychosis.

Appealing to authority IS a logical fallacy. You need to reconcile what you just said with this simple fact. — Harry Hindu

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_authority

An argument from authority is a form of argument in which the opinion of an authority figure (or figures) who lacks relevant expertise is used as evidence to support an argument.

The simple fact is that trained psychiatrists are far more qualified than you to determine what does or doesn’t count as a psychosis, and that it is reasonable for those who aren’t trained psychiatrists to defer to their decisions.

I suppose the rational counterargument would be: ridiculously rare genetic abnormalities aside, how does that change a thing? — Outlander

The claim that some are making is that every single human is either unambiguously male or unambiguously female, and that so-called “intersex” people don’t actually exist.

This claim is simply false, and shows a fundamental misunderstanding of both biology and the English language.

See 46,XX/46,XY.

46,XX/46,XY is either a chimeric or mosaic genetic condition characterized by the presence of some cells that express a 46,XX karyotype and some cells that express a 46,XY karyotype in a single human being. Individuals with these conditions are classified as intersex.

Some of their cells have an SRY gene, some don't. Are they male or female according to your distinction? Is the existence of a single SRY gene sufficient to qualify them as male, even if the majority of their cells have an XX karyotype and they are phenotypically female? Do they become female if we then cut out this single SRY cell? Or are they only male if the majority of their cells have an XY karyotype/have an SRY gene?

And let's consider some hypothetical 46,XX/46,XY person with an equal number of XX cells and XY cells, ambiguous genitalia, and either bilateral oviotestis or streak gonads. Are they male or female?

They believe they are man when they are a woman. That is the delusion. — Harry Hindu

You appear to be equivocating.

Here are two plausible interpretations of your claim:

1. They believe they are biologically male when they are biologically female. That is the delusion.
2. They believe they are non-biologically male when they are biologically female. That is the delusion.

If you mean (1) then your claim is false because they do not believe that they are biologically male.

If you mean (2) then your conclusion is a non sequitur.

Pleading to authority is a logical fallacy. — Harry Hindu

It's not a logical fallacy to defer to what mathematicians say about mathematics, to what physicists say about physics, or to what psychiatrists say about psychiatry.

Psychiatrists do not classify gender incongruence as a psychosis. Unless you have studied psychiatry you are not qualified to have an informed opinion.

That doesn't answer the question.

Given that some human has ovotesticular syndrome caused by 46,XX/46,XY chimerism, what is the biological feature that either makes them a male or makes them a female? Of particular relevance are those with bilateral ovotestis and/or streak gonads, as well as ambiguous genitalia.

But they are either male or female. They aren’t both. — Malcolm Parry

Then which are they? And what about them determines this?

Have you details of a person who is both male and female? — Malcolm Parry

In the most extreme case there's ovotesticular syndrome, where someone has both ovarian and testicular tissue, and can be caused by 46,XX/46,XY chimerism.

The historically recent phenomenon of trans people... — Baden

It's not even recent.

The galli eunuch priests of classical antiquity have been interpreted by some scholars as transgender or third-gender. The trans-feminine kathoey and hijra gender roles have persisted for thousands of years in Thailand and the Indian subcontinent, respectively. In Arabia, khanith (like earlier mukhannathun) have occupied a third gender role attested since the 7th century CE. Traditional roles for transgender women and transgender men have existed in many African societies, with some persisting to the modern day. North American Indigenous fluid and third gender roles, including the Navajo nádleehi and the Zuni lhamana, have existed since pre-colonial times.

Some medieval European documents have been studied as possible accounts of transgender persons. Kalonymus ben Kalonymus's lament for being born a man instead of a woman has been seen as an early account of gender dysphoria. John/Eleanor Rykener, a male-bodied Briton arrested in 1394 while living and doing sex work dressed as a woman, has been interpreted by some contemporary scholars as transgender. In Japan, accounts of transgender people go back to the Edo period. In Indonesia, there are millions of trans-/third-gender waria, and the extant pre-Islamic Bugis society of Sulawesi recognizes five gender roles.

