We refer to all things with 26 protons as "iron", so in your proposition {the things we refer to by the word "iron"} is tautologous with {all things with 26 protons} so by substitution, your proposition is the things we refer to by the word "iron" all things with 26 protons have 26 protons. True, but trivially true. — Isaac

And when I say that we can't make iron into gold by decree I'm saying that we can't just decide that those elements which have 26 protons now have 53 more. That's the sensible interpretation of my claim. Which is why I don't understand why you respond by saying that we can just redefine the word "gold". That we can change the meaning of a word has nothing to do with this discussion.

But we can just decide that a stone is a bishop. That's why a stone being a bishop is an institutional fact but iron not being gold isn't.

The moral and practical basis for free speech is well-established, well-argued, even ancient, especially where the legal basis has yet to catch up. The moral and practical basis for censorship, on the other hand, is utterly threadbare. — NOS4A2

Do you have examples? The SEP article starts with:

The first thing to note in any sensible discussion of freedom of speech is that it will have to be limited. Every society places some limits on the exercise of speech because it always takes place within a context of competing values. In this sense, Stanley Fish is correct when he says that there is no such thing as free speech (in the sense of unlimited speech). Free speech is simply a useful term to focus our attention on a particular form of human interaction and the phrase is not meant to suggest that speech should never be limited. One does not have to fully agree with Fish when he says , “free speech in short, is not an independent value but a political prize” (1994,102) but it is the case that no society has existed where speech has not been limited to some extent.

You mentioned Mill earlier (and several times in the past), whom the SEP article also mentions:

It is true that many human rights documents give a prominent place to the right to speech and conscience, but such documents also place limits on what can be said because of the harm and offense that unlimited speech can cause, (I will discuss this in more detail later). Outside of the United States of America speech does not tend to have a specially protected status and it has to compete with other rights claims for our allegiance. John Stuart Mill, one of the great defenders of free speech, summarized these points in On Liberty, where he suggests that a struggle always takes place between the competing demands of authority and liberty. He claimed that we cannot have the latter without the former:

"All that makes existence valuable to anyone depends on the enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people. Some rules of conduct, therefore, must be imposed—by law in the first place, and by opinion on many things which are not fit subjects for the operation of law. (1978, 5)"

The task, therefore, is not to argue for an unlimited domain of free speech; such a concept cannot be defended. Instead, we need to decide how much value we place on speech in relation to other important ideals such as privacy, security, democratic equality and the prevention of harm and there is nothing inherent to speech that suggests it must always win out in competition with these values. Speech is part of a package deal of social goods: “speech, in short, is never a value in and of itself but is always produced within the precincts of some assumed conception of the good” (Fish, 1994, 104).

Iron doesn't even exist but for a human decision to group all things with 26 protons into one group. — Isaac

The stuff we refer to by the word "iron" exists even if we don't use the word "iron" to refer to them. And I'm saying that the things we refer to by the word "iron" have 26 protons, and will continue to have 26 protons even if we change the meaning of the word "iron". You still don't seem to understand the use-mention distinction.

Iron is a class of objects, not an object. — Isaac

When I eat a banana I don't eat a class of objects. A banana isn't a class of objects; it's a fruit. Iron isn't a class of objects; it's a chemical element with 26 protons.

When I use the word "iron" I might be referring to members of a class, but I nonetheless am referring to the members of the class, not the class.

...because a human institution decided so. — Isaac

Yes, which is beside the point. You continue to fail to understand the use-mention distinction.

"iron" is a four letter word but iron isn't a four letter word.

That "iron" refers to the element with 26 protons is a human decision but that iron has 26 protons isn't a human decision.

I addressed this. The christening changes some of the properties of the object but not others. Christening a particular stone 'a bishop' changes some of its properties (the way we treat it) but not others (how heavy it is). Christening some things 'gold' changes some of its properties (the way we treat it) but not others (how heavy it is). — Isaac

There's a difference between changing the meaning of the word "gold" such that it includes lead and deciding to use a stone as a bishop.

The criteria that qualifies something as gold (as the word "gold" is currently understood) is criteria that has nothing to do with human institutions and everything to do with its chemical composition.

The criteria that qualifies something as a bishop (as the word "bishop" is currently understood) is criteria that has to do with human institutions.

That's all there is to it. That we can change the meaning of the words "gold" and "bishop" (and even switch them) is irrelevant to the distinction Searle is making.

Searle argues that awareness has in fact two senses. The first sense is intentionalistic, about objects and states of affairs in the world, for example, being aware of a cup. The second sense is constitutive, such that an awareness of something is identical to the awareness itself, for example, being aware of a headache. — RussellA

Probably for another discussion, but I think that the constitutive sense is the sense that gave rise to the disagreement between naive and indirect realists. That's why Locke drew a distinction between the primary and secondary qualities. The argument was over whether or not the external world resembles the world as it appears to us. The naive realists argued that it does and the indirect realists argued that it doesn't.

