But you are saying it wrong. — Banno

I don't think I am.

Take "there are unuttered propositions" which I compared to "there are unborn babies".

That there are unborn babies just is that new babies will be born in the future, and so that there are unuttered propositions just is that new propositions will be uttered in the future, consistent with everything I have been saying.

That you think that "there are unuttered propositions" is inconsistent with my position suggests that you are being led astray by the grammar of this sentence into thinking it entails something else – something that seems akin to platonism even though you don't seem to want to commit to platonism, which is why it is not clear to me what you are trying to say, and why I think you're falling victim to an unintentional equivocation caused by the imprecise use of the terms "true" and "truth" that I am trying to fix.

You just slide the goal from utterances to propositions to assertion: — Banno

Yes, it makes no difference. Either way, platonism is wrong and truth- and falsehood-predication only makes sense when the object predicated as either true or false is a feature of language.

You are headed to absurdity, forced to conclude that the number of true additions is finite, since it is limited to only those that have been uttered. — Banno

I am saying that the number of true assertions that have been made is finite, that the number of false assertions that have been made is finite, that platonism is incorrect, and that using the adjectives "true" and "false" to describe something other than an assertion is either a category error or vacuous.

It ain't nonsense.

There are unuttered propositions. — Banno

Only in the trivial sense that there are unborn babies.

Srap showed this by uttering one. — Banno

That's a contradiction. You can't show that there are unuttered propositions by uttering a proposition. In uttering a proposition you only show that there's an uttered proposition.

The only alternative is for you to claim that 799168003115 + 193637359638 = 992805362753 was not true until Srap made it so by uttering it. — Banno

This is like saying "the only alternative is for you to claim that the painting was not accurate until the painter made it so by painting it". You're not making any sense.

I'm not saying that some sentence wasn't true before it was said, because any talk about a sentence before it is said is incoherent. I'm only saying that only the things we say are true or false.

And yet ↪Srap Tasmaner showed you an example that negates your assertion. — Banno

No he didn't.

But utterances and propositions are not the very same. — Banno

I'm not saying that they're the very same. I'm saying that if there are no utterances then there are no propositions, i.e. that platonism is wrong.

You didn't address the argument, which is that different utterances are understood as saying the same thing; therefore what they say is not peculiar to an individual utterance. — Banno

I haven't claimed otherwise. I've only claimed that the only things that can be true or false are the things we say (which I'm using as a catch-all for speech, writing, signing, thinking, believing, etc.).

Whether you want to interpret "what we say" as referring to an utterance or a sentence or a proposition makes no difference; either way, we must be saying something for something to be true or for something to be false.

The claim that there are true and false sentences/propositions/predications even if nothing is being said is incoherent.

"1+1=3 is false" becasue by substitution 1+1≠ 3.

"1+1=3" is true ≡ 1+1=3. — Banno

I don't see how that answers my question.

There is a reason we have different words for utterance, sentence, statement, proposition, predication...

Which of these is true? Any of them. — Banno

Sure, but there are no sentences if there are no utterances, there are no statements if there are no utterances, there are no propositions if there are no utterances, and there are no predications if there are no utterances.

There is a red mountain (which isn't truth-apt) and there is the utterance "the mountain is red" (which is truth-apt). There isn't some third thing – the fact that the mountain is red (allegedly truth-apt) – distinct from the former and independent of the latter. Which is why I disagree with platonism.

And moreover, it's not an error to say that the fact that 1 + 1 = 2 is true, it's just redundant. — Banno

And how does this work with the case of "1 + 1 = 3" being false? We certainly can't say that the fact that 1 + 1 = 3 is false. So if you want to say that "it" is false even if not uttered, what other than the sentence is the sort of thing that can be false?

As for redundancy, I addressed something like that several times. The claim that it is true that X can be interpreted in one of two ways:

1. "X" is true
2. X

And the claim that it is false that X can be interpreted in one of two ways:

1. "X" is false
2. not X

If we interpret it as (1) then we're predicating truth of a sentence. If we interpret it as (2) then the phrase "it is true that" is vacuous, with the words "it" and "true" not referring to any entity or any property, and nothing is added by using such grammar, but in using such grammar you risk equivocating.

the second order predication "There is gold in those hills" is true, even if never uttered. — Banno

This second order predication is still a sentence that you have written and have described using the adjective "true", and asserting that it is true even if never uttered is like asserting that a painting is accurate even if never painted. It simply makes no sense.

