Can you find any newspapers magazines or documentaries comparing Biden to Hitler for example? — NOS4A2

Kilmeade says Biden went ‘full Hitler’

Tulsi Gabbard says Biden, Democrats share same ‘core principles’ as Hitler

But also, when you have Trump's social media account post[ing] video referencing ‘unified Reich’ if re-elected, it's hardly surprising that people will respond accordingly.

Likewise, one can be a nominalist without denying that triangles exist. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Because nominalists don't claim that triangles are abstract objects. There are concrete objects with three sides, or there are instructions that one can follow to draw a triangle.

What would it mean to be a nominalist and to claim that obligations exist? Perhaps it amounts to nothing more than the claim that some relevant authority has told me to do something, and that if I don't do it then I will be penalised.

So an official Trump campaign video posted by the official Trump YouTube account isn't a valid example of propaganda against Joe Biden and the Democrats? :brow:

This all seems to reduce to the claim that some authority has told me to do something. I understand and accept that. What I cannot make sense of is the conclusion "therefore I ought do as I'm told". What does this conclusion add that hasn't already been covered by the fact that some authority has told me to do something?

You seem to think that there is the command and then also the obligation. I don't know what this second thing is, or how/why it follows from the command.

I posted one, you posted one. What's the problem? Are we going to spend the rest of our lives posting every instance of one side attacking the other?

I literally posted something Trump said when I first responded to your remarks:

“He’s been weaponizing government against his political opponents like a Third World political tyrant,” Trump said to a crowd in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. “Biden and his radical left allies like to pose as standing up as allies of democracy,” Trump continued, arguing: “Joe Biden is not the defender of American democracy, Joe Biden is the destroyer of American democracy.”

I didn't just mention moral nihilism.

I also mentioned nominalism: obligations, if they exist, are abstract objects. Abstract objects do not exist. Therefore, obligations do not exist.

But my main position is that there is no meaningful distinction between these two sentences:

1. Soldiers are obligated to report all instances of sexual assault to their superior officers
2. If you are a soldier then report all instances of sexual assault to your superior officers

(1) is just (2) but fictitiously treated as a truth-apt proposition. If you think that (1) means something more then please explain what that is because I promise you that I don't see it.

I think even you will admit that the propaganda in one outpaces the propaganda in the other. — NOS4A2

Yes, and I can assure you that it’s the opposite side to the one you think.

I'm finding it hard to believe that you cannot parse the meaning of sentences like: "soldiers are obligated to report all instances of sexual assault to their superior officers." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Why? Moral nihilism, fictionalism, and nominalism are legitimate philosophical positions.

Sure. What the complaint here, that the claim that "lifeguard's primary purpose is to prevent drownings," has no truth value? — Count Timothy von Icarus

That the concept of obligations isn't clear, and that it isn't clear that the sincere use of the phrase "I promise" entails the undertaking of an obligation.

No, it means your role entails a duty to perform that action. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What does "if someone is drowning then you have a duty to jump into the water and save their life" mean?

Does it just mean "if someone is drowning then jump into the water and save their life" but phrased as if it were a truth-apt proposition?

It's not clear to me what "if someone is drowning then you are obligated to jump into the water and save their life" even means.

Does it just mean "if someone is drowning then jump into the water and save their life" but phrased as if it were a truth-apt proposition? Because that's all it seems to be to me.

The attempt is the logical conclusion of anti-Trumpism. If you repeat long enough that another human being is an existential threat it won’t be long before someone takes action. It was only a matter of time until the persecution reached murderous levels. — NOS4A2

Both sides are guilty of that, e.g.:

“He’s been weaponizing government against his political opponents like a Third World political tyrant,” Trump said to a crowd in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. “Biden and his radical left allies like to pose as standing up as allies of democracy,” Trump continued, arguing: “Joe Biden is not the defender of American democracy, Joe Biden is the destroyer of American democracy.”

I’m not really sure how your comments are related to mine? I am simply asking what “obligation” means, and how the sincere use of the verb “promise” entails an obligation.

As I understand it obligations are an incoherent concept and superfluous to the use of the phrase “I promise”.

Even though one of their fellow panicked brethren committed the act, one way or another this will be Trump’s fault. — NOS4A2

Surely the only person whose fault it is is the shooter?

