I'm also thinking of slightly more specialized pursuits like painting. As I understand it, in introductory painting classes some considerable pains must be taken to get students to see the patches of color in their visual field: they tend to think apples are a uniform red all over because the object they know is kinda like that. With enough practice they can learn to overcome color constancy and actually see the effects of light and shadow and reflectivity that present the apple not just in shades of red but with blues and purples and whatnot. Again, even that repackaging is not the raw data, but matches up with the names printed on the tubes of paint! — Srap Tasmaner

OK. I'm going to take a giant leap to crazy-land here. One distinctive characteristic of humans is our use of language. So, thanks to language, we are no longer confined to knowledge that is inherent or that we figure out on our own. With the use of language we can pass knowledge from generation to generation and we can learn from the experience of others.

The development of this sophisticated communication system requires system 2. What we call consciousness is really just an artifact of our communication system. So we got everything backwards. We think of the thing that we call consciousness as our essence. But instead our essence is contained in that invisible fellow buried in system 1. Can system 2 influence system 1 to make different choices? Yes it can. But only if it is inclined to do so by system 1.

So is there evidence that system 2 is just an outgrowth of our communications ability? Certainly I spend a good deal of conscious time having conversations with others, conversations with myself, reading, watching videos. All forms of communication. What about math and logic? That would be manipulation of human created ideas and symbols. Long term planning? That looks like an exception. But maybe I can argue that once we developed the capability to remember ideas and plan communications, it was just a minor adaptation to use that same capability for other purposes.

OK. That's my thought. We are not our consciousness. We are our prejudices and emotions.

Got it. Well said.

I'm pretty much with you on your future of justice comments. I think I would add restitution to the list of goals.

Perhaps, logically, the concept of free will is garbage. But I get this very strong feeling that I am making decisions.

So we generally want one of these descriptions to "win" and be the "real" description — Mijin

Right. Magic or neurochemistry. Makes no difference. However, even if we decide that we have no free will, it seems to me that we still have to live our lives as if we do. We have to take responsibility for the consequences of our decisions. If you are suggesting that we have to let the conclusions of free-will and no-free-will coexist, then I'm in agreement.

Here's where I have a problem:

This is more explicit but still not explicit enough. What is the reasoning behind the inference from atoms not having free will to the brain and the mind not having one? There are many properties which parts of the object do not posess yet the object posesses. Think about a digital image of a dog. The image is composed of bits, 0s and 1s. None of the bits have the property of portraying dog. Is it reasonable to infer that the image itself does not portray a dog? Of course not. So there must be something different in the case of the brain and the atoms. As we already discussed, the burden of proof is on the objector to bring about the explicit contradiction. If there is one, it's well hidden. — icosahedron

The brain is a container full of chemicals. When the brain goes from state A to state B those chemicals just act according to the laws that govern chemical reactions whether deterministic or random. So how is this different from any other bowl of chemicals? Why is there free will in one bowl of chemicals, but not in the other? It seems like the burden of proof lies with the claim that the one bowl of chemicals has something different that gives it free will.

3. For some yet unknown reason, Dawkins misrepresented the thesis in his book, turning a work on altruism into a book on the selfishness of genes. — Olivier5

We seem to be talking past each other. Dawkins' exact point is that the unrelenting statistical imperative for genes to produce organisms that are likely to propagate more copies of the genes does not necessarily lead to selfish behavior in the organisms that carry those genes. Note the difference between genes and organisms that carry the genes. There is no contradiction.

↪Kenosha Kid why the title, do you think? Why this conclusion? ("We are born selfish") You've read the book, right? It didn't strike you as odd? — Olivier5

Yes. It is at odds with the thesis of the book. In his forward to the second edition he expresses his regret for making that particular statement.

Yes but not a scientific theoretical basis for same. — Olivier5

Darwin provided some people with a scientific theoretical basis for theories of racial superiority/inferiority (survival of the fittest organism). By shifting emphasis to gene selection, Dawkins demonstrated how natural selection can support altruism.