What are the chances that anyone has ever said that 799168003115 + 193637359638 = 992805362753? — Srap Tasmaner

Well you've just said it now?

Are you perhaps suggesting that it was true before you said it? What does the word "it" here refer to? Does it refer to the sentence "799168003115 + 193637359638 = 992805362753"? Then we're back to what I said above; saying that a sentence is true before it is said makes as little sense as saying that a painting is accurate before it is painted.

Perhaps the word "it" refers to the fact that 799168003115 + 193637359638 = 992805362753? I don't think that facts are the sort of thing that can be true or false, i.e. it's a category error to say that the fact that 1 + 1 = 2 is true. And what if I were to assert the false sentence "1 + 1 = 3"? Was it false before I said it? But the word "it" here can't refer to the fact that 1 + 1 = 3 because 1 + 1 does not equal 3.

It is. A truth realist believes there are truths which have never been uttered. — frank

A platonist does, but I don't think that a realist must be a platonist. A realist can be a non-platonist by accepting that only the things we say are true or false but that some of the things we say are unknowably true or false.

you don't think P is true until someone expresses P. — frank

I also don't think that a painting is accurate until someone has painted it. But that's because a painting being accurate (or inaccurate) before it is painted makes no sense. Just as a sentence being true (or false) before it is said makes no sense.

This isn't truth skepticism.

But this sentence wasn't true before you uttered it, right? — frank

There wasn't a sentence before it was uttered.

That's truth anti-realism. A truth realist would say it was true before you said it. — frank

The anti-realist (at least of Dummett's kind) says that if a sentence is true then it's possible to know that it's true (subject to the appropriate restrictions as per Fitch's paradox), whereas the realist allows for the possibility that some true sentences are unknowably true.

Is it true that there are no minds in world B? — Banno

This can mean one of two things:

1. Are there no minds in World B?
2. Is "there are no minds in World B" true?

The answer to both is "yes".

And as the diagram shows, "there are no minds in World B" is a truth in World A about World B, not a truth in World B.

I'm not tying myself in knots. I'm making this very simple observation:



There are no truths in World B because nothing true is being said in World B.

But there is a truth in World A because something true (about World B) is being said in World A.

Given that nothing true is being said in a world without minds, nothing is true in a world without minds.

But something true is being said in the actual world in which there are minds at/about a world without minds.

As it stands, I have no clear idea of what the point you were attempting to make was. My apologies for attempting to take you seriously.

I will try not to do it again. — Banno

This line of discussion started from this comment of mine:

What some are saying is that "a truth" means "a true proposition" and "a falsehood" means "a false proposition", that a proposition requires a language, and that a language requires a mind.

This is not to say that a mind is sufficient; only that it is necessary. The (often mind-independent) thing that the proposition describes is also necessary (to determine whether or not the proposition is a truth or a falsehood).

So the claim is that when all life dies out there will be gold in Boorara but no truths or falsehoods because there will be no propositions. — Michael

In even simpler terms, there is gold in Boorara even if nothing is being said but there are no truths if nothing true is being said and no falsehoods if nothing false is being said.

You finally now seem to agree with me.

or was trivial, all along. — Banno

Yes, as it was always meant to be. It was a simple remark about how people were being imprecise with their use of the terms "true" and "truth". I thought this post from 11 days ago was clear enough, and yet still people were misunderstanding me and accusing me of saying something I'm not, despite me repeatedly and explicitly saying that I am being misunderstood and am not saying what I am being accused of saying.

Hence what we say is not all there is to truth and falsity. There is, in addition, what is the case. — Banno

I didn't say that saying things is all there is to truth and falsity. I said that saying true and false things is all there is to truth and falsity.

The diagram above is very clear. The existence of gold determines whether what we say is true or false, but it is nonetheless what we say that is true or false, not some other thing such that there are truths even if nothing true is said and falsehoods even if nothing false is said.

This invokes the existence of a new entity, the proposition, in the word in question. — Banno

It doesn't. We simply say true or false things or we don't, and that's all there is to truth and falsity. Your suggestion that there are truths in World B even though nothing true is being said in World B makes no sense – unless you're arguing for platonism, which I also think makes no sense.

But there are true things being said in World A about World B.

