The way you've been presenting this thought completely fails to acknowledge the fact that you can distinguish between the existence or non-existence of a sentence and what that sentence is about. — Apustimelogist

I'm not failing to distinguish them. I'm saying that the adjectives "true" and "false" apply to sentences, not to rain or gold. I think I've been very clear.

And as for my debate with @Banno, there's a very simple solution; we ought be more precise with P1:

P1. If someone expresses the sentence "it is raining" then their expression is true if and only if it is raining

Then we no longer derive the absurd conclusions that if the sentence "it is raining" does not exist then it is not raining and if the sentence "it is not raining" does not exist then it is raining.

And it helps us avoid any Platonic interpretation of propositions.

Yes, exactly. So the fact that language didn't exist 8 million years ago doesn't affect the fact that mountains existed 8 million years ago, because the what is the case does not depend on the incidental existence or non-existence of language. The existence of mountains determines whether such sentences are correct, not whether a sentence exists. — Apustimelogist

I'm not denying this. I'm simply explaining the proper use of the adjectives "true" and "false".

The traditional view is that there are truth-makers and truth-bearers. Truth and falsehood are properties of truth-bearers, not properties of truth-makers, and not the truth-makers themselves.

If the appropriate truth-maker exists/occurs then the truth-bearer is true, otherwise the truth-bearer is false.

A truth-maker can exist even if a truth-bearer doesn't, but if a truth-bearer doesn't exist then nothing exists that has the property of being either true (correct/accurate) or false (incorrect/inaccurate).

"is true" and "is false" mean something like "is correct" and "is incorrect". They are adjectives that describe a sentence.

If the world is as the sentence says it is then the sentence is correct/true. If the world isn't as the sentence says it is then the sentence is incorrect/false.

So it is appropriate to describe the sentence "it is raining" as being correct/true/incorrect/false but a category error to describe either the rain or the cloudless sky as being correct/true/incorrect/false.

Yep, there are sentences. — Banno

Which says nothing about the conclusion, which is that if the sentence "gold exists" does not exist then gold does not exist.

This is like me saying that if the Earth does not exist then there are 7 planets in the Solar System and your response is "yes, the Earth exists".

And it's not at all clear what it might mean for a sentence to exist. — Banno

You know what it means for a language to exist surely? Especially given that we have been discussing the nature of a world without a language. Sentences are particular features of a language.

And if you're going to start saying that sentences have properties, such as being true or English, then surely you know what it means for those sentences to exist, because the suggestion that a non-existent sentence can be false or French makes no sense.

It is suspicious that it predicates truth to sentences in it's own domain. — Banno

It's just taking Tarski's account:

The sentence "gold exists" is true if and only if gold exists

What's suspicious about Tarski?

But to make things more interesting:

P1. The sentence "gold does not exist" is true if and only if gold does not exist
C1. Therefore, gold does not exist if and only if the sentence "gold does not exist" is true
P2. If the sentence "gold does not exist" is true then the sentence "gold does not exist" exists
C2. Therefore, if gold does not exist then the sentence "gold does not exist" exists
C3. Therefore, if the sentence "gold does not exist" does not exist then gold exists

SO are you happy with that conclusion? — Banno

I'm just presenting the argument. I don't care either way. But if you're not happy with the conclusion then you must provide either an alternative interpretation of the conclusion or deny one or both of the premises.

So do you interpret this? That if the language English had not developed, then there would be no gold? — Banno

How else would you interpret it?

You've clearly tied yourself in knots. — Leontiskos

No I haven't. You're just putting words in my mouth.

And by that you mean that it is true. — Leontiskos

I mean what I say, and what I said was "gold exists".

now you realize you shouldn't use that particular word. — frank

No I don't realize that.

Here are two sentences:

1. How old are you?
2. I am 25 years old.

(1) is a question and (2) is a proposition.

Sometimes I use the word "sentence" rather than "proposition" even though the word "sentence" includes questions.