In the United States in 1776, the genderless Public Universal Friend refused both birth name and gendered pronouns. Transgender American men and women are documented in accounts from throughout the 19th century. The first known informal transgender advocacy organisation in the United States, Cercle Hermaphroditos, was founded in 1895.

It's not clear to me what delusion you believe they have. We've already established that trans men don't believe that they were born with a penis or XY chromosomes, so it can't be that.

And neither the DSM nor the ICD classify gender dysphoria/incongruence as a type of psychosis, and unless you're a qualified psychiatrist you're in no position to question the professionals – or at the very least I have no good reason to believe you over them.

It is you that is focused on the bathroom issue when I have shown that is a symptom and not the cause. It is illogical to even discuss bathrooms when you haven't ironed out the psychological issue first. — Harry Hindu

I’m focused on actual people trying to live their actual lives. Trans people aren’t just some philosophical hypothetical. They exist and they often need to use public bathrooms. The studies show that it is safer to let trans men use men’s bathrooms and trans women use women’s bathrooms, so any law that tries to prevent this ought not be passed.

If you don’t understand trans people then fine. You don’t need to. Them going to the toilet has nothing to do with you - or anyone else.

The most relevant issue that you are avoiding is how do we determine when someone is telling the truth when they say they are a man or a woman? — Harry Hindu

You don't need to know. Just let people take a piss in peace. It's not hard. Why you are even thinking about other people's genitals or chromosomes or psychology when going to the toilet is beyond me. It's kinda creepy.

If trans-people's safety are threatened in bathrooms, then what makes you think a trans-man will be safe entering a men's bathroom? When you actually dig deep and think beyond the statistics you are providing, it doesn't make a whole lot of sense, or is realistic. — Harry Hindu

What do you mean "think beyond the statistics"? You're suggesting we ignoring the facts? Because the facts are:

Among transgender men who used women’s restrooms (i.e., according to their sex assigned at birth), about 10% were denied access, and nearly 11% experienced verbal harassment in the past year, compared to those who used men’s restrooms (5% and 7%, respectively).

Among transgender women who used men’s restrooms (i.e., according to their sex assigned at birth), 7% were denied access, and nearly 9% experienced verbal harassment in the past year, compared to those who used women’s restrooms (5% and 7%, respectively).

Whether or not it "makes sense" to you is irrelevant. Your intuition – or whatever it is – is wrong.

I addressed the relevant issue. Trans people are at a greater risk when they use the bathroom according to their biological sex and cis women are not at a greater risk when trans women are allowed to use the women’s bathroom.

So if your concern is people’s safety then trans men ought use men’s bathrooms and trans women ought use women’s bathrooms.

Where are the statistics that show that trans-people are disproportionately assaulted in bathrooms as opposed to other places? — Harry Hindu

I don’t know if they’re disproportionately assaulted in bathrooms as opposed to other places, but they are at greater risk if forced to use bathrooms according to their biological sex, as quoted 8 days ago.

“Current policy debates about transgender people’s access to restrooms are based on a narrative, asserted without evidence, that safety and privacy in women’s spaces are at risk,” said lead author Jody Herman, Senior Scholar of Public Policy at the Williams Institute. “However, research shows that transgender people are the ones who face harm from others in these spaces, including being denied access, verbal harassment, and physical assault. Moreover, they are at greater risk of harm when laws require them to use restrooms according to their assigned sex at birth.”

So, to repeat myself; if you're concerned about people's safety, just let trans men use men's bathrooms and trans women use women's bathrooms.

The issue is men that are not trans entering women's bathrooms and locker rooms. — Harry Hindu

So trans women ought to suffer using men's bathrooms, risking being abused, because cis men might pretend to be trans women to use women's bathrooms? That seems unfair.

And perhaps read the first article I linked to:

There is no evidence that letting transgender people use public facilities that align with their gender identity increases safety risks, according to a new study from the Williams Institute at UCLA School of Law. The study is the first of its kind to rigorously test the relationship between nondiscrimination laws in public accommodations and reports of crime in public restrooms and other gender-segregated facilities.

“Opponents of public accommodations laws that include gender identity protections often claim that the laws leave women and children vulnerable to attack in public restrooms,” said lead author Amira Hasenbush. “But this study provides evidence that these incidents are rare and unrelated to the laws.”

