such that it goes from satisfying what we currently mean by "lead" to satisfying what we currently mean by "gold". — Michael

Mmhm.

Notice the deontic element here! The obligation that is attributed to 'institutional facts'.

But what you have done there just to decide that the word "gold" now refers to what was previously called lead.

The number of protons in a given sample has not changed.

That number of protons is a basic fact, not an institutional fact. That we use the words "number", "proton" "82", and that we put these together to represent the number of protons in the atoms in the sample - these are institutional facts.

That number of protons — Banno

And presumably what counts as a proton - the criteria by which we decide - can be seen under the same electron microscope that sees the protons?

Look, that's the trick. 'Non-institutional facts' look or seem non-institutional to the degree that we can continually put the 'institution' at one remove from the fact. But at some point you will always hit the bedrock of things-counting-as-things, whose only guarantee will be nothing other than human institutions. At some point, you will hit the bedrock of obligation, beyond which the spade can only be turned and say - "this doesn't satisfy what I meant"!

\

And presumably what counts as a proton - the criteria by which we decide - can be seen under the same electron microscope that sees the protons? — StreetlightX

Well no, a electron microscope is not how it is done; but the protons could not care less. That's the point.

but the protons could not care less. That's the point. — Banno

And the uncaringness is mutual. We use words as we want to. Sometimes, we let (and want!) how things are guide our use of words. Sometimes we do not. In both cases, it is up to us. 'Us' as an institution, that is.

Come on, you know this. Think back to coloured squares.

Meanwhile, in another part of the forest, Judith Butler treated the midwife's announcement "It's a girl!" as performative, making the attribution of sex as much an institutional fact as the naming of a ship. https://criticallegalthinking.com/2016/11/14/judith-butlers-performativity/

We-intentionality is different to I-intentionality. — Banno

I get that. There needs to be an agreement about our intentions, for them to be considered 'common'.

And presumably what counts as a proton - the criteria by which we decide - can be seen under the same electron microscope that sees the protons?

Look, that's the trick. 'Non-institutional facts' look or seem non-institutional to the degree that we can continually put the 'institution' at one remove from the fact. But at some point you will always hit the bedrock of things-counting-as-things, whose only guarantee will be nothing other than human institutions. At some point, you will hit the bedrock of obligation, beyond which the spade can only be turned and say - "this doesn't satisfy what I meant"! — StreetlightX

I don't think it needs to be this complicated. There's just the common sense understanding that something is a bishop if we use it as such in a game of chess but that something being magnetic is a brute fact of physics. We can't just decide to use a non-magnetic material as a magnetic material, and changing the meaning of the word "magnetic" isn't going to get a piece of wood to stick to my fridge door.

We can't just decide to use a non-magnetic material as a magnetic material. — Michael

But this has no bearing - none - on the fact that what counts as magnetic or not ultimately bears on human institutions. Once we fix our understanding of magnetic material as we have, it is of course the case that "we can't just decide to use a non-magnetic material as a magnetic material". But this is downstream from said (institutional) fixing.

Exactly! There are political stakes to this, and this 'not being very complicated' suddenly gets very complicated once say, transphobes decide that 'you can't just decide to be a woman' because you "can't argue with genes". Or in this case, protons.

changing the meaning of the word "magnetic" isn't going to get a piece of wood to stick to my fridge door. — Michael

Of course not. We also need to change the meaning of the word 'stick'!

Physical constraints apply to bishops too. We cannot, no matter our assignation, claim an object larger than the square on our chessboard is a bishop. It could not function as one, no matter how much we define it as such. If we say "bishops move diagonally on a chess board" then something which, by it's physical properties, cannot so move cannot be a bishop.

Likewise with gold. If we define gold as something with 79 protons then something which physically cannot meet those requirements cannot be gold.

Neither the bishop nor gold are more or less constrained by reality than the other once defined.

But this has no bearing - none - on the fact that what counts as magnetic or not ultimately bears on human institutions. — StreetlightX

And this has no bearing on the distinction Searle makes between institutional and non-institutional facts. Human institutions might determine the meaning of the words "lead", "gold", "stone", and "bishop", but given the meaning of these words we can just decide that a stone is a bishop but can't just decide that lead is gold, or alchemists could have just re-written the dictionary to create the philosophers' stone.

given the meaning of these words we can just decide that a stone is a bishop — Michael

We can't though. See above.

Physical constraints apply to bishops too. We cannot, no matter our assignation, claim an object larger than the square on our chessboard is a bishop. It could not function as one, no matter how much we define it as such. If we say "bishops move diagonally on a chess board" then something which, by it's physical properties, cannot so move cannot be a bishop. — Isaac

We don't need the piece to be on the board. We could just have a piece of paper attached to the piece and write the position on it.

