Aren't numbers the sorts of abstract objects you wanted nothing to do with? — Srap Tasmaner

I want nothing to do with mind-independent abstract objects à la Platonism or mathematical realism.

Well, yes. A sentence about it raining is only true if there is rain, and a painting of a landscape is only accurate if there is a landscape. But truth and accuracy are properties of the sentence and the painting, not properties of the rain or the landscape.

As in, as a straightforward account of English grammar we say “the sentence is true” and “the painting is accurate”; we don’t say “the rain is true” or “the landscape is accurate”.

My point is that talk of truths without sentences is a category error, just as talk of accuracies without paintings is a category error. Without sentences and paintings there’s just rain and landscapes.

To say that a painting is accurate in itself makes no sense without reference to something outside the painting. — Leontiskos

Sure, and being an integer greater than the number 3 makes no sense without reference to the number 3, but being an integer greater than the number 3 isn't a property of the number 3; it's a property of the numbers 4 and 5 and 6 and so on.

So if you set up your easel in front of my house and make a lovely painting of it, will it seem, even to you, to be accurate if you look at my house from the back? (Or after dark? Or in the rain?) — Srap Tasmaner

It's an accurate painting of the front of your house on a rainless day.

Is it? — Srap Tasmaner

I think so, much like accuracy is a property of paintings (that resemble their subject).

I certainly don’t think that accuracy is a property of the landscape being painted, and I don’t think we need some intermediate thing that sits between the painting and the landscape.

That's all fine. There is very little that can be said about truth. — Banno

But presumably more can be said about whether or not aliens exist, whether or not dinosaurs existed, whether or not I will win the lottery next week, and whether or not Hitler would have been assassinated had he not killed himself.

What I don't think is that this poses a problem for realism. — Banno

It wasn't meant to be. It was meant to be an examination of "p" is true iff p. I think it's both problematic and impoverished.

It's problematic in that it appears to entail an absurd conclusion – but as mentioned in my earlier comment we can at least address this by amending the premise to if "p" exists then "p" is true iff p.

It's impoverished in that it only says that "if Hitler had not killed himself then he would have been assassinated" is true iff if Hitler had not killed himself then he would have been been assassinated, but this says nothing substantial about whether or not such a counterfactual can be true or about the ontology of counterfactual truthmakers (i.e. the consequent of the biconditional) – concerns that have merit regardless of truth deflationism. And these concerns also have merit when discussing non-counterfactual claims about the past, the future, and even the present.

So whether you're a realist or an anti-realist or an idealist, the bare assertion that "it is raining" is true iff it is raining says nothing to address any metaphysical issues – or even issues about truth. It's just a rather vacuous aphorism.

Maybe, but then is there a future actuality if eternalism is not the case? Is there a past actuality if presentism is the case?

Does it make sense for a true sentence to have a non-existent truthmaker?

But I think there’s a more interesting approach to this topic.

We start with the counterfactual sentences “if Hitler hadn’t killed himself then he would have been assassinated” and “if Hitler hadn’t killed himself then he would not have been assassinated.”

The counterfactual-realist would say that one of these sentences is true, but then that would seem to require the existence of a counterfactual truthmaker. Can we make sense of such a thing? Is there good reason to believe that there is such a thing?

With this consideration in mind, we can ask the same thing about sentences about the future. Such sentences being true would seem to require the existence of a future truthmaker. Does this require eternalism to be the case?

And the same questions can be asked about sentences about the past. Does them being true require presentism to not be the case?

Sentences have no existence or meaning apart from minds. — Leontiskos

I know.

Truths and sentences are about things, not sentences. — Leontiskos

Truth is a property of a sentence that correctly describes these other things. Truth is not a property of these other things and it is not identical to these other things.

Falsehood is a property of a sentence that incorrectly describes these other things. Falsehood is not a property of these other things and it is not identical to these other things.

You want to say that a claim about the future involves no claim about what will be true in the future, and that's not coherent. — Leontiskos

A claim about the future is a claim about what will exist in the future and about what will happen in the future. We don't need true sentences to exist in the future for rocks to exist in the future.

If you assert "there are dinosaurs at t", where t is a time when there are dinosaurs... It's true. But "there are dinosaurs at t" cannot be true at t, since there were no truthbearers at t. — fdrake

I wouldn't say "there are dinosaurs at t", I'd say "there were dinosaurs at t", and in saying it (now) I am speaking the truth.

This perhaps ties into something I said earlier:

1. "Languages will die out" is true
2. "Languages are dead" will be true

(1) is true but (2) is necessarily false.