The intentional sense as often argued in modern times is something of a red herring. When I look at you in a mirror, am I looking at you or at your reflection? The direct realist argues that I'm looking at you and the indirect realist argues that I'm looking at your reflection. I don't see why we can't say both. They're just different ways of talking about it. I'm looking at you and I'm looking at your reflection (and I'm looking at a mirror) – despite the fact that you and your reflection (and the mirror) are different things.

I'm addressing @Isaac's non sequitur. I claimed that we can't turn lead into gold by decree. He responded by saying that we can change the meaning of "gold" such that it refers to what we currently mean by "lead". But that has nothing to do with what I mean when I said that we can't turn lead into gold. I'm not saying that we can't use the word "gold" to refer to lead; I'm saying that we can't change the chemical composition of lead to that of gold by declaring it to be different or by changing the meaning of a word.

But I can just declare that a stone is a bishop by saying so and using it as such. That's the distinction between an institutional and non-institutional fact.

But why would you expect the latter to follow from the former? — StreetlightX

And why would you expect it to? — StreetlightX

I don't expect it to.

You're still not acknowledging the questionable status of universals sns as such begging the question. I'm talking about cheese, not 'cheese'. Gold, not 'gold'. These universals are brought into being by our definition of them. They don't otherwise exist as anything more thsn a potential (some distinctions among an almost infinite choice of distinctions). — Isaac

I have no idea what you mean. The real object(s) referred to by the words "gold" and "cheese" exist and have the properties they do regardless of what we say about them.

There's not two 'gold's (the name and the real substance), the name is all there is. — Isaac

Again, see the use-mention distinction.

Use: Cheese is derived from milk.
Mention: 'Cheese' is derived from the Old English word ċēse.

We don't just have conversations in a vacuum. Our words refer to things. The word "gold" refers to a chemical element. We can change what the word "gold" means but we can't change the nature of the chemical element (by decree). Calling dirt "food" isn't going to help a starving family.

I'm saying that just because we can change the meaning of the word "lead" to that of "gold" doesn't mean that "lead isn't gold" isn't a non-institutional fact.

That human institutions determine the meaning of the words "lead" and "gold" isn't that human institutions determine whether or not lead is gold. To say otherwise is to collapse the use-mention distinction.

They're restricted in chess as much as they are in science. — frank

Yes, but it's still the case that the thing they've chosen is a bishop because that's how they've decided to use it. This contrasts with something like being magnetic which I can't just make happen by deciding that the piece of wood will stick to my fridge door.

At the moment you're trying to argue that 1 + 1 = 3 because we can change the meaning of the symbols such that the equation would be satisfied.

If we decide to change the definition of gold — Isaac

This is where you're going wrong. It's not about changing the definition of words. Given what the words currently mean, human institutions can't just decide that lead is gold but can just decide that a stone is a bishop. That's all there is to it.

At the moment your argument is tantamount to saying that there is no distinction between English and French vocabulary because English speakers can adopt the word "bonjour" and French speakers can adopt the word "hello" as greetings.

Yes. Listen, if you have to begin each line with 'given X', then the whole point is that I will not give you X. — StreetlightX

And that's why your arguments against Searle are misplaced. His distinction between institutional and non-institutional facts, and which things are institutional and non-institutional facts, is one that holds within the framework of an existing language with existing rules and existing meanings that he will accept is a human institution.

Yes, but I can disagree that that is rat poison, or that this constitues a killing.

Not that I would, but I can. — StreetlightX

You can disagree with it, but you will be wrong if it is rat poison and does constitute a killing. That we can change the meaning of a word isn't that words don't currently mean what they do.

Given what we currently mean by "rat poison", that something is rat poison isn't something that is decided by human institutions; it's something that's decided by its chemical composition. Whereas given what we currently mean by "bishop", that something is a bishop is decided by human institutions; I can put a stone on a chess board in the appropriate place and declare it to be a bishop.

That rat poison will kill me if I drink it is a non-institutional fact.

Drinking rat poison is going to kill me even if I declare that it isn't rat poison.

That you think this constitutes an objection speaks to some kind of miscommnication here. Nothing about this contradicts the fact that how things count as things is entirely up to us. That you think it does leaves me puzzled. — StreetlightX

And as I said, I don't dispute that how things count as things is entirely up to us. I dispute that this has anything to do with Searle's distinction between institutional and non-institutional facts.

We decide what the word "food" means, but given what it means we can't just decide what stuff is food. That's the use-mention distinction.

And that this is so, is entirely in our power to decide. — StreetlightX

It's not (always) in our power to decide. A starving family can't just make food out of dirt by changing the meaning of the words "food" or "dirt" or thinking about the world differently or whatever.

