Yes. And my claim is that the idea of determinism is meaningless if prediction is not possible, even in theory. — T Clark
If consciousness is strictly a bodily function, we'd have to explain how it is that the body doesn't adapt, but the mind does. — frank
I don't pretend to really understand it, but if I am not misinformed, as jgill pointed out, from the standpoint of the ship, as you approach the speed of light, the distance traversed approaches zero and the time to cross it also approaches zero. It takes a million years for light to cross a gap of a million light years only for an observer stationary with respect to it. For the photon, no distance and no time. — petrichor
If, from the photon's perspective, there is zero distance between its origin and destination, maybe in some sense, rather than there being an actual photon crossing a distance, it is rather a matter of the two electrons on either end just interacting and transferring a quantum of energy from one to the other. One loses an energy level and the other gains one, maybe like a billiard ball transferring its energy to another ball. How it is determined which electron will interact with which other one halfway "across" the universe though is beyond me! It makes me wonder if we really understand what is going on with space and time at all. The model of a photon as a thing that passes through space works as a model, but maybe thinking about it like that gives the wrong intuition about what is actually happening. — petrichor
And it is the same dichotomistic logic down at the level of sensory receptors or enzymatic regulation. You have to be able to make a choice, and indeed not choose that in the most definite sense by doing its very opposite, to in fact have choices, and thus what we think of as creative agency or freewill. — apokrisis
So is my idea of ‘7’ different to yours? (Better not be, else it might be hard to do business.) — Wayfarer
So there is what Ned Block has characterized as the "Harder Problem of Consciousness." This speaks to Philosophim's point about experiencing other consciousnesses.. the problem as I understand it is: how can I know what it's like to be you, without actually being you. The physicalist rejoinder may be: well the brain stuff is the same, so the mental states must be the same.. but the brain stuff is only approximately the same, not exactly the same, and the difference in brain states means different mental states, and these mental states are simply not accessible to another, at least, not in an "experiential" way. — NotAristotle
In other words, what is it about this arrangement of physical matter and energy that allows consciousness, and how is it different from some other assortment of physical matter and energy that does not allow consciousness? That is, if we think consciousness arises from a physical substrata, what about that physical substrata gives rise to consciousness? — NotAristotle
However, there seems to be no reason Ned could choose not to follow the prediction... — NotAristotle
1. With sufficient information about Ned’s internal states and sufficient information about the surrounding environment, Ned’s immediate actions could be predicted.
2. There is sufficient information about Ned’s internal states and sufficient information about the surrounding environment.
3. Therefore, Ned’s immediate actions can be predicted. — NotAristotle
the concern is whether in principle, if this information were acquired, could Ned act in opposition to it. And the answer to that seems to be yes. — NotAristotle
Think of it this way, although a crude and oversimplified example, if you flick a domino to start a 1,000,000 domino chain of them hitting each other one-by-one, there is nothing it is like to be those dominos hitting each other. They just hit each other: they are unconscious.