Which isn't to say that it's false, it's to say that it's not there. — fdrake

Yes, precisely. I'm only saying that truth is a property of propositions and that there are no true propositions (truths) in a world without language (i.e inside the World B circle). There are also no false propositions (falsehoods) in a world without language.

Maybe this diagram is easier to understand. The quoted sentences represent true (blue) and false (red) propositions.



Something is true in a world if it appears as a blue sentence in that world's circle. Something is true at a world if its truth conditions appear inside that world's circle.

In the above case there are no truths in World B even though there are two truths at World B.

The platonist places true and false propositions inside the World B circle even though there's nobody in World B to say those things, and I don't think that makes any sense.

There's gold in A. There's gold in A-H. Gold is an entity in both of their domains.
"There is gold" is true at A, "There is gold" is true at A-H.
"There is gold" is true in A. "There is gold" is false in A-H.

Make sense so far? — fdrake

No, it should be:

"There is gold" is true at A, "There is gold" is true at A-H.
"There is gold" is true in A. "There is gold" doesn't exist in A-H.

In addition, imagine who could possibly make the speech act that "There is gold" is true at A-H. — fdrake

You're doing it right now.

there's no one with language in A-H. — fdrake

That's why there isn't a true sentence in A-H.

Moreover, your opponents are arguing that to be true is to be true in a world - I think that's what you see it as anyway. And you say that this entails a platonism, like it's a bad thing? — fdrake

Well, it's a bad thing if platonism is wrong, which I think it is, and as Banno has claimed to be a mathematical antirealist I take him to be an anti-platonist, and so if he were to claim that to be true is to be true in a world then he would have to abandon his realism in favour of a strong anti-realism, so there appears to be some sort of inconsistency there.

Now it's not incoherent, it's simply platonist. — fdrake

Well, it may be that platonism is incoherent, which some argue it is.

But truth at a world has the same trans-world property that made truth in a world incoherent, for you, with regard to truths. — fdrake

I don't understand this. Take a variation of what I said above:

1. Something true can be said about a world without language
2. Something true can be said in a world without language

(2) is certainly incoherent but (1) doesn't appear to be.

As an example: "the Earth would still exist even humanity were to go extinct". This is an English language sentence about a world in which no English sentence is spoken or written. It seems meaningful and is arguably true (especially if one is a realist).

Although, as I mentioned a few pages ago, whether or not (non a priori) counterfactuals are truth-apt is questionable.

Maybe the issue is that you and I have very different interpretations of the difference between truth in a world and truth at a world.

All I mean is to make this distinction:

1. Something true can be said about W (truth at a world)
2. Something true can be said in W (truth in a world)

Which gives us:

3. Something true can be said about a world without language
4. Nothing true can be said in a world without language

(4) is a truism.

And unless platonism is correct, saying something true or false is all there is to truth and falsity – there are no mind-independent abstract truth-bearers.

Your T_@ behaves the same as their T_R, so your T_@ entails their T_R — fdrake

Okay, but what does that have to do with T_I? My claim is that nothing is T_I relative to a world without language but that some things are T_@ relative to a world without language. If all you are claiming is that T_R and T_@ mean the same thing, and so some things are T_R relative to a world without language then this does not contradict anything I'm saying.

You'll probably claim that it's your opponents who are equivocating T_I with T_R, your opponents will claim you're equivocating T_R with T_I, and IMO everyone's right, but no one's actually arguing about what they disagree about. — fdrake

That's not what's happening.

All that's happening is that I'm explaining that there is a difference between T_I ("truth in") and T_@ ("truth at"), and that nothing is T_I relative to a world without language (unless platonism is correct).

And then some seem to think that I’m saying that the existence of gold depends on the existence of language, despite me repeatedly denying this.

Then you're not addressing what I'm saying, because those are all I'm saying.

Then perhaps you can tell me which, if either, of these you disagree with?

1. "a truth" means "a true sentence"
2. Sentences are not mind-independent abstract objects à la platonism

I am simply saying that you are simply refusing to play ball. — fdrake

With what? The problem as I see it as that you and others think I'm saying something I'm not and now you're criticising me for not defending what I'm not saying.

What insane interpretation? I am simply making two simple claims:

1. "a truth" means "a true sentence"
2. Sentences are not mind-independent abstract objects à la platonism

Do you disagree with either of these?