Yep.

We don't need the piece to be on the board. We could just have a piece of paper attached to the piece and write the position on it. — Michael

Only if our definition of "bishop" allows such a move. Not if it doesn't. Our definition of 'gold' is highly specific and doesn't allow for leeway, our definition of 'bishop' is wide and so does allow a lot of leeway. This makes them of different scale, not if different type.

We could not claim an amorphous gas was a bishop, it's physical properties mean it cannot carry out the function of one.

Also this misunderstands what I'm saying. I'm not saying that anything can be a bishop; I'm saying that being a bishop is something that human institutions impose on an object; it's not a bishop by virtue of its innate characteristics.

Whereas an object's size, shape, and chemical composition aren't things that human institutions impose on an object (even if the words used to talk about them are); they're innate characteristics of the object that have nothing to do with what we think or say about them.

Being a pane of glass and being a window are two very different things. The former a non-institutional fact, the latter an institutional fact. It's a perfectly understandable distinction.

it's not a bishop by virtue of its innate characteristics. — Michael

Exactly. Neither is gold 'gold' by virtue of its innate properties. It's 'gold' by virtue of some of its innate properties matching the criteria we decided for what constitutes 'gold'.

We decided all matter with 79 protons shall be 'gold'.

As it is with the bishop we decided all objects moved only diagonally on a chess board in the game of chess shall be 'bishops'

but given the meaning of these words we can just decide that a stone is a bishop but can't just decide that lead is gold, or alchemists could have just re-written the dictionary to create the philosophers' stone. — Michael

And that this is so, is entirely in our power to decide. Again: we let ourselves - or rather our concepts - be constained by how things are.

Exactly. Neither is gold 'gold' by virtue of its innate properties. It's 'gold' by virtue of some of its innate properties matching the criteria we decided for what constitutes 'gold'.

We decided all matter with 79 protons shall be 'gold'.

As it is with the bishop we decided all objects moved only diagonally on a chess board in the game of chess shall be 'bishops' — Isaac

Use–mention distinction.

There's a difference between saying "gold is (not) gold by virtue of its innate properties" and saying "gold is (not) named 'gold' by virtue of its innate properties."

I'm saying the former. You're saying the latter. The latter has no bearing on Searle's distinction between institutional and non-institutional facts.

And that this is so, is entirely in our power to decide. — StreetlightX

It's not (always) in our power to decide. A starving family can't just make food out of dirt by changing the meaning of the words "food" or "dirt" or thinking about the world differently or whatever.

But that family can play chess with dirt. They can have pawns and bishops from whatever they have available.

It's not (always) in our power to decide. A starving family can't just make food out of dirt by changing the meaning of the words "food" or "dirt" or thinking about the world differently or whatever. — Michael

That you think this constitutes an objection speaks to some kind of miscommunication here. Nothing about this contradicts the fact that how things count as things is entirely up to us. That you think it does leaves me puzzled. You clearly think I mean something other than I do. But what, I am not sure.

I guess I'm also just sad that a reader of Wittgenstein could read Searle and just... forget everything. A great disappointment. In language, it's all roles, all the way down. There is nothing that does not function in the mode of a role, and to think otherwise is just language in idle.

That you think this constitutes an objection speaks to some kind of miscommnication here. Nothing about this contradicts the fact that how things count as things is entirely up to us. That you think it does leaves me puzzled. — StreetlightX

And as I said, I don't dispute that how things count as things is entirely up to us. I dispute that this has anything to do with Searle's distinction between institutional and non-institutional facts.

We decide what the word "food" means, but given what it means we can't just decide what stuff is food. That's the use-mention distinction.

Because it's all counting-as, all facts, everywhere, all the time.

Drinking rat poison is going to kill me even if I declare that it isn't rat poison.

Yes.

And?

That rat poison will kill me if I drink it is a non-institutional fact.

But I can disagree that that is [read: counts-as] rat poison, or that this constitues [read: counts-as] a killing.

Not that I would, but I can.

Yes, but I can disagree that that is rat poison, or that this constitues a killing.

Not that I would, but I can. — StreetlightX

You can disagree with it, but you will be wrong if it is rat poison and does constitute a killing. That we can change the meaning of a word isn't that words don't currently mean what they do.

Given what we currently mean by "rat poison", that something is rat poison isn't something that is decided by human institutions; it's something that's decided by its chemical composition. Whereas given what we currently mean by "bishop", that something is a bishop is decided by human institutions; I can put a stone on a chess board in the appropriate place and declare it to be a bishop.

Given what we currently mean — Michael

Yes. Listen, if you have to begin each line with 'given X', then the whole point is that I will not give you X.