Mine is a perfectly reasonable paraphrasing of Plantinga’s argument. — Wayfarer

No. You seem confused, and are mixing bits of arguments against physicalism into your 'paraphrase'. The EAAN isn't an argument against mind/body physicalism.

On page 313 of Where the Conflict Really Lies Plantinga writes:

The basic idea of my argument could be put (a bit crudely) as follows. First, the probability of our cognitive faculties being reliable, given naturalism and evolution, is low. (To put it a bit inaccurately but suggestively, if naturalism and evolution were both true, our cognitive faculties would very likely not be reliable.) But then according to the second premise of my argument, if I believe both naturalism and evolution, I have a defeater for my intuitive assumption that my cognitive faculties are reliable. If I have a defeater for that belief, however, then I have a defeater for any belief I take to be produced by my cognitive faculties. That means that I have a defeater for my belief that naturalism and evolution are true. So my belief that naturalism and evolution are true gives me a defeater for that very belief; that belief shoots itself in the foot and is self-referentially incoherent; therefore I cannot rationally accept it. And if one can’t accept both naturalism and evolution, that pillar of current science, then there is serious conflict between naturalism and science.

Plantinga is not making an argument against physicalism. In fact Plantinga thinks everyone has a God detector organ. (Although sadly, yours and mine are broken.)

In Calvin's view, there is no reasonable non-belief:

"That there exists in the human mind and indeed by natural instinct, some sense of Deity [sensus divinitatis], we hold to be beyond dispute, since God himself, to prevent any man from pretending ignorance, has endued all men with some idea of his Godhead…. …this is not a doctrine which is first learned at school, but one as to which every man is, from the womb, his own master; one which nature herself allows no individual to forget.[2]"

Jonathan Edwards, the 18th-century American Calvinist preacher and theologian, claimed that while every human being has been granted the capacity to know God, a sense of divinity, successful use of these capacities requires an attitude of "true benevolence".[citation needed] Analytic philosopher Alvin Plantinga of the University of Notre Dame posits a similar modified form of the sensus divinitatis in his Reformed epistemology whereby all have the sense, only it does not work properly in some humans, due to sin's noetic effects.

If you have a Kindle, I can loan out my Kindle copy of the book so that you don't have to just pretend to know what you are talking about.

Again, it doesn't address the evolutionary argument against naturalism. He doesn't say that we're incapable of communicating, or that we can't convey information by speaking to one another. — Wayfarer

Plantinga doesn't consider the role of communication at all. That is what disqualifies his argument from serious consideration as an argument against naturalism.

The argument is that naturalism maintains that mental events such as beliefs are the result of natural (e.g. neurological) causes that can be explained by the principles of natural science (such as neurology) - in other words, instances of efficient causation, where one event (cause) brings about another event (effect) in accordance with physical or natural laws. In this view, mental states, including beliefs, are determined by physical processes in the brain, which are themselves the result of evolutionary pressures and biological mechanisms. Whereas, reasoned inference works by different principles, relying on the relationship between propositions where the truth of one proposition logically necessitates the truth of another. — Wayfarer

You are conflating other stuff with Plantinga's argument. It would probably be better for you to stick to quoting actual passages written by Plantinga, or start arguing for your own version and we can ignore Plantinga.

Your objection doesn’t address the argument. — Wayfarer

It addresses this gloss on your part:

Plantinga argues that if both naturalism and evolution are true, then the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable is low. — Wayfarer

If you want to provide a more fleshed out account of this aspect of Plantinga's argument, I'll address that. In the meantime...

As I said, Plantinga doesn't consider the role of communication among members of a social species in making his case. So Plantinga's claim is that:

P(R|N&E) is low
(I.e. the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable given naturalism and evolution is low.)

However, in order for Plantinga to address a scientifically informed position regarding the reliability of our cognitive faculties he needs to address a more complex scenario than he actually does. We can say that to be taken seriously Plantinga needs to address:

P(R|N&E&S)
(The probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable given naturalism and evolution and the evolution occured in a social species.)

However, in order to make that case Plantinga would need to establish that truth conveying communication occurring amongst members of the social species would do nothing to increase the reliability of the cognitive faculties of members of that species, as compared to being a feral member of the species without social interaction.

It's pretty ironic that an educator like Plantinga, needs to ignore the possibility of members of a social species educating each other and passing down culture, in order for his argument to superficially appear to work.