And who do you even mean by “they”?

As a comparison, consider these two propositions:

1. You will love this movie
2. I promise you that you will love this movie

What does the addition of "I promise you that" add? Not much. It's more of an emphasis; an expression of certainty. — Michael

As a further example, consider something like "I'll try to do this, but I can't promise that I will". This isn't me saying that I intend to but am not obligated to; it is me saying that I am not certain that I will.

The use of "I promise" over "I intend" is just to emphasise the strength of one's belief that it will happen.

Here.

I guess you're asking what "obligation" is supposed to be adding to the act of uttering a promise. — frank

Yes. I want to know what an obligation is, and why it is necessary.

To me, it's simple; we use the verb "promise" in conversation and sincerely intend to do what we say we promise to do.

No need to make things more complicated by bringing in some further conditions, especially conditions that entail/require the existence of some abstract object.

As a comparison, consider these two propositions:

1. You will love this movie
2. I promise you that you will love this movie

What does the addition of "I promise you that" add? Not much. It's more of an emphasis; an expression of certainty.

The Secret Service did a terrible job. Apparently them and the police were told about a man with a gun on the roof several minutes before shots were fired, and when they surrounded Trump they barely covered him at all, leaving his head in the open, and just stood on the spot.

Crooks is a registered Republican — Wayfarer

Hopefully that will temper the response of those who might otherwise take it as a call to arms.

If there's an active shooter – and especially if you've been shot – then you get away and get help. All this macho man bullshit is childish.

The reason I never really think Michael is being sincere is because he is never willing to do any of the leg work. How many times have we told him that to intend something is not yet to promise it, only to be met with mute silence? — Leontiskos

I'm still waiting on a reply to this.

There is something of Moore's paradox here. — Banno

I was going to bring up the same point, which is why these matters are best discussed in the third person:

S promised to marry H but S is not obligated to marry H.

Whether or not this sentence is contradictory depends on what it means to be obligated to do something, but as previously mentioned it is barely a coherent concept. It seems to me that obligations are nothing more than commands fictitiously treated as truth-apt propositions.

Your reference to contracts does not explain them further. It simply asserts that a contract lists our obligations; it doesn't explain what obligations are. At best I understand a contract as a list of commands that if not followed entail a penalty. The introduction of further (abstract) entities certainly seems superfluous. See also my recent comment to Leontiskos, where we are discussing this very issue.

But still, do you at least accept that your claim that a promise is the undertaking of an obligation is not one of Searle's conditions, and nor does it follow from Searle's conditions? His conditions (7) and (8) only describe what S intends to happen, and intentions do not prima facie entail the intended.

I think it’s clearer to phrase it like this:

Scenario 1
A sometimes lies (and is lying)
B always lies
C always tells the truth

Scenario 2
A sometimes lies (and is telling the truth)
B always tells the truth
C always lies

Scenario 3
A always tells the truth
B always tells the truth
C always lies

Or one of a and B sometimes, and the other one always tells the truth — flannel jesus

What I was getting at is that if "sometimes tells the truth" doesn't mean "only sometimes tells the truth" then the original claim "one person sometimes tells the truth and one person always tells the truth" is consistent with the claim "two people always tell the truth".

So our initial setup is that two people always tell the truth and one person always lies.

Yes. And reaching (more or less) that conclusion, we can say that A is the ambiguous here. Right? — javi2541997

No, because if "sometimes tells the truth" doesn't mean "only sometimes tells the truth" then "sometimes tells the truth" is consistent with "always tells the truth", and so there may in fact be two people who always tell the truth.

In such a scenario it would be that both A and B always tell the truth and C always lies.

If A sometimes tells the truth it means he can also lie as well as B. — javi2541997

That is unclear. Prima facie these might mean two different things:

1. I sometimes tell the truth
2. I only sometimes tell the truth

Strictly speaking (1) might be true even if I always tell the truth. It is ambiguous as to whether or not (1) entails (2).

If it doesn't then the question is even more problematic as the person who sometimes tells the truth might always tell the truth, and so we have two people who always tell the truth.

I think you are confusing matters by being imprecise with your descriptions.