I'm more worried about the much larger portion that preys one women. — Harry Hindu

No link between trans-inclusive policies and bathroom safety, study finds

Transgender people over four times more likely than cisgender people to be victims of violent crime

Prohibiting transgender people from accessing bathrooms puts them at added risk of harassment

“Current policy debates about transgender people’s access to restrooms are based on a narrative, asserted without evidence, that safety and privacy in women’s spaces are at risk,” said lead author Jody Herman, Senior Scholar of Public Policy at the Williams Institute. “However, research shows that transgender people are the ones who face harm from others in these spaces, including being denied access, verbal harassment, and physical assault. Moreover, they are at greater risk of harm when laws require them to use restrooms according to their assigned sex at birth.”

If you're concerned about people's safety, just let trans men use men's bathrooms and trans women use women's bathrooms.

What I have said would support this, yes. Is there a problem? — Harry Hindu

You tell me. You seem to think that there are good reasons to separate bathrooms according some biological binary. What are those reasons? Perhaps when we examine those reasons we might conclude that, actually, we ought separate according to genitals, and that DNA, hormones, and mammary glands are irrelevant.

Notice though that we have moved from talking about trans-gender to trans-sexual, or intersex. How can this be if gender and sex are distinct? — Harry Hindu

I don't understand what you're asking here.

Again, why would one need to transition if gender is separate from sex? — Harry Hindu

Because of gender dysphoria.

But you are speaking for them, so you appear to know what they think. — Harry Hindu

I don't need to understand why they wish to transition to understand that trans men do not believe that they have a penis. Indeed, the very fact that they transition (if they do) proves that they know that they don't have a penis.

So it's unclear what delusion you think they're suffering from.

Yet you are notified of responses to your posts. — Harry Hindu

Yes, but is this post of yours that listed the biological criteria a reply to me? If not then I wouldn't have been notified of it.

Found the post, was a reply to me. I forgot about it over my 4 day absence from this discussion. Apologies.

I provided five traits that almost always occur together in females and males.
- chromosomes (in humans, XY is male, XX female)
- genitals (penis vs. vagina)
- gonads (testes vs. ovaries)
- hormones (males have higher relative levels of testosterone than women, while women have higher levels of estrogen)
- secondary sex characteristics that aren’t connected with the reproductive system but distinguish the sexes, and usually appear at puberty (breasts, facial hair, size of larynx, subcutaneous fat, etc.) — Harry Hindu

So were some hypothetical person to have:

1. XX chromsomes
2. A penis
3. Testes
4. Low testosterone and high estrogen
5. Breasts

Then they have 3 female traits and 2 male traits and so are female and ought use the women's changing rooms, compete in women's sports, etc.?

Then why do trans people modify there biology? If merely believing something is an affirmation, then there would be no need to modify one's biology. — Harry Hindu

Firstly, not all do. Secondly, you'll have to ask them, not me. Thirdly, the same can be asked about anyone who undergoes cosmetic surgery, whether transgender or not.

As I pointed out earlier in this thread that you appeared to have ignored, there are five traits that determine one's sex. — Harry Hindu

It's a long discussion and I haven't read every post.

How do you determine one's intention in this case? — Harry Hindu

I'm not a legal professional. I don't know how prosecutors prove intent beyond reasonable doubt.

The problem is affirming another's delusions for the purpose of using them as political pawns. — Harry Hindu

If someone born without a penis believes that they have a penis then they would be suffering from a delusion, but this isn't what trans men believe.

If you read the rest of my post, you would see that I had said that we can have body scanners at public bathroom entrances to scan for biological features... — Harry Hindu

What would it scan for? Chromosomes? Genitals? What if someone has XX chromosomes and a penis?

Is it right for a trans person to fool a homosexual into having intimate relations with them? — Harry Hindu

I don't know what the etiquette is regarding transgender people having one night stands, but I'd presume that if they present as men when clothed but have a vagina then this will come up in conversation before they start getting naked.

In a society where it is against the law for people to walk around naked... — Harry Hindu

Which society do you live in? Because there are plenty of places where it isn't against the law for people to walk around naked.