But you did say that Thomas Nagel... — Wayfarer

If you are going to claim that I said something, then please have the intellectual integrity to quote what I actually said, rather than make up stories of what I said to suit the narrative you are trying to gaslight people into believing.

Can you cite evidence from any version of the EAAN that considers evolution occurring within a social species? Can you recognize that failure to think through the implications of evolution occurring within a social species results in the failure of the EAAN to make the case it claims to?

Suppose evolution alone only resulted in something like a feral human child that you might barely call rational, but if the individual members of that species were raised in a culture with other members of the same species the result was members of that species going to the moon.

Where does Plantinga show any evidence of having considered the role of cuture?
— wonderer1

None of that is relevant, though. — Wayfarer

Sure it is relevant, if Plantinga hopes to do more than beat on a staw man account of naturalistic evolution.

Can you help Plantinga out, by explaining why the species under consideration is a social species for which generally communicating truths is of no more adaptive value than generally communicating falsehoods?

From the jacket cover of that title:

This intriguing line of argument raises issues of importance to epistemologists and to philosophers of mind, of religion, and of science. — Wayfarer

I agree the argument raises such issues, but that is a different matter than whether it merits being taken seriously as an argument against naturalism.

No, you said he was a crank. That is not a word I put in your mouth. — Wayfarer

So, an academically-qualified professor of philosophy, but Christian, therefore a crank, right? — Wayfarer

You asked a loaded question, insinuating that what is in bold is my thinking.

Anyway, the EAAN is a crank argument because it ignores many issues that were previously brought up in this thread.

Can you cite evidence from any version of the EAAN that considers evolution occurring within a social species? Can you recognize that failure to think through the implications of evolution occurring within a social species results in the failure of the EAAN to make the case it claims to?

Suppose evolution alone only resulted in something like a feral human child that you might barely call rational, but if the individual members of that species were raised in a culture with other members of the same species the result was members of that species going to the moon.

Where does Plantinga show any evidence of having considered the role of cuture?

Jeez! You guys get a room, will ya? — creativesoul

:razz:

So, an academically-qualified professor of philosophy, but Christian, therefore a crank, right? — Wayfarer

I didn't say anything about Plantinga being a Christian, and I'd like to hope you might want to refrain from putting words in my mouth like that. Do you think that you can?

Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism is a crank argument Do you think academically qualified professors of philosophy are somehow immune to being cranks?

Of course, if you want to argue for the EAAN I'd be happy to point out many ways that it is a crank argument.

It's very common for religious aplologists to engage in such propagandizing, and I'm done with biting my tongue when Wayfarer is doing it.
— wonderer1
Thank you for telling me. But I think I'll make up my own mind, if you don't mind. — Ludwig V

I wouldn't have it any other way. It seems as if you've taken something I said as suggesting otherwise, but if so, I don't understand what you interpreted that way.

Is there any chance Nagel's perspective is as scientifically well informed as that of anyone here?
— Patterner
If Nagel is not scientifically well informed, he is as well informed as me. In other respects also, I would very much like to be able to adopt Nagel's perspective. He's a much better philosopher than me. Yet I still disagree with many of his opinions, especially with regard to bats. — Ludwig V

I suppose I should have said "well informed in a way commensurate with the claims he makes". Nagel has fallen in with the cranks at the Discovery Institute, the crank Alvin Plantinga, etc. I don't see any reason to consider Nagel a better philosopher than you. How do you define better?

Language is a barrier unto itself, it is a performance, a recreation of the real in way that we hope are intelligible to others, it is not the real itself and therefore we can express the whole of what we feel and cracks begin to appear in our understanding. — Dorrian

Welcome to the forum.

I agree with a lot of what you say, but I'm not really understanding this. Should the "can" which I have highlighted be "can't"?

If so, what cracks in our understanding are you referring to?

I don't know how much science Nagel knows, but do you really mean to say that any perspective is not scientifically well-informed is not worth having? That's a very big assumption. — Ludwig V

I'm not saying that at all, I'm just pointing out that Nagel's perspective is not a scientifically well informed perspective, and that @Wayfarer tries to use Nagel's perspective to besmirch the perspective of people unlike Nagel.

It's very common for religious aplologists to engage in such propagandizing, and I'm done with biting my tongue when Wayfarer is doing it.

:halo:

Thomas Nagel has an interesting essay I often refer to, Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion. I've mentioned it a few times on the forum, it's generaly not well received, but I find it very insightful. (Nagel is not pushing a religious barrow, he's an avowed atheist but one with the chutzpah to call scientific materialism into question.) — Wayfarer

Thomas Nagel is a scientific ignoramus and doesn't have a perspective based on being scientifically well informed. Your attempts to smear scientifically informed people with Nagel's emotional issues amount to pushing propaganda on your part.