Sure. And the English language does exist. So if our domain includes English sentences, the sentence "Gold exists" is a member of that domain.

That's all that the argument can conclude. — Banno

The argument concludes via valid inferences:

C2. If the sentence "gold exists" does not exist then gold does not exist

I didn't mention propositions.

I do not think it is that complicated. — Banno

It's not. The sentence "gold exists" doesn't exist if the English language doesn't exist (unless sentences are mind-independent Platonic entities). The sentence "gold exists" exists if someone says or writes "gold exists".

So, with that in mind, if we have:

P1. The sentence "gold exists" is true if and only if gold exists

We eventually conclude:

C1. If the sentence "gold exists" does not exist then gold does not exist

There's nothing here about "being an element in the domain under discussion"; there's just the ordinary sense of "exists" that is described in the opening paragraph of this discussion.

But now you should go on to ask yourself how it is that you are claiming, "(It is true that) gold still exists but nothing has the property of being true or false." — Leontiskos

But I didn't say "it is true that gold still exists". I said "gold still exists".

You're not wrong.

Gold exists and, if said, "gold exists" is true and "gold does not exist" is false.

If nobody says anything then gold still exists but nothing has the property of being true or false.

"true" and "false" are just adjectives used to categorize speech and writing and thoughts and beliefs.

Although I'm not sure what you mean by this:

then those gold deposits exist, as does the state of affairs in the statement. — AmadeusD

The gold exists and the state of affairs exists? These aren't two different things. There's just the gold.

I'm happy to go along with it's being valid, with some reservation about what it means to use existential generalisation over a truth statement. That is, it's not clear what <"There is gold in those hills" exists> is saying, beyond that "There is gold in those hills" is an element in the domain under discussion. — Banno

It's just the ordinary sense of "exists": the Earth exists but ghosts don't.

So is it clearer if the argument is phrased like this?

P1. The sentence "there is gold in those hills" is true if and only if there is gold in those hills
C1. Therefore, there is gold in those hills if and only if the sentence "there is gold in those hills" is true
P2. If the sentence "there is gold in those hills" is true then the sentence "there is gold in those hills" exists.
C2. Therefore, if there is gold in those hills then the sentence "there is gold in those hills" exists.
C3. Therefore, if the sentence "there is gold in those hills" does not exist then there is no gold in those hills.

So what do you take it to imply? Where does this lead? — Banno

It leads to C3, which suggests either that the sentence "there is gold in those hills" can exist without the existence of language or that gold being in those hills depends on the existence of language.

It is literally saying that the easy argument entails Platonism about propositions and that many philosophers reject propositions because of that. If it were just discussing whether or not rocks exist without us then it would only be the few idealists who take issue with it.

I suggest you re-read it carefully because it is clearly you who is misunderstanding it.

It was literally in the SEP article you referenced:

The proposition that there are rocks, which we denote <there are rocks>, does not entail the existence of any beings that have or are capable of having mental states. It entails this neither in a strictly or broadly logical sense. That is, it is possible in the broadest sense for <there are rocks> to be true in the absence of all mental states. But now, if this proposition is possibly true in the absence of mental states, then it possibly exists in the absence of all mental states, and so is mind-independent. This is an easy argument for the mind-independence of at least some propositions.

...

But if the Easy Arguments succeed, it seems that to accept propositions, we must accept Platonism. Conceptualism about propositions seems ruled out.

...

Many philosophers deny that there are propositions precisely because they accept the validity of these Easy Arguments (and the truth of certain attitude ascriptions).

There are people who claim that mind-independent truth-apt propositions exist.

So we can add all things on top of just gold and sentences. — frank

That's not what I was getting at. I was getting at the suggestion there there is gold, there is the sentence, and there is the mind-independent proposition – with it being the proposition rather than the sentence which is either true or false, and which is either true or false even if nothing is said.

This is what I find nonsense.