But that family can play chess with dirt. They can have pawns and bishops from whatever they have available.

Exactly. Neither is gold 'gold' by virtue of its innate properties. It's 'gold' by virtue of some of its innate properties matching the criteria we decided for what constitutes 'gold'.

We decided all matter with 79 protons shall be 'gold'.

As it is with the bishop we decided all objects moved only diagonally on a chess board in the game of chess shall be 'bishops' — Isaac

Use–mention distinction.

There's a difference between saying "gold is (not) gold by virtue of its innate properties" and saying "gold is (not) named 'gold' by virtue of its innate properties."

I'm saying the former. You're saying the latter. The latter has no bearing on Searle's distinction between institutional and non-institutional facts.

Also this misunderstands what I'm saying. I'm not saying that anything can be a bishop; I'm saying that being a bishop is something that human institutions impose on an object; it's not a bishop by virtue of its innate characteristics.

Whereas an object's size, shape, and chemical composition aren't things that human institutions impose on an object (even if the words used to talk about them are); they're innate characteristics of the object that have nothing to do with what we think or say about them.

Being a pane of glass and being a window are two very different things. The former a non-institutional fact, the latter an institutional fact. It's a perfectly understandable distinction.

Physical constraints apply to bishops too. We cannot, no matter our assignation, claim an object larger than the square on our chessboard is a bishop. It could not function as one, no matter how much we define it as such. If we say "bishops move diagonally on a chess board" then something which, by it's physical properties, cannot so move cannot be a bishop. — Isaac

We don't need the piece to be on the board. We could just have a piece of paper attached to the piece and write the position on it.

But this has no bearing - none - on the fact that what counts as magnetic or not ultimately bears on human institutions. — StreetlightX

And this has no bearing on the distinction Searle makes between institutional and non-institutional facts. Human institutions might determine the meaning of the words "lead", "gold", "stone", and "bishop", but given the meaning of these words we can just decide that a stone is a bishop but can't just decide that lead is gold, or alchemists could have just re-written the dictionary to create the philosophers' stone.

And presumably what counts as a proton - the criteria by which we decide - can be seen under the same electron microscope that sees the protons?

Look, that's the trick. 'Non-institutional facts' look or seem non-institutional to the degree that we can continually put the 'institution' at one remove from the fact. But at some point you will always hit the bedrock of things-counting-as-things, whose only guarantee will be nothing other than human institutions. At some point, you will hit the bedrock of obligation, beyond which the spade can only be turned and say - "this doesn't satisfy what I meant"! — StreetlightX

I don't think it needs to be this complicated. There's just the common sense understanding that something is a bishop if we use it as such in a game of chess but that something being magnetic is a brute fact of physics. We can't just decide to use a non-magnetic material as a magnetic material, and changing the meaning of the word "magnetic" isn't going to get a piece of wood to stick to my fridge door.

Of course we can turn lead into gold just by deciding that it's gold. We only need say that the definition of gold is now anything with between 79 and 82 protons. Voilà, lead is now gold. — Isaac

By "turning lead into gold" I mean changing the chemical composition of an object such that it goes from satisfying what we currently mean by "lead" to satisfying what we currently mean by "gold".

They have different propositional content (the aboutness). — Michael

...doesn't follow either. — Isaac

You and I have already agreed that "I know that there is an apple in the bag" and "there is an apple in the bag" have different propositional content. That's a starting point for our discussion. I'm not saying that it follows from anything.

We can't turn lead into gold just by deciding that it's gold, but we can turn a stone into a bishop just by using it as such on a chess board.

No, we're assigning an institutional grouping to the entire collection of sensory data the object has (the realism part - we're assuming there is definitely an object with the properties our senses seem to detect). Is an object with 26 protons and 27 neutrons still iron? We've just decided it is. It could have been otherwise. We call it an isotope of iron rather than give it some completely new name.

So saying "this is iron" is saying that this is the sort of thing iron is. What sort of thing is and isn't iron is an institutional fact. We decide what criteria we want to use to determine membership of that class of materials. — Isaac

I agree that how we use words is an institutional fact, but whether or not an object satisfies the meaning of those words might not be. The word "bishop" refers to the role an object plays in a game, which is an institutional fact. The word "iron" refers to the chemical composition of an object, which isn't an institutional fact.

But we're not obligated by God to group all the products of trees into one grouping are we? Maybe the material from Oak is not the same thing as the material from Beech. There need be no such thing as 'wood'. It's an institutional fact that there is. — Isaac

Then let's use a simpler example; "this is iron" and "this is a bishop."

In the case of the former we're describing an object's chemical composition, in the case of the latter we're describing an object's role in a game. An object's chemical composition doesn't depend on human institutions; the atoms that make it up are what they are regardless of what we think or say or do. But an object's role in a game very much depends on us.