:up: Fascinating! This seems to confirm what I have always believed: that dogs are capable of deductive inferences, rational thought. — Janus

It occurred to me after you responded, that in that video we have a demonstration of Kahneman's fast and slow thinking occurring in a dog. (And literally fast and literally slow.)

Abiogenesis is simply a theory of how life came from non-life, what’s woo-woo about that ? It’s just a word for a type of process(es) that occurred 3.5 billions of years ago during the inception of life. How can it be supported by science when we’re not privy to the conditions and events that transformed non living matter to living one 3.5 billions of years ago.

In the absence of alternative theories abiogenesis is just a label of how life came from non-life. You may dismiss it as woo-woo but it still remains a valid theory although it doesn’t have the answers of exactly how life came about, you have the right to remain sceptical about it. — kindred

"Hypothesis" would be a more scientifically appropriate word to use than "theory" in the context of discussing abiogenesis.

Instinct and structure are all my dogs need to be so brilliant. — Fire Ologist

I don't know what you have in mind with "structure", and whether it is relevant to the following, but I don't think it reasonable to see what is shown below as merely a matter of instinct.

@Amity

Sorry it has taken me so long to respond. I suppose I was waiting for that question about metaphysical intuition to stop rattling around in my subconscious.

Perhaps not much of a hero worshipper? — Amity

Well, I'm certainly a hero appreciator, but I suppose not much of a worshipper in general.

Interesting to compare. For a quick understanding of the story, perhaps prose is better. It's more direct and not so much of a puzzle. However, it loses something of the compactness and the alliteration and kennings pulled me in at the start: — Amity

It is so interesting and mysterious, the effect that poetic elements seem to have on us.

I once got the following response to a sentence I had written on another forum, "Something about that sentence just makes it feel awesome when you read it out loud, especially the ending. Nice use of words wonderer."

My first thought was something like, "What??? How in the world did what I had said result in that sort of reaction?"

My sentence that was being responded to was, "I'm afraid "self" is too ambiguous a concept on physicalism to expect any clear cut quantification of the accuracy of self referential statements in all conceivable cases."

I had to look at what I had written to figure out that it was probably a matter of the alliteration, which it seems my subconscious had managed to work into the sentence, while consciously I was struggling to express something semantically complex in a succinct way, with no conscious consideration of how it would sound.

Long story short... I like alliteration as well, perhaps more than I know. :smile:

Anyway, back to metaphysical imagination...

I've come to the conclusion that I am intuitively epistemologically opposed to compartmentalizing imagination in such a way that it would make any sense to me to say, "This is metaphysical imagination and this is not." I suppose I see an important part of imagination as being a way of escaping the ruts of unimaginative thinking, and calling some imagination "metaphysical" seems likely to create the sort of boundaries to my thinking that I seek to escape via imagination.

Of course, you are welcome to inspire me to look at things differently. :wink:

Ah Gnomon, have you no sources of narcissistic supply outside of TPF?

Anyway, here's an article on pseudo philosophy:
https://psyche.co/ideas/pseudophilosophy-encourages-confused-self-indulgent-thinking:

An excerpt:

Epistemic unconscientiousness is an essential but not exhaustive component of pseudoscience. To count as pseudoscientific, a belief must also be about some scientific issue, and this is precisely where pseudoscience and pseudophilosophy differ. Just like pseudoscience, pseudophilosophy is defined by a lack of epistemic conscientiousness, but its subject matter is philosophical rather than scientific.

[Emphasis added]

Perhaps another issue worth considering in this thread is, do animals think critically? Do humans think critically? What percent of humans?

Is rationality the result of having culturally acquired skills that improve the reliability of one's thinking?

Why would they need to think exactly the same way we do in order to be considered rational? — Vera Mont

Perhaps "rational" is being equated with "the way I think"? (If only subconsciously.)

Perhaps the point is that uniqueness is not a particularly good basis for jumping to anaturalistic conclusions?

I do go on to suggest that is may be this kind of process that refined our reasoning too. Not sure if you got to that point or lost the will to live listening to me tripping over nearly every word I said — I like sushi

:lol:

If I was prone to losing the will to live in response to people struggling to articulate their thoughts, I'd have murdered myself a long time ago.

However, at the moment, the desire to maintain my social status as a responsible adult in the eyes of my coworkers is interfering with me watching more.