For example:

Firstly, it is not an offence to be naked in public in England and Wales. However, it can become an offence if it can be proven that the naked individual caused harassment, alarm or distress to another person. In the absence of any sexual context and intention to cause alarm and distress – being naked in public is within the law.

The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) notes in its guidance that every case should be considered on its own facts and merits and ‘a balance needs to be struck between the naturist’s right to freedom of expression and the right of the wider public to be protected from harassment, alarm and distress’. In assessing intention, there must be a serious reason to believe that the naked individual intended to cause alarm and distress.

Why would manly looking women now be an issue since it hasn't been before? — Malcolm Parry

Because of the anti-trans agenda. There is such an uproar in some circles against trans women using women's bathrooms that masculine-looking cis women have faced abuse.

Cis Woman Mistaken as Transgender Records Being Berated in Bathroom

Cis woman confronted by police officers in Arizona Walmart restroom for looking too masculine

Because they are a woman. They have every right to use a female space.

But why do we have this female space? You've said before that it's because cis women would be uncomfortable sharing a changing room with biological men. But they'll also be uncomfortable sharing a changing room with "passing" trans men. So if "making cis women uncomfortable" is a good reason to exclude biological men from these changing rooms it must also be a good reason to exclude "passing" trans men from these changing rooms.

If a person looks like a woman then there would be no issue. — Malcolm Parry

Well then now we get into murky territory. Who gets to decide whether or not a trans woman looks enough like a woman to use the women's changing room? Different people might have different opinions. And sometimes cisgender women are mistaken for men.

If a trans man wants to use a women's restroom they have every right should they wish. — Malcolm Parry

If a trans man (after having surgery) is indistinguishable from a cis man, then what rationale is there for allowing trans men in women's changing rooms but not cis men? We don't carry out genetic testing whenever someone enters the room, so no third party is going to know. The cis woman isn't going to know that the muscular, bearded person changing next to them was actually born a woman, and is going to be as uncomfortable with them being there as they would be a cis man being there.

Do you see no discomfort or risk from allowing males in changing rooms etc? — Malcolm Parry

If they've had surgery, how would you know?

What about trans men (esp. after hormones and surgery)? Ought they use women's changing rooms because they're biological women?

@Tobias

So the summary of the argument of that paper is:

I am convinced that it is sheer effrontery to believe that anyone is morally obligated to do that which will make him unhappy. And yet I am just as fully convinced of the objectivity of good, that is, that some things are better than others, independently of what anyone happens to desire and independently of what any particular person happens to find to be satisfying, and that the uniqueness and dignity of man can never be understood in the absence of this concept. Why cannot both of these convictions be maintained? Surely the burden of proof rests in showing that they are not compatible.

In other words, for some X it is conceivable that:

1. "X is good" is true
2. "You ought do X even if doing so makes you unhappy" is false

I don't suspect you find this argument particularly compelling. I probably wouldn't if I were committed to your position. I'd simply reject (2).

There is, however, a passage that might provide a good launchpad for further discussion:

It would appear, indeed, that people who conceive of good in an objectivistic and non-naturalistic way, who believe, for example, that there is such a thing as a better character and such a thing as a better way of treating others, would be particularly inclined to believe that there are in fact moral obligations.

The focus is on ethical non-naturalism. But what of ethical naturalism? Is the person who claims that goodness is a natural (i.e. empirical) property committed to the claim that obligations are a natural (i.e. empirical) phenomena? Can science determine the physical existence of moral obligations? It seems like an absurd notion. But is ethical naturalism absurd? If not then there must be a conceptual (and so semantic) distinction between something being good and someone having an obligation.

One could also argue that whoever owns the toilet should decide. If it's a public toilet, it belongs to the tax payers, so let them vote and decide how it should be used.

If you decide not to do it that way, the question would be: why not? On what basis do we reject the public will? Is it because the public is danger of violating someone's rights? — frank

Whites only

My point is that bathrooms and sports are separated by biology, not gender. If sex and gender are separate then why is it so difficult to make a meaningful distinction between them? — Harry Hindu

A meaningful question to ask is why we have such separations.