This is the kind of thing I am arguing against:

It misleads Michael to think that truths only exist when sentences exist. — Banno

I am saying that a truth is a true sentence, much like a falsehood is a false sentence, and that, contrary to platonism, a sentence (whether true, false, or neither) only exists if a language exists, because sentences are not mind-independent abstract objects.

That is all.

Entities aren't true or false though? Unless they're sentences. "there is a rock" is true or false. The rock isn't true or false. This might be a pedantic point but I don't know. — fdrake

Yes, that's the point I have been trying to make for over a week.

It's presumably because the things you're saying appear to entail lots of absurd and counterintuitive things. — fdrake

If you're referring to C2 and C3 here, I do explain how we avoid them. I don't think the issue is with anything I have been saying but with the T-schema being imprecise (or misinterpreted).

Much like the idea that propositions are somehow trans-world and nevertheless language items. — fdrake

I don't think there's anything absurd or counterintuitive about us using the English language to describe possible (non-actual) or counterfactuals worlds.

I have honestly no idea what the point of this discussion is. — fdrake

I am simply saying that truth is a property of truth-bearers and that truth-bearers are features of language (i.e. platonism is wrong), and so therefore nothing that exists in a world without language has the property of being either true or false.

I don't think that this is anything controversial (unless you agree with platonism) or substantial, and so I don't understand the resistance I'm facing. I can only assume that people think I'm saying something I'm not.

The world isn't empty without language in it though. There'll still be rocks and gold. — fdrake

I know.

Which will mean statements like "this is gold" evaluates to true in that world, not just at it. — fdrake

If the proposition "there is gold" is true in that world then platonism is correct, and I do not believe that platonism is correct. If platonism is incorrect then "there is gold" is only true at that world.

But in a vacuous sense, since there are no descriptions to be true or false. — fdrake

And that's all I've ever been saying. If nothing is being said then nothing true is being said. The notion that there are truths and falsehoods without something true or false being said makes no sense to me.

If you think that truths are required for something to exist (and that falsehoods are required for something to not exist?) then that's on you. I certainly don't think it follows.

I'm repeating it because you don't seem to be addressing it. You seem to think I'm saying something I'm not and addressing that instead.

From Truth in a World vs. Truth at a World

One way for something to be true with respect to a world requires the truth-bearer to exist in the world and be true there. Another way is for the truth-bearer to “correctly describe” the world, where this does not require existing in the world.

...

The conceptualist may claim that propositions can be true at worlds without being true in them, by analogy with the examples from Pollock and Buridan. A proposition like <there are no propositions> is true at certain possible worlds but true in none.

All I am saying is that there are no truths (true propositions) in a world without language. Either this is true or platonism is true, and I don't believe that platonism is true.

See here for a visual representation.

With that established we can then consider something like the T-schema:

"it is raining" is true iff it is raining

This can be interpreted in one of two ways:

a. "it is raining" is true in world A iff it is raining in world A
b. "it is raining" is true at world A iff it is raining in world A

If we interpret the T-Schema according to (a) then we are left with the other argument I gave:

P1. "it is raining" is true in world A iff it is raining in world A
C1. Therefore, it is raining in world A iff "it is raining" is true in world A
P2. If "it is raining" is true in world A then "it is raining" exists in world A
C2. Therefore, if it is raining in world A then "it is raining" exists in world A
C3. Therefore, if "it is raining" does not exist in world A then it is not raining in world A

You took issue with P2, but if you understand what it means for something to be true at a world but not in that world then you should understand what it means for a proposition to exist or not in a world.

That leaves us with either accepting C2 and C3 or rejecting P1.

If we reject P1 then we can re-interpret the T-schema according to (b) and/or we can amend P1 to:

P1. If "it is raining" exists in world A then "it is raining" is true in world A iff it is raining in world A

Either option allows us to avoid C1 and C2.

Per your view there aren't many truths in the present either. — frank

Yes, we’re not saying many true things in the present.

But there are many mountains and planets and so on.

The set of present Kings of France is empty. — Banno

And the set of truth bearers in a world without language is empty. Therefore if truth is a property of truth bearers then the set of truths in a world without language is empty (even if the set of gold in a world without language is not empty).

One of these is false:

1. Particles cannot influence one another faster than the speed of light (locality)
2. Particles have well defined properties before being measured (realism)

As examples, the Copenhagen and Many Worlds interpretations reject realism, and the de Broglie–Bohm theory rejects locality.