I've taken the time to watch the first six minutes and "embellishment" comes to mind as a pertinent word for what you are getting at.

And I would say yes, I think the human tendency towards embellishment has played a large role in the development of religious claims. I think we naturally develop subconscious recognition of the sorts of things that make stories more interesting, and this subconscious recognition tends to influence our storytelling whether we are conscious of it or not.

It seems plausible that in a culture without an understanding of a scientific method, and consequently with less recognition of the negative aspects of the human tendency to embellish, embellishment plays a particularly large role in the way beliefs get propagated.

Bart Ehrman's book, How Jesus Became God, goes into this with regards to the development of Christian beliefs.

The question is if intelligence is a property of matter or a thing in itself (which exists of its own) and acts on matter to make it come to life which is what actually happened as we are such intelligence. The other question is whether intelligence preceded the universe or even matter and is a fundamental function of existence itself. — kindred

I'd say there is a lot of good evidence for one option and no good evidence that I know of for the other.

Do you think there is any value in considering the matter with an eye towards what is well evidenced and what isn't?

Life could simply not have arisen, and it would have been far easier in terms of explanation if it hadn’t yet it did, which remains a mystery. — kindred

Well life exists on one planet in the universe and there is good reason to think that life doesn't exist in vastly more places than it does, and that really doesn't seem all that mysterious to me. I think you might find it a lot less mysterious with some study.

Little help?? — Mww

I was attempting to convey a contradiction to the following without using language. (With the irony of using an image with linguistic content thrown in for my own amusement I suppose.)

All representation of thought in humans is linguistic, whether vocal or otherwise. — Mww

So more straightforwardly, isn't a painting (generally) a non-linguistic representation of human thought?

All representation of thought in humans is linguistic, whether vocal or otherwise. — Mww

The chemical component of past trouble concerns me. That does not seem fair to me. A bad experience is bad enough, but to live with it our whole lives just isn't fair. — Athena

And relevant to the thread title, what does an inability to live life free from the effects of such scars say about free will?

Hum, do other animals laugh? — Athena

I've gotten the impression that pigs, at least when young, have a sense of humor. (A mother pig with a litter of piglets, not so much.)

Looks like a republic/democrat divide. — Athena

:rofl:

That's good to know. Years ago, I was part of a team that taught an interdisciplinary course for psychology students. Intelligence was part of the programme and I got to give a lecture on it. I did my best with them, but most of them stuck to the party line - I couldn't criticize them for that. But perhaps I did contribute in a small way to that change — Ludwig V

:up:

For the record, I'm extremely dubious about the construct "g", but happy to think about more specific skills, with some reservations about "problem-solving ability" - surely much will depend on the kind of problem? — Ludwig V

Yeah "g" is a simplistic/expedient way of treating the subject, and there is much diversity to the way individuals go about solving problems that is not captured with attempts to measure g.

Unfortunately, testing to develop a more fine grained understanding of an individual's cognitive strengths and weaknesses (such as the WAIS test) is much more involved and requires a lot of one on one interaction between the individual conducting the test and the test taker. (Although I suppose soon computers might be able to take over a lot of what a human conducting such a test does.)

Perhaps it is worth pointing out, that most psychologists probably strongly agree with your view on "g".

Wallace believed that natural selection could not fully explain these advanced cognitive faculties because they seemed disproportionate to the practical demands of survival in hunter-gatherer societies. He speculated that some form of higher intelligence or spiritual intervention might be responsible for these traits, which led to a divergence from Charles Darwin, who maintained that natural selection alone could account for the full spectrum of human abilities (see his Darwinism Applied to Man). — Wayfarer

Can you cite Darwin claiming that natural selection alone can account for the full spectrum of human abilities? After all, Darwin recognized distinctions in selective processes such as sexual selection and artificial selection.

Wallace argued that certain uniquely human traits—such as higher reasoning, artistic creativity, complex language, mathematical and abstract thought—seemed to far exceed what would have been necessary for survival in the early human environment. — Wayfarer

The social environment has always been a very significant component of the human environment, and higher reasoning, artistic creativity, complex language, mathematical and abstract thought facilitate thriving in human social environments.

Perhaps those with the ARHGAP11B mutation, with so much brain power to spare for making music and wooing the ladies, were just much sexier than those without?

I'm not here to win a contest for my knowledge of philosophy. At present I am discussing matters of psychology.
— wonderer1

Probably just as well ;-) — Wayfarer

And probably just as well that you realize that your knowledge of philosophy doesn't make you particularly insightful into other people's psychology, or sadly, even your own.