An “unconscious experiencer”, like an AI, is just a more complex version of this: it is mechanical parts hitting each other or transferring this or that—it is quantitative through-and-through just like the domino’s hitting each other. There is nothing it is like to be an AI in the sense like there is something to be like a qualitative experiencer: qualia (in the sense of instances of qualitative experience) have a “special” property of there being something it is like to be it (or perhaps to have it). — Bob Ross
Yes, he has a deep understanding of the workings of biological organisms, and many clear thoughts. However, his speculative theory of biosemiotics is deficient for the reasons I described. When you study biosemiotics further, in the future, keep in mind the issue I mentioned, and now that it's been pointed out to you, it ought to become evident that it's a very real problem, indicating that biosemiotics is quite insufficient. — Metaphysician Undercover
I suppose we could stipulate that Ned has enough information about his immediate environment to make an accurate prediction about how he will act. It doesn't really concern us whether this sort of information can, as a matter of practicality, be acquired; the concern is whether in principle, if this information were acquired, could Ned act in opposition to it. And the answer to that seems to be yes. — NotAristotle
Now we take this utterly for granted. But it wasn't so until quite recently. That's the point, we are no longer bothered that we don't understand gravity intuitively, but are perfectly content with the theory and sometimes have trouble comprehending what this issue of understanding could even mean. Wasn't always this way. — Manuel
I take him to mean that "strong emergence" happens all the time. I don't see any intuitive (I'm not speaking of a theoretical account) reasoning that would get a rational human being to expect or not be surprised that liquid can emerge from what looks to me to be completely liquid-less particle, in isolation. — Manuel
Of course, we are then forced to say, that the particle is not liquid-less, it has the potential for liquidity in certain configurations. But I don't see how the end result of liquidity, is evident from the constituent parts. — Manuel
It all seems like an intentional distraction from the antagonisms existing in the real and political worlds. — jgill
But the issue is that if we do not sense the external world directly, but instead our senses are representational, our bodies themselves are also part of what is sensed, and therefore must themselves be representational. I see my hands, touch my head, hear myself speak. I may posit this phone I am typing on is a representation generated by my brain of a phone in the external world, but then so too must also be the hands I am holding it with - both are part of my visual field. And so the external world must not mean "the world beyond my body", but instead is a sort of radically skeptical hypothesis of a world that exists beyond the solipsistic representational bubble I inhabit. My body, being itself represented, must not have a brain doing the representing - a brain in the external world would be doing it. — Inyenzi
What evidence is there, that a space as described by you in that quote, exists outside of your imagination
— wonderer1
The definition of a vacuum. And the definition of spacetime. And the definition of object permanence and it's implications. — Benj96
The dimensions of matter are instrinsic to them. The distance between material is extrinsic to it. We wouldn't say what's the distance of an apple. We would say what are it's dimensions.
If there was no need to make distinctions why bother with different vernacular to describe them? — Benj96
Furthermore there is yet a another, a third form of space. The space nothing can occupy. The void. The vacuum. If it is occupied it is not a vacuum. It is the true absence of anything material or substantial. — Benj96
I have read some say it can be because what I am seeing is not a real screen, but some sort of brain generated fiction, a phantasm of my visual cortex. But this cannot be true because along with the screen I also see my body, which must therefore also be part of this fiction. And so the skepticism refutes itself. If all is phantasm, then so too are my observations of the functioning of sense organs. My eyes cannot give me accurate observations of how the sense organs function and yet also produce nothing but phantasm. What would be going on if looked in the mirror? The phantasm sees itself? — Inyenzi
Then the question would be, how many light years away? What we see may have happened eons ago. — jgill
We'll just be one more speck on a photo receptor. — BC
No, Mr Atwill was talking about the various clashes he has had with atheists such as Dr Richard Carrier, regarding the veracity of the content of his book. — universeness
Yeah, not many have had the chance to notice us. — ssu
↪wonderer1 ↪HanoverYou accuse me of a total crock and I can't be outraged!? You are a piece of ignorant treacherous garbage with no place here. — quintillus
Yes, everyone mistakenly thinks law is determinative...
Get hosed. — quintillus
You are going off half cocked, when you rush to inhumanely name me delusional, for knowing that law does not, cannot, act causally upon human beings. — quintillus
No one at all has an a priori responsibility to understand my writing, but, if you engage that writing, and engage me here regarding that writing, it is simply your responsibility to work toward comprehension — quintillus
I do not see law as a cause or as capable of causing persons to act or not act; although everyone else does. — quintillus
Nonetheless, it is the reader's responsibility to research and study whatever he cannot understand, until he does understand. — quintillus
Be careful when dealing with many, who claim to be atheists, they often make strange bedfellows with theists. — universeness
And when I say the things I've been saying it feels kinda wrong, in that I'm speaking from a position of privilege: the privilege of living in a liberal secular society that makes it too easy to take a contrarian anti-militant-atheist line. — Jamal