1. Research into the possible genetic basis of altruism was represented by Dawkins under a title referring to selfishness, against all logic. Why? Probably because this way it could sell better in the zeitgeist, and incidentally served to justify rightist policies, whereas the idea that evolution rewards altruism would presumably have had the opposite political effect. — Olivier5

So the whole problem with TSG is the title.

2. The reason Midgley was furious about Gene the Shellfish was that it described human beings as slaves to their genes. Such full biological determinism is eminently ideological -- it tells people that they are not free -- and it's an ideology with dark history (eugenism, racism, slavery, nazism, etc.). — Olivier5

I think you are giving Dawkins and Darwin too much credit. We had eugenism, racism, slavery, nazism, etc. long before either (OK, maybe the Romans didn't call themselves Nazis).

Yes, full biological determinism certainly leads to some very problematical conclusions. But that isn't a good enough reason to reject the theory of gene selection. The question is: Is the theory correct or incorrect? If the theory is correct, then we have to figure out how to deal with that reality. We can't reject the science just because we don't like the result.

Do I need to know about Quine? Where's a good place to start?

I agree with how you explain humanity, but there must be a way. Consciousness is an evolving process of self organization so it seems it will at some point transcend this impasse. Can you think of a solution? — Pop

I can not think of a solution. But I am hopeful.

Is consciousness the key? It certainly seems to be at the forefront when we consider philosophy. But a lot of cognitive research seems to support the ancient notion that we are actually ruled by our emotions. So maybe emotions are the key. Meanwhile, perhaps we can take as a temporary purpose that we not destroy ourselves or our earth.

That is a good point, and I would add, given our genetic code, is it possible to even answer this question in a non self interested way? — Pop

Well that opens a whole can-o-worms. For those of us who view humans as devices to propagate genes, our purpose is to propagate genes. Can we transcend that particular purpose? Can we come up with a new purpose "in a non self interested way" until we understand how our brain, conscious and emotional, is processing information about our world?

In Dawkins' defense, what I got from TSG was the idea that shifting focus from organisms (survival of the fittest) to genes provides a different way to address observed altruism. Altruism is a bit of a conundrum because it doesn't seem to make much sense from the viewpoint of organism survival, but it may make sense from the viewpoint of gene survival. I think that is a perspective that has endured.

As for the things he got wrong. I think that he would probably admit that he has changed his mind about a few things. But I think it is also important to consider how important it is for scientists to be wrong. We really never know if a theory is right or wrong. So all we can do is attack the theory until it has won the war of attrition against all objections. This means that the unsung heroes of science are all of those guys who sacrificed their careers and reputations by supporting the wrong positions. No Nobels for those guys. But no science without them.

Why do the philosophically minded want to ground their views in science? Because otherwise they're just flailing in the wind. That's not comfortable. — frank

Plus, there's lots of new science. It seems like a rich field to find new ways to approach philosophical issues.

It seems to me that Dawkins was shifting the focus from the gene propagating devices (e.g. humans or any other living things) to the genes themselves. So it is the genes that are selfish (that word is a metaphor for propagation probability). If it is advantageous for the gene propagating device to be altruistic, then so be it. No problem. But if the behavior of the gene propagating device seems to be such that it will reduce the probability of gene propagation, that is behavior that needs to be explained.

I guess Darwin has become our "god of the gaps". But I don't see much in the way of alternatives either.

Good example. So your suggestion is that on a really good day our interlocutors and our system 2 will show us a new way to look at a concept that will improve the way we understand the world, either by shifting our focus or by training system 1 to pre-process data differently. That's plausible.