As you noted, materialistic Science is OK with the notion of Potential in cases where the before & after can be measured, in theory. For example, a AA battery is rated for 1.5 volts, but that future current is imaginary in the sense that it cannot be measured until a hypothetical circuit is completed by some external Cause. So, what is rated is unreal Potential*1 instead of real Actual voltage. — Gnomon

You are once again demonstrating that you don't understand the things you are making claims about. You seemingly don't understand the distinction between electrical voltage and electrical current.

Ironically, the Potential of a physical battery refers to something physically non-existent, hence literally Metaphysical : knowable only by Reason, not by Senses*2. — Gnomon

Umm, we call the sensors used to measure Voltage... ...wait for it... ..."Voltmeters".

You flatter yourself. You evince no evidence of learning in philosophy beyond a smattering of popular neuroscience. — Wayfarer

I'm not here to win a contest for my knowledge of philosophy. At present I am discussing matters of psychology.

Can a forum be a good place for people struggling to be accepted and maybe even appreciated? — Athena

Absolutely.

Can we make the world a better place in small ways?

Sure. In light of Trump's presidency and candidacy, taking an opportunity to promote recognition of narcissism might be one small way.

Anyway, I think our pragmatic concerns are too different for us to reach aggreement anytime soon.

That's what I've been arguing for, and also, why is it that it seems such a hard thing to grasp. Apparently that makes me a pathological narcissist... — Wayfarer

This is straw manning/gaslighting. No one has claimed that arguing for human exceptionalism is associated with narcissism. Gaslighting however, is strongly associated with narcissism.

It's patterns to your behavior which I have observed over the course of the last year and a half, including observations of your responses to deliberate probing on my part, that result in me recognizing the narcisstic pattern to your thinking. For example, things I have said to you, that I would expect to result in a raging response if directed towards a grandiose narcissist, have coincided with you taking long breaks from the forum. Such behavior on your part fits the characteristics of covert narcissism, rather than grandiose narcissism.

However, I don't want to layout all the evidence, and those interested in developing a recognition of the pattern can look into it for themselves.

...although of course I don't possess the insight to see it. — Wayfarer

Also characteristic of narcissists.

I knew that but I thought you might think about what you said if I responded as though you were addressing me. — Athena

I see, and appreciate the compassion behind your response.

I do think about what I say, and try to tailor the things I say to the individual that I am speaking to, rather than attempt to have a 'one size fits all' way of speaking to people.

One aspect of that is understanding that there are people with personality disorders who exhibit very sterotypical behavior patterns that can be recognized. Some categories of personality disorders are narcissistic personality disorder, antisocial personality disorder (colloquially psychopathy), and borderline personality disorder. I've had experience interacting with people with all three of those conditions, and I've done some study of psychological perspectives on all three of those conditions.

As food for thought... Although you haven't provided very detailed information on your recent interactions with your sister, I think it might be beneficial for you to investigate borderline personality disorder and what is referred to as "splitting" in the case of someone with borderline personality disorder, and see if it rings any bells.

I think to have the meaningful discussions we all want in this special forum, we need to feel safe and when we are made the subject of a post and criticized for all to see, we might not feel safe. — Athena

My thinking is influenced by things discussed by M. Scott Peck in the book The Different Drum: Community Making and Peace, not least of which is Peck's discussion of the toxic effect on communities that people with personality disorders often have.

I guess you'd need to make a better case against calling out narcissism when the evidence for it is overwhelming, in order for me to think that it is not worthwhile to do so. (Not to say that it is likely to be of any benefit to the narcissist herself, but that is a different matter than what is of benefit to a community.)

I could say that my air conditioner uses its thermostat to sense the temperature and then desires to cool the house so it rationally engages the air conditioner until the house reaches the system’s desired temperature.

Or I could just say it’s all a system of stimuli and responses with no inner life, self-awareness, decision-making capability or rational capability.

We could say the same thing about animals. — Fire Ologist

One problem with this is, that when you look at the mechanisms enabling the behavior of a thermostat and the behavior of an animal, that of the animal is vastly more complex than that of a thermostat. Furthermore, what enables the behavior of most animals (and in particular mammals) has a substantial degree of similarity to what enables our behavior.

Like us, animals have brains composed of complex neural networks, which enable complex responses. Based on such physiological similarities, I would think it naive at best, to be dismissive of the possibility of cognitive similarities.