If a 25 year old says "I am 25 years old" then what they say is true.
If a 26 year old says "I am 25 years old" then what they say is false.
If a 27 year old says nothing then nothing true or false is said.

There is a person and there is, optionally, a truth-apt proposition-sentence. That's all we need to make sense of the above.

There's certainly no need to bring up mind-independent abstract objects that exist even if language doesn't.

I keep it simple:

1. How old are you?
2. I am 25 years old.

(1) is a question and (2) is a proposition. Both are sentences.

Question-sentences aren't truth-apt, proposition-sentences are.

If a 25 year old says (2) then what they say is true, and if a 26 year old says (2) then what they say is false. And if nobody says (2) then nothing true or false is said.

There is a) the Earth orbiting the Sun and there is b) the sentence "the Earth orbits the Sun". There's no need for c) the proposition that the Earth is orbiting the Sun, distinct from (a) and (b).

We just need (a) and (b), with (b) being true if (a) occurs and false if it doesn't.

I dunno, when I look up the definition of "proposition" on wikipedia, and it says that they are "the type of object that declarative sentences denote", then it is not clear to me that "the type of object that declarative sentences denote" should depend on the existence of language. Is that a faulty analysis? — Apustimelogist

There is gold and there is the sentence "gold exists". Why add some third thing? Having a piece of gold, a sentence, and a proposition is superfluous.

You're denying that propositions and states of affairs are the same thing. — frank

I like to keep things simple. Gold exists and we either truthfully say "gold exists" or falsely say "gold doesn't exist" (or we say nothing, and so nothing true or false is said).

Anything more than this is unnecessary.

That there is gold in hills in the absence of minds follows from your worldview. — frank

What is my worldview?

The status of propositions doesn't really have anything to do with this. — frank

I'm just talking about the adjective "true" (and the adjective "false"). I am saying that a) being true (or false) is a property of propositions, that b) the existence of propositions depends on the existence of language, and so that c) if language does not exist then nothing exists that has the property of being true (or false).

I'm not the one claiming that the existence of gold depends on the existence of something which has the property of being true.

The existence of gold and the truth of the proposition "gold exists" are two different things.

So you are objecting to existential generalisation over a truth statement? — Banno

No, I'm asserting existential generalisation and then showing what follows from it.

Do you agree that the argument is valid? Do you agree that both premises are true? Do you agree that the conclusions entail what I suggest they entail?

But if you prefer, I'll make it simpler:

P1. "there is gold in those hills" is true if and only if there is gold in those hills
C1. Therefore, there is gold in those hills if and only if "there is gold in those hills" is true
P2. If "there is gold in those hills" is true then "there is gold in those hills" exists.
C2. Therefore, if there is gold in those hills then "there is gold in those hills" exists.
C3. Therefore, if "there is gold in those hills" does not exist then there is no gold in those hills.

C2 and C3 appear to entail either Platonism about propositions or that the existence of gold in those hills depends on the existence of language.

It's saying that they mean the same thing, much like "bachelor" and "unmarried man" mean the same thing.

What's your point? — Banno

This sentence is true:

1. If the King of France is bald then the King of France exists

And this sentence is true:

2. If "there is gold in those hills" is true then "there is gold in those hills" exists.

Now let's assume that another sentence is true:

3. "there is gold in those hills" is true is semantically equivalent to there is gold in those hills

It would then follow from (2) and (3) that this sentence is true:

4. If there is gold in those hills then "there is gold in those hills" exists.

It would then follow via modus tollens that this sentence is true:

5. If "there is gold in those hills" does not exist then there is no gold in those hills.

It would then follow that this sentence is true:

6. Either Platonism about propositions is correct or the existence of gold in those hills depends on the existence of language.

So to avoid (6) it would appear that one would have to deny (3).

Presumably they are the same in at least this way: whatever truth value you assign to one, you must also assign to the other two. — Banno

Sure, but that's not the same as semantic equivalence.

