Why do men take them? I suppose it says something about men, which I took to be the question of the OP, but then you interjected to help the women cross the street because they needed a man to help them from my maybe bad words. — Hanover
rather than constantly de-railing. — Wayfarer
Diverting the thread to AI research and neural networks as a kind of 'general argument for physicalism' is just changing the subject. — Wayfarer
Shoshin (Japanese: 初心) is a concept from Zen Buddhism meaning beginner's mind. It refers to having an attitude of openness, eagerness, and lack of preconceptions when studying, even at an advanced level, just as a beginner would. The term is especially used in the study of Zen Buddhism and Japanese martial arts,[1] and was popularized outside of Japan by Shunryū Suzuki's 1970 book Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind.
The practice of shoshin acts as a counter to the hubris and closed-mindedness often associated with thinking of oneself as an expert.[2] This includes the Einstellung effect, where a person becomes so accustomed to a certain way of doing things that they do not consider or acknowledge new ideas or approaches.[3] The word shoshin is a combination of sho (Japanese: 初), meaning "beginner" or "initial", and shin (Japanese: 心), meaning "mind".[4]
Since nothing travels faster than light the "pretend" observation of knowing what happens simultaneously lightyears away in a theoretical frame of reference is simply nonsense. — Benkei
Robert Kowalski (early developer of Prolog) has been suggesting that instead of trying to get machines to think like us, we ought to consider learning to think more like machines. Wrote a book about it. — Srap Tasmaner
Can you recommend an introductory text? — Janus
Right. Going with intuition is relying on the deep learning which has occurred in neural nets between our ears.
— wonderer1
I think that's right, but our intuitions can fool us, so we do need to examine the reasoning and its foundational presuppositions and our desires and aversions that underly our intuitions — Janus
“The first principle is that you must not fool yourself, and you are the easiest person to fool.”
From what, to what? — Wayfarer
Reading Surely You're Joking at I guess 16 or so was a formative experience for me. — Srap Tasmaner
But I insist the phenomenology of this is hard. — Srap Tasmaner
I have sometimes said that many people on this forum don't seem to believe in disagreement: "if you seem to disagree with me, it can only be because you didn't understand what I said, so I'll say it again." We do recognize that even correct arguments don't always land with an audience, do not compel them with the force of reason, so we try different wordings, different analogies and examples, hoping that one of them will finally do the trick. — Srap Tasmaner
My point here is only that we don't know what will work, why it will work, and what worked in our case. — Srap Tasmaner
If you grasp the meaning at all, logic is supposed to carry the day, but experience tells us this is not so, though we believe it of ourselves. — Srap Tasmaner
...If thoughts were produced and stored in the brain, shouldn't neurologists or other specialized scientists,ehen they open or scan the brain, be able to trace them and identify them? Yet, not only there has been the least trace of such an identification but they have not even explained the process of thought, at least not in a provable and undisputed way. As Leibniz would say, they will "never find anything to explain a thought". And think that "perception" that Leibniz talks about is much more concrete and near to physicality that thinking. — Alkis Piskas
So I still think Hume's horror is hard to shrug off. Our thinking is not what we thought it was. We learn some things about it that are reassuring and some that aren't, but the real problem is there is no transparency here; we're in the land of "for all we know..." — Srap Tasmaner
Richard FeynmanYou see, one thing is, I can live with doubt, and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it's much more interesting to live not knowing than to have answers which might be wrong. I have approximate answers and possible beliefs and different degrees of certainty about different things. But I'm not absolutely sure of anything, and there are many things I don't know anything about, such as whether it means anything to ask why we're here, and what the question might mean. I might think about it a little bit; if I can't figure it out, then I go onto something else. But I don't have to know an answer. I don't feel frightened by not knowing things, by being lost in the mysterious universe without having any purpose, which is the way it really is, as far as I can tell -- possibly. It doesn't frighten me. [smiles]
I have to hope that what reason I have has done a good job filtering and weighing its inputs to reach a sound conclusion. If I try to justify my belief, I will surely succeed. It's one of my best things, as it is for everyone; rationalizing is our super power. Now I have to hope, as well, that my post-hoc justifications are everything they seem to be. — Srap Tasmaner
So, yes, I broadly agree with what you posted, Janus, but I reserve a bit of Humean horror that the foundations of my rationality are not themselves rational. — Srap Tasmaner
Chess provides a clear example, as usual: there's a saying among masters that the move you want to play is the right move, even if it seems impossible. This is intuition, and the idea is that careful analysis will justify your inclination, so some part of your mind must have zipped through that analysis without bothering to keep you informed... — Srap Tasmaner
Two people pass each other on the street; and according to one of the two people, an Andromedean space fleet has already set off on its journey, while to the other, the decision as to whether or not the journey will actually take place has not yet been made.