For sports it's to give biological women a competitive chance, and that may be a reason to exclude trans women from women's sports. But then what about trans men? They're biological women, so ought they compete in women's sports? Or do we say that trans men who have taken hormones to transition into a man must compete in men's sports?

For bathrooms it may be something to do with "decency" or safety, but that may be a reason to allow trans women (esp. post-surgery) to use women's bathrooms and trans men (esp. post-surgery) to use men's bathrooms, and so bathrooms ought not be separated by biology but by something else (e.g. outward appearance, even if "artificial"). Of course, the difficulty then comes in how such things can be policed. Ought everyone be subject to genital inspection before and/or after using a public bathroom?

Do you have this upload icon next to the floppy disk/save icon? It might be for mods/sponsors only?

This may be an interesting read: Good and Obligation.

In what goes below I shall argue against the doctrine that there are moral obligations (in any unconditional sense), but at the same time I will affirm the objectivity of good. My general procedure will be, first, to argue that the doctrine of moral obligations is both a dubious doctrine and a superfluous doctrine and, second, to suggest that it is fallacious to assume – as might be tempting – that a belief in the objectivity of good commits one to a belief in moral obligations, or that a denial of moral obligations is incompatible with a belief in the objectivity of good.

I don't have access to the full paper, but I'll look to see if I can find it (for free) somewhere. I can see the appeal of the view, especially as I'm partial to Anscombe's remarks that the term "ought" lacks any real meaning but also do not agree with the moral nihilist who cannot draw a moral distinction between charity and genocide.

As a particular example, an ethical naturalist could claim that being good is a natural property without claiming that obligations are a natural property/phenomena.

And presumably my obligations, if such things exist, concern me, whereas the ethical goodness of charity has nothing (directly) to do with me at all.

The point I am making is that if truths exist then the proposition "only I exist" is a logical contradiction.

Therefore if "only I exist" is not a logical contradiction then truths do not exist.

I think we need to disambiguate the term "exists" and draw a distinction between saying that there are mathematical truths and saying that mathematical truths exist.

That 2 + 2 = 4 is not a problem for physicalism (or solipsism, for that matter).

In your previous post you alluded to the existence of mathematical truths, e.g. if "2 + 2 = 4" is true then the truth that 2 + 2 = 4 exists. Presumably, then, you also believe in the existence of propositional truths, e.g. if "bachelors are unmarried men" is true then the truth that bachelors are unmarried men exists?

If so then if "only I exist" is true then this propositional truth exists, and if this propositional truth exists then "only I exist" is false, giving us a contradiction.

So either "only I exist" is a logical contradiction or this notion that truths exist (whether mathematical or other) is mistaken – or at least the term "exists" is being used in two different ways, in which case mathematical truths are not prima facie problematic for physicalism.

Is "only I exist" a logical contradition?

Take the following exchanges:

Exchange 1
Michael: Why ought I give money to charity?
Tobias: Because giving money to charity is good.

Exchange 2
Michael: Why ought I give money to charity?
Tobias: Because you ought give money to charity.

Are these exchanges equivalent? I think prima facie they're not; the first appears to provide a reason why one ought give money to charity, whereas the second doesn't. So the suggestion that "X is good" is synonymous with "I ought X" doesn't seem to be consistent with how we actually understand moral language.

Carrying on from Exchange 1, the implicit syllogism is:

A1. Giving money to charity is good
A2. If giving money to charity is good then I ought give money to charity
A3. Therefore, I ought give money to charity

The problem is that if A2 is a tautology then A1 begs the question, assuming A3, and so the argument commits an informal fallacy. It would be equivalent to the following syllogism:

B1. I ought give money to charity
B2. If I ought give money to charity then I ought give money to charity
B3. Therefore, I ought give money to charity

Which returns us to Exchange 2.

I think that the uselessness of this second syllogism and of Exchange 2 shows that "good" and "ought" are not synonymous, even if there is a connection between the two, and so it's reasonable to ask for a justification for A2 (and for the more general and simplified "I ought do good").

The term "intersex" exists for a reason. Human biology is complex, and English vocabulary does not fully account for this complexity, and so the suggestion that the terms "biological male" and "biological female" each describe some unambiguous and mutually exclusive biological property that every human has shows a misunderstanding of both biology and language.