Take these two biconditionals:

1. John is a bachelor if and only if John is an unmarried man
2. John is the Prime Minister if and only if John was appointed as Prime Minister by the King

With (1), the antecedent and the consequent mean the same thing and so (1) is true a priori.
With (2), the antecedent and the consequent do not mean the same thing and so (2) is not true a priori; it is true a posteriori, subject to whatever law determines how someone becomes Prime Minister.

So given these two biconditionals:

1. "there is gold in those hills" is true if and only if it is true that there is gold in those hills
2. there is gold in those hills if and only if it is true that there is gold in those hills

In either case are the antecedent and the consequent semantically equivalent?

There's an ambiguity in "truth" such that "a truth" is also used to talk about a state of affairs that is the case - It is true that there is gold in those hills. — Banno

So we have three different claims:

1. "there is gold in those hills" is true
2. it is true that there is gold in those hills
3. there is gold in those hills

Are you suggesting that (2) is semantically equivalent to (3) rather than semantically equivalent to (1)?

Either way, I think the use of (2) is confusing matters. Perhaps it's better to just stick to (1) and (3) as there's less ambiguity.

Michael is here trying to use language in the absence of language. — Leontiskos

I'm not trying to use language in the absence of language. I'm using language in the presence of language. Language exists and I'm using it.

And I can use language to talk about what the world will be like without language, just as I can use a pen to write about what the world will be like without pens.

One day, websites will no longer exist but stars will continue to exist.
One day, the English language will no longer exist but the Earth will continue to exist.

There's no contradiction in me using the English language on a website to assert either of the above.

We are talking about Platonism.

See for example the SEP article on propositions that you referenced:

The proposition that there are rocks, which we denote <there are rocks>, does not entail the existence of any beings that have or are capable of having mental states. It entails this neither in a strictly or broadly logical sense. That is, it is possible in the broadest sense for <there are rocks> to be true in the absence of all mental states. But now, if this proposition is possibly true in the absence of mental states, then it possibly exists in the absence of all mental states, and so is mind-independent. This is an easy argument for the mind-independence of at least some propositions.

...

But if the Easy Arguments succeed, it seems that to accept propositions, we must accept Platonism. Conceptualism about propositions seems ruled out.

I disagree with Platonism.

A truth is a true proposition. Propositions do not exist in the absence of language and so true propositions do not exist in the absence of language and so truths do not exist in the absence of language.

But gold does exist in the absence of language. It's very straightforward.

That last sentence only makes sense as an assertion at a possible world. — frank

Language currently exists and so I can assert the true proposition "gold will continue to exist even after all life dies".

But the claim that the true proposition "gold exists" will continue to exist even after all life dies is Platonic nonsense.

If there are no truthbearers, there is no truth... about anything. — frank

Given that "a truth" means "a true proposition" your claim is just the claim "if there are no truthbearers there is no true proposition about anything". Well, yes. Nothing true is being said or written or believed, etc.

But there's still gold.

You're saying that if there are no humans, there is no truth. — frank

I'm saying what I said here:

What some are saying is that "a truth" means "a true proposition" and "a falsehood" means "a false proposition", that a proposition requires a language, and that a language requires a mind.

This is not to say that a mind is sufficient; only that it is necessary. The (often mind-independent) thing that the proposition describes is also necessary (to determine whether or not the proposition is a truth or a falsehood).

So the claim is that when all life dies out there will be gold in Boorara but no truths or falsehoods because there will be no propositions. — Michael

This was it. This sentence doesn't make any sense. I think we agree on that now? — frank

It does make sense. Propositions are features of language; ergo if there is no language there are no propositions.

Yes, the word "proposition" has a technical meaning in philosophy, but that meaning does not entail Platonism. See for example the section titled "The Nature and Status of Propositions" where they discuss various conceptualist arguments against the claim that propositions "exist in the absence of all mental states."

Maybe you disagree with conceptualists, but they are quite welcome to talk about propositions without committing to Platonism.