There are three types of person:

1. The person who always tells the truth
2. The person who always lies
3. The person who sometimes tells the truth

Person A can tell the truth but cannot be the person who always tells the truth.
Person A can lie but cannot be the person who always lies.

Person A is the person who sometimes tells the truth. If Person C is the person who always tells the truth then Person A is lying. If Person B is the person who always tells the truth then Person A is telling the truth.

I've made a few edits to my first comment since I first posted it. If you haven't already, refresh the page and check it out. It should answer everything very clearly.

He's using unclear wording, but when he says "ambiguous person" he means "the person who sometimes tells the truth". He doesn't mean "the person whose role is ambiguous". — flannel jesus

Gotcha, thanks.

But what happens to A then — javi2541997

A is the person who sometimes tells the truth.

B cannot be the truth-teller. — javi2541997

That depends on whether or not "I sometimes tell the truth" entails "I sometimes lie". If it does then B is not the truth-teller. If it doesn't then the answer is undecidable.

Nonetheless, it seems the riddle turned out with A being the ambiguous person — javi2541997

No, B is the ambiguous person given the ambiguity of the phrase "I sometimes tell the truth".

Among persons A, B and C one person always lies, one person always tells the truth and one person sometimes speaks the truth, hence being ambiguous.

We get the following statements:

Person A claims person B always tells the truth.
Person B claims person B (himself) sometimes tells the truth.
Person C claims person B always lies. — javi2541997

If "sometimes tells the truth" entails "sometimes lies" then:

If Person A is the person who always tells the truth then Person B is the person who always tells the truth. This is a contradiction. Therefore, Person A is not the person who always tells the truth.

If Person A is the person who always lies then Person C is the person who always tells the truth. If Person C is the person who always tells the truth then Person B is the person who always lies. This is a contradiction. Therefore, Person A is not the person who always lies.

Therefore, Person A is the person who sometimes tells the truth, Person B is the person who always lies, and Person C is the person who always tells the truth.

And you think it is possible to claim that one of the contractors is more reliable without at the same time saying that he is more likely to fulfill his obligations? — Leontiskos

In this context what is the difference between these two propositions?

1. He is more likely to fulfil his obligations
2. He is more likely to complete the contract

If they're the same then I have no objections, except to point out that the introduction of the term “obligation” is unnecessary, and evidently susceptible to misunderstanding.

If they're different then I need (1) explained, and to know why (2) is not a sufficient account.

She bound herself to you. She placed herself under an obligation. — Banno

Which still needs to be explained.

I've offered my own understanding of obligations; they are commands treated as if they were truth-apt propositions, but as commands are not truth-apt propositions obligations are a fiction, and barely even sensible.

If this account is incorrect then please provide a correct account, else how am I to even understand what you are trying to argue? All I can point out is that your conclusion does not follow from Searle's list of necessary and sufficient conditions, which you yourself directed me to. You appear to misinterpret his conditions (7) and (8). They only describe what S intends to happen. S intends to be placed under an obligation (and for H to know this), but this does not prima facie entail that S is placed under an obligation (whatever an obligation is), much like intending to be President does not entail being President.

She undertook to marry you. — Banno

She intended to marry me. That’s all there is to it.

Either she reneged on that obligation or you allowed her to leave it. — Banno

You still haven’t explained what an obligation is.

As a specific example: my girlfriend promises to marry me, but several weeks later changes her mind.

Is my girlfriend obligated to marry me?

What even is an obligation? She just either does or she doesn’t.

Well, what is a promise, if not the undertaking of an obligation? — Banno

Searle’s conditions (1) - (6) (and maybe sometimes even (7) and (8)).

These do not entail the undertaking of an obligation.

People want a contractor who will build them a house; they don't want a contractor who will not build them a house.

You are really overthinking this.

Well, if you don't like the word 'obligation', then instead of trying to convince the judge that you have no obligation to fulfill your contract you should convince him that you need not fulfill the contract and that you need not be punished. After all, why must you fulfill the contract? Why must you be punished? Why must you do what the law tells you to do? Why must you do what you said you were going to do when you signed the contract? — Leontiskos

The law simply says "if someone does not fulfil the terms of their contract then they are to be jailed". The judge then rules that I did not fulfil the terms of my contract and so orders the bailiffs to take me to jail.

Again, the existence of some supposed obligation is utterly irrelevant.