I'm talking about the language use and the meanings those expressions have — Isaac

And this is where I think you're making a mistake. The meaning of an expression is its aboutness. As you said before, "I know that there is an apple in the bag" is about my state of mind, "there is an apple in the bag" about the state of the world. The two statements are about different things.

Even if in using the statement "the grass is green" I imply that I believe that the grass is green it doesn't follow that "the grass is green" means "I believe the grass is green". They have different propositional content (the aboutness).

I think it's more the case that "this is a bishop" is an institutional fact but that "this is wood" isn't.

The actual consequence of speech are physical in nature: the expelling of breath, the subtle vibration of the air, the marking of pencil on a paper, and so on. All benign stuff and not worthy of suppression.

Any and all reactions to those benign activities are born in those that react to them, and thus a consequence of themselves.

Considering this, the phrase “freedom of speech but not freedom from consequences” is a goofy one at best, but a justification for censorship at worse. — NOS4A2

This is an utterly pedantic and useless interpretation of the meaning of the word "consequence" in this context. Any normal person understands what is meant by the phrase "freedom of speech but not freedom from consequences". It's a way of saying that even if it's not illegal for you to say something you're at risk of being shunned or fired or de-platformed etc. – and rightfully so.

How does the statement "the grass is green", when uttered by me, have any different meaning to "I believe the grass is green" (or " I know the grass is green ")? Unless I'm lying, my saying " the grass is green " automatically entails that I believe the grass is green.

Break the statement down. According to JTB, you're saying "I believe the grass is green" and "it's true that 'the grass is green'". Now since you can't rationally claim the latter with entailing tormer claim becomes redundant. So you're just claiming "it's true that 'the grass is green'", which deflates to "the grass is green". — Isaac

You’re confusing logical entailment with something like a 'performative' entailment. The phrase "the grass is green" doesn't logically entail the phrase "I believe the grass is green", even though in practice someone who (honestly) asserts one will (honestly) assert the other. This is Moore’s Paradox.

It is clearly about your beliefs. Since the actual truth of the grass's greenness can't be established, the comment can only be interpreted as comparing the expressed certainty of John's belief to the certainty you have in yours. — Isaac

It's not about my beliefs. You're conflating the propositional content of a statement with the reason for asserting it. You seemed to understand this before when you said "["I know that there is an apple in the bag"] is about my state of mind, ["there is an apple in the bag"] about the state of the world."

You obviously can't be comparing John's stated belief to the actual truth, since that is only an ideal. — Isaac

It's not an ideal. The actual colour of the grass is a real thing (the argument between direct and indirect realists notwithstanding), not imaginary or hypothetical. Even if I don't have direct access to this fact, I'm quite capable of understanding what it would mean for someone to correctly describe it. And regardless of my beliefs I can say "John knows that the grass is green only if the grass is green" which certainly shouldn't be interpreted as "John knows that the grass is green only if I believe that the grass is green."

It was a question back to you, to answer from your position of JTB. — Isaac

My answer is the same answer that you gave: the latter is about my state of mind, the former about the state of the world.

How does the statement "the grass is green", when uttered by me, have any different meaning to "I believe the grass is green" — Isaac

You answered this yourself: "The [latter] is about my state of mind, the [former] about the state of the world."

Are you now going back on that?

No I am not. My whole argument is to distinguish true statements from Absolute truth.

I pointed out that true statements (based on facts) are reasonable but not necessarily absolute truths.
Reasonableness(accepting a claim to be true based on current facts) and Absolute Truthiness are two different things. — Nickolasgaspar

I don't know what you mean by "absolute truth". Statements are either true or false, and then either said to be true or said to be false.

The former is about my state of mind, the latter about the state of the world. — Isaac

Then we can understand "I know that the grass is green" as a combination of "I believe that the grass is green" (a statement about my state of mind) and "the grass is green" (a statement about the state of the world).

Or perhaps this is better understood in the third person: "John knows that the grass is green." The statement isn't about me or my beliefs (even if my beliefs motivate the assertion), and it's not just about John's belief as we can say "John believes that the grass is green but he doesn't know that the grass is green because the grass isn't green."

The grass being green is a requirement for John to know that the grass is green. A strongly held, justified belief isn't sufficient. And the grass being green is a requirement for me to know that the grass is green.

Correct but we don't know that.We can only arrive to a conclusion based on available facts. So our statements are evaluated as true or not true based on those facts. — Nickolasgaspar

Correct, but again our evaluation can only be made based on the available facts either we are happy or not. — Nickolasgaspar

I know. The point I am making is that the below are two different claims that you are conflating:

1. The statement has been evaluated as true
2. The statement is true

You argue for the former and conclude the latter which is a non sequitur.