Take true hermaphroditism:

True hermaphroditism, a rare and usually sporadic disorder, is defined as the coexistence of seminiferous tubules and ovarian follicles. Most patients have an ovotestis with either an ovary or a testis on the opposite side; a gonad in the scrotum is usually a testis but may be an ovotestis.

The genitalia are usually ambiguous, but they may appear completely masculine or feminine. The anatomy of the internal reproductive tract depends on the nature of the gonads, particularly whether they secrete AMH. A uterus or uterine horn is present in 90% of cases. Testosterone response to HCG is variable, and AMH levels are usually low. Most patients experience breast development, ovulation, and even menstruation at puberty; pregnancy and successful childbirth are possible if selective removal of testicular tissue is feasible. Unless sex of rearing has already been chosen, male gender assignment should be restricted to patients with no uterus and descended testicular tissue because the latter is usually dysgenetic and prone to malignant degeneration. Most true hermaphrodites have a 46,XX karyotype. Despite the presence of testicular tissue, true hermaphrodites usually lack SRY; this suggests that the condition is the result of constitutive activation of a gene normally triggered by SRY.

But there, in the ear, is essentially where the effects of the mechanical soundwave ends, and a new sequences of acts begin. — NOS4A2

This seems to me like saying that if I kick a football through a window then I didn’t cause the window to break, as if I’m causally responsible only for kicking the ball and not also for what the ball does to the window after being kicked.

Your suggestion that this sequence of events is one causal chain, that this subsequent sequence of events is a second causal chain, and that there's no causal connection between the two is both incompatible with physics and a seemingly arbitrary delineation.

Brain states and mind? Not so much, though I do not begrudge their application in common use. — NOS4A2

A brain state is just the state of the brain, i.e its composition and the behaviour of its neurons. It is the way it is because of a long chain of causal events, both internal to the body and external. Our brains are not isolated systems.

What substances or objects can you move with your speech? — NOS4A2

The brain states of listeners. You could read up on speech perception for more technical information on the physics of neural activity responding to auditory stimulation.

Unless you believe that the mind is some non-physical substance that can somehow gain information from sound without being causally affected by it?

It does, though, when used here. You're bait-and-switching this to high hell. If you mean chromosomal sex, then say that. If you mean phenotypic sex then say that. These have no effect on whether one is a male or female organism.

I cannot understand why this is even something to push back against. They are simple observations about biology. — AmadeusD

Why do you think that the adjectives "male" and "female" properly refer only to the status of the SRY gene and not chromosomal sex or phenotypic sex?

Our disagreement has nothing to do with biology, but about the meaning of the adjectives "male" and "female".

I think as a general examination of etymology, phenotype is the most immediate determinant of how the adjectives "male" and "female" are ordinarily used, with their uses in other cases deriving from this, e.g. the "male" chromosome pair (or the SRY gene) is only described as being male because it is the most common cause of a male phenotype.

I put it to you that if there is an alien species that is phenotypically indistinguishable from humans, such as Kryptonians in fiction, but with different chromosomes and DNA, then the adjective "male" in the phrase "male human" means the same thing as the adjective "male" in the phrase "male Kryptonian".

Purely trivial. It is synonymous with X ought to be done. — Tobias

Is “X ought to be done” synonymous with “I ought to X”?

But it does not imply that you can. — Tobias

Then that’s the issue of contention. According to Kant, “for if the moral law commands that we ought to be better human beings now, it inescapably follows that we must be capable of being better human beings. The action to which the ‘ought’ applies must indeed be possible under natural conditions.”

As a practical example, “I ought breastfeed my child” must be false because I am incapable of breastfeeding.

Perhaps you cannot and you will fail, but that des not imply you should not have tried. — Tobias

So you’ve changed it slightly. It’s no longer the case that “X is good” means “X ought be done” but “X ought be tried”?

the question is whether we need to do good (or: 'good ought to be done' or 'I ought to do good'). — Tobias

Again, your own wording suggests that these two mean different things:

1. Ought I do good?
2. Ought I do that which I ought do?

The second isn't in question; it's a vacuous truism that I ought do that which I ought do. So if the first is in question then it isn't synonymous with the second.