Yes. Note 'used by a speaker'. They are on that sense imbued with intentionality, namely, that of the speaker, to convey or represent something. — Wayfarer
...that kind of analysis is what is appropriate... — Wayfarer
Which states that:
In philosophy, intentionality is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. To say of an individual’s mental states that they have intentionality is to say that they are mental representations or that they have contents. — Wayfarer
Furthermore, to the extent that a speaker utters words from some natural language or draws pictures or symbols from a formal language for the purpose of conveying to others the contents of her mental states, these artifacts used by a speaker too have contents or intentionality.
Owned the first edition. Nothing whatever to do with the point at issue. — Wayfarer
...You've already suggested a couple of times that ChatGPT might possess intentionality, which in both cases, ChatGPT itself has rejected. — Wayfarer
Besides, when you mention neural networks or artificial intelligence, you do so precisely because of what they represent: you are saying that they represent the way in which physical systems are able to embody intentionality. So again your argument is recursive - you are imputing intentionality to those systems on the basis of your rational ability to draw reasoned conclusions, which is the very faculty that is in question. — Wayfarer
So I can't see how your proposed definition:
I think that only physical systems with outputs, that are about some aspect of their inputs have intentionality.
— wonderer1
squares with what is given in the SEP article. — Wayfarer
It was written – as our exchanges are written, Wayf – by deterministic nonlinear dynamic system-agents which reflexively confabulate ex post facto intentions-of-the-gaps. :sparkle: :eyes: — 180 Proof
I'm not convinced we know what is random versus that which is not random. We detect patterns, as far as human cognition allows and we ascribe characteristics to those patterns - again in human terms. But words like 'random' or 'accidental' seem to have emotional connotations and function as tips of icebergs. — Tom Storm
In computing, a hardware random number generator (HRNG) or true random number generator (TRNG) is a device that generates random numbers from a physical process, rather than by means of an algorithm. Such devices are often based on microscopic phenomena that generate low-level, statistically random "noise" signals, such as thermal noise, the photoelectric effect, involving a beam splitter, and other quantum phenomena. These stochastic processes are, in theory, completely unpredictable for as long as an equation governing such phenomena is unknown or uncomputable. This is in contrast to the paradigm of pseudo-random number generation commonly implemented in computer programs.
This TLS accelerator computer card uses a hardware random number generator to generate cryptographic keys to encrypt data sent over computer networks.
A hardware random number generator typically consists of a transducer to convert some aspect of the physical phenomena to an electrical signal, an amplifier and other electronic circuitry to increase the amplitude of the random fluctuations to a measurable level, and some type of analog-to-digital converter to convert the output into a digital number, often a simple binary digit 0 or 1. By repeatedly sampling the randomly varying signal, a series of random numbers is obtained.
Just because it's the only argument you're willing to consider doesn't mean it's the only argument or the main one. — T Clark
No worries. I guess where I was heading is that if animals have rudimentary intentionality, what does this say about a more evolved human version? Is intentionality just a hallmark of complexity (an idea mocked by many). — Tom Storm
Wayfarer argues that human rationality and intentionality is special. He's not the only one. Can we infer anything additional about this matter from understanding animal behaviour? — Tom Storm
Tiger got to hunt, bird got to fly;
Man got to sit and wonder 'why, why, why? '
Tiger got to sleep, bird got to land;
Man got to tell himself he understand.
I think consideration of the role of networks of neurons, and disregarding the molecular details on which the neurons supervene, is an appropriate level of looking at things for the purpose of this discussion
— wonderer1
It might be, were this a computer science or neuroscience forum. — Wayfarer
Philosophy has become in large part insular and self-referential. Written by philosophers for philosophers. With a specialized language designed only for the initiated, a cramped style of writing intended to ward off attack, overburdened by its own theory laden stranglehold on thinking and seeing, enamored by its linguistic prowess and the production of problems that only arise within this hermetically sealed sterile environment. It either laments the fact that it is regarded as irrelevant or takes this to be the sign of its superiority. — Fooloso4
The SEP entry would be a good starting point https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality — Wayfarer
OK then, give us a well-informed materialists' account of the significance of intentionality. — Wayfarer
As for whether output - written text - has any kind of ‘intentionality’, I would say, clearly not. Written text means nothing without being interpreted.
Do animals have intentionality? They seem to from my perspective. What does this add to the discussion? — Tom Storm
Question: In philosophy, 'intentionality' is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. Do AI systems such as ChatGPT possess this power?
ChatGPT: AI systems, including ChatGPT, do not possess intentionality in the same way that humans do. Intentionality is typically associated with consciousness and subjective experience, which are currently not attributes of AI systems.
Perhaps someday we will figure out how cooperation strategies were encoded into the biology that underlies our moral sense. But I do not expect that to happen soon. — Mark S
Which question, exactly? It starts with the presumption that we can arrive at true beliefs through reasoned inference, and then asks what must be the case in order for this to be so. — Wayfarer