And here is exactly why we need philosophy. (1) The data always comes packaged. System 1 won't give you the raw data, you couldn't use it even it did; it packages it up using whatever concepts it has. This is the major blow struck repeatedly against classic empiricism, the assumption that reason works with the raw data, the Myth of the Given. But that means there is a role for philosophy in understanding how the data is packaged: you may never be able to say "this wrapper is the concept" and "this part left over after I remove the wrapper is the data" -- that's very nearly Quine's first dogma, the futile attempt to distinguish analytic and synthetic; but you may at least be able to recognize the wrapper and know why it's there and how it relates to other elements of the conceptual apparatus, get a sense of the effect of how it was packaged. I also think we can send back what we get and ask for it to be repackaged in a different way. note added (2) Even though in some sense System 2 is the big leagues, where the stuff we find interesting happens, it's also the feeder system, the minor leagues, for System 1, right? Play enough chess and a lot of the stuff you had to agonizingly work out with step-by-step analysis when you started becomes habit, pushed down to System 1 and handled now in a flash. Stuff you know you know how to do, and could have explained back when you learned it, can become an ability you have trouble articulating. So there is a role for philosophy in making sure that what we do in System 2 is done well, since it's going to end up a habit. And that includes the conceptual apparatus itself; if you get in the habit -- I just mean "habit", still System 2 -- of sending back data packaged in a certain way, because it's not appropriate for your reasoning, System 1 will get the message, move that packaging to a less accessible part of the warehouse, and maybe eventually quit using it at all. — Srap Tasmaner

As I sit here in my armchair, I find that I am just not understanding this passage. I think I can accept the idea of packaging: stripping away extraneous information, abstracting. So for the purpose of this passage, do you have an example of the packaging that you have in mind.

While my personal opinion is that system 1 is the "big leagues", we should probably discuss that some other time. I would like to understand your concept of system 2 sending data back to system 1 for repackaging. I get that system 2 can train system 1 for expertise like chess, but this idea about system 2 deciding that it wants data packaged in a certain way and training system 1 to do it just isn't resonating. Can you give an example to help me understand? Thanks.

Right. Time for me to go back to my armchair and think for a while. Good thread!

"Bayesian brain" talk sounds interesting. Any handy references?

OK. Let's look at evolution. Let's say that we get an evolutionary advantage from creating models in our brain and monitoring the effectiveness of the models for obtaining food and avoiding close calls of becoming food. We modify those models and check to see if they become more or less effective for achieving our survival goals. Maybe creating those models is an innate feature of our brains. Maybe creating the models is subconscious. Would that fit your idea of a conceptual framework generated along empiricist lines? It seems like this formulation requires an innate capability rather than a blank slate. Can you lay out a scenario that is illustrative of your concept of a conceptual framework that is generated along empiricist lines?

But that lack of transparency doesn't sound much like science either. Remember a couple years ago when Donald Hoffman was pushing that "desktop" metaphor? He was arguing that this subconscious is systematically lying, because evolution would have selected for rapid threat identification and against accurate perception. Whatever the merits of his position, people can tell different stories about what's going on in the black box, and different evolutionary psychology stories about why. Do we need a way to assess these stories? What would that be? — Srap Tasmaner

OK. I will start off with the confession that my exposure to Hoffman's idea is a 20 minute TED talk. But from that talk, I think he has gone a bridge too far. I agree that our perception of reality seems to be warped by evolution. But maybe not always. Figuring the trajectory of a spear on a windy day might have less warping than deciding if the snap of a twig is a hungry lion hiding in the undergrowth. But, I agree that we can't depend on the output of the black box to be a reliable representation of reality. So, yes, we do need a way to assess these stories. For me, that would be science. Formulating models. Doing experiments. And then arguing about the results with lots of people with different black boxes. Hoping for transcendence.

Now what about the part we're aware of? Is it conceivable there is something like an old school blank slate empiricist agent that we experience consciously as feeding us a complete conceptual framework, already assembled, such that we might as well have been born with it? — Srap Tasmaner

If a part of my mind is a blank slate, it would be the conscious part. But I don't know about an innate empiricist agent or an innate conceptual framework. How will we figure that out?

And in the second quote I'm thinking of those types of models. But "System 1 is a machine for jumping to conclusions." That's a funny kind of science, isn't it? — Srap Tasmaner

But isn't that the way we often do science? First we jump to a conclusion (an intuitive leap). Then we start doing the analysis to see if the data will support or falsify it.

Plus, we don't really know what's going on in that subconscious mind. I suspect that what we perceive as an instantaneous jump to a conclusion may have extensive experience and analysis underlying it.