That's just a matter of tense.

"there were dinosaurs" is true.

This doesn't require someone to have truthfully said "there are dinosaurs".

It's complicated by the fact that any theory of truth worth its salt should evaluate "There were rocks before the advent of humans" as true — fdrake

I don't see why that's a complication? Let's just replace "is true" with "is a correct description of the world".

Can there be a correct description of the world without someone saying something? No.
Can rocks exist without someone correctly describing the world? Yes.
Is "rocks can exist without someone correctly describing the world" a correct description of the world? Yes.

Seems simple to me.

In which case my description of your illustration is perfectly accurate, "That gold exists in universe B is true in universe A and neither true nor false in universe B." — Leontiskos

No it's not.

I'm not refusing to talk about truth. I am only talking about truth. Truth is a property of sentences. Sentences do not exist as mind-independent Platonic entities. If nothing is said then there are no sentences, and if there are no sentences then there are no true sentences.

And the existence of gold does not depend on us saying "gold exists".

Can there be truth without a truthbearer? Seems to me a different question to whether there can be rocks on earth without humans. — fdrake

Which I thought I made very clear here, but I guess not.

Sure you have. — Leontiskos

1. Gold exists in universe B but nothing true or false is said in universe B
2. That gold exists in universe B is true in universe A and neither true nor false in universe B

I said (1). You accused me of saying (2). (1) and (2) are not the same thing.

Try addressing my actual words and not the word you're putting in my mouth.

You seem to continually misunderstand what I am saying.

"it is raining" is a correct description of the world (if it is raining).

The property of being a correct description of the world is a property that only sentences have. If there are no sentences then there are no correct descriptions of the world. But there's still rain.

Now just replace "is a correct description of the world" with "is true".

You seem to be reading something into my words that isn't there.

What began as a simple contradiction, "It is true and not true that gold exists," ended as a more complex contradiction, "That gold exists in universe B is true in universe A and neither true nor false in universe B." — Leontiskos

I haven’t said either of those things.

There are two planets, A and B. I live on planet A. Planet B is uninhabited and rich in gold. I say "gold exists on planet B but nothing true or false is said on planet B". What I say is true, and is being said on planet A.

There are two possible universes, A and B. I live in universe A (the actual universe). Universe B is uninhabited and rich in gold. I say "gold exists in universe B but nothing true or false is said in universe B". What I say is true, and is being said in universe A.

See Truth in a World vs. Truth at a World for a more in depth examination.

Here are three sentences:

1. "Gold exists" is true
2. It is true that gold exists
3. Gold exists

(1) and (3) do not mean the same thing; (1) describes a sentence as being true but (3) doesn't.

To me, (2) and (1) mean the same thing; they both describe a sentence as being true – (2) just does so without the use of quotation marks.

But perhaps you want to say that (2) and (3) mean the same thing? If so, the phrase "it is true that" is vacuous, adding nothing to the sentence that isn't already given in (3). The word "it" in the phrase "it is true that" doesn't refer to anything, and it doesn't make sense for some non-existent entity to have the property of being true.

In fact, I think "is true" can be replaced with the phrase "is an accurate account of the world" without issue. So, we have:

1. "Gold exists" is an accurate account of the world
2. It is an accurate account of the world that gold exists
3. Gold exists

My claim is that in a world without language gold exists but there are no accurate accounts of the world. Which is true; there can't be an accurate account of the world if nobody is saying or writing or signing or thinking something about the world.

the non-existence of a sentence doesn't affect the truth — Apustimelogist

There's no such thing as the truth; there's only the truth of a sentence, so this remark doesn't make much sense.

What you should say is that the non-existence of a sentence doesn't affect the existence of rain.

I think truth possibly would make sense as more like a condition that asserts what those sentences are about — Apustimelogist

I don't understand what this means.

The sentence "it is raining" is a sentence about the weather and is true if it is raining and false if it isn't.

Nothing more needs to be said about truth and falsity. We don't need them to be both properties of sentences and properties of something else.

This notion that the existence of rain either entails or requires that something has the property of being true is misguided.

If we uploaded your consciousness to a self repairing robot and checked back in 10,000 years from now and asked you about the sentence thing, we'd find your view had not changed at all. Gotta respect that. — frank

What is so problematic about my view?

Sentences are true and cardboard boxes have 8 corners. Your claim that sentences merely express (abstract) propositions and that it is these (abstract) propositions that are true is like the claim that cardboard boxes merely exemplify cubes and that it is these abstract cubes that have 8 corners.

If you want to talk about things in terms of abstract objects then go ahead, but I'm quite happy in saying that sentences are true and that cardboard boxes have 8 corners. Abstractions might be conceptually useful, but given that they lead some to Platonism I'd rather just not give them much significant thought.

The way you've been presenting this thought completely fails to acknowledge the fact that you can distinguish between the existence or non-existence of a sentence and what that sentence is about. — Apustimelogist

I'm not failing to distinguish them. I'm saying that the adjectives "true" and "false" apply to sentences, not to rain or gold. I think I've been very clear.

And as for my debate with @Banno, there's a very simple solution; we ought be more precise with P1:

P1. If someone expresses the sentence "it is raining" then their expression is true if and only if it is raining

Then we no longer derive the absurd conclusions that if the sentence "it is raining" does not exist then it is not raining and if the sentence "it is not raining" does not exist then it is raining.

And it helps us avoid any Platonic interpretation of propositions.

Yes, exactly. So the fact that language didn't exist 8 million years ago doesn't affect the fact that mountains existed 8 million years ago, because the what is the case does not depend on the incidental existence or non-existence of language. The existence of mountains determines whether such sentences are correct, not whether a sentence exists. — Apustimelogist

I'm not denying this. I'm simply explaining the proper use of the adjectives "true" and "false".

The traditional view is that there are truth-makers and truth-bearers. Truth and falsehood are properties of truth-bearers, not properties of truth-makers, and not the truth-makers themselves.

If the appropriate truth-maker exists/occurs then the truth-bearer is true, otherwise the truth-bearer is false.

A truth-maker can exist even if a truth-bearer doesn't, but if a truth-bearer doesn't exist then nothing exists that has the property of being either true (correct/accurate) or false (incorrect/inaccurate).

"is true" and "is false" mean something like "is correct" and "is incorrect". They are adjectives that describe a sentence.

If the world is as the sentence says it is then the sentence is correct/true. If the world isn't as the sentence says it is then the sentence is incorrect/false.

So it is appropriate to describe the sentence "it is raining" as being correct/true/incorrect/false but a category error to describe either the rain or the cloudless sky as being correct/true/incorrect/false.

Yep, there are sentences. — Banno

Which says nothing about the conclusion, which is that if the sentence "gold exists" does not exist then gold does not exist.

This is like me saying that if the Earth does not exist then there are 7 planets in the Solar System and your response is "yes, the Earth exists".

And it's not at all clear what it might mean for a sentence to exist. — Banno

You know what it means for a language to exist surely? Especially given that we have been discussing the nature of a world without a language. Sentences are particular features of a language.

And if you're going to start saying that sentences have properties, such as being true or English, then surely you know what it means for those sentences to exist, because the suggestion that a non-existent sentence can be false or French makes no sense.

It is suspicious that it predicates truth to sentences in it's own domain. — Banno

It's just taking Tarski's account:

The sentence "gold exists" is true if and only if gold exists

What's suspicious about Tarski?

But to make things more interesting:

P1. The sentence "gold does not exist" is true if and only if gold does not exist
C1. Therefore, gold does not exist if and only if the sentence "gold does not exist" is true
P2. If the sentence "gold does not exist" is true then the sentence "gold does not exist" exists
C2. Therefore, if gold does not exist then the sentence "gold does not exist" exists
C3. Therefore, if the sentence "gold does not exist" does not exist then gold exists

SO are you happy with that conclusion? — Banno

I'm just presenting the argument. I don't care either way. But if you're not happy with the conclusion then you must provide either an alternative interpretation of the conclusion or deny one or both of the premises.

So do you interpret this? That if the language English had not developed, then there would be no gold? — Banno

How else would you interpret it?

You've clearly tied yourself in knots. — Leontiskos

No I haven't. You're just putting words in my mouth.

And by that you mean that it is true. — Leontiskos

I mean what I say, and what I said was "gold exists".

now you realize you shouldn't use that particular word. — frank

No I don't realize that.

Here are two sentences:

1. How old are you?
2. I am 25 years old.

(1) is a question and (2) is a proposition.

Sometimes I use the word "sentence" rather than "proposition" even though the word "sentence" includes questions.

Sure. And the English language does exist. So if our domain includes English sentences, the sentence "Gold exists" is a member of that domain.

That's all that the argument can conclude. — Banno

The argument concludes via valid inferences:

C2. If the sentence "gold exists" does not exist then gold does not exist

I didn't mention propositions.