Let's define an empiricism -- not the empiricism, but one of many: human beings use concepts, but they are born with no conceptual apparatus at all; therefore, a human being must be able to construct a conceptual apparatus out of the only material she has, her individual sense experience; some of this may occur naturally, through "association", say, and some of this construction is done by the use of reason, which may be inborn but only provides the tools to construct a conceptual framework, not the framework itself. — Srap Tasmaner

This seems awful close to a "blank slate" theory of mind which I think has been fatally wounded in the last few decades. If this is the empiricism that we are talking about, then I think I will have to throw in with the people who think it is on its way out.

So do you see an individual, even if she's not aware of it, as essentially doing science all the time? That is, as having a working theory that produces predictions and directs the acquisition of new data via sense experience? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes! As I interpret Kahneman and Haidt, most of our thinking is done subconsciously and we only roll out the rational part of our minds when we need to justify decisions that we make. The idea that we are doing science all the time, even if subconsciously, is very appealing.

If empiricism is the theory that all knowledge is derived from sense-experience, then I think it still has legs. It seems to me that millennia of (dare i call it?) pre-empiricist philosophy produced only a complicated spirograph going in circles. Now with a vast trove of empirical data in areas such as cognitive science and evolution, there is a possibility of making some progress (or at least a larger spirograph).

Are we just constantly dancing at the line, choosing to lean one way or the other, or is there something in acknowledging that duality that could lead us somewhere better? — dan0mac

I have difficulty imagining where "somewhere better" would be. We have ant colonies as an example of selflessness carried to its logical extreme. I don't think I want to be that altruistic.

Humans, on the other hand, seem to have arrived at a middle state. We are rather selfish. But we are also highly sensitive to selfishness in others. We mete out punishment to individuals whose selfishness is conspicuous or damaging to the group, e.g.: shaming, shunning, imprisonment, even death. And we derive pleasure from altruistic acts. Maybe this is exactly where we should be. We get to keep our individuality, but we also manage to keep our selfish impulses in check.

I think it is important to think about the aggregate; are we selfish or selfless, and how does that inform how we conduct ourselves? — dan0mac

That certainly seems like one of the primary questions that philosophers have been trying to answer since the beginning of philosophy. And I think many philosophers will agree, both ancient and modern, that we are both selfish and selfless. In my mind, the evidence that this is a fundamental feature of our human nature can be found in the fact that we get pleasure from both our selfish acts and our selfless ones.

But I suppose then, what is the distinction between, say, someone doing a selfless act to shine their halos and an actually selfless person? — dan0mac

But don't you think we all have both characteristics? Sometimes we respond to social pressures by "doing good and talking about it". Other times we just perform anonymous altruistic acts because it feels good to do it.

Would you agree that being selfish requires that one is also conscious of their selfish motives? I don’t think most people are thinking about group strength when they are behaving altruistically. — Jarmo

Generally true. But we have a great capacity for self-deception. If I were an elected official I might convince myself that I should grant special favors to campaign contributors because that is required so that I can get elected in order to do things that will benefit everyone. Unbiased observers would see this as totally self-serving. But I would convince myself that this is selfless behavior. So I'm not sure we can depend on self-awareness in the determination of selflessness.

I've encountered this idea in a number of sources. The most recent is E. O. Wilson, "The Social Conquest of Earth", Chapter 24.

Wilson has studied ants extensively. They represent rather extreme altruistic societies. I don't think the ant philosophers spend a lot of time discussing selfishness vs. selflessness.

One evolutionary theory is that individual humans thrive when they are members of a group that is thriving. A human on its own is very vulnerable. So altruism (selflessness) is an evolved trait to strengthen the group for the advantage of all members of the group. However, individuals within the group also act for their own advantage relative to other members of the group (selfishness) even if the selfish acts weaken the group. So human thriving depends on the ability of the group to nurture the altruistic impulse while warding off the selfish impulse.

If one subscribes to this theory of human evolution, then it would appear that altruistic acts are rooted in the selfish motive of strengthening the group. Have we transcended this selfishness by extending our altruism to members of other groups or even other species? Hmm.